Makati Shangri-La Hotel and Resort, Inc. vs. Harper

5/21/2021 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 679
G.R. No. 189998. August 29, 2012.*
MAKATI SHANGRI-LA HOTEL AND RESORT, INC.,

petitioner, vs. ELLEN JOHANNE HARPER, JONATHAN
CHRISTOPHER HARPER, and RIGOBERTO GILLERA,
respondents.
Procedural Rules and Technicalities; The procedural rules

should definitely be liberally construed if strict adherence to their
letter will result in absurdity and in manifest injustice, or where
the merits of a party’s cause are apparent and outweigh
considerations of
_______________
* FIRST DIVISION.
445
VOL. 679, AUGUST 29, 2012 445
Makati Shangri-La Hotel and Resort, Inc. vs. Harper
non-compliance with certain formal requirements.—The

principle of substantial compliance recognizes that exigencies and
situations do occasionally demand some flexibility in the rigid
application of the rules of procedure and the laws. That rules of
procedure may be mandatory in form and application does not
forbid a showing of substantial compliance under justifiable
circumstances, because substantial compliance does not equate to
a disregard of basic rules. For sure, substantial compliance and
strict adherence are not always incompatible and do not always
clash in discord. The power of the Court to suspend its own rules
or to except any particular case from the operation of the rules
whenever the purposes of justice require the suspension cannot be
challenged. In the interest of substantial justice, even procedural
rules of the most mandatory character in terms of compliance are
frequently relaxed. Similarly, the procedural rules should
definitely be liberally construed if strict adherence to their letter
will result in absurdity and in manifest injustice, or where the
https://central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/000001798ed8f16fe7ac21ab000d00d40059004a/t/?o=False 1/34
merits of a party’s cause are apparent and outweigh

considerations of non-compliance with certain formal
requirements. It is more in accord with justice that a party-
litigant is given the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of
his claim or defense than for him to lose his life, liberty, honor or
property on mere technicalities. Truly, the rules of procedure are
intended to promote substantial justice, not to defeat it, and
should not be applied in a very rigid and technical sense.
Civil Law; Filiation; Evidence; The Court sustained the
Cabais petitioners’ stance that the Regional Trial Court (RTC) had
apparently erred in relying on the baptismal certificate to establish
filiation, stressing the baptismal certificate’s limited evidentiary
value as proof of filiation inferior to that of a birth certificate; and
declaring that the baptismal certificate did not attest to the
veracity of the statements regarding the kinsfolk of the one
baptized.—The Court sustained the Cabais petitioners’ stance
that the RTC had apparently erred in relying on the baptismal
certificate to establish filiation, stressing the baptismal
certificate’s limited evidentiary value as proof of filiation inferior
to that of a birth certificate; and declaring that the baptismal
certificate did not attest to the veracity of the statements
regarding the kinsfolk of the one baptized. Nevertheless, the
Court ultimately ruled that it was respondents’ failure to present
the birth certificate, more than anything else, that lost them their
case, stating that: “The unjustified failure to present the birth cer-
446
446 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
tificate instead of the baptismal certificate now under

consideration or to otherwise prove filiation by any other means
recognized by law weigh heavily against respondents.”
Same; Hotelkeepers; The hotel business is imbued with public
interest. Catering to the public, hotelkeepers are bound to provide
not only lodging for their guests but also security to the persons
and belongings of their guests. The twin duty constitutes the
essence of the business.―The hotel business is imbued with public
interest. Catering to the public, hotelkeepers are bound to provide
not only lodging for their guests but also security to the persons
and belongings of their guests. The twin duty constitutes the
essence of the business. Applying by analogy Article 2000, Article
2001 and Article 2002 of the Civil Code (all of which concerned
the hotelkeepers’ degree of care and responsibility as to the
personal effects of their guests), we hold that there is much
greater reason to apply the same if not greater degree of care and
responsibility when the lives and personal safety of their guests
are involved. Otherwise, the hotelkeepers would simply stand idly
by as strangers have unrestricted access to all the hotel rooms on
the pretense of being visitors of the guests, without being held
liable should anything untoward befall the unwary guests. That
would be absurd, something that no good law would ever envision.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the

Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Romulo, Mabanta, Buevaventura, Sayoc & Delos
Angeles Law Offices for petitioner.
Barbers, Molina & Molina for respondents.
BERSAMIN, J.:
The hotel owner is liable for civil damages to the

surviving heirs of its hotel guest whom strangers murder
inside his hotel room.
447
VOL. 679, AUGUST 29, 2012 447

The Case
Petitioner, the owner and operator of the 5-star Shangri-

La Hotel in Makati City (Shangri-La Hotel), appeals the
decision promulgated on October 21, 2009,1 whereby the
Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed with modification the
judgment rendered on October 25, 2005 by the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) in Quezon City holding petitioner liable
for damages for the murder of Christian Fredrik Harper, a
Norwegian national.2 Respondents Ellen Johanne Harper
and Jonathan Christopher Harper are the widow and son
of Christian Harper, while respondent Rigoberto Gillera is
their authorized representative in the Philippines.
Antecedents
In the first week of November 1999, Christian Harper

came to Manila on a business trip as the Business
Development Manager for Asia of ALSTOM Power Norway
AS, an engineering firm with worldwide operations. He
checked in at the Shangri-La Hotel and was billeted at
Room 1428. He was due to check out on November 6, 1999.
In the early morning of that date, however, he was
murdered inside his hotel room by still unidentified

malefactors. He was then 30 years old.
How the crime was discovered was a story in itself. A
routine verification call from the American Express Card
Company to cardholder Harper’s residence in Oslo, Norway
(i.e., Bygdoy Terasse 16, 0287 Oslo, Norway) led to the
discovery. It appears that at around 11:00 am of November
6, 1999, a Caucasian male of about 30-32 years in age, 5’4”
in height, clad in maroon long sleeves, black denims and
black shoes, entered the Alexis Jewelry Store in Glorietta,
Ayala Center,
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 58-83; penned by Associate Justice Priscilla J. Baltazar-
Padilla, with Associate Justice Fernanda Lampas Peralta and Associate
Justice Celia C. Librea-Leagogo, concurring.
2 Id., at pp. 109-118.
448

Makati City and expressed interest in purchasing a Cartier

lady’s watch valued at P320,000.00 with the use of two
Mastercard credit cards and an American Express credit
card issued in the name of Harper. But the customer’s
difficulty in answering the queries phoned in by a credit
card representative sufficiently aroused the suspicion of
saleslady Anna Liza Lumba (Lumba), who asked for the
customer’s passport upon suggestion of the credit card
representative to put the credit cards on hold. Probably
sensing trouble for himself, the customer hurriedly left the
store, and left the three credit cards and the passport
behind.
In the meanwhile, Harper’s family in Norway must have
called him at his hotel room to inform him about the
attempt to use his American Express card. Not getting any
response from the room, his family requested Raymond
Alarcon, the Duty Manager of the Shangri-La Hotel, to
check on Harper’s room. Alarcon and a security personnel
went to Room 1428 at 11:27 a.m., and were shocked to
discover Harper’s lifeless body on the bed.
Col. Rodrigo de Guzman (de Guzman), the hotel’s
Security Manager, initially investigated the murder. In his
incident report, he concluded from the several empty
bottles of wine in the trash can and the number of cigarette
butts in the toilet bowl that Harper and his visitors had
drunk that much and smoked that many cigarettes the

