The Revolution and the Revolutionary Government

THE Indonesian elite's dissatisfaction with Dutch rule was such that many
welcomed the Japanese invasion of early 1942, believing that under Japan
their situation could not be worse and might well be better. The harshness of
Japanese rule soon disabused them of any such expectations. The sufferings of
Indonesians at the hands of the Japanese reinforced their nationalism and did
not dispose them to welcome the return of the Dutch. The weak, half-hearted
defense put up by the Dutch army dealt a heavy blow to Netherlands prestige,
and Indonesians tended to hold the Dutch responsible for their sufferings
inasmuch as the Netherlands was regarded as having neither effectively
protected Indonesia nor permitted Indonesians to bear arms to protect
themselves. This and the persistent anti-Dutch propaganda of the Japanese
spread anti-Dutch sentiment more widely among the mass of the population
than ever before.

The Japanese Occupation

Nationalism grew apace during the three and a half years of Japanese
occupation, but in the various parts of the archipelago its growth as an
organized movement was rather uneven, there being three separate Japanese
military occupation zones in Indonesia.' Each was administratively distinct,
with little intercourse between them. One Japanese army occupied Java and,
although responsible to the Japanese Southeast Asia command headquarters in
Saigon, enjoyed considerable autonomy. Under it the Indonesian nationalist
movement was given the greatest latitude for development. Sumatra was
administered by a separate Japanese army, likewise directly responsible to
Saigon but inclined to give nationalists less scope. Celebes, Borneo, the
Moluccas, and the Lesser Sundas were under a division of the Japanese navy,
with headquarters at Macassar which followed a severely repressive policy
that in general allowed Indonesian nationalists no more latitude than had the
Dutch.
On Java long-exiled influential nationalist leaders were allowed sub-
stantial freedom of movement; some were permitted a contact with the
Indonesian masses which, although limited and controlled, was much greater
than had been countenanced by the Dutch. The Japanese were willing to grant
them such opportunities in order to secure their help in harnessing Indonesia
more effectively to Japan's wartime economic requirements—in particular
assistance in mobilizing forced labor and in organizing peasant deliveries of
rice. Those nationalist leaders willing to lend themselves to this work,
Soekarno in particular, were given opportunities for touring the countryside,
making speeches to the peasantry, and utilizing the radio network. In the
process they were able to engage in a considerable amount of nationalist
propaganda.
The Japanese occupation greatly furthered the spread of an all- Indonesian
language. This language, based primarily upon Sumatran Malay (and closely
related to the old commercial lingua franca of the Indonesian port cities), had earlier
been promoted by Indonesian nationalists with only modest success. After the
outlawing of Dutch and an abortive attempt to get the Indonesians to use Japanese
in schools and in administration, the occupation command authorized the use of
Indonesian for these key functions. As a consequence a national language, a basic
vehicle of any nationalistic movement, took real root in Indonesia.
One of the most important results of the occupation was the virtual
' For accounts in English of the Japanese occupation see H. J. Benda, The Crescent and
the Rising Sun (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations; The Hague: van Hoeve, 1958); Willard H.
Elsbree, Japan's Role in Southeast Asian Nationalist Movements, 1940-45 (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1953); G. McT. Kahin, Nationalism and
Revolution in Indo. nesia (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1952), pp. 101-133.

