Distributed Ledger Technology in Payments Clearing and Settlement
Distributed Ledger Technology in Payments Clearing and Settlement
Distributed Ledger Technology in Payments Clearing and Settlement
NOTE: Staff working papers in the Finance and Economics Discussion Series (FEDS) are preliminary materials
circulated to stimulate discussion and critical comment. The analysis and conclusions set forth are those of the
authors and do not indicate concurrence by other members of the research staff or the Board of Governors.
References in publications to the Finance and Economics Discussion Series (other than acknowledgement) should
be cleared with the author(s) to protect the tentative character of these papers.
¹ The authors would like to thank Mari Baca, Daniel Ebanks, Sarah Wright, Thomas Doheny, Robert Carper, Patrick Adler, Peter Lee, Michael
Warner, and Kaushik Ashodiya for their contributions and assistance. The views expressed in this paper are solely the responsibility of the
authors and should not be interpreted as reflecting the views of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, or anyone else in the
Federal Reserve System.
² For example, technology research firm Gartner, which monitors emerging technologies, estimates that it will be five to ten years until DLT
achieves "mainstream adoption." See Gartner (2016), "Hype Cycle for Emerging Technologies."
³ Average daily volume and value were calculated using 2014 data on U.S. retail and wholesale PCS systems and were approximated based on
the number of business days in the year. See Committee on Payment and Market Infrastructures (2015), Statistics on Payment, Clearing and
Settlement Systems in the CPMI Countries, http://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d142.htm.
⁴ The Federal Reserve Board adopted its Federal Reserve Policy on Payment System Risk (PSR policy) with the objectives of fostering the safety
and efficiency of payment, clearing, settlement, and recording systems and promoting financial stability, more broadly. The PSR policy
includes the Board's views on standards for the management of risks (including legal, operational, and financial risks) in these types of
systems. See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2016), "Federal Reserve Policy on Payment System Risk," Board of
Governors, https://www.federalreserve.gov/paymentsystems/files/psr_policy.pdf.
⁵ The research team is a multi-disciplinary group of officers and staff from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York, and the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
⁶ For purposes of this paper, a financial intermediary is broadly defined to include financial institutions (such as banks, broker/dealers, and
other institutions that interact with the end-users of a financial transaction) and infrastructures (such as payment, clearing, and settlement
systems for funds, securities, and derivatives).
⁷ The discussion in sections 2.1.1 and 2.1.2 are based on Annex D of the following: Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems and
Technical Committee of the International Organization of Securities Commissions (2012), Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures,
http://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d101a.pdf. Effective September 2014, the Committee on Payment Settlement Systems changed its name to
the Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures.
⁸ A "payment system" is defined in the PSR policy as a set of instruments, procedures, and rules for the transfer of funds between or among
participants. Payment systems include, but are not limited to, large-value funds transfer systems, automated clearing house systems, check
clearing houses, and credit and debit card settlement systems. See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2016), "Federal
Reserve Policy on Payment System Risk," Board of Governors, https://www.federalreserve.gov/paymentsystems/files/psr_policy.pdf.
⁹ A "securities settlement system" is defined in the PSR policy as an entity that enables securities to be transferred and settled by book entry
and allows the transfers of securities free of or against payment. A "central securities depository" is defined in the PSR policy as an entity that
provides securities accounts and central safekeeping services. A "central counterparty" is defined in the PSR policy as an entity that
interposes itself between counterparties to contracts traded in one or more financial markets, becoming the buyer to every seller and the
seller to every buyer. See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2016), "Federal Reserve Policy on Payment System Risk," Board
of Governors, https://www.federalreserve.gov/paymentsystems/files/psr_policy.pdf.
¹⁰ In some cases, one entity may perform multiple PCS functions, such as securities clearing and settlement, as well as safekeeping and custody.
¹¹ For a description of the different models, see Annex D of the following: Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems and Technical
Committee of the International Organization of Securities Commissions (2012), Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures,
http://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d101a.pdf. See also Committee on Payment and Settlement System (1992), Delivery Versus Payment in
Securities Settlement Systems, http://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d06.htm.
¹² A "financial market infrastructure" is defined in the PSR policy as a multilateral system among participating financial institutions, including
the system operator, used for the purposes of clearing, settling, or recording payments, securities,
¹³ However, FMIs may also concentrate risks and create interdependencies between and among FMIs and participating institutions.
¹⁴ For an example depiction of this complex set of linkages in the derivatives market, see figures 1 and 2 in Jerome Powell (2014), "A Financial
System Perspective on Central Clearing of Derivatives," speech delivered at "The New International Financial System: Analyzing the
Cumulative Impact of Regulatory Reform", a conference sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago and the Bank of England, held in
Chicago, Illinois, November 6, 2014, https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/powell20141106a.pdf.
