Making Policy Better: Improving Whitehall's Core Business

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England No. 6480524 MAKING POLICY BETTER
Registered Charity No. 1123926 Improving Whitehall’s core business
Michael Hallsworth and Jill Rutter

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MAKING POLICY BETTER
Improving Whitehall’s core business

Foreword
Policy making is Whitehall’s core business and better policy making is a core theme for the Institute
for Government.
The last government made repeated attempts to reform policy making. But, as our research shows,
civil servants and ministers still felt that those attempts fell short. Our report, Policy Making in the
Real World and working paper, System Stewardship, explore the problems with those past attempts
and the future challenges policy makers face in a world of decentralised services and complex
problems. This report, Making Policy Better, takes the findings from that work and makes a series of
recommendations aimed at not just improving the approach to policy making, through a new set
of policy fundamentals, but also crucially embedding it into a system for making policy, which gives
ministers more control over departmental priorities, and makes the civil service more responsible
for the quality of policy making. It therefore builds on the work currently being driven forward by
the Head of Policy Profession.
At the heart of good policy is an effective relationship between ministers and civil servants. That
has emerged as a strong theme in a number of the ‘policy success reunions’ we have been holding
at the Institute over the last six months. This report calls for greater mutual understanding of and
respect for the roles of both in policy making. It sets out proposals for improving the capacity of
civil servants to help ministers. In a separate report, to be published later this year, we look at how
we can increase the effectiveness of ministers themselves.
There is much good policy making and that is why we have been keen to explore many of the
achievements of the last 30 years at our reunions. But we need to learn from what has worked
while looking for ways of building a system which makes policy more likely to work in the future.
That is what our report attempts to do.
Andrew Adonis
Director, Institute for Government
Foreword 3
Contents
Foreword 3
About the authors 6
Acknowledgements 7
Executive summary 8
1. The need to improve policy making 10
2. A new approach to policy making 14
3. Making the vision a reality 20
4. Conclusion 36
Contents 5
About the authors
Michael Hallsworth – Senior Researcher, Institute for Government

Michael joined the Institute in May 2008. He has conducted cross-government research into
organisational behaviour, machinery of government changes, and information technology. Most
recently, his work has focused on behaviour change and public policy making. Previously, he was
at RAND Europe (a not-for-profit public policy research institute), specialising in futures thinking
and performance management. He holds undergraduate and postgraduate degrees from
Cambridge University.
Jill Rutter – Programme Director, Institute for Government
Jill joined the Institute for Government as a Whitehall Fellow in September 2009 and was
co-author of its report on arm’s length bodies, Read Before Burning (July 2010). Before joining
the Institute, Jill was Director of Strategy and Sustainable Development at Defra. Before that
she worked for BP for six years, following a career in the Treasury, where she was Press Secretary,
Private Secretary to the Chief Secretary and Chancellor, as well as working on areas such as tax, local
government finance and debt and export finance. She spent two and a half years seconded to the
No.10 Policy Unit (1992–94) where she oversaw health, local government and environment issues.
6 About the Authors

Acknowledgements
This has been a long project, involving many people. The authors would particularly like to thank
the senior civil servants and former ministers and special advisers who generously gave their time
to be interviewed. Robert Devereux and Jon Coles, Head and Deputy Head of the Policy Profession
for the civil service, gave helpful steers at various points in the process. Members of the informal
policy reform group, indefatigably chaired by Donald Macrae, debated our conclusions repeatedly
and their contributions helped improve them. The Political Studies Association allowed us to survey
their members and have helped stage our policy reunions.
Special thanks are due to Simon Parker who conceived and led the project in its early stages
and continued to be involved after moving to the New Local Government Network; Tom Gash,
who took time out from his sabbatical to quality assure the outputs; Ian Moss, Sue Richards and
Julian Wood and other Institute for Government colleagues who contributed to the thinking
as it developed; and to Lord Adonis and Lord Sainsbury, who have given us the benefits of their
experience of policy making in Whitehall.
We also benefited from the help of a series of excellent interns at the Institute for Government:
Eimear O’Casey, Michael Law, Mike McKessar, Tori Harris and Edward Marshall. Finally, thanks
to our publications team – Nadine Smith and Paul Drinkwater – and our superb events team –
Loren Austin, Kerry Burkett, Alice LeGros and Hana Maitland – who helped pull together our policy
reunions and will help with the many spin-out events to come.
The conclusions are entirely the responsibility of the Institute for Government.
Acknowledgements 7
Executive summary
Policy making is a core activity for Whitehall. Yet, despite improvements made under the last
government, many ministers and civil servants are still dissatisfied with the way policy is made –
and significant underlying weaknesses remain.
Our analysis suggests that earlier reform attempts delivered only limited improvements because they
failed to take account of the real world of policy making: the pressures and incentives experienced
by various players, including ministers. Moreover, many existing models of policy making are
increasingly inappropriate in a world of decentralised services and complex policy problems.
In the face of these challenges, we need to give a more realistic account of what good policy making
should look like – and then ensure the surrounding system increases its resilience to the inevitable
pressures to depart from good practice. Our recommendations build on the intentions of the new
government Policy Skills Framework, but aim to drive changes further and faster into the system.
The starting point is our analysis that there are certain fundamentals of good policy making which
need to be observed at some point in the policy process:
• Clarity on goals
• Open and evidence-based idea generation
• Rigorous policy design
• Responsive external engagement
• Thorough appraisal
• Clarity on the role of central government and accountabilities
• Establishment of effective mechanisms for feedback and evaluation.
The fundamentals draw on elements of current policy making models, but place additional
emphasis on policy design and clear roles and accountabilities. They need to be seen alongside the
need to ensure long-term affordability and effective prioritisation of policy goals. Each department
should set out how it plans to uphold the policy fundamentals in a statement of policy making
practice, signed by the secretary of state and permanent secretary.
What is striking about the current system is that no one – in departments or at the centre of
government – has responsibility for ensuring that policy making is high quality, and that the system
responds effectively to ministers’ priorities. We propose a series of measures to change this situation:
• The appointment within each department of a ‘Policy Director’, who would report directly to
the permanent secretary, work closely with private offices, and act as the departmental Head
of the Policy Profession. They would coordinate policy work in the department: in particular
they would plan, commission and challenge internal policy work on behalf of ministers, review
the current ‘stock’ of policy, and develop the department’s policy capacity. Policy Directors
would also ensure that ministers are adequately engaged in the policy process.
• An extension of existing Accounting Officer responsibilities to cover due policy process, based
on the policy fundamentals outlined above.
8 Executive summary
• Streamlined ‘policy assessments’ to replace existing impact assessments and business cases.
These assessments would be available for public scrutiny, and officials would be personally
accountable to departmental select committees for their quality.
• A greater role for the centre in overseeing the quality of policy making (rather than just skills
and capabilities) through the creation of a senior Head of Policy Effectiveness, who will also
ensure rigorous and independent evaluation of government policies, and commission lessons
learned exercises for major failures of policy process.
These changes give the civil service a clear public duty to ensure good policy process, while leaving
political decisions in the hands of ministers.
Our next set of recommendations address concerns about the relationships between civil servants
and ministers raised by both parties. They know they would both benefit from honest and open
relationships based on trust, with space for constructive challenge, but felt that was too often
absent. We propose:
• Greater clarity from ministers on their high-level policy goals; and greater clarity from
ministers and civil service leaders on the value both parties can bring to the policy process.
• Engaging ministers early in the policy process, well before options are identified, and finding
new ways to create space for challenging discussions through internal tactics and by opening
out the policy process. Departments should work together to produce shared analysis to allow
ministers to focus on political choices.
Upholding the policy fundamentals and meeting the challenges of operating in a decentralised
world will require new skills and behaviours from the civil service. Our research also showed
concerns about existing knowledge deficits in departments. Our report makes proposals to address
these by:
• Better development of the skills of policy teams within departments, including more emphasis
on policy design, innovation and influencing
• Changes to incentives to retain internal expertise and to make more use of external expertise
in policy making. Departments should be able to access the necessary expertise at ‘one degree
of separation’.
Finally, the culture of the civil service needs to change to be effective in the future. Policy-makers
should see their role more as one of ‘system stewardship’, rather than delivering outcomes through
top down control:
• Whitehall policy makers need to reconceive their role increasingly as one of creating the
conditions for others to deal with policy problems using innovative and adaptive approaches.
• Incentives need to reward those who energetically search out experience and ideas, network,
facilitate and understand the systems within which they operate.
This is a significant agenda for change. The Institute for Government is keen to work with all
interested parties to see how we can make policy better.
Executive summary 9
1. The need to improve policy making
Making policy has traditionally been seen as Whitehall’s main function. Yet, despite the improvements
brought by a decade of sustained attempts at reform, civil servants, politicians and academics
continue to express concerns about the way policy is made. These concerns need to be taken
seriously: good government depends on good policy making. When policies fail, the costs can be
significant; repeated failure can erode confidence in government, and in the democratic process itself.
The Institute’s Better Policy Making project investigates why such concerns still linger and how
they can be addressed. Over the past year, we interviewed 50 senior civil servants and 20 former
ministers (including seven Secretaries of State) to understand their experience of the policy making
process. We also studied 60 evaluations of government policies, conducted soft systems mapping
exercises, and analysed existing government data sources.1 Finally, we held a series of ‘Policy
Reunions’, which brought together the key players from some of the most successful policies of the
past 30 years, in order to identify what worked and why.2
Our findings are set out in two accompanying reports. First, Policy Making in the Real World shows
how earlier reform attempts had only limited success because those reform attempts failed to
acknowledge the ‘real world’ of policy making. Second, System Stewardship sets out a new policy
role for Whitehall in an era of decentralisation and budget cuts.
This final report brings together our findings from the past and future of policy making to show
how policy could be made better. We set out what we have found, present a new vision of policy
making, and make specific recommendations about how the vision can be realised in practice.
1.1 What the research tells us