night before.3
The police investigation actually commenced only upon
the arrival in the hotel of the team of PO3 Carmelito
Mendoza4 and SPO4 Roberto Hizon. Mendoza entered
Harper’s room in the company of De Guzman, Alarcon,
Gami Holazo (the hotel’s Executive Assistant Manager),
Norge Rosales (the hotel’s Executive Housekeeper), and
Melvin Imperial (a security personnel of the hotel). They
found Harper’s body on the bed covered with a blanket, and
only the back of the head could be
_______________
3 Id., at p. 60.
4 Also referred to by petitioner as PO3 Carmelito Valiente.
449
VOL. 679, AUGUST 29, 2012 449

seen. Lifting the blanket, Mendoza saw that the victim’s

eyes and mouth had been bound with electrical and
packaging tapes, and his hands and feet tied with a white
rope. The body was identified to be that of hotel guest
Christian Fredrik Harper.
Mendoza subsequently viewed the closed circuit
television (CCTV) tapes, from which he found that Harper
had entered his room at 12:14 a.m. of November 6, 1999,
and had been followed into the room at 12:17 a.m. by a
woman; that another person, a Caucasian male, had
entered Harper’s room at 2:48 a.m.; that the woman had
left the room at around 5:33 a.m.; and that the Caucasian
male had come out at 5:46 a.m.
On November 10, 1999, SPO1 Ramoncito Ocampo, Jr.
interviewed Lumba about the incident in the Alexis
Jewelry Shop. During the interview, Lumba confirmed that
the person who had attempted to purchase the Cartier
lady’s watch on November 6, 1999 had been the person
whose picture was on the passport issued under the name
of Christian Fredrik Harper and the Caucasian male seen
on the CCTV tapes entering Harper’s hotel room.
Sr. Insp. Danilo Javier of the Criminal Investigation
Division of the Makati City Police reflected in his Progress
Report No. 25 that the police investigation showed that
Harper’s passport, credit cards, laptop and an
undetermined amount of cash had been missing from the
crime scene; and that he had learned during the follow-up
investigation about an unidentified Caucasian male’s

attempt to purchase a Cartier lady’s watch from the Alexis
Jewelry Store in Glorietta, Ayala Center, Makati City with
the use of one of Harper’s credit cards.
_______________
5 Rollo, p. 26 (entitled Re: Death of Christian Harper, dated January
17, 2000, of the Criminal Investigation Division of the Makati Police
Station).
450

On August 30, 2002, respondents commenced this suit in

the RTC to recover various damages from petitioner,6
pertinently alleging:
xxx
7. The deceased was to check out and leave the hotel on
November 6, 1999, but in the early morning of said date, while he
was in his hotel room, he was stabbed to death by an (sic) still
unidentified male who had succeeded to intrude into his room.
8. The murderer succeeded to trespass into the area of the
hotel’s private rooms area and into the room of the said deceased
on account of the hotel’s gross negligence in providing the most
basic security system of its guests, the lack of which owing to the
acts or omissions of its employees was the immediate cause of the
tragic death of said deceased.
xxx
10. Defendant has prided itself to be among the top hotel
chains in the East claiming to provide excellent service, comfort
and security for its guests for which reason ABB Alstom
executives and their guests have invariably chosen this hotel to
stay.7
xxx
Ruling of the RTC
On October 25, 2005, the RTC rendered judgment after

trial,8 viz.:
WHEREFORE, finding the defendant hotel to be remiss in its

duties and thus liable for the death of Christian Harper, this
Court orders the defendant to pay plaintiffs the amount of:
PhP 43,901,055.00 as and by way of actual and compensatory
damages;
PhP 739,075.00 representing the expenses of transporting the

remains of Harper to Oslo, Norway;
_______________
6 Id., at pp. 84-89.
7 Id., at p. 86.
8 Id., at pp. 109-118.
451
VOL. 679, AUGUST 29, 2012 451

PhP 250,000.00 attorney’s fees;

and to pay the cost of suit.
SO ORDERED.
Ruling of the CA
Petitioner appealed, assigning to the RTC the following

errors, to wit:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE
PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES ARE THE HEIRS OF THE
LATE CHRISTIAN HARPER, AS THERE IS NO
COMPETENT EVIDENCE ON RECORD SUPPORTING
SUCH RULING.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT’S NEGLIGENCE WAS THE
PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE DEATH OF MR. HARPER,
OR IN NOT RULING THAT IT WAS MR. CHRISTIAN
HARPER’S OWN NEGLIGENCE WHICH WAS THE
SOLE, PROXIMATE CAUSE OF HIS DEATH.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING TO THE
PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES THE AMOUNT OF
PHP43,901,055.00, REPRESENTING THE ALLEGED
LOST EARNING OF THE LATE CHRISTIAN HARPER,
THERE BEING NO COMPETENT PROOF OF THE
EARNING OF MR. HARPER DURING HIS LIFETIME
AND OF THE ALLEGATION THAT THE PLAINTIFFS-
APPELLEES ARE MR. HARPER’S HEIRS.
IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING TO THE
PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES THE AMOUNT OF
PHP739,075.00, REPRESENTING THE ALLEGED COST
OF TRANSPORTING THE REMAINS OF MR.
CHRISTIAN HARPER TO OSLO, NORWAY, THERE

BEING NO PROOF ON RECORD THAT IT WAS
PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES WHO PAID FOR SAID COST.
452

V
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING
ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COST OF SUIT TO THE
PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES, THERE BEING NO PROOF
ON RECORD SUPPORTING SUCH AWARD.

On October 21, 2009, the CA affirmed the judgment of
the RTC with modification,9 as follows:
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Regional Trial

Court dated October 25, 2005 is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. Accordingly, defendant-appellant is ordered to
pay plaintiffs-appellees the amounts of P52,078,702.50, as actual
and compensatory damages; P25,000.00, as temperate damages;
P250,000.00, as attorney’s fees; and to pay the costs of the suit.
SO ORDERED.10
Issues
Petitioner still seeks the review of the judgment of the

CA, submitting the following issues for consideration and
determination, namely:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES WERE
ABLE TO PROVE WITH COMPETENT EVIDENCE THE
AFFIRMATIVE ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT THAT
THEY ARE THE WIDOW AND SON OF MR. CHRISTIAN
HARPER.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE APPELLEES WERE ABLE TO
PROVE WITH COMPETENT EVIDENCE THE AFFIRMATIVE
ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT THAT THERE WAS
NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF THE APPELLANT AND ITS
SAID NEGLIGENCE WAS THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE
DEATH OF MR. CHRISTIAN HARPER.
_______________
9 Id., at pp. 58-83.
10 Id., at pp. 82-83.
453
VOL. 679, AUGUST 29, 2012 453

III.
WHETHER OR NOT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE
DEATH OF MR. CHRISTIAN HARPER WAS HIS OWN
NEGLIGENCE.
Ruling
The appeal lacks merit.

