(G.R. Nos. 131926 & 138991. June 18, 2003) : Decision

[G.R. Nos. 131926 & 138991.
June 18, 2003]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. MICHAEL U.

PAGALASAN alias Mike, RONNIE CABALO alias Romy, ALADIN
CABALO, FERDINAND CORTEZ, a JOHN DOE identified only as
FERNANDO, and a PETER DOE identified only as
Bong, accused.
MICHAEL U. PAGALASAN alias Mike, appellant.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is an automatic review of the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
[1]
General Santos City, Branch 35, convicting appellant Michael U. Pagalasan of

two counts of kidnapping for ransom of George Lim and his 10-year-old son
Christopher Neal Lim and sentencing him to double death.
The Antecedents
The Spouses George and Desiree Lim and their three young children, one
of whom was 10-year-old Christopher Neal Lim, resided at Villa Consuelo
Subdivision, General Santos City.The spouses hired a security guard,
Ferdinand Cortez, from the Valiant Security Agency to provide security
services to the family. On September 4, 1994, at 11:00 p.m., the spouses and
their children were in the masters bedroom watching television. The couples
housemaid, Julita Sarno, was in the kitchen. She heard knocks on the kitchen
door. Thinking that it was Ferdinand, she opened the door. Four men, about
55 to 56 tall, each armed with handguns, two of whom were holding hand
grenades, barged into the kitchen. The four intruders wore bonnets over their
faces. With them was Ferdinand, whose hands were tied behind his
back. When asked by the masked men where her employers were, Julita
responded that they were in their bedroom. On orders of the intruders, she
knocked on the bedroom door. When Georges daughter opened the door,
three of the masked men barged into the room, while the fourth masked man
remained in the sala of the house. The three masked men shouted to George
[2]
and Desiree: Walang mangyayari sa inyo basta ibigay ninyo ang kailangan

namin. (Nothing will happen to you provided you give us what we want.) They
[3]
ransacked the house, getting cash and valuables. The masked men gave
Desiree a handwritten note, and dragged George and Christopher Neal Lim
[4]
out of the bedroom through the sala to the garage, where Georges Nissan car
was parked for the night. George saw Ferdinand in the sala with his hands
tied behind his back. One of the masked men ordered George to hand over
the key to his vehicle, to board the car and occupy the back seat along with
Christopher. Father and son did as they were told. Two of the masked men
positioned themselves on either side of George and Christopher. The third
man drove the car, while the fourth sat on the passengers seat beside the
driver. The car cruised along the national highway. When the car was nearing
the Gambalan Kitchenette, George and Christopher were blindfolded. The
masked men told them that they would be brought to Polomolok. After about
fifteen minutes, the car stopped at Sitio Tupi. The two men who were seated
at the back and the masked man seated beside the driver alighted from the
car, bringing Christopher with them. George was transferred to the front seat
beside the driver. George was told that he would be transported to Maasim.
In the meantime, SPO2 Federico Pao, the duty officer of Police Precinct
No. 2, received a radio report that George Lim and his son Christopher had
been kidnapped. Police investigators were dispatched to the Lim residence to
conduct an on-the-spot investigation. They brought Ferdinand and Julita to the
police station for investigation. SPO2 Renato Daga-as, SPO2 Datur
Villanueva and SPO1 Alimuddin Timbao were directed to establish a mobile
checkpoint at the intersection of the national highway and a dirt road (Espina
Road). The three policemen boarded a Tamaraw mobile car and parked it at
the said intersection. At about thirty meters from the checkpoint, the masked
driver of the Nissan vehicle saw the police car.Instead of running the car
through the checkpoint, the driver stopped and switched off its headlights. He
removed his bonnet and Georges blindfold, warning the latter not to make any
false move. George looked at the driver, who turned out to be the appellant
Michael Pagalasan.
The three police officers approached the car. Daga-as went to the right
side of the car beside the passenger seat, while Villanueva went to the left
side, near the drivers seat. For his part, Timbao proceeded to the cars rear
end. Daga-as and Villanueva identified themselves to George and Michael as
police officers on the lookout for a certain George Lim and his son who had
been kidnapped in General Santos City. Daga-as inquired from George what
his name was, and George replied that he was Albert Lim. The driver
identified himself as Michael Pagalasan. George gave a false first name
because he was afraid Michael might shoot him. Daga-as noticed that
Georges fingers were trembling. Villanueva knocked at the door on the drivers
side, and tried to open the same, but it was locked. When Michael himself
opened the door, Villanueva pulled him out of the vehicle and brought him to
the mobile car. Michael was suddenly in the custody of the policemen. George
then identified himself as one of the kidnapped victims. He also told the
policemen that his son was still with the other kidnappers. The policemen
thereafter searched the Nissan car and found a .38 caliber handgun with six
[5]
live bullets in its chamber and a grenade under the drivers seat. The
[6] [7]
policemen brought Michael and George to the police station where Ferdinand
was being interrogated by police investigators. Ferdinand told George that he
had nothing to do with the kidnapping, but before he could explain further, he
was whisked into the investigation room. After giving a sworn statement to the
police investigator, George was allowed to go home. Desiree gave George the
handwritten letter earlier given to her by the kidnappers before they left the
house that evening. In the letter, the spouses were warned not to coordinate
with the military, nor to take any action in connection with the kidnapping
without their knowledge or consent. They were also informed that the
malefactors would communicate with the couple, whether by letter or through
the telephone only through MUBARAK II or 2. Julita executed an affidavit in
[8]
connection with the kidnapping. [9]
Police Inspector Antonio Evangelista ordered SPO4 Recio Aniversario to

conduct a custodial investigation on Michael. Recio asked Michael if he
wanted to execute an affidavit, and Michael replied that he was going to
execute one. The police investigator inquired if he knew of any lawyer, to
which Michael replied in the negative. The police investigator then suggested
Atty. Tomas C. Falgui, a private practitioner, as his counsel. When Michael
agreed, the police investigator phoned the lawyer, requesting the latter to
assist Michael while undergoing custodial investigation. The lawyer agreed
and forthwith proceeded to the police station. Michael gave his confession
under custodial investigation with the assistance of Atty. Falgui.
[10]
In his confession, Michael admitted that upon orders of Ronnie Cabalo, he

and three other men, Aladin (Ronnies brother), a Muslim known as Ferdinand,
and Bong (a resident of Purok Islam), had kidnapped George and his son
Christopher. Ronnie Cabalo instructed Michael to use Georges vehicle to
transport father and son to the banana plantation where Aladin, Ferdinand
and Boy would alight with Christopher, and to thereafter return George to his
house. Aladin had given him a handgun for his use. Ferdinand Cortez was in
cahoots with them. He was at first reluctant to obey Ronnie, but relented when
he was told not to be afraid and to use the grenade in case of trouble. George
told him that he had already given money to Aladin, and that Michaels
companions had taken some pieces of jewelry from him and his wife before
they left the Lim residence.
In the light of Michaels confession, farmer Hadji Aladin Malang Cabalo,
Ronie Puntuan and Fernando Quizon were arrested and detained at Camp
Fermin Lira Barracks, General Santos City. In the meantime, on September 6,
1994, George received another handwritten letter, ordering the release of
Michael and Ronie Puntuan because they were innocent, and
demanding P3,000,000 for Christophers release. [11]
On September 9, 1994, George received another handwritten letter dated

September 9, 1994, this time from MUBARAK II or 2 informing him and his
wife that the kidnappers did not want the military to be involved nor innocent
people to be prejudiced. The spouses were also warned that their son would
not be released alive unless Ronie Puntuan was freed in three days. On the
[12]
same day at 3:25 p.m., Ronie Puntuan, through counsel, filed a motion with
the MTC praying that he be transferred from the Camp Fermin Lira Barracks
to the General Santos City Jail.
[13]
In the morning of the following day, September 10, 1994, Christopher was
rescued by policemen without any ransom being paid. On September 13,
1994, George executed a sworn statement relating to the incidents that
happened from September 4, 1994 to September 10, 1994. [14]
Michael was charged with kidnapping for ransom and violation of PD 1866
before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of General Santos City. [15]
During the initial stage of the preliminary investigation by the MTC on

September 6, 1994, Atty. Falgui appeared as Michaels counsel and testified
on what transpired immediately before, during and after the custodial
investigation, including Michaels execution of his extrajudicial confession.
Michael was also placed on the witness stand and, with the assistance of
[16]
counsel, testified on his extrajudicial confession. He affirmed the veracity of

the contents of the said confession. Subsequently, Michael, through his
[17]
mother, secured the services of Atty. Emmanuel V. Fontanilla. On September

12, 1994, Michael executed an affidavit withdrawing his September 5, 1994
extrajudicial confession, in which he stated that: (a) he was not assisted by
counsel of his own choice when he executed the extrajudicial confession; and
(b) Ronie Puntuan, who was arrested and detained, was not Ronnie Cabalo.
Michael also executed a counter-affidavit where he denied the accusations
[18]
against him, and clarified that he was forced and intimidated into making his
September 5, 1994 confession, and he was not provided with counsel of his
own choice during custodial investigation. His constitutional rights under
custodial investigation were allegedly not sufficiently explained to him. He [19]
filed the said affidavits with the MTC during the preliminary investigation.
On September 23, 1994, the MTC issued a resolution finding probable
cause for charging the accused with kidnapping for ransom. The Office of the
City Prosecutor conducted a reinvestigation of the case. On October 4, 1994,
the Office of the City Prosecutor issued a resolution ordering the release of
Hadji Aladin Malang Cabalo on the ground that he was not the Aladin Cabalo
referred to by Michael in his confession. [20]
An Information for violation of PD 1866 was filed against Michael on

October 17, 1994 with the Regional Trial Court of General Santos City,
Branch 22, docketed as Criminal Case No. 11062. On November 3, 1994,
Michael, Ronnie Cabalo, Aladin Cabalo, Ferdinand Cortez, a certain John Doe
identified as Fernando, and Peter Doe were charged with kidnapping for
ransom in an Information, docketed as Criminal Case No. 11098, which reads:
That on or about September 4, 1994, in General Santos City, Philippines, within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, conspiring, and confederating
together and mutually helping each other, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously kidnap George Lim, and his ten-year-old son, Christopher Neal Lim, for
the purpose of extorting ransom from the said victims.[21]
The cases were raffled to Branch 22 of the Regional Trial Court. When

arraigned in Criminal Case No. 11062 for Violation of PD 1866, Michael
pleaded not guilty. On February 6, 1995, Michael, Ferdinand and Fernando
Quizon were arraigned in Criminal Case No. 11098 and pleaded not guilty.
Ronnie Cabalo and Aladin Cabalo remained at-large. On August 24, 1995,
[22]
the judge hearing the cases inhibited himself. Both cases were re-raffled,
assigned to, and were tried jointly by Branch 35 of the Regional Trial Court.
During the trial, Michael, through counsel, admitted the truth of the
contents of the affidavit executed by Julita Sarno. Michael also executed an
[23]
affidavit on December 5, 1995 alleging inter alia that he was forced at

gunpoint by Boy and Aladin to barge into the Lim residence and drive the
latters car, and that he did not know Fernando Quizon. After the prosecution
[24]
had presented all its witnesses, it filed a formal offer of its documentary
evidence including Michaels December 15, 1995 Sworn Statement and his
confession. Michael did not file any comment or opposition to the said
[25]
offer. On May 3, 1996, the trial court issued an order admitting the
prosecutions documentary evidence, including Michaels confession. After [26]
the prosecution had rested its case, Fernando Quizon filed a demurrer to
evidence in Criminal Case No. 11098. On July 2, 1996, the court issued an
order granting the demurrer to evidence of the said accused and acquitted
him of the charge.[27]
The Defense and Evidence of the Accused
Ferdinand Cortez denied kidnapping George and Christopher. He testified

that he had been employed as a security guard by the Valiant Security
Agency. He was assigned by the agency to protect George Lim and his
family. On the evening of September 4, 1994, Ferdinand was washing
Georges car in the garage. The house was surrounded by a 10-foot wall, and
the gate was locked. Ferdinand was shocked when masked men, armed with
handguns, suddenly arrived. They poked their guns at him, maltreated him,
and tied his hands behind his back. The masked men knocked at the door of
the house and when the housemaid Julita Sarno opened it, the men dragged
Ferdinand towards the entrance, to make it appear that he was the one
knocking. The masked men then barged into the sala and tied Julitas
hands. Ferdinand claimed he never met any of the kidnappers before
September 4, 1994. He was puzzled why he was being implicated in the case.
For his part, Michael testified that he was a Muslim, 19 years of age, and
an elementary school graduate. He made a living as a conductor of his uncles
jeepney. At night, the jeepney was parked in Tambler, and it was where he
usually slept. On the evening of September 4, 1994, at about 9:00 p.m., he
was in their house at Purok Islam public market, General Santos City. His
friend Bong arrived, and invited him for a stroll and to accompany the latter to
get a motorcycle. Michael agreed. They took a tricycle and arrived at the Villa
Consuelo Subdivision.Michael was surprised when the tricycle stopped near
the gate of the Lim residence and masked men suddenly appeared, poking
their guns at him. Bong fled, leaving Michael alone to fend for himself. The
masked men ordered Michael to drive a car, and warned him that if he
refused, he would be killed. Momentarily, one of the men emerged from the
house, with George Lim in tow. George gave the key to his Nissan car to one
of the kidnappers, who in turn handed it over to Michael. The men forced
George and his son Christopher to board the car. Father and son were seated
between two masked men. Afraid for his life, Michael was forced to drive the
car with one of the kidnappers pointing a gun at him, seated to his right at the
passengers side. The kidnappers ordered Michael to drive the car towards the
direction of Barangay Ligaya.
When the car reached a dark portion of the road in Barangay Ligaya, three
of the men alighted, bringing Christopher with them. Michael then pleaded to
George to bring him first to Tambler, where the jeepney of his uncle was
parked. Michael wanted to sleep there instead of going home. George agreed,
and drove the car himself through Barangay Makar. George told Michael that
they had to travel along Espina road, a dirt road, instead of the regular road
because they might encounter policemen, and Christopher might be killed by
his kidnappers.However, the car had to stop at the intersection of the national
highway and Espina Road when George saw policemen and the mobile police
car parked at the intersection.
Michael was arrested by the police, blindfolded, and brought to the mobile
car where he was also mauled. His head was banged against the sides of the
mobile car. At the precinct, Michael was mauled anew by the policemen. It
was only after he had given his statement to a police investigator that Atty.
Falgui arrived and told Michael, I am your lawyer. Atty. Falgui instructed
[28]
Michael to tell the whole truth. When his mother Camaria Opong visited him,
[29]
he told her that he had been blindfolded and mauled at the station, and that
because of this, his body ached. She saw a big hump in his head. On
September 8, 1994, she secured the services of Atty. Fontanilla as counsel of
her son. The lawyer went to the City Jail and talked to Michael. Michael
showed the lawyer the contusions and bruises on his body, and the scratches
on his neck. Michael told the lawyer that he had been maltreated by an inmate
at the detention cell. He also narrated that he knew nothing about the
kidnapping and that he was only hired by somebody to drive a car. Michael
assured the lawyer that he was not aware of the purpose of the culprits in
kidnapping George and Christopher. On September 9, 1994, Atty. Fontanilla
executed an affidavit reiterating the information Michael conveyed to him. On
[30]
September 16, 1994, Michael filed an urgent motion for medical check-up,
which the court granted.[31]
Dra. Virginia Ramirez, Officer-In-Charge of the City Integrated Health

Services, examined Michael on September 22, 1994 and found him suffering
from myalgia residual or muscle pains due to mauling, which she surmised
took place about one week to ten days before the examination. She issued a
medical certificate of the said examination.[32]
On September 24, 1997, the trial court rendered judgment acquitting

Ferdinand Cortez and convicting Michael of kidnapping for ransom, the
decretal portion of which reads:
JUDGMENT
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the accused is hereby sentenced as follows:

In Criminal Case No. 11062 for failure of the prosecution to prove the accusation
against the accused Michael Pagalasan beyond reasonable doubt, he is hereby
ACQUITTED of the crime charged.
In Criminal Case No. 11098, the accused Michael Pagalasan is hereby found guilty of
the crime of kidnapping for ransom as defined and penalized under Article 267 as
amended by Section 8 of Republic Act 7659, and there being no modifying
circumstance to consider, he is sentenced to suffer the EXTREME PENALTY OF
DEATH insofar as the case of George Lim is concerned.
The same penalty of death shall also be imposed against Michael Pagalasan in the
case of Christopher Neal Lim who was kidnapped on the same occasion and was
released only on the sixth day after his captivity.
The case of Ferdinand Cortez, for lack of sufficient evidence to convict him, he is
hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged.
SO ORDERED. [33]
The trial court ruled in Criminal Case No. 11098 that with or without the
confession of Michael, the prosecution adduced proof beyond reasonable
doubt that he, in conspiracy with three others, kidnapped George and
Christopher. It found the testimony of George straightforward and positive,
credible and entitled to full probative weight. The trial court sentenced Michael
to double death on its finding that he and his cohorts kidnapped George and
Christopher for the purpose of extorting ransom. It disbelieved Michaels
confession implicating Ferdinand Cortez, and acquitted the latter for failure of
the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The trial court
likewise acquitted Michael in Criminal Case No. 11062.
Michael, now the appellant, asserts that:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT

FOR THE CRIME OF KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM OF CHRISTOPHER NEAL
LIM DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT
FOR THE CRIME OF KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM OF ONE GEORGE LIM
WITHOUT ANY BASIS IN FACT AND IN LAW.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE DEFENSE

INTERPOSED BY THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT AND IN GIVING CREDENCE
TO THE INCONSISTENT TESTIMONY OF GEORGE LIM. [34]
The appellant is guilty of

kidnapping Christopher
under Article 267 of the
Revised Penal Code.
On the first assignment of error, the appellant avers that the prosecution
failed to prove his guilt beyond cavil of doubt for the crime of kidnapping
Christopher. Georges testimony that the gun and hand grenade were found
[35]
in the car, under the seat beside the driver is inconsistent with his own
statement before the police investigator that the said gun and grenade were
found in the appellants possession; hence, the testimony of George is
incredible and barren of probative weight. The case for the prosecution was
enfeebled by its failure to present Christopher to testify on his kidnapping and
to corroborate the testimony of his father. The failure of the prosecution to
present Christopher as a witness raised the presumption that if he had been
so presented, he would have testified on matters adverse to the
prosecution. For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General contends that the
testimony of George, its principal witness, as well as those of its other
witnesses, is sufficient to prove, beyond reasonable doubt, that the appellant
conspired with three others in kidnapping Christopher for ransom. There was
no need for the prosecution to present Christopher to testify on his
kidnapping, as his testimony would be merely corroborative of his fathers
account of events.
The contention of the appellant is barren of merit.
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act No.
7659 reads:
ART. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. Any private individual who shall
kidnap or detain another, or in any other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetuato death:
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days.
2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.
3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped
or detained, or if threats to kill him shall have been made.
4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the accused is
any of the parents, female, or a public officer.
The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed for the
purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person, even if none of the
circumstances above-mentioned were present in the commission of the offense.
When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped, or is

subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed. (As
amended by RA No. 7659).
For the accused to be convicted of kidnapping, the prosecution is

burdened to prove beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of the crime,
namely: (a) the offender is a private individual; (b) he kidnaps or detains
another, or in any manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (c) the act of
detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and (d) in the commission of the
offense any of the following circumstances is present: (1) the kidnapping or
detention lasts for more than three days; (2) it is committed by simulating
public authority; (3) any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person
kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made; or (4) the person
kidnapped or detained is a minor, female, or a public officer. If the victim of
[36]
kidnapping and serious illegal detention is a minor, the duration of his

detention is immaterial. Likewise, if the victim is kidnapped and illegally
detained for the purpose of extorting ransom, the duration of his detention is
immaterial.
The essential elements for this crime is the deprivation of liberty of the
victim under any of the above-mentioned circumstances coupled with
indubitable proof of intent of the accused to effect the same. There must be a
[37]
purposeful or knowing action by the accused to forcibly restrain the victim

coupled with intent. [38]
Judge Learned Hand once called conspiracy the darling of the modern
prosecutors nursery. There is conspiracy when two or more persons agree to
[39]
commit a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy as a mode of incurring

[40]
criminal liability must be proven separately from and with the same quantum
of proof as the crime itself. Conspiracy need not be proven by direct
evidence. After all, secrecy and concealment are essential features of a
successful conspiracy. Conspiracies are clandestine in nature. It may be
inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during and after the
commission of the crime, showing that they had acted with a common
purpose and design. Paraphrasing the decision of the English Court
[41]
in Regina v. Murphy, conspiracy may be implied if it is proved that two or

[42]
more persons aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment of the same
unlawful object, each doing a part so that their combined acts, though
apparently independent of each other, were, in fact, connected and
cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association and a concurrence
of sentiment. To hold an accused guilty as a co-principal by reason of
[43]
conspiracy, he must be shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or

furtherance of the complicity. There must be intentional participation in the
[44]
transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose.
[45]
The United States Supreme Court in Braverman v. United States, held [46]
that the precise nature and extent of the conspiracy must be determined by
reference to the agreement which embraces and defines its objects. For one
thing, the temporal dimension of the conspiracy is of particular
importance. Settled as a rule of law is that the conspiracy continues until the
object is attained, unless in the meantime the conspirator abandons the
conspiracy or is arrested. There is authority to the effect that the conspiracy
ends at the moment of any conspirators arrest, on the presumption, albeit
rebuttable, that at the moment the conspiracy has been thwarted, no other
overt act contributing to the conspiracy can possibly take place, at least as far
as the arrested conspirator is concerned. The longer a conspiracy is deemed
[47]
to continue, the greater the chances that additional persons will be found to
have joined it. There is also the possibility that as the conspiracy continues,
there may occur new overt acts. If the conspiracy has not yet ended, then the
hearsay acts and declarations of one conspirator will be admissible against
the other conspirators and one conspirator may be held liable for substantive
crimes committed by the others. [48]
Each conspirator is responsible for everything done by his confederates

which follows incidentally in the execution of a common design as one of its
probable and natural consequences even though it was not intended as part
of the original design. Responsibility of a conspirator is not confined to the
[49]
accomplishment of a particular purpose of conspiracy but extends to collateral

acts and offenses incident to and growing out of the purpose intended.
Conspirators are held to have intended the consequences of their acts and
[50]
by purposely engaging in conspiracy which necessarily and directly produces

a prohibited result that they are in contemplation of law, charged with
intending the result. Conspirators are necessarily liable for the acts of
[51]
another conspirator even though such act differs radically and substantively
from that which they intended to commit. The Court agrees with the ruling of
[52]
the Circuit Court of Appeals (Second District) per Judge Learned Hand
in United States v. Peoni that nobody is liable in conspiracy except for the
[53]
fair import of the concerted purpose or agreement as he understood it; if later

comers change that, he is not liable for the change; his liability is limited to the
common purpose while he remains in it. Earlier, the Appellate Court of
Kentucky in Gabbard v. Commonwealth held that:
[54]
The act must be the ordinary and probable effect of the wrongful acts specifically
agreed on, so that the connection between them may be reasonably apparent, and not a
fresh and independent project of the mind of one of the confederates, outside of or
foreign to the common design, and growing out of the individual malice of the
perpetrator.
Equally persuasive is the pronouncement of the Circuit Court of Appeals

(Second District) in United States v. Crimms, that it is never permissible to
[55]
enlarge the scope of the conspiracy itself by proving that some of the
conspirators, unknown to the rest, have done what was beyond the
reasonable intendment of the common understanding. This is equally true
when the crime which the conspirators agreed upon is one of which they
severally might be guilty though they were ignorant of the existence of some
of its constitutive facts. Also, while conspirators are responsible for
consequent acts growing out of the common design they are not for
independent acts growing out of the particular acts of individuals. [56]
In this case, the evidence on record inscrutably shows that the appellant
and his three cohorts were armed with handguns; two of them had hand
grenades, and all of them had masks over their faces. They gained entry into
the Lim residence after overpowering the security guard Ferdinand and the
housemaid Julita, and tying their hands behind their backs. One of the
masked men remained in the sala, while the three others barged into the
bedroom of George and Desiree, and kidnapped George and his ten-year-old
son Christopher. The appellant and his cohorts forced father and son to board
Georges car. The appellant drove the car, dropped off Christopher and his
cohorts at Sitio Tupi, and drove on with George in the car towards the
direction of Maasim.
The collective, concerted and synchronized acts of the appellant and his
cohorts before, during and after the kidnapping constitute indubitable proof
that the appellant and his three companions conspired with each other to
attain a common objective: to kidnap George and Christopher and detain
them illegally. The appellant was a principal by direct participation in the
kidnapping of the two victims.
The trial court found the testimony of George straightforward and positive,
and entitled to credit and full probative weight. The legal aphorism is that the
[57]
findings of facts of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of witnesses
and of their probative weight, its conclusions anchored on its findings are
accorded high respect by the appellate court, if not conclusive effect, because
of the unique advantage of the trial court of observing at close range the
demeanor, conduct and deportment of witnesses as they regale the trial court
with their testimonies. It is true that the appellate court is not bound by the
[58]
findings and conclusions of the trial court if the latter ignored, misunderstood,
misapplied or misinterpreted cogent facts and circumstances, which, if
considered, would change the outcome of the case. This ruling, however, is
[59]
inapplicable in the case at bar, since the appellant failed to establish that the
trial court erred in this wise.
George testified that when the policemen found the gun and
grenade inside his car, the appellant was already at the police station.
[60]
However, in his September 13, 1994 Affidavit, George stated that the
[61] [62]
policemen found the gun when the appellant was frisked, while the grenade
was spotted under the passengers seat, beside the driver. This seeming
inconsistency between the two statements does not discredit his testimony
nor his credibility for the following reasons: (a) it is of judicial knowledge that
affidavits being taken ex parte are almost always incomplete and often
inaccurate and are generally inferior to the testimony of a witness in open
court; (b) the credibility of Georges testimony cannot be impeached by the
[63]
inconsistent statements contained in his sworn statement because the said

statement was not admitted in evidence; and Section 34, Rule 132 of the
Revised Rules of Evidence provides that the Court shall not consider
evidence which has not been formally offered; besides, George was not
confronted with his sworn statement and accorded an opportunity to explain
the inconsistency; (c) the inconsistency refers to trivial, minor and collateral
[64]
matters and not to the substance of his testimony. Such minor inconsistency

even enhances its veracity as the variances erase any suspicion of a
rehearsed testimony. A truth-telling witness is not always expected to give an
[65]
error-free testimony, considering the lapse of time and the treachery of human
memory. [66]
Neither is the case for the prosecution impaired by the failure of the
prosecution to present Christopher as its witness. It bears stressing that
Georges testimony is corroborated by Julita and the three arresting
officers. Besides, case law has it that the testimony of a single witness, if
positive and credible, is sufficient to sustain a judgment of conviction. The [67]
law does not require the testimonies of at least two witnesses for the
conviction of an accused for kidnapping and serious illegal detention. The
prosecution has the discretion to decide on who to call as witness during the
trial, and its failure to present a particular witness does not give rise to the
presumption that evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if withheld,
where the evidence is at the disposal of the appellant and is merely
cumulative or corroborative. In this case, the testimony of George is, by
[68]
itself, independently of Christophers testimony, sufficient proof of the guilt of

the appellant. George had personal knowledge of the facts and circumstances
of the kidnapping, as he himself had been kidnapped along with his young
son. His failure to testify on where Christopher was detained after the three
cohorts of the appellant had alighted from the car with Christopher, and the
circumstances surrounding the rescue do not weaken the case of the
prosecution, as the said facts and circumstances had occurred after the crime
of kidnapping had already been a fait accompli.
The prosecution failed to prove
that in kidnapping George and
Christopher, the appellant and
his cohorts intended to extort
ransom.
The trial court convicted the appellant of kidnapping George and
Christopher for ransom and sentenced him to double death on its finding that
the appellant and his co-accused conspired to extort ransom for the release of
the victims. For his part, the appellant contends that the prosecution failed to
prove the element of extorting ransom. The appellant argues that he cannot
be held liable for kidnapping for ransom, even if after his arrest on September
4, 1994 his co-conspirators actually demanded ransom for Christophers
release. The prosecution failed to prove that he had knowledge of and
concurred with the said demand.
The Court agrees with the appellant. The second paragraph of Article 267
of the Revised Penal Code reads:
The provision is pursuant to Rep. Act No. 1084 approved on June 15, 1984
derived from the so-called Lindbergh Law in the United States, approved on
June 22, 1932, as amended on May 13, 1934.
To warrant the imposition of the death penalty for the crime of kidnapping
and serious illegal detention for ransom, the prosecution must prove beyond
reasonable doubt the following: (a) intent on the part of the accused to deprive
the victim of his liberty; (b) actual deprivation of the victim of his liberty; (c)
motive of the accused, which is extortion of ransom from the victim or any
other person. In kidnapping or serious illegal detention for ransom, the
purpose of extorting ransom is a qualifying circumstance which must be
alleged in the Information and proved by the prosecution as the crime itself by
words and overt acts of the accused before, during and after the kidnapping
and detention of the victim. Neither actual demand for nor actual payment of
ransom is necessary for the crime to be committed. Although kidnapping for
[69]
a certain purpose is a qualifying circumstance, the law does not require that
the purpose be accomplished. Ransom employed in the law is so used in its
[70]
common or ordinary sense: a sum of money or other thing of value, price, or

consideration paid or demanded for redemption of a kidnapped or detained
person, a payment that releases from captivity. It may include benefits not
[71]
necessarily pecuniary which may accrue to the kidnapper or a third person as

a condition for the release of the victim.
[72]
In this case, the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt
that the appellant conspired with three others to kidnap the victims. However,
it failed to prove that they intended to extort ransom from the victims
themselves or from some other person, with a view to obtaining the latters
release. The kidnapping by itself does not give rise to the presumption that the
appellant and his co-conspirators purpose is to extort ransom from the victims
or any other person.
The only evidence adduced by the prosecution to prove the element of
extorting ransom are the three handwritten letters: the first was received by
Desiree on September 4, 1994, while the second and third letters were
received by George on September 6 and 9, 1994, respectively.
The handwritten letter received by Desiree on September 4, 1994, first
letter for brevity, reads:
Para Sa Inyo Mr. & Mrs. Lim,
Una wag na wag kayong gumawa ng hakbang na hindi namin alam o gusto, lalong-
lalo na sa pakikipag-usap sa militar o magkoordinate sa militar ay hindi namin
gustong mangyari ang ganon mga sistem.Ang pangalawa, wag na wag kayong
tumanggap ng negotiator na walang palatandaan na galing sa amin, pakiusap lang yon
na dapat ninyong sundin, madidisgrasya ang aming dala kung kayoy magkakamali ng
hakbang.
Maliwanag sana sa inyo ang aming mga salaysay.
Note
Palatandaan na galing sa aming hakbang ay ito
MR. MUBARAK II or 2
Sulat man o telephone [73]
The letter received by George on September 6, 1994, second letter for

brevity, reads:
Ronie Puntuan
Michael Pagalasan
Mr. G. Lim palayain ninyo ang suspek ninyo. Wala silang kasalanan bago natin
tapusin ang usapan tatlong milyong piso (3,000,000) katumbas ng kalayaan ng mahal
ninyong anak. Paalisin ang mga sundalo.Kailangan ang Black Out News. Huwag kang
magkakamali Mr. Lim. Kunting sipyot mo patay ang anak mo. Isang araw lamang ang
tagal namin sa inyo.
(Sgd.) [74]
The handwritten letter received by George on September 9, 1994, third

letter for brevity, reads:
Para sayo Mr. & Mrs. Lim,
Mr. Lim, gusto ko lang ipaabot sayo ang maikli kong kataga. Unang-una, ayaw namin
na mga asong militar na makialam. Pangalawa, ayaw namin sa grupo na idamay ang
tao na walang-alam. Alalahanin mo mabuti lahat ng mga kataga na iniwan ko sayo,
Mr. Lim. Ang taong dinampot ng militar sa purok islam na si Ronie, ang taong yan
walang conection (sic) sa grupo, sa madaling usapan, Mr. Lim, alalahanin mo ang
anak mo sa oras na tatlong araw na taong yan hindi makalabas. Ang isipin mo ang
anak mo hindi rin makalabas hanggat sa mabulok sa lupa (maliwanag).
(Sign)
Palatandaan
MUBARAK II - 2 [75]
As gleaned from the three letters, there was no demand for ransom in
exchange for George and Christophers liberty. While there is a demand for
ransom of P3,000,000 in the second letter, and a demand for the release of
Ronie Puntuan within three days in the third letter, the said demands are in
consideration of Christophers release from custody, and not that of George.
Even then, the prosecution failed to adduce evidence that the second
letter demanding ransom in the amount of P3,000,000 for the release of
Christopher actually came from the appellant and his co-conspirators. It bears
stressing that in the first letter, the kidnappers made it clear to the couple that
only those communications, whether by letter or by telephone, bearing the
name MR. MUBARAK II or 2 came from them:
Note
Palatandaan na galing sa aming hakbang ay ito
MR. MUBARAK II or 2
Sulat man o telephone [76]
The second letter received by George was signed by an unidentified

person. It was not stated that the letter came from MUBARAK II-2. That
the second letter could not have come from the appellant and his cohorts is
buttressed by the fact that the third letter, which came from MUBARAK II-2,
does not even mention any demand for ransom in the amount of P3,000,000
for Christophers release.
The Court can only surmise, but it is possible that the signatory and
sender of the second letter could have been acting independently of the
appellant and his co-conspirators in order to profit from the kidnapping. It
bears stressing that the kidnapping of Christopher and George was already
known when the appellant was arrested on September 4, 1994, and the crime
had already been reported to the police authorities. Persons other than the co-
conspirators of the appellant could have written the letter.
Since there is no evidence that the signatory and sender of the second
letter is a co-conspirator of the appellant, the latter is not bound by the said
letter, conformably to Section 28, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Evidence
which reads:
Sec. 28. Admission by third party. The rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an

act, declaration, or omission of another, except as hereinafter provided.
Even if it is assumed for the nonce that the second letter came from a co-

conspirator, the same is not binding on the appellant, absent
evidence aliunde that he knew of and concurred with the said ransom
demand. It bears stressing that when George received the second letter on
September 6, 1994, the appellant had already been arrested and
detained. The conspiracy forged by the appellant and his cohorts on or before
September 4, 1994 had already ceased, when on the said date, the appellant
was arrested by the policemen and detained. [77]
Neither is the third letter admissible in evidence against the appellant to

prove that he conspired with others to demand the release of Ronie Puntuan
in consideration for Christophers freedom. The appellant and his cohorts
could not have planned to demand ransom for the release of Ronie Puntuan
as early as September 4, 1994, the date of the kidnapping: Ronie had not yet
been arrested on this date. The appellant was arrested first, and Ronies
detention was only to follow. Furthermore, the third letter was sent to George
on September 9, 1994. At that point, the appellant had already been arrested
by the policemen, and was already in jail. There is no evidence that while in
jail, the appellant had knowledge of and concurred with the said ransom
demand. It may be reasonably inferred that the appellants co-conspirators
could have decided to demand Ronie Puntuans release as a consideration for
Christophers liberty, while the appellant was already languishing in jail. The
said demand for ransom was a new and independent project of the appellants
co-conspirators, growing out of their own malice, without any a
priori knowledge on the part of the appellant or his post facto concurrence
therewith. Indeed, the records show that on September 9, 1994, the very day
the co-conspirators sent the third letter to George, Ronie Puntuan through
counsel Atty. Jose Jerry L. Fulgar, also the counsel for the appellant, filed a
motion with the MTC, praying that he be detained at the General Santos City
Jail:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed that an order be

please issued directing that accused Ronie Puntuan be please detained at General
Santos City Jail with the instruction that the said accused be separated from his co-
accused as desired by the Police Officers.[78]
That the appellant plotted with his co-conspirators to demand the release
of Ronie Puntuan as a condition for Christophers liberty is too far-fetched,
considering that Ronie and the appellant had the same lawyer. Ronie Puntuan
himself, through his and the appellants counsel, prayed to the court that he be
transferred from Camp Fermin Lira Barracks to the General Santos City Jail.
The appellant is also guilty
of slight illegal detention of
George under Article 268
of the Revised Penal Code.
Aside from convicting the appellant of kidnapping Christopher, the trial
court also convicted him of kidnapping George under Article 267 of the
Revised Penal Code. But the Office of the Solicitor General contends that the
appellant is guilty of another felony: slight illegal detention under Article 268 of
the Revised Penal Code, because none of the circumstances enumerated in
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code is present in the kidnapping and
detention of George. The prosecution may have failed to prove that the
appellant and his co-conspirators intended to extort ransom for Georges
release; however, as a matter of substantive law, the appellant may be held
guilty of two separate crimes, although he and his co-conspirators kidnapped
George and Christopher on the same occasion and from the same situs. As a
matter of procedural law, the appellant may be convicted of slight illegal
detention under the Information for kidnapping for ransom as the former is
necessarily included in the latter crime.
The Court agrees with the Office of the Solicitor General. The appellant is
guilty of slight illegal detention under Article 268 of the Revised Penal Code
which reads:
Art. 268. Slight illegal detention. The penalty of reclusion temporal shall be imposed

upon any private individual who shall commit the crimes described in the next
preceding article without the attendance of any of the circumstances enumerated
therein.
The same penalty shall be incurred by anyone who shall furnish the place for the
perpetration of the crime.
If the offender shall voluntarily release the person so kidnapped or detained within
three days from the commencement of the detention, without having attained the
purpose intended, and before the institution of criminal proceedings against him, the
penalty shall be prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods and a fine not
exceeding seven hundred pesos. (As amended by Republic Act No. 18).
While the epigraph or title of the article mentions only slight illegal
detention, kidnapping committed in connection with the lower offense of slight
illegal detention is also covered by the article. [79]
The felony has the following essential elements:

1. That the offender is a private individual.
2. That he kidnaps or detains another, or in any other manner deprives him of
his liberty.
3. That the act of kidnapping or detention is illegal.
4. That the crime is committed without the attendance of any of the circumstances
enumerated in Art. 267.[80]
The crime of slight illegal detention is consummated upon the occurrence

of all the elements thereof. A day, in the last paragraph of Article 268 of the
Revised Penal Code, should be understood as twenty-four hours, to be
counted from the deprivation of the liberty of the victim until the cessation
thereof. As Cuello Calon put it: El plazo de los tres dias de veinte cuatro
horas y desde el momento de la privacion de libertad si en que esta cesare.
The rescue or escape of the victim within three days from his kidnapping
[81]
and detention is not an exempting circumstance. The voluntary release by the

offender of the victim within three days from his detention, without the offender
having attained his purpose and before the institution of criminal proceedings
against him for slight illegal detention, is not an exempting circumstance; it
merely serves to reduce the penalty to prision mayor in its maximum and
medium periods and a fine not exceeding P700.
In this case, the appellant is a private individual. George had been
kidnapped and detained illegally by the appellant and his cohorts, but only for
less than a day. George regained his freedom after the appellant had been
arrested at the intersection of the national highway and Espina Road. There is
no evidence that the appellant and his cohorts kidnapped George for the
purpose of extorting ransom for his release. There is likewise no evidence that
they inflicted any serious physical injuries on George, or simulated public
authority, or threatened to kill him. Furthermore, there is no evidence that the
appellant and his cohorts intended to detain the victim for more than three
days.
Although the appellant and his co-conspirators kidnapped George and
Christopher on the same occasion and from the same situs, the appellant is
guilty of two separate crimes: kidnapping under Article 267 of the Revised
Penal Code, and slight illegal detention under Article 268 of the Revised Penal
Code. The appellant and his co-conspirators were animated by two sets of
separate criminal intents and criminal resolutions in kidnapping and illegally
detaining the two victims. The criminal intent in kidnapping Christopher was
separate from and independent of the criminal intent and resolution in
kidnapping and detaining George for less than three days. In the mind and
conscience of the appellant, he had committed two separate felonies; hence,
should be meted two separate penalties for the said crimes: one for
kidnapping under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code and another for slight
illegal detention under Article 268 of the same code. The felony of slight
[82]
illegal detention is necessarily included in the crime of kidnapping for ransom;

thus, the appellant may be convicted of the former crime under an Information
for kidnapping for ransom. [83]
PENALTIES FOR THE CRIMES

COMMITTED BY THE APPELLANT
The crimes committed by the appellant were aggravated by dwelling, the [84]
victims having been kidnapped in their house; by the use of motor vehicle,
the victims having been transported by the appellant from their house with
[85]
the use of Georges car; and by a band, the crime having been committed by
the appellant and three co-conspirators. However, the Court cannot consider
[86]
these aggravating circumstances in determining the proper penalties for the

said crimes, because the same were not alleged in the Information as
mandated by Sections 8 and 9, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure. Although the said rules took effect after the commission of the
[87]
crimes by the appellant, the same is favorable to the appellant; hence, should
be applied retroactively.[88]
The appellant is not entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance

under the second paragraph of Article 268 of the Revised Penal
Code because he did not voluntarily release George within three days from
[89]
the kidnapping. George was recovered by the policemen at the intersection of

the national highway and Espina Road.
The prescribed penalty for kidnapping under Article 267 of the Revised
Penal Code as amended by Rep. Act No. 7659 is reclusion perpetua to
death. There being no aggravating circumstance or modifying circumstance in
the commission of the crime, the proper penalty for the said crime is reclusion
perpetua, conformably to Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code.The prescribed
penalty for slight illegal detention is reclusion temporal in its full period, with a
range of twelve years and one day to twenty years. To determine the
minimum of the indeterminate penalty, the penalty shall be reduced by one
degree, prision mayor, which has a range of six years and one day to twelve
years. The minimum of the indeterminate penalty shall be taken from the full
range of the penalty at the discretion of the Court. The maximum of the
indeterminate penalty shall be taken from the medium period of reclusion
temporal,conformably to Article 64, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal
Code. Hence, the appellant shall suffer an indeterminate penalty of nine years
and four months of prision mayor in its medium period as minimum, to sixteen
years and five months of reclusion temporal in its medium period as
maximum.
CIVIL LIABILITIES OF THE APPELLANT
Although the prosecution adduced testimonial evidence that the appellant

and his co-conspirators ransacked the bedroom of the victims and took cash
and valuables, the prosecution nevertheless failed to adduce any
documentary evidence to prove the amount of the said cash and the value of
the jewelry. Hence, Spouses George and Desiree Lim are not entitled to
actual damages.
Under Article 2219, paragraph 5 of the New Civil Code, moral damages
may be recovered. In this case, the prosecution adduced testimonial evidence
that for the crimes committed by the appellant and his co-conspirators,
Spouses George and Desiree suffered mental anguish, fright and serious
anxiety caused by the kidnapping of George and their son
Christopher.Considering the factual milieu in this case, the Court believes that
the said spouses are entitled to moral damages in the amount of P100,000 for
the kidnapping of Christopher, and the amount of P50,000 for the illegal
detention of George. The appellant is also liable to the spouses for exemplary
damages in the total amount of P50,000 for the two crimes conformably with
current jurisprudence.[90]
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision dated September 27,

1997 of the Regional Trial Court of General Santos City, Branch 35, is
AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATIONS.Appellant Michael Pagalasan alias Mike
is found guilty of kidnapping under Article 267, paragraph 4 of the Revised
Penal Code and there being no modifying circumstances in the commission of
the crime is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. Appellant Michael Pagalasan alias Mike is found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of slight illegal detention under Article 268 of
the Revised Penal Code and there being no modifying circumstances in the
commission of the crime is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate
penalty of from nine years and four months of prision mayor in its medium
period as minimum to sixteen years and five months of reclusion temporal in
its medium period as maximum. The said appellant is ordered to pay to
Spouses George and Desiree Lim the total amount of P150,000 as moral
damages; and P50,000 as exemplary damages in the two cases.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 187534
Plaintiff-Appellee,
Present:

CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
PERALTA,
- versus - ABAD,
MENDOZA, and
SERENO,* JJ.