There are two main conclusions arising from our research.
a. Successful reforms need to recognise the ‘real world’ of policy making
Any serious attempt to improve policy making needs to look at what has already been tried. The
1997–2010 Labour government is notable for making concerted efforts to improve policy making
in ways not tried before. While those attempts led to definite improvements, both former ministers
and civil servants still feel dissatisfied with the progress that has been made. Our research suggests
the past reforms have tended to fall into one of four traps:
• Setting out an idealised process that is too distant from the realities of policy making (e.g. the
Treasury’s ROAMEF policy cycle)
• Offering realistic ambitions for policy making, but not specifying how they will be achieved in
practice (e.g. the qualities of good policy making set out by the Cabinet Office)
• Reorganising structures to improve policy making without embedding them in a wider view of
what good policy making looks like (e.g. the way in which flexible policy pools have been
adopted by central government departments)
• Neglecting the role of politics (e.g. the lack of attempts to engage ministers in reforms to
policy making, the omission of any discussion of the ministerial role).
Those earlier reform attempts failed to acknowledge the real world of policy making: the pressures,
constraints and motivations experienced by those in the system. As a result, civil servants recognise
1 For a full account of our research activity, see Michael Hallsworth, Simon Parker and Jill Rutter, Policy Making in the Real World, Institute for Government, 2011, Chapter 2.
2 Details and summary reports of these reunions can be found at: www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/content/160/better-policymaking
10 The need to improve policy making

good policy making in theory, but experience difficulties putting it into practice. Successful policy
makers end up finding ad hoc solutions to the problems that arise, but the system as a whole
leaves too much to chance, personality and individual skill.
The new Policy Skills Framework, launched in 2010, emphasises that policy is about “making change
happen in the real world”.3 This is clearly a move in the right direction, and our recommendations
can be seen as a way of driving those changes further and faster into the system.
For these changes to happen there needs to be clear ownership within departments for the integrity
and health of the policy-making system; our research found such ownership absent in too many
cases. The doctrine of ministerial responsibility makes it too easy for the civil service to avoid taking
responsibility for the quality of individual policy decisions. Some departments have failed to create
a culture that consistently challenges policy making to ensure it is high quality. And policy making
is still a relatively closed process, so the quality of policy advice is not subject to external scrutiny.
At the same time, no one at the centre of government has a general brief for the quality of the
policy process. The Cabinet Office’s capability functions do not cover policy making; Number
10 tries to anticipate the political problems policies may generate, but mainly exists to further
the Prime Minister’s agenda and put out fires. The (relatively) new position of Head of the Policy
Profession considers skills but not outputs. The result is a lack of internal quality control, and
limited systematic learning and improvement.
There is thus little counterweight to the day-to-day pressures on ministers and civil servants:
pressure to maintain a steady flow of initiatives; pressure to respond rapidly to events; pressure
to keep decisions closed until they can be announced fully formed; pressure to place short-term
departmental advantage over long-term collective benefit. The ministers (and by extension the civil
servants) who succeed in this system are those who make a splash or manage crises – not those
who oversee long-term results.
We need a more resilient policy process that recognises these pressures and helps policy makers
– both ministerial and civil service – navigate them. In particular, the political dimension of policy
making needs to be accommodated rather than ignored. Past attempts at reform have failed to
give an account of the role ministers are expected to play in the policy process. But good policies
depend on a blend of the political and the technocratic, and have effective collaboration between
ministers and civil servants at their core. The recent inclusion of ‘politics’ in the new Policy Skills
Framework is a significant step forward and needs to be built on.
b. Policy making needs to adapt to new challenges
As our report System Stewardship shows, policy making faces major new challenges. Departmental
administration budgets are being cut by a third on average over four years, and the Prime Minister
has promised that decentralisation, the Big Society, and payment by results will create “a total
change in the way our country is run”.4
Given these challenges, simply understanding the current system is not enough. It could lead to a
limited vision of policy making that is based solely on the practices of the past. Rather, we need to
ensure that any new policy process takes account of the emerging challenges faced by government,
and is appropriate for a more complex, decentralised world.
3 Available at: www.civilservice.gov.uk/Assets/Policy-Skills-Framework_tcm6-37017.pdf

4 David Cameron’s speech to Civil Service Live, 8 July 2010, transcript available at: www.number10.gov.uk/news/speeches-and-transcripts/2010/07/pms-speech-at-civil-
service-live-53064
The need to improve policy making 11

Already we can see that these changes will require a major overhaul of the way Whitehall makes
policy. The change will be biggest in the major public service departments which, under the
previous government, were expected to achieve outcomes through clear top-down ‘delivery chains’.
Their policy role will change to focus more on setting frameworks through guidance, facilitation
and commissioning, and less on ‘delivering’ outcomes themselves. But many policy makers still lack
a clear sense of what this change would mean in practice, and fear that they lack the capabilities
that will be required.
We need to address these questions urgently. The reduction in administrative budgets means
that reforms to departments’ policy functions are accelerating – without any clear understanding
of what has worked in the past, and little thought about how the various reforms will cohere in
the future. For example, departments are increasingly moving towards a more project-based way
of making policy, with defined deliverables and clear end-dates, reasoning that this will create
efficiency savings. But this trend could clash with the vision of a Whitehall that facilitates and
oversees, rather than creating a stream of new initiatives and projects.
We argue that the most effective role for policy makers in central government is likely to be one
of ‘system stewardship’. Rather than seeing policy formulation and delivery as entirely separate
and distinct activities, policy makers would acknowledge that the nature and outcomes of a policy
are often adapted as it is realised in practice. This adaptation is created by many different actors
working together in a ‘system’. System stewardship would involve policy makers overseeing the
ways in which the policy is being adapted, and attempting to steer the system towards certain
outcomes, if appropriate.
1.2 Improving policy making

The challenge is clear: to develop a process that is both resilient to the realities of the policy
making system and appropriate for meeting future challenges. This report sets out the Institute’s
proposals to meet that challenge.
First, we set a new approach for better policy making, which consists of two parts: a set of ‘policy
fundamentals’ that together constitute good process for policy development; and a set of roles for
central government to perform as the policy is put into practice. These are not discrete phases, but
constantly inform each other.
Second, we set out the means of turning this vision into reality. These are the concrete proposals
for ensuring the vision is put into practice. They fall under five categories: structures, controls,
politics and the role of ministers, skills and culture.
These categories are not mutually exclusive. For example, our proposals for new controls involve
the creation of new structures. But they can come together in a mutually reinforcing way to make
policy better, as set out in Figure 1.
12 The need to improve policy making

Figure 1: The policy making system
Structures
Culture Controls
Policy
fundamentals
Policy
realisation
Skills Politics
Source: Institute for Government
While we have gone into some detail to show how they could work in practice, our recommendations
are not intended to be overly prescriptive. None of the proposals are entirely new: elements are
already present in policy making activity across Whitehall. What is different is that these elements
have not been brought together in a systematic (and systemic) way. We are keen to engage with
all those involved in policy making – officials, ministers, advisers and those affected by policies – in
order to test and develop specific solutions.
The next section sets out the details of policy fundamentals and policy realisation; we then explain
how they can be put into practice.
The need to improve policy making 13

2. A new approach to policy making
Good policy making can be seen as consisting of two parts: a set of ‘policy fundamentals’ that
together constitute good policy development process; and a set of roles for central government to
perform as the policy is put into practice. Whereas in the past focus and effort has been devoted to
policy development, the move to system stewardship is likely to involve a greater focus on the task
of realising policies in practice.
2.1 Policy fundamentals

Our analysis of policy making identified seven elements that are integral to a good policy
development process:
• Goals. Has the issue been adequately defined and properly framed? How will the policy
achieve the high-level policy goals of the department – and the government as a whole
(with reference to the departmental ‘vision’, as stated in business plans)?5
• Ideas. Has the policy process been informed by evidence that is high quality and up to date?
Has account been taken of evaluations of previous policies? Has there been an opportunity
or licence for innovative thinking? Have policy makers sought out and analysed ideas and
experience from the ‘front line’, overseas and the devolved administrations?
• Design. Have policy makers rigorously tested or assessed whether the policy design is realistic,
involving implementers and/or end users? Have the policy makers addressed common
implementation problems? Is the design resilient to adaptation by implementers?
• External engagement. Have those affected by the policy been engaged in the process?
Have policy makers identified and responded reasonably to their views?
• Appraisal. Have the options been robustly assessed? Are they cost-effective over the
appropriate time horizon? Are they resilient to changes in the external environment?
Have the risks been identified and weighed fairly against potential benefits?
• Roles and accountabilities. Have policy makers judged the appropriate level of central
government involvement? Is it clear who is responsible for what, who will hold them to
account, and how?
• Feedback and evaluation. Is there a realistic plan for obtaining timely feedback on how the
policy is being realised in practice? Does the policy allow for effective evaluation, even if
central government is not doing it?
Overlaying these criteria has to be a decision on resources and resource availability. Individual
policies have to be affordable over their life time and represent good long-term value for money.
Resources are a critical part of the appraisal process, but they also contribute to the wider
prioritisation that has to take place both at departmental and government level.
These policy fundamentals draw on material from existing frameworks like the Cabinet Office’s
characteristics of good policy making and the Treasury’s ROAMEF cycle.6 However, they attempt
to address the main deficiencies of both. Unlike the Cabinet Office characteristics, they are
underpinned by recommendations to ensure they are embedded into practice. Unlike the ROAMEF
cycle, they are not dependent on being carried out sequentially. In the real world policy making
5 Available at: http://transparency.number10.gov.uk/transparency/srp/

