Analyzing Local Government Capacity and Performance
Analyzing Local Government Capacity and Performance
Analyzing Local Government Capacity and Performance
Article
Analyzing Local Government Capacity and Performance:
Implications for Sustainable Development
NakHyeok Choi
Abstract: Local infrastructure development is a crucial goal for sustainable development, for which
local governments take charge of developmental policies. This implies that the capacity of the local
government determines the performance of the developmental policies—local infrastructure develop-
ment. In this sense, this study investigated the impact of local government capacity, measured via the
quantity and the quality of human and financial resource factors, on its performance. Moreover, the
study examined which of the multidimensional government capacity components affect performance,
controlling a competition effect or spillover effect among localities. The study analyzed panel data
containing six years (2013–2018) of information on 152 local bodies in Korea, employing the spatial
autoregressive model, which is useful for controlling geographical spatial effects. The data show that,
unlike the quality factors, the quantity of government capacity does not have a significant effect on
its performance. Furthermore, the data also indicated that there are competition effects in relation to
the performance of local development. The results imply that local governments need to improve
the quality of managerial government capacity in order to increase their sustainable development
performance.
Keywords: developmental policy; local government; government capacity; government performance;
Citation: Choi, N. Analyzing Local sustainable development
Government Capacity and
Performance: Implications for
Sustainable Development.
Sustainability 2021, 13, 3862. 1. Introduction
https://doi.org/10.3390/su13073862
Public policy can be simply divided into developmental and redistributive policies.
Redistributive policies are related to reallocating societal resources, and developmental
Academic Editor: Richard C. Feiock
policies refer to establishing the physical and social infrastructure that is necessary to
facilitate economic growth. As regards the type of policies, in many countries, the central
Received: 15 February 2021
Accepted: 25 March 2021
government takes charge of redistributive policies. This is because, at the very least, people
Published: 31 March 2021
in a country should receive equal minimum welfare benefits, regardless of where they live.
However, local governments are in charge of developmental policies due to the fact that
Publisher’s Note: MDPI stays neutral
local developments must be designed and implemented according to their own specific
with regard to jurisdictional claims in
characteristics [1].
published maps and institutional affil- Among the two types of policies, this study focuses on the developmental policies
iations. related to local development. In particular, this study analyzes the degree of infrastructure
development resulting from the developmental policies implemented by local govern-
ments and discusses implications for sustainable development. In general, sustainable
development is recognized as an integrated approach that pursues the three core values
Copyright: © 2021 by the author.
of economy, society, and the environment. Though various different kinds of sustainable
Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland.
development goals (SDGs) have been suggested, infrastructure development is enshrined
This article is an open access article
within SDGs as a crucial element. This means that infrastructure development, as social
distributed under the terms and overhead capital (SOC), is not just a sufficient condition for sustainable development, but
conditions of the Creative Commons a necessary one. In this sense, continuous and successful promotion of infrastructure
Attribution (CC BY) license (https:// development is an important performance goal of local governments.
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/ While various different determinants of the performance of local governments have
4.0/). been discussed, the most significant factor in public policy is the capacity of the government.
Several studies have been conducted on government capacity (GC) [2–4], reporting on the
relationship between GC and government performance [5–9]. However, several questions
remain that have not been clearly answered. First, most prior studies have not provided
a theoretical framework for the link between GC and performance. Second, such studies
have also not suggested a theoretical background for the measurement of GC. The literature
indicates that authors use their intuition and experience for measuring this. Third, prior
studies have not clearly explained which factors within GC influence performance and
which factors do not. Most studies have regarded GC as just one factor, such as the number
of civil servants; however, it should be studied in the context of more diverse and detailed
factors, with the impact of the various aspects of GC being tested. Consequently, to fill in
the knowledge gaps of the literature, this study adopted two theories: Systems theory, that
implies the dependence of policy output on input and throughput, and Resource based
theory, that demonstrates the importance of resources for better performance. By employing
these theories, this research presents the theoretical background and a framework for the
concept and measurement of GC, the relationship between GC and performance, and for
testing performance competition between local governments in the context of infrastructure
development.
Specifically, this study seeks to address three research questions pertaining to the asso-
ciation between GC and performance. First, this study tested whether local government
capacity has a positive effect on performance. Secondly, if so, which specific multidi-
mensional local government capacity components affect performance was investigated.
Finally, the study examined whether the performance of local governments is affected
by neighboring local governments. That is, the research determined whether there is a
competition effect or spillover effect between localities and in what direction this affects
performance.
To answer these questions, the study defined GC as human and financial resources,
while defining performance as infrastructure development. Then, the study gathered
data on local governments’ GC and performance in Korea, between 2013 and 2018. Local
governments in Korea consist of 17 macro-level and 226 primary-level bodies. Macro-
level bodies represent one special city (Seoul), six metropolitan cities such as Busan and
Incheon, and eight “DOs” for example Gyeonggi-do and Gangwon-do, which are similar
to provinces. Primary-level bodies fall within the jurisdiction of each macro-level body,
which affects the degree of local development. Specifically, 74 primary-level entities under
the special and metropolitan cities are relatively well developed with a higher level of
infrastructure than the other 152 ones in “Dos.” This study investigates the 152 developing
entities, focusing on the association between GC and performance by using a spatial
autoregressive model (SAR) to control spatial effects.