DIMA MONTANIR, RONALD Promulgated:
NORVA and EDUARDO CHUA, April 4, 2011
Accused-Appellants.
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

D E C I S I O N

PERALTA, J.:

For consideration of this Court is the Decision [1] dated April 22, 2008 of the Court
Appeals (CA) in CA- G.R. CR-HC No. 00499, affirming with modification the
Decision[2]dated October 28, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Valenzuela City, Branch 171, finding Appellants Dima Montanir, Ronald Norva
and Eduardo Chua, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Kidnapping
under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.

The records bear the following factual antecedents:

Josie Herrera, Robert Uy, Alicia a.k.a. Alice Buenaflor, together with appellants
Ronald Norva and Eduardo Chua, on December 17, 1997, concocted a plan to
kidnap Rafael Mendoza, and after several days of conducting surveillance on their
intended victim, on January 5, 1998, they decided to kidnap Rafael in Ali Mall,
Cubao, Quezon City.However, the intended kidnapping failed, because Rafael did
not show up at the said place. On February 5, 1998, a second attempt was made,
but they encountered an accident before they could even execute their original
plan.

Around 5:30 a.m. of February 17, 1998, Alicia called up Rosalina Reyes, a partner
of Rafael, to tell her that she wanted to meet her and Rafael at Jollibee, BBB,
Valenzuela City to settle the former's loan of P350,000.00. She requested Rosalina
to bring the land title which she was given as collateral for the said loan.

Rosalina and Rafael arrived at Jollibee ahead of Alicia. Eventually, around 9:15
a.m. of the same date, Alicia showed up outside the store aboard a car. She was
with appellant Ronald Norva. Alicia motioned Rosalina and Rafael to approach the
car, which the two did as requested. While inside the vehicle, Alicia introduced
appellant Ronald as her cousin. Later on, Alicia informed Rosalina and Rafael that
she would pay them at her place.

When the car passed by the street where Alicia's house was located, Rosalina asked
the former where they were going. Alicia answered that they had to drop by the
house of her financier who agreed to redeem her title and substitute as her
creditor. Trusting Alicia, Rosalina and Rafael did not protest. They finally reached
a house in Ciudad Grande, Valenzuela City.

Thereafter, appellant Ronald alighted from the vehicle and talked to a man inside a
store, later identified as Jonard Mangelin. The gate of the house was then opened
by appellant Dima. The car proceeded to the garage and Rosalina and Rafael were
asked to go inside the house. Rosalina followed Alicia, while Rafael trailed
Rosalina as they entered through a kitchen door. They passed by a man (Jessie
Doe) who was washing his hands in the sink. While Rosalina was walking behind
Alicia, she suddenly heard a dull moan coupled with the sound of stomping
feet. She looked back at the direction where the sounds came from and saw Rafael
being forcibly dragged inside a room. She decided to look for Rafael and on her
way, she saw Jessie Doe place his hand on Rafael's mouth and poke a gun at
him. Rafael struggled to get free. Rosalina pleaded with Jessie Doe to have pity on
Rafael because of his existing heart ailment. Appellant Ronald rushed towards her,
poked a gun at her mouth, tied her to a bed and warned her not to make any
noise. He told her that all they want is her money, upon which, Rosalina said that if
they really wanted money, they should untie Rafael, who then appeared to be on
the verge of having a heart attack. Rosalina was untied and she immediately rushed
to Rafael and began pumping his chest. She asked Jonard, who had just entered the
room, to help her pump Rafael's chest while she applied CPR on the latter. Jonard
did as told. While CPR was being administered, appellant Dima started removing
all of Rafael's personal belongings, which include his ring, wallet, watch and other
items inside his pocket, and passed them on to appellant Ronald.

Afterwards, appellant Ronald instructed Jonard to take Rosalina to another
room. While inside the room where she was brought, Rosalina begged Jonard to
help her escape.Jonard was moved by Rosalina's plea and agreed to help
her. During their conversation, Jonard told Rosalina that two women had tipped
them off as the kidnap victims. When asked who they were, Jonard refused to
reveal their identities.
Rosalina was transferred to the master's bedroom around 12:00 noon because
certain female visitors arrived. After the visitors left, Rosalina was returned to the
room where she was previously taken. Rosalina asked Jonard about Rafael's
condition, to which he replied that Rafael would be brought to the hospital. A little
later, at around 1 p.m., Jonard went to check on Rafael and confirmed that he was
still alive.

Around 2:00 p.m., Rosalina heard the sound of someone being pummelled. Feeling
nervous, she asked Jonard the whereabouts of Rafael and was told that he was
brought to the hospital. But unknown to Rosalina, Rafael had just died and his
body was placed inside the trunk of a car.

Around 6:30 p.m., Rosalina was informed that she will be brought to another safe
house. She was taken to a car and placed at the back seat, together with Jonard and
three other men, later identified as Larry, Jack and Boy. The driver of the car was
appellant Ronald. Appellant Ronald instructed Jonard to cover Rosalina's head
with a jacket which Jonard did. As they were about to leave, the man seated beside
Ronald started to talk. Rosalina recognized the voice of Robert. She then lifted the
jacket covering her head and was able to confirm that the one talking was
Robert. Rosalina cried, Robert, Robert, why did you do this, we did not do
anything to you and Robert responded, Pasensiyahan na lang tayo.

By 10:00 p.m., they arrived at a certain house in Pandi, Bulacan where there was
no electricity. Thus, they lit candles for illumination. Rosalina found the house
familiar and concluded that it was Alicia's. Rosalina was brought to a room on the
second floor and while inside the room, she was told by one of the men guarding
her that one of the leaders wanted to talk to her. Per the leader's instruction, the
guard put out the candle light. The man then seated himself beside Rosalina and
warned her against escaping as they were a large and armed group. Rosalina
recognized the voice as that of Robert's. Before he left the room, Robert gave
instructions to Jonard and the other men inside. Meanwhile, the group started
digging a pit at the back of the same house near the swimming pool.

Around 3:00 a.m. of the following day (February 18), the group buried Rafael's
body in the pit. Thereafter, Robert instructed appellant Ronald to tell Jonard that
the latter should kill Rosalina, which Jonard refused to do. Nonetheless, Robert
instructed Jonard and the others to guard Rosalina well, as he himself would deal
with her upon his return.

Rosalina heard the car leave around 5:00 a.m. of the same day. Sensing that Jonard
was sympathetic to her, Rosalina begged him again to help her escape for the sake
of her children.

When electricity was restored around 8 p.m., one of the men guarding Rosalina
turned off the light inside the room. The room was only illuminated by a light
coming from the hallway. Rosalina saw a person wearing a wig and sunglasses
enter the room. Rosalina recognized him as Robert. Trying to mimic a woman by
modulating his voice, Robert told her that Rafael was in the hospital and that he
could still sign a check. He asked Rosalina the whereabouts of the other land titles
and the identities of the other financiers whom she knew. Rosalina replied in the
negative. Robert angrily poked a gun at her and shouted, That's impossible, and
then left the room. He gave instructions to his members and left.

At 9:00 p.m., Jonard went to Rosalina and told her about Robert's order to kill her,
which caused the latter to panic and cry. She then implored the help of Jonard for
her escape. Afterwards, Jonard went to his companions Larry, Jack and Boy and
told them that he would help Rosalina escape. His companions immediately
cocked their guns and an argument ensued. Rosalina talked to them and begged
them all to spare her life. One of Jonard's companions told Rosalina that if they
would allow her to escape, they too would get into trouble. Taking advantage of
the situation, Rosalina suggested that all of them should escape. They all agreed to
escape in the early morning.

Around 5:00 a.m., Rosalina, Jonard, Larry, Jack and Boy left the safe house. They
walked through a rice field for about 30 minutes and then boarded a jeepney bound
for Balagtas, Bulacan. From Balagtas, they took a bus going to Cubao and arrived
at 7:30 a.m. Rosalina pawned her pieces of jewelry for P1,500.00 and gave
the P1,000.00 to Larry, Jack and Boy. The three told Jonard to stay with Rosalina
so that she would have a witness and, in case Rosalina would further need their
help, left their address with Jonard.

When the three left, Rosalina immediately called Rafael's brother Tito, and related
what happened to her and his brother. When Tito asked Jonard which hospital
Rafael was brought to, Jonard revealed to Rosalina that Rafael died at the safe
house in Ciudad Grande, Valenzuela City. Rosalina called her lawyer, Atty.
Teresita Agbi and asked her to meet them at Farmer's, Cubao. When Atty. Agbi
arrived, she accompanied them to the Department of Interior and Local
Government (DILG) where an investigation was conducted.

The following day, at 4:00 a.m., two groups from the DILG were formed to arrest
Alicia, Josie, the appellants, and Robert. Alicia and Josie were not at their homes,
while appellants Ronald and Dima were arrested at the residence of Robert. While
at the DILG office, Rosalina positively identified appellants Ronald and Dima as
her kidnappers. Meanwhile, Jonard accompanied the police authorities to the safe
house in Pandi, Bulacan and showed them where the body of Rafael was
buried. The remains of Rafael was later on exhumed.
Thereafter, two Informations were filed with the RTC of Valenzuela City (Branch
171), with the following allegations:

Criminal Case No. 123-V-98

th
That on or about the 17 day of February 1998 in Valenzuela, Metro
Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, conspiring together and mutually helping one another,
being then private person, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously kidnap one ROSALINA REYES against her will and
detained her, thereby depriving her of her liberty for a period of two
days.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Criminal Case No. 124-V-98

th
That on or about the 17 day of February 1998 in Valenzuela, Metro
Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, conspiring together and mutually helping one another,
being then a private person, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously kidnap one RAFAEL MENDOZA against his will and
detained him, thereby depriving him of his liberty and on the occasion
thereof, the death of the victim resulted.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Upon arraignment, with the assistance of counsel, Jonard and appellants Ronald,
Dima and Eduardo, pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Robert Uy, Alice
Buenaflor and Jessie Doe remained at-large during the trial of the case. Jonard was
later on discharged as a state witness. Afterwards, the trial on the merits ensued.

On October 28, 2004, the trial court rendered judgment against the appellants for
the crime of kidnapping, the dispositive portion of which, reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, accused DIMA MONTANIR,
RONALD NORVA, and EDUARDO CHUA are hereby found GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping and in accordance
with Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, this Court
hereby imposes the penalty of DEATH on accused NORVA and
MONTANIR. As regards accused CHUA, this Court hereby imposes the
penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Further, accused Montanir, Norva and Chua are hereby held jointly and
severally liable to pay the heirs of Mendoza the amount of Php 71,000.00
in actual damages and Php 50,000.00 as moral damages.

As for accused JOSIE HERRERA, the Court hereby ACQUITS her on
reasonable doubt of the charge of kidnapping. Consequently, The Jail
Warden of Valenzuela City Jail is hereby ordered to cause the immediate
release of the said accused from detention unless she is otherwise being
detained for some other legal and lawful cause.

With regard to accused ALICE BUENAFLOR, ROBERT UY and one
JESSIE DOE, let the cases against them be ARCHIVED pending their
apprehension. Meantime, let an alias warrant issue for their
apprehension.

Considering the penalty imposed on accused MONTANIR, NORVA and
CHUA, let the entire records of these cases be elevated to the Court of
Appeals for appropriate review of the judgment herein rendered.

SO ORDERED.

On automatic review, the CA affirmed the conviction with modification on the
penalty imposed, thus:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the impugned Decision is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the penalty of death imposed
on accused Montanir and Norva is hereby modified to reclusion
perpetua to conform to and in accordance with Republic Act No.
9346. Appellants Montanir, Norva and Chua are ordered to pay jointly
and severally the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity to the heirs of
the victims.

Costs against appellants.

SO ORDERED.

Hence, the present appeal.

In their respective Briefs, appellants raised the following assignment of errors:

DIMA MONTANIR:

I.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE
TO THE INCONSISTENT AND INCREDIBLE TESTIMONIES OF
THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-
APPELLANT DIMA MONTANIR GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE
PATENT WEAKNESS OF THE PROSECUTION'S EVIDENCE.

EDUARDO CHUA:

I.
THE DECISION IS NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND THE
EVIDENCE.

II.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING APPELLANT
CHUA A CONSPIRATOR TO THE COMMISSION OF
KIDNAPPING.

RONALD NORVA:

I.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE
TO THE INCONSISTENT AND INCREDIBLE TESTIMONIES OF
THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES.

II.
APPELLANT RONALD NORVA GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE PATENT
WEAKNESS OF THE PROSECUTION'S EVIDENCE.

First of all, it must be emphasized that the crime committed by the appellants, as
ruled by the trial court and affirmed by the CA, is the special complex crime of
Kidnapping with Homicide. After the amendment of the Revised Penal Code on
December 31, 1993 by Republic Act No. 7659, Article 267 of the Revised Penal
Code, now provides:

Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. - Any private individual
who shall kidnap or detain another, or in any other manner deprive him
of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death:

1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three
days.


3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon
the person kidnapped or detained; or if threats to kill him shall have been
made.
4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except
when the accused is any of the parents, female or a public officer;

The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention
was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or
any other person, even if none of the circumstances above-mentioned
were present in the commission of the offense.

When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the
detention or is raped, or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the
maximum penalty shall be imposed.

As expounded in People v. Mercado:[3]

In People v. Ramos,[4] the accused was found guilty of two separate
heinous crimes of kidnapping for ransom and murder committed on July
13, 1994 and sentenced to death. On appeal, this Court modified the
ruling and found the accused guilty of the "special complex crime"
of kidnapping for ransom with murder under the last paragraph of Article
267, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659. This Court said:

x x x This amendment introduced in our criminal statutes
the concept of 'special complex crime' of kidnapping with
murder or homicide. It effectively eliminated the distinction
drawn by the courts between those cases where the killing
of the kidnapped victim was purposely sought by the
accused, and those where the killing of the victim was not
deliberately resorted to but was merely an afterthought.
Consequently, the rule now is: Where the person
kidnapped is killed in the course of the detention,
regardless of whether the killing was purposely sought
or was merely an afterthought, the kidnapping and
murder or homicide can no longer be complexed under
Art. 48, nor be treated as separate crimes, but shall be
punished as a special complex crime under the last
paragraph of Art. 267, as amended by RA No. 7659.

This Court further discussed the nature of the special complex crime of
Kidnapping with Homicide in People v. Larraaga,[5] thus:

A discussion on the nature of special complex crime is
imperative. Where the law provides a single penalty for two or more
component offenses, the resulting crime is called a special complex
crime. Some of the special complex crimes under the Revised Penal
Code are (1) robbery with homicide,[6] (2) robbery with rape,
[7]
(3) kidnapping with serious physical injuries, [8] (4) kidnapping with
murder or homicide,[9] and (5) rape with homicide.[10] In a special
complex crime, the prosecution must necessarily prove each of the
component offenses with the same precision that would be necessary if
they were made the subject of separate complaints. As earlier mentioned,
R.A. No. 7659 amended Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code by
adding thereto this provision: "When the victim is killed or dies as a
consequence of the detention, or is raped, or is subjected to torture or
dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed; and that this
provision gives rise to a special complex crime. In the cases at bar,
particularly Criminal Case No. CBU-45303, the Information specifically
alleges that the victim Marijoy was raped "on the occasion and in
connection" with her detention and was killed "subsequent thereto and
on the occasion thereof." Considering that the prosecution was able to
prove each of the component offenses, appellants should be convicted of
the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention
with homicide and rape. It appearing from the overwhelming evidence of
the prosecution that there is a "direct relation, and intimate
connection"[11] between the kidnapping, killing and raping of Marijoy,
rape cannot be considered merely as an aggravating circumstance but as
a component offense forming part of the herein special complex crime. It
bears reiterating that in People vs. Ramos,[12] and People vs. Mercado,
[13]
interpreting Article 267, we ruled that "where the person killed in the
course of the detention, regardless of whether the killing was purposely
sought or was merely an afterthought, the kidnapping and murder
or homicide can no longer be complexed under Article 48, nor be treated
as separate crimes, but shall be punished as a special complex crime
under the last paragraph of Article 267." The same principle applies here.
The kidnapping and serious illegal detention can no longer be complexed
under Article 48, nor be treated as separate crime but shall be punished
as a special complex crime. At any rate, the technical designation of
the crime is of no consequence in the imposition of the penalty
considering that kidnapping and serious illegal detention if
complexed with either homicide or rape, still, the maximum penalty
of death shall be imposed.

In this particular case, the Information specifically alleges that the appellants
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnapped Rafael Mendoza against his will
and detained him, thereby depriving him of his liberty and on the occasion
thereof, the death of the victim resulted. The trial court, in its decision,
particularly in the dispositive portion, merely stated that the appellants were found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping, however, its mention
of the phrase, in accordance with Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, this Court hereby imposes the penalty of DEATH on accused Norva and
Montanir, clearly refers to the crime committed as that of the special complex
crime of Kidnapping with Homicide. The appellants, therefore, were correctly
punished under the last paragraph of Article 267 as the evidence presented during
the trial, in its entirety, undoubtedly proves that the death of Rafael Mendoza,
although of natural causes, occurred on the occasion of the kidnapping.

Delving on the arguments presented by the appellants in this Court, their
corresponding briefs pose a single common argument the prosecution did not
present sufficient evidence to prove beyond reasonable doubt that they committed
the crime charged against them. In particular, they questioned the inconsistent
testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution. According to them, the said
inconsistent statements from the witnesses, tarnish their credibility.

This Court finds otherwise.

The question of credibility of witnesses is primarily for the trial court to
determine.[14] For this reason, its observations and conclusions are accorded great
respect on appeal.[15]This rule is variously stated thus: The trial court's assessment
of the credibility of a witness is entitled to great weight. It is conclusive and
binding unless shown to be tainted with arbitrariness or unless, through oversight,
some fact or circumstance of weight and influence has not been considered.
[16]
Absent any showing that the trial judge overlooked, misunderstood, or
misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight which would affect the result of
the case, or that the judge acted arbitrarily, his assessment of the credibility of
witnesses deserves high respect by appellate courts.[17]

Appellants claim that Jonard, a witness for the prosecution, stated in
his Sinumpaang Salaysay that he was the one who whispered to appellant Ronald
to transfer Rosalina to another room so that the latter would have no idea that
Rafael was in a critical condition, but during trial, Jonard testified that it was
Ronald who instructed him to transfer Rosalina to a different room. Appellants
also point out that in the same sworn statement, Jonard averred that he resided in
Taguig since October, 1987, which is contrary to what he testified in court that he
resided in that same place since 1997. In addition, appellants further argue that in
her testimony, Rosalina declared that she was with four men seated at the back of
the car when she was brought to Pandi, Bulacan, however, Jonard, in his own
testimony, stated that there were four of them including Rosalina seated at the
back of the car.

A close reading of the above inconsistencies asserted by the appellants show that
the same refer only to minor details and collateral matters and do not affect the
veracity and weight of the testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution. What
really prevails is the consistency of the testimonies of the witnesses in relating the
principal occurrence and positive identification of the appellants. Slight
contradictions in fact even serve to strengthen the credibility of the witnesses and
prove that their testimonies are not rehearsed.[18] They are thus safeguards against
memorized perjury.[19]

Anent the inconsistencies of the contents of the affidavits and that of the
testimonies in court, this Court has already ruled that testimonies in court are
given more weight than affidavits, thus:

x x x x Affidavits are not entirely reliable evidence in court due to their
incompleteness and the inaccuracies that may have attended their
formulation.[20] In general, such affidavits are not prepared by the
affiants themselves but by another person (i.e., investigator) who may
have used his own language in writing the statement or misunderstood
the affiant or omitted material facts in the hurry and impatience that
usually attend the preparation of such affidavits. As this Court has often
said:

An affidavit, being taken ex-parte, is almost
always incomplete and often inaccurate, sometimes
from partial suggestion, and sometimes from want of
suggestion and inquiries, without the aid of which the
witness may be unable to recall the connected collateral
circumstances necessary for the correction of the first
suggestion of his memory and for his accurate
recollection of all that belongs to the subject.[21]

We have too much experience of the great infirmity
of affidavit evidence. When the witness is illiterate and
ignorant, the language presented to the court is not his; it is;
and must be, the language of the person who prepares the
affidavit; and it may be, and too often is, the expression of
that person's erroneous inference as to the meaning of the
language used by the witness himself; and however
carefully the affidavit may be read over to the witness, he
may not understand what is said in a language so different
from that which he is accustomed to use. Having expressed
his meaning in his own language, and finding it translated
by a person on whom he relies, into language not his own,
and which he does not perfectly understand, he is too apt to
acquiesce; and testimony not intended by him is brought
before the court as his.' (2 Moore on Facts, sec. 952, p.
1105; People v. Timbang, 74 Phil. 295, 299).[22]

For this reason, affidavits have generally been considered inferior to
testimony given in open court.[23]

Incidentally, the CA was correct in stating that Jonard was able to explain and
reconcile the minor discrepancies in his testimony by saying that he whispered to
appellant Ronald that Rafael was in a bad condition and afterwards, it was
appellant Ronald who instructed him to transfer Rosalina to another room, thus:

Atty. Basco:

Referring to the same statement, Mr. Witness, on page 20 of the TSN
dated February 24, 1999 referring to the same statement, Mr. Witness, in
your statement here when asked:

Q. Then what happened, Mr. Witness, when you answered in the
manner? And your answer was:
A Ronald Norva told me, Pare, the old man is in bad condition, you
better transfer Mrs. Reyes to another room so that she could not see the
condition of the old man.

Q So which is which Mr. Witness? It was you who gave order or
instruction to Mr. Ronald Norva or it was he who gave instruction?

Atty. Gabi: Can we have the translation of that statement?

Atty. Basco: That is a very inconsistent statement of the witness?

A: This is like this, ma'am.

Atty. Basco: Just answer my question. Which is which, Mr.
Witness? Which is the truth, your salaysay or your testimony on
February 24 in open court?

A: The two are true, ma'am, because when I whispered to him that
the old man was in a bad condition he gave me instruction to
transfer Mrs. Reyes to another room.[24]

The same is true with his inconsistent statements regarding his time of
residence in Taguig, thus:

Q Mr. Witness, you said in your Sinumpaang Salaysay of February 19,
1998 that you were residing in Taguig at Maharlika Village sometime in
October 1987? Do you confirm that?

Atty. Mendoza:

May we ask for the translations, Your Honor.

A No, sir, the actual year is 1997, not 1987.

Q So you are correcting your answer in your salaysay of February 19,
1998 under paragraph No. 13 wherein you answered: Ako po ay
nakikitira sa kaibigan kong si Ting sa Muslim Area, Maharlika Village,
Taguig, Metro Manila nuong buwan ng Oktubre, 1987. You are
changing the 1987 to 1997?
A The truth is 1997, sir.[25]

Apellant Dima, in his Brief, insists that the prosecution was not able to establish
his participation in the commission of the crime because he was merely the house
helper of the safe house in Ciudad Grande, Valenzuela, when the kidnappers and
the victims arrived. In the same vein, appellant Ronald asserts that there was no
convincing evidence presented by the prosecution that will point to his clear
participation in the crime because he was just the driver of the car that brought the
victims to the place where the latter were kept. Appellant Eduardo also insists that
he was not a participant in the offense charged in the Information. Basically, the
appellants deny any participation in the kidnapping.

In convicting the appellants, the trial court, based on the evidence presented,
naturally found the existence of conspiracy among the perpetrators. Conspiracy
exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it.[26] Verily, when conspiracy is
established, the responsibility of the conspirators is collective, not individual, that
render all of them equally liable regardless of the extent of their respective
participations, the act of one being deemed to be the act of the other or the others,
in the commission of the felony.[27] Each conspirator is responsible for everything
done by his confederates which follows incidentally in the execution of a common
design as one of its probable and natural consequences even though it was not
intended as part of the original design. Responsibility of a conspirator is not
confined to the accomplishment of a particular purpose of conspiracy but extends
to collateral acts and offenses incident to and growing out of the purpose intended.
[28]
Conspirators are held to have intended the consequences of their acts and by
purposely engaging in conspiracy which necessarily and directly produces a
prohibited result, they are, in contemplation of law, chargeable with intending that
result.[29] Conspirators are necessarily liable for the acts of another conspirator
unless such act differs radically and substantively from that which they intended to
commit.[30] As Judge Learned Hand put it in United States v. Andolscheck,[31] when
a conspirator embarks upon a criminal venture of indefinite outline, he takes his
chances as to its content and membership, so be it that they fall within the common
purposes as he understands them.

A scrutiny of the records show that the trial court did not err in finding conspiracy
among the appellants, as they each played a role in the commission of the crime.
The trial court correctly found the denial of appellant Dima that he had knowledge
of the kidnapping, unbelievable. The appellants bare denial is a weak defense that
becomes even weaker in the face of the prosecution witnesses positive
identification of him. Jurisprudence gives greater weight to the positive narration
of prosecution witnesses than to the negative testimonies of the defense. [32] The
trial court ruled:

As for accused Montanir, again, this Court finds the testimonies of
prosecution witnesses more credible than his testimony applying the
same principle that evidence to be believed must not only proceed from a
mouth of a credible witness but must be credible in itself, such that the
common experience and observation of mankind can show it as probable
under the circumstances.

Certainly, this Court is not convinced by accused Montanir's claim that
he was at Ciudad Grande because he was a house boy of accused Chua
after he admitted the circumstances under which he has to live there a
few days before the victims were brought there.

To begin with, this Court does not buy accused Montanir's explanation
that he transferred to Chua because he was looking for a permanent job
is hardly credible because he himself admitted that when he was brought
by accused Uy to the residence of accused Chua at Ciudad Grande, it
was the understanding that it would be accused Uy who would be paying
his salary. Why would accused Uy pay the salary of accused Montanir if
he was to work as a house boy of accused Chua? Evidently, the only
plausible reason why accused Uy would pay the salary of accused
Montanir is because he was actually working for the former and only
posted in the house of accused Chua at Ciudad Grande to play his part in
the execution of the planned kidnapping. This conclusion is bolstered by
accused Montanir's admission that he never even spoke with accused
Chua during all those times that he stayed at accused Chua's residence as
in fact, he took orders from accused Uy.

Moreover, this Court finds it rather perplexing that accused Montanir
would suddenly go back to the house of accused Uy on 19 February
1998 on the shallow reason that he had no companion at Ciudad Grande
when precisely he said he was hired as a caretaker thereat while the
regular boy was on vacation.[33]

The above conclusion was bolstered by the positive identification of the same
appellant and his exact participation in the execution of the crime, by the witnesses
for the prosecution, thus:

WITNESS JONARD

Q Could you tell this Honorable Court what happened, Mr. Witness?
A When the four (4) entered after ten (10) minutes I heard like a
commotion inside the house.
Q Then when you heard the commotion, Mr. Witness, what did you
do?
A What I did was I went out of the store to peep thru the window near
the lavatory.

Q And what did you see, Mr. Witness?
A I saw Jess and Dems poking a gun to (sic) Mr. Mendoza.

Q Then what happened, Mr. Witness, when they poked a gun?
A When they poked a gun and placed the hands of Mr. Mendoza at his
back they forcibly entered the room.[34]

WITNESS ROSALINA

Q And then what happened, Ms. Witness?
A And suddenly Jonard Mangelin entered.

Q And what happened?
A I pleaded to him to help me in pumping.

Q What did he do?
A And he helped me.

Q After helping you pumping Mr. Mendoza (sic), what happened to
Mr. Mendoza?
A While we were pumping Mr. Mendoza's chest, Dima Montanir
was busy removing the things of Mr. Mendoza.

Q When you said things to which are you referring to?
A His wallet, watch, ring and all the things in his pocket and gave it to
Ronald Norva.[35]
xxxx
A When we returned to the DILG, the persons arrested were already
there and when I saw them I recognized them that they were the ones.

Q Could you tell us the people whom you said were there?
A Dima Montanir.

Q Can you point to him?

(Witness pointing to a man inside the Courtroom, whom when asked
his name, answered: Dima Montanir).

Q And who else, Ms. Witness?
A Ronald Norva.

Q Can you point to him also?

(Witness pointing to a man inside the Courtroom whom when asked his
name, answered: Ronald Norva).
Q Then what happened, Ms. Witness, after you were able to recognize
them?
A I told that they were the ones.[36]

In like manner, appellant Eduardo's denial that he participated in the offense
charged does not outweigh the testimonies of the witnesses positively identifying
him as one of the culprits, thus:

WITNESS JONARD

Q Did you follow the instruction, Mr. Witness?
A Yes, ma'am.

Q Why did you follow the instruction?
A Because they are my Boss.

Q When you said they are my Boss, to whom, Mr. Witness, are you
referring to?
A Ronald Norva, Robert Uy, Eduardo Chua, Alice Buenaflor and
Josie Herrera.

Q You mentioned the name of Josie Herrera, was she there at the
vicinity?
A She was not there when the incident happened on February 17, 1998.
Q Why did you include the name of Josie Herrera as one of your
bosses, Mr. Witness?
A Because, ma'am. On December 19, 1997 at the middle of that month,
Josie Herrera tipped to the group that Mr. Rafael Mendoza is a good
victim because he has lots of money and engaged in a lending business.

Q Were you there when she tipped the person of Mr. Mendoza?
A Yes, ma'am.

Q Where was this, Mr. Witness?
A At the house of Robert Uy.

Q Where was the house of Mr. Robert Uy, Mr. Witness?
A Candido Homes Subdivision, West Fairview, Quezon City.

Q That was on (sic) the middle of December, 1997?
A Yes, ma'am.

Q Mr. Witness, if this Josie Herrera whom you have referred as one of
your Bosses is around this courtroom, could you please point to her?
(Witness pointing to a lady inside the Courtroom whom when asked
her name, answered: Josie Herrera).

Q You also mentioned the name of Eduardo Chua as one of your
bosses, why do you say so that he was one of your bosses?
A Because they were the ones planning how they could get Mr.
Mendoza.

Q And who were these people planning, Mr. Witness?
A The five (5) of them, ma'am.

Q Who are these five (5), Mr. Witness?
A Robert Uy, Ronald, Alice, Josie Herrera and Eduardo Chua.

Q And where did this happen, Mr. Witness?
A When Josie Herrera tipped to the group on that December, the group
made a surveillance to be familiarized with the face of Mr. Mendoza
and Mrs. Reyes.

Q And all the time, Mr. Witness, where was (sic) this happened when
you said they were planning?
A At the house of Robert Uy.

Q Did the surveillance took (sic) place, Mr. Witness?
A Yes, ma'am.[37]

xxxx

Q And where did you count the surveillance, Mr. Witness?
A Ali Mall, at Cubao, Quezon City.

Q And what was the result of your surveillance, Mr. Witness?
A They saw the victims Mr. Mendoza and Mrs. Reyes. Robert Uy
pointed to the two (2) as our victims.

Q Aside from the planning and the surveillance, Mr. Witness, what else
took place?
A On January 3, 1998 the first stage of the kidnapping will took (sic)
place on January 5, 1998 because they want to make it quick.

Q Was (sic) the kidnapping take place at that time, Mr. Witness?
A Yes, ma'am.

Q On January 5, 1998?
A No, ma'am, January 5, that was the first try to kidnap them when we
went to Ali Mall but we were not able to see them.

Q You said that there was a first try, was there another try, Mr.
Witness?
A Yes, ma'am.

Q When was that, Mr. Witness?
A On February 5, 1998.

Q What happened? Was that agreed upon by the group, Mr. Witness?
A Yes, ma'am.

Q Who were these people in the group, Mr. Witness?
A Alice Buenaflor, Robert Uy, Ronald Norva, Eduardo Chua and
Josie Herrera.

Q And did the kidnapping take place on the second try, Mr. Witness?
A We were not able to take them, ma'am.

Q Then what happened, Mr. Witness?
A On February 5, 1998, on our second try to kidnap them, we were not
able to get them because in Ali Mall the car of Alice Buenaflor was
bumped by a taxi.

Q Was there another try after the February 5 try, Mr. Witness?
A On that February 5, when we were not able to take them; they
changed the plan.

Q And who participated in the plan, Mr. Witness?
A Eduardo Chua, Robert Uy, Ronald, Alice Buenaflor and Josie
Herrera.

Q Is she the same Josie Herrera whom you identified earlier, Mr.
Witness?
A Yes, ma'am.

Q Then what happened, Witness?
A After the second try, we were not able to take them, so the plan was
changed.

Q What was the plan that was changed? What was the new plan?
A They were the ones who knew it. They were the ones planning and I
was only being utilized by the syndicate. [38]

It must always be remembered that between positive and categorical testimony
which has a ring of truth to it on the one hand, and a bare denial on the other, the
former generally prevails.[39]

It is also not disputed that the safe house in Ciudad Grande, Valenzuela, where the
victims were brought was owned by appellant Eduardo. The trial court was also
correct in dismissing the claim of appellant Eduardo that he merely lent his car to
Robert and allowed the latter to occupy his house because Robert had been so
accommodating to him and had facilitated his loan, thus:

Regarding the criminal liability of accused Chua, while it is conceded
that the said accused was nowhere in the actual scene of the incident, this
Court nonetheless finds the said accused guilty of kidnapping as one of
the conspirators to the commission of the felony who participated by
furnishing the vehicle used in abducting the victims and the house where
they were held captive and where Mendoza died.

Again, this Court applied the time-honored principle that evidence to be
believed must come from the mouth of a credible witness which accused
Chua is not. Indeed, this Court finds no iota of truth on the protestation
of accused Chua that he knew nothing of accused Uy's plans. It is simply
too good to be true that he allowed Mangelin and accused Montanir to
stay at his house to guard it and attend to his store while his caretakers
were having a vacation. Neither could this Court find cogent reason why
accused Chua would allow accused Uy to use his vehicle and house
totally oblivious of any plan/design or purpose of accused Uy. Nor is it
credible that accused Chua would allow accused Uy to use his vehicle
just to follow up his loan application and then after the same had been
released he (accused Chua) did not come home either to Santa Maria,
Bulacan or to Ciudad Grande, instead, he went straight to the residence
of accused Uy, waited for him until the wee hours of the morning of the
following day, 18 February 1998, only to tell accused Uy he was going
home.

It is also bewildering to this Court why immediately after receiving the
money he borrowed, he would spend it in going to Davao with his
daughter on 18 February 1988, without any previous plan whatsoever
and suspiciously, upon invitation of accused Uy who had known by then
that one of the victims, Mendoza, had died in the course of the
kidnapping.