social revolution which expediency obliged the Japanese to put through, a

measure which gave a sharp fillip to the growth of nationalist sentiment.
Arriving with almost no military government personnel and believing it
necessary to intern practically all Netherlanders, they were obliged to turn to
Indonesians to help them staff many administrative and technical positions
previously held by the Dutch. Until the last months of the war the Japanese
filled the top posts themselves, but Indonesians who had formerly occupied
the lower ranks of the services frequently were suddenly pushed up into
positions two or three levels above what they had held in the Dutch colonial
administration. Generally they were able to fill these positions with a degree
of competence which quite surprised them. It became apparent to many that
the skills of the Dutch colonial official, whom for so long they had been taught
to regard as their superior, were well within the compass of their own abilities.
This realization engendered a powerful self-confidence which increased their
belief in their ability to govern themselves. Moreover, those who had
personally benefited from this revolutionary upward social mobility naturally
had a vested interest in maintaining these changes. To them, this meant
resistance to any return of Dutch rule; for they felt that its re-establishment
would mean loss of their new posts.
Toward the end of the war expectation of an Allied attack on Java
persuaded the Japanese that to have any hope of the Indonesians' support they
would have to promise them independence and yield them some upper-level
administrative posts. Beginning in early October 1944, just after an
announcement by the Japanese Prime Minister that Indonesia would be given
independence "in the very near future," occupation authorities on Java began
to relax controls over the activities of nationalist leaders, giving them greater
opportunities for contact with the people. By early 1945 the Japanese began to
take some short and halting steps in the direction of limited Indonesian self-
government. A significant number of top-level administrative positions were
gradually opened to Indonesians. (Again it was only on Java, and to a much
lesser extent on Sumatra, that the Japanese made these concessions to
Indonesian nationalism; in the areas administered by the navy the lid was
clamped tight until almost the very end.) Although these positions remained
usually under close Japanese supervision and always under ultimate Japanese
control, they were important in generating a feeling of self-confidence among
the Indonesian elite, a belief in their ability to handle the key positions
previously held by Dutch officials.
Expectation of an Allied attack also brought the Japanese to establish an
auxiliary army, a lightly armed militia known as the Peta, numbering some
120,000 men by mid-1945. It was this Japanese-trained, but Indonesian
officered, militia which was to provide the principal military force behind the
revolution, both in its early stages, when ironically it turned on the Japanese
troops and fought them, and later when it fought British and subsequently
Dutch forces. In addition, the Japanese gave a very limited military training—
but no arms—and the function of security guards to a considerable number of
village and urban youth; when the Peta later as a revolutionary army expanded
its ranks, it was able to draw on this source.
In March 1945 the Japanese appointed a committee of some 60
Indonesians, most of them prominent, representing the principal social and
ethnic groups of Java and Madura, and 7 Japanese to work out plans for the
political and economic organization of an independent Indonesia. At meetings
in May and July its members reached agreement on a set of broad national
political principles. The Indonesians appear to have dominated these
discussions, the Japanese members, for whatever reasons, taking relatively
modest parts. The major role was played by Soekarno; much of the discussion
was between him and certain Islamic leaders who wished the principles to
have a more strongly Islamic cast than he believed was consistent with that
religion's relatively undogmatic character in most of Indonesia and with the
fact that the country had important non-Islamic minorities. Soekarno
prevailed, and the set of five principles, Pant jasila, finally adopted —through
a compromise between differing views held by the committee members—was
a synthesis wherein his own thinking was dominant. In fact the Pantjasila was
Soekarno's own statement made in an off-the-cuff speech (and recorded
stenographically) toward the end of the meeting wherein he presented his own
ideological synthesis in an effort to bridge his position and that of the more
doctrinaire Islamic leaders while changing his own views as little as possible
in the process.
The Pantjasila, although vague and not fully acceptable to some nominally
Islamic Western-educated Indonesians as well as some prominent Islamic
leaders, was to become the nearest approach to an official Indonesian national
philosophy. The Five Principles in the order then presented by Soekarno were
nationalism, internationalism (or humanitarianism), representative
government, social justice, and belief in God in a context of religious freedom.
His nationalism had a geopolitical element and defined the Indonesian nation
as covering "the entire archipelago of Indonesia from the northern tip of
Sumatra to Papua." It was not, however, to be chauvinistic, but was to har-
monize with other nationalisms to form an international community, "one
family of all nations," wherein each member would maintain his national
identity. Representative government would incorporate the Islamic principle
of consultation, and the envisaged house of representatives would provide
Muslims with ample opportunity for working toward an Islamic political order
while at the same time giving adherents of other religions an equal chance to
advance their own ideas. But representative government would mean little if
not under-girded by social justice. In America and the countries of Western
Europe, Soekarno argued, "the capitalists are in control," and in them political
democracy is unaccompanied by economic democracy. "Political democracy,"
he stated, citing the French revisionist socialist Jean Jaures, does not ensure
"economic democracy." If social justice was to be secured for the Indonesian
people, both kinds of democracy would be necessary; "if we are seeking
democracy, the need is not for the democracy of the West, but for . .. politico-
economic democracy."
