Descartes's Demon and the Madness of Don Quixote

Author(s): Steven Nadler

Source: Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 58, No. 1 (Jan., 1997), pp. 41-55
Published by: University of Pennsylvania Press
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 Descartes's Demon and the
Madness of Don Quixote

StevenNadler

Descartes's "maliciousdemon"(genius malignus,le mauvaisgenie)-the

evil deceiver of the Meditationson First Philosophywhose hypotheticalexist-
ence threatensto undermineradicallyDescartes's confidence in his cognitive
faculties-is an artfulphilosophicaland literarydevice. There is considerable
debate over the significance of this powerful and malevolent being within
Descartes's argumentativestrategy.Some insist that its role is a substantive
one, with Descartes introducingthe deceiver in orderto deepen yet furtherthe
skeptical doubts of the First Meditation,doubts from which he hopes, by the
grace of a benevolentGod, eventuallyto rescue himself.' Othersclaim that its
role is merely a rhetoricalone, with the demon meant simply to reinforceal-
ready philosophicallywell-establishedskepticaldoubtsthat, in the face of ev-
eryday habit, are difficult to sustain.2Eitherway, there is no underestimating
the force of the hypothesisas an epistemologicaltool for subvertingourfaithin
our reasoningand sensorypowers.

I am gratefulto Red Watson, Larry Shapiro, Zev Trachtenberg,and Timothy Reiss for
their comments and suggestions. A French version of this paper was read to a conference
commemoratingthe 400th anniversaryof Descartes's birthat the Universit6de Laval,Quebec
(September 1996). I wish to thank all of the participants in the discussion there for their
helpful remarks. References are to the Oeuvres de Descartes, ed. Charles Adam and Paul
Tannery(12 vols.; Paris, 1974-83), by "AT,"vol. and p. no., translationsfrom The Philosophi-
cal Writingsof Descartes, tr. John Cottingham,Robert Stoothoff, Dugald Murdoch,and An-
thony Kenny (3 vols.; Cambridge,1984), by "CSM,"vol. andp. no.; andto Miguel de Cervantes
Saavedra,Obras Completas (18 vols.; Madrid, 1928-41), Don Quixote appearingin volumes
XV-XVIII, translationsby J. M. Cohen (Harmondsworth,1950).
See BernardWilliams, Descartes: TheProject of Pure Enquiry(Harmondsworth,1978),
56; and Harry Frankfurt, Demons, Dreamers, and Madmen: The Defense of Reason in
Descartes's Meditations (Indianapolis, 1970), 87.
2 See Henri Gouhier,Essais sur Descartes (Paris, 1949), 154; and RobertWachbrit,"Car-
tesian Skepticism from Bare Possibility,"JHI, 57 (1996), 109-29.
41
Copyright1997 by Journalof the Historyof Ideas, Inc.