Truly, all of the foregoing facts when taken together with the testimonies
of Mangelin and Montanir unequivocally indicate accused Chua's
complicity with the criminal design of accused Uy and dissolves the said
accused's plea of innocence.[40]

Each conspirator is responsible for everything done by his confederates which
follows incidentally in the execution of a common design as one of its probable
and natural consequences even though it was not intended as part of the original
design.[41] Responsibility of a conspirator is not confined to the accomplishment of
a particular purpose of conspiracy but extends to collateral acts and offenses
incident to and growing out of the purpose intended.[42] Conspirators are held to
have intended the consequences of their acts and by purposely engaging in
conspiracy which necessarily and directly produces a prohibited result that they are
in contemplation of law, charged with intending the result. [43] Conspirators are
necessarily liable for the acts of another conspirator even though such act differs
radically and substantively from that which they intended to commit.[44]

Considering the above disquisitions, there is no doubt that conspiracy existed in the
perpetration of the crime. Thus, all of the appellants, having been proven that they
each took part in the accomplishment of the original design, are all equally liable
for the crime of Kidnapping with Homicide.

Lastly, this Court finds no error in the CA's modification of the penalty imposed by
the trial court. The penalty imposed by the trial court, which is Death is now
reduced toreclusion perpetua in accordance with Republic Act No. 9346.[45]

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated April 22, 2008 of the Court Appeals,
affirming with modification the Decision dated October 28, 2004 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Valenzuela City, Branch 171 is hereby AFFIRMED, with
further MODIFICATION that all the appellants herein are equally
found GUILTY of the special complex crime of Kidnapping with Homicide.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 140895. July 17, 2003]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. ALMA BISDA y GAUPO

and GENEROSA JENNY ROSE BASILAN y PAYAN, appellants.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Before this Court on automatic review is the Decision of the Regional Trial
[1]
Court (RTC) of Marikina City, Branch 272, convicting appellants Alma Bisda
and Generosa Jenny Rose Basilan, of kidnapping for ransom; sentencing
each of them to the extreme penalty of death by lethal injection, and ordering
them to indemnify the parents of the victim Angela Michelle Soriano the
amount of P100,000 as moral damages, and to pay the costs of the suit.
The Case
In an Amended Information docketed as Criminal Case No. 98-2647-MK,

the appellants were charged with the felony of kidnapping for ransom
committed as follows:
That on or about the 3rd of September 1998, in the City of Marikina, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating and helping one another, did there and then willfully, unlawfully,
feloniously and knowingly kidnap, detain and deprive ANGELA MICHELLE
SORIANO y SAN JUAN of her liberty for six (6) days for the purpose of extorting
ransom from her/or her family.
Contrary to law. [2]
When arraigned, the appellants, assisted by counsel, entered separate

pleas of not guilty. [3]
The Evidence for the Prosecution [4]
William Soriano, a training consultant by profession, and his wife Marymae

Soriano, had two children: Kathleen Denise and Angela Michelle. They rented
a house at No. 5 Col. Divino St., Concepcion, Marikina. Their landlady who
lived nearby had a telephone with number 942-49-18. During the school year
[5]
1997-1998, then five-year-old Angela was in Prep at the Mother of Divine

Providence School in Marikina Heights, Marikina City. The couple employed
Lea and Wendy Salingatog as the yayas of their children. Angela met
appellant Jenny Rose Basilan when the latter visited her niece Wendy in the
Soriano residence. Jenny Rose was, thus, no stranger to Angela.
About 11:00 a.m. on September 3, 1998, Angelas classes had just ended
and she was on her way to her school bus which was parked outside the
school campus near the exit gate. She was in her school uniform and wore
black shoes. Unknown to Angela, appellants Alma and Jenny Rose were
outside of the school gate waiting for her. When they saw Angela, Alma and
Jenny Rose proceeded to the gate and showed a visitors gate pass to the
security guard. They approached the young girl, and told her that her parents
were waiting for her at the Jollibee Restaurant. Angela initially refused to go
with the two women, but because Alma held on to her hand so tightly and
poked a knife at her, Angela had no choice but to go with them. They rode a
tricycle and went to the Jollibee Restaurant where Jenny Rose ordered
spaghetti for Angela. When Angela did not see her parents, she wondered
why she went with Jenny Rose and Alma in the first place. With Angela in tow,
Alma and Jenny Rose boarded a white taxi and went to a dirty house where
they changed Angelas clothes. The girl was made to wear blouse and shorts,
yellow t-shirt and a pair of panties. Alma and Jenny Rose took her
[6]
earrings. They fed her with the spaghetti they earlier bought at the
restaurant. Alma then left, leaving Angela and Jenny Rose in the house.
Jenny Rose sent Angela to sleep, and after a while, Alma returned. When
Angela woke up, Alma and Jenny Rose served her merienda and allowed her
to watch television. Henceforth, Angela was kept in the house. At one time,
Alma and Jenny Rose tied up Angelas hands and feet, and placed scotch
tape on her mouth. Angela was sometimes left alone in the house but the door
was kept locked. To pass the time, Angela watched television and made
drawings. Jenny Rose and Alma did not fail to feed and bathe Angela. Angela
did not call her parents through the telephone number of their landlady.
In the meantime, when William arrived home shortly before noon on that
day, Lea and Wendy told him that Angela had not yet arrived home from
school. He rushed to the school to fetch Angela, but was informed by the
school security guard that his daughter had already been picked up by two
women, one of whom was registered in the visitors slip as Aileen Corpuz.
Because he did not know anyone by that name, William immediately
proceeded to the registrars office to verify the information, only to find out that
Aileen Corpuz had earlier inquired at the said office about the possibility of
transferring Angela to another school. The school staff panicked when William
demanded to know how unknown persons were able to get his daughter. He
then started calling his friends and relatives to help him locate Angela. He also
sought the help of Rizza Hontiveros, a TV personality who promised to relay
his plea to the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF). The
school staff also reported the incident to the Marikina Police Force which
dispatched a team of investigators to the Soriano residence. [7]
When apprised of the incident, the PAOCTF organized a team headed by

then Chief Inspector Ricardo Dandan with SPO4 Tito Tuanggang, SPO1
Charles Larroza and civilian agent George Torrente, as members, to conduct
surveillance operations and to recover the victim and arrest the culprits. The
team proceeded to the Soriano residence and to Angelas school to conduct
an initial investigation.
At about 6:00 a.m. on September 4, 1998, Williams landlady went to his
apartment to tell him that a lady had called up earlier and left a message for
him: Pakisabi na lang kay Mr. Soriano na kakausapin ko siya bukas ng
umaga. When the landlady asked who the caller was, the voice replied, Hindi
na importante iyon. William thereafter convinced his landlady to have her
[8]
telephone set transferred to his residence to facilitate communication with his

daughters abductors. [9]
Shortly before midnight that same day, George arrived at the Soriano
residence and asked William if the kidnapper had already made contact.
William responded that a woman had earlier called, through his
landlady. George then instructed William to prolong the conversation should
the kidnapper call again, to enable the agents to establish the possible
location of the caller.
[10]
On September 5, 1998 at around 9:25 p.m., William received a call from an

unidentified woman who told him, Kung gusto mo pang makita yong anak mo,
maghanda ka ng five million pesos. He replied, Saan naman ako kukuha
ng five million? Alam mo naman na nakatira lang ako sa apartment. The
caller said, Hindi ko masasagotyan. Tatanungin ko na lang sa aking mga
boss. William informed George of his conversation with the caller. George
relayed the information by means of a hand-held radio to the other PAOCTF
operatives standing by. [11]
On September 7, 1998, at about 11:25 a.m., Marymae received a

telephone call from a woman demanding for ransom money. The caller called
two more times, at 7:00 p.m. and at 9:26 p.m. Marymae pleaded with the
caller to reduce the ransom money to P25,000, or if that was not possible, to
an amount not exceeding P50,000. The caller said, Hindi ko masasagot iyan.
Dadaihin na lang namin ang bata sa boss namin. Marymae relayed the
conversation to William, their other daughter Kathleen and to George. [12]
At about noon that day, PAOCTF Chief of Operations Superintendent

Michael Ray Aquino received a call from an anonymous source informing him
that a woman who had talked about a ransom and had acted in a suspicious
manner was spotted at the MSC Freight Service office located at No. 1303
Paz Street, Paco, Manila. Acting on the information, Ricardo, Charles, Tito
and other PAOCTF operatives swooped down on the place and saw a
woman, who turned out to be Alma Bisda, emerging from a small house at No.
1258 Paz Street, some fifty meters or so away from the said office. She had
just bought food from an adjacent store at No. 1246 Paz Street, Paco, Manila.
Surveillance operations were thereafter conducted.
At about 3:40 p.m. on September 8, 1998, George and Charles were at
the Soriano residence. Ricardo and Tito were in the periphery of Almas
house, monitoring her whereabouts and movements. Alma again left her
house and after locking the door, went to the small store nearby. She lifted the
telephone and called someone. The telephone in the Soriano residence rang.
When William lifted the receiver, he heard a voice similar to that of the woman
who had called him the first time. The caller was asking where the money
was. William told her that the P25,000 was ready, to which she replied, Hindi
ko masasagot iyan, dadalhin na lang namin ang bata sa aking boss. William
told the caller that he was willing to give P50,000 but pleaded that he be given
ample time to produce the money. The woman reiterated: Hindi ko masasagot
iyan.
[13]
Ricardo and Tito heard the sound of a car horn blowing while Alma was
using the telephone. Tito called up Charles and inquired whether he (Charles)
heard the same sound while William was talking to the caller. After William
hung up the telephone, he told George that he could hear the horn off a car
blowing in the background. George then called up Ricardo by phone and
relayed the information. When George inquired if Ricardo heard the sound of
the horn of a car while Alma was talking over the telephone, Ricardo replied in
the affirmative. The PAOCTF operatives concluded that Alma was the
kidnapper.
After making the call, Alma hung up the telephone and returned to her
house. The PAOCTF operatives followed. When Alma unlocked the door to
the house, the operatives accosted her. She tried to escape, to no avail. Tito
heard the cry of a child coming from inside the house, pleading for help: Tita
ilabas mo ako! He rushed to the house and saw the victim Angela. He then
[14]
carried her outside to safety. The agents searched the house for evidence and
found a pair of black shoes, a pair of panties, a yellow shirt, a set of blouse
and shorts with red, yellow and white stripes. The evidence was placed in a
plastic bag. The victim and the suspects were thereafter brought to the
[15]
PAOCTF office for proper documentation.

When informed that his daughter had already been rescued, William
rushed to the PAOCTF headquarters where he and Angela were reunited.
Angela identified Alma as her kidnapper. When William asked Alma why she
kidnapped Angela and what she would do with the one-million-peso ransom
she was demanding, she replied: Kuya, wag kang maghusga, pareho lang
tayong biktima. When William asked Alma: Biktima, saan? Alma replied: Ang
anak ko, kinidnap din nila.
[16]
Chief Inspector Dandan turned over to Evidence Custodian P02 Joseph
Bagsao, the pieces of evidence contained in a blue Shoe Mart (SM), plastic
bag which the operatives found in Almas house: a pair of black shoes, a pair
of panties, a yellow shirt, a set of white blouse and shorts with red, yellow and
white stripes, all of which were sized to fit a child of 4 to 7 years of age.
[17]
On October 19, 1998, an Information for kidnapping for ransom was filed
against Alma and Jane Doe.
On October 26, 1998, at around 11:00 a.m., Jenny Rose arrived at the
PAOCTF Headquarters in Camp Crame, and proceeded to P02 Joseph
Bagsaos office where she announcedthat she was one of Almas cohorts. P02
Bagsao took Jenny Roses fingerprints and entered the data in a fingerprint
index card. Jenny Rose was thereafter placed in a police line-up. Angela,
[18]
who arrived at the PAOCTF office with her father, identified Jenny Rose as
one of her kidnappers. Police Chief Inspector Atty. Aurelio C. Trampe, Jr., the
Legal and Investigation Division Chief of the PAOCTF, later referred Jenny
Rose to the Office of the City Prosecutor of Marikina City, for preliminary
investigation. [19]
The prosecutor later amended the Information by deleting the name Jane
Doe and substituting the name Jenny Rose Basilan y Payan as the second
accused.
Almas Evidence
Alma denied having kidnapped Angela for ransom. She testified that she
was married, and a resident of Block 38, Lot 38, G. Maliputo Street, Phase II,
Area 4, Kaunlaran Village, Navotas, Metro Manila. She was a businesswoman
who ran a local employment agency for household help. She was also
engaged in the business of buying and selling palay grains. Her local
employment agency was located in Navotas. She had another office at No.
1258 Paz Street, Paco, Manila, which served as a bodega for items she sent
to the province, as well as items she purchased. She had an adopted
daughter named Mary Rose, who, in September 1998, studied at Harris
School in Antipolo. She had employed Wendy Salingatog for a time as
the yaya of her adopted daughter. Alma was then residing in V. Luna Street,
Quezon City.
Alma employed Jenny Rose as secretary in her employment agency. In
payment for services rendered, Jenny Rose was sent to school at the Lyceum
of the Philippines to study B.S. Business Administration. She was also given an
allowance.
In September 1998, Alma was looking for a school run by nuns that would
be willing to accept her adopted daughter in the middle of the school year.
Jenny Rose suggested the Divine Providence School in Marikina City. In the
morning of September 3, 1998, Jenny Rose brought her to the said school.
They proceeded to the administration office where Alma inquired if the school
would allow her adopted daughter to enroll. When Jenny Rose and Alma were
about to leave, a little girl, who turned out to be Angela, approached them and
asked what Jenny Rose was doing in her school. Jenny Rose introduced
Angela to Alma as her niece, and informed Alma that she would be bringing
Angela with her to her boarding house in Espaa Street.
At that point, Alma asked Jenny Rose and Angela if they wanted to eat.
When they agreed, the three of them proceeded to the Jollibee Restaurant
near the Meralco office in Marikina City. After eating, Alma bade them
goodbye and was about to leave for her office when Jenny Rose asked if she
and Angela could come along with her to Cubao. She acceded to the request,
and they rode a Tamaraw FX taxi. Because Angela was getting sleepy, Alma
offered to bring them to Jennys boarding house in Espaa, and dropped them
off there. Alma thereafter proceeded to her office at 1258 Paz St., Paco,
Manila, where she had been holding office since January 1997, and arrived
thereat at about 2:00 p.m.
At or about 8:00 p.m. of the same day, Alma passed by Jenny Roses
boarding house to give her instructions on what to do the following day. She
saw Angela crying profusely. She told Jenny Rose to bring Angela home, but
Jenny Rose told her that Angelas parents would be coming to fetch
her. Thinking that Angela was probably bored, Alma suggested that they stay
in her office in Paco so that they could watch television while waiting for
Angelas parents. Jenny Rose agreed. They arrived at the said office at around
8:40 p.m. Alma left at around 10:00 p.m. and went home to her rented house
in Palmera Homes, Antipolo, where she stayed until September 6, 1998.
On September 7, 1998, at around 12:00 noon, Alma arrived at her office in
Paco, Manila, and found that Jenny Rose and Angela were still there. Jenny
Rose assured Alma that Angela would be fetched by her parents. At around
4:00 p.m., Alma instructed Jenny Rose to go to the province to collect some
debts, Jenny Rose left for the province on the same day. Alma stayed in the
office because she was having her menstrual period at the time and was not
feeling well. She took care of Angela while Jenny Rose was away.
The next day, September 8, 1998, Alma was still in her office with Angela.
At about 3:00 p.m., while she was watching television with Angela, someone
knocked at the door. When she opened it, two male persons entered. One of
them was Inspector Ricardo Dandan who showed her a photograph of Angela
and asked if she knew the child. Alma answered in the affirmative. Ricardo
then asked her, Dont you know that this is kidnapping? to which Alma replied,
I do not know. She also told Dandan that she did not know what was
happening to her. Suddenly, Alma was handcuffed. Angela cried and asked
Alma: What are they doing to you, Tita? She was brought to Camp Crame
where she was interrogated and detained. Alma did not make any telephone
calls that day. William, Marymae and Angela arrived at Almas detention cell.
When Angela saw her, the girl tried to run to Alma but William held on to his
daughter. William asked Alma why she took Angela, Alma replied that it was
Jenny Rose who brought the girl along with them. She told William that they
were both victims.
Sometime on October 26, 1998, Jenny Rose visited Alma to ask for
forgiveness and to assume full responsibility for the incident. Jenny Rose also
informed her that she wanted to ask forgiveness from the Sorianos so that she
could finish her schooling. It was only then that she realized what Jenny Rose
had done to her. Nevertheless, she still believed that Jenny Rose was a good
person. She advised her to go home and continue with her studies.
When Angelas sworn statement was shown to her, Alma noticed that
Angela did not mention Jenny Rose as one of the two persons who had
kidnapped her. Alma executed a handwritten statement denying the truth of
the contents of Angelas affidavit.[20]
Jenny Roses Evidence
Jenny Rose did not testify in her defense. She presented Atty. Aurelio
Trampe, Jr. as her witness who testified that he was the Legal and
[21]
Investigation Division Chief of the PAOCTF. On October 26, 1998, he

interviewed Jenny Rose when the latter surrendered to the task force. Jenny
Rose insisted that she wanted to help Alma and get all the blame for the
kidnapping. She wanted to admit her participation in the crime, and
volunteered the information that she and Alma kidnapped Angela. Atty.
Trampe, Jr. wrote a letter to the Department of Justice requesting for her
[22]
inclusion in the ongoing preliminary investigation. He believed that it would be

more appropriate for the prosecutor handling the case to investigate and
determine whether Jenny Rose was the Jane Doe referred to in the complaint.
Atty. Trampe, Jr. admitted, however, that aside from the voluntary surrender
of Jenny Rose, he did not have any other evidence to include her as one of
the suspects in the case. Further, he did not provide a lawyer for Jenny Rose
because he did not intend to conduct an exhaustive interrogation, and he
knew that even if she admitted her participation, the statement would not be
admitted as evidence. [23]
Jenny Rose adduced in evidence the letter of Atty. Trampe, Jr. to prove
that she voluntarily surrendered and that there was lack of evidence against
her.
On September 16, 1999, the trial court rendered judgment, the decretal
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the accused ALMA BISDA y

GAUPO and GENEROSA BASILAN y PAYAN are hereby found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom penalized under Article 267
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 7659 and is sentenced to suffer the
extreme penalty of DOUBLE DEATH by lethal injection, the two accused having
conspired in the commission thereof. They are further ordered to pay solidarily the
parents of the victim the amount of P100,000.00 as moral damages, and costs of the
suit.
SO ORDERED. [24]
The assigned errors ascribed by the appellants to the trial court may be
synthesized, thus: (a) the trial court erred in convicting the appellants of
kidnapping; (b) the trial court erred in sentencing the appellants to double
death. The Court will delve into and resolve the issues simultaneously.
[25]
The prosecution adduced

proof beyond reasonable
doubt that the appellants
kidnapped the victim.
The appellants aver that the prosecution failed to muster proof, beyond
reasonable doubt that, they kidnapped and illegally detained Angela. Angela
in fact voluntarily went with them, and she was free to roam around the house,
and to call her parents through the telephone of their landlady which Angela
knew by heart.
There is no proof beyond reasonable doubt that the appellants conspired
to kidnap Angela. Appellant Bisda avers that she is guilty only of slight illegal
detention under Article 268 of the Revised Penal Code because (a) Angela
stayed in her office for only three days; and (b) the circumstance of a female
offender and a female offended party is not one of those included in the
definition of kidnapping or serious illegal detention under Article 267 of the
RPC.
The trial courts reliance on Angelas testimony is misplaced because the
records do not show that Angela had the capacity to distinguish right from
wrong when she testified in open court. The appellants point out that she was
merely six years old at the time. Although Angela took an oath before she
testified, the trial judge failed to ask any questions to determine whether or not
she could distinguish right from wrong, and comprehend the obligation of
telling the truth before the court. Hence, one of the standards in determining
the credibility of a child witness was not followed. There is, thus, a veritable
doubt that Angela told the truth when she testified.
Moreover, Angelas testimony is, besides being inconsistent on material
points, contrary to ordinary human experience. Angela did not shout or
cry when she was forced to leave the school premises and brought to
the Jollibee Restaurant. Angela could have easily sought help from the
security guard at the exit gate of the school and from the customers in the
restaurant, or even from the tricycle and taxi drivers; but Angela did not.
Angela even admitted that she voluntarily went with the appellants. She did
not cry while detained in the office of appellant Bisda, and even admitted that
it was only that time when she was rescued that she cried. The conduct of
Angela, the appellants insist, is contrary to ordinary human experience,
knowledge and observation. By her own admission in her sworn statement to [26]
the PAOCTF agents, Angela was assisted by her parents while she was
giving the said statement. This raised doubts as to the veracity of her
testimony.
The contentions of the appellants are bereft of merit.
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act No.
7659 reads:
ART. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. Any private individual who shall

kidnap or detain another, or in any other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.
I. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days.
3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person
kidnapped or detained, or if threats to kill him shall have been made.
4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the
accused is any of the parents, female or a public officer.
When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped, or is

subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed. (As
amended by RA No. 7659). [27]
For the accused to be convicted of kidnapping or serious illegal detention,

the prosecution is burdened to prove beyond reasonable doubt all the
elements of the crime, namely, (1) the offender is a private individual; (2) he
kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner deprives the latter of his liberty;
(3) the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and (4) in the
commission of the offense any of the following circumstances is present:
(a) the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than three days; (b) it is
committed by simulating public authority; (c) any serious physical injuries are
inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are
made; or (d) the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female, or a public
officer. If the victim of kidnapping and serious illegal detention is a minor, the
[28]
duration of his detention is immaterial. Likewise, if the victim is kidnapped and

illegally detained for the purpose of extorting ransom, the duration of his
detention is immaterial. The word female in paragraph 1(4) of Article 267 of
[29]
the Revised Penal Code refers to the gender of the victim and not of the
offender.
The essence of the crime of kidnapping is the actual deprivation of the
victims liberty under any of the above-mentioned circumstances, coupled with
indubitable proof of intent of the accused to effect the same. There must be a
[30]
purposeful or knowing action by the accused to forcibly restrain the victim

because taking coupled with intent completes the offense. Kidnapping which
[31]
involves the detention of another is by its nature a continuing crime. [32]
The victims lack of consent is also a fundamental element of kidnapping.

The involuntariness of the seizure and detention is the very essence of the
crime. The general rule is that the prosecution is burdened to prove lack of
[33]
consent on the part of the victim. However, where the victim is a minor
especially if she is only five years old, lack of consent is presumed. She is
incompetent to assent to seizure and illegal detention. In this case, Angela
[34]
was merely five years old when she was kidnapped; thus incapable of giving
consent. The consent of such child could place the appellants in no better
position than if the act had been done against her will. The appellants cannot
rely on Angelas initial willingness to go along with them to the restaurant. As
Judge Shepherd stated in State v. Chisenhall: [35]
It is clear that the consent of the child, obtained by means of persuasion, is no defense,
since the result of such persuasion is just as great an evil as if it had been
accomplished by other means.
A kidnapper should not be rewarded with an acquittal simply because she

is ingenious enough to conceal her true motive from her victim until she is
able to transport the latter to another place.
Although Angela was free to roam around in the dirty house, to draw and
to watch television during the entire period of her detention, and was regularly
fed and bathed, the appellants are nevertheless guilty of kidnapping and
illegally detaining the five-year-old child. As Judge McGill of the United States
Court of Appeals said in United States v. McCabe ,to accept a childs desire
[36]
for food, comfort as the type of will or consent contemplated in the context of
kidnapping would render the concept meaningless.
In People v. Baldogo, this Court held that illegal serious detention under
[37]
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code as amended, includes not only the
imprisonment of a person but also the deprivation of her liberty in whatever
form and for whatever length of time. It includes a situation where the victim
cannot go out of the place of confinement or detention or is restricted or
impeded in his liberty to move. In this case, the door to the office of appellant
[38]
Bisda was locked while Angela was detained therein. Even if she wanted to
escape and go home, Angela, at her age, could not do so all by herself.
During the period of her confinement, Angela was under the control of the
appellants. The helpless child was waiting and hoping that she would be
brought home, or that her parents would come and fetch her.
The prosecution adduced proof beyond reasonable doubt that the
appellants conspired to kidnap and illegally detain Angela. The appellants
testimonies even buttressed the testimonies of both the victim and the other
witnesses for the prosecution.
Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code provides that there is conspiracy
when two or more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to commit it.

In People v. Pagalasan, this Court held that conspiracy need not be proven
[39] [40]
by direct evidence. It may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before,
during and after the commission of the crime, showing that they had acted
with a common purpose and design. Conspiracy may be implied if it is
[41]
proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts towards the
accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their
combined acts, though apparently independent of each other were, in fact,
connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association
and a concurrence of sentiment. Conspiracy once found, continues until the
object of it has been accomplished unless abandoned or broken up. To hold
[42]
an accused guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he must be

shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the
complicity. There must be intentional participation in the transaction with a
[43]
view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose. [44]
Each conspirator is responsible for everything done by his confederates

which follows incidentally in the execution of a common design as one of its
probable and natural consequences even though it was not intended as part
of the original design. Responsibility of a conspirator is not confined to the
[45]
accomplishment of a particular purpose of conspiracy but extends to collateral

acts and offenses incident to and growing out of the purpose intended.
Conspirators are held to have intended the consequences of their acts and
[46]
by purposely engaging in conspiracy which necessarily and directly produces

a prohibited result, they are, in contemplation of law, chargeable with
intending that result. Conspirators are necessarily liable for the acts of
[47]
another conspirator unless such act differs radically and substantively from
that which they intended to commit. As Judge Learned Hand put it in United
[48]
States v. Andolscheck, when a conspirator embarks upon a criminal venture

[49]
of indefinite outline, he takes his chances as to its content and membership,

so be it that they fall within the common purposes as he understands them.
The appellants enveigled Angela into going with them by telling her that
her parents were waiting for her at the Jollibee Restaurant. Appellant Bisda
poked a knife at Angela and held her hands so tightly that the helpless child
had no recourse but to come along. The appellants transported Angela on
board a taxi and brought her to Cubao, and then to appellant Bisdas office at
No. 1258 Paz St., Paco, Manila. The appellants tied her hands, covered her
mouth with scotch tape, and detained her from September 3, 1998 until
September 8, 1998, when she was providentially rescued by the operatives of
the PAOCTF.
The collective, concerted and synchronized acts of the appellants before,
during and after the kidnapping and the illegal detention of Angela constitute
indubitable proof that the appellants conspired with each other to attain a
common objective, i.e., to kidnap Angela and detain her illegally. The
appellants are thus principals by direct participation in the kidnapping of
Angela and illegally detaining her.
Appellant Basilan cannot escape conviction for the crime charged on her
barefaced claim that she merely accompanied appellant Bisda to the latters
office with the victim in tow. The records show that the appellant presented as
her sole witness Atty. Aurelio Trampe, Jr., then PAOCTF Legal and
Investigation Division Chief, who testified that when she surrendered to him,
the appellant admitted that she and appellant Bisda had kidnapped Angela:
ATTY. SALAMERA:
This court would like to be cleared (sic). Did she admit to you the condition of the
alleged kidnapping on September 3, 1998?
WITNESS:
She volunteered that statement that she was together with Ms. Alma Besda (sic)
kidnap (sic) Angela Michelle Soriano.[50]
The appellants contention that the prosecution failed to establish that

Angela understood the nature of an oath and the need for her to tell the truth
must fail.
Section 1, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of evidence provides that the
examination of witnesses shall be under oath or affirmation: [51]
SECTION 1. Examination to be done in open court. The examination of witnesses

presented in a trial or hearing shall be done in open court, and under oath or
affirmation. Unless the witness is incapacitated to speak, or the question calls for a
different mode of answer, the answers of the witness shall be given orally. (1a). [52]
An oath is defined as an outward pledge, given by the person taking it that

his attestation or promise is made under an immediate sense of his
responsibility to God. The object of the rule is to affect the conscience of the
[53]
witness and thus compel him to speak the truth, and also to lay him open to
punishment for perjury in case he willfully falsifies. A witness must be
[54]
sensible to the obligation of an oath before he can be permitted to testify. It is [55]
not, however, essential that he knows how he will be punished if he testify

falsely. Under modem statutes, a person is not disqualified as a witness
[56]
simply because he is unable to tell the nature of the oath administered to a

witness. In order that one may be competent as a witness, it is not necessary
[57]
that he has a definite knowledge of the difference between his duty to tell the
truth after being sworn and before, or that he be able to state it, but it is
necessary that he be conscious that there is a difference. It cannot be argued
[58]
that simply because a child witness is not examined on the nature of the oath
and the need for her to tell the whole truth, the competency of the witness and
the truth of her testimony are impaired. If a party against whom a witness is
presented believes that the witness is incompetent or is not aware of his
obligation and responsibility to tell the truth and the consequence of him
testifying falsely, such party may pray for leave to conduct a voire
dire examination on such witness to test his competency. The court [59]
may motu proprio conduct the voir dire examination. In United States v.

Buncad, this Court held that when a child of tender age is presented as a
[60]
witness, it is the duty of the judge to examine the child to determine his
competency. In Republic v. Court of Appeals, this Court held that:
[61]
[W]hen a witness is produced, it is a right and privilege accorded to the adverse party
to object to his examination on the ground of incompetency to testify. If a party knows
before trial that a witness is incompetent, objection must be made before trial that a
witness is incompetent, objection must be made before he has given any testimony; if
the incompetency appears on the trial, it must be interposed as soon as it becomes
apparent.[62]
The competency of a person to take the prescribed oath is a question for

the trial court to decide.[63]
If a party admits proof to be taken in a case without an oath, after the

testimony has been acted upon by the court, and made the basis of a
judgment, such party can no longer object to the admissibility of the said
testimony. He is estopped from raising the issue in the appellate court. This
[64]
was the ruling of this Court in Republic v. Court of Appeals, thus: [65]
Simply put, any objection to the admissibility of evidence should be made at the time
such evidence is offered or as soon thereafter as the objection to its admissibility
becomes apparent, otherwise the objection will be considered waived and such
evidence will form part of the records of the case as competent and admissible
evidence. The failure of petitioner to interpose a timely objection to the presentation
of Divinaflors testimony results in the waiver of any objection to the admissibility
thereof and he is therefore barred from raising said issue on appeal.
In this case, Angela was six years old when she testified. She took an oath to
[66]
tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth before she testified on
direct examination. There was nary a whimper of protest or objection on the
part of the appellants to Angelas competence as a witness and the
prosecutions failure to propound questions to determine whether Angela
understood her obligation and responsibility of telling the truth respecting the
matter of her testimony before the court. The appellants did not even bother
requesting the trial court for leave to conduct a voir dire examination of
Angela. After the prosecution terminated its direct examination, the appellants
thereafter cross-examined Angela extensively and intensively on the matter of
her testimony on direct examination. It was only in this Court that the
appellants raised the matter for the first time, that there was failure on the part
of the prosecution to examine Angela on the nature of her oath, and to
ascertain whether she had the capacity to distinguish right from wrong. It is
too late in the day for the appellants to raise the issue.
The determination of the competence and capability of a child as a witness
rests primarily with the trial judge. The trial court correctly found Angela a
[67]
competent witness and her testimony entitled to full probative weight. Any
child regardless of age, can be a competent witness if she can perceive and
perceiving, can make known to others, and that she is capable of relating
truthfully facts for which she is examined. In People v. Mendiola, this Court
[68] [69]
found the six-year-old victim competent and her testimony credible. Also
in Dulla v. Court of Appeals, this Court gave credence to the testimony of a
[70]
three-year-old victim. It has been the consistent ruling of the Court that the
findings of facts of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of witnesses
and its assessment of the probative weight thereof, as well as its conclusions
anchored on said findings are accorded by the appellate courts high respect if
not conclusive effect absent clear and convincing evidence that the trial court
ignored, misconstrued, or misinterpreted cogent facts and circumstances
which if considered warrants a reversal or modification of the outcome of the
case. In this case, the Court finds no basis to deviate from the findings and
[71]
conclusions of the trial court on the competency of Angela, and the probative
weight of her testimony.
Appellants must come to grips with case law that testimonies of child
victims are given full weight and credit. The testimony of children of sound
mind is likewise to be more correct and truthful than that of older persons.

In People vs. Alba, this Court ruled that children of sound mind are likely
[72] [73]
to be more observant of incidents which take place within their view than older
persons, and their testimonies are likely more correct in detail than that of
older persons. Angela was barely six years old when she testified.
Considering her tender years, innocent and guileless, it is incredible that
Angela would testify falsely that the appellants took her from the school
through threats and detained her in the dirty house for five days. In People v.
Dela Cruz, this Court also ruled that ample margin of error
[74]
and understanding should be accorded to young witnesses who, much more

than adults, would be gripped with tension due to the novelty and the
experience in testifying before the trial court.
The credibility of Angela and the verisimilitude of her testimony is not
impaired by her failure to shout for help when the appellants took her, or to
make any attempt to call her parents or to escape from her captors and to use
the telephone to call her parents. At five years old, she could not be expected
to act and react to her kidnapping and detention like an adult should. She did
not shout and seek help from the school security guards because the
appellants told Angela that her parents were waiting for her. Appellant Basilan
was the niece of Angelas yaya. She then believed that nothing was amiss. It
was only when she failed to see her parents that Angela blamed herself for
going with the appellants in the first place.
Atty. Laracas:
Now, they told you that your parents were at Jollibee. When you did not see your
parents, what did you do?
Witness:
I told myself, why did I go with them.
Atty. Laracas:
So you just told that to yourself?
Witness:
Yes, maam.
Atty. Laracas:
So initially, Angela, you are not blaming yourself when you went with Jenny Rose?
Witness:
Yes, maam.[75]
The evidence on record shows that appellant Bisda poked a knife at

Angela and her hands were held tightly by the appellants as they proceeded
to the restaurant from the school. Although the Soriano spouses were by
Angelas side when the latter gave her sworn statement in the PAOCTF [76]
office, there is no showing on record that the spouses ever influenced their
daughter to prevaricate. Significantly, the appellants counsel did not even
cross-examine Angela on her sworn statement.
In this case, appellant Bisda asserts that Angelas testimony contains four
inconsistencies on material points; hence, is incredible. First, Angela testified
on cross-examination that the appellants approached her but she did not talk
to them. In contrast, Angela testified on cross-examination that she saw
[77]
appellant Basilan, and talked to her. Second, Angela testified on direct

[78]
examination that she first came to know the identities of the kidnappers when
she was brought to the dirty house. Angela contradicted herself when she
[79]
testified on cross-examination that when she was brought to the said house,
she already knew appellant Basilan. Third, Angela testified on direct
[80]
examination that she went with the appellants to the Jollibee Restaurant when
they held her hands firmly. On cross-examination, Angela testified that the
[81]
appellants threatened her when they kidnapped her by pointing a knife at her
which made her cry. Angela further contradicted herself when she testified on
[82]
direct examination that the appellants pointed a knife at her one night.
Fourth, Angela said that when she was in the office of appellant Bisda in
[83]
Paco, Manila, her feet were tied and her mouth was covered with scotch tape.

However, on cross-examination, Angela revealed that she was free to roam
[84]
around and even watched television and made drawings. [85]
Anent the first and second set of inconsistencies adverted to by the

appellants, the same pertain only to minor and peripheral matters and not to
the principal occurrence or the elements of the crime charged, and the
positive identification of the appellants. Hence, the credibility of Angela, and
that of her testimony were not impaired by the said inconsistencies. The [86]
inscrutable fact is that the appellants took the victim from the school and
detained her at the office of appellant Bisda at No. 1258 Paz St., Paco,
Manila, until she was rescued. Whether or not Angela talked with the
appellants as she was being brought to the restaurant or that she came to
know of the identities of the kidnappers before or when she was brought to the
dirty house, are inconsequential. The overwhelming evidence on record is that
no other than the appellants kidnapped her from her school and illegally
detained her from September 3 to 8, 1998. Indeed, when asked to point and
identify her kidnappers, Angela did so spontaneously and positively. [87]
Pros. Junio:
If you see... this Alma Besda (sic), if you will be able to see her again, if you see her
again, will you be able to recognize her?
Witness:
Yes, maam.
Pros. Junio:
Will you point to her.
(The witness is pointing to a lady, seated at the second from the left at the corner at the
last seat.)
Court:
Identify yourself.
(The person pointed to, stood up and identified herself as Alma Besda [sic]).
Pros. Junio:
What about Jenny Rose, will you be able to recognize her?
Witness:
Yes, maam.
Pros. Junio:
You point to her Angel.
(The witness is pointing to the first lady seated on the left side)
Court:
Stand up and identify yourself.
The lady stood up and identified herself as Jenny Rose Basilan.[88]
Appellant Basilan did not controvert the evidence of the prosecution that she
was the niece of the yaya of the victim, and that the said appellant, at one
time, went to the Soriano residence where Angela saw and met her. The
victim was, thus, acquainted with appellant Basilan even before the
kidnapping.
Angela testified on direct examination, thus:
Atty. Junio:
So when Alma and Jenny Rose told you that Mommy and Daddy were at Jollibee,
what did you do?
Witness:
I did not want to go with them but they held me firm.
Pros. Junio:
What part of the body did they hold firmly?
Witness:
My hands.
Pros. Junio:
After Alma and Jenny Rose held your hand firmly, what did, where did you go?
Witness:
To Jollibee.[89]
Angela was not asked by the public prosecutor whether or not the
appellants threatened her with any weapon before proceeding to the Jollibee
Restaurant. The additional fact was revealed by Angela, ironically, on cross-
examination:
Atty. Salamera:
Now, were you threatened on September 3 at around eleven in the morning when
both accused allegedly abducted you?
Witness:
Yes, sir.
Atty. Salamera:
There are two accused, who threatened you?
Witness:
They pointed knife against me.
Atty. Salamera:
Who pointed the knife upon your person?
Witness:
Alma, sir.
Atty. Salamera:
Did you cry?
Witness:
Yes, sir.
Atty. Salamera:
Did you also cry inside the Jollibee?
Witness:
No, sir.
Atty. Salamera:
Was Alma still holding a knife at the Jollibee?
Witness:
No, sir.[90]
The prosecutor tried on re-direct to take advantage of Angelas revelation

but the appellants counsel, realizing that he had just committed a faux
pas, objected to the questions of the public prosecutor. It turned out that the
latter was himself confused because instead of adverting to a knife, as
testified to by Angela, he blurted that appellant Bisda used a gun in
intimidating the victim. Even Angela must have been bewildered by the
repartees of the prosecution and the appellants counsel such that, instead of
answering one time, to the questions of the prosecutor, she said one night.
Redirect:
Pros. Junio:
Angel, how many times did Alma and Jenny Rose point a knife at you?
Atty. Salamera:
Objection. Improper at this point in time. First it was not covered.
Pros. Junio:
How many times did Alma point a gun?
Atty. Salamera:
Knife, your Honor.
Pros. Junio:
It was covered on cross.
Court:
Objection denied. Overruled. Witness may answer.
Witness:
One night.[91]
There was, thus, no inconsistency in Angelas testimony on this point.