1.
Requirements for authentication of documents
establishing respondents’ legal relationship with the
victim as his heirs were complied with
As to the first issue, the CA pertinently held as follows:
The documentary evidence that plaintiffs-appellees offered

relative to their heirship consisted of the following―
1. Exhibit “Q” — Birth Certificate of Jonathan Christopher
Harper, son of Christian Fredrik Harper and Ellen Johanne
Harper;
2. Exhibit “Q-1” — Marriage Certificate of Ellen Johanne Clausen
and Christian Fredrik Harper;
3. Exhibit “R” — Birth Certificate of Christian Fredrick Harper,
son of Christopher Shaun Harper and Eva Harper; and
4. Exhibit “R-1” — Certificate from the Oslo Probate Court stating
that Ellen Harper was married to the deceased, Christian
Fredrick Harper and listed Ellen Harper and Jonathan
Christopher Harper as the heirs of Christian Fredrik Harper.
Defendant-appellant points out that plaintiffs-appellees
committed several mistakes as regards the above documentary
exhibits, resultantly making them incompetent evidence, to wit,
(a) none of the plaintiffs-appellees or any of the witnesses who
testified for the plaintiffs gave evidence that Ellen Johanne
Harper and Jonathan Christopher Harper are the widow and son
of the deceased Christian
454

Fredrik Harper; (b) Exhibit “Q” was labeled as Certificate of

Marriage in plaintiffs-appellees’ Formal Offer of Evidence, when
it appears to be the Birth Certificate of the late Christian Harper;
(c) Exhibit “Q-1” is a translation of the Marriage Certificate of
Ellen Johanne Harper and Christian Fredrik Harper, the original
of which was not produced in court, much less, offered in
evidence. Being a mere translation, it cannot be a competent
evidence of the alleged fact that Ellen Johanne Harper is the
widow of Christian Fredrik Harper, pursuant to the Best
Evidence Rule. Even assuming that it is an original Marriage
Certificate, it is not a public document that is admissible without
the need of being identified or authenticated on the witness stand
by a witness, as it appears to be a document issued by the Vicar of
the Parish of Ullern and, hence, a private document; (d) Exhibit
“R” was labeled as Probate Court Certificate in plaintiffs-
appellees’ Formal Offer of Evidence, when it appears to be the
Birth Certificate of the deceased, Christian Fredrik Harper; and
(e) Exhibit “R-1” is a translation of the supposed Probate Court
Certificate, the original of which was not produced in court, much
less, offered in evidence. Being a mere translation, it is an
incompetent evidence of the alleged fact that plaintiffs-appellees
are the heirs of Christian Fredrik Harper, pursuant to the Best
Evidence Rule.
Defendant-appellant further adds that Exhibits “Q-1” and “R-
1” were not duly attested by the legal custodians (by the Vicar of
the Parish of Ullern for Exhibit “Q-1” and by the Judge or Clerk of
the Probate Court for Exhibit “R-1”) as required under Sections 24
and 25, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court. Likewise, the said
documents are not accompanied by a certificate that such officer
has the custody as also required under Section 24 of Rule 132.
Consequently, defendant-appellant asseverates that Exhibits “Q-
1” and “R-1” as private documents, which were not duly
authenticated on the witness stand by a competent witness, are
essentially hearsay in nature that have no probative value.
Therefore, it is obvious that plaintiffs-appellees failed to prove
that they are the widow and son of the late Christian Harper.
Plaintiffs-appellees make the following counter arguments,
viz., (a) Exhibit “Q-1,” the Marriage Certificate of Ellen Johanne
Harper and Christian Fredrik Harper, was issued by the Office of
the Vicar of Ullern with a statement that “this certificate is a
transcript from the Register of Marriage of Ullern Church.” The
contents
455
VOL. 679, AUGUST 29, 2012 455

of Exhibit “Q-1” were translated by the Government of the

Kingdom of Norway, through its authorized translator, into
English and authenticated by the Royal Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Norway, which in turn, was also authenticated by the
Consul, Embassy of the Republic of the Philippines in Stockholm,
Sweden; (b) Exhibit “Q,” the Birth Certificate of Jonathan
Christopher Harper, was issued and signed by the Registrar of
the Kingdom of Norway, as authenticated by the Royal Ministry
of Foreign Affairs of Norway, whose signature was also
authenticated by the Consul, Embassy of the Republic of the
Philippines in Stockholm, Sweden; and (c) Exhibit “R-1,” the
Probate Court Certificate was also authenticated by the Royal
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway, whose signature was also
authenticated by the Consul, Embassy of the Republic of the
Philippines in Stockholm, Sweden.
They further argue that since Exhibit “Q-1,” Marriage
Certificate, was issued by the vicar or parish priest, the legal
custodian of parish records, it is considered as an exception to the
hearsay rule. As for Exhibit “R-1,” the Probate Court Certificate,
while the document is indeed a translation of the certificate, it is
an official certification, duly confirmed by the Government of the
Kingdom of Norway; its contents were lifted by the Government
Authorized Translator from the official record and thus, a written
official act of a foreign sovereign country.
WE rule for plaintiffs-appellees.
The Revised Rules of Court provides that public documents
may be evidenced by a copy attested by the officer having the
legal custody of the record. The attestation must state, in
substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a
specific part thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must be
under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if
he be the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of such
court.
If the record is not kept in the Philippines, the attested copy
must be accompanied with a certificate that such officer has the
custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign
country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of the
embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or
consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the
Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is
kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.
456

The documents involved in this case are all kept in

Norway. These documents have been authenticated by the
Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs; they bear
the official seal of the Ministry and signature of one, Tanja
Sorlie. The documents are accompanied by an
Authentication by the Consul, Embassy of the Republic of
the Philippines in Stockholm, Sweden to the effect that,
Tanja Sorlie is duly authorized to legalize official
documents for the Ministry.
Exhibits “Q” and “R” are extracts of the register of
births of both Jonathan Christopher Harper and the late
Christian Fredrik Harper, respectively, wherein the
former explicitly declares that Jonathan Christopher is
the son of Christian Fredrik and Ellen Johanne Harper.
Said documents bear the signature of the keeper, Y. Ayse
B. Nordal with the official seal of the Office of the
Registrar of Oslo, and the authentication of Tanja Sorlie of
the Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Oslo, which were
further authenticated by Philippine Consul Marian
Jocelyn R. Tirol. In addition, the latter states that said
documents are the birth certificates of Jonathan
Christopher Harper and Christian Fredrik Harper issued
by the Registrar Office of Oslo, Norway on March 23, 2004.
Exhibits “Q-1,” on the other hand, is the Marriage
Certificate of Christian Fredrik Harper and Ellen Johanne
Harper issued by the vicar of the Parish of Ullern while
Exhibit “R-1” is the Probate Court Certificate from the
Oslo Probate Court, naming Ellen Johanne Harper and
Jonathan Christopher Harper as the heirs of the deceased
Christian Fredrik Harper. The documents are certified
true translations into English of the transcript of the said
marriage certificate and the probate court certificate.
They were likewise signed by the authorized government
translator of Oslo with the seal of his office; attested by
Tanja Sorlie and further certified by our own Consul.
In view of the foregoing, WE conclude that plaintiffs-
appellees had substantially complied with the
requirements set forth under the rules. WE would also like
to stress that plaintiffs-appellees herein are residing
overseas and are litigating locally through their
representative. While they are
457
VOL. 679, AUGUST 29, 2012 457

not excused from complying with our rules, WE must take

into account the attendant reality that these overseas
litigants communicate with their representative and
counsel via long distance communication. Add to this is
the fact that compliance with the requirements on
attestation and authentication or certification is no easy
process and completion thereof may vary depending on
different factors such as the location of the requesting
party from the consulate and the office of the record
custodian, the volume of transactions in said offices and
even the mode of sending these documents to the
Philippines. With these circumstances under
consideration, to OUR minds, there is every reason for an
equitable and relaxed application of the rules on the
issuance of the required attestation from the custodian of
the documents to plaintiffs-appellees’ situation. Besides,
these questioned documents were duly signed by the
officers having custody of the same.11
Petitioner assails the CA’s ruling that respondents

substantially complied with the rules on the authentication
of the proofs of marriage and filiation set by Section 24 and
Section 25 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court when they
presented Exhibit Q, Exhibit Q-1, Exhibit R and Exhibit R-
1, because the legal custodian did not duly attest that
Exhibit Q-1 and Exhibit R-1 were the correct copies of the
originals on file, and because no certification accompanied
the documents stating that “such officer has custody of the
originals.” It contends that respondents did not
competently prove their being Harper’s surviving heirs by
reason of such documents being hearsay and incompetent.
Petitioner’s challenge against respondents’
documentary evidence on marriage and heirship is not
well-taken.
Section 24 and Section 25 of Rule 132 provide:
Section 24. Proof of official record.―The record of public

documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when
admissi-
_______________
11 Rollo, pp. 64-68 (bold emphasis supplied).
458

ble for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication

thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal
custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the
record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such
officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is
in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of
the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or
consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the
Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is
kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.
Section 25. What attestation of copy must state.―Whenever a
copy of a document or record is attested for the purpose of
evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is
a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case
may be. The attestation must be under the official seal of the
attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court
having a seal, under the seal of such court.
Although Exhibit Q,12 Exhibit Q-1,13 Exhibit R14 and