Late in July 1945 the Japanese command on Sumatra provided for the
establishment of a roughly similar committee to make preparations for
independence, but in the areas under its control the Japanese navy made no
such concession. Not until August 7, 1945, when Japan's Southeast Asia
headquarters ordered the establishment of an all-Indonesian Independence
Preparatory Committee, was it possible for Indonesian nationalists from the
navy-administered areas to come to Java to consult with Javanese and
Sumatran leaders. This committee, with Soekarno as chairman and
Mohammad Hatta as vice-chairman, was composed of 11 members from Java,
4 from Sumatra, 2 from Celebes, and 1 each representing the Lesser Sundas,
the Moluccas, and the Indonesian Chinese community. Its announced function
was to make preparations for transfer of governmental authority to it by the
Japanese.

The Revolutionary Struggle

Japan's surrender resulted in the sudden removal of the repressive
apparatus that had for so long held the Indonesian nationalist movement in
check. It found the Indonesian members of the Peta anti-Japanese as well as
anti-Dutch and equipped with the arms necessary to contest any reimposition
of outside control. When the Japanese commander in Java made clear that
rather than promote Indonesian independence he would obey the Allied orders
to maintain the status quo pending the take-over by Allied troops, Soekarno
and Hatta, urged on by the anti-Japanese underground organizations and
student groups, on August 17, 1945, proclaimed Indonesia's independence.
Some Japanese officers, stupefied by their country's sudden surrender,
acquiesced to the Indonesians' seizure of stocks of arms in their custody; but
others ordered their troops to resist the Peta and students. The scope and
tempo of this fighting quickly increased, with the Peta, reinforced by newly
armed student organizations, engaging in heavy fighting against Japanese
forces for control of key cities. The first phase of the Indonesian revolution
had begun. Sumatra followed Java's example, and in parts of that island, too,
fighting broke out between Indonesians and Japanese. This was not the
pattern, however, in Borneo, Celebes, the Lesser Sundas, or the Moluccas.
There the Japanese had not allowed Indonesian nationalists to Organize or to
form militias, and consequently they had little trouble in maintaining control
until Allied troops, generally Australian, took over. The Australians, not
confronted by any strong and active Indonesian nationalist organization with
which they felt obliged to come to terms, did not hesitate to reinstall Dutch
civil administrators promptly.
In Java and Sumatra the situation was very different. When the British,
the Allied troops assigned there, first landed in Java some six weeks after the
declaration of independence, they were amazed to find the newly born
Indonesian Republic a going organization, possessing an effective militia and
a functioning, if somewhat rudimentary, administration. Moreover, they soon
discovered that the Republican regimes on Java and Sumatra were solidly,
linked to and backed by the Indonesian masses. Although the Indonesians
were glad to have the British accept the surrender of Japanese troops and send
them home, they naturally could not agree with that part of the Allied mandate
which called for the British to turn over authority to the Dutch before pulling
out. Heavy fighting resulted. The British ultimately had to send Japanese
troops into battle to shore up an Indian division which except for its Ghurka
component had proved unreliable, several hundred Indians deserting to the
Indonesian side.
It rapidly became clear to the British that unless they were willing to bring
to Indonesia a greatly increased strength of soldiers and equipment they would
have to alter their policies and find some measure of common ground with the
leaders of the Indonesian revolution. Continuation of a military policy found
no backing at home, and the British soon began to deal with the Republic of
Indonesia as a de facto government. In addition they urged the Dutch, whose
troops they had meanwhile begun to shoehorn into some of the port areas they
held, to negotiate with the Republic so that a peaceful compromise might be
effected. Following the disarming and removal of the Japanese, Britain put
great pressure on the Netherlands to come to such an agreement, making it
clear that all British troops would leave Indonesia by November 1946.
Late in November, Netherlands and Republican authorities finally signed
an ambiguously worded document, the Linggadjati Agreement, which it was
hoped would avert the outbreak of war and meet the basic demands of both
parties. This provided for the protection of Dutch economic interests in
Indonesia and for Dutch recognition of the Republic's de facto authority over
Java and Sumatra. Ultimately the Republic was to be merged in an Indonesian
federation containing at least two other units—Borneo and "the Great East"
(Celebes, the Lesser Sundas, the Moluccas, and Western New Guinea). This
federal state would then co-operate with the Netherlands in establishing a
vaguely defined Netherlands-Indonesian Union to emerge at the beginning of
January 1949.2 During the ensuing eight months of relative peace the Dutch
consolidated their control over the islands outside of Java and Sumatra and
reinforced their troop strength in the Javan and Sumatran port cities turned
over to them by the retiring British. Dutch efforts to reassert political control
over Indonesia followed two courses: first, an attempt to destroy the Republic
and its armed forces by military means and, second, a politics of divide-and-
rule calculated to isolate the Republic from other areas of Indonesia and create
a political system—a so-called federal order—wherein pro-Republican
elements would be smothered, or at least decisively outvoted, by
representatives from a congeries of some fifteen Dutch- sponsored and Dutch-
controlled component states.3 But successful prosecution of their tactics of
indirect rule, however refined and skillful, was ultimately dependent upon the
other prong of their strategy, a decisive and crushing military victory over the
forces of the Republic —an objective they were to find unobtainable.
In July 1947 the Dutch charged the Republic with violating the
'For a full account of the Linggadjati negotiations and an analysis of the agree-
ment see Charles Wolf, Jr., The Indonesian Story (New York: John Day', 1948).
'For an account of the strategy and tactics employed by the Dutch see Kahin,
Nationalism and Revolution, pp. 351-390.