As explained in detail in the following sections, the findings of the study are as follows.
Not all components of GC affect the performance of developmental policies, however,
the quality of GC does. The study demonstrates that the inefficiency factor negatively
affects government performance, while fiscal autonomy of revenue collection yielded
positive effects. Additionally, the inter-local competition effect pertaining to infrastructure
development can clearly be observed.
The rest of this article is structured as follows. The next section provides the theoretical
framework and reviews prior research used to devise the hypotheses. In the third section,
the methodology of the study is described, and the results of the regression analysis are
presented. The final section discusses the implications of the findings.
capacity was reviewed to compare how the various studies defined and utilized capacity.
Then, this study reviewed empirical research about GC that investigated management and
fiscal capacity.
The dictionary definition (https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/capacity, accessed
on 1 January 2021) of capacity is “the ability or power to do, experience, or under-
stand something,” “the maximum amount that something can contain,” or “amount
that something can produce.” A related term, capability, is defined in the dictionary
(https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/capability, accessed on 1 January 2021) as “power
or ability,” “the extent of someone’s or something’s ability,” or “forces or resources giving a
country or state the ability to undertake a particular kind of military action.” The common
ground between the meanings of capability and capacity is “ability.” While capability
focuses on “ability” or “resources,” capacity additionally encompasses the meaning of
volume to contain something [10]. For “ability,” the two concepts—capability and capacity—
have the same dictionary meaning. Academic literature rarely distinguishes between the
two terms. Most studies in the field of public administration or political science account
for the two terms as the power or the ability of government, and regard them as having
interchangeable definitions.
The first mention and conceptualization of GC occurred in a number of pioneering
studies (see Tables 1 and 2) [2–4,11]. Honadle [4] defined capacity as “the ability to antic-
ipate and influence change; make informed, intelligent decisions about policy; develop
programs to implement policy; attract and absorb resources; manage resources; and eval-
uate current activities to guide future actions.” Ingraham and Donahue [12] stated that
management capacity indicates “government’s intrinsic ability to marshal, develop, direct,
and control its human, physical, and information capital to support the discharge of its
policy directions” (p. 577). Similarly, Donahue, Selden and Ingraham [3] described man-
agement capacity as a “government’s ability to develop, direct, and control its resources to
support the discharge of its policy and program responsibilities” (p. 384). Second movers
adopted the former studies’ conceptualization and expanded or applied capacity according
to research focuses. Van Slyke [13] demonstrated management capacity as “personnel,
oversight and program audit capabilities, and the necessary communication and political
skills” (p. 296). Particularly, for management capacity, personnel must possess “contract-
management experience, policy expertise, negotiation, bargaining, and mediation skills”
(p. 296). Meanwhile, Hou, et al. [14] classified GC as “the administrative capacity approach”
and “the governance capability approach.” The former refers to aspects of the adminis-
tration that considers “the importance of policies, procedures, and resources governing
administrative action” (p. 300). The latter approach embraces external aspects such as
political influences. The authors considered capability as the rules or equilibrium that are
devised and restricted by political choice, an institution, and the rule of law—adopting the
perspective of New Institutional Economics [10].
Sustainability 2021, 13, 3862 4 of 14
Table 2. Cont.
2.2. Theoretical Framework for the Association between Government Capacity and Performance
This section proposes the theoretical framework of the present study by presenting
two background theories: Systems theory and Resource-Based Theory (RBT). Systems
theory provides the background logic that is used to explain how GC affects performance.
RBT concerns the measurement of GC and the reason for the significance of GC in terms of
performance.
Sustainability 2021, 13, 3862 6 of 14
2.2.3. Framework for the Link between Government Capacity and Performance
Borrowing from systems theory and RBT, this study established a theoretical frame-
work linking GC and performance. First, the implication of systems theory is that output is
a result of input and throughput. That is, the performance of government depends on how
well the phases of input and throughput performed. In addition, because government is an
open-system organization, the adaptability and manipulability of the external environment
are also significant; the input and throughput phases must secure abilities (capacities).
Second, RBT implies that good resources are key factors enabling a government to exceed
the benchmarks set by its neighbors. RBT also provides a background to identify the
factors that are considered to be components of GC. An empirical study [39] supported
the rationale of RBT by considering several resources to be components of capacity (e.g.,
administrative, human, and financial resources) [10].
Based on systems theory and RBT, this study proposed a framework for the rela-
tionship between GC and performance. The framework, Figure 1, presents an open
system, in which output (performance) depends on input/throughput (GC, local needs,
and competition).
Government can control or manage only GC, among the factors of input and through-
put. Thus, this study focuses on GC which is the key independent variable affecting its
performance.