Angelas hands were tied, and her mouth was covered with scotch tape the
day after she was brought to the dirty house. Angela testified on direct
examination, thus:
Pros. Junio:
Okay, where did you go?
Witness:
To the dirty house.
Pros. Junio:
Who was with you or who were with you at that time?
Witness:
Alma Besda (sic) and Jenny Rose, maam.
Pros. Junio:
Where is this dirty house located?
Witness:
I do not know, maam.
Pros. Junio:
Upon arriving at that dirty house, what did you do?
Witness:
They changed my clothes once.
Pros. Junio:
Do you remember the color of the dress?
Witness:
No, maam.
Pros. Junio:
After they changed your dress or your clothes, what happened next? What did they
do to you?
Witness:
They fed me, maam.
Pros. Junio:
After they fed you, what did you do?
Witness:
They send (sic) me to sleep.
Pros. Junio:
When you woke up, what did they do to you?
Witness:
They fed me (pinamiryenda) (sic)
Pros. Junio:
After you ate your miryenda (sic) what else did they do to you?
Witness:
They allowed me to watch tv, maam.
Pros. Junio:
What about your hands, your mouth, what did they do?
Witness:
They tied my hands.
Pros. Junio;
And your mouth?
Witness:
It was sealed with scotch tape.
Pros. Junio;
And your feet?
Witness:
They were also tied, maam.
Pros. Junio:
Who tied your hands?
Witness:
The two of them, maam.
Pros. Junio:
Will you mention their names again?
Witness:
Alma Besda (sic) and Jenny Rose.[92]
On cross-examination, Angela testified that on the day she was rescued, she
could watch the television, make drawings and roam around the room:
Atty. Larracas:
You did . . . At that time you were allegedly rescued, Jenny Rose was not at the
place where you were rescued?
Witness:
She was not there, maam.
Atty. Larracas:
All along you were watching tv (sic) at the place where you were taken?
Witness:
Only once, maam.
Atty. Larracas:
And when you were not watching tv (sic), what were you doing Angela in that dirty
house?
Witness:
I was drawing, maam.
Atty. Larracas:
So you watched tv once and the rest of the time you were drawing?
Witness:
Yes, maam.
Atty. Larracas:
Of course, you cannot draw if your hands were tied, Angela?
Witness:
Yes, mam.
Atty. Larracas:
So your hands were not tied?
Witness:
No, maam.
Atty. Larracas:
You can move along freely at that time?
Witness:
Yes, maam.
Atty. Larracas:
You can walk?
Witness:
Yes, maam.
Atty. Larracas:
You can drink?
Witness:
Yes, maam.
Atty. Larracas:
Of course, you cannot walk if your feet were tied and cannot drink if your mouth was
sealed?
Witness:
Yes, maam.
Atty. Larracas:
When the police arrived, what were you doing?
Witness:
I cried, maam.[93]
It is not quite clear whether the counsel for the appellants were asking about
Angelas activities during her detention, or during her rescue. Taking into
account Angelas answers, it is evident that her hands were tied and her
mouth covered with scotch tape the day after she was kidnapped, but that she
was free to roam around the room, practice on her drawings and watch
television during the rest of the period of her detention.
PROPER PENALTIES
The appellants aver that the prosecution failed to prove that in kidnapping
and illegally detaining the victim, they intended to demand ransom from her
parents. William Soriano, the victims father, failed to prove that the appellants
or any of them called through the telephone demanding ransom. The
collective testimonies of police operatives Tito Tuanggang, Ricardo Dandan
and George Torrente were hearsay evidence; hence, barren of probative
weight. The trial court likewise failed to take into account the voluntary
surrender of appellant Basilan.
The Office of the Solicitor General, for its part, posits the view that the
prosecution mustered the requisite quantum of evidence to prove that the
appellants and no other demanded ransom from the parents of the victim.
The appellants contention does not hold water. Admittedly, the
prosecution failed to adduce direct evidence that the appellants demanded
ransom for the release of the victim. However, the prosecution adduced
circumstantial evidence to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the appellants,
or at least one of them, demanded ransom from the Soriano spouses for
the release of their daughter.
To warrant the imposition of the death penalty for the crime of kidnapping
and serious illegal detention for ransom, the prosecution must prove beyond
reasonable doubt: (a) intent on the part of the accused to deprive the victim of
his liberty; (b) actual deprivation of the victim of his liberty; and (c) motive of
the accused, which is ransom for the victim or other person for the release of
the victim. The purpose of the offender in extorting ransom is a qualifying
circumstance which may be proved by his words and overt acts before, during
and after the kidnapping and detention of the victim. Neither actual demand
[94]
for nor actual payment of ransom is necessary for the crime to be committed.

Ransom as employed in the law is so used in its common or ordinary sense;
[95]
meaning, a sum of money or other thing of value, price, or consideration paid

or demanded for redemption of a kidnapped or detained person, a payment
that releases from captivity. It may include benefits not necessarily pecuniary
[96]
which may accrue to the kidnapper as a condition for the release of the victim.
[97]
Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to prove the qualifying circumstance if

(a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the
inferences are proven; (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as
to produce a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. The circumstances
proved should constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and
reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused to the exclusion of others as
the one who demanded ransom. The circumstances proved must be
consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is
guilty, and that at the same time inconsistent with any other hypothesis
except that of guilty. The prosecution must rely on the strength of its evidence
[98]
and not on the weakness of that of the appellants. [99]
In this case, the chain of circumstantial evidence adduced by the

prosecution proves that no one other than the appellants or one of them called
up the spouses Soriano through the telephone and demanded ransom of
P5,000,000:
1. Appellant Basilan is the niece of Wendy Salingatog, who was for a time
the housemaid of appellant Bisda;
2. The appellants kidnapped Angela shortly before noon on September 3,
1998, and detained her at No. 1258 Paz Street, Paco, Manila, where appellant
Bisda held office;
3. The following morning, William was informed by his landlady that a
woman had earlier called up over the telephone requesting her to inform
William that she (the caller), would call again the next day, September 5,
1998;
4. On September 5, 1998, William received a telephone call from a woman
demanding a ransom of P5,000,000 for Angelas freedom. When William
complained that he did not have the amount, she told William that she cannot
be responsible for it and that she would inquire from her bosses. Williams
testimony reads:
Pros. Junio:
And what did she tell you?
Witness:
She told me KUNG GUSTO MO PANG MAKITA IYONG ANAK MO, MAGHANDA
KA NG FIVE MILLION PESOS.
Pros. Junio:
What did you told (sic) her if any?
Witness:
SAAN AKO KUKUHA NG FIVE MILLION PESOS? ALAM MO NAMAN NA
NAKATIRA LANG AKO SA APARTMENT.
Pros. Junio:
What did she say?
Witness:
She answered, HINDI KO MASASAGOT YAN.
Pros. Junio:
Did she tell you why she could not respond to you?
Witness:
She continued to say TATANUNGIN KO NA LANG SA AKING MGA BOSS.[100]
5. In the morning of September 7, 1998, Inspector Ricardo Dandan and

SPO4 Tito Tuanggang, acting on an anonymous tip, rushed to the vicinity of
No. 1303 Paz Street, Paco, Manila, the office of the MSC Freight Service, to
conduct surveillance operations. Later in the afternoon, they saw appellant
Bisda emerging from a small house about fifty meters from the office of the
MSC Freight Service;
6. At about 3:40 p.m. on September 8, 1998, appellant Bisda emerged
from the house at No. 1258 Paz Street, and went to the small store near the
house. Chief Inspector Dandan and Tito Tuanggang were about two meters
from the store and saw appellant Bisda enter the same, lift the telephone and
talk to someone over the telephone;
7. At about the same time, William received a telephone call from a
woman demanding where the money was and when William replied that he
was ready with P25,000, the woman replied: Hindi ko masasagot iyan,
dadalhin na lang namin ang bata sa aking boss. When William intimated that
he could raise P50,000 but pleaded for more time to produce the amount, the
woman retorted: Hindi ko masasagot iyan. Williams testimony reads:
Pros. Junio:
On September 8, 1998, at about 3:40 in the afternoon, what happened if any?
Witness:
At around 3:40 in the afternoon of September 8, a lady caller called again. I
answered the telephone.
Pros. Junio:
Who was this lady caller?
Witness:
I would say, my perception is it was the same lady caller who called the first time I
answered the telephone.
Pros. Junio:
And what did she tell you?
Witness:
And she told me where is the money.
Pros. Junio:
And what did you tell her?
Witness:
And I also told her if its okey with you, my twenty-five is ready.
Pros. Junio:
Then what did she say?
Witness:
She said HINDI KO MASASAGOT IYAN, DADALIN NA LANG NAMIN ANG BATA
SA AKING BOSS.
Pros. Junio:
What happened next after that?
Witness:
I would like to plead that I will make it fifty thousand, just give me ample time.
Pros. Junio:
How did she react to your suggestion?
Witness:
HINDI KO MASASAGOT IYAN. Then she hanged (sic) the phone.[101]
8. After making the telephone call, appellant Bisda left the store and
returned to the house at No. 1258 Paz Street, Paco, Manila;
9. The operatives from the PAOCTF followed appellant Bisda and
confronted her before she could enter the house. The operatives then barged
into the premises of No. 1258 Paz Street where they saw Angela in the room;
10. When William arrived at the PAOCTF office, with Angela that day, he
inquired from appellant Bisda why she kidnapped Angela and what she would
do with the P5,000,000 ransom she was demanding, and the appellant
replied: Kuya, wag (sic) kang nang maghusga, pareho lang tayong
biktima. When William asked Alma: Biktima, saan? The appellant
replied: Ang anak ko, kinidnap din nila.
In light of the foregoing facts, there can be no other conclusion than that
appellant Bisda demanded a ransom of P5,000,000 from William Soriano;
hence, she is GUILTY of kidnapping for ransom. Being a conspirator,
appellant Basilan is also guilty of the said crime. The penalty for kidnapping
for ransom is death, a single and indivisible penalty. The aggravating
circumstance of use of a motor vehicle under Article 14, paragraph 20 of the
Revised Penal Code was attendant in the commission of the crime.

However, said circumstance, as well as the voluntary surrender of appellant
[102]
Basilan, are inconsequential in the penalties to be imposed on the said

appellants, conformably to Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code. [103]
CIVIL LIABILITIES OF THE APPELLANTS
The trial court awarded P100,000 moral damages to the spouses William
and Marymae Soriano, the parents of the victim. The trial court did not award
any moral and exemplary damages to the victim. The decision of the trial court
has to be modified. Under Article 2219, paragraph 7, of the New Civil Code,
moral damages may be awarded to a victim of illegal arrest and detention. In
this case, the appellants poked a knife on the victim as they took her from the
school. The appellants also tied her hands, and placed scotch tape on her
mouth. The hapless victim was so shocked when operatives of the PAOCTF
barged into the office of appellant Bisda, and took custody of the victim that
she cried profusely. The victim suffered trauma, mental, physical and
psychological ordeal. There is, thus, sufficient basis for an award of moral
damages in the amount of P300,000. Since there were demands for ransom,
[104]
not to mention the use by the appellants of a vehicle to transport the victim
from the school to the Jollibee Restaurant and to the office of appellant Bisda,
the victim is entitled to exemplary damages in the amount of P100,000.

Although the victim claims that the appellants took her earrings, the
[105]
prosecution failed to prove the value of the same.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Marikina City, Branch 272, is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. The
appellants, Alma Bisda and Generosa Jenny Rose Basilan, are found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of kidnapping for ransom under paragraph 4 and
the last paragraph of Article 267, of the Revised Penal Code, and are
sentenced to suffer the penalty of death by lethal injection. The appellants are
hereby directed to pay jointly and severally to the victim Angela Michelle
Soriano the amount of P300,000 by way of moral damages and P 100,000 by
way of exemplary damages. Costs against the appellants.
Three Justices of the Court maintain their position that Rep. Act
No. 7659 is unconstitutional insofar as it prescribes the death penalty;
nevertheless, they submit to the ruling of the majority that the law is
constitutional, and that the death penalty can be lawfully imposed in the case
at bar.
In accordance with Section 25 of Rep. Act No. 7659 amending Section 83
of the Revised Penal Code, let the records of this case be forthwith forwarded,
upon finality of this Decision, to the Office of the President for possible
exercise of the pardoning power. Costs against the appellants.
SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 179943
Appellee,
Present:

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
-versus- CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA, and
PERALTA, JJ.

MARLON ALBERT Promulgated:
DE LEON yHOMO,
Appellant. June 26, 2009

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This is an appeal from the Decision [1] of the Court of Appeals (CA),
affirming with modification the Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 76, San Mateo, Rizal, finding appellant Marlon Lambert De Leon y Homo
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide.

The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows:

According to the prosecution, in the early morning, around 2 o'clock of
January 7, 2000, Eduardo Zulueta and Fortunato Lacambra III, both gasoline
boys; Julieta Amistoso, cashier; and Edralin Macahis, security guard; all
employees of Energex Gasoline Station, located at Barangay Guinayan, San
Mateo, Rizal, were on duty when a mint green-colored Tamaraw FX arrived for
service at the said gasoline station.[3]

Eduardo Zulueta was the one who attended to the said vehicle. He went to
the drivers side in order to take the key of the vehicle from the driver so that he
could open the gas tank. He saw through the lowered window shield that there
were about six to seven persons aboard the vehicle. He proceeded to fill up P50.00
worth of diesel in the gas tank.After doing this, he returned the key to the
driver. While returning the key, the driver told him that the engine of the vehicle
would not start.[4] Eduardo Zulueta offered to give the vehicle a push. While
Eduardo Zulueta and fellow gasoline boy Fortunato Lacambra III were positioned
at the back of the vehicle, ready to push the same, the six male passengers of the
same vehicle, except the driver, alighted and announced a hold-up. They were
armed with a shotgun and .38 caliber pistol.[5]

Fortunato Lacambra III was ordered to lie down, [6] while Eduardo Zulueta
was directed to go near the Car Wash Section. [7] At that instance, guns were poked
at them.[8]

Appellant, who guarded Eduardo Zulueta, poked a gun at the latter and took
the latter's wallet containing a pawnshop ticket and P50.00, while the companion
of the former, hit the latter on his nape with a gun.[9]

Meanwhile, four members of the group went to the cashier's office and took
the money worth P3,000.00.[10] Those four robbers were also the ones who shot
Edralin Macahis in the stomach.[11] Thereafter, the same robbers took Edralin
Macahis' service firearm.[12]

After he heard successive gunshots, Eduardo Zulueta saw appellant and his
companions immediately leave the place.[13] The robbers boarded the same vehicle
and proceeded toward San Mateo, Rizal.[14] When the robbers left, Eduardo Zulueta
stood up and found Julieta Amistoso, who told him that the robbers took her bag
and jewelry. He also saw that Edralin Macahis had a gunshot wound in the
stomach. He immediately hailed a vehicle which transported the injured Edralin
Macahis to the hospital.[15] Later on, Edralin Macahis died at the hospital due to the
gunshot wound.[16]

The following day, Eduardo Zulueta identified appellant as one of the
robbers who poked a gun at him.[17]

However, according to appellant, from January 4 to 6, 2000, he stayed at the
house of his Tita Emma at Pantok, Binangonan, Rizal, helping the latter in her
canteen. On the evening of January 6, at approximately 9 o'clock, appellant asked
permission from his Tita Emma to go to Antipolo. Catherine Homo, appellant's
cousin and the latter's younger brother, accompanied appellant to the
terminal. While waiting for a ride, the vehicle, a Tamaraw FX, of a certain
Christian Gersalia, a relative of appellant and Catherine Homo, passed
by. Catherine Homo asked Christian Gersalia if he would allow appellant to hitch a
ride on his vehicle. Christian Gersalia agreed. Aside from Christian Gersalia, there
were other passengers in the said vehicle.[18]

When the vehicle reached Masinag, where appellant was supposed to alight,
he was not allowed to do so; instead, he was asked by the other passengers to join
them in their destination. While on the road, appellant fell asleep. When he woke
up, they were in a gasoline station. He then saw Christian Gersalia and the other
passengers conducting a hold-up. He never left the vehicle and was not able to do
anything because he was overwhelmed with fear. After he heard the gunshots,
Christian Gersalia and the other passengers went to the vehicle and proceeded
towards Marikina. On their way, they were followed by policemen who fired at
them. The other passengers fired back at the policemen. It was then that the vehicle
hit a wall prompting the other passengers to scamper in different directions leaving
him behind. When the policemen arrived, he was immediately arrested.[19]

As a result of the above incident, four Informations for Robbery with
Homicide were filed against appellant, Rudy Gersalia, Christian Gersalia, Dondon
Brenvuela, Jonathan Brenvuela, Pantoy Servantes, an alias Rey, an alias Jonard, an
alias Precie, and an alias Renato, which read as:

Criminal Case No. 4747

th
That on or about the 7 day of January 2000, in the Municipality
of San Mateo, Province of Rizal, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and
confederating together with Rudy Gersalia, Christian Gersalia, Dondon
Brenvuela, Jonathan Brenvuela, Pantoy Servantes, Alias Rey, Alias
Jonard, Alias Precie and Alias Renato whose true names, identities and
present whereabouts are still unknown and still at-large, and conspiring
and mutually helping and assisting one another, while armed with
unlicensed firearms and acting as a band, with intent of gain with
aggravating circumstances of treachery, abuse of superior strength and
using disguise, fraud or craft and taking advantage of nighttime, and by
means of motor vehicle and by means of force, violence and
intimidation, employed upon ENERGEX GASOLINE STATION,
owned by Regino C. Natividad, and represented by Macario C.
Natividad, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously rob,
steal and carry away its cash earnings worth P3,000.00, to the damage
and prejudice of said Energex Gasoline Station in the aforesaid amount
of P3,000.00 and on the occasion of the said robbery, the above-named
accused, while armed with unlicensed firearms with intent to kill,
conspiring and confederating together with Rudy Gersalia, Christian
Gersalia, Dondon Brenvuela, Jonathan Brenvuela, Pantoy Servantes,
Alias Rey, Alias Jonard, Alias Precie and Alias Renato, whose true
names, identities and present whereabouts are still unknown and still at-
large, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and shoot one EDRALIN MACAHIS, a Security Guard of
Energex Gasoline Station, thereby inflicting upon him gunshot wound on
his trunk which directly caused his death.

Contrary to law.


That on or about the 7th day of January 2000 in the Municipality of
San Mateo, Province of Rizal, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and
confederating , together with Rudy Gersalia, Christian Gersalia, Dondon
Jonard, Alias Precie and Alias Renato, whose true names, identities and
present whereabouts are still unknown and still at-large and conspiring
unlicensed firearms and acting as a band, with intent of gain, with
means of a motor vehicle and by means of force, violence and
intimidation, employed upon the person of JULIETA A. AMISTOSO,
the Cashier of Energex Gasoline Station, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously rob, steal and carry away the following, to
wit:

a) One (1) ladies ring with sapphire stone valued at P1,500.00
b) One (1) Omac ladies wristwatch valued at P2,000.00
c) Guess black bag valued at P500.00
d) Leather wallet valued at P150.00
e) White T-Shirt valued at P175.00

to her damage and prejudice in the total amount of P4,325.00 and on the
occasion of the said robbery, the above-named accused while armed with
unlicensed firearms with intent to kill, conspiring and confederating
together with Rudy Gersalia, Christian Gersalia, Dondon Brenvuela,
Jonathan Brenvuela, Pantoy Servantes, Alias Rey, Alias Jonard, Alias
Precie and Alias Renato, whose true names, identities and present
whereabouts are still unknown and still at-large, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot one
EDRALIN MACAHIS, a Security Guard of Energex Gasoline Station,
thereby inflicting upon him gunshot wound on his trunk which directly
caused his death.

Contrary to law.


th
of San Mateo, Province of Rizal, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
present whereabouts are still unknown and still at-large, and conspiring
intimidation, employed upon EDRALIN MACAHIS, a Security Guard
of Energex Gasoline Station, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously rob, steal, and carry away his service firearm .12 gauge
shotgun with serial number 13265 valued at P12,000.00 owned by Alert
and Quick (A-Q) Security Services Incorporated represented by its
General Manager Alberto T. Quintos to the damage and prejudice of said
Alert and Quick (A-Q) Security Services Incorporated in the aforesaid
amount of P12,000.00 and on the occasion of the said robbery the above-
named accused, while armed with unlicensed firearms, with intent to kill
conspiring and confederating together with Rudy Gersalia, Christian
Gersalia, Dondon Brenvuela, Jonathan Brenvuela, Pantoy Servantes,
Alias Rey, Alias Jonard, Alias Precie and Alias Renato, whose true
names, identities and present whereabouts are still unknown and still at-
large, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and shoot one EDRALIN MACAHIS, thereby inflicting upon
him gunshot wound on his trunk which directly caused his death.

Contrary to law.


th
of San Mateo, Province of Rizal, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
present whereabouts are still unknown and still at-large and conspiring
intimidation, employed upon the person of EDUARDO ZULUETA, a
gasoline boy of Energex Gasoline Station, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously rob, steal and carry away the following to
wit:

a) Pawnshop Ticket from M. Lhuiller Pawnshop for
one (1) black Citizen men's watch (automatic) valued
at P2,000.00

b) Cash money worth P50.00

to his damage and prejudice in the total amount of P2,050.00 and on the
occasion of the said robbery, the above-named accused, while armed
with unlicensed firearms with intent to kill, conspiring and confederating
together with Rudy Gersalia, Christian Gersalia, Dondon Brenvuela,
Jonathan Brenvuela, Pantoy Servantes, Alias Rey, Alias Jonard, Alias
Precie and Alias Renato, whose true names, identities and present
whereabouts are still unknown and still at-large, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot one
EDRALIN MACAHIS, a Security Guard of Energex Gasoline Station,
thereby inflicting upon him gunshot wound on his trunk which directly
caused his death.

Contrary to law.

Upon arraignment on March 23, 2000, appellant, with the assistance of
counsel de parte, entered a plea of not guilty on all the charges. Thereafter, trial on
the merits ensued.

The prosecution presented five witnesses, namely: Macario C. Natividad,
[20]
then officer-in-charge of Energex Gasoline Station where the incident took
place; Edito Macahis,[21] a cousin of the deceased security guard Edralin Macahis;
Fortunato Lacambra III,[22] a gasoline boy of the same gas station; Eduardo
Zulueta,[23] also a gasoline boy of the same gas station, and Alberto Quintos,
[24]
general manager of Alert and Quick Security Services, Inc., where the deceased
security guard was employed.

The defense, on the other hand, presented two witnesses, namely: Catherine
Homo,[25] a cousin of appellant and the appellant[26] himself.

On December 20, 2001, the RTC rendered its Decision[27] convicting
appellant beyond reasonable doubt of all the charges against him, the dispositive

1. In Criminal Case No. 4747, finding accused Marlon Albert de
Leon y Homo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery
with Homicide, as defined and penalized under No. 1 of Art. 294 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Sec. 9 of R.A. 7659, in relation to
Sec. 1 of P.D. 1866, as further amended by Sec. 1 of R.A. 8294, having
acted in conspiracy with other malefactors who have, to date, remained
at-large, and sentencing the said Marlon Albert de Leon y Homo to the
penalty of Death, taking into consideration the use of an unlicensed
firearm in the commission of the crime as an aggravating circumstance;
to pay Energex Gasoline Station owned by Regino Natividad and
represented by Macario C. Natividad the amount of P3,000.00 as
compensatory damages and to pay the costs;

2. In Crim. Case No. 4748, finding accused Marlon Albert de
firearm in the commission of the crime as an aggravating circumstance,
and to pay the costs;

Leon y Homo guilty beyond reasonable ground of the crime of Robbery
firearm in the commission of the crime as an aggravating circumstance;
to indemnify the heirs of Edralin Macahis in the amount of P50,000.00
as death indemnity; to pay P12,000.00 as compensatory damages for the
stolen service firearm if restitution is no longer possible and P50,000.00
as moral damages, and to pay the costs;
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Sec. 9 of R.A 7659, in relation to
firearm in the commission of the crime as an aggravating circumstance
and to pay Eduardo Zulueta, victim of the robbery, in the amount
of P2,050.00 as compensatory damages for the stolen properties if
restitution is no longer possible and to pay the costs.

As against accused Rudy Gersalia and Christian Gersalia, who
have, to date, remained at-large, let a warrant of arrest be issued against
them and let these cases be, in the meantime, sent to the archives without
prejudice to their reinstatement upon apprehension of the said accused.

As against accused Dondon Brenvuela, Jonathan Brenvuela,
Pantoy Servantes, Alias Rey, Alias Jonard, Alias Precie and Alias
Renato, whose true names, identities and present whereabouts are still
unknown and are still at-large, let these cases be, in the meantime, sent
to the archives without prejudice to their reinstatement upon the
identification and apprehension of the said accused.

SO ORDERED.

The cases were appealed to this Court, however, on September, 21, 2004,
[28]
in conformity with the Decision dated July 7, 2004 in G.R. Nos. 147678-87
entitled The People of the Philippines v. Efren Mateo y Garcia, modifying the
pertinent provisions of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, more particularly
Sections 3 and 10 of Rule 125 and any other rule insofar as they provide for direct
appeals from the RTCs to this Court in cases where the penalty imposed is
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, as well as the Resolution of this
Court, en banc dated September 19, 1995, in Internal Rules of the Supreme Court
in cases similarly involving the death penalty, pursuant to the Court's power to
promulgate rules of procedure in all courts under Article VII, Section 5 of the
Constitution, and allowing an intermediate review by the CA before such cases are
elevated to this Court. This Court transferred the cases to the CA for appropriate
action and disposition.
The CA, on June 29, 2007,[29] affirmed with modification, the Decision of the
RTC, with the dispositive portion reading:

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. Accused Marlon Albert de Leon y Homo is hereby
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with
Homicide of only one count.

Given the passage of Republic Act 9346 which took effect on 24
June 2006, the penalty imposed upon Marlon de Leon y Homo is hereby
reduced or commuted to reclusion perpetua.

SO ORDERED.

On December 10, 2007, this Court accepted the appeal,[30] the penalty
imposed being reclusion perpetua.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), on February 8, 2008, filed its
Manifestation and Motion In Lieu of the Supplemental Brief[31] dated February 4,
2008 stating that it will no longer file a supplemental brief, considering that
appellant has not raised any new issue that would require the filing of a
supplemental brief.

Appellant filed a Manifestation[32] on February 22, 2008 stating that he re-
pleads and adopts his Appellant's Brief and Reply Brief as Supplemental Brief.

Appellant, in his Brief,[33] assigned the following errors:
I
APPELLANT A CO-CONSPIRATOR IN THE COMMISSION OF
THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE
PROSECUTION TO PROVE THE SAME AND GUILT BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.

II

ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT IS GUILTY
OF ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE, THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY
ERRED IN IMPOSING FOUR (4) DEATH PENALTIES DESPITE
THAT THE CRIME CHARGED WAS PRODUCED BY ONE SINGLE
ACT WHICH SHOULD BE METED WITH A SINGLE PENALTY.

The OSG, in its Appellee's Brief,[34] insisted that all the elements of the
crime and the appellant's participation in the crime had been established.

Appellant, in his Reply Brief,[35] argued that the penalty should not be
death, but only reclusion perpetua, because the aggravating circumstance of use of
unlicensed firearm, although alleged in the Information, was not alleged with
specificity.

Article 294, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

Art. 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons
Penalties. - Any person guilty of robbery with the use of violence against
or any person shall suffer:

1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or
on occasion of the robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been
committed, or when the robbery shall have been accompanied by rape or
intentional mutilation or arson.

In People v. De Jesus,[36] this Court had exhaustively discussed the crime of
robbery with homicide, thus:

For the accused to be convicted of the said crime, the prosecution
is burdened to prove the confluence of the following elements:

(1) the taking of personal property is committed with violence or
intimidation against persons;
(2) the property taken belongs to another;
(3) the taking is animo lucrandi; and
(4) by reason of the robbery or on the occasion thereof, homicide
is committed.[37]
In robbery with homicide, the original criminal design of the
malefactor is to commit robbery, with homicide perpetrated on the
occasion or by reason of the robbery.[38] The intent to commit robbery
must precede the taking of human life.[39] The homicide may take place
before, during or after the robbery. It is only the result obtained, without
reference or distinction as to the circumstances, causes or modes or
persons intervening in the commission of the crime that has to be taken
into consideration.[40] There is no such felony of robbery with homicide
through reckless imprudence or simple negligence. The constitutive
elements of the crime, namely, robbery with homicide, must be
consummated.

It is immaterial that the death would supervene by mere accident;
or that the victim of homicide is other than the victim of robbery, or that
two or more persons are killed, or that aside from the homicide, rape,
intentional mutilation, or usurpation of authority, is committed by reason
or on the occasion of the crime. Likewise immaterial is the fact that the
victim of homicide is one of the robbers; the felony would still
be robbery with homicide. Once a homicide is committed by or on the
occasion of the robbery, the felony committed is robbery with homicide.
All the felonies committed by reason of or on the occasion of the
robbery are integrated into one and indivisible felony of robbery with
homicide. The word homicide is used in its generic sense. Homicide,
thus, includes murder, parricide, and infanticide.

Intent to rob is an internal act, but may be inferred from proof of
violent unlawful taking of personal property. When the fact of
asportation has been established beyond reasonable doubt, conviction of
the accused is justified even if the property subject of the robbery is not
presented in court. After all, the property stolen may have been
abandoned or thrown away and destroyed by the robber or recovered by
the owner.[41] The prosecution is not burdened to prove the actual value
of the property stolen or amount stolen from the victim. Whether the
robber knew the actual amount in the possession of the victim is of no
moment, because the motive for robbery can exist regardless of the exact
amount or value involved.[42]

When homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion of
robbery, all those who took part as principals in the robbery would also
be held liable as principals of the single and indivisible felony of robbery
with homicide, although they did not actually take part in the killing,
unless it clearly appears that they endeavored to prevent the same. [43]

If a robber tries to prevent the commission of homicide after the
commission of the robbery, he is guilty only of robbery and not
of robbery with homicide. All those who conspire to commit robbery
with homicide are guilty as principals of such crime, although not all
profited and gained from the robbery. One who joins a criminal
conspiracy adopts the criminal designs of his co-conspirators and can no
longer repudiate the conspiracy once it has materialized. [44]

Homicide is said to have been committed by reason or on the
occasion of robbery if, for instance, it was committed (a) to facilitate the
robbery or the escape of the culprit; (b) to preserve the possession by the
culprit of the loot; (c) to prevent discovery of the commission of the
robbery; or, (d) to eliminate witnesses in the commission of the crime.
As long as there is a nexus between the robbery and the homicide, the
latter crime may be committed in a place other than the situs of the
robbery.

From the above disquisition, the testimonies of the witnesses, and pieces of
evidence presented by the prosecution, the crime of robbery with homicide was
indeed committed. There was no mistaking from the actions of all the accused that
their main intention was to rob the gasoline station and that on occasion of such
robbery, a homicide was committed. The question now is whether there was
conspiracy in the commission of the crime. According to appellant, the prosecution
failed to prove that he was a co-conspirator. However, this Court finds no merit to
appellant's argument.

If it is proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts towards the
accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their
combined acts, though apparently independent, were in fact connected and
cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association and a concurrence of
sentiment, a conspiracy may be inferred though no actual meeting among them to
concert means is proved. That would be termed an implied conspiracy.[45] The
prosecution was able to prove the presence of an implied conspiracy. The
witnesses were able to narrate in a convincing manner, the circumstances
surrounding the commission of the robbery and positively identified appellant as
one of the robbers. Witness Eduardo Zulueta testified that appellant was one of the
robbers who poked a gun at him, thus:

Q. Were you able to identify those two armed male persons who poked
their guns at you?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Kindly look around inside this courtroom and inform the Hon.
Court whether those two (2) persons who poked their guns at you were
(sic) present now?

A: Only one, sir, and there he is.

(At this juncture, witness pointing to a certain person who answered by
the name of MARLON ALBERT DE LEON when asked.)

Q: This Marlon De Leon was he the one who guarded you in the carwash
or not?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Now, what happened to you at the carwash where this Marlon De
Leon was guarding you?

A: His gun was poked at me, sir.

Q: What else transpired, Mr. Witness, or what else happened to you
aside from that?

A: He hit me with his gun on my nape, sir.

Q: What else, Mr. Witness?

A: He got my wallet from my pocket, sir.

Q: Who hit you with a gun?

A: His other companion, sir.[46]

Appellant was also identified by witness Fortunato Lacambra III, thus:

Q: What about that person who ordered Zulueta to go to the carwash
section and hit him, was he also armed?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What kind of firearm was he carrying then?

A: Also .38 caliber, sir.

Q: Were you able to identify or recognize that person who approached
and ordered Zulueta to go to the carwash section?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: If that person is inside the courtroom, will you be able to identify
him?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Kindly point to him?

A: That man, sir. (Witness pointed to a person who answered by the
name of Marlon Albert de Leon).[47]

Therefore, it can be inferred from the role appellant played in the
commission of the robbery, that a conspiracy existed and he was part of it. To be a
conspirator, one need not participate in every detail of the execution; he need not
even take part in every act or need not even know the exact part to be performed by
the others in the execution of the conspiracy. Each conspirator may be assigned
separate and different tasks which may appear unrelated to one another but, in fact,
constitute a whole collective effort to achieve their common criminal objective.
[48]
Once conspiracy is shown, the act of one is the act of all the conspirators. The
precise extent or modality of participation of each of them becomes secondary,
[49]
since all the conspirators are principals.

As to the credibility of the witnesses, the RTC's findings must not be
disturbed. The well-settled rule in this jurisdiction is that the trial courts findings
on the credibility of witnesses are entitled to the highest degree of respect and will
not be disturbed on appeal without any clear showing that it overlooked,
misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight or substance
which could affect the result of the case.[50]

For his defense, appellant merely denied participating in the
robbery. However, his presence during the commission of the crime was well-
established as appellant himself testified as to the matter. Granting that he was
merely present during the robbery, his inaction does not exculpate him. To exempt
himself from criminal liability, a conspirator must have performed an overt act to
dissociate or detach himself from the conspiracy to commit the felony and prevent
the commission thereof.[51] Appellant offered no evidence that he performed an
overt act neither to escape from the company of the robbers nor to prevent the
robbery from taking place. His denial, therefore, is of no value.Courts generally
view the defenses of denial and alibi with disfavor on account of the facility with
which an accused can concoct them to suit his defense. As both evidence are
negative and self-serving, they cannot attain more credibility than the testimonies
of prosecution witnesses who testify clearly, providing thereby positive evidence
on the various aspects of the crime committed.[52]

Consequently, the CA was correct in ruling that appellant was guilty only of
one count of robbery with homicide. In the crime of robbery with homicide, there
are series of acts, borne from one criminal resolution, which is to rob. As
decided[53] by the Court of Appeals:

A continued (continuous or continuing) crime is defined as a
single crime, consisting of a series of acts but all arising from one
criminal resolution.[54] Although there is a series of acts, there is only one
crime committed; hence, only one penalty shall be imposed. [55]

In the case before Us, [appellant] and his companions intended
only to rob one place; and that is the Energex gasoline station. That they
did; and in the process, also took away by force the money and valuables
of the employees working in said gasoline station. Clearly inferred from
these circumstances are the series of acts which were borne from one
criminal resolution. A continuing offense is a continuous, unlawful act or
series of acts set on foot by a single impulse and operated by
an unintermittent force, however long a time it may occupy. [56] This can
be said of the case at hand.

Akin to the extant case is that of People v. De la Cruz,[57] wherein
the robbery that took place in several houses belonging to different
persons, when not absolutely unconnected, was held not to be taken as
separate and distinct offenses. They formed instead, component parts of
the general plan to despoil all those within the vicinity. In this case, the
Solicitor General argued that the [appellant] had committed eight
different robberies, because the evidence shows distinct and different
acts of spoilation in different houses, with several victimized persons.
[58]
The Highest Tribunal, however, ruled that the perpetrated acts were
not entirely distinct and unconnected from one another. [59] Thus, the
single offense or crime.

Now, this Court comes to the penalty imposed by the CA. The
decision[60] merely states that, in view of the enactment of R.A. 9346, the sentence
of Death Penalty, imposed upon appellant, is automatically commuted to reclusion
perpetua, but is silent as to how it had arrived into such a conclusion.

Under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No.
7659, robbery with homicide is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death, which
are both indivisible penalties. Article 63 of the same Code provides that, in all
cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties,
the greater penalty shall be applied when the commission of the deed is attended
by one aggravating circumstance.[61] It must be remembered that the Informations
filed with the RTC alleged the aggravating circumstance of the use of unlicensed
firearm. Pursuant to the third paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866, as amended
by R.A. No. 8294, such use of an unlicensed firearm is a special and not a generic
aggravating circumstance in the homicide or murder committed. As explained by
this Court in Palaganas v. People:[62]

Generic aggravating circumstances are those that generally apply
to all crimes such as those mentioned in Article 14, paragraphs No. 1, 2,
3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 14, 18, 19 and 20, of the Revised Penal Code. It has the
effect of increasing the penalty for the crime to its maximum period, but
it cannot increase the same to the next higher degree. It must always be
alleged and charged in the information, and must be proven during the
trial in order to be appreciated. [63] Moreover, it can be offset by an
ordinary mitigating circumstance.

On the other hand, special aggravating circumstances are those
which arise under special conditions to increase the penalty for the
offense to its maximum period, but the same cannot increase the penalty
to the next higher degree. Examples are quasi-recidivism under Article
160 and complex crimes under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. It
does not change the character of the offense charged. [64] It must always be
alleged and charged in the information, and must be proven during the
trial in order to be appreciated.[65] Moreover, it cannot be offset by an
ordinary mitigating circumstance.

It is clear from the foregoing that the meaning and effect of
generic and special aggravating circumstances are exactly the same
except that in case of generic aggravating, the same CAN be offset by an
ordinary mitigating circumstance whereas in the case of special
aggravating circumstance, it CANNOT be offset by an ordinary
mitigating circumstance.

Aside from the aggravating circumstances abovementioned, there
is also an aggravating circumstance provided for
under Presidential Decree No. 1866,[66] as amended by Republic Act No.
8294,[67] which is a special law. Its pertinent provision states:

If homicide or murder is committed with the use of
an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be
considered as an aggravating circumstance.

In interpreting the same provision, the trial court reasoned that
such provision is silent as to whether it is generic or qualifying. [68] Thus,
it ruled that when the law is silent, the same must be interpreted in favor
of the accused.[69] Since a generic aggravating circumstance is more
favorable to petitioner compared to a qualifying aggravating
circumstance, as the latter changes the nature of the crime and increase
the penalty thereof by degrees, the trial court proceeded to declare that
the use of an unlicensed firearm by the petitioner is to be considered only
as a generic aggravating circumstance. [70] This interpretation is erroneous,
since we already held in several cases that with the passage of Republic
Act No. 8294 on 6 June 1997, the use of an unlicensed firearm in murder
or homicide is now considered as a SPECIAL aggravating circumstance
and not a generic aggravating circumstance. [71] Republic Act No. 8294
applies to the instant case since it took effect before the commission of
the crimes in 21 April 1998. Therefore, the use of an unlicensed firearm
by the petitioner in the instant case should be designated and appreciated
as a SPECIAL aggravating circumstance and not merely a generic
aggravating circumstance.