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42 StevenNadler

It is usefulto placethe"evilgenius"in thecontextof seventeenth-century

intellectualculture3 notjust forourunderstanding of whatmayhavebeenthe
historicaloriginsof this most extremeand "metaphysical"4 of all skeptical
doubtsbutalsoforbroadening ourappreciation of its significancebeyondepis-
temologyalone.Whenwe graspthevariouspractical(moral,legal,andsocial)
problemsandtheliteraryandartisticpossibilitiesraisedby thedemonhypoth-
esis, we cansee why suchanimprobably hyper-skeptical thesisis nonetheless
of
deserving general interest.
To takejust one example, RichardPopkin,in his
seminalworkon the historyof skepticismin earlymodemthought,describes
the knottyproblemsthataregeneratedin the legalcontextof a trialwhenthe
issue of the demonicis raised(as in the case of someoneon trialfor witch-
craft).5
Intheserviceof thiscontextualizing projectI compareDescartes'smedita-
tor (withhis self-assumedskepticalpose) with a near-contemporary literary
character of particularfameandimportance. Whatis especiallystriking-and
instructive-inthis comparisonarethe parallelsandresonancesbetweenthe
kindof general,systematic,philosophically-generated hyperbolicdoubtthat
Descartesintroducesby way of his deceptorpotentissimuset malignusand the
initiallymoreparticular (butperhapsequallysystematic)distrustof the facul-
ties thatis suggestedby Don Quixote'sown"rationalization" of his illusions.6
In factpreciselythe samephilosophicalproblemis raisedbothin thefirstma-
jorworkof modemphilosophyandin thefirstmodemnovel:in thefaceof the
possibilityof ongoingdeceptionby somepowerfulandmaliciousbeing,how
canwe possiblytrustoursensoryandrationalfacultiesto provideus withtrue
andreliableknowledge?Descartes'sphilosophicalworkcan evenprovideus
witha key to understanding partof the natureof Don Quixote'smadness,to
systematizing it in its epistemological
dimensions.Reciprocally,it maybe that
Cervantes's herogives us a concretepictureof whatit wouldbe liketo tryto
live in the radicallydeceptiveworldof the skepticismof the FirstMeditation.

3 The deceiver
hypothesis has ancestral roots in the concerns of medieval philosophers
with divine omnipotence. William of Ockham, for example, makes a common (but by no
means universal)claim that God could bring about the intuitiveor sensory apprehensionin a
human being of some object even though the object itself no longer (or never) exists; see
OrdinatioI, Q. 1, art. 1; QuodlibetaVI, q. 6. For a discussion of these medieval antecedents,
see Calvin Normore, "Descartesand the Traditionof Medieval Skepticism"(unpublished).
4 See Meditations III, AT VII:36; CSM 11:25:"Metaphysicadubitandiratio est."
5 The
History of Skepticismfrom Erasmus to Spinoza (Berkeley, 1979), 180-81. In short,
if the accused is indeed a witch, then why did she not use her powers to avoid apprehension?
Moreover,can any reliable testimony be taken from her alleged victims, since she (presum-
ably) can influence them?
6 In another
comparativestudy of Descartes and Cervantes,Anthony Cascardipoints out
some similarities and differences in the ways in which the two deal with the skeptical and
epistemological problems surroundingdreams;see "Cervantesand Descartes on the Dream
Argument,"Cervantes,4 ([1989], 109-30).

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Rene Descartes 43

Did Cervantes'snovel have a directinfluence on Descartes'sphilosophical

reflections?The first partof Don Quixote was published in 1604; the second
part,written after several piratededitions of PartI had been circulatingfor a
number of years, appearedin 1614, the year before Cervantes'sdeath. The
novel was immediately and enormously popular and was quickly translated
into a numberof other languages. The first French translationof Part I (by
Cesar Oudin) was published in 1614. In 1618, Francois de Rosset translated
Part II, and these two translationswere published together in one volume in
1639, 1646, and 1665.7 We can be confident that Descartes knew about
Cervantes'sworks; and while we cannot say with certaintythat he read Don
Quixote, given his education, social status, interestin novels of chivalry,and
the intellectualcircles in which he traveled,it would be surprisingif he did not.
He even seems to be alludingto the novel in theDiscourse on Method,when he
warns about the effects of reading fables, chivalric romancesand "even the
most accuratehistories":"thosewho regulatetheirconductby examplesdrawn
from these works are liable to fall into the excesses of the knights-errantin our
tales of chivalry,and conceive plans beyond their powers."8This is of course
exactly what happensto Don Quixote.
Whetheror not there was a direct influence (and it is temptingto believe
thatDon Quixote's evil enchanterwas the model for Descartes'sevil genius9),
there is much to be gained by comparing the predicaments in which both
Descartes'smeditatorand Don Quixote find themselves.