Linggadjati Agreement, refused to abide by its arbitration clause, and

launched an all-out attack. After their forces had overrun the Republic's richest
districts in Java and Sumatra, they were induced by the United Nations to halt
further advance and to sign in January 1947 another military truce and
political agreement with the Republic, the Renville Agreement. In essence this
gave the Dutch temporary control of the areas they had penetrated in return for
their pledge to hold a UN- sponsored plebescite in them to determine whether
or not their populations wished to be governed by the Republic. It was very
clear that in any such plebescite an overwhelming majority would declare for
the Republic, and the Dutch never held one. Instead, and likewise in
contravention of the Renville Agreement, in these disputed areas they
energetically set about to sponsor and build up amenable puppet or
semipuppet states such as they had already begun establishing in Borneo and
Celebes.
Into the truncated territory left the Republic on Java, a deficit food area,
fled approximately a million refugees from those parts Dutch forces had
entered. A tight Dutch blockade, extending even to medical supplies and quite
in violation of the Renville Agreement, made living conditions extremely
harsh. Because of this and because Indonesian leaders saw the United States
and the European democracies unwilling to take effective measures to bring
the Netherlands to live up to its commitments under the agreement (while they
for the time being regarded Soviet Russia as supporting the Republic), the pro-
Communist minority inside the Republic grew in numbers and influence. The
Stalinist Communists were emboldened and, apparently responding to the new
international line, laid plans for taking over the government and ousting
Soekarno and the cabinet headed by Ilatta. Their preparations were only
partially completed when their effort was prematurely triggered by second-
echelon Communist leaders operating from the central Java city of Madiun.
After bitter fighting extending from mid- September through mid-November
1948, the Republic's army (the large majority of its units remaining loyal)
suppressed the rebellion.'
Just six weeks later, in defiance of the UN-sponsored Renville Agree-
ment, the Netherlands launched an all-out military campaign against the
Republic's weakened forces. But Indonesian resistance was determined and
sustained, and by the late spring of 1949 it was clear
' An account of the Madiun rebellion and its background can be found in Kahin, Nationalism
and Revolution, pp. 256-303.

that the Dutch could not marshal sufficient military strength in Indonesia
to enforce a political decision through military power. It was likewise clear
that any prolongation of their costly military effort would result in an even
more widespread destruction of the Netherlands' 2-billion-dollar investment in
Indonesia and he a continuing heavy drain on its manpower and wealth at
home. As Dutch holdings were increasingly exposed to the Republic's
scorched-earth policy, more and more Dutch businessmen joined liberal
elements in the Netherlands long committed to the idea of Indonesian
independence. This in conjunction with powerful adverse world opinion,
including substantial pressure from the United States, finally brought the
Netherlands government to come to terms with the realities of Indonesian
nationalism. At the Round Table Conference held at The Hague during the late
summer of 1949 a settlement was reached which ended the hostilities and
provided for Indonesia's full independence. In essence the Dutch exchanged
their claim to sovereignty over all Indonesia except Western New Ciiinca
(with the proviso that its status he decided during the coming year on the basis
of negotiations between Indonesia and the Netherlands) for the preservation of
their economic stake in Indonesia and a shipping agreement and a debt
settlement distinctly favorable to the Netherlands, Indonesia being saddled
with nearly $1,130,000,000 of the colonial regime's obligations, much of
which had been incurred since 1945 in financing the effort to suppress the
Republic.

