CASE 145 – Topic: CONCURRENT JURISDICTION: FIRST TAKES COGNIZANCE

OF THE COMPLAINT SHALL EXERCISE JURISDICTION TO THE EXCLUSION OF

THE OTHERS.

G.R. No. 183678, MARCH 15, 2010

RENE VENTENILLA PUSE, PETITIONER,

VS.
LIGAYA DELOS SANTOS-PUSE, RESPONDENT.

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

FACTS:
Rene V. Puse, a registered Professional Teacher, married Ligaya Delos-Santos on
January 10, 1992. He had two children with her. When Ligaya learned of Rene's
deception regarding his marital status, she filed a criminal case for bigamy against her
husband before the MTC of Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte. On August 2, 2005,
she filed a letter-complaint with the Director of the Professional Regulation Commission
(PRC), National Capital Region, Manila, through the Director, PRC, Lucena City,
seeking assistance regarding her husband against whom she had filed a criminal case
for “Bigamy” and “Abandonment.”

Rene reiterated the arguments in his Answer and prayed for the dismissal of the
complaint on the ground that it was not verified and for failure of the respondent to
attach a valid certification against forum-shopping. He argued that the proper forum to
hear and decide the complaint was either the CSC pursuant to CSC Resolution No.
991936 (Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service) or the DepEd
pursuant to Rep. Act No. 4670 (Magna Carta for Public School Teachers).  Since the
charge was for violation of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees, the complaint should have been brought before the CSC. 

On 16 February 2007, the Board of Professional Teachers (Board), PRC, Manila, found
Rene administratively liable of the charges and revoked his license as a Professional
Teacher. Rene moved for reconsideration of motion but was denied by the Board. He
then filed a petition for review before the CA. CA denied the Rene's appeal. CA held
that the applicable law was Rep. Act No. 4670 or the Magna Carta for Public School
Teachers because he is a Teacher I. Under Rep. Act No. 4670, the one (1) tasked to
investigate the complaint was the Board of Professional Teachers. It was the Board of
Professional Teachers that had jurisdiction over the administrative case and not the
Civil Service Commission (CSC) or the Department of Education (DepEd) as contended
by Rene.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Board of Professional Teachers have jurisdiction to hear and decide
the complaint filed by respondent against petitioner?
RULING:
Yes, an administrative case against a public school teacher may be filed before the
Board of Professional Teachers-PRC, the DepEd or the CSC, which have concurrent
jurisdiction over administrative cases such as for immoral, unprofessional or
dishonorable conduct. 

Concurrent jurisdiction is that which is possessed over the same parties or subject
matter at the same time by two or more separate tribunals. When the law bestows upon
a government body the jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving specific matters,
it is to be presumed that such jurisdiction is exclusive unless it be proved that another
body is likewise vested with the same jurisdiction, in which case, both bodies have
concurrent jurisdiction over the matter.  
 
The authority to hear and decide administrative cases by the Board of Professional
Teachers-PRC, DepEd and the CSC comes from Rep. Act No. 7836, Rep. Act No. 4670
and Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 807, respectively. 

Under Section 23 of Rep. Act No. 7836, the Board is given the power, after due notice
and hearing, to suspend or revoke the certificate of registration of a professional teacher
for causes enumerated therein.  Among the causes is immoral, unprofessional or
dishonorable conduct. Thus, if a complaint is filed under Rep. Act No. 7836, the
jurisdiction to hear the same falls with the Board of Professional Teachers-PRC.
   
If the complaint against a public school teacher is filed with the DepEd, then under
Section 9 of Rep. Act No. 4670 or the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers, the
jurisdiction over administrative cases of public school teachers is lodged with the
investigating committee created pursuant to said section, now being implemented by
Section 2, Chapter VII of DECS Order No. 33, S. 1999, also known as the DECS Rules
of Procedure.

A complaint filed under Rep. Act No. 4670 shall be heard by the investigating committee
which is under the DepEd. 

The CSC has jurisdiction to supervise and discipline all government employees
including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations with original
charters. Consequently, if civil service rules and regulations are violated, complaints for
said violations may be filed with the CSC.

However, where concurrent jurisdiction exists in several tribunals, the body or agency
that first takes cognizance of the complaint shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of
the others.  Here, it was the Board of Professional Teachers, before which respondent
filed the complaint, that acquired jurisdiction over the case and which had the authority
to proceed and decide the case to the exclusion of the DepEd and the CSC.

CASE DIGEST BY: AGUSTIN, ALVIN C. 

CASE 146 – Topic: CERTIFICATE OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING SHALL BE SIGNED
BY ALL PETITIONERS OR PLAINTIFFS AS REQUIRED UNDER SEC. 1, RULE 65

G.R. NO. 154704, JUNE 1, 2011

NELLIE VDA. DE FORMOSO and her children, namely, MA. THERESA FORMOSO-
PESCADOR, ROGER FORMOSO, MARY JANE FORMOSO, BERNARD FORMOSO
and PRIMITIVO MALCABA, Petitioners,
vs.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, FRANCISCO ARCE, ATTY. BENJAMIN BARBERO,
and ROBERTO NAVARRO, Respondents.