6 See Her Majesty’s Treasury, The Green Book, 2003; and Cabinet Office, Professional Policy Making for the Twenty-first Century, 1999.
14 A new approach to policy making

usually does not proceed in stages.7 Although we set them out as a list, the fundamentals represent
a set of actions that need to have been observed at some point in the policy process; realistically,
the timing and sequence will often vary from policy to policy.
Furthermore, the fundamentals include important aspects that these previous frameworks underplay:
Policy design. By policy design, we mean the stage in the process which turns policy ideas into
implementable actions. Policy design is a fundamental yet under-developed part of the policy
process.8 Design matters. Many ideas which look good on paper are not feasible to implement –
and it is often too late to change course when the legislation is on the statute book and political
capital has been expended. Those failures can come from multiple causes, but one recurrent theme
is the failure to understand the likely behaviours of those whose actions the policy is designed to
affect. Policy makers need to be able to use prototypes and stress-test policies to ensure they are
implementable, which will require new partnerships and a greater involvement of service users in
policy development.9 More radically, policy makers (and Parliament) will need to move on from the
idea that central government creates fixed designs for policies, and start creating designs that are
flexible enough so others can adapt them to changing circumstances. The potential for use of agile
methods in government IT shows how design flexibility can bring major benefits.10
Roles and accountabilities. The coalition has signalled a major shift of power away from central
government through decentralisation, payment by results and the Big Society. These changes are
likely to mean that the systems through which policy is realised will become more complex. For
some policy issues, this complexity may be beneficial: an effective solution may emerge from the
way different actors adapt and react to each other, rather than from a central government plan.
In such cases, the aim is to harness this evolutionary approach. On the other hand, some policy
issues may require a more directive approach. Either way, policy makers need appropriate means
of judging what level of central government intervention is most effective for the policy problem
in question.
We suggest that there are four main criteria for making this judgement, as set out in Figure 2
below. In practice, they will all be applied within the overall context of the current government’s
beliefs about the role and responsibilities of the state, communities and individuals.
7 Hallsworth, Parker and Rutter, Policy Making in the Real World, Chapter 4.
8 Ibid.
9 For a practical guide to policy design, see Christian Bason, Leading Public Sector Innovation: Co-Creating for a Better Society, Policy Press, 2010, Chapter 7.
10 For further information on agile development, see Justine Stephen, et al. System Error: Fixing the flaws in Government IT, Institute for Government, 2011, available at:
www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/publications/23/
A new approach to policy making 15

Figure 2: Criteria for judging the level of central government intervention
Risk. Does the government action need to be ‘right first time’? Is the priority to achieve a
specific goal as efficiently or efficiently as possible, or to explore new possibilities?
Uniformity. What is the appetite for variety and divergence in service provision?
Complexity. Is the issue so complex that it is better for the system of actors to address it
through adaptation, rather than specifying a solution in advance? How likely is it that central
direction will be able to control the actors responsible for realising the policy in practice?
Capacity. What is the capacity of the actors in the system to address the policy issue
through their own agency? Is central government able to intervene to build such capacity?
To what extent is guidance or direction being requested?
The flip side of this focus on appropriate roles is the need to think carefully about who is
accountable to whom, for what, and the mechanisms to achieve that accountability. A key element
of accountability will be ensuring there is a clear failure regime from the start to avoid ministers
being forced to intervene in a crisis.11 The Institute has been conducting a separate project on how
accountabilities will need to change in a decentralised age.12
The fundamentals do not guarantee the success of a policy. However, observing them should help
ensure that the policy making process is robust enough to give ministers sufficient support to make
decisions which are frequently complex, wide-ranging and contested.
To help ensure they are observed, each department should develop a statement of policy making
practice that sets out its approach to upholding the policy fundamentals, including any actions to
strengthen their application. For example, this might explain:
• how the department has the capacity to search out high-quality evidence from other countries
• how interested parties can expect to be consulted, and by when
• how processes incorporate policy design practices
• the minimum standards of feedback and evaluation required.
These statements would be made public, and should be easily accessible online (perhaps from the
same web page as departmental business plans).13 They would be sent to select committees to act
as a common point of reference for subsequent inquiries. Furthermore, they would be signed by the
permanent secretary, as well as each incoming secretary of state.
The statements would be living documents, which would be updated as departments developed
ways of improving their policy function. In particular, they would also allow scrutiny of whether
departments have the capability to deliver their business plans (including the departmental vision)
11 For example, see Ian Magee, Review of Legal Aid Delivery and Governance, 2010, available at: www.justice.gov.uk/publications/docs/legal-aid-delivery.pdf
12 Julian Wood and Bill Moyes, Nothing to do with me?, Institute for Government, 2011.
13 http://transparency.number10.gov.uk/transparency/srp/

and, fundamentally, they would give citizens and Parliament a clear understanding of the quality of
policy process they should expect from Whitehall.
In other words, the policy making statement would not just be another piece of paper. It would
be a public set of guaranteed standards, representing a commitment by the minister and head of
department, for which they can be held responsible.
2.2 Policy realisation

Broadly speaking, central government still retains the underlying view that policy formulation
and delivery are separate and distinct activities. But this separation can be misleading: it implies
that ‘policy makers’ have control over creating the policy, which is then definitively fixed and
transmitted for others to execute faithfully. Rather, our research shows that:
• Policy formulation and implementation are not separate, but intrinsically linked
• The potential outcomes of the policy itself may change significantly during implementation
• Complexity in public service systems often means central government cannot directly control
how these changes happen
• The real world effects policies produce are often complex and unpredictable.
In other words, the goals and nature of a policy are often adapted as it is realised in practice.
A policy is not just made and then executed; it is made and constantly remade by multiple players
throughout the system. Central government policy makers have a continuing role in this remaking:
rather than thinking in terms of policy formulation and implementation, central government is
likely to find itself increasingly adopting the role of ‘system stewardship’.14 System stewardship
consists of four aspects: goals, rules, feedback and response. Table 1 gives a brief description of each
aspect, illustrated by an analogy from football.
14 A 2000 World Health Organisation report introduced system stewardship as a new concept for governments involved in healthcare. The Director-General of WHO
described system stewardship as a matter of “setting and enforcing the rules of the game and providing strategic direction for all the different actors involved”. Cited in
www.who.int/health-systems-performance/sprg/hspa06_stewardship.pdf

Table 1: The role of the system steward
Stewardship Description Football analogy
role
Goals • Owning the overall goals of the policy. Assessing whetherThe football manager sets an
the potential outcomes of the policy are effectively overall goal for the team: win
changing as it is realised in practice. the game. The manager does not
stand on the touchline trying to
• When dealing with a complex system, policy makers should direct every player’s movement.
set high-level policy goals that are resilient to the
adaptation that is likely to occur.
• If a more direct approach is needed, the goals should be

specific and clearly communicated.
Rules • Setting the framework and boundaries for the actors in The game has a set of basic
the system. rules: do not use hands, do not
take the ball outside a set area.
• For complex systems, the best tactic will usually be to Apart from these basic rules,
create a set of basic ‘rules of the game’ to guide actors and the players have freedom. The
specify boundaries that cannot be crossed. manager does not tell them to
do exactly the same thing each
• The rules may be more formal and extensive where greater
time they receive the ball.
control is appropriate.
Feedback • Understanding how the policy is emerging in practice. The manager watches the game
and sees how it is playing out in
• Assessing progress towards the policy goals; identifying practice. The manager watches
problems that central government could help resolve; different parts of the game and
judging the effects of the adaptation that may be occurring. tries to see how the team is
working together overall.
• Greater awareness of complexity will encourage more
informal, inquiring attempts to understand how the policy
is being realised – rather than simple performance
monitoring.
• Even when it is not desired, the existence of adaptation

should be fully recognised and its negative effects
addressed.
Response • Reacting to feedback. The nature of the response will vary In response to the game, the
according to the role central government is assuming. manager may change the team’s
tactics or formation; substitute
• Policy makers may attempt to steer the system using one player for another; issue
advocacy, changing incentives or prices, nudging system instructions to particular players;
users, or creating greater transparency. or give a motivational talk at
half time.
• If appropriate for the issue or system, policy makers may
also use direct intervention to address problems. The manager tries different
responses and watches for the
effects that ensue.

Figure 3 shows how these different roles come together.
Figure 3: System stewardship in practice
System stewards
System stewards vary according to
the policy issue; but
central government
Goals is likely to retain
Rules Feedback Response some responsibility
for overall system
functioning
Actors may include:

local government,
service providers,
mayors, community
groups, individuals,
commissioners, etc.
Of course, not all policies are realised through complex systems, and some policy problems may
be simple to solve. The way policy makers perform these tasks will vary according to the role they
have selected for central government to play. In the previous section we set out the criteria for
determining this role: risk, uniformity, complexity and capacity.
Our analysis suggests that increasingly central government will be exerting indirect control, and
our report System Stewardship outlines various ways this can be done. The crucial point is that
when choosing an intervention (whatever it may be), policy makers should be thinking about how
to manage an overall system, rather than how to launch another stand-alone initiative that tries
to ignore or supplant all its predecessors.
Recommendation 1: Each department should develop a statement of policy making

practice that sets out its approach to upholding the proposed fundamentals of policy
making. These statements would be public, and the permanent secretary and secretary of
state would be responsible for honouring them. They would be living documents, updated
as departments developed ways of improving their policy function. In particular, they
would allow scrutiny of whether departments have the capability to deliver their business
plans. In addition, the policy fundamentals should be incorporated into civil service training
and embedded into the Ministerial Code.