Effect of the Revolution on Indonesian Government

The circumstances attending Indonesia's long and difficult struggle for
independence decisively shaped the nature of its government. The political
institutions forged during the heat of nearly five years of revolution were
developed under unique conditions, quite different from those obtaining after
independence. By its very nature the revolutionary struggle exerted powerful
centripetal pressures which greatly eased the tasks of government. The
necessity for Indonesians to stand shoulder to shoulder against a common
enemy induced a consciousness of common political purpose and a political
integration, at the same time enhancing the individual's willingness to sacrifice
for the common good. The Republic was able to wage a war against tre-
mendous odds for more than four years on a printing-press currency backed by
nothing more than the symbols of nationalism and independence. Thus during
the long period of struggle there was no great pressure to provide formulas of
political organization calculated to satisfy regional sentiments.
The character of the revolutionary Republic's political institutions,
institutions which were to have a profound influence upon postrevolutionary
Indonesian government, was also strongly affected by the struggle for power
within the ranks of revolutionists.` And to some extent it was influenced by a
belief (which reinforced the position of certain leaders) that Indonesia's
bargaining position against the Dutch in the forum of world opinion would be
stronger if it had a government which was rid of any important residue of the
Japanese occupation and any suggestion of fascist orientation.
The course of the revolution also influenced ideological outlook. The
attraction of Indonesians to socialist ideas was reinforced by the leveling
process which the revolution visited upon a society that even before had few
valleys and peaks. For many, disappointment with both the United States and
Soviet Russia—from whom they had hoped for greater support against the
Dutch—and the conviction that their four- year struggle for independence was
won primarily by their own efforts and the heavy sacrifices of their own
people lessened the attraction of either the American or the Soviet system and
reinforced their inclination to work out uniquely Indonesian governmental
institutions. In addition this disillusionment with the two great powers tended
to induce an even stronger determination than is found among most ex-
colonials to follow an international course aligned with neither.
At its first meeting on August 18, 1945, the 21-member Independence
Preparatory Committee added 6 people to its membership, including the
commander of the Jakarta Peta garrison and 3 members of one of the anti-
Japanese underground organizations. It then elected Soekarno and Hatta
respectively President and Vice-President of the newly proclaimed Republic
of Indonesia and appointed a commission of 7, including these two leaders, to
make a final draft of a national constitution, a document already largely
written during the last month prior to the Japanese capitulation. Within a week
this work was completed and the constitution promulgated. Though considered
definitely provisional, it was not replaced until the end of 1949.
The 1945 constitution described a political order somewhat like the
American. The center of power was to be lodged with a President
An account of the internal politics of the revolution in this early, formative period can
be found in Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution, pp. 147-212.

assisted by an appointed cabinet directly responsible to him. In addition to

holding executive powers the President would share legislative power with an
elected Congress. The major departure from the American system was the
provision for a sort of periodical constitutional convention to he known as the
Consultative Assembly, a large elected body to meet every five years which
would elect the President and Vice-President and initially formulate the
definitive constitution, in later meetings amending it if necessary and
determining the broad lines of general governmental policy. There was also
provision for a High Advisory Council, whose composition was to be defined
by law and which was to advise and provide information requested by the
President and have the right to submit proposals to the government.
Although the 1945 constitution envisaged three major lodgments of power
—an elected Consultative Assembly, the presidency, and an elected Chamber
of Representatives—the circumstances of the revolution never allowed
sufficient opportunity to hold the national elections which were the necessary
antecedents for creation of the Consultative Assembly and the Chamber of
Representatives. Only the Transitional Provisions of the 1945 constitution
were in an operational sense of importance. These stipulated that until the
formation of the two elected bodies all state powers would he exercised by the
President assisted by a central national committee which would have a purely
advisory function. Thus on August 29 Sockarno dissolved the Independence
Preparatory Committee and in its place established the Komite Nasional
Indonesia Pusat (Central Indonesian National Committee). or KNIP as it came
to be known. Assisted in his selections by Matta, he appointed 135 members
to the new body, including those of the dissolved Independence Preparatory
Committee. Those selected were considered to be outstanding Indonesian
nationalists and the most important leaders of the principal ethnic, religious,
social, and economic groups in Indonesia; few could be classified as amenable
political stooges. A cabinet directly responsible to the President was
appointed, for the most part made up of those Indonesians who had served as
department heads under the Japanese during the last months of their rule. Thus
the government established at the outset of the Indonesian revolution was one
in which power was largely concentrated in the presidency.
This system lasted for only two and a half months, until November 15,
1945. Widespread opposition to its concentration of power soon emerged, a
large part of the criticism being equally concerned with the survivals of
Japanese rule evidenced by the cabinet's membership. Much of the pushing
power behind the revolution came from the armed youth organizations, whose
members were deeply affected by the ideas of the leaders of the major anti-
Japanese undergrounds, in particular by Soetan Sjahrir and Amir Sjarifuddin.
These youth groups along with a large minority of the KNIP accused several
key members of Soekarno's cabinet of being close to the Japanese in their
thinking and of possessing what they termed "fascist mentalities." They were
disturbed that these men were in control of key sectors of government and in
positions to exert substantial influence on the course of policy. And, although
the majority were reconciled to Soekarno's assumption of the principal post of
leadership in the revolution, they opposed his exercising the overwhelming
and unrestrained power called for in the transitional regulations of the
constitution.
In response to this powerful sentiment, on October 7, 1945, 50 members
of the KNIP presented a petition to Soekarno urging that legislative authority
be shared by the President with the thus far advisory KNIP. Cognizant of the
strong backing of this element and fearful of the challenge from a third group
headed by the nati(malist-Communist leader Tan Malaka, Soekarno gave in to
this demand (undoubtedly with Hatta urging him to do so). Thereby he
strengthened his ties with the Sjahrir and Sjarifuddin groups and those who
shared their dislike of some of the high officials left in office 1w the Japanese.
On October 16, 1945, a presidential decree, signed by Vice-President Hatta,
provided that pending the establishment of the Consultative Assembly and
Chamber of Representatives called for in the constitution the KNIP would be
vested with their legislative authority, thereby sharing legislative power with
the President. All legislation now had to be approved by the KNIP as well as
by the President, with the KNIP having the same right as he to introduce
legislation. The decree also stipulated, as had been requested in the petition,
that the KN1P delegate its powers to a small permanently sitting
representative body known as the Working Committee (Badan Pekerdja)
which was to be composed of members of the infrequently convoked parent
body (the KNIP) and responsible to it." Although the KNIP was required to
convene a minimum of only once a year, the Working Committee was to meet
at least every ten days. The KNIP elected the two men who had been the
principal leaders of the anti-Japanese underground-
° The term Working Committee was one derived from the Indian National Congress, whose
history most Indonesian nationalists knew.