Exhibit R-115 were not attested by the officer having the
legal custody of the record or by his deputy in the manner
required in Section 25 of Rule 132, and said documents did
not comply with the requirement under Section 24 of Rule
132 to the effect that if the record was not kept in the
Philippines a certificate of the person having custody must
accompany the copy of the document that was duly attested
stating that such person had custody of the documents, the
deviation was not enough reason to reject the utility of the
documents for the purposes they were intended to serve.
Exhibit Q and Exhibit R were extracts from the registry
of births of Oslo, Norway issued on March 23, 2004 and
signed by Y. Ayse B. Nordal, Registrar, and corresponded
to respondent Jonathan Christopher Harper and victim
Christian
_______________
12 Id., at p. 98.
13 Id., at p. 100.
14 Id., at p. 101.
15 Id., at p. 104.
459
VOL. 679, AUGUST 29, 2012 459

Fredrik Harper, respectively.16 Exhibit Q explicitly stated

that Jonathan was the son of Christian Fredrik Harper and
Ellen Johanne Harper, while Exhibit R attested to the

birth of Christian Fredrik Harper on December 4, 1968.
Exhibit Q and Exhibit R were authenticated on March 29,
2004 by the signatures of Tanja Sorlie of the Royal
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway as well as by the
official seal of that office. In turn, Consul Marian Jocelyn
R. Tirol of the Philippine Consulate in Stockholm, Sweden
authenticated the signatures of Tanja Sorlie and the
official seal of the Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
Norway on Exhibit Q and Exhibit R, explicitly certifying to
the authority of Tanja Sorlie “to legalize official documents
for the Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway.”17
Exhibit Q-1,18 the Marriage Certificate of Ellen Johanne
Clausen Harper and Christian Fredrik Harper, contained
the following data, namely: (a) the parties were married on
June 29, 1996 in Ullern Church; and (b) the certificate was
issued by the Office of the Vicar of Ullern on June 29, 1996.
Exhibit Q-1 was similarly authenticated by the signature of
Tanja Sorlie of the Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
Norway, with the official seal of that office. Philippine
Consul Tirol again expressly certified to the capacity of
Sorlie “to legalize official documents for the Royal Ministry
of Foreign Affairs of Norway,”19 and further certified that
the document was a true translation into English of a
transcript of a Marriage Certificate issued to Christian
Frederik Harper and Ellen Johanne Clausen by the Vicar
of the Parish of Ullern on June 29, 1996.
Exhibit R-1,20 a Probate Court certificate issued by the
Oslo Probate Court on February 18, 2000 through Morten
Bolstad, its Senior Executive Officer, was also
authenticated by the
_______________
16 Id., at pp. 98-101.
17 Id., at pp. 101 and 103 (Annexes D-2 and D-3).
18 Id., at p. 100.
19 Id., at p. 99.
20 Id., at p. 104.
460

signature of Tanja Sorlie and with the official seal of the

Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway. As with the
other documents, Philippine Consul Tirol explicitly
certified to the capacity of Sorlie “to legalize official
documents for the Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs of

Norway,” and further certified that the document was a
true translation into English of the Oslo Probate Court
certificate issued on February 18, 2000 to the effect that
Christian Fredrik Harper, born on December 4, 1968, had
reportedly died on November 6, 1999.21
The Oslo Probate Court certificate recited that both
Ellen Johanne Harper and Christopher S. Harper were
Harper’s heirs, to wit:

The above names surviving spouse has accepted responsibility for

the commitments of the deceased in accordance with the
provisions of Section 78 of the Probate Court Act (Norway), and
the above substitute guardian has agreed to the private division
of the estate.
The following heir and substitute guardian will undertake the
private division of the estate:
Ellen Johanne Harper
Christopher S. Harper
This probate court certificate relates to the entire estate.
Oslo Probate Court, 18 February 2000.22
The official participation in the authentication process of

Tanja Sorlie of the Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
Norway and the attachment of the official seal of that office
on each authentication indicated that Exhibit Q, Exhibit R,
Exhibit Q-1 and Exhibit R-1 were documents of a public
nature in Norway, not merely private documents. It cannot
be denied that based on Philippine Consul Tirol’s official
authentication, Tanja Sorlie was “on the date of signing,
duly authorized to legalize official documents for the
Royal Ministry of For-
_______________
21 Id., at p. 103.
22 Id., at p. 104.
461
VOL. 679, AUGUST 29, 2012 461

eign Affairs of Norway.” Without a showing to the contrary

by petitioner, Exhibit Q, Exhibit R, Exhibit Q-1 and
Exhibit R-1 should be presumed to be themselves official
documents under Norwegian law, and admissible as prima
facie evidence of the truth of their contents under

Philippine law.
At the minimum, Exhibit Q, Exhibit R, Exhibit Q-1 and
Exhibit R-1 substantially met the requirements of Section
24 and Section 25 of Rule 132 as a condition for their
admission as evidence in default of a showing by petitioner
that the authentication process was tainted with bad faith.
Consequently, the objective of ensuring the authenticity of
the documents prior to their admission as evidence was
substantially achieved. In Constantino-David v.
23
Pangandaman-Gania, the Court has said that
substantial compliance, by its very nature, is actually
inadequate observance of the requirements of a rule or
regulation that are waived under equitable circumstances
in order to facilitate the administration of justice, there
being no damage or injury caused by such flawed
compliance.
The Court has further said in Constantino-David v.
Pangandaman-Gania that the focus in every inquiry on
whether or not to accept substantial compliance is always
on the presence of equitable conditions to administer
justice effectively and efficiently without damage or injury
to the spirit of the legal obligation.24 There are, indeed,
such equitable conditions attendant here, the foremost of
which is that respondents had gone to great lengths to
submit the documents. As the CA observed, respondents’
compliance with the requirements on attestation and
authentication of the documents had not been easy; they
had to contend with many difficulties (such as the distance
of Oslo, their place of residence, from Stockholm, Sweden,
where the Philippine Consulate had its office; the volume of
transactions in the offices concerned; and the safe
_______________
23 G.R. No. 156039, August 14, 2003, 409 SCRA 80.
24 Id., at p. 94.
462

transmission of the documents to the Philippines).25 Their

submission of the documents should be presumed to be in
good faith because they did so in due course. It would be
inequitable if the sincerity of respondents in obtaining and
submitting the documents despite the difficulties was
ignored.
The principle of substantial compliance recognizes that