3. Making the vision a reality
To embed this new approach successfully, we need to address the fact that the current system
makes it too easy to neglect the fundamentals of policy making. Accordingly, we propose a series of
measures to change the incentives and capabilities of civil servants and ministers. These measures
will not only place the fundamentals at the heart of the process, but also help policy makers deal
with unprecedented reductions in administrative expenditure.
Focusing on policy fundamentals does not mean sidelining political will. Rather, it will help
ministers to achieve their high-level policy goals more effectively, which will bring political benefit.
As Tony Blair recently told the Institute, “politics is actually in the end about policy; and the best long
term politics is the best long term policy”.15
The next sections set out the changes that address the problems we have identified. They fall into
five categories: structures, controls, politics and the role of ministers, skills and culture.
3.1 Structures
Current structures within departments need to ensure that policy making resources are aligned
with ministerial priorities more effectively, while also ensuring that proper processes have been
followed. Structures are in flux as departments downsize; there is an opportunity to reorganise
policy making resources and strengthen the way they are managed in the future.
3.1.1 A strong departmental base
The starting point is that departments need a stronger institutional base for their policy making.
There is no single form that this base should take – but all departments need a focal point for:
• Policy planning. Ensuring that the department is working on the minister’s high-level goals,
and has allocated resources to support them; making sure that the minister is engaged early
on in the process to set direction and is kept in touch regularly with progress. Policy planning
would involve keeping abreast of external developments, including horizon scanning. The
planning function would also take over the commissioning of policy resources in the
department and oversee the outputs of policy projects.
• Policy challenge. Ensuring that the fundamentals of good policy making have been observed,
and acting as the quality control. Having an institutional base for such challenge would
address the current reluctance for one policy team to challenge another.
• Policy review. Ensuring that there is regular scrutiny of existing and emergent policy. Checking
that the ‘stock’ of policy is still aligned with departmental priorities and represents value for
money. There should be a more sustained engagement with policy issues and policy systems,
rather than seeing policies as discrete interventions.
• Policy capacity. Acting as a critical friend to standing or project policy teams, to improve their
ability to incorporate best practice and the latest evidence.
Some departments are already incorporating elements of this model. For example, the Policy
Support Unit in the Department of Health peer reviews submissions to ministers, and the Ministry
of Justice is developing a policy planning function to support its move to more flexible policy
structures. Given the pressure on resources, there is a strong case for brigading the planning,
15 Tony Blair’s speech to the Institute for Government, 28 June 2010, transcript available at: www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/pdfs/tony_blair_addresses_institute_for_
government_transcript.pdf
20 Making the vision a reality

challenge, review and capacity functions together so they can interact closely with the
ministerial team.16
Establishing a leader for the planning, challenge and review function is crucial. The permanent
secretary used to be regarded as the minister’s principal policy adviser. But in recent years, many
permanent secretaries have retreated from an explicit policy role, concentrating instead on their
role as de facto departmental chief executive. For these functions to work effectively they need
to be led at senior level on behalf of the permanent secretary.
We suggest that the departmental Head of Policy Profession takes on this senior leadership
role. The Head of Profession would become the Policy Director, who would be responsible for
coordinating the department’s policy work, in particular creating and maintaining the planning,
challenge, review and capacity building functions.17 The Policy Director would also be the main
commissioner of policy resources in the department. She or he would need to work closely
alongside the finance director to ensure affordability and with the chief economist to ensure value
for money. The Policy Director would be uniquely well-placed to take an overview of the policy
capabilities and development needs of the department, which would give real traction to the
Head of Profession role. The Policy Director would act on the behalf of, and directly report to,
the permanent secretary.
Recommendation 2: The departmental Head of Policy Profession should become

the Policy Director, who works alongside ministers to own the quality of policy in the
department. The Policy Director would coordinate departmental policy work, in particular
ensuring adequate planning, challenge and review of policy making, and build the
department’s policy capacity. The Policy Director would act on the behalf of, and directly
report to, the permanent secretary.
3.1.2 Strengthened cross-Whitehall policy governance

These arrangements within departments need to be complemented by others at the centre
of government. Despite policy making being at the heart of what Whitehall does, no one is
accountable for the overall quality of government policy making. Policy making is a core capability
for the civil service that needs to be owned by the Cabinet Office. We propose expanding the
government’s Head of Policy Profession, with its focus on skills, to a wider role as Head of Policy
Effectiveness. The Head would have five main responsibilities:
• accounting for the pace of improvement and learning in government policy making, through a
public annual report on policy capability, drawing on departments’ success in fulfilling their
statements of policy making practice (Recommendation 1)
• overseeing the quality of policy evaluations, and carrying out ‘lessons learned’ reviews in cases
of exceptional policy failure (Recommendation 15)
16 Although we have presented these teams as linked to departments, they could evolve into issue-based Units that work with a thematic Minister to address cross-
cutting challenges. Such a setup would build on the recommendations in our previous report: Simon Parker, et al. Shaping Up: A Whitehall for the future, Institute for
Government, 2010.
17 The Policy (and/or Strategy) Director role already exists in some departments (for example, the Ministry of Justice).
Making the vision a reality 21

• supporting departments’ efforts to ensure that all policy makers have a base level of analytic
skills and enhancing design, innovation and influencing skills (Recommendation 12)
• delivering a concerted programme to implement the Policy Skills Framework
• developing the policy making curriculum (Recommendation 11).
This new role unites oversight of policy standards and policy capability. That way, consistently poor
policy performance within departments can be identified and addressed quickly.
The task of judging and improving the policy process is likely to require significant experience of
government; the task of carrying out ‘lessons learned’ reviews is likely to be controversial. It will
need someone with weight and personal credibility who is prepared, if necessary, to challenge their
colleagues. Therefore, the post should be held by “someone with experience of dealing with ministers
in a very senior role, and who is demonstrably beyond influence, and thus probably in his [sic] last post”.18
Recommendation 3: The government Head of Policy Profession role should be expanded

to become the government’s Head of Policy Effectiveness, responsible for improving policy
capability across government and accounting for policy making standards. The Head should
have considerable experience; this is expected to be a final posting. She or he should report
to the Cabinet Secretary on civil service policy capability and standards.
3.2 Controls
The current system of policy making does not do enough to support and incentivise consistent
good practice; it is too easy for ill-considered initiatives to be introduced in haste. In this section
we propose new controls which can redress that balance, while streamlining the process. The key
challenge is to introduce these new safeguards without undermining the relationship between
ministers and civil servants (we address that challenge in a later section).
Our proposed controls take two forms: internal and external to the department.
3.2.1 Internal controls
At the moment, there are few means of upholding the public interest by ensuring that policy
decisions are based on a reasonable process (unless a decision is taken to judicial review). If officials
are dissatisfied with the way in which ministers have taken decisions, they either shrug their
shoulders and get on with it, or murmur among colleagues and to the press. Neither serves the
public interest. New controls could encourage the civil service to take professional responsibility
for ensuring policy decisions are made on a sound basis.
First, we would build on the existing Accounting Officer arrangements. Currently, each central
government organisation has an Accounting Officer (AO) – in Whitehall departments, usually the
permanent secretary – who is personally responsible to Parliament for “the stewardship of the
resources within the organisation’s control”.19 The AO has to make the minister aware if instructions
18 Lord Butler of Brockwell, Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction, 2004, Para 597, available at: http://image.guardian.co.uk/sys-files/Politics/
documents/2004/07/14/butler.pdf. This is the person specification for the Chair of the Joint Intelligence Committee.
19 Her Majesty’s Treasury, Managing Public Money, 2007, p.17, available at: www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/mpm_whole.pdf

they issue conflict with the standards the AO has to uphold. If the minister decides to continue in
the face of this advice, he or she must provide a written direction to the AO, which is sent to the
Comptroller and Auditor General.
Currently, there are three main instances where the Treasury recommends that the Accounting
Officer should seek a direction:
• Irregularity: if a proposal is outside the legal powers, Parliamentary consents, or Treasury delegations.
• Impropriety: if a proposal would breach Parliamentary control procedures.
• Poor value for money: if an alternative proposal, or doing nothing, would deliver better value,
e.g. a cheaper or higher quality outcome.20
There were 35 written instructions between 1997 and March 2010, of which 24 concerned for
value for money.21
We propose adding a fourth instance: poor policy process, where the AO is not satisfied that the
fundamentals of policy making have been adequately observed. This recommendation builds on
current practice. The Treasury currently recommends that AOs should exercise judgement on when
they need to “take a principled decision”.22 One of the standards they should use to make this
judgement is whether “clear, well reasoned timely and impartial advice” has been provided, and
whether the decision is in line with the aims and objectives of their organisation – both of which
relate closely to our proposed fundamentals.23
Furthermore, this new criterion could be seen as an extension of the current value for money
criteria, since there is a good case that a poorly made policy will provide poor value for money.24
The Treasury is already considering extending AOs’ responsibilities to ‘feasibility’, but our proposal
would also embrace the wider way in which policy is made.25 Where the minister wanted to
override the objection, they could do so, but would need to give a ‘policy direction’.
Such a change would sharpen the incentives for both parties. AOs would act in the knowledge that
they could be held to account by the departmental select committee for the quality of the policy
process, whether or not a direction was issued.26 Since the direction would be sent to the relevant
select committee and published on the department’s website, the minister would be publicly
accountable for taking action despite civil service concerns.
The point of extending the AO remit in this way is not to ensure more directions are issued,
but to make clear to officials, and in particular the head of department, that they must take
responsibility for good process. By extension, this will give ministers a stronger incentive to
observe good policy process.
20 Ibid, Box 3.2, p. 20.