In another case,[72] this Court ruled that, the existence of the firearm can be
established by testimony, even without the presentation of the firearm. [73] In the
said case, it was established that Elmer and Marcelina Hidalgo died of, and Pedro
Hidalgo sustained, gunshot wounds. The ballistic examination of the slugs
recovered from the place of the incident showed that they were fired from a .30
carbine rifle and a .38 caliber firearm. The prosecution witnesses positively
identified appellant therein as one of those who were holding a long firearm. It was
also established that the same appellant was not a licensed firearm holder. Hence,
this Court ruled that the trial court and the CA correctly appreciated the use of
unlicensed firearm as an aggravating circumstance.
After a careful study of the records of the present case, this Court found that
the use of unlicensed firearm was not duly proven by the prosecution. Although
jurisprudence dictates that the existence of the firearm can be established by mere
testimony, the fact that appellant was not a licensed firearm holder must still be
established. The prosecution failed to present written or testimonial evidence to
prove that appellant did not have a license to carry or own a firearm, hence, the use
of unlicensed firearm as an aggravating circumstance cannot be appreciated.
Finally, it is worth noting that the RTC ordered appellant to indemnify the
heirs of Edralin Macahis the amount of P50,000.00 as death indemnity, P12,000.00
as compensatory damages for the stolen service firearm if restitution is no longer
possible and P50,000.00 as moral damages. Actual damages were never proven
during the trial. Hence, this Court's rulings[74] on temperate damages apply, thus:

In People vs. Abrazaldo,[75] we laid down the doctrine that where
the amount of actual damages for funeral expenses cannot be determined
because of the absence of receipts to prove them, temperate damages
may be awarded in the amount of P25,000[76] This doctrine specifically
refers to a situation where no evidence at all of funeral expenses was
presented in the trial court. However, in instances where actual expenses
amounting to less than P25,000 are proved during the trial, as in the case
at bar, we apply the ruling in the more recent case of People vs.
Villanueva[77] which modified the Abrazaldo doctrine. In Villanueva, we
held that when actual damages proven by receipts during the trial
amount to less than P25,000, the award of temperate damages
for P25,000 is justified in lieu of the actual damages of a lesser amount.
To rule otherwise would be anomalous and unfair because the victims
heirs who tried but succeeded in proving actual damages of an amount
less than P25,000 would be in a worse situation than those who might
have presented no receipts at all but would now be entitled to P25,000
temperate damages.[78]

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated June 29, 2007 of the Court of
Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellant Marlon Albert
de Leon y Homo is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Robbery with Homicide, the penalty of which, is reclusion perpetua in view of the
absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance. Appellant is also liable to
pay the heirs of the victim, P25,000.00 as temperate damages, in addition to the
other civil indemnities and damages adjudged by the Regional Trial Court, Branch
76, San Mateo, Rizal.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. Nos. 142919 and 143876. February 4, 2003]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RICARDO

NAPALIT y PARAL,
DECISION
CARPIO-MORALES, J.:
Before this Court on automatic review is the consolidated

decision[1] rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 18, in
Criminal Case Nos. 96-150264 and 97-156381 finding accused-appellant
Ricardo Napalit guilty of robbery with homicide and violation of R. A. 6539 (the
Anti-Carnapping Act), respectively.
In Criminal Case No. 96-150264, the Information[2] charges accused-
appellant with robbery in band with homicide defined and penalized under
Article 294 (as amended by R. A. 7659) and Article 296 of the Revised Penal
Code allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about April 3, 1996, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused,
conspiring and confederating with others, whose true names, real identities and
present whereabouts are still unknown and helping one another, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, all armed with unknown caliber firearms, with
intent of (sic) gain and by means of force, violence and intimidation, to wit: by then
and there barging inside Tondo General Hospital located at Honorio Lopez Blvd.,
Tondo, announcing a hold-up, ordering the people/employees thereat to lie down on
the floor, grabbing the cashier and ordering him to open the vault and filing cabinets
and once opened, take, rob and carry away the following, to wit:
cash money consisting of unions collection, professional fees, patients fees, cash
advances and salaries of employees
amounting to, more or less --- P1,300,000.00
two (2) .38 caliber revolver, Squires Bingham with Serial Nos. 1093998 (from
Benjamin Saclolo) and 1093986 (from Eric Santos) valued at --- P10,353.00
one (1) .38 caliber revolver, Squires Bingham with Serial No. 1094407 more or less
valued at --- P 5,000.00
all valued in the amount of more than P1,315,353.00, belonging to Tondo General
Hospital, represented herein by Rodrigo Calonzo y Sauza and Benjamin Saclolo and
Eric Santos, against their will, to the damage and prejudice of the said owners, in the
aforesaid amount of more than P1,315,353.00, Philippine Currency; that said accused,
on the occasion and by reason of said robbery, attacked, assaulted and used personal
violence upon one Pio Gomez y Ora, one of the security guards therein, by then and
there fring (sic) two successive shots, hitting him at the back, thereby inflicting upon
him mortal gunshots (sic) wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of
his death thereafter. (Emphasis supplied)
In Criminal Case No. 97-156381, the Information[3] charges accused-

appellant with violation of the Anti-Carnapping Act allegedly committed as
follows:
That on or about April 3, 1996, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused,
conspiring and confederating with others whose true names, identities and present
whereabouts are still unknown and helping one another, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously with intent to gain, forcibly take and carry away or carnap
two (2) motor vehicles, more particularly described as follows:
One (1) Unit, Toyota Tamaraw FX, BGC Taxi with Plate No. NYU-381 and
One (1) Unit, Toyota Tamaraw Delivery Van with Plate No. PBM-990
valued at P400,000.00 more or less from the drivers Felix Buenaobra y Bumaba and
Nomeriano Castor y Serbo, respectively, without their consent, to the damage and
prejudice of the drivers/owners thereof in the aforesaid amount of P400,000.00,
Philippine currency.
Upon arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to both charges.

Joint trial of the cases thereupon ensued.
From the evidence for the prosecution, the following facts are established:
At about 4:00 p. m. of April 3, 1996, a group of more than six armed men
including accused-appellant barged into the Tondo General Hospital in
Honorio Lopez Boulevard, Balut, Tondo, Manila.
Security guard Eric Santos who was posted at the hospital emergency
room had just finished talking to a person who was asking about the location
of the x-ray room when one of the armed men pointed a gun at him,
announced that there was a holdup, and instructed him to keep still as he took
his firearm.[4] Simultaneously, accused-appellant pointed a gun at, and
grabbed the firearm[5] of, another security guard, Benjamin Saclolo, who was
seated in front of a desk at the emergency room.
Santos grappled with his assailant for the possession of the latters gun in
the course of which Santos other firearm, a service revolver, was accidentally
pulled out of its holster, resulting to a gunshot. This caught the attention of
accused-appellant who pointed his gun at Santos and warned him that he
would shoot him should he make one false move.[6] Santos then pushed his
assailant in the direction of accused-appellant, causing the former to fall at
which instant Santos ran but not before he was dispossessed of his service
revolver.
In the meantime, about 20 meters away[7], four members of the group
entered the cashiers office of the hospital and ordered the employees to lie
down on the floor. One of them pointed a gun at cashier Rodrigo Alonzo and
ordered him to open the vault.[8] Before Alonzo could do as instructed, he was
searched for weapons in the course of which his wallet containing P450.00 in
cash was taken. Alonzo then opened the vault which the four emptied
of P1,010,274.90 in cash.[9]
While the four malefactors were at the cashiers office, another security
guard, Pio Gomez who was manning the hospital gate and conversing with
maintenance plumber Cesar Rosella, was disarmed of his service pistol,
pushed outside the hospital premises, and shot twice by one of the armed
men.[10]
The four armed men who emptied the vault then rushed out of the hospital
and one of them also shot Gomez who had by then collapsed on the ground.
[11]
Two of them headed toward a Toyota Tamaraw vehicle driven by
Numeriano Castor which was on a stop position, due to heavy traffic, in front
of the hospital at San Rafael Street. One of the duo ordered the passenger at
the front seat to get off the vehicle. The other, after forcing Castor to alight
from the vehicle, drove it and fled with his companion.
That same afternoon of April 3, 1996, at around 6:00 oclock, the vehicle,
valued at P300,000.00, was found abandoned somewhere in Manila and was
brought back to the hospital by police authorities.[12]
More than a month and three weeks after the heist, or on May 27, 1996,
accused-appellant was arrested by police authorities. At the Western Police
District, Ermita, Manila, he was positively identified in a police line-up by the
hospital security guards Santos and Saclolo as one of the two armed men
who announced a holdup and took their firearms at the emergency room of
the hospital on the afternoon of April 3, 1996. Santos and Saclolo thereupon
executed sworn statements.[13]
On June 8, 1996, security guard Gomez who sustained four gunshot
wounds[14] expired. The findings on the autopsy conducted on his body by Dr.
Juan Garcia of the Tondo Medical Center were incorporated in a medico-legal
certificate.[15]
For the hospitalization and medical expenses of Gomez, his family
incurred P70,000.00.[16] And for funeral and miscellaneous expenses, the
amount of P48,000.00[17] was incurred.
As for the defense, lone witness accused-appellant came up with an alibi.
He claimed that between 3:00 p. m. and 4:00 p. m. of April 3, 1996, he and his
wife were at Balic-balic, Sampaloc, Manila looking for a house to rent, and
they returned home at about 7:00 p. m., thus rendering it impossible for him to
be present at the scene of the crime.[18]
Discrediting accused-appellants alibi in favor of his positive identification
by security guards Santos and Saclolo as one of the malefactors, the trial
court convicted him of robbery with homicide in the first case and carnapping
in the second in its Decision of April 25, 2000 on review, the dispositive
WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. 96-150264, the court finds accused Ricardo
Napalit y Paral guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide
with the attendant aggravating circumstance of the offense having been committed by
an organized/syndicated crime group of which the accused belongs, and sentences him
to suffer the penalty of death by lethal injection and to pay the costs.
On the civil liability of the accused, the court further sentences him to pay Evelyn
Gomez, widow of the slain security guard, Pio Gomez, actual and moral damages in
the respective sums of P118,000.00 and P300,000.00, and indemnity for the loss of
life of the victim in the sum of P50,000.00, with interest thereon at the legal rate of
6% per annum from this date until fully paid.
In Criminal Case No. 97-156381, the court likewise, finds accused Ricardo Napalit y
Paral guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Violation of R.A. 6539, or
carnapping, and sentences him to suffer imprisonment of 25 years and to pay the
costs.[19]
In his brief, accused-appellant ascribes the following errors to the trial

court:
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY

BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED.
II. EVEN GRANTING THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS A CO-

CONSPIRATOR IN THE PLAN TO COMMIT ROBBERY, THE TRIAL COURT,
NONETHELESS, ERRED IN ATTRIBUTING TO HIM AND HOLDING HIM
LIABLE FOR THE CRIME OF HOMICIDE WHICH HAPPENED ON THE
OCCASION OF THE ROBBERY.[20]
On the first assigned error, accused-appellant maintains that his

identification by Santos and Saclolo as one of the more than six armed men
during the incident was not established with moral certainty for, so he argues,
said witnesses were at the time of the robbery fraught with fear and
nervousness. To buttress his claim, accused-appellant draws attention to
Santos failure to hear the gunshot which first hit Gomez when he (Santos)
was struggling with his assailant for the possession of the latters gun, which
failure, accused-appellant alleges, prevented Santos from taking a clear look
at the armed man attending to Saclolo, identified as accused-appellant, since
his (Santos) attention was fully focused on his assailant.
Accused-appellant readily admits, however, that both Santos and Saclolo
were credible, conceding that their respective testimonies were
straightforward and consistent insofar as their recollection of the disarming
incident is concerned.[21]
When the issue of credibility is involved, appellate courts generally do not
disturb the findings of the trial court since the latter is in a better position to
pass on it, having heard the witnesses themselves and observed their
deportment and manner of testifying, unless it is shown that it overlooked
certain facts or circumstances of substance that, if considered, could affect
the outcome of the case.[22]
In the case at bar, the trial court found the testimony of witnesses Santos
and Saclolo to be worthy of credence. From the transcripts of the
stenographic notes of their testimonies, this Court finds that, indeed, they
merit credence. They are straightforward and consistent. Consider the
following answers of Santos, quoted verbatim:
Q: On April 3, 1996, at about 4:05 p.m., while you are manning the emergency room of
the Tondo General Hospital, do you recall of any unusual incident that took place?
A: At around 4:00 p.m. that date, while I was talking to a person who was asking about
the location of the x-ray room, someone pointed a gun at me and told me not to
move and that it was a holdup, and he took my firearm.
Q: What else happened after that man poked a gun at you and took your firearm?
A: When I raised up my hand, I look at the direction where my co-security guard was
and I noticed that he was also disarmed by a companion of the man who poked a
gun at me and when the man that disarmed the other security guard was leaving
the premises, I noticed that the man poking a gun at me was nervous because his
gun was shaking and because of this observation and considering that my co-
security guard was nearby, I was emboldened to grab the gun that was being
poked at me so I grappled with the man that was poking a gun at me by grabbing
the gun. While I was holding the arm of the robber, I held with my left arm the gun
in my holster because he was trying to grab it and there was a struggle between
us and in the course of our struggle, my gun fired after it was accidentally pulled
out from its holster.
Q: What happened after that?
A: The gunshot caught the attention of that man who disarmed my co-security guard
and he came back and poked a gun in front of my face and warned me that should
I make a false move, he would shoot me.
Q: What happened next after that?
A: I pushed the man with whom I was struggling with towards the man who was poking
a gun at me and the two of them fell down on the ground and I ran away but in the
process, they were able to grab and get hold of my service revolver.
Q: Were you able to identify that person who initially poked a gun at you?
A: I recognized him and if I will see him again, I will be able to recognize him.
Q: How about the other person who divested the gun of your co-security guard
and your gun also, can you recognize him?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Will you please look around and point to him?
At this juncture, witness is pointing to a man who answered by the name Ricardo
Napalit.
Q: Why do you say that he was the same person who divested your gun and the
gun of your co-security guard?
A: Because he was the one that disarmed my cosecurity guard and later on
poked a gun at me and when he disarmed my co-security guard, I saw him at
a close distance and when he poked his gun at me, we were very near each
other and I could see his face.[23] (Emphasis supplied)
The positive identification of accused-appellant was corroborated by

Saclolo in his answers, quoted verbatim:
Q: Were you able to identify the person who poked his 45 caliver firearm at you?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Look around and tell the court if he is inside the court room?
A: Yes, sir. (At this juncture, witness is pointing to a man who answered by the
name Ricardo Napalit)
xxx
Q: You also testified that one of the robbers poked his gun at your back and you
identified him as the accused in this case, is that correct?
A: He did not poke his gun at my back, he was in front of me because I was sitted at
the table.
Q: What was your position at the time of the incident, before the gun poking?
A: I was sitted on a chair in front of a table.
Q: Were you facing the door or you are at the back of the door?
A: The entrance to the emergency room was in front of me.
Q: You also mentioned that you also saw the gun of the alleged robber?
A: When they entered the emergency room, I did not see the gun. It was only when my
service pistol was taken by one of them that I saw the robbers.
Q: How far were you from the robber that approached you?
At this juncture, witness is pointing to a distance of about 2 and one-half feet.
Q: While you were sitted, was the alleged robber in front of you standing?
A: He was standing in front of me.
Q: How did you see him, did you see space or did you peep?
A: I looked up at his face.[24] (Emphasis supplied).
From the foregoing testimonies, it is clear that Santos and Saclolo saw
accused-appellant at close range as he stood before them at the time of the
taking of their firearms. It bears noting that the incident occurred in broad
daylight. When conditions of visibility are favorable and the witnesses do not
appear to be biased, their assertions as to the identity of the malefactor
should be accepted as trustworthy.[25]
That witnesses to a sudden attack may be frightened or nervous as a
result thereof does not fatally impair the credibility of their testimony,
especially with respect to the identification of their assailant, for they tend to
strive to see his appearance and observe the manner in which the crime is
being committed.[26] In the case at bar, there is no evidence to show that
Santos and Saclolo were so petrified with fear as to result in subnormal
sensory functions on their part.[27]
Accused-appellants bare assertion of alibi thus deserves no merit. Already
a weak defense, his alibi becomes even weaker by reason of his failure to
present any corroboration.[28]
Accused-appellant argues nevertheless that assuming that he had indeed
participated in the incident, he should only be held liable for robbery and not
for the special complex crime of robbery with homicide. For, so he claims, the
shooting of Gomez by his companions was beyond his contemplation and he
never intended to perpetrate any killing, hence, only the actual perpetrators of
the killing should be held liable therefor and the killing should not be
appreciated to increase his liability.[29] And he adds that his carrying of a
firearm was only for the purpose of threatening the victims so that they would
not offer any resistance to him and his companions.
Accused-appellants arguments do not persuade. Article 294 (1) of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 7659, provides:
Article 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons. Penalties. Any

person guilty of robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of any person
shall suffer:
1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasion of the
robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been committed, or when the robbery
shall have been accompanied by rape or intentional mutilation or arson.
x x x (Emphasis supplied.)
In robbery with homicide cases, the prosecution needs to prove these

elements: (a) the taking of personal property is perpetrated by means of
violence or intimidation against a person; (b) the property taken belongs to
another; (c) the taking is characterized by intent to gain or animus lucrandi;
and (d) on the occasion of the robbery or by reason thereof, the crime of
homicide, here used in its generic sense, is committed.[30]
In a long line of cases, this Court has ruled that whenever homicide is
committed as a consequence or on the occasion of the robbery, all those who
took part as principals in the robbery will also be held guilty as principals in the
special complex crime of robbery with homicide although they did not take
part in the homicide, unless it is clearly shown that they endeavored to
prevent the homicide.[31]
Direct proof of a previous agreement to commit a crime is not
indispensable in conspiracy. It may be deduced from the mode and manner
by which the offense was perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the accused
themselves, when such point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action
and community of interest.[32]
From the time accused-appellant and his companions entered the hospital
and announced a holdup up to the time they fled, in the course of which
security guard Gomez was shot, there can be no other conclusion than that
they hatched a criminal scheme, synchronized their acts for unity in its
execution, and aided each other for its consummation.
As correctly pointed out by the trial court, the united, concerted and
coordinated contemporaneous acts of accused-appellant and his companions
in marauding the hospital, neutralizing its security guards and robbing it
of P1,010,274.90 unerringly indicate a well-planned robbery operation and a
conspiracy among them.[33]
As conspiracy has been established, all the conspirators are liable as co-
principals regardless of the manner and extent of their participation since, in
conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all.[34]
That accused-appellant did not shoot Gomez is immaterial. Article 294 (1)
of the Revised Penal Code is clear and leaves no room for any other
interpretation. For, for robbery with homicide to exist, it is sufficient that a
homicide results by reason or on the occasion of robbery.[35] The law of
course exculpates a person who takes part in the robbery from the special
complex crime of robbery with homicide and punishes him only for simple
robbery when there is proof that he tried to prevent the homicide. No such
proof, however, was offered.
As an appeal in a criminal proceeding throws the whole case open for
review, it becomes the duty of this Court to correct errors it may find in the
appealed judgment even if they have not been specifically assigned.[36]
One such error committed by the trial court which was not assigned by
accused-appellant is its appreciation of the aggravating circumstance of the
offense being committed by a person belonging to an organized or syndicated
crime group under Article 62 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A.
7659.
While accused-appellant and company confederated and mutually helped
one another for the purpose of gain, that they formed part of a group
organized for the general purpose of committing crimes for gain, which is
the essence of a syndicated or organized crime group, [37] was neither alleged
nor proved.
There being then no aggravating circumstance to be appreciated, the
proper imposable penalty for the commission of the crime of robbery with
homicide is reclusion perpetua, following Article 63 (2) of the Revised Penal
Code which states that when there are neither mitigating nor aggravating
circumstances in the commission of the deed, the lesser penalty shall be
applied.
And the trial court erred too in finding accused-appellant guilty of the Anti-
Carnapping Act. Carnapping, as defined under Section 2, paragraph 2 of this
special law, is the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to
another without the latters consent, or by means of violence against or
intimidation of persons, or by use of force upon things. The elements of
carnapping are thus: (a) the taking of a motor vehicle which belongs to
another; (b) the taking is without the consent of the owner or by means of
violence against or intimidation of persons or by using force upon things; (c)
the taking is done with intent to gain.[38]
From the following testimony of the Toyota Tamaraw driver Castor:
Q: You said that armed men arrived, more or less, how many armed men did you see?
A: There were two armed men who approached my vehicle. One went to my
passengers seat and the other one to the drivers seat.
Q: What did the armed person who go (sic) to the passengers seat do?
A: He ordered my passenger to get off and he even hit my passenger with his gun.
Q: What about that armed person who went to your side, what did he do to you?
A: He forced me to get off the vehicle and he took over the drivers seat.
Q: Were you able to identify these two armed men who took you (sic) vehicle?
A: If I see them again, I can recognize them.
Q: Will you please look inside the court room and tell us if these two armed men who
forcibly took your vehicle are inside the court room?
A: They are not inside the court room, sir.
Q: Aside from these two armed men who forcibly took your vehicle, did you see any
other armed men also in the vicinity?
A: No one else, sir,[39]
it is clear that accused-appellant took no part in seizing the vehicle. Since

there is no showing that the taking was made in pursuance of the common
criminal plan of the malefactors to rob the hospital, the two armed robbers
who took the vehicle having merely chanced upon it while they were fleeing
from the scene of the crime, accused-appellant cannot be faulted therefor.
Well-settled is the rule that co-conspirators are liable only for acts done
pursuant to the conspiracy, not for other acts done outside their contemplation
or which are not the necessary and logical consequence of the intended
crime.[40]
As to the civil aspect of the case, for loss of earning capacity, Article 2206
(1) of the Civil Code is the applicable law. It provides:
Article 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict shall
be at least three thousand pesos, even though there may have been mitigating
circumstances. In addition:
(1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased,
and the indemnity shall be paid to heirs of the latter; such indemnity shall in every
case be assessed and awarded by the court, unless the deceased on account of
permanent physical disability not caused by the defendant, had no earning capacity at
the time of his death.
Accused-appellant is thus liable for damages for the loss of the earning
capacity of the deceased Pio Gomez which shall be paid to his heirs. In fixing
the indemnity, account is taken of the victims actual income at the time of his
death and his probable life expectancy[41] in accordance with the formula
adopted by this Court, to wit:
Net earning capacity = 2/3 x (80-age of x a reasonable portion
the victim at the of the annual net
time of his death) income which would
have been received by
the heirs for support[42]
At the time of his death, Gomez was 48 years old.[43] Per the certification of
employment and compensation[44] presented at the trial court, his average
monthly gross income was P5,383.12 or an annual gross income
of P64,597.44. In the absence of proof of his living expenses, his net income
is deemed to be 50 percent of his gross income.[45] Using the above-stated
formula, the indemnity for the loss of earning capacity of Gomez
is P688,931.70, arrived at as follows:
Net earning capacity = 2 (80-48) x [P64,597.44 - P32,298.72]
3
= 2 (32) x P32,298.72
3
= 21.33 x P32,298.72
= P688,931.70
With respect to the award by the trial court of P200,000.00 in moral
damages, in line with prevailing jurisprudence[46], it is hereby reduced
to P50,000.00.
As for the award of actual damages in the amount of P118,000.00, since it
is borne out by the records, it is affirmed and so is the award of civil indemnity
in the amount of P50,000.00.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court in Criminal Case No. 96-
150264 finding accused-appellant, Ricardo Napalit y Paral, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. As modified, accused-appellant is
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua; and to pay the
legal heirs of Pio Gomez P118,000.00 for actual damages, P50,000.00 as
indemnity for death, P688,931.70 for lost earnings, and P50,000.00 for moral
damages.
The conviction of accused-appellant Ricardo Napalit y Paral in Criminal
Case No. 97-156381 for violation of R. A. 6539 or the Anti-Carnapping Law is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and he is hereby ACQUITTED for insufficiency
of evidence.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 104285-86 May 21, 1993
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
VICTOR ANGELES Y RAMOS, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Reynaldo Y. Sarmiento for accused-appellant.
FELICIANO, J.:
Victor Angeles appeals from a decision of the Regional Trial Court ("RTC") of Manila, Branch 25,
convicting him of two (2) separate offenses: one of rape and the other of robbery against Analie
Baltazar.
Angeles was charged with rape in a complaint filed by Analie Baltazar dated 28 February 1989; he
was also accused of robbery in an inhabited place in an information filed by Assistant Prosecutor
Eufrocino A. Sulla, also dated 28 February 1989. These two (2) documents read as follows:
That on or about February 24, 1989, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, by means of force,
violence and intimidation, to wit: by poking an ice pick against her person, dragging
her outside the house and bringing her to the Three Bird Lodge located at Sales St.,
Sta. Cruz, in said City, threatening to kill her should she resist and accused succeed
(sic) in having carnal knowledge of the undersigned complainant, against her will and
consent. 1
xxx xxx xxx
That on or about February 24, 1989, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused, conspiring and confederating with two others whose true names, identities
and present whereabouts are still unknown and helping one another, did then and
there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously break into and enter House No. 652 (along)
Algeciras St., Sampaloc, in said City, which was then occupied as a dwelling place of
one ANALIE BALTAZAR Y CORDON and other members of her family, by
destroying the screen of the door of the said house and by passing through the said
door, and once inside, with intent of gain and without the knowledge and consent of
the owner thereof, took, robbed and carried away one (1) Betamax Sony valued at
P10,500.00 and one Typewriter Merit valued at P5,000.00, or all valued at
P15,500.00, belonging to said Analie Baltazar y Cordon to the damage and prejudice
of said owner in the aforesaid sum of P15,500.00, Philippine currency. 2
The complaint and information were raffled off to two (2) different branches of the Manila
RTC. Appellant Angeles entered a plea of not guilty to the complaint of rape before the Manila RTC,
3
Branch 5, on 19 July 1989. A few months earlier, he had pleaded not guilty to the information for
4
robbery before Branch 25 of the Manila RTC on 10 April 1989. 5

In an order dated 13 April 1989, Judge Felix B. Mintu of Branch 5, Manila RTC, upon the ground that
the two (2) criminal cases were "intimately related," ordered that Criminal Case No. 89-70692 (the
robbery case) be consolidated for joint trial with the lower numbered case (the rape case) then
pending before his sala. 6
Earlier, on 12 April 1989, Angeles filed a motion to quash the rape complaint in Criminal Case No.
89-70961, upon the ground that the offense there charged was "the same offense" for which he had
been arraigned just two (2) days earlier before Branch 25 of the Manila RTC in Criminal Case No.
89-70962, and that he would be exposed to "double jeopardy" if he were arraigned anew in Criminal
Case No. 89-70961. 7
After hearing, Judge Mintu denied the motion to quash holding that two (2) distinct crimes of rape
and of robbery were alleged to have been committed by appellant. Appellant moved for
8
reconsideration of that order, without success.
After joint trial of the rape and robbery cases, appellant was found guilty of both offenses in a
decision dated 7 March 1991 of the Manila RTC, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, the prosecution having proven the guilt of the accused VICTOR
ANGELES Y RAMOS beyond reasonable doubt on both cases, sentences him to
suffer the penalty of:
Criminal Case No. 89-70961, Rape LIFE IMPRISONMENT and pay as damages
complainant ANALIE BALTAZAR Y CORDON the sum of FIFTEEN THOUSAND
(P15,000.00) PESOS; WITH COST;
Criminal Case No. 89-70962, Robbery LIFE IMPRISONMENT, the stolen articles
being not recovered, to pay as damages complainant ANALIE BALTAZAR Y
CORDON the sum of FIFTEEN THOUSAND PESOS (P15,000.00) PESOS; WITH
COST. 9
The basic facts as found and set out by the trial court in its decision are as follows:
Analie Baltazar testified that on or about 1:30 in the morning of February 24, 1989,
while she was sleeping at the sala of the second floor of their house in Ageceria (sic)
Street, Sampaloc, Manila, she woke up to urinate. When she stood up, a person
behind held and poked an icepick on her neck. According to her, she begged not to
be killed; that she was dragged towards the rear door of their house. Aside from the
person who dragged her, she also saw two persons on the ground floor carrying their
typewriter and Sony Super betamax. The typewriter, according to her cost about
P10,000.00 to P11,000.00. She was dragged by the man at the railroad track
towards Fermesa Street, (then) to de la Fuente Street, where she was made to board
the (sic) taxi and brought to Dakota (St.) at Recto Avenue. That while she was being
dragged by the person, whom she later identified as the accused Victor Angeles, the
two other companions of the accused were on (sic) their back. According to her, the
two persons placed themselves on (sic) a dark place and she was told not to shout.
That everytime she talked with a loud voice, she was being (sic) slapped. Later, the
two companions of the accused left. Accused Angeles, while still poking the ice pick
on her neck, covered by the blanket she was carrying then, brought her to the Three
Bird Lodge Motel, a few steps from Dakota Recto going towards Evangelista Street,
Quiapo, Manila. At the Three Bird Lodge, accused Angeles talked with the roomboy
while at that time the ice pick was still poked at her. She was brought to a room,
where accused removed her t-shirt, short and underwear. Later, she was made to lie
down on the bed and the accused removed also (sic) his clothes. The room,
according to her, was well-lighted. The accused, after removing his clothes, started
to kiss her on her neck, to her bust and her private parts. That the accused forced his
penis to enter her private parts. That the penis, according to her, penetrated lightly
on her private parts and thereafter, she was told to dress up and let (sic) her go
home.
The following day, the accused was again seen in complainant Analie's
neighborhood. The accused, according to her, was even rubbing his shoes on the
ground and looking at the direction of their house. She immediately informed her
father about the presence of the accused. Her father, according to her, immediately
went to the place where then accused was, but accused has (sic) already left and
thus, was able that time to escape the wrath of her father. On February 26, 1989, at
about 10:00 o'clock in the morning, again (sic), complainant Analie saw the accused
in front of their house. She immediately pointed the accused to her father, who in turn
went down the house and confronted the accused. While talking, her father gave the
accused a fist blow and the people in the neighborhood chased the accused. After a
brief chase, the accused was apprehended and mauled by her neighbors. Later, the
accused was brought to the police station and charged for the present crime.
Dr. Marcial Cenido, Medico-Legal Officer, Western Police District, testified that he
made a physical and genital examination on the person of Analie Baltazar y Cordon,
thru the request of Lt. Generoso Javier, Western Police District, and found her
hymen with deep healing laceration at 6:00 o'clock position extending to the base at
the forchette right of midline and slightly bled upon examination, Exhibit "3" (sic). Its
cause, according to him, was entry of a penis inside it. 10
Appellant submitted a different story to the trial court, which summed up his story in the following
terms:
Accused Victor Angeles denied emphatically the accusation against him. According
to him, on February 23, 1989, at 9:00 in the evening, he was at his house asleep. he
woke up at 6:30 in the morning of February 24, 1989. On said date, he was with his
mother Isabel Ramos. The mother of the accused, Isabel Ramos Angeles,
collaborated (sic) the testimony of the accused that on the night of February 24,
1989, the accused was in his house asleep. He claimed that on February 26, 1989,
he was looking for Ree, a fellow electrician near complainant Analie's house. After a
brief talk with Analie's father, about the robbery being committed in the
neighborhood, the people in the neighborhood suddenly attacked him. He ran away,
but after a brief chase, was apprehended, and mauled and later brought to the police
precinct. Later, he was examined by Dr. Marcial Cenido, WPD Medico Legal Officer.
Dr. Cenido admitted having examined the accused, but aside from having found
scally wounds on the person of the accused, he did not elaborate on any injury
suffered by the accused. 11
In this appeal, Victor Angeles claims that:
1. The trial court erred in not holding that the arraignment of the accused-appellant in
Criminal case No. 89-70962, for robbery, bars the second prosecution of the same
accused-appellant in Criminal Case No. 89-70961, for rape.
2. The trial court erred in not holding that the testimony of the accused-appellant is
more credible and logical than the testimony of Analie Baltazar.
3. The trial court erred in not acquitting the accused-

appellant.12
Two (2) principal issues are posed for the Court's consideration in this case: firstly, whether or not
the trial court erred in holding that two (2) separate felonies of robbery and rape had been committed
by appellant; and secondly, whether the trial court had erred in believing the testimony of Analie
Baltazar to the effect that appellant Angeles had raped her.
In respect of the first issue, we note preliminarily that appellant's argument that the prosecution for
rape was barred by appellant's prosecution and arraignment for robbery, under the doctrine of
"double jeopardy," is bereft of merit. That doctrine, in general, prohibits a second prosecution for the
same offense as that charged in the first prosecution. In the case at bar, robbery and rape cannot
properly be considered the same offense; neither is one included in the other. What appellant was
apparently trying to say was that he was properly chargeable, not for two (2) separate offenses of
robbery and rape, but rather of the special complex crime of "robbery with rape." In other words,
appellant was probably trying to say that the charge for robbery should have been a charge for
"robbery with rape" such that separate complaint for rape was, at least partially, a duplication of the
first charge. Thus, the real issue is whether he was properly charged with and found guilty of two (2)
separate offenses, or whether he should have been charged instead with "robbery with rape." In
either case, of course, the prosecution must show the presence of all the elements of the crime of
robbery, as well as all the elements of the crime of rape.
This issue, however, is not an entirely academic one. In its practical consequences, it relates to
whether only one penalty should have been imposed upon appellant under Article 294, paragraph 2
of the Revised Penal Code; or whether two (2) penalties are appropriately imposable upon appellant,
one for robbery in an inhabited house under Article 299 of the Revised Penal Code and another for
rape under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended.
Appellant contends that the case at bar is controlled by U.S. v.