The study also included an analysis of the impact of surrounding localities. Studies
such as Berry and Baybeck [49] illustrate how local government policies are diffused, with
learning hypotheses and benefit competition hypotheses. In other words, development or
benchmarking by referring to the policy cases of neighboring local governments would
affect a local government. In this regard, I posed a research hypothesis asserting that
interlocal competition would affect local governments’ performance.
higher degree of inefficiency, because it means that the ratio of managers to non-managers
is higher. On the other hand, financial resource capacities are set as the own source revenue
ratio (FC2) and expenditure size (FC1). The own source revenue ratio is calculated by
dividing own source (local tax and non-tax revenue) by total revenue. Expenditure size
is normalized by the number of residents, therefore FC1 means per capita expenditure of
a city.
A number of controls were also included in the model to account for other plausible
explanations of local development. Infrastructure development is associated with the local
needs of households and businesses. “Households’ needs” were measured by population
density, which indicates the number of residents per unit of area and is associated with more
development needs [50]. Additionally, the higher the number of companies, the higher the
demand for local development, because a local firm wants favorable business environments,
such as high-quality infrastructure, for improving profits. Therefore, the analysis model
controlled for “businesses’ needs,” which was operationalized as the number of companies.
Moreover, “population change” in a region affects the need for local development. The
change is computed by the sum of differences between births and deaths, and migration.
Lastly, the study controlled for “competition effect” in that local governments compete with
neighboring localities to expand and improve local infrastructure. The effect is returned by
spatial coefficients.
Table 3 presents all variables used in the model, along with their description and data
sources.
Variable Description
ln[(water supply rate + sewer treatment rate + urban
Log infrastructure development rate
area ratio)/3]
Human Resource Capacity 1 Number of civil servants/1000 residents
Human Resource Capacity 2 Percentage of senior officials (level 5 or higher)
Financial Resource Capacity 1 Expenditure/residents
Financial Resource Capacity 2 Own source revenue ratio
Households’ needs Population Density (Residents/km2/1000)
Businesses’ needs Number of firms/1000 residents
Population change (Births − deaths + net migration)/1000
Competition effect Spatial coefficients (rho)
Data source: Local Government Yearbook, Local Finance Yearbook, Statistics City Yearbook, e-local index by
KOSIS.
where Xit are strictly exogenous regressors, W is a matrix of weights, and r is a parameter
of spatial coefficient.
The SAR model produces outputs of three kinds of impacts: direct impact, indirect
impact, and total impact. The direct effects of an explanatory variable indicate its prediction
on the dependent variable. The indirect effect would be the impact of the surrounding
neighbors’ predictors on the locality’s outcome, which can be regarded as competition
effects or spillover effects.
Sustainability 2021, 13, 3862 10 of 14
I start with the results for the two hypotheses. First, to test H1, which suggests the
relationship between GC and performance, the model used the four GC variables. Yet,
only three GC variables—HC2, FC1 and FC2—reach statistical significance. Regarding the
direct effect, the coefficient on HC2, the percentage of senior officials, which indicates the
inefficiency of local governments, for local development is negative. Specifically, if the
percentage of senior officials increases by one unit, the local infrastructure development
rate would decrease by 1.65%. It is calculated by e β − 1 for which exp(−0.0166) = 0.9835,
therefore e β − 1 = −0.0165. For FC2, which is operationalized by the own source revenue
ratio, an additional one ratio would increase the performance by 0.21%, ceteris paribus.
In addition, FC1 measured by expenditure of local governments also shows explanatory
powers in which a government spending more than others had a higher infrastructure
development rate. However, the other GC variable failed to support the association with the
dependent variable, which means that the analysis results do not support the expectation
that the size of governments operationalized by the number of civil servants affects the local
development. These results indicate that the performance of local governments is more
affected by the quality of GC rather than just the size. That is, the higher the proportion of
civil servants at non-managerial levels and the higher the proportion of its own revenue
resources, the higher the level of local government performance. It implies that managerial
efficiency and financial soundness are significant for government performance. This result
partially supports H1 which expects the positive association between GC and performance.
Second, the study found that local government infrastructure development as an
indicator of its performance is affected by neighboring localities’ policy choices. The
coefficient on the competition effect for local infrastructure development is positive, indi-
cating the presence of positive competition among neighbors. In addition, the coefficient
is statistically significant at the 5% level. This result indicates support for the inter-local
Sustainability 2021, 13, 3862 11 of 14
competition hypothesis (H2), predicting that local governments compete in increasing their
infrastructure development rate.
Finally, the analysis examined the effects of the control variables. The estimation
revealed that businesses’ needs are positively associated with local government perfor-
mance. In other words, localities in which there are higher level of businesses’ needs for
infrastructure development are likely to focus on upgrading their infrastructure. However,
coefficients of other variables such as households’ needs and population change are not
statistically significant. It implies demographic variables are less important, at least in this
data, for local governments’ developmental policy compared to businesses’ needs.
Funding: This work was supported by the Ministry of Education of the Republic of Korea and the
National Research Foundation of Korea (NRF-2018S1A5A8027336).
Institutional Review Board Statement: Not applicable.
Informed Consent Statement: Not applicable.
Data Availability Statement: Not applicable.
Conflicts of Interest: The author declares no conflict of interest.
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