21 Taken from figures at: www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200506/ldhansrd/vo060517/text/60517w02.htm#60517w02_spnew1; and www.publications.parliament.
uk/pa/ld200910/ldhansrd/text/100308w0003.htm#10030843001053
22 Managing Public Money, 2007, Paragraph 3.9.1, p. 22.
23 Ibid, Box 3.1, p. 18.
24 National Audit Office, Modern Policy Making, 2001, available at: www.nao.org.uk/idoc.ashx?docId=7a2ae0e1-6d63-4af0-a080-acb2469f7a41&version=-1
25 Sir Nicholas Macpherson, evidence to the Committee of Public Accounts, 19 January 2010, available at: www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmselect/
cmpubacc/c740-i/c74001.htm
26 This would accord with the Institute’s accountabilities work, which recommends that the Osmotherly Rules are altered so where senior officials have certain
responsibilities, they can be personally accountable to Parliament.

Recommendation 4: The Treasury should expand the remit of the Accounting Officer to
include responsibility for the quality of the policy process, based on the fundamentals of
policy making. In case of objection, the minister could issue an overriding ‘policy direction’.
Departments should make such directions available on their websites and notify their
departmental select committee in addition to the normal process.
3.2.2 External controls

Currently, departments experience two main ex ante controls on their policy making. First, certain
spending decisions require departments to submit a business case to the Treasury.27 Second, policies
that create significant effects through regulation require an impact assessment.28 Some impact
assessments require additional specific impact tests, intended to judge the policy’s impact on
issues including race, disability and gender; competition; small firms; greenhouse gases; health and
wellbeing; human rights; and rural communities.29
In practice, both these controls could work better. Business cases are produced sporadically
and inconsistently.30 The quality of impact assessments is frequently poor, while policy makers
argue that the specific impact tests simply rationalise decisions already taken, creating a major
bureaucratic burden in the process.31 These controls need to be simplified and exposed to
greater scrutiny.
In terms of simplification, we propose that impact assessments and business cases are combined
into a single streamlined ‘policy assessment’ that covers the key aspects of a policy.32 The policy
assessment would state how the process for the policy in question meets the department’s
statement of policy making practice.
Policy assessments would be required for all major policies, not just those involving spending or
regulation. There should be a clear, enforceable rules as to when a policy assessment is required
(as there are for impact assessments), but this decision will often rest on the judgement of the
department’s Policy Director.33 In order to ensure these assessments are a realistic proposition,
policy makers would have to complete them in a manner proportionate to the cost, risk and profile
of the policy.
The policy assessment would be based substantially on the Treasury’s existing five business case
model, which demands that policy makers present the strategic, economic, commercial, financial
and management case for the policy.34 This model would be adapted to incorporate the key aspects
of regulatory and non-expenditure policies, while still keeping the model as simple as possible. In
27 A business case is required if the expenditure lies outside limits that have been delegated by the Treasury or if the proposal is novel or contentious,
see www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/greenbook_businesscase_shortguide.pdf
28 The criteria which require an Impact Assessment are set out at: www.berr.gov.uk/assets/biscore/better-regulation/docs/10-898-impact-assessment-guidance.pdf
29 www.bis.gov.uk/assets/biscore/better-regulation/docs/10-901-impact-assessment-toolkit.pdf, p.34.
30 Centre for Social Justice, Outcome-Based Government, 2011, p.98.
31 See National Audit Office, Assessing the Impact of Proposed New Policies, 2010, p.5; and Regulatory Policy Committee, Challenging Regulation, 2011.
32 The NAO has already indicated that closer integration between Impact Assessments and business cases may be desirable, see NAO, Assessing the Impact of Proposed
New Policies, 2010, p.7.
33 For example, an Impact Assessment is required when the proposed action will impose costs of £5m or more on the public sector. It seems reasonable to apply a similar
criterion to spending decisions. See Impact Assessment Guidance, available at: www.bis.gov.uk/assets/BISCore/better-regulation/docs/I/10-1269-impact-assessment-
guidance.pdf
34 The Treasury’s guide to the business cases is available at: www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/greenbook_businesscase_shortguide.pdf

particular, the various specific impact tests would be streamlined and integrated into the main
policy decision more effectively, rather than existing only as separate tick box exercises.35
All policy assessments would be made public, and would be signed by both the Policy Director and
the chief economist.36 The departmental select committee should be able to call these officials to
account for the quality of the policy assessment, regardless of whether they have subsequently
moved post.37 The main purpose of policy assessments is to act as a way of increasing the
incentives for policy makers to observe good policy process. But in an era of tighter resources,
the assessments will also enable policy makers to prioritise effectively those policies that have
the best chance of success.
Recommendation 5: The existing impact assessments (and their specific impact tests)
should be combined with Treasury business cases to create a single streamlined policy
assessment that sets out how the policy met the policy fundamentals, in line with the
statement of policy making practice. Clear, enforceable, rules should be developed to
determine when a department is required to produce a policy assessment. All policy
assessments should be made public. Select committees should be able to call the relevant
officials to account for the quality of policy assessments – regardless of whether they
have subsequently moved post.
3.3 Politics and the role of ministers

Policy making in government is inherently political; the role of ministers is crucial. Good policies
successfully combine the political (mobilising support and managing opposition, presenting a
vision, setting strategic objectives) and the technocratic (evidence of what works, robust policy
design, realistic implementation plans). Achieving such a combination rests on good relationships
between ministers and officials. Both parties see the ideal as ‘directed exploration’, where ministers
are clear about their political and policy goals, and then are prepared to engage in an honest,
iterative discussion about how best to achieve them.
Yet our research showed that both sides were concerned that too often this ideal was not realised
in practice. If ministers do not recognise the value of challenge to their proposals, civil servants
often lack institutional support to raise important objections. As a result, they often have to adopt
a tactic of trying to judge which policies can be challenged without seeming to be obstructive.
This can be risky. At the same time, current arrangements encourage civil servants to ‘over-manage’
ministers, anticipating political decisions and even making their own judgements about what is and
is not acceptable. There can be a number of causes: wanting to please; assuming that ministerial
reactions can be predicted; or eliminating what appears to be infeasible, in order not to appear to
lack political judgement.
35 Race, disability and gender Impact Assessments are currently on a statutory footing, so would have to continue unless the law is changed. The intention is not to deny
the importance of these issues, but to address the fact that the current means of incorporating them often does not work.
36 The policy assessment should be published at consultation stage (as recommended for impact assessments) if there is one; if not, it should be published at least by
the time the government announces its position on a single policy option. See: www.bis.gov.uk/assets/biscore/better-regulation/docs/i/10-1269-impact-assessment-
guidance.pdf
37 Such a role would be similar to that performed by Australia’s Productivity Commission, see: www.pc.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0005/64679/quick-guide-2009.pdf

Good relationships cannot be mandated; they will always depend on personalities and other
contingencies. But institutions do have a role in creating the conditions that enable good
relationships to flourish, and mitigate the consequences when they do not.38 Our research
suggests there is a set of changes that could support more productive collaboration.
3.3.1 Greater clarity over the government’s high-level policy goals
Policy makers consistently stress the importance of clear goals for good policy making. However,
many civil servants we interviewed said they had felt unclear about the overall objectives of their
ministers, and the government in general. In particular, civil servants wished ministers could be
more comfortable discussing their political objectives with officials.
The Coalition’s Programme for Government sets out agreed current policy priorities but does not
give a more general guide for making future policy. The new business plans do set out the vision
for each department, which is a very welcome development.39 Nevertheless, there is still a case for
a ‘whole of government strategy’.40 Policy assessments would then be able to state how a policy
relates to the government’s broader, long-term agenda.
Recommendation 6: The government should make clear statements of its defining,

high-level policy goals, to guide departmental policy making and inform policy assessments.
3.3.2 Clarifying the roles of ministers and civil servants