MENDOZA, J.:

FACTS:
On October 14, 1989, Nellie Panelo Vda. De Formoso (Nellie) and her children namely:
Ma. Theresa Formoso-Pescador, Roger Formoso, Mary Jane Formoso, Bernard
Formoso, and Benjamin Formoso, executed a special power of attorney in favor of
Primitivo Malcaba (Malcaba) authorizing him, among others, to secure all papers and
documents including the owner’s copies of the titles of real properties pertaining to the
loan with real estate mortgage originally secured by Nellie and her late husband,
Benjamin S. Formoso, from Philippine National Bank, Vigan Branch (PNB) on
September 4, 1980.

On April 20, 1990, the Formosos sold the subject mortgaged real properties to Malcaba
through a Deed of Absolute Sale. Subsequently, on March 22, 1994, Malcaba and his
lawyer went to PNB to fully pay the loan obligation including interests in the amount of
₱2,461,024.74

PNB, however, allegedly refused to accept Malcaba’s tender of payment and to release
the mortgage or surrender the titles of the subject mortgaged real properties. On March
24, 1994, the petitioners filed a Complaint for Specific Performance against PNB before
the Regional Trial Court of Vigan, Ilocos Sur (RTC) praying, among others, that PNB be
ordered to accept the amount of ₱2,461,024.74 as full settlement of the loan obligation
of the Formosos.

On October 27, 1999, the RTC rendered its decision favoring the petitioners. PNB filed
a motion for reconsideration but it was denied for failure to comply with Rule 15, Section
5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. PNB then filed a Notice of Appeal but it was
dismissed for being filed out of time.

The petitioners’ prayer for exemplary or corrective damages, attorney’s fees, and
annual interest and daily interest, however, were denied for lack of evidence.
On September 7, 2001, the petitioners moved for reconsideration but it was denied by
the RTC in its Omnibus Order of September 26, 2001. Petitioners elevated the case to
the CA through a petition for certiorari challenging the RTC decision. But the CA
dismissed the petition stating that:

The verification and certification of non-forum shopping was signed by only one (Mr.
Primitivo Macalba) of the many petitioners.

In Loquias v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 139396, August 15, 2000, it was ruled
that all petitioners must be signatories to the certification of non-forum shopping unless
the one who signed it is authorized by the other petitioners. In the case at bar, there
was no showing that the one who signed was empowered to act for the rest. Therefore,
it cannot be presumed that the one who signed knew to the best of his knowledge
whether his co-petitioners had the same or similar claims or actions filed or pending.
The ruling in Loquias further declared that substantial compliance will not suffice in the
matter involving strict observance of the Rules. Likewise, the certification of non-forum
shopping requires personal knowledge of the party who executed the same and that
petitioners must show reasonable cause for failure to personally sign the certification.
Utter disregard of the Rules cannot just be rationalized by harping on the policy of
liberal construction

Aggrieved. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the court of appeals patently erred in ruling that all the petitioners must
sign the verification and certification of non-forum shopping in a petition for certiorari
wherein only questions of law are involved?

RULING:
No. Certiorari is an extraordinary, prerogative remedy and is never issued as a matter of
right. Accordingly, the party who seeks to avail of it must strictly observe the rules laid
down by law. Section 1(2), Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
“The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or
resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent
thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third
paragraph of section 3, Rule 46.”

In Docena v. Lapesura, the Supreme Court ruled that the certificate of non-forum
shopping should be signed by all the petitioners or plaintiffs in a case, and that the
signing by only one of them is insufficient. The attestation on non-forum shopping
requires personal knowledge by the party executing the same, and the lone signing
petitioner cannot be presumed to have personal knowledge of the filing or non-filing by
his co-petitioners of any action or claim the same as similar to the current petition.

CASE DIGEST BY: AGUSTIN, ALVIN C.

Case 147 - Topic: Questions of Compliance/Non-compliance on Notice of
Publication of a Question of Fact

G.R. No. 187917, January 19, 2011

METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST COMPANY, Petitioner,

vs.
SPOUSES EDMUNDO MIRANDA and JULIE MIRANDA, Respondents.

NACHURA, J.:

FACTS:
On appeal is the June 30, 2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV
No. 87775, affirming the June 16, 2006 Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Santiago City, Branch 35, as well as its subsequent Resolution dated May 7, 2009,
denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

Respondents, spouses Edmundo Miranda and Julie Miranda, obtained several credit
accommodations from Metrobank. To secure such loans, the spouses executed real
estate mortgages. Despite repeated demands, the spouses defaulted in paying the
loan.
Metrobank then filed for the extrajudicial foreclosure and auction of the mortgaged
property. The mortgaged properties were sold to the petitioner bank as the highest
bidder.
Spouses Miranda sought for the nullification of the foreclosure proceeding, alleging,
among others, that the foreclosure and auction sale was void for lack of publication as a
compliance with the provisions of PD 1079 and Act No. 3135.

Metrobank denied its material allegations and asserted the validity of the foreclosure
proceedings. Specifically, it averred compliance with the posting and publication
requirements.

Upon review of the records of the proceeding and sale, the Regional Trial Court found
no publication of the sheriff’s notice of sale, and there was no affidavit of publication
attached therein. Hence, the RTC annulled the foreclosure proceedings as well as the
auction sale.
Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the said decision and order of the RTC.
Metrobank insisted on the validity of the foreclosure proceedings. It argued that
foreclosure proceedings enjoy the presumption of regularity, and the party alleging
irregularity has the burden of proving his claim. Metrobank asserted that, in this case,
the presumption of regularity was not disputed because respondents failed to prove that
the notice of sale was not published as required by law.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the question on the compliance or non-compliance on the publication of
the notice of sale is a question of fact?