exigencies and situations do occasionally demand some
flexibility in the rigid application of the rules of procedure
and the laws.26 That rules of procedure may be mandatory
in form and application does not forbid a showing of
substantial compliance under justifiable circumstances,27
because substantial compliance does not equate to a
disregard of basic rules. For sure, substantial compliance
and strict adherence are not always incompatible and do
not always clash in discord. The power of the Court to
suspend its own rules or to except any particular case from
the operation of the rules whenever the purposes of justice
require the suspension cannot be challenged.28 In the
interest of substantial justice, even procedural rules of the
most mandatory character in terms of compliance are
frequently relaxed. Similarly, the procedural rules should
definitely be liberally construed if strict adherence to their
letter will result in absurdity and in manifest injustice, or
where the merits of a party’s cause are apparent and
outweigh considerations of non-compliance with certain
formal requirements.29 It is more in accord with justice
that a party-litigant is given the fullest opportunity to
establish the merits
_______________
25 Rollo, p. 68.
26 Hadji-Sirad v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 182267, August
28, 2009, 597 SCRA 475.
27 Prince Transport, Ind. v. Garcia, G.R. No. 167291, January 12, 2011,
639 SCRA 312, 326.
28 De Guzman v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 103276, April 11, 1996, 256
SCRA 171, 177.
29 Department of Agrarian Reform v. Republic, G.R. No. 160560, July
29, 2005, 465 SCRA 419, 428; Yao v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 132428,
October 24, 2000, 344 SCRA 202, 221.
463
VOL. 679, AUGUST 29, 2012 463

of his claim or defense than for him to lose his life, liberty,
honor or property on mere technicalities. Truly, the rules of
procedure are intended to promote substantial justice, not
to defeat it, and should not be applied in a very rigid and
technical sense.30
Petitioner urges the Court to resolve the apparent
conflict between the rulings in Heirs of Pedro Cabais v.
31
Court of Appeals (Cabais) and in Heirs of Ignacio Conti v.
Court of Appeals32 (Conti) establishing filiation through a
baptismal certificate.33
Petitioner’s urging is not warranted, both because there
is no conflict between the rulings in Cabais and Conti, and
because neither Cabais nor Conti is relevant herein.
In Cabais, the main issue was whether or not the CA
correctly affirmed the decision of the RTC that had relied
mainly on the baptismal certificate of Felipa C. Buesa to
establish the parentage and filiation of Pedro Cabais. The
Court held that the petition was meritorious, stating:
A birth certificate, being a public document, offers prima facie

evidence of filiation and a high degree of proof is needed to
overthrow the presumption of truth contained in such public
document. This is pursuant to the rule that entries in official
records made in the performance of his duty by a public officer are
prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. The evidentiary
nature of such document must, therefore, be sustained in the
absence of strong, complete and conclusive proof of its falsity or
nullity.
_______________
30 Angel v. Inopiquez, G.R. No. 66712, January 13, 1989, 69 SCRA 129, 136;
Calasiao Farmers Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, No.
L-50633, August 17, 1981, 106 SCRA 630, 637; Director of Lands v. Romamban,
No. L-36948, August 28, 1984, 131 SCRA 431, 438.
31 G.R. Nos. 106314-15, October 8, 1999, 316 SCRA 338.
32 G.R. No. 118464, December 21, 1998, 300 SCRA 345.
33 Rollo, p. 12.
464

On the contrary, a baptismal certificate is a private document,

which, being hearsay, is not a conclusive proof of filiation. It does
not have the same probative value as a record of birth, an official
or public document. In US v. Evangelista, this Court held that
church registers of births, marriages, and deaths made
subsequent to the promulgation of General Orders No. 68 and the
passage of Act No. 190 are no longer public writings, nor are they
kept by duly authorized public officials. Thus, in this jurisdiction,
a certificate of baptism such as the one herein controversy is no
longer regarded with the same evidentiary value as official
records of birth. Moreover, on this score, jurisprudence is
consistent and uniform in ruling that the canonical certificate of
baptism is not sufficient to prove recognition.34
The Court sustained the Cabais petitioners’ stance that

the RTC had apparently erred in relying on the baptismal
certificate to establish filiation, stressing the baptismal
certificate’s limited evidentiary value as proof of filiation
inferior to that of a birth certificate; and declaring that the
baptismal certificate did not attest to the veracity of the
statements regarding the kinsfolk of the one baptized.
Nevertheless, the Court ultimately ruled that it was
respondents’ failure to present the birth certificate, more
than anything else, that lost them their case, stating that:
“The unjustified failure to present the birth certificate
instead of the baptismal certificate now under
consideration or to otherwise prove filiation by any other
means recognized by law weigh heavily against
respondents.”35
In Conti, the Court affirmed the rulings of the trial
court and the CA to the effect that the Conti respondents
were able to prove by preponderance of evidence their being
the collateral heirs of deceased Lourdes Sampayo. The
Conti petitioners disagreed, arguing that baptismal
certificates did not prove the filiation of collateral relatives
of the deceased. Agreeing with the CA, the Court said:
_______________
34 Supra, note 31, at pp. 343-344.
35 Id.
465
VOL. 679, AUGUST 29, 2012 465

We are not persuaded. Altogether, the documentary and

testimonial evidence submitted xxx are competent and adequate
proofs that private respondents are collateral heirs of Lourdes
Sampayo.
xxx
Under Art. 172 of the Family Code, the filiation of legitimate
children shall be proved by any other means allowed by the Rules
of Court and special laws, in the absence of a record of birth or a
parent’s admission of such legitimate filiation in a public or
private document duly signed by the parent. Such other proof of
one’s filiation may be a baptismal certificate, a judicial admission,
a family Bible in which his name has been entered, common
reputation respecting his pedigree, admission by silence, the
testimonies of witnesses and other kinds of proof admissible
under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. By analogy, this method of
proving filiation may also be utilized in the instant case.
Public documents are the written official acts, or records of the

official act of the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals,
and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or a foreign
country. The baptismal certificates presented in evidence
by private respondents are public documents. Parish
priests continue to be the legal custodians of the parish
records and are authorized to issue true copies, in the
form of certificates, of the entries contained therein.
The admissibility of baptismal certificates offered by Lydia S.
Reyes, absent the testimony of the officiating priest or the official
recorder, was settled in People v. Ritter, citing U.S. v. de Vera (28
Phil. 105 [1914]), thus:
…. The entries made in the Registry Book may be
considered as entries made in the course of business under
Section 43 of Rule 130, which is an exception to the hearsay
rule. The baptisms administered by the church are one of its
transactions in the exercise of ecclesiastical duties and
recorded in the book of the church during this course of its
business.
It may be argued that baptismal certificates are
evidence only of the administration of the sacrament, but
in this case, there were four (4) baptismal certificates
which, when taken together, uniformly show that Lourdes,
Josefina, Remedios and Luis had the same set of parents,
as indicated therein. Corroborated by the undisputed
testimony of Ade-
466

laida Sampayo that with the demise of Lourdes and her

brothers Manuel, Luis and sister Remedios, the only
sibling left was Josefina Sampayo Reyes, such baptismal
certificates have acquired evidentiary weight to prove
filiation.36
Obviously, Conti did not treat a baptismal certificate,

standing alone, as sufficient to prove filiation; on the
contrary, Conti expressly held that a baptismal certificate
had evidentiary value to prove filiation if considered
alongside other evidence of filiation. As such, a baptismal
certificate alone is not sufficient to resolve a disputed
filiation.
Unlike Cabais and Conti, this case has respondents
presenting several documents, like the birth certificates of
Harper and respondent Jonathan Harper, the marriage
certificate of Harper and Ellen Johanne Harper, and the
probate court certificate, all of which were presumably

regarded as public documents under the laws of Norway.
Such documentary evidence sufficed to competently
establish the relationship and filiation under the standards
of our Rules of Court.
II
Petitioner was liable due to its own negligence
Petitioner argues that respondents failed to prove its
negligence; that Harper’s own negligence in allowing the
killers into his hotel room was the proximate cause of his
own death; and that hotels were not insurers of the safety
of their guests.
The CA resolved petitioner’s arguments thuswise:
Defendant-appellant contends that the pivotal issue is whether