Ministers and civil servants need to recognise the need for a blend of technocracy and political
values, and to value the role each party plays in achieving this blend. In addition to publicly
adopting the policy fundamentals, leading ministers should stress their support for good policy
process and their recognition of its importance. Ministerial development should focus on how to
build constructive relationships with the civil service, since ministers often come into government
with no prior training or experience of doing so. The Institute for Government will contribute to this
goal through its learning and development agenda.41
From the civil service side, there is a need for greater acceptance of the value that politics brings
to policy making. The new Policy Skills Framework is a major advance because it stresses the
importance of politics, and shows that it should be seen as complementing (rather than opposing)
the use of evidence. The policy profession should ensure civil service leaders are actively supporting
this message; in particular, there is a need to signal that understanding of Parliament and the wider
political process is vital for policy makers.
The need for a combination of evidence and politics in policy making could be set out as a formal
‘bargain’ that outlines the broad roles ministers and civil servants should play. Again, there is a
precedent here. The official Principles of Scientific Advice to Government recognises the value of
politics and technical expertise.42 The Principles states that ministers are expected to “respect
38 Stephen H. Linder and B. Guy Peters, ‘An Institutional Approach to the Theory of Policy-Making: The Role of Guidance Mechanisms in Policy Formulation’, Journal of
Theoretical Politics, 2:1, 1990, pp. 59-83.
39 www.number10.gov.uk/news/latest-news/2010/11/business-plans-published-2-56688
40 The Institute for Government recommended a ‘whole of government strategy’ in Parker, et al. Shaping Up, 2010, available at: www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/pdfs/
shaping-up-a-whitehall-for-the-future.pdf
41 www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/content/75/personalised-learning
42 www.bis.gov.uk/go-science/principles-of-scientific-advice-to-government

and value the academic freedom, professional status and expertise” of independent scientific
advisers.43 But, equally, advisers should “respect the democratic mandate of the Government to take
decisions based on a wide range of factors and recognise that science is only part of the evidence that
Government must consider in developing policy”.44 We propose expanding these principles to cover
the expected roles for both parties in policy making in general.
Effective working relationships between ministers and civil servants within departments are an
important element in departmental success and a source of risk if they are dysfunctional. The
new non-executive directors are well placed to test the quality of working relations within the
department. Serious problems could be escalated to the Cabinet Secretary or the Prime Minister.
The Institute’s separate report on ministerial effectiveness45 will propose further changes to help
ministers work more effectively within departments.
Recommendation 7: The government should set out the broad expected roles for
ministers and civil servants in policy making, along the lines of the revised Principles
of Scientific Advice to Government. Civil service leaders should actively support the
message that politics brings value to policy making, and this message should be explicitly
incorporated in civil service training. Any ministerial development should include the need
to build constructive relations with the civil service. Departmental non-executive directors
should regard dysfunctional relations as a source of risk and escalate them if necessary.
3.3.3 Improving the way ministers are involved in the policy process
Ministers had some specific complaints about the way they were engaged in the policy process.
For example, they felt that they got involved too late, with most of the significant discussions
complete, and were presented with a set of ‘pre-cooked’ options in a policy submission that
required rapid turnaround.46 The practice of policy submissions came in for particular criticism.
As a result, ministers and civil servants felt that their discussions sometimes fell short of complete
candour and clarity, leaving issues to go unexamined.
These difficulties emerge partly because of the way those discussions take place (if they do at all) –
often with options set out in advance, in a tightly scheduled meeting against an external deadline,
with the civil servants ranged ‘against’ a minister across a table, which creates an adversarial
environment and can be inimical to creativity and constructive challenge.
The Policy Director would take the lead in ensuring that ministers are engaged in policy development
early (and actively) enough to provide effective direction. To ensure such engagement, the
Policy Director will need to fashion close relationships with private offices and special advisers,
particularly over diary management. At a minimum there should be a standard monthly policy
progress meeting between the minister, Policy Director and permanent secretary. But there are
also some specific ways that the relationships could be improved.
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid.
45 Forthcoming, May 2011.
46 Hallsworth, Parker and Rutter, Policy Making in the Real World, 2011, Chapter 7.

First, there should be more experimentation with different ways of exploring options. There
could be greater use of external facilitators; techniques such as red and blue teaming, where
people deliberately advocate extreme views; and seminars with outsiders who might challenge
departmental thinking. Second, there could be explicit allowance for internal challenge. Medical
guidance, for example, increasingly mandates ‘pause points’ before surgery, which explicitly allow
anyone in the room to raise difficult but important points that otherwise are suppressed by the
social situation.47
Recommendation 8: Ministers should be part of the process of idea generation as early

as possible. Ministers and civil servants should also adopt tactics that can trigger greater
debate and openness in their relationships, making a reality of co-developing policy.
3.3.4 Opening out the policy process

Too often policy is developed behind closed doors through an unproductively adversarial
departmental process. Privacy may appear to have advantages for ministers and civil servants, since
they can float radical ideas without the risk that they will be leaked in a damaging way. However,
it also creates the risk that the public is at a different stage of understanding when policies finally
emerge fully formed.
Our series of policy reunions, and the experience of Australia (where the government can
commission independent reviews from its Productivity Commission),48 suggest there can be
considerable merit in depoliticising the analytic phase so it becomes less contested – allowing
ministers to focus their attention on the political choices. The Pensions Commission, the Stern
Review and the Low Pay Commission found that opening out the analysis can change the space
for political decision making, which can be a helpful way of managing the UK’s adversarial media
environment.49 The experience of the Office for Climate Change showed the benefits of presenting
a shared evidence base, even where analysis is kept in-house: ministers in Cabinet committees
could then focus on political options, rather than debating ‘facts’.50 At the very least, ministers
should be presented with the best collective internal assessment, with uncertainties highlighted,
as a starting point for decisions.
Recommendation 9: Policy making should be seen as a more open and transparent activity.
Analysis and evidence should, where possible, be produced and discussed in advance of
option decisions to enable better external engagement with the problem. Ministers should
be asked to make decisions from a shared analytic base. Interdepartmental discussions
should focus on producing best decisions, not seeking lowest common denominator
agreement to reconcile conflicting positions.
47 Atul Gawande, The Checklist Manifesto: How to Get Things Right, Metropolitan Books, 2009.
48 http://pc.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0005/64679/quick-guide-2009.pdf
49 www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/pdfs/policy_seminar_report_pensions_commission.pdf; www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/pdfs/IfG_policymaking_casestudy_
minimum_wage.pdf
50 www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/pdfs/IfG_policymaking_casestudy_climate_change.pdf

3.4 Skills, learning and expertise
Good policy making depends on having access to the appropriate skills and expertise – whether
inside or outside the civil service. Policy making has increasingly been treated as a professional skill
in itself, and there are various means of improving how this skill is taught and applied. But the new
environment will require new skills. Many civil servants we interviewed expressed concern about
the civil service’s future capacity both in terms of skills and knowledge. If policy making is to be
regarded on a par with other professions, it needs to professionalise its approach further.
A crucial part of that process will be to develop a willingness to learn from previous successes
and failures. But the real world pressures of policy making continue to prevent government from
learning in this way; in particular, the current way that policy evaluations are commissioned and
conducted has serious flaws.
3.4.1 Training
Civil service policy making training suffers when compared to that provided in other ‘professions’.51
Lawyers, accountants and others have clear routes to recognised qualifications that are
prerequisites of plying their trade, as well as enjoying a commitment to continuous professional
development. When economists and scientists come into government with developed academic
skills in relevant disciplines, they are brigaded into a separate professional class. In contrast, very
few civil servants enter with qualifications in policy and administration, despite the growing
number of relevant courses. As civil service posts are cut, managers need to take the opportunity
to raise entry level standards.
As well as initial qualifications, policy makers need to receive ongoing training and development.
We heard some dissatisfaction from ministers over the in-house analytical training policy makers
receive; it is telling that analytic capacity is often supplied by specialists or bought in from
consultancies. In this context, the recent development of a core training course, Achieving Policy
Outcomes, provided by the National School of Government, is welcome.52 But the Head of Policy
Effectiveness needs to ensure the curriculum is expanded to incorporate the fundamentals of policy
making and relationships with ministers.
Furthermore, there needs to be an expectation that all civil servants entering the policy profession
receive a level of policy skills training, as was supplied at the Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit. Such
training should be part of the initial induction for all Fast Streamers and for all those moving to
policy advice roles.
Recommendation 10: The Head of Policy Effectiveness should expand the curriculum of
the course, Achieving Policy Outcomes, to cover the fundamentals of policy making and
relationships with ministers. All civil servants assuming policy advice roles should receive
initial training in policy analysis skills, similar to that previously provided at the Prime
Minister’s Strategy Unit.
51 Hallsworth, Parker and Rutter, Policy Making in the Real World, 2011, Chapter Six.
52 See: www.nationalschool.gov.uk/csclp/policyoutcomes.asp

3.4.2 Continuous development of policy skills and knowledge
Training courses are only a partial solution; the development of policy skills also needs to be
embedded into practice. The department’s Policy Director needs to ensure that there are continual
efforts to develop analytic skills so policy makers can be competent consumers of research, or are
able to conduct an organisational analysis, or understand concepts from complexity science like
emergence and feedback loops.53 These efforts could take the form of workshops, regular informal
meetings, and the use of case studies.
At the same time, Policy Directors need to ensure that policy makers keep up to date with
latest external thinking and developments. Policy teams need a shift in attitude towards seeing
themselves as internal consultants who need to maintain cutting-edge skills so they can perform
well and keep themselves in business.
Increasingly, development activities will also need to embrace the less traditional skills of policy
design, innovation and influence. Take innovation. Civil servants know they have to be innovative,
but there is a lack of clarity over what this means in practice. The existing culture and incentives
are likely to encourage the ‘invention’ aspect of innovation – coming up with ingenious solutions to
pre-existing problems. In contrast, there is a need to present innovation as more practical, involving
prototyping and experimentation, and more open, drawing on a wide range of ideas from academia
and overseas. Finally, innovation in central government is likely to become more about creating the
conditions for others to innovate, rather than producing solutions. Policy makers need to have the
skills to create platforms for other actors to create ‘open source policy’.54
Good design and innovation will depend on policy makers’ ability to influence and network
other public sector workers and outside groups. Policy makers will increasingly be in a position of
facilitating, persuading and building confidence in others, all of which are very different from more
traditional policy making skills.
Recommendation 11: Policy Directors should be held responsible for developing the
policy skills of their departments, overseeing continuous efforts to improve their analytic
abilities and awareness of the latest ideas and developments. There should be a particular
emphasis on strengthening traditionally weak areas such as policy design, innovation
and influencing.
3.4.3 Valuing internal expertise

Both ministers and civil servants stressed the value of policy makers who have built up expertise
in a particular area. But there were also concerns that current career structures did not allow such
experts to progress unless they also took on management responsibilities. Often this can lead
to careers stalling, morale dropping, and apathy taking hold. In response, the civil service should
develop its expertise by creating greater recognition for civil servants who are experts in a particular
policy subject, along the lines of the private sector ‘high-level individual contributor’ model.
53 The Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit’s Strategy Survival Guide would provide a good starting guide for what should be covered, available at:
http://interactive.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/strategy/survivalguide/downloads/ssgv2.1.pdf.
54 This is different from an ‘open source policy’ model that simply uses the internet to widen policy suggestions for civil servants to consider, along the lines of an
enhanced consultation.