Tiongco, where the Court held that the offense committed was the special complex crime of robbery
13
with rape. Appellant cites the following passages from U.S. v. Tiongco :
xxx xxx xxx
After the robbers had seized such things as they wished to carry off and when ready
to go out, they took the three women below blindfolded. The band then headed fro
the river near by to embark in the banca in which they had come. When they left the
house, Cristeto Ledesma and Narciso Castano compelled two of the women,
Juaneza and Eusula, to accompany them, and while the band was on its way to the
banca these two men separated from the rest, took these two women with them to a
place near a marsh not far from the river bank, and there raped them, employing
force and intimidation to accomplish their purpose. Cristeto Ledesma raped Rosario
Juaneza, and Narciso Castano, Nieves Eusula, after which Cristeto and Narciso
went to the banca, where the other robbers were waiting for them, and all left.
xxx xxx xxx
As the crime of the robbery, with that of rape of said two women — a crime against
chastity committed on the occasion of the robbery — was perpetrated by the
malefactors in the said house of Catalino Balinon, both crimes should be punished as
one single complex crime, as defined and qualified by paragraph 2 of article 503 of
the Penal Code; for, besides the robbers seizing the money and the other effects
they found in said house, two of them sullied the honor of the two women
therein, and the companions of the two men who committed the rape made no
opposition nor prevented these latter from consummating this other crime,
apparently unconnected with and unrelated to that robbery, but which, as well as
sanguinary crimes, is often committed on such occasions, and it is for this reason
that the penal law, in odium of such offenses against property and chastity, has
considered them complex and punished them by one single penalty. (Emphasis
14
supplied)
Close examination of the facts in Tiongco and of the facts in the case at bar lead us to believe
that Tiongco does not control the case at bar. In the case at bar, the robbery carried out in the house
where Analie Baltazar and her parents lived was consummated and completed; the taking of the
goods from the house was completed and the three (3) robbers (including appellant Angeles) walked
from Algeciras Street, Sampaloc, down the railroad track towards Fermesa street and then to Dela
Fuente Street where they boarded a taxi which brought them to Recto Avenue. At Recto Avenue, the
three (3) men and the victim Analie Baltazar got off the taxi and the two (2) co-felons of Angeles left
and went their own way while appellant Angeles proceeded to a motel located in Dakota Street not
far away from recto Avenue in the direction of Quiapo District. The acts constitutive of the robbery
15
at the house of the Baltazars and the acts comprising the rape inflicted upon Analie Baltazar were
separated both by time and space. The conspiracy between the three (3) malefactors clearly
covering the robbery had come to an end with the departure of two (2) of the conspirators. The rape
was carried out after the completion of the robbery and after the break up of the malefactors. The
situs of the rape was far away from the situs of the robbery. We believe and so hold that under the
circumstances of this case, appellant Angeles was properly charged with two (2) distinct offenses of
robbery and of rape, rather than with the special complex crime of robbery with rape under Article
294, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code. Conceptually, the robbery had not been "accompanied
by rape," neither was the rape committed "by reason or on [the] occasion of such robbery;" rather,
the robbery and the rape were committed successively or in sequence.
Appellant's next contention is that in respect of the conviction of rape, the trial court erred in finding
Analie Baltazar to be a credible witness and that the trial court had misapprehended two (2)
important facts of record which indicated that her testimony was incredible in itself. The two (2) facts
submitted by appellant are: firstly, at the motel, Analie had failed to make an outcry which could have
attracted intervention on the part of the roomboy; and secondly, Analie's declaration that appellant
Angeles had returned to the vicinity of her family home a few hours after the robbery, at day break of
24 February 1989, was "highly suspicious" and improbable for then appellant would have been
risking discovery, denunciation and arrest which in fact eventually came
about.16
Once more, the Court is not persuaded. Private complainant's failure to scream for help or otherwise
make an outcry must be evaluated in the context of all the surrounding circumstances of this case.
When Analie woke up at her house after midnight to go to the bathroom, appellant grabbed hold of
her and her sleeping blanket and threatened her with an ice pick on her neck. She was dragged from
her family home, across the railroad tracks and across several streets by the appellant and his two
(2) companions. Inside the taxi that the group boarded, Analie was put bedside the driver, with
appellant's arm on her shoulder while appellant and the other two (2) malefactors were on their rear
seat. The taxi driver did not notice that underneath the blanket draped over Analie's shoulder,
appellant's ice pick remained threateningly poised at her. After alighting from the taxi at Dakota
Street, Analie was brought to a dark and unlighted place where the three (3) malefactors slapped her
on the face everytime she tried to raise her voice. At the motel, while talking to the roomboy,
appellant continued to hold the ice pick against her neck or side underneath the blanket. Inside the
17
motel room, Analie, 17 years of age at the time of the trial, did not physically resist being disrobed by
appellant Angeles who had placed his ice pick nearby on top of the lavatory. She laid down on the
bed when appellant threatened to kill her. She testified that she was then already weakened, tired
and worn out and feared that she would be stabbed if she struggled with appellant. Neither could
she seek to grab the icepick while appellant was on top of her on the bed, for appellant held her
hands and continue to hold the icepick at her neck. This Court has many times held in the past that
18
rape is committed when intimidation is exercised upon the victim and the latter submits herself,
against her will, to the rapist's embrace because of the fear for life and personal safety. The reality
19
of continuing intimidation used against Analie Baltazar is evident all through the record of this case.
As to appellant's argument that Analie's testimony to the effect that he had returned to the scene of
the robbery was improbable, it may be observed, firstly, that even if it is conceded (and it is not
necessary so to concede) that this portion of Analie's testimony was improbable, that testimony did
not relate to the material facts constitutive of the crime of rape. There is no rule of law which requires
a court to disregard the entirety of the testimony of a witness because a portion thereof may be
doubtful. Analie declared before the trial court that she saw the appellant at the vicinity of her house
20
at least three (3) times after the robbery and rape and that she had immediately informed her father
of appellant's appearance. On the third occasion, on 26 February 1989, Analie's father was able to
21
chase down the appellant Angeles and confront him about his daughter's violation. A false sense of
security born out of his having successfully eluded Analie's father twice before, would account for
appellant's imprudent third visit to the scene of the robbery.
Thus, appellant has failed to establish any significant fact which the trial court overlooked or
misconstrued and which would change the result reached by the trial court. This Court is thus bound
to affirm the factual conclusions of the trial court, more particularly on the credit worthiness of
Analie's testimony, since the trial court had the opportunity to observe carefully her demeanor and
22
deportment in court while testifying. 23
Appellant's defense of denial and alibi, it is firmly established doctrine, cannot prevail over the
positive identification made by Analie Baltazar. Analie had expressly and positively stated that it was
appellant Angeles who dragged her from her house in the company of two (2) other men who were
carrying away her family's typewriter and video cassette recorder, and that it was appellant Angeles
who had disrobed her at the motel and then copulated with her, with an icepick poised at her neck or
within easy reach of the appellant. Finally, when appellant and his mother declared that appellant
24
was sleeping at the latter's house at Araneta Street, Tatalon estate, Quezon City, on the evening of
23-24 February 1989, the Court notes that this location is only a few kilometers away from
25
Baltazars' residence at Algeciras Street, Sampaloc, Manila, such that appellant could move from one
location to the other within a short period of time, with public transportation. Appellant's defense of
alibi cannot be sustained in view of his failure to show the physical impossibility of his being at the
scene of the crime or about the time of the commission thereof. 26
There are, however, two (2) errors on the part of the trial court which need to be addressed. The first
error relates to the penalty properly imposable on appellant for the crime of robbery in Criminal Case
No.89-70962. Under Article 299 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty imposable for robbery in an
inhabited place is reclusion temporal.Taking into account the provisions of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, considering that no modifying circumstances were alleged and proved and exercising
the discretion of this Court, the penalty properly imposable upon appellant Angeles for the robbery is
an indeterminate sentence, the minimum of which shall be eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor and the maximum of which shall be fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day
of reclusion temporal.
The second error relates to the proper characterization of the offense with which appellant was
charged and for which he was convicted in Criminal Case No. 89-70961. Analie had testified before
the trial court that while at the motel, the appellant had told her that he and the other malefactors had
been "tipped off that her family residence contained many appliances and that they had planned to
carry away many of them but had changed their minds." Appellant decided to take her with him
because she was "more important to (sic) these things." The information in Criminal Case No. 89-
27
70961 had sufficiently alleged, and the prosecution shown at the trial, that before Analie was raped,
she was taken from her house against her will and with lewd designs. Taking all these
circumstances into account, it is clear to the Court that appellant Angeles committed the complex
crime of forcible abduction with rape, defined and penalized under Article 342 (forcible abduction)
and Article 335 (rape) of the Revised Penal Code in relation to the second clause of Article 48
(complex crimes) of the same Code. The forcible abduction was, in the circumstances of this case, a
necessary means to commit the rape. In the case variance between the caption of the information
28
and the allegations set out in the body thereof, which allegations sufficiently described the offense(s)
and its elements, the latter prevails over the former. Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides
29
that in complex crimes, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed in its maximum
period. In the case at bar, the more serious of the two (2) crimes (forcible abduction and rape)
established in Criminal Case No. 89-70961 was rape committed with a deadly weapon (here, the
icepick) which is punishable with reclusion perpetua to death under paragraph 3 of Article 335 of the
Revised Penal code. Since no modifying circumstances were either alleged or proved in Criminal
Case No. 89-70961, and considering the non-enforceability of the death penalty, the penalty
30
properly imposable on appellant is reclusion perpetua. The trial court's reference to "life
imprisonment" is, of course, wrong.
In line with recent case law, the indemnity for moral damages awarded to Analie Baltazar in Criminal
Case No. 89-70961 should be increased to P30,000.00. 31
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court dated 7 March 1991 is hereby MODIFIED so as to read
as follows:
Criminal Case No. 89-70961, Rape, Reclusion perpetua, and pay as moral damages

complainant ANALIE BALTAZAR Y CORDON the sum of THIRTY THOUSAND
(P30,000.00) PESOS; WITH COSTS.
Criminal Case No. 89-70962, Robbery, Imprisonment for an indeterminate period

ranging from eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to
fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as
maximum, the stolen articles being not recovered, to pay complainant ANALIE
BALTAZAR Y CORDON, by way of reparation, the sum of FIFTEEN THOUSAND
(P15,000.00) PESOS; WITH COST.
As so modified, the decision of the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 148560. November 19, 2001]

JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (Third
Division) and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
JOHN STUART MILL, in his essay On Liberty, unleashes the full fury of his pen in defense
of the rights of the individual from the vast powers of the State and the inroads of societal
pressure. But even as he draws a sacrosanct line demarcating the limits on individuality beyond
which the State cannot tread - asserting that "individual spontaneity" must be allowed to flourish
with very little regard to social interference - he veritably acknowledges that the exercise of
rights and liberties is imbued with a civic obligation, which society is justified in enforcing at all
cost, against those who would endeavor to withhold fulfillment. Thus he says -
The sole end for which mankind is warranted, individually or collectively, in

interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. The
only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a
civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.
Parallel to individual liberty is the natural and illimitable right of the State to self-
preservation. With the end of maintaining the integrity and cohesiveness of the body politic, it
behooves the State to formulate a system of laws that would compel obeisance to its collective
wisdom and inflict punishment for non-observance.
The movement from Mill's individual liberalism to unsystematic collectivism wrought
changes in the social order, carrying with it a new formulation of fundamental rights and duties
more attuned to the imperatives of contemporary socio-political ideologies. In the process, the
web of rights and State impositions became tangled and obscured, enmeshed in threads of
multiple shades and colors, the skein irregular and broken. Antagonism, often outright collision,
between the law as the expression of the will of the State, and the zealous attempts by its
members to preserve their individuality and dignity, inevitably followed. It is when individual
rights are pitted against State authority that judicial conscience is put to its severest test.
Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, the highest-ranking official to be prosecuted under RA
7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder),[1] as amended by RA 7659,
[2]
wishes to impress upon us that the assailed law is so defectively fashioned that it crosses that
thin but distinct line which divides the valid from the constitutionally infirm. He therefore makes
a stringent call for this Court to subject the Plunder Law to the crucible of constitutionality
mainly because, according to him, (a) it suffers from the vice of vagueness; (b) it dispenses with
the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and, (c) it abolishes the element
of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Code, all of which are
purportedly clear violations of the fundamental rights of the accused to due process and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
Specifically, the provisions of the Plunder Law claimed by petitioner to have transgressed
constitutional boundaries are Secs. 1, par. (d), 2 and 4 which are reproduced hereunder:
Section 1. x x x x (d) "Ill-gotten wealth" means any asset, property, business,
enterprise or material possession of any person within the purview of Section Two (2)
hereof, acquired by him directly or indirectly through dummies, nominees, agents,
subordinates and/or business associates by any combination or series of the following
means or similar schemes:
(1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or

raids on the public treasury;
(2) By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage,

kickbacks or any other form of pecuniary benefit from any person and/or entity in
connection with any government contract or project or by reason of the office or
position of the public office concerned;
(3) By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the

National Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, or
government owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries;
(4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock,

equity or any other form of interest or participation including the promise of future
employment in any business enterprise or undertaking;
(5) By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other

combinations and/or implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit
particular persons or special interests; or
(6) By taking advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or

influence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage
and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.
Section 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder, Penalties. - Any public officer who, by
himself or in connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or
consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses,
accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt
or criminal acts as described in Section 1 (d) hereof, in the aggregate amount or
total value of at least fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime
of plunder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death. Any person who
participated with the said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing
to the crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the imposition
of penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of mitigating and
extenuating circumstances as provided by the Revised Penal Code shall be
considered by the court. The court shall declare any and all ill-gotten wealth and
their interests and other incomes and assets including the properties and shares of
stocks derived from the deposit or investment thereof forfeited in favor of the State
(underscoring supplied).
Section 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it

shall not be necessary to prove each and every criminal act done by the accused in
furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten
wealth, it being sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or
criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy (underscoring
supplied).
On 4 April 2001 the Office of the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan eight (8)
separate Informations, docketed as: (a) Crim. Case No. 26558, for violation of RA 7080, as
amended by RA 7659; (b) Crim. Cases Nos. 26559 to 26562, inclusive, for violation of Secs. 3,
par. (a), 3, par. (a), 3, par. (e) and 3, par. (e), of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act), respectively; (c) Crim. Case No. 26563, for violation of Sec. 7, par. (d), of RA 6713
(The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees); (d) Crim.
Case No. 26564, for Perjury (Art. 183 of The Revised Penal Code); and, (e) Crim. Case No.
26565, for Illegal Use Of An Alias (CA No. 142, as amended by RA 6085).
On 11 April 2001 petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for the remand of the case to the
Ombudsman for preliminary investigation with respect to specification "d" of the charges in the
Information in Crim. Case No. 26558; and, for reconsideration/reinvestigation of the offenses
under specifications "a," "b," and "c" to give the accused an opportunity to file counter-affidavits
and other documents necessary to prove lack of probable cause. Noticeably, the grounds raised
were only lack of preliminary investigation, reconsideration/reinvestigation of offenses, and
opportunity to prove lack of probable cause. The purported ambiguity of the charges and the
vagueness of the law under which they are charged were never raised in that Omnibus
Motion thus indicating the explicitness and comprehensibility of the Plunder Law.
On 25 April 2001 the Sandiganbayan, Third Division, issued a Resolution in Crim. Case No.
26558 finding that "a probable cause for the offense of PLUNDER exists to justify the issuance
of warrants for the arrest of the accused." On 25 June 2001 petitioner's motion for
reconsideration was denied by the Sandiganbayan.
On 14 June 2001 petitioner moved to quash the Information in Crim. Case No. 26558 on the
ground that the facts alleged therein did not constitute an indictable offense since the law on
which it was based was unconstitutional for vagueness, and that the Amended Information for
Plunder charged more than one (1) offense. On 21 June 2001 the Government filed
its Opposition to the Motion to Quash, and five (5) days later or on 26 June 2001 petitioner
submitted his Reply to the Opposition. On 9 July 2001 the Sandiganbayan denied
petitioner's Motion to Quash.
As concisely delineated by this Court during the oral arguments on 18 September 2001, the
issues for resolution in the instant petition for certiorari are: (a) The Plunder Law is
unconstitutional for being vague; (b) The Plunder Law requires less evidence for proving the
predicate crimes of plunder and therefore violates the rights of the accused to due process; and,
(c) Whether Plunder as defined in RA 7080 is a malum prohibitum, and if so, whether it is within
the power of Congress to so classify it.
Preliminarily, the whole gamut of legal concepts pertaining to the validity of legislation is
predicated on the basic principle that a legislative measure is presumed to be in harmony with the
Constitution.[3] Courts invariably train their sights on this fundamental rule whenever a legislative
act is under a constitutional attack, for it is the postulate of constitutional adjudication. This
strong predilection for constitutionality takes its bearings on the idea that it is forbidden for one
branch of the government to encroach upon the duties and powers of another. Thus it has been
said that the presumption is based on the deference the judicial branch accords to its coordinate
branch - the legislature.
If there is any reasonable basis upon which the legislation may firmly rest, the courts must
assume that the legislature is ever conscious of the borders and edges of its plenary powers, and
has passed the law with full knowledge of the facts and for the purpose of promoting what is
right and advancing the welfare of the majority. Hence in determining whether the acts of the
legislature are in tune with the fundamental law, courts should proceed with judicial restraint and
act with caution and forbearance. Every intendment of the law must be adjudged by the courts in
favor of its constitutionality, invalidity being a measure of last resort. In construing therefore the
provisions of a statute, courts must first ascertain whether an interpretation is fairly possible to
sidestep the question of constitutionality.
In La Union Credit Cooperative, Inc. v. Yaranon [4] we held that as
long as there is some basis for the decision of the court, the constitutionality of the challenged
law will not be touched and the case will be decided on other available grounds. Yet the force of
the presumption is not sufficient to catapult a fundamentally deficient law into the safe environs
of constitutionality. Of course, where the law clearly and palpably transgresses the hallowed
domain of the organic law, it must be struck down on sight lest the positive commands of the
fundamental law be unduly eroded.
Verily, the onerous task of rebutting the presumption weighs heavily on the party
challenging the validity of the statute. He must demonstrate beyond any tinge of doubt that there
is indeed an infringement of the constitution, for absent such a showing, there can be no finding
of unconstitutionality. A doubt, even if well-founded, will hardly suffice. As tersely put by
Justice Malcolm, "To doubt is to sustain."[5] And petitioner has miserably failed in the instant
case to discharge his burden and overcome the presumption of constitutionality of the Plunder
Law.
As it is written, the Plunder Law contains ascertainable standards and well-defined
parameters which would enable the accused to determine the nature of his violation. Section 2 is
sufficiently explicit inits description of the acts, conduct and conditions required or forbidden,
and prescribes the elements of the crime with reasonable certainty and particularity. Thus -
1. That the offender is a public officer who acts by himself or in connivance with
members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates,
subordinates or other persons;
2. That he amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-gotten wealth through a combination
or series of the following overt or criminal acts: (a) through misappropriation,
conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury;
(b) by receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage,
kickback or any other form of pecuniary benefits from any person and/or entity in
connection with any government contract or project or by reason of the office or
position of the public officer; (c) by the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or
disposition of assets belonging to the NationalGovernment or any of its subdivisions,
agencies or instrumentalities of Government owned or controlled corporations or
their subsidiaries; (d) by obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any
shares of stock, equity or any other form of interest or participation including the
promise of future employment in any business enterprise or undertaking; (e) by
establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations
and/or implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons
or special interests; or (f) by taking advantage of official position, authority,
relationship, connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the
expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of
the Philippines; and,
3. That the aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten wealth amassed,
accumulated or acquired is at least P50,000,000.00.
As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would inform those who
are subject to it what conduct would render them liable to its penalties, its validity will be
sustained. It must sufficiently guide the judge in its application; the counsel, in defending one
charged with its violation; and more importantly, the accused, in identifying the realm of the
proscribed conduct. Indeed, it can be understood with little difficulty that what the assailed
statute punishes is the act of a public officer in amassing or accumulating ill-gotten wealth of at
least P50,000,000.00 through a series or combination of acts enumerated in Sec. 1, par. (d), of
the Plunder Law.
In fact, the amended Information itself closely tracks the language of the law, indicating
with reasonable certainty the various elements of the offense which petitioner is alleged to have
committed:
"The undersigned Ombudsman, Prosecutor and OIC-Director, EPIB, Office of the

Ombudsman, hereby accuses former PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Joseph Ejercito Estrada, a.k.a. 'ASIONG SALONGA' and a.k.a.
'JOSE VELARDE,' together with Jose 'Jinggoy' Estrada, Charlie 'Atong' Ang, Edward
Serapio, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio
Tan OR Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, and
John DOES & Jane Does, of the crime of Plunder, defined and penalized under R.A.
No. 7080, as amended by Sec. 12 of R.A. No. 7659, committed as follows:
That during the period from June, 1998 to January 2001, in the Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada, THEN A
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, by
himself AND/OR in CONNIVANCE/CONSPIRACY with his co-accused, WHO
ARE MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY, RELATIVES BY AFFINITY OR
CONSANGUINITY, BUSINESS ASSOCIATES, SUBORDINATES AND/OR
OTHER PERSONS, BY TAKING UNDUE ADVANTAGE OF HIS OFFICIAL
POSITION, AUTHORITY, RELATIONSHIP, CONNECTION, OR
INFLUENCE, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally amass,
accumulate and acquire BY HIMSELF, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ill-gotten
wealth in the aggregate amount or TOTAL VALUE of FOUR BILLION NINETY
SEVEN MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED
SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN
CENTAVOS (P4,097,804,173.17), more or less, THEREBY UNJUSTLY
ENRICHING HIMSELF OR THEMSELVES AT THE EXPENSE AND TO
THE DAMAGE OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE AND THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, through ANY OR A combination OR A series of overt OR criminal
acts, OR SIMILAR SCHEMES OR MEANS, described as follows:
(a) by receiving OR collecting, directly or indirectly, on SEVERAL INSTANCES,

MONEY IN THE AGGREGATE AMOUNT OF FIVE HUNDRED FORTY-
FIVE MILLION PESOS (P545,000,000.00), MORE OR LESS, FROM
ILLEGAL GAMBLING IN THE FORM OF GIFT, SHARE, PERCENTAGE,
KICKBACK OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFIT, BY HIMSELF
AND/OR in connection with co-accused CHARLIE 'ATONG' ANG, Jose 'Jinggoy'
Estrada, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Edward Serapio, AND JOHN DOES AND JANE
DOES, in consideration OF TOLERATION OR PROTECTION OF ILLEGAL
GAMBLING;
(b) by DIVERTING, RECEIVING, misappropriating,

converting OR misusing DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, for HIS OR THEIR
PERSONAL gain and benefit, public funds in the amount of ONE HUNDRED
THIRTY MILLION PESOS (P130,000,000.00), more or less, representing a portion
of the TWO HUNDRED MILLION PESOS (P200,000,000.00) tobacco excise tax
share allocated for the province of Ilocos Sur under R.A. No. 7171, by himself
and/or in connivance with co-accused Charlie 'Atong' Ang, Alma Alfaro, JOHN
DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, AND
OTHER JOHN DOES & JANE DOES; (italic supplied).
(c) by directing, ordering and compelling, FOR HIS PERSONAL GAIN AND

BENEFIT, the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) TO PURCHASE
351,878,000 SHARES OF STOCKS, MORE OR LESS, and the Social Security
System (SSS), 329,855,000 SHARES OF STOCK, MORE OR LESS, OF THE
BELLE CORPORATION IN THE AMOUNT OF MORE OR LESS ONE
BILLION ONE HUNDRED TWO MILLION NINE HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE
THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS
(P1,102,965,607.50) AND MORE OR LESS SEVEN HUNDRED FORTY FOUR
MILLION SIX HUNDRED TWELVE THOUSAND AND FOUR HUNDRED
FIFTY PESOS (P744,612,450.00), RESPECTIVELY, OR A TOTAL OF MORE
OR LESS ONE BILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY SEVEN MILLION
FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT THOUSAND FIFTY SEVEN PESOS
AND FIFTY CENTAVOS (P1,847,578,057.50); AND BY COLLECTING OR
RECEIVING, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, BY HIMSELF AND/OR IN
CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, COMMISSIONS OR
PERCENTAGES BY REASON OF SAID PURCHASES OF SHARES OF
STOCK IN THE AMOUNT OF ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY NINE MILLION
SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P189,700,000.00) MORE OR LESS,
FROM THE BELLE CORPORATION WHICH BECAME PART OF THE
DEPOSIT IN THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK UNDER THE ACCOUNT
NAME 'JOSE VELARDE;'
(d) by unjustly enriching himself FROM COMMISSIONS, GIFTS, SHARES,

PERCENTAGES, KICKBACKS, OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY
BENEFITS, IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, in the
amount of MORE OR LESS THREE BILLION TWO HUNDRED THIRTY
THREE MILLION ONE HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED
SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS
(P3,233,104,173.17) AND DEPOSITING THE SAME UNDER HIS ACCOUNT
NAME 'JOSE VELARDE' AT THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK."
We discern nothing in the foregoing that is vague or ambiguous - as there is obviously none
- that will confuse petitioner in his defense. Although subject to proof, these factual assertions
clearly show that the elements of the crime are easily understood and provide adequate contrast
between the innocent and the prohibited acts. Upon such unequivocal assertions, petitioner is
completely informed of the accusations against him as to enable him to prepare for an intelligent
defense.
Petitioner, however, bewails the failure of the law to provide for the statutory definition of
the terms "combination" and "series" in the key phrase "a combination or series of overt or
criminal acts" found in Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2, and the word "pattern" in Sec.
4. These omissions, according to petitioner, render the Plunder Law unconstitutional for being
impermissibly vague and overbroad and deny him the right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him, hence, violative of his fundamental right to due process.
The rationalization seems to us to be pure sophistry. A statute is not rendered uncertain and
void merely because general terms are used therein, or because of the employment of terms
without defining them;[6] much less do we have to define every word we use. Besides, there is no
positive constitutional or statutory command requiring the legislature to define each and every
word in an enactment. Congress is not restricted in the form of expression of its will, and its
inability to so define the words employed in a statute will not necessarily result in the vagueness
or ambiguity of the law so long as the legislative will is clear, or at least, can be gathered from
the whole act, which is distinctly expressed in the Plunder Law.
Moreover, it is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will be
interpreted in their natural, plain and ordinary acceptation and signification, [7] unless it is evident
that the legislature intended a technical or special legal meaning to those words. [8] The intention
of the lawmakers - who are, ordinarily, untrained philologists and lexicographers - to
use statutory phraseology in such a manner is always presumed. Thus, Webster's New Collegiate
Dictionary contains the following commonly accepted definition of the words
"combination" and "series:"
Combination - the result or product of combining; the act or process of

combining. To combine is to bring into such close relationship as to obscure
individual characters.
Series - a number of things or events of the same class coming one after another in
spatial and temporal succession.
That Congress intended the words "combination" and "series" to be understood in their

popular meanings is pristinely evident from the legislative deliberations on the bill which
eventually became RA 7080 or the Plunder Law:
DELIBERATIONS OF THE BICAMERAL COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE, 7 May

1991
REP. ISIDRO: I am just intrigued again by our definition of plunder. We say

THROUGH A COMBINATION OR SERIES OF OVERT OR CRIMINAL ACTS AS
MENTIONED IN SECTION ONE HEREOF.Now when we say combination, we
actually mean to say, if there are two or more means, we mean to say that number
one and two or number one and something else are included, how about a series of
the same act? For example, through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, will these
be included also?
REP. GARCIA: Yeah, because we say a series.

REP. ISIDRO: Series.
REP. GARCIA: Yeah, we include series.
REP. ISIDRO: But we say we begin with a combination.
REP. GARCIA: Yes.
REP. ISIDRO: When we say combination, it seems that -
REP. GARCIA: Two.
REP. ISIDRO: Not only two but we seem to mean that two of the enumerated means not twice of one
enumeration.
REP. GARCIA: No, no, not twice.
REP. ISIDRO: Not twice?
REP. GARCIA: Yes. Combination is not twice - but combination, two acts.
REP. ISIDRO: So in other words, thats it. When we say combination, we mean, two different acts. It
cannot be a repetition of the same act.
REP. GARCIA: That be referred to series, yeah.
REP. ISIDRO: No, no. Supposing one act is repeated, so there are two.
REP. GARCIA: A series.
REP. ISIDRO: Thats not series. Its a combination. Because when we say combination or series, we
seem to say that two or more, di ba?
REP. GARCIA: Yes, this distinguishes it really from ordinary crimes. That is why, I said, that is a very
good suggestion because if it is only one act, it may fall under ordinary crime but we have here a
combination or series of overt or criminal acts. So x x x x
REP. GARCIA: Series. One after the other eh di....
SEN. TANADA: So that would fall under the term series?
REP. GARCIA: Series, oo.
REP. ISIDRO: Now, if it is a combination, ano, two misappropriations....
REP. GARCIA: Its not... Two misappropriations will not be combination. Series.
REP. ISIDRO: So, it is not a combination?
REP. GARCIA: Yes.
REP. ISIDRO: When you say combination, two different?
REP. GARCIA: Yes.
SEN. TANADA: Two different.
REP. ISIDRO: Two different acts.
REP. GARCIA: For example, ha...
REP. ISIDRO: Now a series, meaning, repetition...
DELIBERATIONS ON SENATE BILL NO. 733, 6 June 1989
SENATOR MACEDA: In line with our interpellations that sometimes one or maybe even two acts may
already result in such a big amount, on line 25, would the Sponsor consider deleting the words
a series of overt or, to read, therefore: or conspiracy COMMITTED by criminal acts such as.
Remove the idea of necessitating a series. Anyway, the criminal acts are in the plural.
SENATOR TANADA: That would mean a combination of two or more of the acts mentioned in this.
THE PRESIDENT: Probably two or more would be....
SENATOR MACEDA: Yes, because a series implies several or many; two or more.
SENATOR TANADA: Accepted, Mr. President x x x x
THE PRESIDENT: If there is only one, then he has to be prosecuted under the particular crime. But
when we say acts of plunder there should be, at least, two or more.
SENATOR ROMULO: In other words, that is already covered by existing laws, Mr. President.
Thus when the Plunder Law speaks of "combination," it is referring to at least two (2) acts
falling under different categories of enumeration provided in Sec. 1, par. (d), e.g., raids on the
public treasury in Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (1), and fraudulent conveyance of assets belonging to
the National Government under Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (3).
On the other hand, to constitute a series" there must be two (2) or more overt or criminal
acts falling under the same category of enumeration found in Sec. 1, par. (d), say,
misappropriation, malversation and raids on the public treasury, all of which fall under Sec. 1,
par. (d), subpar. (1). Verily, had the legislature intended a technical or distinctive meaning for
"combination" and "series," it would have taken greater pains in specifically providing for it in
the law.
As for "pattern," we agree with the observations of the Sandiganbayan [9] that this term is
sufficiently defined in Sec. 4, in relation to Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2 -
x x x x under Sec. 1 (d) of the law, a 'pattern' consists of at least a combination or

series of overt or criminal acts enumerated in subsections (1) to (6) of Sec. 1
(d). Secondly, pursuant to Sec. 2 of the law, the pattern of overt or criminal acts is
directed towards a common purpose or goal which is to enable the public officer to
amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. And thirdly, there must either be an
'overall unlawful scheme' or 'conspiracy' to achieve said common goal. As commonly
understood, the term 'overall unlawful scheme' indicates a 'general plan of action or
method' which the principal accused and public officer and others conniving with him
follow to achieve the aforesaid common goal. In the alternative, if there is no such
overall scheme or where the schemes or methods used by multiple accused vary, the
overt or criminal acts must form part of a conspiracy to attain a common goal.
Hence, it cannot plausibly be contended that the law does not give a fair warning and
sufficient notice of what it seeks to penalize. Under the circumstances, petitioner's reliance on the
"void-for-vagueness" doctrine is manifestly misplaced. The doctrine has been formulated in
various ways, but is most commonly stated to the effect that a statute establishing a criminal
offense must define the offense with sufficient definiteness that persons of ordinary intelligence
can understand what conduct is prohibited by the statute. It can only be invoked against that
specie of legislation that is utterly vague on its face, i.e., that which cannot be clarified either by
a saving clause or by construction.
A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application. In
such instance, the statute is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects - it violates due
process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of what
conduct to avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions
and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle. [10] But the doctrine does not apply as
against legislations that are merely couched in imprecise language but which nonetheless specify
a standard though defectively phrased; or to those that are apparently ambiguous yet fairly
applicable to certain types of activities. The first may be "saved" by proper construction, while
no challenge may be mounted as against the second whenever directed against such activities.
[11]
With more reason, the doctrine cannot be invoked where the assailed statute is clear and free
from ambiguity, as in this case.
The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for uncertainty is whether the
language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by
common understanding and practice.[12] It must be stressed, however, that the "vagueness"
doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld - not
absolute precision or mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest. Flexibility, rather
than meticulous specificity, is permissible as long as the metes and bounds of the statute are
clearly delineated. An act will not be held invalid merely because it might have been more
explicit in its wordings or detailed in its provisions, especially where, because of the nature of
the act, it would be impossible to provide all the details in advance as in all other statutes.
Moreover, we agree with, hence we adopt, the observations of Mr. Justice Vicente V.
Mendoza during the deliberations of the Court that the allegations that the Plunder Law is vague
and overbroad do not justify a facial review of its validity -
The void-for-vagueness doctrine states that "a statute which either forbids or requires
the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first
essential of due process of law."[13] The overbreadth doctrine, on the other hand, decrees that
"a governmental purpose may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and
thereby invade the area of protected freedoms."[14]
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is

overbroad because of possible "chilling effect" upon protected speech. The theory is
that "[w]hen statutes regulate or proscribe speech and no readily apparent construction
suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a single prosecution, the
transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected expression is deemed to
justify allowing attacks on overly broad statutes with no requirement that the person
making the attack demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated by a
statute drawn with narrow specificity."[15] The possible harm to society in permitting
some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that the
protected speech of others may be deterred and perceived grievances left to fester
because of possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes.
This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in
terrorem effect resulting from their very existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed
for this reason alone, the State may well be prevented from enacting laws against
socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as
in the area of free speech.
The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special application only to free
speech cases. They are inapt for testing the validity of penal statutes. As the U.S.
Supreme Court put it, in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, "we have not
recognized an 'overbreadth' doctrine outside the limited context of the First
Amendment."[16] In Broadrick v. Oklahoma,[17] the Court ruled that "claims of facial
overbreadth have been entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms,
seek to regulate only spoken words" and, again, that "overbreadth claims, if
entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws
that are sought to be applied to protected conduct." For this reason, it has been held
that "a facial challenge to a legislative act is the most difficult challenge to mount
successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists
under which the Act would be valid." [18] As for the vagueness doctrine, it is said that a
litigant may challenge a statute on its face only if it is vague in all its possible
applications. "A plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed
cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others." [19]
In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools
developed for testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech cases or, as they are
called in American law, First Amendment cases. They cannot be made to do service
when what is involved is a criminal statute. With respect to such statute, the
established rule is that "one to whom application of a statute is constitutional will not
be heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as
applying to other persons or other situations in which its application might be
unconstitutional."[20] As has been pointed out, "vagueness challenges in the First
Amendment context, like overbreadth challenges typically produce facial invalidation,
while statutes found vague as a matter of due process typically are invalidated [only]
'as applied' to a particular defendant."[21] Consequently, there is no basis for
petitioner's claim that this Court review the Anti-Plunder Law on its face and in its
entirety.
Indeed, "on its face" invalidation of statutes results in striking them down entirely on
the ground that they might be applied to parties not before the Court whose activities
are constitutionally protected.[22] It constitutes a departure from the case and
controversy requirement of the Constitution and permits decisions to be made without
concrete factual settings and in sterile abstract contexts. [23] But, as the U.S. Supreme
Court pointed out in Younger v. Harris[24]
[T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its deficiencies, and requiring
correction of these deficiencies before the statute is put into effect, is rarely if ever an
appropriate task for the judiciary.The combination of the relative remoteness of the
controversy, the impact on the legislative process of the relief sought, and above all
the speculative and amorphous nature of the required line-by-line analysis of detailed
statutes, . . . ordinarily results in a kind of case that is wholly unsatisfactory for
deciding constitutional questions, whichever way they might be decided.
For these reasons, "on its face" invalidation of statutes has been described as
"manifestly strong medicine," to be employed "sparingly and only as a last
resort,"[25] and is generally disfavored.[26] In determining the constitutionality of a
statute, therefore, its provisions which are alleged to have been violated in a case must
be examined in the light of the conduct with which the defendant is charged. [27]
In light of the foregoing disquisition, it is evident that the purported ambiguity of the
Plunder Law, so tenaciously claimed and argued at length by petitioner, is more imagined than
real. Ambiguity, where none exists, cannot be created by dissecting parts and words in the statute
to furnish support to critics who cavil at the want of scientific precision in the law. Every
provision of the law should be construed in relation and with reference to every other part. To be
sure, it will take more than nitpicking to overturn the well-entrenched presumption of
constitutionality and validity of the Plunder Law. A fortiori, petitioner cannot feign ignorance of
what the Plunder Law is all about. Being one of the Senators who voted for its passage,
petitioner must be aware that the law was extensively deliberated upon by the Senate and its
appropriate committees by reason of which he even registered his affirmative vote with full
knowledge of its legal implications and sound constitutional anchorage.
The parallel case of Gallego v. Sandiganbayan[28] must be mentioned if only to illustrate and
emphasize the point that courts are loathed to declare a statute void for uncertainty unless the law
itself is so imperfect and deficient in its details, and is susceptible of no reasonable construction
that will support and give it effect. In that case, petitioners Gallego and Agoncillo challenged the
constitutionality of Sec. 3, par. (e), of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for being
vague. Petitioners posited, among others, that the term "unwarranted" is highly imprecise and
elastic with no common law meaning or settled definition by prior judicial or administrative
precedents; that, for its vagueness, Sec. 3, par. (e), violates due process in that it does not give
fair warning or sufficient notice of what it seeks to penalize.Petitioners further argued that the
Information charged them with three (3) distinct offenses, to wit: (a) giving of "unwarranted"
benefits through manifest partiality; (b) giving of "unwarranted" benefits through evident bad
faith; and, (c) giving of "unwarranted" benefits through gross inexcusable negligence while in
the discharge of their official function and that their right to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation against them was violated because they were left to guess which of the three (3)
offenses, if not all, they were being charged and prosecuted.
In dismissing the petition, this Court held that Sec. 3, par. (e), of The Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act does not suffer from the constitutional defect of vagueness. The phrases
"manifest partiality," "evident bad faith," and "gross and inexcusable negligence" merely
describe the different modes by which the offense penalized in Sec. 3, par. (e), of the statute may
be committed, and the use of all these phrases in the same Information does not mean that the
indictment charges three (3) distinct offenses.
The word 'unwarranted' is not uncertain. It seems lacking adequate or official support;
unjustified; unauthorized (Webster, Third International Dictionary, p. 2514); or
without justification or adequate reason (Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. US Dept. of
Justice, C.D. Pa., 405 F. Supp. 8, 12, cited in Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition,
Vol. 43-A 1978, Cumulative Annual Pocket Part, p. 19).
The assailed provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act consider a corrupt
practice and make unlawful the act of the public officer in:
x x x or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in
the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence, x x x (Section 3 [e], Rep.
Act 3019, as amended).
It is not at all difficult to comprehend that what the aforequoted penal provisions
penalize is the act of a public officer, in the discharge of his official, administrative or
judicial functions, in giving any private party benefits, advantage or preference which
is unjustified, unauthorized or without justification or adequate reason, through
manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.
In other words, this Court found that there was nothing vague or ambiguous in the use of the
term "unwarranted" in Sec. 3, par. (e), of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which was
understood in its primary and general acceptation. Consequently, in that case, petitioners'
objection thereto was held inadequate to declare the section unconstitutional.
On the second issue, petitioner advances the highly stretched theory that Sec. 4 of the
Plunder Law circumvents the immutable obligation of the prosecution to prove beyond
reasonable doubt the predicate acts constituting the crime of plunder when it requires only proof
of a pattern of overt or criminal acts showing unlawful scheme or conspiracy -
SEC. 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall
not be necessary to prove each and every criminal act done by the accused in
furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten
wealth, it being sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or
criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy.
The running fault in this reasoning is obvious even to the simplistic mind. In a criminal
prosecution for plunder, as in all other crimes, the accused always has in his favor the
presumption of innocence which is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and unless the State
succeeds in demonstrating by proof beyond reasonable doubt that culpability lies, the accused is
entitled to an acquittal.[29] The use of the"reasonable doubt" standard is indispensable to command
the respect and confidence of the community in the application of criminal law. It is critical that
the moral force of criminal law be not diluted by a standard of proof that leaves people in doubt
whether innocent men are being condemned. It is also important in our free society that every
individual going about his ordinary affairs has confidence that his government cannot adjudge
him guilty of a criminal offense without convincing a proper factfinder of his guilt with utmost
certainty. This "reasonable doubt" standard has acquired such exalted stature in the realm of
constitutional law as it gives life to the Due Process Clause which protects the accused against
conviction except upon proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the
crime with which he is charged.[30] The following exchanges between Rep. Rodolfo Albano and
Rep. Pablo Garcia on this score during the deliberations in the floor of the House of
Representatives are elucidating -
DELIBERATIONS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ON RA 7080, 9