Sjahrir and Sjarifuddin—respectively as chairman and vice-chairman of

the newly established Working Committee. They accepted their posts on
condition that they be empowered to select its other 13 members, a demand
which the KNIP granted. Thereupon the Working Committee became a key
factor in the Republic's government, exercising to the full its colegislative
powers and under Sjahrir overshadowing both President and cabinet.
At the end of October 1945, Sjahrir published a small booklet, Our
Struggle (Perdjuangan Kita), which had great impact upon the thinking of
politically active Indonesians, especially those who remained dissatisfied with
the still substantial power in the hands of the cabinet and regarded its members
as too close to the Japanese in their thinking. Sjahrir strongly castigated what
he described as the fascist and opportunistic mentality of many members of
the government, both in the cabinet and in the upper level of the bureaucracy.
He warned that these men might lead the government in the direction of fascist
totalitarianism and jingoist nationalism and called for their prompt removal
from office. There was a heavy rallying behind him; those who had earlier
called for the President's sharing power with the KNIP now demanded that the
cabinet be responsible to the KNIP rather than to the President. The positions
of those in the cabinet and in the bureaucracy who owed their posts to the
Japanese were seriously weakened, arid although Soekarno had not been
included in the attack, there is no doubt that it temporarily decreased his
political stature. Sjahrir's position was further strengthened because of the
feeling among a number of influential Indonesians that a government required
to deal with the victorious Allies ought to show as little residual Japanese
influence as possible.
Thus on November 11 the Working Committee called for the introduction
of cabinet responsibility to parliament, that is, to the KNIT. Sockarno and
Hatta promptly accepted this proposal, dismissing the old cabinet and opening
the way for establishment on November 14, 1945, of a new cabinet headed by
Sjahrir, one no longer under the authority of the President and responsible
only to the representative body of the government. With the Working
Committee (now under a new chairman and vice-chairman) still serving as
deputy of the KNIP during the long periods between its meetings, the cabinet
in effect became responsible to the Working Committee. Although not
specifically spelled out at this time, it was expected that should a difference
arise between cabinet and Working Committee the matter would be referred
for resolution to the KNIP. In practice all disagreements which arose were
resolved between them without either making an appeal to the KNIP.' The
Working Committee never challenged the cabinet's assumption of the major
executive role, but it reserved the right to scrutinize closely its discharge of
that power through a frequently employed right of interpolation. In the
legislative field the Working Committee came close to being the cabinet's
peer. By mid-1948 out of the 98 legislative acts passed during its existence, it
had itself initiated 15. During the year's span between the KNIP meetings of
March 4, 1946, and February 17, 1947, it rejected 10 and passed 20 of the bills
which had been approved by cabinet and President, adding its own
amendments to many. One reason for the positive and efficient role played by
the Working Committee was its small size. Until March 1947 its membership
did not exceed 24, and thereafter it was increased to only 45. This made
possible discussion along traditional Indonesian lines, that is, discussion
resulting in a conclusion based upon the broad consensus of the group as a
whole rather than one based upon majority vote. \\'hereas the KNIP, had it
been disposed to be an active legislative body, was much too large for
discussion and decision making along traditional Indonesian lines, the
Working Committee was of optimal size and usually followed this process in
arriving at its most important decisions. Another reason for the Working
Committee's efficiency was its members' freedom from close connection with
political parties and their usual tendency to view issues apart from party
considerations, showing themselves in most cases to be above party in their
conduct'
' No clear agreement ever emerged as to what would happen if the cabinet in the face of
a disagreement with the Working Committee refused to accept a KNIP judgment hacking up the
Working Committee. It was the position of Mr. Assam, chairman of both the KNIP and the
Working Committee, that should "a serious conflict arise between the KNIP and the cabinet
where the President is convinced that the KNIP no longer represents the people, he may
dissolve the KNIP and establish a new one which is more representative"; he argued,
however, that should there he a continuation of the disagreement between the cabinet and the
new KNIP, the President would he required to dissolve the cabinet rather than the new
KNIP (Hukum Tata Negara [Constitutional Law; Jogjakarta, 1947], p. 33).
Not only was the original nucleus of the Working Committee appointed before the
formation of most of the political parties, but in addition its membership was originally selected
as being representative of "political trends, communal groups, or the provinces" rather than of
parties. Thus during 1946-1947 out of a membership of 25, 8 members had been elected as
representing the 8 provinces of Indonesia, 1 the Chinese community, 1 the Christian element, 4
"the national democratic trend," 2 the Mohammedan trend, with the remaining 9 regarded as
representing the "workers, peasants, socialists, the youth movement, and the women's
 During its month's operation under Sjahrir's chairmanship (October 16,
1945—November 12, 1945) prior to the establishment of cabinet
responsibility to parliament, the Working Committee had called for the
creation of a diversity of political parties. It took this important measure
largely to obviate the possible growth of a totalitarian political order —one of
the reasons which had prompted it to demand that the KN1P be transformed
into a body with legislative authority and which later brought it to demand that
the cabinet be responsible to the KNIP rather than the President. The Working
Committee was particularly concerned lest a monolithic party organization be
created wherein those who had worked with the Japanese would exercise
control because of their still dominant position throughout most of the
bureaucracy.° It was to preclude this and ensure that these elements would be
politically undercut that the Working Committee on October 30, 1945, called
for the formation of several political parties reflecting various trends of
opinion. This position was promptly endorsed by the cabinet and President in
a government regulation of November 3 which noted that "if democratic
principles are to be observed it is not permissible that only one party should be
allowed to function." There followed a rapid establishment of parties, and
those who had hoped to form a single national party were never again to have
a favorable opportunity. While parties proliferated, they did not develop real
roots in the population; for national elections, although repeatedly scheduled,
were not held during the revolutionary period. The impact of the parties on the
political scene was not immediate. But whereas in the formation of his first
cabinet (November 14, 1945—March 12, 1946) Sjahrir was able to disregard
them completely, in forming his third and last cabinet (October 2, 1946—July
3, 1947) he was obliged to meet them half way in their demand for cabinet
representation.
Although it is true that during the four-year revolutionary period the
principal legislative and executive roles were played by the Working
Committee and the cabinet, one should not minimize the importance of the
presidency. Sockarno and Matta appear to have participated in
movement." Although at a later date most members of the Working Committee established
party affiliations, even then their work on the committee usually gave little evidence of party
considerations.
" An abortive move to establish such a party had been made on August 22, 1945, when the
Independence Preparatory Committee had decided on the formation of a single national
party. Ten days later this decision was withdrawn and the proposal shelved, but there was
considerable expectation that it might be reactivated.
 all major governmental decisions, and as far as can be ascertained, none
was ever taken to which they were strongly opposed. Promulgation of any law
or decree was regarded as requiring the signature of either the President or the
Vice-President, and it was Soekarno's position that signing was no mere
formality but an indication of presidential approval which he had the right to
withhold when he was in disagreement. Thus to the writer lie stated:
"Theoretically 1 can veto any law of parliament. However, I have never done
so, because my system was to keep in very close contact with Assaat
[chairman of both the Working Committee and the KNIPI and to influence the
Working Committee. Agreements were worked out ahead of time, and thus
collisions between presidency and Working Committee were avoided.- 10 The
fact that both President and Vice-President generally acted in close concert
during this period helped ensure that their views would usually diverge little
from those held by the cabinet and the Working Committee. For in the process
of finding common ground between themselves the two leaders were likely to
be that much closer to the views of these other two organs of government. On
only one occasion did differences come to a head. This occurred at the end of
1946, with the President's assuming in rather dramatic fashion his prerogative
for appointing members to the KNIP. It was primarily in order to get that body
to ratify the Linggadjati Agreement and provide for peaceful negotiations with
the Netherlands that Soekarno, backed by both Matt and Sjahrir's cabinet,