Such subject experts could provide continuity, subject expertise, and good stakeholder contacts.
They would also be responsible for maintaining a high quality, up-to-date body of evidence
for their subject area, which should be easily accessed from within the department and easily
integrated with other departmental evidence sources.
Recommendation 12: The civil service should create greater recognition for civil servants
who are experts in a particular policy subject, along the lines of the private sector ‘high-level
individual contributor’ model. These subject experts would be responsible for maintaining a
body of high quality research evidence in their subject area and networks of key contacts.
3.4.4 Accessing external expertise

Many interviewees argued that the policy process does not gather or use outside thinking well.
There are good reasons to think that policy making is improved by drawing on multiple sources of
expertise, and by bringing in outsiders able to challenge departmental thinking.55 Bringing in a wider
range of expertise – whether from local government, delivery bodies, academia or civil society – on
a short-term basis should be regarded as standard practice. Departments should, for example, have
standing contracts with universities or research institutes to embed outsiders in project teams on a
short-term basis. Policy makers will need to have ready access to a network of high-quality, current
thinking, and one of the roles of the new departmental policy function would be to make sure
policy teams build and nurture these networks.
Ministers also have a role in accessing external expertise – for example, they should easily be able
to bring in outside experts to challenge civil service advice. Indeed, they have incentives to do so,
since making the problem definition and analysis more porous and well informed is likely to build
public and professional support. Ministers should also be able to take new approaches to developing
policy options, such as challenging competing civil service teams to come up with ideas. However,
the Policy Director would need to ensure that such moves did not lead to a loss of internal policy
making capacity.
Recommendation 13: Departments should exercise a ‘one degree of separation rule’ so they
either have the requisite knowledge in-house or can access it at one remove. Departments
should make better use of external expertise to enhance and challenge in-house policy
making. For example, standing contracts could enable experts to be embedded in policy
teams quickly. Ministers should also be able to call on external experts to help challenge
civil service advice.
55 The flaws in tax policy making are plausibly explained by the relative lack of public debate and scrutiny surrounding the topic. See Hallsworth, Parker and Rutter, Policy
Making in the Real World, 2011, Chapter 6.

3.4.5 Better knowledge management
Many of our respondents were concerned about the lack of effective internal knowledge
management, which they felt was often underpinned by a culture that inhibits knowledge exchange
between individuals. This problem risks being exacerbated as Whitehall loses people and moves
to a more flexible, project-based approach to policy making. When project teams are disbanded
after completing their ‘project’ (for example, authoring a white paper or overseeing the drafting of
legislation), there are weak mechanisms for capturing what they have learned during the process.56
This is a risk which needs to be managed. First, there is a need for more rigorous knowledge
management processes, which are often standard practice in comparable organisations where
people work on individual projects. For example, no one should be signed off from a policy project
without having gone through a rigorous de-brief to ensure salient information is captured in an
accessible form; in the case of anyone leaving the department, this should be a standard part of
the exit process. The project manager should be held personally accountable for making sure this
happens. Second, there need to be clear handover processes to standing teams, which may include
continuity of personnel, and these need to be overseen by the Policy Directors and their team.
Recommendation 14: More rigorous knowledge management processes need to underpin

any move to more flexible project working. The Policy Director should ensure effective
handovers between those developing policy and those overseeing its implementation.
3.4.6 Evaluation
Evaluations aim to identify ‘what works’ in policy making, and the possibility of a poor evaluation
can also stimulate good practices earlier in the process. In practice, while government often
commissions evaluations, our evidence shows that most politicians and civil servants are extremely
sceptical about whether Whitehall takes note of their results: lessons often do not feed back into
policy design or problem formulation. In other words, although evaluations are often commissioned
they are often ignored.
One of the main problems is that evaluations are usually commissioned and managed by the
same department that carried out the policy. As a result, the department has the incentive and
opportunity to tone down evaluation findings that are critical, but which could lead to significant
learning. Since evaluators often depend on repeat business, they have the incentive to acquiesce
in self-censorship. At same time, the evaluation often ends up focusing on a narrow departmental
question, with few opportunities for cross-government learning.
To address these problems we propose that departments lose their monopoly on evaluations
of their own policies’ impacts. To achieve this we propose that the government’s Head of Policy
Effectiveness takes over a significant role in evaluations. She or he would receive a proportion of
departments’ current evaluation spending to establish an institutional base that carried out three
main functions.
56 Ibid.

First: overseeing the quality of evaluations commissioned by departments. This could be done by
sitting on steering groups for individual evaluations, or by auditing evaluation performance (for
example, assessing how evaluations are commissioned and subsequently used).
Second: running a process of open commissioning. Bids would be received from evaluators to
assess policies. They would be assessed on the public interest or value for money case presented
by the evaluator, and on the quality of the methodology proposed. This new setup should allow
more innovative practices in evaluation. It would also create greater recognition that the effects
of policies are intertwined with other government actions, rather than being achieved in isolation.
It may also allow evaluations of ‘framework’ policies – where central government has attempted
to create the conditions for others to solve problems (e.g. the use of payment by results). And the
publication of policy assessments may help promote open evaluation of policies by academics and
any other interested parties. The Head would need to work closely with departments to avoid the
risk of disconnect sometimes associated with independent evaluation centres.57
Third, in exceptional cases of policy failure, the Head of Policy Effectiveness would be able to
commission their own ‘lessons learned’ exercises. These reviews would promote internal learning,
as well as offering lessons for public dissemination along the lines of the International Monetary
Fund’s (IMF’s) Independent Evaluation Office’s recent report on the IMF’s role in the run-up to the
financial crisis.58 In order to do this, they would need access to internal papers and civil servants and
ministers would be required to cooperate.
Recommendation 15: The government’s Head of Policy Effectiveness should take a

significant role in evaluations. She or he would receive a proportion of departments’ current
evaluation spending to establish an institutional base that had three main functions: to
oversee departmental commissioning; to run an open evaluation commissioning process;
and to commission its own lessons learned reviews in cases of exceptional policy failure.
The Head of Policy Effectiveness should ensure that general lessons emerging from
evaluations are incorporated into policy making guidance.
3.5 Culture
The conventional view of policy making – of civil servants advising, ministers deciding, government
legislating and others implementing – no longer holds up. The culture and conception of policy
making in Whitehall needs to adapt in the future, which means reconsidering several core tenets.
The generation of policy ideas – the idea that Whitehall policy makers’ main purpose is to
generate policy solutions. There is still a feeling that, as one civil servant put it, “if we don’t have the
good ideas then we don’t think there’s a value to us”.59 There will need to be increasing recognition
that central government may not be able to provide all the answers to complex problems. Good
policy making will often be about creating the conditions for others (foundation trusts, teachers,
businesses and citizens) to deal with problems using innovative and adaptive approaches.
57 Kevin Williams, Bastiaan de Laat and Elliot Stern, The Use of Evaluation in the Commission Services: Final Report, Technopolis France and The Tavistock Institute, 2002.
58 Independent Evaluation Office of the International Monetary Fund, IMF Performance in the Run-Up to the Financial and Economic Crisis, 2011, available at: www.ieo-imf.
org/eval/complete/eval_01102011.html
59 Ibid.