October 1990
MR. ALBANO: Now, Mr. Speaker, it is also elementary in our criminal law that what is alleged in the
information must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. If we will prove only one act and find him
guilty of the other acts enumerated in the information, does that not work against the right of the
accused especially so if the amount committed, say, by falsification is less than P100 million, but
the totality of the crime committed is P100 million since there is malversation, bribery,
falsification of public document, coercion, theft?
MR. GARCIA: Mr. Speaker, not everything alleged in the information needs to be proved beyond
reasonable doubt. What is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt is every element of the
crime charged. For example, Mr. Speaker, there is an enumeration of the things taken by the
robber in the information three pairs of pants, pieces of jewelry. These need not be proved
beyond reasonable doubt, but these will not prevent the conviction of a crime for which he was
charged just because, say, instead of 3 pairs of diamond earrings the prosecution proved
two. Now, what is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt is the element of the offense.
MR. ALBANO: I am aware of that, Mr. Speaker, but considering that in the crime of plunder the
totality of the amount is very important, I feel that such a series of overt criminal acts has to be
taken singly. For instance, in the act of bribery, he was able to accumulate only P50,000 and in
the crime of extortion, he was only able to accumulate P1 million. Now, when we add the totality
of the other acts as required under this bill through the interpretation on the rule of evidence, it
is just one single act, so how can we now convict him?
MR. GARCIA: With due respect, Mr. Speaker, for purposes of proving an essential element of the
crime, there is a need to prove that element beyond reasonable doubt. For example, one essential
element of the crime is that the amount involved is P100 million. Now, in a series of defalcations
and other acts of corruption in the enumeration the total amount would be P110 or P120 million,
but there are certain acts that could not be proved, so, we will sum up the amounts involved in
those transactions which were proved. Now, if the amount involved in these transactions, proved
beyond reasonable doubt, is P100 million, then there is a crime of plunder(underscoring
supplied).
It is thus plain from the foregoing that the legislature did not in any manner refashion the
standard quantum of proof in the crime of plunder. The burden still remains with the prosecution
to prove beyond any iota of doubt every fact or element necessary to constitute the crime.
The thesis that Sec. 4 does away with proof of each and every component of the crime
suffers from a dismal misconception of the import of that provision. What the prosecution needs
to prove beyond reasonable doubt is only a number of acts sufficient to form a combination or
series which would constitute a pattern and involving an amount of at
least P50,000,000.00. There is no need to prove each and every other act alleged in the
Information to have been committed by the accused in furtherance of the overall unlawful
scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. To illustrate, supposing
that the accused is charged in an Information for plunder with having committed fifty (50) raids
on the public treasury. The prosecution need not prove all these fifty (50) raids, it being
sufficient to prove by pattern at least two (2) of the raids beyond reasonable doubt provided only
that they amounted to at least P50,000,000.00.[31]
A reading of Sec. 2 in conjunction with Sec. 4, brings us to the logical conclusion
that "pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy"
inheres in the very acts of accumulating, acquiring or amassing hidden wealth. Stated otherwise,
such pattern arises where the prosecution is able to prove beyond reasonable doubt the predicate
acts as defined in Sec. 1, par. (d). Pattern is merely a by-product of the proof of the predicate
acts. This conclusion is consistent with reason and common sense. There would be no other
explanation for a combination or series of
overt or criminal acts to stash P50,000,000.00 or more, than "a scheme or conspiracy to amass,
accumulate or acquire ill gotten wealth." The prosecution is therefore not required to make a
deliberate and conscious effort to prove pattern as it necessarily follows with the establishment
of a series or combination of the predicate acts.
Relative to petitioner's contentions on the purported defect of Sec. 4 is his submission that
"pattern" is "a very important element of the crime of plunder;" and that Sec. 4 is "two pronged,
(as) it contains a rule of evidence and a substantive element of the crime," such that without it the
accused cannot be convicted of plunder -
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: In other words, cannot an accused be convicted under the Plunder Law
without applying Section 4 on the Rule of Evidence if there is proof beyond reasonable doubt of
the commission of the acts complained of?
ATTY. AGABIN: In that case he can be convicted of individual crimes enumerated in the Revised
Penal Code, but not plunder.
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: In other words, if all the elements of the crime are proved beyond
reasonable doubt without applying Section 4, can you not have a conviction under the Plunder
Law?
ATTY. AGABIN: Not a conviction for plunder, your Honor.
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: Can you not disregard the application of Sec. 4 in convicting an accused
charged for violation of the Plunder Law?
ATTY. AGABIN: Well, your Honor, in the first place Section 4 lays down a substantive element of the
law x x x x
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: What I said is - do we have to avail of Section 4 when there is proof beyond
reasonable doubt on the acts charged constituting plunder?
ATTY. AGABIN: Yes, your Honor, because Section 4 is two pronged, it contains a rule of evidence
and it contains a substantive element of the crime of plunder. So, there is no way by which we
can avoid Section 4.
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: But there is proof beyond reasonable doubt insofar as the predicate crimes
charged are concerned that you do not have to go that far by applying Section 4?
ATTY. AGABIN: Your Honor, our thinking is that Section 4 contains a very important element of the
crime of plunder and that cannot be avoided by the prosecution. [32]
We do not subscribe to petitioner's stand. Primarily, all the essential elements of plunder can
be culled and understood from its definition in Sec. 2, in relation to Sec. 1, par. (d), and "pattern"
is not one of them. Moreover, the epigraph and opening clause of Sec. 4 is clear and
unequivocal:
SEC. 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder
xxxx
It purports to do no more than prescribe a rule of procedure for the prosecution of a criminal
case for plunder. Being a purely procedural measure, Sec. 4 does not define or establish any
substantive right in favor of the accused but only operates in furtherance of a remedy. It is only a
means to an end, an aid to substantive law. Indubitably, even without invoking Sec. 4, a
conviction for plunder may be had, for what is crucial for the prosecution is to present sufficient
evidence to engender that moral certitude exacted by the fundamental law to prove the guilt of
the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, even granting for the sake of argument that Sec. 4 is
flawed and vitiated for the reasons advanced by petitioner, it may simply be severed from the
rest of the provisions without necessarily resulting in the demise of the law; after all, the existing
rules on evidence can supplant Sec. 4 more than enough. Besides, Sec. 7 of RA 7080 provides
for a separability clause -
Sec. 7. Separability of Provisions. - If any provisions of this Act or the application

thereof to any person or circumstance
is held invalid, the remaining provisions of this Act and the application of such
provisions to other persons or circumstances shall not be affected thereby.
Implicit in the foregoing section is that to avoid the whole act from being declared invalid as
a result of the nullity of some of its provisions, assuming that to be the case although it is not
really so, all the provisions thereof should accordingly be treated independently of each other,
especially if by doing so, the objectives of the statute can best be achieved.
As regards the third issue, again we agree with Justice Mendoza that plunder is a malum in
se which requires proof of criminal intent. Thus, he says, in his Concurring Opinion -
x x x Precisely because the constitutive crimes are mala in se the element of mens

rea must be proven in a prosecution for plunder. It is noteworthy that the amended
information alleges that the crime of plunder was committed "willfully, unlawfully
and criminally." It thus alleges guilty knowledge on the part of petitioner.
In support of his contention that the statute eliminates the requirement of mens
rea and that is the reason he claims the statute is void, petitioner cites the following
remarks of Senator Taada made during the deliberation on S.B. No. 733:
SENATOR TAADA . . . And the evidence that will be required to convict him would
not be evidence for each and every individual criminal act but only evidence sufficient
to establish the conspiracy or scheme to commit this crime of plunder. [33]
However, Senator Taada was discussing 4 as shown by the succeeding portion of the
transcript quoted by petitioner:
SENATOR ROMULO: And, Mr. President, the Gentleman feels that it is contained in

Section 4, Rule of Evidence, which, in the Gentleman's view, would provide for a
speedier and faster process of attending to this kind of cases?
SENATOR TAADA: Yes, Mr. President . . .[34]
Senator Taada was only saying that where the charge is conspiracy to commit plunder,
the prosecution need not prove each and every criminal act done to further the scheme
or conspiracy, it being enough if it proves beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt
or ciminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy. As far as the
acts constituting the pattern are concerned, however, the elements of the crime must
be proved and the requisite mens rea must be shown.
Indeed, 2 provides that -
Any person who participated with the said public officer in the commission of an
offense contributing to the crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for such
offense. In the imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance
of mitigating and extenuating circumstances, as provided by the Revised Penal Code,
shall be considered by the court.
The application of mitigating and extenuating circumstances in the Revised Penal

Code to prosecutions under the Anti-Plunder Law indicates quite clearly that mens
rea is an element of plunder since the degree of responsibility of the offender is
determined by his criminal intent. It is true that 2 refers to "any person who
participates with the said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing
to the crime of plunder." There is no reason to believe, however, that it does not apply
as well to the public officer as principal in the crime. As Justice Holmes said: "We
agree to all the generalities about not supplying criminal laws with what they omit,
but there is no canon against using common sense in construing laws as saying what
they obviously mean."[35]
Finally, any doubt as to whether the crime of plunder is a malum in se must be

deemed to have been resolved in the affirmative by the decision of Congress in 1993
to include it among the heinous crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to
death. Other heinous crimes are punished with death as a straight penalty in R.A. No.
7659. Referring to these groups of heinous crimes, this Court held in People v.
Echegaray:[36]
The evil of a crime may take various forms. There are crimes that are, by their very
nature, despicable, either because life was callously taken or the victim is treated like
an animal and utterly dehumanized as to completely disrupt the normal course of his
or her growth as a human being . . . . Seen in this light, the capital crimes of
kidnapping and serious illegal detention for ransom resulting in the death of the victim
or the victim is raped, tortured, or subjected to dehumanizing acts; destructive arson
resulting in death; and drug offenses involving minors or resulting in the death of the
victim in the case of other crimes; as well as murder, rape,
parricide, infanticide, kidnapping and serious illegal detention, where the victim is
detained for more than three days or serious physical injuries were inflicted on the
victim or threats to kill him were made or the victim is a minor, robbery with
homicide, rape or intentional mutilation, destructive arson, and carnapping where the
owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped vehicle is killed or raped, which are
penalized by reclusion perpetua to death, are clearly heinous by their very nature.
There are crimes, however, in which the abomination lies in the significance and
implications of the subject criminal acts in the scheme of the larger socio-political and
economic context in which the state finds itself to be struggling to develop and
provide for its poor and underprivileged masses. Reeling from decades of corrupt
tyrannical rule that bankrupted the government and impoverished the population, the
Philippine Government must muster the political will to dismantle the culture of
corruption, dishonesty, greed and syndicated criminality that so deeply entrenched
itself in the structures of society and the psyche of the populace. [With the
government] terribly lacking the money to provide even the most basic services to its
people, any form of misappropriation or misapplication of government funds
translates to an actual threat to the very existence of government, and in turn, the very
survival of the people it governs over. Viewed in this context, no less heinous are the
effects and repercussions of crimes like qualified bribery, destructive arson resulting
in death, and drug offenses involving government officials, employees or officers, that
their perpetrators must not be allowed to cause further destruction and damage to
society.
The legislative declaration in R.A. No. 7659 that plunder is a heinous offense implies
that it is a malum in se. For when the acts punished are inherently immoral or
inherently wrong, they are mala in se[37]and it does not matter that such acts are
punished in a special law, especially since in the case of plunder the predicate crimes
are mainly mala in se. Indeed, it would be absurd to treat prosecutions for plunder as
though they are mere prosecutions for violations of the Bouncing Check Law (B.P.
Blg. 22) or of an ordinance against jaywalking, without regard to the inherent
wrongness of the acts.
To clinch, petitioner likewise assails the validity of RA 7659, the amendatory law of RA
7080, on constitutional grounds. Suffice it to say however that it is now too late in the day for
him to resurrect thislong dead issue, the same having been eternally consigned by People v.
Echegaray[38] to the archives of jurisprudential history. The declaration of this Court therein that
RA 7659 is constitutionally valid stands as a declaration of the State, and becomes, by necessary
effect, assimilated in the Constitution now as an integral part of it.
Our nation has been racked by scandals of corruption and obscene profligacy of officials in
high places which have shaken its very foundation. The anatomy of graft and corruption has
become more elaborate in the corridors of time as unscrupulous people relentlessly contrive
more and more ingenious ways to bilk the coffers of the government. Drastic and radical
measures are imperative to fight the increasingly sophisticated, extraordinarily methodical and
economically catastrophic looting of the national treasury. Such is the Plunder Law, especially
designed to disentangle those ghastly tissues of grand-scale corruption which, if left unchecked,
will spread like a malignant tumor and ultimately consume the moral and institutional fiber of
our nation. The Plunder Law, indeed, is a living testament to the will of the legislature to
ultimately eradicate this scourge and thus secure society against the avarice and other venalities
in public office.
These are times that try men's souls. In the checkered history of this nation, few issues of
national importance can equal the amount of interest and passion generated by petitioner's
ignominious fall from the highest office, and his eventual prosecution and trial under a virginal
statute. This continuing saga has driven a wedge of dissension among our people that may linger
for a long time. Only by responding to the clarion call for patriotism, to rise above factionalism
and prejudices, shall we emerge triumphant in the midst of ferment.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court holds that RA 7080 otherwise known as the
Plunder Law, as amended by RA 7659, is CONSTITUTIONAL. Consequently, the petition to
declare the law unconstitutional is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 81563 December 19, 1989

AMADO C. ARIAS, petitioner,
vs.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN, respondent.
G.R. No. 82512 December 19, 1989
CRESENCIO D. DATA, petitioner,
vs.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN, respondent.
Paredes Law Office for petitioner.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
The facts of this case are stated in the dissenting opinion of Justice Carolina C. Griño-Aquino which
follows this majority opinion. The dissent substantially reiterates the draft report prepared by Justice
Griño-Aquino as a working basis for the Court's deliberations when the case was being discussed
and for the subsequent votes of concurrence or dissent on the action proposed by the report.
There is no dispute over the events which transpired. The division of the Court is on the conclusions
to be drawn from those events and the facts insofar as the two petitioners are concerned. The
majority is of the view that Messrs. Arias and Data should be acquitted on grounds of reasonable
doubt. The Court feels that the quantum of evidence needed to convict petitioners Arias and Data
beyond reasonable doubt, as co-conspirators in the conspiracy to cause undue injury to the
Government through the irregular disbursement and expenditure of public funds, has not been
satisfied.
In acquitting the petitioners, the Court agrees with the Solicitor-General who, in 80 pages of his
1
consolidated manifestation and motion, recommended that Messrs. Arias and Data be acquitted of
the crime charged, with costs de oficio. Earlier, Tanodbayan Special Prosecutor Eleuterio F.
Guerrero had also recommended the dropping of Arias from the information before it was filed.
There is no question about the need to ferret out and convict public officers whose acts have made
the bidding out and construction of public works and highways synonymous with graft or criminal
inefficiency in the public eye. However, the remedy is not to indict and jail every person who may
have ordered the project, who signed a document incident to its construction, or who had a hand
somewhere in its implementation. The careless use of the conspiracy theory may sweep into jail
even innocent persons who may have been made unwitting tools by the criminal minds who
engineered the defraudation.
Under the Sandiganbayan's decision in this case, a department secretary, bureau chief, commission
chairman, agency head, and all chief auditors would be equally culpable for every crime arising from
disbursements which they have approved. The department head or chief auditor would be guilty of
conspiracy simply because he was the last of a long line of officials and employees who acted upon
or affixed their signatures to a transaction. Guilt must be premised on a more knowing, personal, and
deliberate participation of each individual who is charged with others as part of a conspiracy.
The records show that the six accused persons were convicted in connection with the overpricing of
land purchased by the Bureau of Public Works for the Mangahan Floodway Project. The project was
intended to ease the perennial floods in Marikina and Pasig, Metro Manila.
The accused were prosecuted because 19,004 square meters of "riceland" in Rosario, Pasig which
had been assessed at P5.00 a square meter in 1973 were sold as residential land" in 1978 for
P80.00 a square meter. The land for the floodway was acquired through negotiated purchase,
We agree with the Solicitor-General that the assessor's tax valuation of P5.00 per square meter of
land in Rosario, Pasig, Metro Manila is completely unrealistic and arbitrary as the basis for
conviction.
Herein lies the first error of the trial court.
It must be stressed that the petitioners are not charged with conspiracy in the falsification of public
documents or preparation of spurious supporting papers. The charge is causing undue injury to the
Government and giving a private party unwarranted benefits through manifest partiality, evident bad
faith, or inexcusable negligence.
The alleged undue injury in a nutshell is the Government purchase of land in Pasig, Rizal for P80.00
a square meter instead of the P5.00 value per square meter appearing in the tax declarations and
fixed by the municipal assessor, not by the landowner.
The Sandiganbayan, without any clear factual basis for doing so has assumed that the P5.00 per
square meter value fixed by the assessor in the tax declarations was the correct market value of the
Mangahan property and if the Government purchased the land for P80.00 a square meter, it follows
that it must have suffered undue injury.
The Solicitor General explains why this conclusion is erroneous:
1. No undue injury was caused to the Government
a. The P80.00 per square rneter acquisition cost is just fair and
reasonable.
It bears stress that the Agleham property was acquired through negotiated purchase.
It was, therefor, nothing more than an ordinary contract of sale where the purchase
price had to be arrived at by agreement between the parties and could never be left
to the discretion of one of the contracting parties (Article 1473, New Civil Code). For
it is the essence of a contract of sale that there must be a meeting of the minds
between the seller and the buyer upon the thing which is the object of the contract
and upon the price (Article 1475, New Civil Code). Necessarily, the parties have to
negotiate the reasonableness of the price, taking into consideration such other
factors as location, potentials, surroundings and capabilities. After taking the
foregoing premises into consideration, the parties have, thus, arrived at the amount
of P80.00 per square meter as the fair and reasonable price for the Agleham
property.
It bears stress that the prosecution failed to adduce evidence to prove that the true
and fair market value in 1978 of the Agleham property was indeed P5.00 per square
meter only as stated by the assessor in the tax declaration (Exhibit W). On the
contrary, the prosecution's principal witness Pedro Ocol, the Assistant Municipal
Assessor of Pasig, admitted that the purchase price of P80.00 per square meter paid
for the Agleham property as stated in the Deed of Sale (Exhibit G) is reasonable (tsn,
August 19,1983, p. 20) and fair (Ibid, p. 76); that 'the value of lands within the town of
Pasig ranges from P80.00 to P500.00' (Ibid, p. 21); that the Agleham property is
"around 300 meters" from Ortigas Avenue, "adjacent to the existing Leongson
[Liamson] Subdivision ... and near Eastland Garment Building" (Ibid, pp. 12-13); that
said property is surrounded by factories, commercial establishments and residential
subdivisions (Ibid, pp. 73-74); that the P5.00 per square meter assessed valuation of
the Agleham property appearing on the tax declaration (Exhibit W) was based on
actual use only (lbid, pp. 26-27), it being the uniform rate for all ricefields in Pasig
irrespective of their locations (Ibid, pp. 72-74) and did not take into account the
existence of many factories and subdivisions in the area (Ibid., pp. 25-27, 72-74),
and that the assessed value is different from and always lower than the actual
market value (Ibid, pp. 22-23). (At pp. 256-259, Rollo)
A negotiated purchase may usually entail a higher buying price than one arrived at in the course of
expropriation proceedings.
In Export Processing Zone Authority v. Dulay (149 SCRA 305, 310 [1987]) we struck down the
martial law decree that pegged just compensation in eminent domain cases to the assessed value
stated by a landowner in his tax declaration or fixed by the municipal assessor, whichever is lower.
Other factors must be considered. These factors must be determined by a court of justice and not by
municipal employees.
In the instant case, the assessor's low evaluation, in the fixing of which the landowner had no
participation, was used for a purpose infinitely more weighty than mere expropriation of land. It forms
the basis for a criminal conviction.
The Court is not prepared to say that P80.00 to P500.00 a square meter for land in Pasig in 1978
would be a fair evaluation. The value must be determined in eminent domain proceedings by a
competent court. We are certain, however, that it cannot be P5.00 a square meter. Hence, the
decision, insofar as it says that the "correct" valuation is P5.00 per square meter and on that basis
convicted that petitioners of causing undue injury, damage, and prejudice to the Government
because of gross overpricing, is grounded on shaky foundations.
There can be no overpricing for purposes of a criminal conviction where no proof adduced during
orderly proceedings has been presented and accepted.
The Court's decision, however, is based on a more basic reason. Herein lies the principal error of the
respondent court.
We would be setting a bad precedent if a head of office plagued by all too common problems-
dishonest or negligent subordinates, overwork, multiple assignments or positions, or plain
incompetence is suddenly swept into a conspiracy conviction simply because he did not personally
examine every single detail, painstakingly trace every step from inception, and investigate the
motives of every person involved in a transaction before affixing, his signature as the final approving
authority.
There appears to be no question from the records that documents used in the negotiated sale were
falsified. A key tax declaration had a typewritten number instead of being machine-numbered. The
registration stampmark was antedated and the land reclassified as residential instead of ricefield.
But were the petitioners guilty of conspiracy in the falsification and the subsequent charge of causing
undue in injury and damage to the Government?
We can, in retrospect, argue that Arias should have probed records, inspected documents, received
procedures, and questioned persons. It is doubtful if any auditor for a fairly sized office
could personally do all these things in all vouchers presented for his signature. The Court would be
asking for the impossible. All heads of offices have to rely to a reasonable extent 'on their
subordinates and on the good faith of those prepare bids, purchase supplies, or enter into
negotiations. If a department secretary entertains important visitors, the auditor is not ordinarily
expected to call the restaurant about the amount of the bill, question each guest whether he was
present at the luncheon, inquire whether the correct amount of food was served and
otherwise personally look into the reimbursement voucher's accuracy, propriety, and sufficiency.
There has to be some added reason why he should examine each voucher in such detail. Any
executive head of even small government agencies or commissions can attest to the volume of
papers that must be signed. There are hundreds of document , letters and supporting paper that
routinely pass through his hands. The number in bigger offices or departments is even more
appalling.
There should be other grounds than the mere signature or approval appearing on a voucher to
sustain a conspiracy charge and conviction.
Was petitioner Arias part of the planning, preparation, and perpetration of the alleged conspiracy to
defraud the government?
Arias joined the Pasig office on July 19, 1978. The negotiations for the purchase of the property
started in 1977. The deed of sale was executed on April 20, 1978. Title was transferred to the
Republic on June 8, 1978. In other words, the transaction had already been consummated before
his arrival. The pre-audit, incident to payment of the purchase, was conducted in the first week of
October, 1978. Arias points out that apart from his signature linking him to the signature on the
voucher, there is no evidence transaction. On the contrary, the other co-accused testified they did
not know him personally and none approached him to follow up the payment.
Should the big amount of P1,520,320.00 have caused him to investigate . gate the smallest detains
of the transaction?
Yes, if the land was really worth only P5.00 a square meter. However, if land in Pasig was already
worth P80.00 a square meter at the time, no warning bell of intuition would have sounded an inner
alarm. Land along Ortigas Avenue on the way to Pasig is now worth P20,000.00 to P30,000.00
a square meter. The falsification of the tax declaration by changing "riceland" to "residential' was
done before Arias was assigned to Pasig besides, there is no such thing as "riceland" in inner Metro
Manila. Some lots in outlying or easily flooded areas may still be planted to rice or kangkong but this
is only until the place is dedicated to its real purpose which is commercial, industrial, or residential. If
the Sandiganbayan is going to send somebody to jail for six years, the decision should be based on
firmer foundation.
The Sandiganbayan asked why Arias kept the documents from October, 1978 to June 23, 1982.
Arias explained that the rules of the Commission on Audit require auditors to keep these d
documents and under no circumstance to relinquish custody to other persons. Arias was auditor of
the Bureau of Public Works in Pasig up to September 1, 1981. The seven months delay in the formal
turnover of custody to the new auditor was explained by prosecution witness Julito Pesayco, who
succeeded him as auditor and who took over the custody of records in that office.
The main reason for the judgment of conviction, for the finding of undue injury and damage to the
Government is the alleged gross overprice for the land purchased for the floodway project.
Assuming that P80.00 is indeed exorbitant, petitioner Arias cites his testimony as follows:
Q In conducting the pre-audit, did you determine the reasonableness

of the price of the property?
A In this case, the price has been stated, the transaction had been
consummated and the corresponding Transfer Certificate of little had
been issued and transferred to the government of the Philippines.
The auditors have no more leeway to return the papers and then
question the purchase price.
Q Is it not a procedure in your office that before payment is given by

the government to private individuals there should be a pre-audit of
the papers and the corresponding checks issued to the vendor?
A Correct, Your Honor, but it depends on the kind of transaction there

is.
Q Yes, but in this particular case, the papers were transferred to the
government without paying the price Did you not consider that rather
odd or unusual? (TSN, page 17, April 27,1987).
A No, Your Honor.
Q Why not?
A Because in the Deed of Sale as being noted there, there is a

condition that no payments will be made unless the corresponding
title in the payment of the Republic is committed is made.
Q In this case you said that the title is already in the name of the
government?
A Yes, Your Honor. The only thing we do is to determine whether

there is an appropriation set aside to cover the said specification. As
of the price it is under the sole authority of the proper officer making
the sale.
Q My point is this. Did you not consider it unusual for a piece of

property to be bought by the government; the sale was
consummated; the title was issued in favor of the government without
the price being paid first to the seller?
A No, Your Honor. In all cases usually, payments made by the

government comes later than the transfer.
Q That is usual procedure utilized in road right of way transaction?
A Yes, Your Honor. (TSN, p. 18, April 27,1987).

Q And of course as auditor, 'watch-dog' of the government there is
also that function you are also called upon by going over the
papers . . . (TSN, page 22, April 27,1987). I ... vouchers called upon
to determine whether there is any irregularity as at all in this particular
transaction, is it not?
A Yes, Ma'am.
Q And that was in fact the reason why you scrutinized also, not only
the tax declaration but also the certification by Mr. Jose and Mr.
Cruz?
A As what do you mean of the certification, ma'am?
Q Certification of Mr. Jose and Mr. Cruz in relation to PD No. 296, A

They are not required documents that an auditor must see. (TSN,
page 23, April 27,1987).
and continuing:
A ... The questioning of the purchase price is now beyond the

authority of the auditor because it is inasmuch as the amount
involved is beyond his counter-signing authority. (TSN, page 35, April
27, 1987). (At pp. 15-16, Petition. Underlinings supplied by petitioner)
The Solicitor General summarizes the participation of petitioner Data as follows:
As regards petitioner Data's alleged participation, the evidence on record shows that
as the then District Engineer of the Pasig Engineering District he created a
committee, headed by Engr. Priscillo Fernando with Ricardo Asuncion, Alfonso
Mendoza, Ladislao Cruz, Pedro Hucom and Carlos Jose, all employees of the district
office, as members, specifically to handle the Mangahan Floodway Project, gather
and verify documents, conduct surveys, negotiate with the owners for the sale of
their lots, process claims and prepare the necessary documents; he did not take any
direct and active part in the acquisition of land for the Mangahan floodway; it was the
committee which determined the authenticity of the documents presented to them for
processing and on the basis thereof prepared the corresponding deed of sale;
thereafter, the committee submitted the deed of sale together with the supporting
documents to petitioner Data for signing; on the basis of the supporting certified
documents which appeared regular and complete on their face, petitioner Data, as
head of the office and the signing authority at that level, merely signed but did not
approve the deed of sale (Exhibit G) as the approval thereof was the prerogative of
the Secretary of Public Works; he thereafter transmitted the signed deed of sale with
its supporting documents to Director Anolin of the Bureau of Public Works who in
turn recommended approval thereof by the Secretary of Public Works; the deed of
sale was approved by the Asst. Secretary of Public Works after a review and re-
examination thereof at that level; after the approval of the deed of sale by the higher
authorities the covering voucher for payment thereof was prepared which petitioner
Data signed; petitioner Data did not know Gutierrez and had never met her during
the processing and payment of her claims (tsn, February 26, 1987, pp. 10-14, 16-24,
31-32). (At pp. 267-268, Rollo.)
On the alleged conspiracy, the Solicitor General argues:
It is respectfully submitted that the prosecution likewise has not shown any positive
and convincing evidence of conspiracy between the petitioners and their co-accused.
There was no direct finding of conspiracy. Respondent Court's inference on the
alleged existence of conspiracy merely upon the purported 'pre-assigned roles (of
the accused) in the commission of the (alleged) illegal acts in question is not
supported by any evidence on record. Nowhere in the seventy- eight (78) page
Decision was there any specific allusion to some or even one instance which would
link either petitioner Arias or Data to their co-accused in the planning, preparation
and/or perpetration, if any, of the purported fraud and falsifications alleged in the
information That petitioners Data and Arias happened to be officials of the Pasig
District Engineering Office who signed the deed of sale and passed on pre-audit the
general voucher covering the subject sale, respectively, does hot raise any
presumption or inference, that they were part of the alleged plan to defraud the
Government, as indeed there was none. It should be remembered that, as
aboveshown, there was no undue injury caused to the Government as the negotiated
purchase of the Agleham property was made at the fair and reasonable price of
P80.00 per square meter.
That there were erasures and superimpositions of the words and figures of the
purchase price in the deed of sale from P1,546,240.00 to P1,520,320.00 does not
prove conspiracy. It may be noted that there was a reduction in the affected area
from the estimated 19,328 square meters to 19,004 square meters as approved by
the Land Registration Commission, which resulted in the corresponding reduction in
the purchase price from P1,546,240.00 to Pl,520,320.00. The erasures in the deed of
sale were simple corrections that even benefited the Government.
Moreover, contrary to the respondent Court's suspicion, there was nothing irregular
in the use of the unapproved survey plan/technical description in the deed of sale
because the approval of the survey plan/ technical description was not a prerequisite
to the approval of the deed of sale. What is important is that before any payment is
made by the Government under the deed of sale the title of the seller must have
already been cancelled and another one issued to the Government incorporating
therein the technical description as approved by the Land Registration Commission,
as what obtained in the instant case. (At pp. 273-275, Rollo)
We agree with the counsel for the People. There is no adequate evidence to establish the guilt of the
petitioners, Amado C. Arias and Cresencio D. Data, beyond reasonable doubt. The inadequate
evidence on record is not sufficient to sustain a conviction.
WHEREFORE, the questioned decision of the Sandiganbayan insofar as it convicts and sentences
petitioners Amado C. Arias and Cresencio D. Data is hereby SET ASIDE. Petitioners Arias and Data
are acquitted on grounds of reasonable doubt. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Gancayco, Bidin, Cortes and Medialdea, JJ.,
concur.
Separate Opinions

GRIÑO-AQUINO, J., dissenting:
The lone issue in these consolidated petitions for review is whether the Sandiganbayan committed a
reversible error in convicting the petitioners, Amado C. Arias and Cresencio D. Data, of having
violated Section 3, paragraph (e), of the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, in connection with the
scandalous overpricing of land purchased by the Government as right of way for its Mangahan
Floodway Project in Pasig, Rizal. The pertinent provision of the Anti-Graft Law reads as follows:
SEC. 3. Corrupt Practices of Public Officers-In addition to acts or omissions of public

officers already penalized by existing law. the following shall constitute corrupt
practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxxxxxxxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any
private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of
his official administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad
faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and
employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses
or permits or other concessions.
The amended information against them, to which they pleaded not guilty, alleged:
That on or about the period covering April, 1978 to October 1978, in Rosario, Pasig,
Metro Manila, Philippines, and with the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
accused Cresencio D. Data, being then the district Engineer of the province of Rizal,
Ministry of Public Works, and as such, headed and supervised the acquisition of
private lands for the right-of-way of the Mangahan Floodway Project of the
Government at Sitio Mangahan, Rosario, Pasig, Metro Manila; accused Priscillo G.
Fernando, then the Supervising Engineer of the Office of the District Engineer of
Rizal, Ministry of Public Works who acted as assistant of accused Cresencio D. Data
in the Mangahan Floodway Project; accused Ladislao G. Cruz, then the Senior
Engineer of the Office of the District Engineer of Rizal, Ministry of Public Works, who
was charged with the acquisition of lots needed for the Mangahan Floodway Project;
accused Carlos L. Jose then the Instrumentman of the office of the District Engineer
of Rizal, Ministry of Public Works who acted as the surveyor of the Mangahan
Floodway Project; accused Claudio H. Arcaya, then the Administrative Officer I of the
Rizal District Engineer's Office, Ministry of Public Works who passed upon all papers
and documents pertaining to private lands acquired by the Government for the
Mangahan Floodway Project; and accused Amado C. Arias, then the Auditor of Rizal
Engineering District, Pasig, Metro Manila, who passed upon and approved in audit
the acquisition as well as the payment of lands needed for the Mangahan Floodway
Project all taking advantage of their public and official positions, and conspiring,
confederating and confabulating with accused Natividad C. Gutierrez, the attorney-
in-fact of Benjamin Agleham, who is the registered owner of a parcel of land situated
at Rosario, Pasig, Metro Manila and covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 0097,
with accused Ladislao G. Cruz, Carlos L. -Jose and Claudio Arias, acting with
evident bad faith, while accused Cresencio D. Data, Priscillo G. Fernando and
Amado C. Arias, acting with manifest partiality in the discharge of their official public
and/or administrative functions, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
cause undue injury, damage and prejudice to the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines by causing, allowing and/or approving the illegal and irregular
disbursement and expenditure of public funds in favor of and in the name of
Benjamin P. Agleham in the amount of P1,520,320.00 under General Voucher No. 8-
047, supported by a certification, dated September 14, 1978, which was purportedly
issued by the Municipal Treasurer of Pasig, and certified xerox copies of Tax
Declarations Nos. 47895 and A-018-0091 1, both in the name of Benjamin P.
Agleham, and an alleged owner's copy of Tax Declaration No. 49948, in the name of
the Republic of the Philippines, said supporting documents having been falsified by
the accused to make it appear that the land mentioned in the above-stated
supporting papers is a residential land with a market value of P80.00 per square
meter and that 19,004 square meters thereof were transferred in the name of the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines under Tax Declaration No. 49948,
when in truth and in fact, the afore-stated land is actually a riceland with a true and
actual market value of P5.00 per square meter only and Tax Declaration No. 49948
was truly and officially registered in the names of spouses Moises Javillonar and
Sofia San Andres, not in the name of the Government, and refers to a parcel of land
at Sagad, Pasig, Metro Manila; that the foregoing falsities were committed by the
accused to conceal the fact that the true and actual pace of the 19,004 square
meters of land of Benjamin P. Agleham, which was acquired in behalf of the
Government by way of negotiated purchase by the accused officials herein for the
right of way of the Mangahan Floodway project at an overprice of P1,520,320.00 was
P92,020.00 only; and finally, upon receipt of the overpriced amount, the accused
misappropriated, converted and misapplied the excess of the true and actual value of
the above-mentioned land, i.e., P1,428,300.00 for their own personal needs, uses
and benefits, to the damage and prejudice of the Government in the amount of
P1,428,300.00. (pp. 2931, Rollo of G.R. No. 81563.)
Priscillo Fernando did not face trial for he has remained at large, his present whereabouts being
unknown (p. 48, Sandiganbayan Decision, p. 75, Rollo of G.R. No. 81563).
In 1975, the Bureau of Public Works initiated the Mangahan Floodway Project to ease the perennial
floods affecting the towns of Marikina and Pasig, Metro Manila. The project would traverse the
northern and southern portions of Ortigas Avenue in Pasig, Metro Manila (Exhibits A and A-1). An
announcement was published in leading newspapers advising affected property owners to file their
applications for payment at the District Engineer's Office (p. 29, Sandiganbayan Decision, p.
56, Ibid.).
The implementation of the Mangahan Floodway Project was entrusted to the Pasig Engineering
District headed by the District Engineer, Cresencio Data. He formed a committee composed of
Supervising Civil Engineer Priscillo Fernando, as over-all in charge, Alfonso Mendoza and Pedro
Hucom for acquisition of improvements, and Instrumentman Carlos Jose for surveys (p. 26,
Sandiganbayan Decision, p. 53, Ibid.). The team was tasked to notify lot owners affected by the
project of the impending expropriation of their properties and to receive and process applications for
payment.
The reclassification of all lands around the Mangahan Floodway Project was suspended in 1975 by
order of the President (p. 45, Sandiganbayan Decision, p. 72, Ibid.). Implementing that order, a
memorandum was sent to Data on August 27,1976, by Public Works Director Desiderio Anolin,
directing that all affected lands covered by the Mangahan Floodway Project shall be excluded from
reevaluation and reassessment (Annex A, Exh. DD, Counter-Affidavit of Data, p. 70, Sandiganbayan
Decision, P. 97, Ibid).
Among the lots affected was a 19,004-square-meter portion of a 30,169-square-meter riceland in
Pasig registered in the name of Benjamin Agleham under Original Certificate of Title No. 0097
issued on May 5, 1977 (Exh. H). The land was previously owned by Andrea Arabit and Evaristo
Gutierrez, parents of the accused Natividad Gutierrez.
After Agleham acquired the 3-hectare land in 1973 from the Gutierrez spouses, he had it subdivided
into three (3) lots under plan (LRC) Psd-278456 which was approved by the Land Registration
Commission on June 1, 1978 (Entry No. 27399/12071, Exh. H). Lot 1, with an area of 19,004 square
meters, is the portion that Agleham, through Natividad Gutierrez, sold to the Government in 1978 for
the Mangahan Floodway Project.
On December 15, 1973, Agleham's property, classified as a "ricefield" with an area of 3.2 hectares,
was declared for taxation under Tax Declaration No. 28246 (Exh-Y). Its assessed value was P4,800
or P0.15 per square meter (p. 10, Sandiganbayan Decision, p. 37, Ibid.). On February 27, 1978,
another Tax Declaration No. 47895 (Exh. Y-1) was issued for the same ricefield" with a revised area
of 30,169 square meters. The declared market value was P150,850 (or P5 per square meter), and
the assessed value was P60,340.
Ten months later, or on December 15, 1978, Tax Declaration No. 47895 was cancelled and replaced
by Tax Declaration No. A018- 00911 (Exh. Y-2) wherein the market value of the same "ricefield,"
jumped to P301,690 (P10 per square meter). Its assessed value was fixed at P120,680. The
description and value of the property, according to Pedro Ocol, the assistant Municipal Assessor of
Pasig, was based on the actual use of the property (riceland) not on its potential use (p. 13,
Sandiganbayan Decision, p. 40, Ibid.). The valuation was based on a compilation of sales given to
the Municipal Assessor's office by the Register of Deeds, from which transactions the Assessor
obtained the average valuation of the properties in the same vicinity (p. 14, Sandiganbayan
Decision, p. 41, Ibid.).
Among those who filed an application for payment (Exhs. FF and FF-1) at the District Engineer's
Office was the accused, Natividad Gutierrez, who was armed with a Special Power of Attorney
allegedly executed on February 24,1978 by Benjamin Agleham in her favor (Exhs. C and C-1). She
submitted a falsified xerox copy of Tax Declaration No. 47895 (Exh. B) bearing a false date:
December 15,1973 (instead of February 27, 1978) and describing Agleham's 30,169-square-meter
property as "residential" (instead of riceland), with a fair market value of P2,413,520 or P80 per
square meter (instead of P150,845 at P5 per square meter). Its assessed value appeared to be
P724,056 (instead of P60,340). Gutierrez submitted Agleham's Original Certificate of Title No. 0097
(Exh. H-1), the technical description of the property, and a xerox copy of a "Sworn Statement of the
True Current and Fair Market Value of Real Property" required under P.D. No. 76 (Exh. 1). The
xerox copy of Tax Declaration No. 47895 was supposedly certified by the Municipal Treasurer of
Pasig, Alfredo Prudencio.
The documents supporting Agleham's claim were "examined" by the Administrative Officer, accused
Claudio Arcaya, who, after initiating them, turned them over to accused Ladislao G. Cruz, A Deed of
Absolute Sale for Lot 1 (19,004 square meters valued at P80 per square meter) was prepared by
Cruz who also initialed the supporting documents and transmitted them to District Engr. Data.
On April 20,1978, the Deed of Absolute Sale (Exhs. G and G-1) was signed by Data and Gutierrez
(as attorney-in-fact of Agleham). Thereafter, Data sent the papers to Director Desiderio Anolin of the
Bureau of Public Works who recommended to the Assistant Secretary of Public Works the approval
of the Deed of Sale (Exh. G-1). Afterwards, the documents were returned to Data's office for the
transfer of title to the Government. On June 8, 1978, the sale was registered and Transfer Certificate
of Title No. T-12071 (Exh. T) was issued in the name of the Government.
General Voucher (Exh. S) No. 85-2-7809-52 dated "9/29/78" for the amount of P1,520,320 bore
fourth certifications of. (1) Cruz as Senior Civil Engineer; (2) Priscillo G. Fernando as Supervising
Civil Engineer II; (3) Cresencio Data as District Engineer II and (4) Cesar V. Franco as Project Acting
Accountant (p. 56, Sandiganbayan Decision, p. 83, Ibid.).
On October 23, 1978, the voucher and its supporting documents were pre-audited and approved for
payment by the accused, Amado C. Arias, as auditor of the Engineering District. The next day,
October 24, 1978, sixteen (16) PNB checks with Serial Nos. 188532 to 188547, inclusive (Exhs. X to
X-1 5), for the total sum of Pl,520,320.00 were issued to Gutierrez as payment for Agleham's
19,004-square-meter lot.
In October, 1979, an investigation was conducted by the Ministry of National Defense on the gross
overpricing of Agleham's property. During the investigation, sworn statements were taken from
Alfredo Prudencio, Municipal Treasurer of Pasig (Exh. AA), Pedro Ocol, Assistant Municipal
Assessor of Pasig (Exh. BB), and the accused Claudio Arcaya (Exh. EE). Prudencio denied having
issued or signed the certification dated September 14,1978 (Exh. J), attesting that Agleham's
property covered by Tax Declaration No. 47895 had a market value of P2,413,520 and that the taxes
had been paid from 1975 to 1978. Prudencio also impugned the initial (purporting to be that of his
subordinate Ruben Gatchalian, Chief of the Land Tax Division) that was affixed below Prudencio's
typewritten name in Exhibit J. Both Prudencio and Gatchalian disowned the typewritten certification.
They declared that such certifications are usually issued by their office on mimeographed forms
(Exh. J-1).
Assistant Municipal Assessor Pedro Ocol produced and Identified the original or genuine Tax
Declaration No. 47895 dated February 27, 1978, and a certified copy thereof (Exh. Y-1). Therein,
Agleham's property of 30,169 square meters was classified as a "ricefield" and appraised at P5 per
square meter, with an assessed value of P60,340 and a market value of PI 50,850. Ocol testified
that the supposed xerox copy of Tax Declaration No. 47895 (Exh. B), which Gutierrez submitted as
one of the supporting documents of the general voucher (Exh. S), was fake, because of the following
tell-tale signs:
(1) the tax declaration number was typewritten, not machine numbered as in the genuine tax
declaration, Exhibit Y;
(2) the stampmark of registration was antedated to December 15, 1973 in the fake, instead of the
correct date February 27, 1978-- in the genuine tax declaration;
(3) the classification of the property was "residential," instead of "ricefield" which is its classification
in the genuine document; and
(4) the lot was over priced at P80 per square meter in the fake tax declaration, instead of the
appraised value of only P5 per square meter appearing in the genuine declaration.
Also found to be fake was Tax Declaration No. 49948 in the name of the Republic of the Philippines
(Exhs. K and K-1). The genuine Tax Declaration No. 49948 (Exhs. U and V-2) was actually filed on
October 18, 1978 in the names of the spouses Moises Javillonar and Sofia Andres, for their 598-
square-meters' residential property with a declared market value of P51,630.
The Agleham deed of sale was pre-audited by the auditor of the Rizal Engineering District, Amado
Arias, who approved the payment of Pl,520,320 to Gutierrez without questioning the fact that the
amount of the purchase price therein had been altered, i.e., "snow-flaked (sic) and later
superimposed by the amount of P1,520,320 in words and figures" (p. 71, Sandiganbayan Decision,
p. 98, Ibid.), nor checking the veracity of the supporting documents listed at the back of the General
Voucher (Exh. S), numbering fifteen (15) in all, among which were:
(1) the fake Tax Declaration No. 47895 showing that the value of the land was P80 per square meter
(Exh. B);
(2) fake Tax Declaration No. 49948 In the name of the Republic of the Philippines (Exh. K)
(3) the forged certification of Municipal Treasurer Prudencio that the fair market value of 'the land
was P100 per square meter (Exh. J);
(4) a false certification (Exh. D) dated September 19, 1978 signed by accused Cruz, Jose, and
Fernando, certifying that the Agleham property was upon ocular inspection by them, found to be
"residential;"
(5) a falsely dated certification where the original date was erased and a false date (February 15,
1978) was superimposed (Exh.E), issued by Engr. Fernando pursuant to DPWTC Circular No. 557,
certifying that he had examined the real estate tax receipts of the Agleham property for the last three
(3) years;
(6) the technical description of the land (Exhs. F and F-1) attached to the deed of sale dated April
20, 1978 was not an approved technical description for the subdivision survey executed by Geodetic
Engineer Cipriano C. Caro was verified and approved by the Land Registration Commission on May
28,1978 only. There were "substantial variations" noted by the Sandiganbayan between the
approved technical description and the technical description of the land in the deed of sale (p. 61,
Sandiganbayan Decision, p. 88, Ibid.);
(7) the special power of attorney dated February 24, 1978, supposedly given to Gutierrez by
Agleham (Exhs. C, C-1) bore a fictitious residence certificate Agleham (p. 64, Sandiganbayan
Decision, p. 91, Ibid.); and
(8) the fake Sworn Statement on the Current and Fair Market Value of Real Properties (Exh. Z)
dated October 1, 1973, contained a forged signature of Agleham, presumably made by Gutierrez
herself The Sandiganbayan observed that Agleham's supposed signature "appears to be identical to
accused Gutierrez' signatures in the General Voucher (Exh. S), in the release and Quitclaim which
she signed in favor of Agleham on July 20, 1983 (Exh. CC), and in her affidavits (Exhs. FF and FF-
1)." (pp. 64-65, Sandiganbayan Decision, pp. 91-92, Ibid.).
After payment of the Agleham claim, all the supporting documents were kept by Arias. Even after he
had been replaced by Julito Pesayco on September 1, 1981, as auditor of the Rizal Engineering
District, he did not turn over the documents to Pesayco. It was only on June 23, 1982, after this case
had been filed in the Sandiganbayan and the trial had begun, that Arias delivered them to Pesayco
(Exh. T-1).
After a trial lasting nearly six years, the Sandiganbayan rendered a 78-page decision on November
16, 1987, whose dispositive portion reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Natividad G. Gutierrez,