decreed that the KNIP be expanded in membership from 200 to 514 members.
The Working Committee challenged this measure, and the issue was therefore
referred to the Working Committee's parent body, the KNIP, for resolution.
Meeting in full session in February of 1947 the KNIP was initially inclined to
support the Working Committee and finally was only dissuaded from doing so
by a vigorous speech of Vice-President Hatta wherein he made clear that he
and Soekarno would resign if defeated on this issue."
F Muntok, Bangka, May 4, 1949.
" It was the position of Mr. Assaat, chairman of the KNIP, that this event tended to fix
the general principle ( never again tested ) that whenever on a matter of presidential
prerogative the President was opposed by the KNIP he and the Vice-President would be
obliged to resign, the KNIP then electing a new President and Vice-President. Although there
was no clear agreement as to what powers were included in the sphere of presidential
prerogative, there was a considerable and influential body of opinion which held that in
addition to the power of appointing the membership of the KNIP it also included—though
probably most would have argued subject to subsequent KNIP ratification—declaration of a state of
emergency, initiation and promulgation of ordinances during such a period, decla-
 Soekarno, in addressing this session of the KNIP, stated that in his
opinion, pending elections which would determine the composition of the
representative bodies of the state, "it is the task of the President himself to
nominate and appoint members because of the fact that the President himself
is regarded as the representative of the whole people." Even then his views
concerning the proper qualities of a representative body foreshadowed the
controversial position which he was to take in 1957; he held that the KNIP
should incorporate members of occupational groups, the regions, the principal
non-Indonesian minorities, the armed organizations, as well as of the political
parties. In the enlarged KNIP the parties actually held only 222 out of 514
seats as against a previous 129 out of 200, and the appointments reflected
Sockarno's view that a party's representation should be determined not merely
by the number of its members, but also by its degree of organization and
integration. Thus while acknowledging that the major Islamic party, time
Masjumi, enrolled several times as many members as either time Socialist,
Labor, or Communist parties, he held that nevertheless because of greater
integration and superior organization these last three were entitled to 35 seats
each in the KNIP as against 60 for the Masjumi.'' This same philosophy was
reflected in the composition of the Republic's high Advisory Council, one of
the few organs of government provided for in the 1945 constitution which
functioned as described. Its membership of 10 to 19 members, selected by
Soekarno in consultation with Hatta, related only incidentally to party and
embraced distinguished regional leaders as well as individuals representing
important religious and ethnic groups.'" Its importance as an advisory body to
the President was assured by the KNIP's early relinquishment of this function.
Although the Working
ration of war, the making of peace, and conclusion of treaties. Assaat believed, however,
that there was a general consensus that unless the point of difference between President and
KN1P was vital to the country and the President irrevocably committed to his action (e.g.,
signing of a treaty with the Netherlands which the KN1P rejected ) he would, once the
difference was apparent, generally be prepared to yield to the KNIP and consequently remain
in office (discussion with the writer, Jogjakarta, September 17, 1948).
Conversation of the writer with President Soekarno, Jogjakarta, December 12, 1948.
Soekarno stated that in determining party strength he consulted with Hatta after having
received reports from local officials giving estimates of party strength within their areas.
" An original membership of 10 (1 a woman) was expanded to 19 in April 1948,
when it included 8 representatives from outside Java ( 3 being Sumatrans), 1 Chinese, and 1
Eurasian. At the end of 1949 its membership stood at 13.
 Committee repeatedly sought to have the Council abolished, regarding it
as undemocratic, Soekarno found it useful and successfully contested such
efforts.
In times of acute crisis when for one reason or another the cabinet could
not function effectively, plenary emergency powers were exercised by the
President. It was, however, never clear to what extent the decision to vest the
President with them was a prerogative of the President or lay within the
competence of cabinet and/or Working Committee." During the revolutionary
period there were three such occasions, each brief. The first was from June 29
to October 2, 1946, being precipitated by the kidnaping of Prime Minister
Sjahrir during an unsuccessful coup d'ctat led by Tan Malaka. Soekarno
assumed full powers on the basis of his own decree, surrendering them follow-
ing the coup's suppression and Sjahrir's formation of a new and broader
cabinet. (in this case the rump cabinet had urged Soekarno to issue the decree,
and following its promulgation the Working Committee concurred.) The
second instance was from June 27 to July 3, 1947, in connection with the
critical situation arising from the deadlock in negotiations with the Dutch,
Sjahrir having urged concessions which went further than the rest of the
government were initially prepared to go. By presidential decree, ratified by
the Working Committee the following day, full powers were again assumed by
Soekarno pending the formation of a new cabinet a week later with Sjarifuddin
as Prime Minister. The third instance occurred as a consequence of the Com-
munists' Madiun rebellion and lasted from September 15, 1948, to December
15, 1948. In this case the cabinet with the concurrence of the Working
Committee passed an act vesting President Soekarno with full emergency
powers.
The relative efficiency and quality of Indonesia's government during the
revolutionary period may be explained in part at least by three important
factors. One was the previously noted solidarity induced by the common
struggle against the Dutch. A second was the generally smooth working
relationship between the government's representative body and the cabinet, a
situation which was not to obtain during most
"See A. K. Pringgodigdo, The Office of President in Indonesia as Defined in the Three
Constitutions in Theory and Practice (Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, Translation Series; Ithaca,
N.Y., 1957), pp. 15-16. Soekarno's own position was clear. To the present writer he stated: "I
have the right to declare a state of emergency, during which I can govern by decree, and to do
so I clo not need consent of parliament, though of course I would always talk it over with the
ministers beforehand" (Muntok, Bangka, May 4, 1949).
 of the postrevolutionary period. In practice the cabinet had to deal only
with the Working Committee of the representative body (KNIP) and for all
practical purposes was responsible only to it. With the Working Committee
composed of a small group of competent men, it was reasonably easy for them
to reach agreement in a short time. Thus the cabinet could generally count
upon the Working Committee's knowing its own mind and reaching a decision
fairly quickly, qualities which were much more difficult to develop in the
large, heterogeneous, and loosely organized KNIP and which were to prove
equally difficult to achieve in the postrevolutionary parliament. Moreover, the
size and quality of the Working Committee's membership meant that
discussion, informal as well as formal, between it and cabinet members could
yield mutual understanding, common ground, and filially agreement relatively
quickly. Such rapport would not have been possible had the cabinet been
obliged to deal directly with the KNIP, and it was not to prove possible
between cabinet and parliament in the postrevolutionary period when the
intermediary Working Committee had been abolished.
A third reason for the relative effectiveness of government in the
revolutionary period lay in the generally harmonious relationship between
President and Vice-President. The policies emanating from the presidency
were moderated by the fact that such co-operation implied a degree of
compromise between the views of these two men. In addition, when during the
last two years of the revolutionary period the hardening of party lines made it
increasingly difficult in times of crisis to form cabinets based upon a
parliamentary majority, this harmony ensured that emergency, transitional
-presidential cabinets" could be formed with Vice-President Ilatta acting as
Prime Minister. The composition of such cabinets did not become a question
of bargaining between the various political parties, the key post being held by
a man of great prestige who stood above party, and it was generally believed
that a cabinet so established could not be forced to resign by a vote of
nonconfidence in the KNIP. During periods of crisis two such cabinets were
formed. The first was established following the Renville Agreement on
January 29, 194S, in order to ensure that the Republic undertake the unpopular
task of implementing it and endured until August 4, 1949. It was not based
upon a party coalition commanding a majority in parliament, although the
major parties were represented in it, and Hatta conducted his government in a
way which in fact ensured consistent majority support. The second, essentially
a reshuffle of the first, lasted from August 4, 1949, to December 20, 1949, and
was created under Hatta's leadership to set the stage for the final negotiations
with the Dutch at The Hague. It should be reiterated that the possibility of
establishing such presidential cabinets was dependent upon a reasonably
harmonious relationship between Matt and Suekarno, a harmony which was to
decrease rapidly after 1950 and give place to a complete rupture by 1956.