or not it had committed negligence and corollarily, whether its
negligence was the immediate cause of the death of Christian
Harper. In its defense, defendant-appellant mainly avers that it is
equipped with adequate security system as follows: (1) keycards
or vingcards
_______________
36 Heirs of Ignacio Conti v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118464, December 21,
1998, 300 SCRA 345, 356-358.
467
VOL. 679, AUGUST 29, 2012 467

for opening the guest rooms, (2) two CCTV monitoring cameras on
each floor of the hotel and (3) roving guards with handheld radios,
the number of which depends on the occupancy rate of the hotel.
Likewise, it reiterates that the proximate cause of Christian
Harper’s death was his own negligence in inviting to his room the
two (2) still unidentified suspects.
Plaintiffs-appellees in their Brief refute, in that, the liability of
defendant-appellant is based upon the fact that it was in a better
situation than the injured person, Christian Harper, to foresee
and prevent the happening of the injurious occurrence. They
maintain that there is no dispute that even prior to the untimely
demise of Christian Harper, defendant-appellant was duly
forewarned of its security lapses as pointed out by its Chief
Security Officer, Col. Rodrigo De Guzman, who recommended that
one roving guard be assigned on each floor of the hotel considering
the length and shape of the corridors. They posit that defendant-
appellant’s inaction constitutes negligence.
This Court finds for plaintiffs-appellees.
As the action is predicated on negligence, the relevant law is

Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which states that―
“Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another,
there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there was no
preexisting contractual relation between the parties, is
called quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this
chapter.”
Negligence is defined as the omission to do something which a
reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily
regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of
something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do.
The Supreme Court likewise ruled that negligence is want of care
required by the circumstances. It is a relative or comparative, not
an absolute, term and its application depends upon the situation
of the parties and the degree of care and vigilance which the
circumstances reasonably require. In determining whether or not
there is negligence on the part of the parties in a given situation,
jurisprudence has laid down the following test: Did defendant, in
doing the alleged negligent act, use that reasonable care and
caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in
the same situation? If not, the person is guilty of negligence. The
law, in effect, adopts the
468

standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the

discreet pater familias of the Roman law.
The test of negligence is objective. WE measure the act or
omission of the tortfeasor with a perspective as that of an
ordinary reasonable person who is similarly situated. The test, as
applied to the extant case, is whether or not defendant-appellant,
under the attendant circumstances, used that reasonable care and
caution which an ordinary reasonable person would have used in
the same situation.
WE rule in the negative.
In finding defendant-appellant remiss in its duty of exercising
the required reasonable care under the circumstances, the court a
quo reasoned-out, to wit:
“Of the witnesses presented by plaintiffs to prove its (sic)
case, the only one with competence to testify on the issue of
adequacy or inadequacy of security is Col. Rodrigo De
Guzman who was then the Chief Security Officer of
defendant hotel for the year 1999. He is a retired police
officer and had vast experience in security jobs. He was

likewise a member of the elite Presidential Security Group.
He testified that upon taking over the job as the chief of
the security force of the hotel, he made an assessment of the
security situation. Col. De Guzman was not satisfied with
the security set-up and told the hotel management of his
desire to improve it. In his testimony, De Guzman testified
that at the time he took over, he noticed that there were few
guards in the elevated portion of the hotel where the rooms
were located. The existing security scheme then was one
guard for 3 or 4 floors. He likewise testified that he
recommended to the hotel management that at least one
guard must be assigned per floor especially considering that
the hotel has a long “L-shaped” hallway, such that one
cannot see both ends of the hallway. He further opined that
“even one guard in that hallway is not enough because of
the blind portion of the hallway.”
On cross-examination, Col. De Guzman testified that the
security of the hotel was adequate at the time the crime
occurred because the hotel was not fully booked. He
qualified his testimony on direct in that his
recommendation of one guard per floor is the “ideal” set-up
when the hotel is fully-booked.
Be that as it may, it must be noted that Col. De Guzman
also testified that the reason why the hotel management
disapproved his recommendation was that the hotel was not
doing well. It is for this reason that the hotel management
did not heed the recommendation of Col. De Guzman, no
matter how sound the recommendation was, and whether
the hotel is fully-booked or not. It was a business judgment
call on the part of the defendant.
Plaintiffs anchor its (sic) case on our law on quasi-delicts.
Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes
damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called quasi-delict.
Liability on the part of the defendant is based upon the
fact that he was in a better situation than the injured
person to foresee and prevent the happening of the injurious
occurrence.
There is no dispute that even prior to the untimely
demise of Mr. Harper, defendant was duly forewarned of
the security lapses in the hotel. Col. De Guzman was
particularly concerned with the security of the private areas
where the guest rooms are. He wanted not just one roving
guard in every three or four floors. He insisted there must
be at least one in each floor considering the length and the
shape of the corridors. The trained eyes of a security officer
was (sic) looking at that deadly scenario resulting from that

wide security breach as that which befell Christian Harper.
The theory of the defense that the malefactor/s was/were
known to Harper or was/were visitors of Harper and that
there was a shindig among [the] three deserves scant
consideration.
The NBI Biology Report (Exhs. “C” & “D”) and the
Toxicology Report (Exh. “E”) belie the defense theory of a
joyous party between and among Harper and the
unidentified malefactor/s. Based on the Biology Report,
Harper was found negative of prohibited and regulated
drugs. The Toxicology Report likewise revealed that the
deceased was negative of the presence of alcohol in his
blood.
470

The defense even suggests that the malefactor/s gained

entry into the private room of Harper either because Harper
allowed them entry by giving them access to the vingcard or
because Harper allowed them entry by opening the door for
them, the usual gesture of a room occupant to his visitors.
While defendant’s theory may be true, it is more likely,
under the circumstances obtaining that the malefactor/s
gained entry into his room by simply knocking at Harper’s
door and the latter opening it probably thinking it was hotel
personnel, without an inkling that criminal/s could be in the
premises.
The latter theory is more attuned to the dictates of
reason. If indeed the female “visitor” is known to or a visitor
of Harper, she should have entered the the room together
with Harper. It is quite unlikely that a supposed “visitor”
would wait three minutes to be with a guest when he/she
could go with the guest directly to the room. The interval of
three minutes in Harper’s entry and that of the alleged
female visitor belies the “theory of acquaintanceship.” It is
most likely that the female “visitor” was the one who
opened the door to the male “visitor,” undoubtedly, a co-
conspirator.
In any case, the ghastly incident could have been
prevented had there been adequate security in each of the
hotel floors. This, coupled with the earlier recommendation
of Col. De Guzman to the hotel management to act on the
security lapses of the hotel, raises the presumption that the
crime was foreseeable.
Clearly, defendant’s inaction constitutes negligence or

want of the reasonable care demanded of it in that
particular situation.
In a case, the Supreme Court defined negligence as:
The failure to observe for the protection of the
interests of another person that degree of care,
precaution and vigilance, which the circumstances
justly demand, whereby such person suffers injury.
Negligence is want of care required by the
circumstances. It is a relative or comparative, not an
absolute term, and its application depends upon the
situation of
471
VOL. 679, AUGUST 29, 2012 471

the parties, and the degree of care and vigilance

which the circumstances reasonably impose. Where
the danger is great, a high degree of care is necessary.
Moreover, in applying the premises liability rule in the
instant case as it is applied in some jurisdiction (sic) in the
United States, it is enough that guests are injured while
inside the hotel premises to make the hotelkeeper liable.
With great caution should the liability of the hotelkeeper be
enforced when a guest died inside the hotel premises.
It also bears stressing that there were prior incidents
that occurred in the hotel which should have forewarned
the hotel management of the security lapses of the hotel. As
testified to by Col. De Guzman, “there were ‘minor’
incidents” (loss of items) before the happening of the instant
case.
These “minor” incidents may be of little significance to
the hotel, yet relative to the instant case, it speaks volume.
This should have served as a caveat that the hotel security
has lapses.
Makati Shangri-La Hotel, to stress, is a five-star hotel.
The “reasonable care” that it must exercise for the safety
and comfort of its guests should be commensurate with the
grade and quality of the accommodation it offers. If there is
such a thing as “five-star hotel security,” the guests at
Makati Shangri-La surely deserves just that!
When one registers (as) a guest of a hotel, he makes the
establishment the guardian of his life and his personal
belongings during his stay. It is a standard procedure of the
management of the hotel to screen visitors who call on their
guests at their rooms. The murder of Harper could have
been avoided had the security guards of the Shangri-La