RULING:
It must be stated that only questions of law may be raised before this Court in a Petition
for Review under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. This Court is not a
trier of facts, and it is not the function of this Court to reexamine the evidence submitted
by the parties.

It has been our consistent ruling that the question of compliance or non-compliance with
notice and publication requirements of an extrajudicial foreclosure sale is a factual
issue, and the resolution thereof by the trial court is generally binding on this Court. The
matter of sufficiency of posting and publication of a notice of foreclosure sale need not
be resolved by this Court, especially when the findings of the RTC were sustained by
the CA. Well-established is the rule that factual findings of the CA are conclusive on the
parties and carry even more weight when the said court affirms the factual findings of
the trial court.

The unanimity of the CA and the trial court in their factual ascertainment that there was
non-compliance with the publication requirement bars us from supplanting their findings
and substituting them with our own. Metrobank has not shown that they are entitled to
an exception to this rule. It has not sufficiently demonstrated any special circumstances
to justify a factual review.

It would have been a simple matter for Metrobank to rebut the allegation of non-
compliance by producing the required proof of publication. Yet, Metrobank opted not to
rebut the allegation; it simply relied on the presumption of regularity in the performance
of official duty.

As correctly found by the RTC and the CA, the records of the foreclosure proceedings
lacked any proof of publication. This explains why Metrobank could not present any
proof of publication.

The goal of the notice requirement is to achieve a "reasonably wide publicity" of the
auction sale. This is why publication in a newspaper of general circulation is required.
The Court has previously taken judicial notice of the "far-reaching effects" of publishing
the notice of sale in a newspaper of general circulation. Thus, the publication of the
notice of sale was held essential to the validity of foreclosure proceedings. In this case,
Metrobank failed to establish compliance with the publication requirement. The RTC
and the CA cannot, therefore, be faulted for nullifying the foreclosure proceedings.

CASE DIGEST BY: CUATON, JOEDDIE MAE T.

Case 148 - Topic: QUESTION ON IMPLIED TRUST, A QUESTION OF FACT.

G.R. No. 182177       March 30, 2011

RICHARD JUAN, Petitioner,

vs.
GABRIEL YAP, SR., Respondent. 

CARPIO, J.:

FACTS:
The spouses Maximo and Dulcisima Cañeda (Cañeda spouses) mortgaged to petitioner
Richard Juan, employee and nephew of respondent Gabriel Yap, Sr., two parcels of
land in Talisay, Cebu to secure a loan of ₱1.68 million, payable within one year.

Petitioner Juan then sought the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage. The properties
were auctioned and sold to petitioner although no certificate of sale was issued to him.

Respondent and the Cañeda spouses executed a memorandum of agreement (MOA)

where (1) the Cañeda spouses acknowledged re,spondent as their “real mortgagee-
creditor while Richard Juan is merely a trustee” of respondent; (2) respondent agreed to
allow the Cañeda spouses to redeem the foreclosed properties for P1.2 million; and (3)
the Cañeda spouses and respondent agreed to initiate judicial action “either to annul or
reform the contract or to compel Richard Juan to reconvey the mortgagee’s rights” to
respondent as trustor.

Three days later, the Cañeda spouses and respondent sued petitioner in the Regional
Trial Court of Cebu City (trial court) to declare respondent as trustee of petitioner vis a
vis the Contract, annul petitioner’s bid for the foreclosed properties, declare the Contract
"superseded or novated" by the MOA, and require petitioner to pay damages, attorney’s
fees and the costs.

Juan insisted on his rights over the mortgaged properties and also counterclaimed for
damages and attorney’s fees and the turn-over of the owner’s copy of the titles for the
mortgaged properties.

The trial court ruled in favor of the petitioner declaring him the "true and real"
mortgagee, ordering respondent to pay moral damages and attorney’s fees, and
requiring respondent to deliver the titles in question to petitioner. 
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), imputing error in the trial court’s
refusal to recognize a resulting trust between him and petitioner and in granting
monetary reliefs to petitioner.

The CA granted the petition, set aside the trial court’s ruling, declared respondent the
Contract’s mortgagee, directed the trial court to release the redemption payment to
respondent, and ordered petitioner to pay damages and attorney’s fees.
The CA found the following circumstances crucial in its concurrence with respondent’s
theory, notwithstanding the terms of the Contract: (1) Solon testified that he drew up the
Contract naming petitioner as mortgagee upon instructions of respondent; (2) Dulcisima
Cañeda acknowledged respondent as the creditor from whom she and her husband
obtained the loan the Contract secured; and (3) respondent shouldered the payment of
the foreclosure expenses.

Petitioner prays for the reversal of the CA’s ruling. He relies on the terms of the
Contract, and argues that respondent’s proof of a resulting trust created in his favor is
weak. 

On the other hand, respondent questions the propriety of this petition for raising only
factual questions, incompatible with the office of a petition for review on certiorari.
Alternatively, respondent argues that the pieces of parol evidence the CA used to
anchor its ruling are more than sufficient to prove the existence of an implied trust
between him and petitioner.

ISSUE/S:
1) Whether or not the question of the existence of an implied trust is a question of fact?
2) Whether there was an implied trust?