Government in Sumatra and in the Dutch-controlled Areas

During the first two rears of the Republic's existence, that is, until the first
Dutch military campaign of July 1947, its authority extended to all of Java and
Sumatra except for a few enclaves embracing those major ports held first by
the British and later by the Dutch. In the remainder of Indonesia, it will be
recalled, the Dutch were enabled to take over with very little trouble. Although
most politically conscious Indonesians in Borneo, Celebes, the Lesser Sundas,
and the Moluccas were strongly pro-Republican, the Dutch were able to put
down their few efforts at armed resistance with relative ease. The central
government of the Republic, with its capital during most of this period at
Jogjakarta in central Java, certainly spoke for that large majority of
Indonesians on Java and Sumatra ( well over four-fifths of Indonesia's
population ), but its relationship with Java was much closer than with Sumatra.
The Netherlands navy and air force so effectively controlled communications
between the two islands that only rarely were the Republic's officials able to
run their blockade. Following the military campaigns of the summer of 19-17,
wherein approximately one-half of Java and about a quarter of Sumatra
(including almost every important port) were overrun by Dutch troops, the
problem of communication became even more difficult. Thus, although during
the revolutionary period the top administrative posts in Sumatra were held by
officials appointed or endorsed by the central government of the Republic and
though many of its major policies were followed insofar as possible by the
Sumatran Republican administrations, of necessity these administrations were
highly autonomous." Financially they
" This autonomy had been recognized by a central government decree of 1945, providing
that the province be administered by a governor appointed by the cen tral Republican
government and assisted by a locally selected Sumatran national committee (KNI ). Actually
this legislation merely formalized the existing situa tion. Until the beginning of April 1948
the only contact between Sumatra and the Republican government on Java was by radio, and
not until then were cabinet ministers of the Republic's government able to reach the island.
This mission,

were completely independent of the central government, printing their

own currencies, usually tying them to the Straits dollar. The Republic's armed
forces in Sumatra were obliged to finance themselves, often quite
independently of the local civil administrations, and to rely primarily upon the
local Indonesian population for food and supplies)" Thus during the course of
the revolution the several regions of Sumatra by and large governed
themselves through their own highly autonomous Republican administrations,
operating only under broad directives from the central government and doing
so only to the extent that they regarded this as feasible. They fended for
themselves militarily against the Dutch, financed themselves, and undertook
directly the local measures which they deemed necessary for their economic
and social wellbeing.
Nleanwhile in the substantial areas controlled by the Netherlands outside
of Java and Sumatra, and after mid-1947 in those parts of these two islands
which its army had overrun, the Dutch endeavored to establish a new political
order of their own. By early 1949 they had created in these areas fifteen so-
called "states" which were represented to time outside world as being run by
local Indonesians and possessing a high degree of self-government. Although
elaborate governmental facades were set up, in every case the outwardly
Indonesian regime was controlled tightly and effectively by the Dutch colonial
adminis-
headed hr two Stun:am-born leaders—Amir Sjarifuddin, Minister of Defense, and NIoliammad
Natsir, Minister of Information—succeeded in partially reorganizing Suintara's administration,
establish in g it network of Local national committees and a Sumatran central national
committee. It was, however, able to reinforce only slightly the meager authority of the
Repulthe's governor on Sumatra, Tengku Hasan. Upon the initiative of Nlohammad Ilatta a
second reorganization was effected under central government legislation of July 10, 1948.
This divided Sumatra into three separate provinces—North, Central, and Smith Sumatra—and
dissolved the existing all-Sumatra KNI, establishing in its place three such bodies, one for each
province. Heading each of the provinces was a state commissioner (a local leader of
considerable political stature) appointed by the central government. Each was charged with
representing logjakarta (the central government) in his province and ensuring as much co-
ordination as was feasible between his administration and the major directives of the central
government. Another mission sent to Sumatra in 1948 and headed by the Republic's Minister
of Economic Affairs, Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, was able to establish some rather slender finan -
cial ties between Jogjakarta and the Sumatran areas which resulted in the central government's
receiving some benefit from the blockade-nmning barter trade b e tween certain Sumatran areas,
particularly Atjeh, and Singapore. All these efforts, however, bore limited results, and throughout
the revolution the autonomy of the Sumatran administrations remained very great.
"'They derived some additional income from "contributions" of Chinese mer chants in
return for protection and assistance in their lucrative smuggling trade with Singapore.
 tration. In those states created in former Republican territory following the
military campaign of mid-1947, Republican guerrilla units sometimes
controlled as much of the area as the Dutch; but in those set up outside of Java
and Sumatra, Netherlands military and police control was effective, and pro-
Republican elements were either jailed or induced to keep quiet because of the
overwhelming force which they confronted. In some of these areas the Dutch
were able to win the support of a small minority which foresaw that under the
Republic its aristocratic status and semifeudal privileges would be lost. And in
almost every case there were a few political opportunists from other walks of
life willing to collaborate in a positive sense in order to benefit from the
financial remuneration, the automobiles, and the other things that the Dutch
made available to them. Other Indonesians grudgingly co-operated in order to
secure a living for their families, but remained pro-Republican at heart. The
overwhelming majority of the Indonesian populations of these Netherlands-
sponsored states were, however, opposed to the regimes with which they were
saddled and looked wistfully to those areas of Java and Sumatra still able to
hold out against the Dutch, regarding them as champions of their own cause.
It should be noted, then, that throughout the long period of the revolution
only on Sumatra and Java, and after the middle of 1947 only in parts of these
islands, were the Indonesian people administratively linked to the Republic.
And only on Java itself ( only half of Java after mid-1947) were they
effectively incorporated into its government. Thus the major part of the
Indonesian archipelago went through the more than four years of the
revolution either as highly autonomous units with ties more psychological than
substantive connecting them with the Republic's central government (as on
Sumatra), or as units completely separated from it and under Netherlands con-
trol. The desire for independence and common opposition to the Dutch rallied
all these areas and ensured a psychological unity throughout the revolution,
one demanding a united and fully independent Indonesia. But this
psychological bond was a mixture of positive and negative elements. True, it
was to an important extent based upon an increasing sense of national identity
and the belief that independence would open the way to a better life. At the
same time, however, it was activated by the powerful negative dynamic of
opposition to colonial rule—a component of Indonesian nationalism which
was to lose much of its strength as a force for national cohesion once
independence had been won.