Hotel in Makati dutifully observed this standard
procedure.”
WE concur.
Well settled is the doctrine that “the findings of fact by the trial
court are accorded great respect by appellate courts and should
not be disturbed on appeal unless the trial court has overlooked,
ignored, or disregarded some fact or circumstances of sufficient
weight or significance which, if considered, would alter the situa-
472

tion.” After a conscientious sifting of the records, defendant-

appellant fails to convince US to deviate from this doctrine.
It could be gleaned from findings of the trial court that its
conclusion of negligence on the part of defendant-appellant is
grounded mainly on the latter’s inadequate hotel security, more
particularly on the failure to deploy sufficient security personnel
or roving guards at the time the ghastly incident happened.
A review of the testimony of Col. De Guzman reveals that on
direct examination he testified that at the time he assumed his
position as Chief Security Officer of defendant-appellant, during
the early part of 1999 to the early part of 2000, he noticed that
some of the floors of the hotel were being guarded by a few
guards, for instance, 3 or 4 floors by one guard only on a roving
manner. He then made a recommendation that the ideal-set up
for an effective security should be one guard for every floor,
considering that the hotel is L-shaped and the ends of the
hallways cannot be seen. At the time he made the
recommendation, the same was denied, but it was later on
considered and approved on December 1999 because of the
Centennial Celebration.
On cross-examination, Col. De Guzman confirmed that after he
took over as Chief Security Officer, the number of security guards
was increased during the first part of December or about the last
week of November, and before the incident happened, the security
was adequate. He also qualified that as to his direct testimony on
“ideal-set up,” he was referring to one guard for every floor if the
hotel is fully booked. At the time he made his recommendation in
the early part of 1999, it was disapproved as the hotel was not
doing well and it was not fully booked so the existing security was
adequate enough. He further explained that his advice was
observed only in the late November 1999 or the early part of
December 1999.
It could be inferred from the foregoing declarations of the

former Chief Security Officer of defendant-appellant that the
latter was negligent in providing adequate security due its guests.
With confidence, it was repeatedly claimed by defendant-
appellant that it is a five-star hotel. Unfortunately, the record
failed to show that at the time of the death of Christian Harper, it
was exercising reasonable care to protect its guests from harm
and danger by providing sufficient security commensurate to it
being one of the finest hotels in the country. In so concluding, WE
are reminded of the Supreme Court’s enunciation that the hotel
business like the common carrier’s busi-
473
VOL. 679, AUGUST 29, 2012 473

ness is imbued with public interest. Catering to the public,

hotelkeepers are bound to provide not only lodging for hotel
guests but also security to their persons and belongings. The twin
duty constitutes the essence of the business.
It is clear from the testimony of Col. De Guzman that his
recommendation was initially denied due to the fact that the
business was then not doing well. The “one guard, one floor”
recommended policy, although ideal when the hotel is fully-
booked, was observed only later in November 1999 or in the early
part of December 1999, or needless to state, after the murder of
Christian Harper. The apparent security lapses of defendant-
appellant were further shown when the male culprit who entered
Christian Harper’s room was never checked by any of the guards
when he came inside the hotel. As per interview conducted by the
initial investigator, PO3 Cornelio Valiente to the guards, they
admitted that nobody know that said man entered the hotel and it
was only through the monitor that they became aware of his
entry. It was even evidenced by the CCTV that before he walked
to the room of the late Christian Harper, said male suspect even
looked at the monitoring camera. Such act of the man showing
wariness, added to the fact that his entry to the hotel was
unnoticed, at an unholy hour, should have aroused suspicion on
the part of the roving guard in the said floor, had there been any.
Unluckily for Christian Harper, there was none at that time.
Proximate cause is defined as that cause, which, in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
produces, the injury, and without which the result would not have
occurred. More comprehensively, proximate cause is that cause
acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by
setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and
continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection
with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain

immediately effecting the injury as natural and probable result of
the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the
person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily
prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect
at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person
might probably result therefrom.
Defendant-appellant’s contention that it was Christian
Harper’s own negligence in allowing the malefactors to his room
that was the proximate cause of his death, is untenable. To
reiterate,
474

defendant-appellant is engaged in a business imbued with public

interest, ergo, it is bound to provide adequate security to its
guests. As previously discussed, defendant-appellant failed to
exercise such reasonable care expected of it under the
circumstances. Such negligence is the proximate cause which set
the chain of events that led to the eventual demise of its guest.
Had there been reasonable security precautions, the same could
have saved Christian Harper from a brutal death.
The Court concurs entirely with the findings and

conclusions of the CA, which the Court regards to be
thorough and supported by the records of the trial.
Moreover, the Court cannot now review and pass upon the
uniform findings of negligence by the CA and the RTC
because doing so would require the Court to delve into and
revisit the factual bases for the finding of negligence,
something fully contrary to its character as not a trier of
facts. In that regard, the factual findings of the trial court
that are supported by the evidence on record, especially
when affirmed by the CA, are conclusive on the Court.37
Consequently, the Court will not review unless there are
exceptional circumstances for doing so, such as the
following:
(a) When the findings are grounded entirely on speculation,
surmises or conjectures;
(b) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken,
absurd or impossible;
(c) When there is grave abuse of discretion;
(d) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of
facts;
(e) When the findings of facts are conflicting;
(f) When in making its findings the Court of Appeals went

beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary
to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee;
_______________
37 Lambert v. Heirs of Ray Castillon, G.R. No. 160709, February 23,
2005, 452 SCRA 285, 290.
475
VOL. 679, AUGUST 29, 2012 475

(g) When the findings are contrary to the trial court;