RULING:
1) Yes. The question of the existence of an implied trust is factual, hence, ordinarily
outside the purview of a Rule 45 review of purely legal questions. Nevertheless, our
review is justified by the need to make a definitive finding on this factual issue in light of
the conflicting rulings rendered by the courts below.

The general rule for petitions filed under Rule 45 admits exceptions, to wit: (1) When the
conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2)
When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) Where there
is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of
facts; (5) When the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) When the Court of Appeals, in
making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the
admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are
contrary to those of the trial court; (8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without
citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) When the facts set forth in the
petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the
respondents; and (10) The finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is 1 premised on the
supposed absence of evidence and is contradicted by the evidence on record.
2) Yes. There is an implied trust between the petitioner and the respondent. 

An implied trust arising from mortgage contracts is not among the trust relationships the
Civil Code enumerates. The Code itself provides, however, that such listing "does not
exclude others established by the general law on trust x x x." Under the general
principles on trust, equity converts the holder of property right as trustee for the benefit
of another if the circumstances of its acquisition makes the holder ineligible "in x x x
good conscience [to] hold and enjoy [it]." As implied trusts are remedies against unjust
enrichment, the "only problem of great importance in the field of constructive trusts is
whether in the numerous and varying factual situations presented x x x there is a
wrongful holding of property and hence, a threatened unjust enrichment of the
defendant." 

Applying these principles, this Court recognized unconventional implied trusts in

contracts involving the purchase of housing units by officers of tenants’ associations in
breach of their obligations, the partitioning of realty contrary to the terms of a
compromise agreement, and the execution of a sales contract indicating a buyer distinct
from the provider of the purchase money. In all these cases, the formal holders of title
were deemed trustees obliged to transfer title to the beneficiaries in whose favor the
trusts were deemed created. We see no reason to bar the recognition of the same
obligation in a mortgage contract meeting the standards for the creation of an implied
trust.

Based on parol evidence, the Cañeda spouses acknowledged respondent as the lender
from whom they borrowed the funds secured by the Contract. Furthermore, it was
respondent, not petitioner, who shouldered the payment of the foreclosure expenses.
Thus, the court gave credence to the parol evidence of the latter and found the former
liable to hold the purchased property in trust of the actual buyer under an implied trust.

Lastly, the court ruled that the formal holders of title may be deemed trustees obliged to
transfer title to the beneficiaries in whose favor the trusts were deemed created. The
court, see no reason to bar the recognition of the same obligation in a mortgage
contract meeting the standards for the creation of an implied trust.  
Petition is DENIED and the Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. 

CASE DIGEST BY: CUATON, JOEDDIE MAE T.

Case 149 Topic: Rule 41 RTC-CA (Question tenancy relation)

G.R. No. 179024 May 30, 2011

ESTATE OF PASTOR M. SAMSON, REPRESENTED BY HIS HEIR ROLANDO B.

SAMSON, petitioners,
vs.
MERCEDES R. SUSANO AND NORBERTO R. SUSANO, respondents

VILLARAMA, JR., J.

FACTS:
Pastor M. Samson (Pastor) owned a 1.0138-hectare parcel of land known as Lot 1108
of the Tala Estate Subdivision located in Bagumbong, Caloocan City and covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 65174.

Pastor was approached by his friend Macario Susano (Macario) who asked for
permission to occupy a portion of Lot 1108 to build a house for his family. Pastor
acceded to Macario's request.

Macario and his family occupied 620 square meters of Lot 1108 and devoted the rest of
the land to palay cultivation. Macario's wife, Mercedes R. Susano and their son
Norberto R. Susano, the respondents, insist that while no agricultural leasehold contract
was executed by Pastor and Macario, Macario religiously paid 15 cavans of palay per
agricultural year to Pastor, which rent was reduced by Pastor in 1986 to 8 cavans of
palay per agricultural year.

In 1979, Pastor sold 2,552 square meters of Lot 1108-A to spouses Felix Pacheco and
Juanita Clamor without Macario's knowledge and consent. As a result of the sale, the lot
was subdivided into 3 portions and the last two parcels were registered under the name
of spouses Felix Pacheco and Juanita Clamor. Lots 1108-A-1 and 1108-C comprising a
total area of 7,316 square meters remained occupied and cultivated by Macario and his
family.

In 1989, Pastor sold Lot 1108-C to Julian Chan. Consequently, TCT No. 52638 was
cancelled and TCT No. 176758 was issued in Chan's name.

In 1990, Macario received a letter from Pastor's lawyer demanding that he vacate the
property within twenty (20) days. Macario filed a complaint against Pastor before the
Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) of Valenzuela.

Pastor filed a Motion to Dismiss citing the pendency of the complaint filed against him
before the MARO of Valenzuela and alleging that the property is not agricultural land
but a residential lot as indicated in Tax Declaration No. 10081. Pastor also argued that
the land involved, Lot 1108-A-1 covered by TCT No. 137744, is only 620 square meters,
too small to be considered a viable family-size farm or economic family-size farm under
RA No. 6657 and P.D. No. 27.

The Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD) issued an Order denying Pastor's
motion and directing the parties to submit their respective position papers. Pastor filed a
Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied. He filed his answer. Pastor maintained
that no tenancy relationship was established between him and herein respondents
because Macario's occupancy, as well as that of respondents, was only by mere
tolerance. He also alleged that respondents' cause of action, if there be any, is already
barred by prescription, estoppel and/or laches. Pastor likewise filed his Position Paper
as directed.
The respondents maintained in their Position Paper that their predecessor-in-interest,
Macario, was a bona fide agricultural tenant; hence, they are entitled to the rights of pre-
emption and redemption. And having validly exercised their right of redemption through
the deposit of the redemption price with the DAR, they are allegedly now the owners of
the subject land.

On December 26, 1994, the RARAD issued a Decision declaring that the late Macario
validly acquired the status of a bona fide and de jure tenant over the subject land due to
Pastor's implied acquiescence in allowing Macario to discharge the duties of a tenant for
a considerable length of time until the latter's death in 1993. However, the decision of
the RARAD was partially modified.

Upon appeal, the DARAB, reversed the ruling of the RARAD. It explained that the
issuance of an ordinance classifying the subject property into non-agricultural land did
not have the effect of automatically converting the said land as non-agricultural land and
terminating the tenancy relationship between the parties.
Aggrieved, Pastor and Chan sought reconsideration of the said decision but their
motions were denied for lack of merit. They filed their respective petitions for review
before the CA.

The CA dismissed the appeal. The CA also held that Pastor and Macario's tenancy
relationship was not extinguished despite the reclassification of the subject land into
non-agricultural land in 1981.

The CA denied petitioners' motions for reconsideration.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in rendering its subject
Decision affirming the findings of the RARAD a quo and DARAB that a tenancy
relationship existed between the late Pastor M. Samson and the late Macario Susano?

RULING:
Yes, the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in rendering its subject Decision
affirming the findings of the RARAD a quo and DARAB that a tenancy relationship
existed between the late Pastor M. Samson and the late Macario Susano.

For a tenancy relationship to exist between the parties, the following essential elements
must be shown: (1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant; (2) the subject matter
is agricultural land; (3) there is consent between the parties; (4) the purpose is
agricultural production; (5) there is personal cultivation by the tenant; and (6) there is
sharing of the harvests between the parties. The presence of all of these elements must
be proved by substantial evidence.
The question of whether a tenancy relationship exists is basically a question of fact
which, as a general rule, is beyond the scope of a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.

The question of whether there was an implied tenancy and sharing are basically
questions of fact and the findings of the Court of Appeals and the Boards a quo are,
generally, entitled to respect and non-disturbance, as long as they are supported by
substantial evidence. Such findings of fact may be reviewed by the Court when the
conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures, or if
the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they
are based.

In the case at bar, while the RARAD, DARAB and the CA are unanimous in their
conclusion that an implied tenancy relationship existed between Pastor Samson and
Macario Susano, no specific evidence was cited to support such conclusion other than
their observation that Pastor failed to protest Macario's possession and cultivation over
the subject land for more than 30 years. Contrary to what is required by law; however,
no independent and concrete evidence were adduced by respondents to prove that
there was indeed consent and sharing of harvests between Pastor and Macario.

Substantial evidence necessary to establish the fact of sharing cannot be satisfied by a

mere scintilla of evidence; there must be concrete evidence on record adequate to
prove the element of sharing. To prove sharing of harvests, a receipt or any other
credible evidence must be presented, because self-serving statements are inadequate.

Tenancy relationship cannot be presumed; the elements for its existence are explicit in
law and cannot be done away with by conjectures. For implied tenancy to arise it is
necessary that all the essential requisites of tenancy must be present.

The conclusions of the RARAD, DARAB and the CA respecting the existence of
tenancy relationship between Pastor and Macario are not supported by substantial
evidence on record.

CASE DIGEST BY: JUNTILA, HANNAH MAY T.

Case 150 Topic: Rule 41 RTC-CA

(Incorrect computation of surety bond a Question of Fact)

G.R. No. 187973 January 20, 2014

LZK HOLDINGS AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioners,

vs.
PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK, respondents
REYES, J.

FACTS:
LZK Holdings obtained a P 40,000,000.00 loan from Planters Bank and secured the
same with a Real Estate Mortgage over its lot located in La Union. On September 21,
1998, the lot was sold at a public auction after Planters Bank extrajudicially foreclosed
the real estate mortgage thereon due to LZK Holdings' failure to pay its loan. Planters
Bank emerged as the highest bidder during the auction sale and its certificate of sale
was registered on March 16, 1999.

On April 5, 1999, LZK Holdings filed before the RTC of Makati City, Branch 150, a
complaint for annulment of extra judicial foreclosure, mortgage contract, promissory
note and damages. LZK Holdings also prayed for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order (TRO) or writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the consolidation of title
over the lot by Planters Bank. Planters Bank filed an ex-parte motion for the issuance of
a writ of possession with the RTC-San Fernando.

Three (3) days before the expiration of LZK Holdings' redemption period, the RTC-
Makati issued a TRO effective for 20 days enjoining Planters Bank from consolidating
its title over the property. Then, the RTC-Makati ordered the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction for the same purpose but the writ was issued only on June 20,
2000 upon LZK Holdings' posting of a P40,000.00 bond.

In the meantime, Planters Bank succeeded in consolidating its ownership over the
property. However, the proceedings for its ex-parte motion for the issuance of a writ of
possession was suspended by the RTC-San Fernando in view of the TRO and writ of
preliminary injunction issued by the RTC-Makati. Planters Bank moved for
reconsideration but its motion was denied by the RTC-San Fernando in an Order dated
September 1, 2000.