The outputs of policy making – civil servants often feel they are rewarded for producing tangible
outputs – briefings, white papers, consultation documents. Rather than regarding these outputs,
and proximity to ministers, as the badge of success and the route to promotion, the successful
policy maker of the future needs to be able to search out experience and ideas, network, facilitate
and understand complexity. Instead of being based solely around individual projects and initiatives,
central government policy makers will need to take a more continuous, iterative, long-term
approach to problems, keeping track of how the systems they oversee are evolving.
The practice of policy making – policy making needs to be seen as a more practical, adaptive
activity, rather than one concerned primarily with the production of policy documents, speeches
or legislation. The focal point of policy making has always been the ‘front end’ – determining the
overall scope, purpose and presentation of the policy with ministers. In the new world, the locus of
power and action shifts more to the ‘back end’ – how policies are realised in practice.
Our understanding of policy making will need to adapt accordingly. In the past, policy makers have
been encouraged to get more practical experience through secondments, or ‘delivery experience’
has been made a condition for senior positions. The problem is that these tactics have not tackled
the root of the issue: they have continued to present ‘delivery’ as fundamentally different from
‘policy’, and just exhorted policy makers to do more of the former, as if it were unpleasant medicine.
But if policy is increasingly seen as inseparable from delivery, there is likely to be a more limited
role for Whitehall and a corresponding expansion in the degree to which the real impacts of policy
are determined by the actions of multiple ‘deliverers’. Policy makers may increasingly perceive
the real policy making to be taking place in localities or ‘delivery’ roles. At the same time, if the
power and challenges are seen to reside outside Whitehall, Whitehall may need to start tempting
people to move away from those roles to become central government policy makers – rather than
assuming they will jump at the chance.
Reflection – If they are to adapt successfully, policy makers will need to get better at reflecting on
how they do things. Currently, such reflection is rare – partly because our political system has little
tolerance for admitting being wrong. A more realistic understanding that policy is a set of adaptive
attempts to tackle a problem, rather than a fixed, perfect solution, should increase the ability of
policy makers (official and ministerial) to admit they do not always get it right and to learn from
their mistakes.
At the same time, there should be a growing recognition of the cognitive biases that often affect
policy makers, and increasing attempts to anticipate and correct for them.60 For example, it has
been shown that we are vulnerable to ‘anchoring’ effects: the first piece of information we receive
irrationally governs our subsequent decisions.61 We found clear evidence this happens in policy
making; as one interviewee said, “in that first visit for a new minister, and a new policy area, they can
very easily be swayed by early impressions – and then other evidence that supports that is obviously
going to get more attention... even within the civil service there is a bit of a tendency towards that”.62
Other biases, such as over-optimism bias, have previously been noted in policy failures, and have
led to new guidance being produced.63
60 Many of these biases are set out in Michael Hallsworth, et al. MINDSPACE: Influencing behaviour through public policy, Institute for Government and Cabinet Office, 2010.
61 Dan Ariely, Predictably Irrational: The Hidden Forces that Shape Our Decisions, HarperCollins, 2008, Chapter 1.
62 See Hallsworth, Parker and Rutter, Policy Making in the Real World, 2011, Chapter 8.
63 Kenneth R. Hammond, Human Judgement in Social Policy: Irreducible Uncertainty, Inevitable Error, Unavoidable Injustice, Oxford University Press, 1996; National Audit
Office, The Delays in Administering the 2005 Single Payment Scheme in England, 2006; and Her Majesty’s Treasury, The Green Book, available at www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/
green_book_guidance_optimism_bias.htm

The role of ministers – Any move to accept that policy is increasingly made from outside
Whitehall needs to be reinforced by changed practices from ministers, Parliament and the media.
Much of the pressure for central control comes from ministers feeling they need to account to
Parliament and the national media for decisions made outside Whitehall. If that pressure is not to
lead to recentralisation, new accountability mechanisms need to be found to satisfy pressure for
answers in case of failure. As the Institute says in a separate project, a clear ‘accountability map’
should be created as an integral part of the policy design process – rather than being left
to resolution in the face of failure or challenge.64
Changing perceptions of policy success – In a complex and decentralised environment, the
perception of policy success needs to change. A more trial and error approach to policy is likely
to yield better results than policies which require wholesale system change. However, one of the
big barriers to experimentation is the perception that a failed experiment is a political failure, and
a waste of public funds (rather than saving larger sums by preventing full-scale implementation
of a flawed concept). Politicians and civil servants need to be more confident in defending such
approaches, which also need to be reflected in the attitudes of bodies such as the National
Audit Office.
Experimentation is only part of the story, however. We also need to reconsider the notion that
there is always a ‘right’ policy to be discovered. Policy solutions often create their own problems,
which gradually displace the original difficulty.65 Rather than delivering outputs in a linear way, the
policy process is often about adapting to the unanticipated effects that public decisions themselves
have created.66 In future, we may increasingly see a successful policy as one that can adapt in
response to the effects it is creating, in order to keep sight of the overall outcome at stake.
Recommendation 16: Whitehall policy makers need to reconceive their role increasingly
as one of creating the conditions for others to deal with policy problems using innovative
and adaptive approaches. Incentives should be used to reward those who energetically
search out experience and ideas, network, facilitate and understand the systems in which
they operate. Policy making needs to be seen as a practical activity as well as an abstract
one, and provide greater scope for policy makers to reflect on how they do things. Finally,
in a complex and decentralised environment, expectations and perceptions of policy
success need to change.
64 Wood and Moyes, Nothing to do with me?, 2011.

65 We explain this concept, with reference to school testing policies, in Michael Hallsworth, System Stewardship, Institute for Government, 2011. Regulation is an obvious
example: a regulatory system fails if it does not adapt to the way actors are responding to the system it has set up, see Aaron Wildavsky, Speaking Truth to Power: The
Art and Craft of Policy Analysis, Little Brown, 1979, p.62.
66 Peter John, Analysing Public Policy, Continuum, 1998, pp.25-6.

4. Conclusion
Policy making is integral to good government. But it is important to note how difficult it can be
to improve the process of policy making in the UK. Peter Hennessey argues that there has been a
“distinct trait” in British ministers and civil servants to “eschew the rational, the written, the planned
or the strategic”, in favour of “understated, pragmatic, occasionally inspired ad hoccery and last-
minute improvisation”.67 Attempts at reforming policy making have tried to address this tendency
by imposing an artificial rationality on the process, which has then fallen victim to the realities of
operating in a political environment with many pressures and many actors. Policy makers must
reflect the flexible, perhaps chaotic, nature of public decision making, rather than cling to a false
ideal of rationality. But that does not mean they should not strive for a better, more resilient, policy
process – for two important reasons.
First, although policy making is inherently complex and messy, there are good reasons to believe
that a more ordered government underpinned by sound processes will be more effective and
efficient.68 Many of the complaints about the current state of policy making focused on its ad
hoc and rushed nature. Ensuring the systematic application of the policy fundamentals will help
mitigate this tendency.
Second, the process of democratic government is based on the electorate voting for policies in
the expectation that they will have the promised effects when put into practice, and holds the
government to account accordingly.69 The more this process is illusory, the more faith in democracy
and the political process is undermined. We need the notion of “intentional choice through politics”.70
A more effective policy process is needed to ensure that the reality of government comes as close
to the principle of ‘intentional choice’ as possible.
The attempts at reforming policy making over the past 14 years have made some progress towards
a better process; the Policy Skills Framework, with its acknowledgement of the role of politics,
marks another step forward. But our research suggests a need to go further and faster, especially
in the light of current pressures.
Whitehall does not face a stable future; it faces a period of unprecedented change: radical
downsizing of civil service numbers, deep cuts in programme spending, and a government with
a mission to decentralise decision taking and replace top down accountability with bottom-up
mechanisms. Those changes will only succeed if the policy making process can adapt to enable
ministers and civil servants to make policy better.
The answer is not to abandon any attempt at process, but to develop a more realistic process that
will be more resilient to the pressures on ministers and civil servants, and which enables them to
achieve the right blend of politics and technocracy in making policy. This means looking at policy
making in a more systemic way than we have before.
The proposals we set out in this report chart a possible way forward, which would address many
of those challenges. But, as we show elsewhere, plans alone are not enough: they need to be
embedded into the realities of the policy making system to ensure improvements take root. We
now want to work with those who can make change happen to test and develop these ideas further.
67 Peter Hennessy, Muddling Through: Power, Politics and the Quality of Government in Postwar Britain, Gollancz, 1996, p.14. Hennessy goes on to criticise ‘the pretence that
this [trait] is not only deliberate, but desirable and successful too.
68 See the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators, available at: http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp
69 See Amihai Glazer and Lawrence S. Rothenberg, Why Government Succeeds and Why it Fails, Harvard University Press, 2001.
70 James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics, The Free Press, 1989, p.52.
36 Conclusion
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The Institute for Government

is here to act as a catalyst for

The Institute for Government is

The Institute is a company limited

Michael Hallsworth and Jill Rutter

Michael Hallsworth and Jill Rutter

About the authors 6

1. The need to improve policy making 10

2. A new approach to policy making 14

3. Making the vision a reality 20

Michael Hallsworth – Senior Researcher, Institute for Government

6 About the Authors

1.1 What the research tells us

10 The need to improve policy making

3 Available at: www.civilservice.gov.uk/Assets/Policy-Skills-Framework_tcm6-37017.pdf

The need to improve policy making 11

1.2 Improving policy making

12 The need to improve policy making

Source: Institute for Government

The need to improve policy making 13

2.1 Policy fundamentals

5 Available at: http://transparency.number10.gov.uk/transparency/srp/

14 A new approach to policy making

A new approach to policy making 15

Source: Institute for Government

16 A new approach to policy making

2.2 Policy realisation

A new approach to policy making 17

• If a more direct approach is needed, the goals should be

• Even when it is not desired, the existence of adaptation

18 A new approach to policy making

Figure 3: System stewardship in practice

Actors may include:

Source: Institute for Government

Recommendation 1: Each department should develop a statement of policy making

A new approach to policy making 19

20 Making the vision a reality

Recommendation 2: The departmental Head of Policy Profession should become

3.1.2 Strengthened cross-Whitehall policy governance

Making the vision a reality 21

Recommendation 3: The government Head of Policy Profession role should be expanded

22 Making the vision a reality

20 Ibid, Box 3.2, p. 20.

Making the vision a reality 23

3.2.2 External controls

24 Making the vision a reality

3.3 Politics and the role of ministers

Making the vision a reality 25

Recommendation 6: The government should make clear statements of its defining,

3.3.2 Clarifying the roles of ministers and civil servants

26 Making the vision a reality

Making the vision a reality 27

Recommendation 8: Ministers should be part of the process of idea generation as early

3.3.4 Opening out the policy process

28 Making the vision a reality

Making the vision a reality 29

3.4.3 Valuing internal expertise

30 Making the vision a reality

3.4.4 Accessing external expertise