¹⁵ Trade execution takes place before PCS processes, but is referenced here for illustrative purposes.
¹⁶ One example in which a change in market organization and structure provided a solution to an operational inefficiency was the formation of
check clearing houses. The New York Clearing House was formed in the 1850s for the purposes of interbank check collections, before
computer technology was available to address the increasingly cumbersome physical settlement of checks by payment in gold among
multiple banks. As a result, the settlement process itself was redesigned by introducing a new facility that centralized physical check clearing
and settlement on a multilateral basis in one location. Many other local or regional check clearing houses were subsequently created around
the United States. See J.S. Gibbons (1859), the Banks of New- York, Their Dealers, the Clearing House, and the Panic of 1857 (New York: D.
Appleton & Co), pp. 292-295.
¹⁷ An important element of any CCP design is the legal mechanism for the CCP to become the counterparty to its participants' trades (such as
through innovation and substitution of counterparties), which allows the CCP to assume the original parties' contractual obligations to each
other. Other legal mechanisms that allow the CCP to guarantee obligations may also exist, such as explicit and legally binding settlement
guarantees.
¹⁸ Federal Reserve System (2015), "Strategies for Improving the U.S. Payment System," white paper, January 26,
https://fedpaymentsimprovement.org/wp-content/uploads/strategies-improving-us-payment-system.pdf
¹⁹ One specific type of distributed ledger is a block chain, which adds changes to the database via a series of blocks of transactional data that
are chronologically and cryptographically linked to one another. The terms “distributed ledger technology” and “block chain technology” are
often treated as synonyms in the industry even though block chain is actually a specific type of distributed ledger.
²⁰ Communication channels between nodes may be separate from the channels used by end users to access the nodes or the institutions that
maintain them.
²¹ In the context of Figure 3, the left panel is a clear example of a closed DLT arrangement, as all the nodes are hosted by a single entity. The right
panel, however, could represent either an open or closed arrangement. The determining factor of which is whether the entities that host the
nodes also needed to meet additional criteria to be permitted to participate in the arrangement.
²² Public key infrastructure (PKI) is the name given to the set of entities and procedures that govern the creation, distribution, and validation of
public keys. With respect to some implementations of DLT, roles and procedures played by specific entities in the traditional PKI framework
may be executed by the DLT protocol and thus may not require centralized authority or control. For additional information on public key
infrastructure, see U.S. Department of Commerce, National Institute of Standards and Technology (2013), Digital Signature Standards (DSS),
http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.186-4.pdf, and U.S. Department of Commerce, National Institution of Standards and
Te c h n o l o g y ( 2 0 0 1 ) , I n t r o d u c t i o n t o P u b l i c K e y Te c h n o l o g y a n d t h e F e d e r a l P K I I n f r a s t r u c t u r e ,
http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-32.pdf.
²³ U.S. Department of Commerce, National Institute of Standards and Technology (2013), Digital Signature Standards (DSS),
http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.186-4.pdf.
²⁴ In both DLT arrangements and traditional payment systems, the double-spend problem may arise, for example, if identical, duplicate
payments or transfers can be sent even when only one payment or transfer can be valid. In a DLT arrangement, an example would be multiple
simultaneous attempts to transfer a digital asset with the same serial number or unique identifier. Note that a related but not identical
problem can occur if a party attempts to make two valid transfers, but owns an insufficient amount of a digital asset to settle both transfers.
²⁵ Even in the pre-2008 environment of voluntary central clearing of standardized over-the-counter derivatives, CCPs existed and performed
important functions such as clearing interest rate swaps for major dealers.
²⁶ For information on the issues considered by the industry on the plan to shorten the settlement cycle of U.S. equities from three days after
trade date (i.e., T+3) to T+2, see Industry Steering Committee (2015), White Paper: Shortening the Settlement Cycle: The Move to T+2,
http://www.ust2.com/pdfs/ssc.pdf. For additional information on the initiative to move to T+2, see the industry T+2 website at
http://www.ust2.com/.
²⁷ Associations of financial institutions have also been used to establish model master agreements used in bilateral clearing.
DLT, typically follows several stages of development, industry stakeholders indicates that firms have several
beginning with a “proof of concept.”²⁸ common motivations behind efforts to develop and
deploy DLT arrangements:
These PoCs are simple, experimental uses of the • Reduced complexity (especially in multiparty,
technology on a very small scale in a controlled cross-border transactions)
environment (for example, nonproduction) and are • Improved end-to-end processing speed and
often used to help researchers understand the availability of assets and funds
potential and limits of a technology for a specific • Decreased need for reconciliation across multiple
purpose. At this stage, some important aspects of the record keeping infrastructures
²⁸ Scott Campbell (2013), "POC vs. Pilot vs. Production," January 25, https://www.citrix.com/blogs/2013/01/25/poc-vs-pilot-vs-production/.
See also National Defense Industrial Association 2008, "Engineering for System Assurance", Version 1.0, pp. 84,
http://www.acq.osd.mil/se/docs/SA-Guidebook-v1-Oct2008.pdf.
identified during the industry interviews and in development to potentially allow for more efficient
transfers of commodity “certificates” tied to specific
discusses, among other uses, post-trade clearing and
physical assets such as precious metals.
settlement, cross-border payments, and financial
inclusion. For each potential use, the industry has
Both examples connect with legacy payments systems
noted a set of existing frictions that might be
for the payments leg of an asset transfer. Thus,
addressed by DLT technology and developed one or
interoperability between the DLT arrangement and
more PoCs to explore major issues in developing and
legacy systems becomes an area of focus because final
applying the technology further. The PoCs also suggest
settlement is tied to the completion of both legs of a
that DLT arrangements may introduce new challenges
securities or commodities transfer (as discussed in
to potential uses, and as a result, sections 5 and 6 will
section 6.3). The industry has been focusing on ways to
discuss questions that will need to be addressed in
make those connections, including the establishment
order to transition from the PoC stage to widespread
of escrow accounts that interact with or are within a
adoption.
DLT arrangement. These escrow accounts would hold
onto one side of the transaction until confirmation
Securities, commodities, and derivatives
that the other side is executed.
transactions
Many organizations are particularly interested in The potential for DLT to reduce frictions in the clearing
identifying which aspects of post-trade processing and settlement of securities has led many industry
could benefit from DLT's potential to reduce participants to explore this technology as a way of
information transfer times from trade execution to reducing middle and back office costs. For example,
settlement, and thus to increase the speed and many such costs are driven by procedures that must be
efficiency of the operations that influence the length done manually or duplicated at multiple firms. During
of settlement cycles. In theory, the distributed and securities trades, all parties typically keep duplicative
consensus forming aspects of DLT could allow for records of the trade details, requiring costly
multiple parties to agree on the terms of trades in a reconciliation between firms. DLT arrangements are
fraction of the time required with existing processes. being developed to, among other things, share the
In addition, some contend that eliminating other c o s t s o f m a i n t a i n i n g s u c h r e c o r d ke e p i n g
frictions in clearing, such as reconciliation across infrastructures.
³⁴ Depository Trust and Clearing Corporation (2016), "Embracing Disruption: Blockchain White Paper," white paper, January,
http://www.dtcc.com/news/2016/january/25/blockchain-white-paper. See also SWIFT and Accenture (2016), "SWIFT on distributed
ledger," April, https://www.swift.com/insights/press-releases/swift-and-accenture-outline-path-to-distributed-ledger-technology-
adoption-within-financial-services. See also Euroclear and Oliver Wyman (2016), "Blockchain in Capital Markets," February,
http://www.oliverwyman.com/content/dam/oliver-wyman/global/en/2016/feb/BlockChain-In-Capital-Markets.pdf.
³⁵ See generally, Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (2004), FFIEC Information Technology Handbook, "Operations Booklet,"
July, http://ithandbook.ffiec.gov/it-booklets/operations/introduction.aspx. See also SWIFT and Accenture (2016), "SWIFT on distributed
ledger," April, https://www.swift.com/insights/press-releases/swift-and-accenture-outline-path-to-distributed-ledger-technology-
adoption-within-financial-services.
keys to individual or corporate identities is also an participants can write to the ledger. For example,
important privacy-related aspect of digital signature decisions regarding who can create new assets and
arrangements in which users are subject to legal how information that is input to the system is checked
requirements such as those associated with anti- for accuracy are fundamental. Also, the designers of a
³⁶ U.S. Department of Commerce, National Institute of Standards and Technology (2013), A Framework for Designing Cryptographic Key
Management Systems, August, http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-130.pdf.See also U.S. Department of
Commerce, National Institute of Standards and Technology (2016), Recommendation for Key Management, January,
http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-57pt1r4.pdf. See also International Organization for Standardization
and International Electrotechnical Commission (2005), Information Technology - Security Techniques - Code of Practice for Information
Security Management, June, http://www.slinfo.una.ac.cr/documentos/EIF402/ISO27001.pdf. See also Federal Financial Institutions
E xa m i n a t i o n C o u n c i l ( 2 0 1 6 ) , F F I E C I n f o r m a t i o n Te c h n o l o g y H a n d b o o k , " I n f o r m a t i o n S e c u r i t y, " S e p t e m b e r,
http://ithandbook.ffiec.gov/media/216407/informationsecurity2016booklet.pdf.
The use of DLT technologies may raise basic issues intermediaries, but not to be the security itself or the
about how financial instruments are designed and, in bundle of rights and obligations the security
some cases, the role and need for financial represents. One aspect that will not change is that the
intermediaries. The design of a DLT arrangement securities themselves will by definition continue to be
could take many forms and involves decisions about liabilities of the ultimate issuer of the securities.
so, and the roles that intermediaries will ultimately books will presumably continue to have rights and
play regarding the issuance, storage, recordkeeping, responsibilities with respect to those securities. If
and transfer of the digital assets. Some of these issues systems with tokens representing securities are
echo debates from the development of book-entry developed, and the tokens are not designed or
securities and electronic payments over the past five intended to be securities, then questions may arise
³⁹ Some laws and regulations have been designed to reduce the use of paper in PCS systems following, for example, the “paperwork crisis” of
the 1960s and 1970s. Some legal frameworks have also had implicit biases toward paper notices and other documents since these were the
accepted communications or authentication technologies when the frameworks were adopted.
⁴⁰ An example of how using a DLT-enabled shared ledger may be inconsistent with existing laws has been highlighted in the following article:
Jenny Cieplak and Mike Gill (2016), "How Distributed Ledgers Impact Post-Trade in a Dodd-Frank World," Coindesk, July 9,
http://www.coindesk.com/distributed-ledger-cftc-post-trade-dodd-frank/.
⁴¹ For example, the Decentralized Autonomous Organization (DAO) was a smart contract running on the Ethereum block chain that acted as a
venture capital fund. Participants pledged ether, the Ethereum block chain's native crypto currency, to the DAO in exchange for tokens, which
represented voting shares in the organization. Curators (well-known members of the community) were to select projects seeking funding
and put them up for a vote, with token holders receiving votes proportional to the amount of ether they pledged.
⁴² N ew Yo r k S ta te D e p a r t m e nt o f F i n a n c i a l S e r v i ce s ( 2 0 1 5 ) , F i n a l B i t L i ce n s e Re g u l a to r y Fr a m ew o r k , J u n e 2 4 ,
http://www.dfs.ny.gov/legal/regulations/bitlicense_reg_framework.htm.
⁴³ The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency has sought comment on similar ideas. See Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (2016),
Supporting Responsible Innovation in the Federal Banking System: An O C C Perspective, March,
http://www.occ.gov/publications/publications-by-type/other-publications-reports/pub-responsible-innovation-banking-system-occ-
perspective.pdf. See also Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (2016), Recommendations and Decisions for Implementing a Responsible
Innovation Framework, October, https://occ.gov/topics/bank-operations/innovation/recommendations-decisions-f or-implementing-a-
responsible-innovation-framework.pdf.
⁴⁴ In the United States, the AML authority responsible for interpreting the BSA and its implementing regulations is FinCEN:
https://www.fincen.gov/.
⁴⁵ U.S. Department of the Treasury, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (March 18, 2013), FIN-2013-G001, "Application of FinCEN's
Regulations to Persons Administering, Exchanging, or Using Virtual Currencies," https://fincen.gov/statutes_regs/guidance/pdf/FIN-2013-
G001.pdf.
⁴⁶ For additional information on the DAO hack, see Dan Goodin (2016), "Bitcoin Rival Ethereum Fights for its Survival after $50 million Heist,"
June 21, http://arstechnica.com/security/2016/06/bitcoin-rival-ethereum-fights-for-its-survival-after-50-million-heist/.
⁴⁷ Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems and Technical Committee of the International Organization of Securities Commissions
(2012), Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures, http://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d101a.pdf, page 19.
⁴⁸ Lael Brainard (2016), "The Use of Distributed Ledger Technologies in Payment, Clearing, and Settlement," speech delivered at The Institute of
I n t e r n a t i o n a l F i n a n c e B l o c kc h a i n Ro u n d ta b l e , Wa s h i n g to n D.C . , A p r i l 1 4 , h t t p s : / / w w w. fe d e r a l r e s e r v e . g o v /
newsevents/speech/brainard20160414a.htm.
⁴⁹ Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures and Board of the International Organization of Securities Commissions (2015),
Guidance on Cyber Resilience for Financial Market Infrastructures, http://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d146.pdf. See also National Institute of
S ta n d a r d s a n d Te c h n o l o g y ( 2 0 1 4 ) , Fr a m e w o r k f o r I m p r o v i n g C r i t i c a l I n f r a s t r u c t u r e C y b e r s e c u r i t y, Fe b 1 2 ,
https://www.nist.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cyberframework/cybersecurity-framework-021214.pdf.
David Mills, Kathy Wang, Brendan Malone, Anjana Ravi, Jeff Marquardt, Clinton Chen, Anton Badev, and
Timothy Brezinski are/were with U.S. Federal Reserve Board. Linda Fahy, Kimberley Liao, Vanessa
Kargenian, Max Ellithorpe, and Wendy Ng are/were with U.S. Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Maria
Baird is/was with U.S. Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.