The TRO and writ were both issued. Planters Bank’s motion for a writ of possession
was denied but was subsequently granted upon appeal to the CA. CA stated that a writ
of possession may be issued in case of an extrajudicial foreclosure of a real estate
mortgage under Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118. Under said
provision, the writ of possession may be issued to the purchaser in a foreclosure sale
either within the one-year redemption period upon the filing of a bond, or after the lapse
of the redemption period, without need of a bond.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA committed reversible error in affirming the issuance of a writ of
possession by the RTC in favor of Planters Bank?

RULING:
The Court finds and stands by its initial determination that the CA committed no
reversible error in affirming the issuance of a writ of possession by the RTC in favor of
Planters Bank.

Anent the correct amount of surety bond, it is well to emphasize that our task in an
appeal by petition for review on certiorari is limited, as a jurisdictional matter, to
reviewing errors of law that might have been committed by the CA. The allegations of
incorrect computation of the surety bond involve factual matters within the competence
of the trial court to address as this Court is not a trier of facts.

The RTC found the amount of ₱2,000,000.00 to be sufficiently equivalent to the use of
the property for a period of twelve (12) months. We are bound by such factual finding
especially considering the affirmation accorded it by the CA.

In fine, the decision of the CA is in accordance with the law and jurisprudence on the
matter. It correctly sustained the Order of the RTC in issuing a writ of possession in
favor of Planters Bank.

CASE DIGEST BY: JUNTILA, HANNAH MAY T.

Case 151 – Topic: Petition for Certiorari under Rule 45

G.R. No. 181218 January 28, 2013

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC
WORKS AND HIGHWAYS, Petitioner
vs.
HEIRS OF SPOUSES PEDRO BAUTISTA and VALENTINA MALABANAN,
Respondents

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

FACTS:
The respondents’ parents, (spouses Bautista) are the registered owners of an 1,893-
square meter parcel of land (the lot) located in Barangay Bulacnin North, Lipa City.

Sometime in 2000, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Department of Public
Works and Highways (DPWH), acquired by negotiated sale a 36-square meter portion
of the lot at ₱1,300.00 per square meter for use in the STAR (Southern Tagalog Arterial
Road) Tollway project.

Later on, petitioner offered to purchase an additional 1,155 square meters of the lot at
₱100.00 per square meter, but the spouses Bautista refused to sell. The portion sought
to be purchased was to be used for the Balete-Lipa City Interchange Ramp B, which
would serve as a motorist’s entry/exit to/from Lipa City.

The petitioner filed a Complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Lipa City for the
expropriation of the said 1,155-square meter portion (the subject portion). In its
Amended Complaint, petitioner alleged that the zonal valuation of the lot at the time of
the filing of the Complaint as determined by the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) is
₱100.00 per square meter, which is thus the fair value of the property for purposes of
expropriation.

In their Answer, respondents claimed that the valuation of ₱100.00 per square meter
based on the BIR zonal valuation is not fair considering that the petitioner in the past
bought a portion of the same property at ₱1,300.00 per square meter. They added that
the current fair market value of the lot should be pegged at more than ₱3,000.00 per
square meter.

In an Order of Expropriation, the trial court condemned the subject portion for
expropriation and constituted a panel of commissioners, consisting of the Lipa City
Assessor and the Registrar of Deeds of Lipa City, for the purpose of ascertaining just
compensation that should be paid to respondents. On petitioner’s Opposition, however,
the trial court appointed a third commissioner in the person of Nimfa Martinez-Mecate
(Mecate), who is the DPWH special agent for Road Right-of-Way for Region IV-A.
The Lipa City Assessor and the Registrar of Deeds thus concluded in their Joint
Commissioners’ Report that just compensation for the subject portion should be within
the range of ₱1,960.00 and ₱2,500.00 per square meter.

On the other and, Mecate thus recommended that the reasonable value for agricultural,
orchard, and sugar land is ₱400.00 per square meter, and ₱600.00 per square meter
for residential and commercial land.

The trial court rendered its Decision, fixing just compensation for the subject portion,
including all its improvements, at ₱1,960.00 per square meter.
The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Secretary of the DPWH, is ordered
to pay to the defendants, the amount of ₱2,263,800, with interest at the legal rate, from
the time it took possession of the condemned property, until fully paid.

If the defendants or any of them refuse or fail to receive said payment, the same shall
be made to the Clerk of Court, RTC, Lipa City, who shall receive such payment and be
responsible on his bond therefor.

Upon finality of this decision, the Branch Clerk of Court of this Court is directed to
immediately issue a certified true copy of the same for recording in the Office of the
Register of Deeds of Lipa City. With costs against the plaintiff.

Petitioner interposed an appeal with the CA.

The appeal questioned the trial court’s ₱1,960.00 valuation, claiming that in arriving at
such amount, the trial court disregarded other documentary evidence such as the
assessed value, tax declaration, the BIR zonal valuation, and the appraisal report of the
Lipa City Assessor.

The CA sustained the trial court’s reliance on the Lipa City Assessor and the Registrar
of Deeds’s Joint Commissioners’ Report, finding that the same took into consideration
the fair market value of the subject portion, the condition of the surroundings, the
improvements introduced, the character of the property, and the value of adjacent and
nearby properties as shown by the deeds of sale covering the same. The CA also noted
that in 2000, petitioner bought a 36-square meter portion of respondents’ property at
₱1,300.00 per square meter, which means that as of 2000, respondents’ property
already had a market value of ₱1,300.00 per square meter.

The CA further held that the Joint Commissioners’ Report is the majority decision of the
constituted board of commissioners. Such being the case, the trial court may not be
faulted for relying thereon

In the absence of abuse on the part of the commissioners or the trial court, their
determination regarding just compensation must be sustained.

The CA thus affirmed the trial court’s Decision.

Unable to obtain a reconsideration of the appellate court’s Decision, petitioners filed the
present Petition.

ISSUE:
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court’s decision fixing the just
compensation for the subject property at ₱1,960.00 per square meter despite its failure
to consider all factors in arriving at the said amount of just compensation prescribed
under the applicable laws?

RULING:
The Petition must be denied.

This Court is not a trier of facts. Questions of fact may not be raised in a petition brought
under Rule 45, as such petition may only raise questions of law.

This rule applies in expropriation cases. Moreover, factual findings of the trial court,
when affirmed by the CA, are generally binding on this Court. An evaluation of the case
and the issues presented leads the Court to the conclusion that it is unnecessary to
deviate from the findings of fact of the trial and appellate courts.
Under Section 8 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, the trial court sitting as an
expropriation court may, after hearing, accept the commissioners’ report and render
judgment in accordance therewith.
This is what the trial court did in this case. The CA affirmed the trial court’s
pronouncement in toto. Given these facts, the trial court and the CA’s identical findings
of fact concerning the issue of just compensation should be accorded the greatest
respect, and are binding on the Court absent proof that they committed error in
establishing the facts and in drawing conclusions from them. There being no showing
that the trial court and the CA committed any error, we thus accord due respect to their
findings.

CASE DIGEST BY: BUÑALES, EDEN A.

Case 152 – Topic: Appeal by Certiorari to the Supreme Court

G.R. No. 193861 March 14, 2012

PUALITA “EDITH” SERRA, Petitioner

vs.
NELFA T. MUMAR, Respondent

CARPIO, J.:

FACTS:
A vehicular accident along the National Highway in Barangay Apopong, General Santos
City resulted in the death of Armando Mumar, husband of respondent Nelfa T. Mumar.

Based on the evidence presented before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of General
Santos City, Armando Tenerife was driving his Toyota Corolla sedan on the National
Highway heading in the direction of Polomolok, South Cotabato. Tenerife noticed the
van owned by petitioner Paulita "Edith" Serra (petitioner) coming from the opposite
direction, which was trying to overtake a passenger jeep, and in the process
encroached on his lane. The left side of the sedan was hit by the van, causing the
sedan to swerve to the left and end up on the other side of the road. The van collided
head on with the motorcycle, which was about 12 meters behind the sedan on the outer
lane, causing injuries to Mumar, which eventually led to his death.

On the other hand, petitioner denied that her van was overtaking the jeepney at the time
of the incident. She claimed that the left tire of Tenerife’s sedan burst, causing it to
sideswipe her van. Consequently, the left front tire of the van also burst and the van’s
driver, Marciano de Castro (de Castro), lost control of the vehicle. The van swerved to
the left towards Mumar’s motorcycle. The impact resulted in the death of Mumar.

Subsequently, respondent filed a complaint against petitioner for Damages by Reason

of Reckless Imprudence resulting to Homicide and Attachment before the General
Santos City RTC.
The RTC found that, based on the evidence presented at the trial, at the time of impact
"the van was overtaking another vehicle without due regard for the safety of others,
bumped the Toyota Car (sic) and the motorcycle traveling in the right lane going to
Polomolok, South Cotabato." The RTC noted that the damage to the van was located at
the bumper, evincing a frontal collision, while the damage to the sedan was on the left
side door and window, evincing that the van sideswiped the sedan. Likewise, the RTC
found that the van encroached on the sedan and motorcycle’s lane, in the process
hitting the motorcycle, causing the injuries and subsequent death of Mumar.

Petitioner appealed the RTC ruling to the CA.

The CA denied the appeal and affirmed with modification the RTC’s ruling.

The CA adopted the factual findings of the RTC. It also ruled that the RTC erred in
awarding burial expenses and actual damages for loss of earning capacity despite lack
of proof.

Likewise, the CA said that the RTC erred in not awarding civil indemnity in the amount
of ₱50,000.00. The CA also awarded temperate damages of ₱25,000.00 finding that
respondent spent for her husband’s burial although the exact amount could not be
proven.

ISSUE:
Whether both the lower court and the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in
finding that the incident which killed Armando Mumar was not purely accidental for
which defendants may not be held liable?

RULING:
A petition for review on certiorari should raise only questions of law. In resolving a
petition for review, the Court "does not sit as an arbiter of facts for it is not the function
of the Supreme Court to analyze or weigh all over again the evidence already
considered in the proceedings below." When supported by substantial evidence, the
factual findings of the CA affirming those of the trial court are final and conclusive on
this Court and may not be reviewed on appeal, unless petitioner can show compelling
or exceptional reasons for this Court to disregard, overturn or modify such findings.

In the present case, the Court notes the uniform factual findings by the RTC and CA,
and petitioner has not shown compelling or exceptional reasons warranting deviation
from these findings. Both the trial court and the CA found that it was petitioner’s van,
then being driven by de Castro, that encroached on the sedan’s lane, then hit the latter
and, eventually, Mumar’s motorcycle.

The Court has previously held that evidence to be worthy of credit, must not only
proceed from a credible source but must, in addition, be credible in itself. The evidence
must be natural, reasonable and probable as to make it easy to believe. No better test
has yet been found to determine the value of the testimony of a witness than its
conformity to the knowledge and common experience of mankind.

CASE DIGEST BY: BUÑALES, EDEN A.

CASE 152 TOPIC: RULE 45 APPEAL BY CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT

(LIMITATION TO REVIEWING ERRORS OF LAW OF THE SUPREME COURT IN
THE ABSENCE OF ACTUAL FINDINGS)

G.R. No. 166803, October 11, 2012

CREWLINK, INC. and/or GULF MARINE SERVICES, Petitioners,

vs.
EDITHA TERINGTERING, for her behalf and in behalf of minor EIMAEREACH
ROSE DE GARCIA TERINGTERING, Respondents.

PERALTA, J.:

FACTS:
Respondent Editha Teringtering, spouse of the deceased Jacinto Teringtering, and in
behalf of her minor child filed a complaint against Crewlink for the payment of death
benefits, benefit for minor child, burial assistance, damages and attorney’s fees.

Editha alleged that her husband entered into an overseas employment contract with
Crewlink – he took a medical exam and was declared fit to work. On April 9, 2001
Jacinto died due to drowning. Editha claimed for compensation but was denied by
Crewlink. She claimed that in order for her to get compensation it is enough that Jacinto
died during the term of his contract and while still on board. She asserted that Jacinto
was suffering from a psychotic disorder, or mood disorder bipolar type. She further
alleged that the death was not deliberate and of his own will but as a result of a mental
disorder.

Crewlink alleged that Jacinto jumped off the ship twice. He was saved the first time and
someone was assigned to watch over him. He jumped off a second time and was no
longer saved. Crewlink asserted that Editha was not entitled to the benefits because
Jacinto committed suicide.

In a Decision dated February 12, 2002, the Labor Arbiter, after hearing, dismissed the
case for lack of merit. The Labor Arbiter held that, while it is true that Jacinto
Teringtering died during the effectivity of his contract of employment and that he died of
asphyxiation, nevertheless, his death was the result of his deliberate or intentional
jumping into the sea. Thus, his death was directly attributable to him.

Teringtering then appealed before the NLRC which affirmed in toto the ruling of the
Labor Arbiter.

Unsatisfied, Teringtering filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the Court of
Appeals and sought the nullification of the NLRC Resolution, dated February 20, 2003,
which affirmed the Labor Arbiter’s Decision dated February 12, 2002.

On July 8, 2004, the CA reversed and set aside the assailed Resolution of the NLRC,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Resolution dated February 20, 2003 is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondents Crewlink, Inc. and Gulf Marine Services are
hereby DECLARED jointly and severally liable and, accordingly, are directed to pay
deceased Jacinto Teringtering's beneficiaries, namely respondent Editha Teringtering
and her daughter Eimaereach Rose de Gracia, the Philippine Currency equivalent to
US$50,000.00, and an additional amount of US$7,000, both at the exchange rate
prevailing at the time of payment.

ISSUE:
Whether a special civil action of certiorari includes correction of the NLRC's evaluation
of the evidence and factual findings based thereon or correction of errors of facts in the
judgment of the NLRC?

RULING:
In a petition for review on certiorari, our jurisdiction is limited to reviewing errors of law in
the absence of any showing that the factual findings complained of are devoid of
support in the records or are glaringly erroneous. We are not a trier of facts, and this
applies with greater force in labor cases. Findings of fact of administrative agencies and
quasi-judicial bodies, which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is
confined to specific matters, are generally accorded not only great respect but even
finality. They are binding upon this Court unless there is a showing of grave abuse of
discretion or where it is clearly shown that they were arrived at arbitrarily or in utter
disregard of the evidence on record.

This case is no different.

As found by the Labor Arbiter, Jacinto's jumping into the sea was not an accident but
was deliberately done. Indeed, Jacinto jumped off twice into the sea and it was on his
second attempt that caused his death. The accident report of Captain Oscar Morado
narrated in detail the circumstances that led to Jacinto's death. The circumstances of
Jacinto's actions before and at the time of his death were likewise entered in the Chief
Officer's Log Book and were attested to by Captain Morado before the Philippine
Embassy. Even the A/B personnel, Ronald Arroga, who was tasked to watch over
Jacinto after his first attempt of committing suicide, testified that despite his efforts to
prevent Jacinto from jumping again overboard, Jacinto was determined and even
shoved him and jumped anew which eventually caused his death.

Considering the foregoing, we do not find any reason to discredit the evidence
presented as well as the findings of the Labor Arbiter. Settled is the rule that factual
findings of labor officials, who are deemed to have acquired expertise in matters within
their jurisdiction, are generally accorded not only respect but even finality by the courts
when supported by substantial evidence, i.e., the amount of relevant evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. More so, when there
is no showing that said findings were arrived at arbitrarily or in disregard of the evidence
on record.

CASE DIGEST BY: VILCHES, CARL NICCOLO F.