(h) When the findings are conclusions without citation of
specific evidence on which they are based;
(i) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the
petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by
the respondent;
(j) When the findings of fact are premised on the supposed
absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on
record; and
(k) When the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked
certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which,
if properly considered, would justify a different
conclusion.38
None of the exceptional circumstances obtains herein.
Accordingly, the Court cannot depart from or disturb the
factual findings on negligence of petitioner made by both
the RTC and the CA.39
Even so, the Court agrees with the CA that petitioner
failed to provide the basic and adequate security measures
expected of a five-star hotel; and that its omission was the
proximate cause of Harper’s death.
The testimony of Col. De Guzman revealed that the
management practice prior to the murder of Harper had
been to deploy only one security or roving guard for every
three or four floors of the building; that such ratio had not
been enough considering the L-shape configuration of the
hotel that rendered the hallways not visible from one or the
other end; and that he had recommended to management
to post a guard for each floor, but his recommendation had
been disap-
_______________
38 Heirs of Carlos Alcaraz v. Republic, G.R. No. 131667, July 28, 2005,
464 SCRA 280, 289.
39 Cuizon v. Remoto, G.R. No. 143027, March 31, 2006, 486 SCRA 196.
476

proved because the hotel “was not doing well” at that

particular time.40
Probably realizing that his testimony had weakened
petitioner’s position in the case, Col. De Guzman soon
clarified on cross-examination that petitioner had seen no
need at the time of the incident to augment the number of
guards due to the hotel being then only half-booked. Here
is how his testimony went:
ATTY MOLINA:
I just forgot one more point, Your Honor please. Was there ever a time,
Mr. Witness, that your recommendation to post a guard in every floor
ever considered and approved by the hotel?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: When was this?
A: That was on December 1999 because of the Centennial Celebration
when the hotel accepted so many guests wherein most of the rooms
were fully booked and I recommended that all the hallways should be
guarded by one guard.41
xxx
ATTY COSICO:
Q: So at that time that you made your recommendation, the hotel was
half-filled.
A: Maybe.
Q: And even if the hotel is half-filled, your recommendation is that each
floor shall be maintained by one security guard per floors?
A: Yes sir.
Q: Would you agree with me that even if the hotel is half-filled, there is no
need to increase the guards because there were only few customers?
_______________
40 TSN, November 26, 2004, p. 23.
41 Rollo, pp. 135-136 (TSN, February 13, 2004, pp. 17-18).
477
VOL. 679, AUGUST 29, 2012 477

A: I think so.

Q: So you will agree with me that each floor should be maintained by one
security guard if the rooms are filled up or occupied?
A: Yes sir.

Q: Now, you even testified that from January 1999 to November 1999
thereof, only minor incidents were involved?
A: Yes sir.
Q: So it would be correct to say that the security at that time in February
was adequate?
A: I believe so.
Q: Even up to November when the incident happened for that same
reason, security was adequate?
A: Yes, before the incident.
Q: Now, you testified on direct that the hotel posted one guard each floor?
A: Yes sir.
Q: And it was your own recommendation?
A: Yes, because we are expecting that the hotel will be filled up.
Q: In fact, the hotel was fully booked?
A: Yes sir.42
Petitioner would thereby have the Court believe that

Col. De Guzman’s initial recommendation had been
rebuffed due to the hotel being only half-booked; that there
had been no urgency to adopt a one-guard-per-floor policy
because security had been adequate at that time; and that
he actually meant by his statement that “the hotel was not
doing well” that the hotel was only half-booked.
We are not convinced.
The hotel business is imbued with public interest.
Catering to the public, hotelkeepers are bound to provide
not only lodg-
_______________
42 Id., at pp. 154-156 (TSN, February 27, 2004, pp. 5-7).
478

ing for their guests but also security to the persons and
belongings of their guests. The twin duty constitutes the
essence of the business.43 Applying by analogy Article
2000,44 Article 200145 and Article 200246 of the Civil Code
(all of which concerned the hotelkeepers’ degree of care and
responsibility as to the personal effects of their guests), we
hold that there is much greater reason to apply the same if
not greater degree of care and responsibility when the lives
and personal safety of their guests are involved. Otherwise,
the hotelkeepers would simply stand idly by as strangers
have unrestricted access to all the hotel rooms on the
pretense of being visitors of the guests, without being held

liable should anything untoward befall the unwary guests.
That would be absurd, some thing that no good law would
ever envision.
In fine, the Court sees no reversible-error on the part of
the CA.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the judgment of the
Court of Appeals; and ORDERS petitioner to pay the costs
of suit.
_______________
43 YHT Realty Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126780,
February 17, 2005, 451 SCRA 638, 658.
44 Article 2000. The responsibility referred to in the two preceding
articles shall include the loss of, or injury to the personal property of the
guests caused by the servants or employees of the keepers of hotels or inns
as well as strangers; but not that which may proceed from any force
majeure. The fact that travellers are constrained to rely on the vigilance of
the keeper of the hotels or inns shall be considered in determining the
degree of care required of him.
45 Article 2001. The act of a thief or robber, who has entered the
hotel is not deemed force majeure, unless it is done with the use of arms or
through an irresistible force. (n)
46 Article 2002. The hotel-keeper is not liable for compensation if the
loss is due to the acts of the guest, his family, servants or visitors, or if the
loss arises from the character of the things brought into the hotel. (n)
479
VOL. 679, AUGUST 29, 2012 479

SO ORDERED.
Sereno (C.J.), Leonardo-De Castro, Villarama, Jr. and

Reyes, JJ., concur.
Judgment affirmed.
Notes.―A baptismal certificate may be appreciated,

together with all other documentary and testimonial
evidence to prove a person’s filiation. (Republic vs.
Mangotara, 624 SCRA 360 [2010])
In statutory rape cases, a baptismal certificate is
sufficient to prove the age of the victim. (People vs. Salazar,
634 SCRA 307 [2010])
――o0o――
© Copyright 2021 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.

Makati Shangri-La Hotel and Resort, Inc. vs. Harper

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Makati Shangri-La Hotel and Resort, Inc. vs. Harper

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Makati Shangri-La Hotel and Resort, Inc. vs. Harper

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

5/21/2021 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 679

G.R. No. 189998. August 29, 2012.*

MAKATI SHANGRI-LA HOTEL AND RESORT, INC.,

Procedural Rules and Technicalities; The procedural rules

VOL. 679, AUGUST 29, 2012 445

Makati Shangri-La Hotel and Resort, Inc. vs. Harper

non-compliance with certain formal requirements.—The

merits of a party’s cause are apparent and outweigh

446 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Makati Shangri-La Hotel and Resort, Inc. vs. Harper

tificate instead of the baptismal certificate now under

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the

The hotel owner is liable for civil damages to the

VOL. 679, AUGUST 29, 2012 447

Petitioner, the owner and operator of the 5-star Shangri-

In the first week of November 1999, Christian Harper

murdered inside his hotel room by still unidentified

448 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Makati City and expressed interest in purchasing a Cartier

drunk that much and smoked that many cigarettes the

VOL. 679, AUGUST 29, 2012 449

seen. Lifting the blanket, Mendoza saw that the victim’s

investigation about an unidentified Caucasian male’s

450 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

On August 30, 2002, respondents commenced this suit in

Ruling of the RTC

On October 25, 2005, the RTC rendered judgment after

WHEREFORE, finding the defendant hotel to be remiss in its

PhP 739,075.00 representing the expenses of transporting the

VOL. 679, AUGUST 29, 2012 451

PhP 250,000.00 attorney’s fees;

Petitioner appealed, assigning to the RTC the following

CHRISTIAN HARPER TO OSLO, NORWAY, THERE

452 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Regional Trial

Petitioner still seeks the review of the judgment of the

10 Id., at pp. 82-83.

VOL. 679, AUGUST 29, 2012 453

The appeal lacks merit.

As to the first issue, the CA pertinently held as follows:

The documentary evidence that plaintiffs-appellees offered

454 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Fredrik Harper; (b) Exhibit “Q” was labeled as Certificate of

VOL. 679, AUGUST 29, 2012 455

of Exhibit “Q-1” were translated by the Government of the

456 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

The documents involved in this case are all kept in

VOL. 679, AUGUST 29, 2012 457

not excused from complying with our rules, WE must take

Petitioner assails the CA’s ruling that respondents

Section 24. Proof of official record.―The record of public

458 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

ble for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication

Although Exhibit Q,12 Exhibit Q-1,13 Exhibit R14 and

VOL. 679, AUGUST 29, 2012 459

Fredrik Harper, respectively.16 Exhibit Q explicitly stated

Ellen Johanne Harper, while Exhibit R attested to the

460 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

signature of Tanja Sorlie and with the official seal of the

documents for the Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs of