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US Vs Barrias 11 Phil 327

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US vs Barrias 11 Phil 327

FACTS: Defendant Aniceto Barrias was charged in CFI with violations of par. 70 and 83 of Circular no.
397. Paragraph 70 of Circular No. 397 reads as follows: No heavily loaded casco, lighter, or other similar
craft shall be permitted to move in the Pasig River without being towed by steam or moved by other
adequate power.Paragraph 83 reads, in part, as follows:For the violation of any part of the foregoing
regulations, the persons offending shall be liable to a fine of not less than P5 and not more than P500, in
the discretion of the court.

Counsel for the appellant attacked the validity of paragraph 70 on two grounds: First that it is
unauthorized by section 19 of Act No. 355; and, second, that if the acts of the Philippine Commission
bear the interpretation of authorizing the Collector to promulgate such a law, they are void, as constituting
an illegal delegation of legislative power.

The complaint in this instance was framed with reference to sections 311 and 319 [19 and 311] at No. 355
of the Philippine Customs Administrative Acts, as amended by Act Nos. 1235 and 1480. Under Act No.
1235, the Collector is not only empowered to make suitable regulations, but also to "fix penalties for
violation thereof,"not exceeding a fine of P500.

ISSUE: WON Collector of Customs can fix the penalty of a law?

HELD: The answer is in the Negative. Although the Collector of Customs can make and publish rules and
regulations but it cannot make the duty of the legislature to fix the penalty of a certain law. It is in this
case that it will be an illegal delegation of power. One of the settled maxims in constitutional law is, that
the power conferred upon the legislature to make laws can not be delegated by that department to any
body or authority. Where the sovereign power of the State has located the authority, there it must remain
only by the constitutional agency alone the laws must be made until the constitution itself is changed.
This doctrine is based on the ethical principle that such a delegated power constitutes not only a right but
a duty to be performed by the delegate by the instrumentality of his own judgment acting immediately
upon the matter of legislation and not through the intervening mind of another.

CARINO Vs CAPULONG 222 SCRA 593

FACTS : On 6 July 1990, AMA filed with the RTC of Manila, Branch 18, a petition for
prohibition,certiorari and mandamus against the Hon. Isidro Carino, DEC's Secretary and Atty. Venancio
R. Nava, Regional Director, Department of Education, Culture and Sports, Region IX to annul and set
aside the closure order and to enjoin the respondents from closing or padlocking AMACC, Davao City.
On 26 July 1990, the trial court dismissed the petition for lack of merit. Thereafter, AMA filed with the
Court of Appeals a petition forcer ti or ar i in assailing the 26 July order of the court a quo, but, again, the
Court of Appeals peremptorily dismissed the petition and also denied its motion for reconsideration.
Under the cloak of an organization of parents of students styling themselves as AMACC- PARENTS
Organization,

AMA filed another petition for prohibition and/or mandamus with preliminary injunction with the RTC of
Davao City, Branch 8, entitled "Freddie Retotal, Ricardo Fuentes, Calixta Holazo, Ursula Reyes, in their
own behalf and in behalf of the other members of AMACC Parents' Organization vs. Venancio Nava, in
his capacity as Regional Director, Department of Education, Culture and Sports."

On 7 August 1990, the court dismissed the petition.


AMA, however, in order to thwart the closure or padlocking of its school in Davao City, filed with the
RTC of Makati, Branch 134, presided over by respondent Judge, another petition for mandamus, with
damages, preliminary injunction and/or restraining order against Hon. Isidro Carino, Secretary and
Director, Department of Education, Culture and Sports, Region IX to compel the respondents to approve
petitioners' application for permit to operate retroactive to the commencement of school year 1990-1991,
and to enjoin the closure and/or padlocking of AMA-Davao school.

Petitioners, through the Office of the Solicitor General, moved to dismiss AMA's petition on the ground
that

(1) AMA is not entitled to the writ of mandamus as petitioners' authority to grant or deny the permit to
operate is discretionary and not ministerial;
(2) AMA failed to comply with the provisions of the Education Act;
(3) AMA is blatantly engaging in forum shopping;
(4) AMA failed to exhaust available administrative remedies before resorting to court; and
(5) lack of territorial jurisdiction over petitioner Regional Director and AMA-Davao.

On 15 November 1990, the respondent Judge issued an order directing the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing reasons, let a writ of preliminary injunction be issued, upon
filing of petitioners of a bond in the amount of P500,000.00, duly approved by this Court, enjoining and
restraining the respondent Hon. Isidro Carino, his agents, representatives and any person acting for and
his behalf, from implementing the closing and/or padlocking AMA Computer College, Inc. - Davao City
Branch, until further orders from this Court and on the following day, on 16 November 1990, issued the
writ of preliminary injunction.

ISSUE: WON the authority to grant permit by DECS to applicant educational institution is a ministerial
duty or discretionary duty?

HELD : The SC ruled that As a rule mandamus will lie only to compel an officer to perform a ministerial
duty but not a discretionary function. A ministerial duty is one which is so clear and specific as to leave
no room for the exercise of discretion in its performance. On the other hand, a discretionary duty is that
which by nature requires the exercise of judgment. As explained in the case of Symaco vs. Aquino, —

A purely ministerial act or duty to a discretional act, is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a
given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of legal authority, without regard
to or the exercise of his own judgment, upon the propriety of the act done. If the law imposes a duty upon
a public officer, and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is
ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of official discretion nor
judgment.

In the present case, the issuance of the permit in question is not a ministerial duty of the petitioners. It is a
discretionary duty or function on the part of the petitioners because it had to be exercised in accordance
with — and not in violation of — the law and its Implementing Rules and Regulations. Thus, as aptly
observed by the Solicitor General in his Motion to Dismiss the petition —

Establishment or recognition of private schools through government grant of permits is governed by law,
specifically Batas Pambansa Blg. 232. The authority to grant permit is vested upon the judgment of the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports, which prescribes the rules and regulations governing the
recognition on private schools (Section 27,Batas Pambansa Blg. 232).
Whether to grant or not a permit is not a ministerial duty of the Department of Education, Culture and
Sports. Rather it is a discretionary duty to be exercised in accordance with the rules and regulations
prescribed.

In the case at bar, petitioner has been operating a school without a permit in blatant violation of law.
Public respondent has no ministerial duty to issue to petitioner a permit to operate a school in Davao City
before petitioner has even filed an application or before his application has been first processed in
accordance with the rules and regulations on the matter.

SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC v NTC

408 SCRA 678

YNARES-SANTIAGO; August 12, 2003

FACTS

- The NTC issued a memorandum circular regarding the billing of telecoms services, including the sale of sim cards.

- Petitioners Islacom and Piltel alleged, inter alia, that the NTC has no jurisdiction to regulate the sale of consumer
goods such as the prepaid call cards since such jurisdiction belongs to the Department of Trade and Industry under
the Consumer Act of the Philippines; that the Billing Circular is oppressive, confiscatory and violative of the
constitutional prohibition against deprivation of property without due process of law; that the Circular will result in the
impairment of the viability of the prepaid cellular service by unduly prolonging the validity and expiration of the
prepaid SIM and call cards; and that the requirements of identification of prepaid card buyers and call balance
announcement are unreasonable. Hence, they prayed that the Billing Circular be declared null and void ab initio.

- Soon thereafter, petitioners Globe Telecom, Inc. and Smart Communications, Inc. filed a joint Motion for Leave to
Intervene and to Admit Complaint-in-Intervention. This was granted by the trial court.

- RTC issued TRO enjoining NTC from implementing the circular.

- NTC filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of petitioners’ failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

- RTC denied NTC’s motion. NTC filed a special civil action certiorari and prohibition with the CA. CA granted the
petition and annunled and set aside the decision of the lower court.

ISSUES

WON RTC has jurisdiction over the case

HELD

YES.

- In questioning the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by an administrative agency, a party need
not exhaust administrative remedies before going to court. This principle applies only where the act of the
administrative agency concerned was performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial function, and not when the assailed act
pertained to its rule-making or quasi-legislative power.
- Even assuming arguendo that the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies applies in this case, the
records reveal that petitioners sufficiently complied with this requirement. Even during the drafting and deliberation
stages leading to the issuance of Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000, petitioners were able to register their
protests to the proposed billing guidelines.

- Where what is assailed is the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by the administrative agency
in the performance of its quasi-legislative function, the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the same. The
determination of whether a specific rule or set of rules issued by an administrative agency contravenes the law or the
constitution is within the jurisdiction of the regular courts. Indeed, the Constitution vests the power of judicial review
or the power to declare a law, treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulation in the courts, including the regional trial courts. This is within the scope of judicial power,
which includes the authority of the courts to determine in an appropriate action the validity of the acts of the political
departments. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

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