Cresencio D. Data, Ladislao G. Cruz, Carlos L. Jose, Claudio H. Arcaya and Amado
C. Arias GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the violation of Section 3, paragraph
(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, as ascended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, and hereby sentences each of them to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment for THREE (3) YEARS, as minimum to SIX (6) YEARS, as maximum;
to further suffer perpetual disqualification from public office; to indemnify jointly and
severally, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines in the amount of
P1,425,300, and to pay their proportional costs of this action. (p. 104, Rollo of G.R.
No. 81563.)
Both Arias and Data appealed.
Arias anchors his petition for review of the Sandiganbayan's decision (G.R. No. 81563) on his
contention that the court's findings that he conspired with his co-accused and that he was grossly
negligent are based on misapprehension of facts, speculation, surmise, and conjecture.
Data's main defense is that the acquisition of the Agleham property was the work of the committee of
Prescillo Fernando iii which he did not take an active part, and that the price which the government
paid for it was reasonable. Hence, it uttered no jury in the transaction.
In his consolidated brief or comment for the State, the Solicitor General recommends the acquittal of
the petitioners because the Agleham property was allegedly not grossly overpriced.
After deliberating on the petitions in these cases, we find no error in the decision under review. The
Sandiganbayan did not err in finding that the petitioners conspired with their co-accused to cause
injury to the Government and to unduly favor the lot owner, Agleham.
A conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence of the acts charged, but may and generally
must be proven by a number of indefinite acts, conditions and circumstances (People vs. Maralit,
G.R. No. 71143, Sept. 19,1988; People vs. Roca, G.R. No. 77779, June 27, 1988).
This case presents a conspiracy of silence and inaction where chiefs of office who should have been
vigilant to protect the interest of the Government in the purchase of Agleham's two-hectare riceland,
accepted as gospel truth the certifications of their subordinates, and approved without question the
million-peso purchase which, by the standards prevailing in 1976-78, should have pricked their
curiosity and prompted them to make inquiries and to verify the authenticity of the documents
presented to them for approval. The petitioners kept silent when they should have asked questions
they looked the other way when they should have probed deep into the transaction.
Since it was too much of a coincidence that both petitioners were negligent at the same time over
the same transaction, the Sandiganbayan was justified in concluding that they connived and
conspired to act in that manner to approve the illegal transaction which would favor the seller of the
land and defraud the Government.
We cannot accept Arias' excuse that because the deed of sale had been signed and the property
transferred to the Government which received a title in its name, there was nothing else for him to do
but approve the voucher for payment. The primary function of an auditor is to prevent irregular,
unnecessary, excessive or extravagant expenditures of government funds.
The auditorial function of an auditor, as a representative of the Commission on Audit, comprises

three aspects: (1) examination; (2) audit: and (3) settlement of the accounts, funds, financial
transactions and resources of the agencies under their respective audit jurisdiction (Sec. 43,
Government Auditing Code of the Phil.). Examination, as applied to auditing, means "to probe
records, or inspect securities or other documents; review procedures, and question persons, all for
the purpose of arriving at an opinion of accuracy, propriety, sufficiency, and the like." (State Audit
Code of the Philippines, Annotated by Tantuico, 1982 Ed., p. 57.)
Arias admitted that he did not check or verify the papers supporting the general voucher that was
submitted to him for payment of Pl,520,320 to Agleham or his attorney-in-fact, Natividad Gutierrez.
Arias did not question any person for the purpose of determining the accuracy and integrity of the
documents submitted to him and the reasonableness of the price that the Government was paying
for the less than two-hectare riceland. We reject his casuistic explanation that since his subordinates
had passed upon the transaction, he could assume that it was lawful and regular for, if he would be
a mere rubber stamp for his subordinates, his position as auditor would be useless and
unnecessary.
We make the same observation concerning District Engineer Cresencio Data who claims innocence
because he allegedly did not take any direct and active participation in the acquisition of the
Agleham property, throwing the blame on the committee which he created, composed of Fernando,
Asuncion, Mendoza, Cruz, Hucom and Jose that negotiated with the property owners for the
purchase of properties on the path of the Mangahan Floodway Project. He in effect would hide under
the skirt of the committee which he himself selected and to which he delegated the task that was
assigned to his office to identify the lots that would be traversed by the floodway project, gather and
verify documents, make surveys, negotiate with the owners for the price, prepare the deeds of sale,
and process claims for payment. By appointing the committee, he did not cease to be responsible for
the implementation of the project. Under the principle of command responsibility, he was responsible
for the manner in which the committee performed its tasks for it was he who in fact signed the deed
of sale prepared by the committee. By signing the deed of sale and certifications prepared for his
signature by his committee, he in effect, made their acts his own. He is, therefore, equally guilty with
those members of the committee (Fernando, Cruz and Jose) who accepted the fake tax declarations
and made false certifications regarding the use and value of the Agleham property.
The Solicitor General has pointed out that Data signed, but did not approve, the deed of sale of
Agleham's property because the approval thereof was the prerogative of the Secretary of Public
Works. It should not be overlooked, however, that Data's signature on the deed of sale was
equivalent to an attestation that the transaction was fair, honest and legal. It was he who was
charged with the task of implementing the Mangahan Floodway Project within his engineering
district.
We find no merit in the Solicitor General's argument that the Agleham riceland was not overpriced
because the price of P80 per square meter fixed in the deed of sale was reasonable, hence, the
petitioners are not guilty of having caused undue injury and prejudice to the Government, nor of
having given unwarranted benefits to the property owner and/or his attorney-in-fact, Gutierrez. He
further argues that the valuation in the owner's genuine tax declaration may not be used as a
standard in determining the fair market value of the property because PD Nos. 76 and 464 (making it
mandatory in expropriation cases to fix the price at the value of the property as declared by the
owner, or as determined by the assessor, whichever is lower), were declared null and void by this
Court in the case of Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA) vs. Dulay, 149 SCRA 305, and other
related cases.
That argument is not well taken because PD Nos. 76 and 464 (before they were nullified) applied to
the expropriation of property for public use. The acquisition of Agleham's riceland was not done by
expropriation but through a negotiated sale. In the course of the negotiations, there was
absolutely no allegation nor proof that the price of P80 per square meter was its fair market value in
1978, i.e., eleven (11) years ago. What the accused did was to prove the value of the land through
fake tax declarations (Exhs. B, F, K), false certifications (Exhs. J, D and E) and a forged sworn
statement on the current and fair market value of the real property (Exh. Z) submitted by the
accused in support of the deed of sale. Because fraudulent documents were used, it may not be said
that the State agreed to pay the price on the basis of its fairness, for the Government was in fact
deceived concerning the reasonable value of the land.
When Ocol testified in 1983 that P80 was a reasonable valuation for the Agleham's land, he did not
clarify that was also its reasonable value in 1975, before real estate values in Pasig soared as a
result of the implementation of the Mangahan Floodway Project. Hence, Ocol's testimony was
insufficient to rebut the valuation in Agleham's genuine 1978 Tax Declaration No. 47895 that the fair
valuation of the riceland then was only P5 per square meter. A Tax Declaration is a guide or
indicator of the reasonable value of the property (EPZA vs. Dulay, supra).
The petitioner's partiality for Agleham/Gutierrez may be inferred from their having deliberately closed
their eyes to the defects and irregularities of the transaction in his favor and their seeming neglect, if
not deliberate omission, to check, the authenticity of the documents presented to them for approval.
Since partiality is a mental state or predilection, in the absence of direct evidence, it may be proved
by the attendant circumstance instances.
WHEREFORE, I vote to affirm in toto the decision of the Sandiganbayan in SB Crim. Case No.
2010, with costs against the petitioners, Amado Arias and Cresencio Data.
Feliciano, Padilla, Sarmiento, and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J., dissenting:
The lone issue in these consolidated petitions for review is whether the Sandiganbayan committed a
reversible error in convicting the petitioners, Amado C. Arias and Cresencio D. Data, of having
violated Section 3, paragraph (e), of the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, in connection with the
scandalous overpricing of land purchased by the Government as right of way for its Mangahan
Floodway Project in Pasig, Rizal. The pertinent provision of the Anti-Graft Law reads as follows:
SEC. 3. Corrupt Practices of Public Officers-In addition to acts or omissions of public

officers already penalized by existing law. the following shall constitute corrupt
practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxxxxxxxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any
private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of
his official administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad
faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and
employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses
or permits or other concessions.
The amended information against them, to which they pleaded not guilty, alleged:
That on or about the period covering April, 1978 to October 1978, in Rosario, Pasig,
Metro Manila, Philippines, and with the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
accused Cresencio D. Data, being then the district Engineer of the province of Rizal,
Ministry of Public Works, and as such, headed and supervised the acquisition of
private lands for the right-of-way of the Mangahan Floodway Project of the
Government at Sitio Mangahan, Rosario, Pasig, Metro Manila; accused Priscillo G.
Fernando, then the Supervising Engineer of the Office of the District Engineer of
Rizal, Ministry of Public Works who acted as assistant of accused Cresencio D. Data
in the Mangahan Floodway Project; accused Ladislao G. Cruz, then the Senior
Engineer of the Office of the District Engineer of Rizal, Ministry of Public Works, who
was charged with the acquisition of lots needed for the Mangahan Floodway Project;
accused Carlos L. Jose then the Instrumentman of the office of the District Engineer
of Rizal, Ministry of Public Works who acted as the surveyor of the Mangahan
Floodway Project; accused Claudio H. Arcaya, then the Administrative Officer I of the
Rizal District Engineer's Office, Ministry of Public Works who passed upon all papers
and documents pertaining to private lands acquired by the Government for the
Mangahan Floodway Project; and accused Amado C. Arias, then the Auditor of Rizal
Engineering District, Pasig, Metro Manila, who passed upon and approved in audit
the acquisition as well as the payment of lands needed for the Mangahan Floodway
Project all taking advantage of their public and official positions, and conspiring,
confederating and confabulating with accused Natividad C. Gutierrez, the attorney-
in-fact of Benjamin Agleham, who is the registered owner of a parcel of land situated
at Rosario, Pasig, Metro Manila and covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 0097,
with accused Ladislao G. Cruz, Carlos L. -Jose and Claudio Arias, acting with
evident bad faith, while accused Cresencio D. Data, Priscillo G. Fernando and
Amado C. Arias, acting with manifest partiality in the discharge of their official public
and/or administrative functions, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
cause undue injury, damage and prejudice to the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines by causing, allowing and/or approving the illegal and irregular
disbursement and expenditure of public funds in favor of and in the name of
Benjamin P. Agleham in the amount of P1,520,320.00 under General Voucher No. 8-
047, supported by a certification, dated September 14, 1978, which was purportedly
issued by the Municipal Treasurer of Pasig, and certified xerox copies of Tax
Declarations Nos. 47895 and A-018-0091 1, both in the name of Benjamin P.
Agleham, and an alleged owner's copy of Tax Declaration No. 49948, in the name of
the Republic of the Philippines, said supporting documents having been falsified by
the accused to make it appear that the land mentioned in the above-stated
supporting papers is a residential land with a market value of P80.00 per square
meter and that 19,004 square meters thereof were transferred in the name of the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines under Tax Declaration No. 49948,
when in truth and in fact, the afore-stated land is actually a riceland with a true and
actual market value of P5.00 per square meter only and Tax Declaration No. 49948
was truly and officially registered in the names of spouses Moises Javillonar and
Sofia San Andres, not in the name of the Government, and refers to a parcel of land
at Sagad, Pasig, Metro Manila; that the foregoing falsities were committed by the
accused to conceal the fact that the true and actual pace of the 19,004 square
meters of land of Benjamin P. Agleham, which was acquired in behalf of the
Government by way of negotiated purchase by the accused officials herein for the
right of way of the Mangahan Floodway project at an overprice of P1,520,320.00 was
P92,020.00 only; and finally, upon receipt of the overpriced amount, the accused
misappropriated, converted and misapplied the excess of the true and actual value of
the above-mentioned land, i.e., P1,428,300.00 for their own personal needs, uses
and benefits, to the damage and prejudice of the Government in the amount of
P1,428,300.00. (pp. 2931, Rollo of G.R. No. 81563.)
Priscillo Fernando did not face trial for he has remained at large, his present whereabouts being
unknown (p. 48, Sandiganbayan Decision, p. 75, Rollo of G.R. No. 81563).
In 1975, the Bureau of Public Works initiated the Mangahan Floodway Project to ease the perennial
floods affecting the towns of Marikina and Pasig, Metro Manila. The project would traverse the
northern and southern portions of Ortigas Avenue in Pasig, Metro Manila (Exhibits A and A-1). An
announcement was published in leading newspapers advising affected property owners to file their
applications for payment at the District Engineer's Office (p. 29, Sandiganbayan Decision, p.
56, Ibid.).
The implementation of the Mangahan Floodway Project was entrusted to the Pasig Engineering
District headed by the District Engineer, Cresencio Data. He formed a committee composed of
Supervising Civil Engineer Priscillo Fernando, as over-all in charge, Alfonso Mendoza and Pedro
Hucom for acquisition of improvements, and Instrumentman Carlos Jose for surveys (p. 26,
Sandiganbayan Decision, p. 53, Ibid.). The team was tasked to notify lot owners affected by the
project of the impending expropriation of their properties and to receive and process applications for
payment.
The reclassification of all lands around the Mangahan Floodway Project was suspended in 1975 by
order of the President (p. 45, Sandiganbayan Decision, p. 72, Ibid.). Implementing that order, a
memorandum was sent to Data on August 27,1976, by Public Works Director Desiderio Anolin,
directing that all affected lands covered by the Mangahan Floodway Project shall be excluded from
reevaluation and reassessment (Annex A, Exh. DD, Counter-Affidavit of Data, p. 70, Sandiganbayan
Decision, P. 97, Ibid).
Among the lots affected was a 19,004-square-meter portion of a 30,169-square-meter riceland in

Pasig registered in the name of Benjamin Agleham under Original Certificate of Title No. 0097
issued on May 5, 1977 (Exh. H). The land was previously owned by Andrea Arabit and Evaristo
Gutierrez, parents of the accused Natividad Gutierrez.
After Agleham acquired the 3-hectare land in 1973 from the Gutierrez spouses, he had it subdivided
into three (3) lots under plan (LRC) Psd-278456 which was approved by the Land Registration
Commission on June 1, 1978 (Entry No. 27399/12071, Exh. H). Lot 1, with an area of 19,004 square
meters, is the portion that Agleham, through Natividad Gutierrez, sold to the Government in 1978 for
the Mangahan Floodway Project.
On December 15, 1973, Agleham's property, classified as a "ricefield" with an area of 3.2 hectares,
was declared for taxation under Tax Declaration No. 28246 (Exh-Y). Its assessed value was P4,800
or P0.15 per square meter (p. 10, Sandiganbayan Decision, p. 37, Ibid.). On February 27, 1978,
another Tax Declaration No. 47895 (Exh. Y-1) was issued for the same ricefield" with a revised area
of 30,169 square meters. The declared market value was P150,850 (or P5 per square meter), and
the assessed value was P60,340.
Ten months later, or on December 15, 1978, Tax Declaration No. 47895 was cancelled and replaced
by Tax Declaration No. A018- 00911 (Exh. Y-2) wherein the market value of the same "ricefield,"
jumped to P301,690 (P10 per square meter). Its assessed value was fixed at P120,680. The
description and value of the property, according to Pedro Ocol, the assistant Municipal Assessor of
Pasig, was based on the actual use of the property (riceland) not on its potential use (p. 13,
Sandiganbayan Decision, p. 40, Ibid.). The valuation was based on a compilation of sales given to
the Municipal Assessor's office by the Register of Deeds, from which transactions the Assessor
obtained the average valuation of the properties in the same vicinity (p. 14, Sandiganbayan
Decision, p. 41, Ibid.).
Among those who filed an application for payment (Exhs. FF and FF-1) at the District Engineer's
Office was the accused, Natividad Gutierrez, who was armed with a Special Power of Attorney
allegedly executed on February 24,1978 by Benjamin Agleham in her favor (Exhs. C and C-1). She
submitted a falsified xerox copy of Tax Declaration No. 47895 (Exh. B) bearing a false date:
December 15,1973 (instead of February 27, 1978) and describing Agleham's 30,169-square-meter
property as "residential" (instead of riceland), with a fair market value of P2,413,520 or P80 per
square meter (instead of P150,845 at P5 per square meter). Its assessed value appeared to be
P724,056 (instead of P60,340). Gutierrez submitted Agleham's Original Certificate of Title No. 0097
(Exh. H-1), the technical description of the property, and a xerox copy of a "Sworn Statement of the
True Current and Fair Market Value of Real Property" required under P.D. No. 76 (Exh. 1). The
xerox copy of Tax Declaration No. 47895 was supposedly certified by the Municipal Treasurer of
Pasig, Alfredo Prudencio.
The documents supporting Agleham's claim were "examined" by the Administrative Officer, accused
Claudio Arcaya, who, after initiating them, turned them over to accused Ladislao G. Cruz, A Deed of
Absolute Sale for Lot 1 (19,004 square meters valued at P80 per square meter) was prepared by
Cruz who also initialed the supporting documents and transmitted them to District Engr. Data.
On April 20,1978, the Deed of Absolute Sale (Exhs. G and G-1) was signed by Data and Gutierrez
(as attorney-in-fact of Agleham). Thereafter, Data sent the papers to Director Desiderio Anolin of the
Bureau of Public Works who recommended to the Assistant Secretary of Public Works the approval
of the Deed of Sale (Exh. G-1). Afterwards, the documents were returned to Data's office for the
transfer of title to the Government. On June 8, 1978, the sale was registered and Transfer Certificate
of Title No. T-12071 (Exh. T) was issued in the name of the Government.
General Voucher (Exh. S) No. 85-2-7809-52 dated "9/29/78" for the amount of P1,520,320 bore
fourth certifications of. (1) Cruz as Senior Civil Engineer; (2) Priscillo G. Fernando as Supervising
Civil Engineer II; (3) Cresencio Data as District Engineer II and (4) Cesar V. Franco as Project Acting
Accountant (p. 56, Sandiganbayan Decision, p. 83, Ibid.).
On October 23, 1978, the voucher and its supporting documents were pre-audited and approved for
payment by the accused, Amado C. Arias, as auditor of the Engineering District. The next day,
October 24, 1978, sixteen (16) PNB checks with Serial Nos. 188532 to 188547, inclusive (Exhs. X to
X-1 5), for the total sum of Pl,520,320.00 were issued to Gutierrez as payment for Agleham's
19,004-square-meter lot.
In October, 1979, an investigation was conducted by the Ministry of National Defense on the gross
overpricing of Agleham's property. During the investigation, sworn statements were taken from
Alfredo Prudencio, Municipal Treasurer of Pasig (Exh. AA), Pedro Ocol, Assistant Municipal
Assessor of Pasig (Exh. BB), and the accused Claudio Arcaya (Exh. EE). Prudencio denied having
issued or signed the certification dated September 14,1978 (Exh. J), attesting that Agleham's
property covered by Tax Declaration No. 47895 had a market value of P2,413,520 and that the taxes
had been paid from 1975 to 1978. Prudencio also impugned the initial (purporting to be that of his
subordinate Ruben Gatchalian, Chief of the Land Tax Division) that was affixed below Prudencio's
typewritten name in Exhibit J. Both Prudencio and Gatchalian disowned the typewritten certification.
They declared that such certifications are usually issued by their office on mimeographed forms
(Exh. J-1).
Assistant Municipal Assessor Pedro Ocol produced and Identified the original or genuine Tax
Declaration No. 47895 dated February 27, 1978, and a certified copy thereof (Exh. Y-1). Therein,
Agleham's property of 30,169 square meters was classified as a "ricefield" and appraised at P5 per
square meter, with an assessed value of P60,340 and a market value of PI 50,850. Ocol testified
that the supposed xerox copy of Tax Declaration No. 47895 (Exh. B), which Gutierrez submitted as
one of the supporting documents of the general voucher (Exh. S), was fake, because of the following
tell-tale signs:
(1) the tax declaration number was typewritten, not machine numbered as in the genuine tax
declaration, Exhibit Y;
(2) the stampmark of registration was antedated to December 15, 1973 in the fake, instead of the
correct date February 27, 1978-- in the genuine tax declaration;
(3) the classification of the property was "residential," instead of "ricefield" which is its classification
in the genuine document; and
(4) the lot was over priced at P80 per square meter in the fake tax declaration, instead of the
appraised value of only P5 per square meter appearing in the genuine declaration.
Also found to be fake was Tax Declaration No. 49948 in the name of the Republic of the Philippines
(Exhs. K and K-1). The genuine Tax Declaration No. 49948 (Exhs. U and V-2) was actually filed on
October 18, 1978 in the names of the spouses Moises Javillonar and Sofia Andres, for their 598-
square-meters' residential property with a declared market value of P51,630.
The Agleham deed of sale was pre-audited by the auditor of the Rizal Engineering District, Amado
Arias, who approved the payment of Pl,520,320 to Gutierrez without questioning the fact that the
amount of the purchase price therein had been altered, i.e., "snow-flaked (sic) and later
superimposed by the amount of P1,520,320 in words and figures" (p. 71, Sandiganbayan Decision,
p. 98, Ibid.), nor checking the veracity of the supporting documents listed at the back of the General
Voucher (Exh. S), numbering fifteen (15) in all, among which were:
(1) the fake Tax Declaration No. 47895 showing that the value of the land was P80 per square meter
(Exh. B);
(2) fake Tax Declaration No. 49948 In the name of the Republic of the Philippines (Exh. K)
(3) the forged certification of Municipal Treasurer Prudencio that the fair market value of 'the land
was P100 per square meter (Exh. J);
(4) a false certification (Exh. D) dated September 19, 1978 signed by accused Cruz, Jose, and
Fernando, certifying that the Agleham property was upon ocular inspection by them, found to be
"residential;"
(5) a falsely dated certification where the original date was erased and a false date (February 15,
1978) was superimposed (Exh.E), issued by Engr. Fernando pursuant to DPWTC Circular No. 557,
certifying that he had examined the real estate tax receipts of the Agleham property for the last three
(3) years;
(6) the technical description of the land (Exhs. F and F-1) attached to the deed of sale dated April
20, 1978 was not an approved technical description for the subdivision survey executed by Geodetic
Engineer Cipriano C. Caro was verified and approved by the Land Registration Commission on May
28,1978 only. There were "substantial variations" noted by the Sandiganbayan between the
approved technical description and the technical description of the land in the deed of sale (p. 61,
Sandiganbayan Decision, p. 88, Ibid.);
(7) the special power of attorney dated February 24, 1978, supposedly given to Gutierrez by
Agleham (Exhs. C, C-1) bore a fictitious residence certificate Agleham (p. 64, Sandiganbayan
Decision, p. 91, Ibid.); and
(8) the fake Sworn Statement on the Current and Fair Market Value of Real Properties (Exh. Z)
dated October 1, 1973, contained a forged signature of Agleham, presumably made by Gutierrez
herself The Sandiganbayan observed that Agleham's supposed signature "appears to be Identical to
accused Gutierrez' signatures in the General Voucher (Exh. S), in the release and Quitclaim which
she signed in favor of Agleham on July 20, 1983 (Exh. CC), and in her affidavits (Exhs. FF and FF-
1)." (pp. 64-65, Sandiganbayan Decision, pp. 91-92, Ibid.).
After payment of the Agleham claim, all the supporting documents were kept by Arias. Even after he
had been replaced by Julito Pesayco on September 1, 1981, as auditor of the Rizal Engineering
District, he did not turn over the documents to Pesayco. It was only on June 23, 1982, after this case
had been filed in the Sandiganbayan and the trial had begun, that Arias delivered them to Pesayco
(Exh. T-1).
After a trial lasting nearly six years, the Sandiganbayan rendered a 78-page decision on November
16, 1987, whose dispositive portion reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Natividad G. Gutierrez,

Cresencio D. Data, Ladislao G. Cruz, Carlos L. Jose, Claudio H. Arcaya and Amado
C. Arias GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the violation of Section 3, paragraph
(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, as ascended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, and hereby sentences each of them to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment for THREE (3) YEARS, as minimum to SIX (6) YEARS, as maximum;
to further suffer perpetual disqualification from public office; to indemnify jointly and
severally, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines in the amount of
P1,425,300, and to pay their proportional costs of this action. (p. 104, Rollo of G.R.
No. 81563.)
Both Arias and Data appealed.
Arias anchors his petition for review of the Sandiganbayan's decision (G.R. No. 81563) on his
contention that the court's findings that he conspired with his co-accused and that he was grossly
negligent are based on misapprehension of facts, speculation, surmise, and conjecture.
Data's main defense is that the acquisition of the Agleham property was the work of the committee of
Prescillo Fernando iii which he did not take an active part, and that the price which the government
paid for it was reasonable. Hence, it uttered no jury in the transaction.
In his consolidated brief or comment for the State, the Solicitor General recommends the acquittal of
the petitioners because the Agleham property was allegedly not grossly overpriced.
After deliberating on the petitions in these cases, we find no error in the decision under review. The
Sandiganbayan did not err in finding that the petitioners conspired with their co-accused to cause
injury to the Government and to unduly favor the lot owner, Agleham.
A conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence of the acts charged, but may and generally
must be proven by a number of indefinite acts, conditions and circumstances (People vs. Maralit,
G.R. No. 71143, Sept. 19,1988; People vs. Roca, G.R. No. 77779, June 27, 1988).
This case presents a conspiracy of silence and inaction where chiefs of office who should have been
vigilant to protect the interest of the Government in the purchase of Agleham's two-hectare riceland,
accepted as gospel truth the certifications of their subordinates, and approved without question the
million-peso purchase which, by the standards prevailing in 1976-78, should have pricked their
curiosity and prompted them to make inquiries and to verify the authenticity of the documents
presented to them for approval. The petitioners kept silent when they should have asked questions
they looked the other way when they should have probed deep into the transaction.
Since it was too much of a coincidence that both petitioners were negligent at the same time over
the same transaction, the Sandiganbayan was justified in concluding that they connived and
conspired to act in that manner to approve the illegal transaction which would favor the seller of the
land and defraud the Government.
We cannot accept Arias' excuse that because the deed of sale had been signed and the property
transferred to the Government which received a title in its name, there was nothing else for him to do
but approve the voucher for payment. The primary function of an auditor is to prevent irregular,
unnecessary, excessive or extravagant expenditures of government funds.
The auditorial function of an auditor, as a representative of the Commission on Audit, comprises

three aspects: (1) examination; (2) audit: and (3) settlement of the accounts, funds, financial
transactions and resources of the agencies under their respective audit jurisdiction (Sec. 43,
Government Auditing Code of the Phil.). Examination, as applied to auditing, means "to probe
records, or inspect securities or other documents; review procedures, and question persons, all for
the purpose of arriving at an opinion of accuracy, propriety, sufficiency, and the like." (State Audit
Code of the Philippines, Annotated by Tantuico, 1982 Ed., p. 57.)
Arias admitted that he did not check or verify the papers supporting the general voucher that was
submitted to him for payment of Pl,520,320 to Agleham or his attorney-in-fact, Natividad Gutierrez.
Arias did not question any person for the purpose of determining the accuracy and integrity of the
documents submitted to him and the reasonableness of the price that the Government was paying
for the less than two-hectare riceland. We reject his casuistic explanation that since his subordinates
had passed upon the transaction, he could assume that it was lawful and regular for, if he would be
a mere rubber stamp for his subordinates, his position as auditor would be useless and
unnecessary.
We make the same observation concerning District Engineer Cresencio Data who claims innocence
because he allegedly did not take any direct and active participation in the acquisition of the
Agleham property, throwing the blame on the committee which he created, composed of Fernando,
Asuncion, Mendoza, Cruz, Hucom and Jose that negotiated with the property owners for the
purchase of properties on the path of the Mangahan Floodway Project. He in effect would hide under
the skirt of the committee which he himself selected and to which he delegated the task that was
assigned to his office to Identify the lots that would be traversed by the floodway project, gather and
verify documents, make surveys, negotiate with the owners for the price, prepare the deeds of sale,
and process claims for payment. By appointing the committee, he did not cease to be responsible for
the implementation of the project. Under the principle of command responsibility, he was responsible
for the manner in which the committee performed its tasks for it was he who in fact signed the deed
of sale prepared by the committee. By signing the deed of sale and certifications prepared for his
signature by his committee, he in effect, made their acts his own. He is, therefore, equally guilty with
those members of the committee (Fernando, Cruz and Jose) who accepted the fake tax declarations
and made false certifications regarding the use and value of the Agleham property.
The Solicitor General has pointed out that Data signed, but did not approve, the deed of sale of
Agleham's property because the approval thereof was the prerogative of the Secretary of Public
Works. It should not be overlooked, however, that Data's signature on the deed of sale was
equivalent to an attestation that the transaction was fair, honest and legal. It was he who was
charged with the task of implementing the Mangahan Floodway Project within his engineering
district.
We find no merit in the Solicitor General's argument that the Agleham riceland was not overpriced
because the price of P80 per square meter fixed in the deed of sale was reasonable, hence, the
petitioners are not guilty of having caused undue injury and prejudice to the Government, nor of
having given unwarranted benefits to the property owner and/or his attorney-in-fact, Gutierrez. He
further argues that the valuation in the owner's genuine tax declaration may not be used as a
standard in determining the fair market value of the property because PD Nos. 76 and 464 (making it
mandatory in expropriation cases to fix the price at the value of the property as declared by the
owner, or as determined by the assessor, whichever is lower), were declared null and void by this
Court in the case of Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA) vs. Dulay, 149 SCRA 305, and other
related cases.
That argument is not well taken because PD Nos. 76 and 464 (before they were nullified) applied to
the expropriation of property for public use. The acquisition of Agleham's riceland was not done by
expropriation but through a negotiated sale. In the course of the negotiations, there was
absolutely no allegation nor proof that the price of P80 per square meter was its fair market value in
1978, i.e., eleven (11) years ago. What the accused did was to prove the value of the land through
fake tax declarations (Exhs. B, F, K), false certifications (Exhs. J, D and E) and a forged sworn
statement on the current and fair market value of the real property (Exh. Z) submitted by the
accused in support of the deed of sale. Because fraudulent documents were used, it may not be said
that the State agreed to pay the price on the basis of its fairness, for the Government was in fact
deceived concerning the reasonable value of the land.
When Ocol testified in 1983 that P80 was a reasonable valuation for the Agleham's land, he did not
clarify that was also its reasonable value in 1975, before real estate values in Pasig soared as a
result of the implementation of the Mangahan Floodway Project. Hence, Ocol's testimony was
insufficient to rebut the valuation in Agleham's genuine 1978 Tax Declaration No. 47895 that the fair
valuation of the riceland then was only P5 per square meter. A Tax Declaration is a guide or
indicator of the reasonable value of the property (EPZA vs. Dulay, supra).
The petitioner's partiality for Agleham/Gutierrez may be inferred from their having deliberately closed
their eyes to the defects and irregularities of the transaction in his favor and their seeming neglect, if
not deliberate omission, to check, the authenticity of the documents presented to them for approval.
Since partiality is a mental state or predilection, in the absence of direct evidence, it may be proved
by the attendant circumstance instances.
WHEREFORE, I vote to affirm in toto the decision of the Sandiganbayan in SB Crim. Case No.
2010, with costs against the petitioners, Amado Arias and Cresencio Data.
Feliciano, Padilla, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.

(G.R. Nos. 131926 & 138991. June 18, 2003) : Decision

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[G.R. Nos. 131926 & 138991.

June 18, 2003]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. MICHAEL U.

General Santos City, Branch 35, convicting appellant Michael U. Pagalasan of

and Desiree: Walang mangyayari sa inyo basta ibigay ninyo ang kailangan

connection with the kidnapping. [9]

Police Inspector Antonio Evangelista ordered SPO4 Recio Aniversario to

In his confession, Michael admitted that upon orders of Ronnie Cabalo, he

On September 9, 1994, George received another handwritten letter dated

During the initial stage of the preliminary investigation by the MTC on

counsel, testified on his extrajudicial confession. He affirmed the veracity of

mother, secured the services of Atty. Emmanuel V. Fontanilla. On September

An Information for violation of PD 1866 was filed against Michael on

The cases were raffled to Branch 22 of the Regional Trial Court. When

affidavit on December 5, 1995 alleging inter alia that he was forced at

The Defense and Evidence of the Accused

Ferdinand Cortez denied kidnapping George and Christopher. He testified

Dra. Virginia Ramirez, Officer-In-Charge of the City Integrated Health

On September 24, 1997, the trial court rendered judgment acquitting

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the accused is hereby sentenced as follows:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE DEFENSE

The appellant is guilty of

2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.

When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped, or is

For the accused to be convicted of kidnapping, the prosecution is

kidnapping and serious illegal detention is a minor, the duration of his

purposeful or knowing action by the accused to forcibly restrain the victim

commit a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy as a mode of incurring

in Regina v. Murphy, conspiracy may be implied if it is proved that two or

conspiracy, he must be shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or

Each conspirator is responsible for everything done by his confederates

accomplishment of a particular purpose of conspiracy but extends to collateral

by purposely engaging in conspiracy which necessarily and directly produces

fair import of the concerted purpose or agreement as he understood it; if later

Equally persuasive is the pronouncement of the Circuit Court of Appeals

inconsistent statements contained in his sworn statement because the said

matters and not to the substance of his testimony. Such minor inconsistency

itself, independently of Christophers testimony, sufficient proof of the guilt of

common or ordinary sense: a sum of money or other thing of value, price, or

necessarily pecuniary which may accrue to the kidnapper or a third person as

Para Sa Inyo Mr. & Mrs. Lim,

Maliwanag sana sa inyo ang aming mga salaysay.

Palatandaan na galing sa aming hakbang ay ito

Sulat man o telephone [73]

The letter received by George on September 6, 1994, second letter for

The handwritten letter received by George on September 9, 1994, third

Para sayo Mr. & Mrs. Lim,

Palatandaan na galing sa aming hakbang ay ito

Sulat man o telephone [76]

The second letter received by George was signed by an unidentified

Sec. 28. Admission by third party. The rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an

Even if it is assumed for the nonce that the second letter came from a co-

Neither is the third letter admissible in evidence against the appellant to

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed that an order be

Art. 268. Slight illegal detention. The penalty of reclusion temporal shall be imposed

The felony has the following essential elements:

The crime of slight illegal detention is consummated upon the occurrence

and detention is not an exempting circumstance. The voluntary release by the