Fictum Cartesianum

Despite the widely-used but misleading phrase, "Cartesianskepticism,"

Descartes-a scientist seeking to provide a solid foundationfor the mechanist
naturalphilosophy-was concerned to combat skepticism'1;and the Medita-
7 See EstherCrooks, "Translationsof Cervantesinto French,"in Angel Flores and M. J.
Benardete(eds.), CervantesAcross the Centuries (New York, 1947).
8 AT,VI, 7; CSM, I, 114. The reference to "our tales of
chivalry"could be to the famous
stories of Amadis de Gaule, first collected in 1465 and published in 1508 (first Frenchtransla-
tion in 1540). During the sixteenth and early seventeenthcenturies, new tales were still being
added to the popular and widely-read collection. Descartes shows his familiaritywith these
tales in a letter to Chanut, 1 February1647, AT IV:615. They certainlyhad theireffect on Don
Quixote who, afterreadingAmadis, models himself afterthe "Knightof the Sun"(Don Quixote
I.1, Obras XV, 51-53; Cohen 32-34).
9 The French
phrasethatOudinuses to translate"evil enchanter"from Spanish(el maligno
encantador) is le malin enchanteur;see L'lngenieux Hidalgo Don Quichotte de la Manche
(Paris, 1949), 591. In the Duc de Luyne's French translationof the Meditations(the produc-
tion of which Descartes oversaw) the phrase mauvais genie is used to renderDescartes's ge-
nius malignus, while "evil deceiver [deceptor malignus]" is capturedby the words trompeur
and malicieux, although de Luyne never actually uses those two words together in a single
phrase.
10 See
Popkin, The History of Skepticism,chap. 9, and E. M. Curley,Descartes Against
the Skeptics (Oxford, 1978). On the other hand Stephen Gaukroger,in his recent Descartes:

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44 StevenNadler

tionsis wherethe epistemologicalbattletakesplace. Moreover,he believed

thatthebestwayto refutethe skepticis to beathimat his own gameby show-
ing that,in fact,therearecertainindubitabletruthsto whichevenone in the
throesof the mostradicalskepticaldoubtcannothelpbutassent.To demon-
stratethis, the first-personnarrator of the Meditationsmusthimselfadopta
radicalskepticalpersona.Hethusplaystheroleof aninquirerwhois seriously
consideringanyandeverypossiblereasonfor doubtinghis beliefs."lSomeof
thosebeliefs may survivethe skepticalonslaughtto be revealedas trueand
indubitable; otherbeliefswill be discardedas nothingbutprejudiceandunjus-
tifiableopinionor revisedin the lightof criticalreflection.Butunlessall pos-
siblereasonsfordoubtareconsidered-no matterhowimpractical or implau-
sible theymay seem-the inquirer,afterhavingdiscoveredsome apparently
indubitable truths,couldnevertrulyandconfidentlyclaimto haveovercome
anything a weakformof skepticism.
but
In playingthe skeptic,Descartesbeginsby rejectingany kindof naive
relianceon his senses:it is not the case thatone shouldbelieveall of one's
sensoryreports,for "fromtimeto time I havefoundthatthe sensesdeceive,
andit is prudentneverto trustcompletely[plane]thosewho havedeceivedus
evenonce."'2 Norshouldoneadoptevena criticallyinformedfaithinthesenses
underapparentlyoptimalconditions.Forgiventhe qualitativesimilaritybe-
tweenourdreamexperiencesandour wakefulperceptuallife, "I see plainly
thatthereare neverany suresigns by meansof which being awakecan be
distinguished frombeingasleep."'3 Hence,on anygivenoccasiononecannever
be absolutelycertain(andin a projectsuchas this nothingless will do) that
one'ssensoryexperienceis a veridical(waking)oneandnotanillusorydream.
Yet,themeditatorcontinues,at leastthereis an externalworldoutthere,from
whichdreamsget theirmaterial;or, if one cannotbe assuredeven of that,at
leastone can be confidentof thosebeliefs whosetruthis independent of or
"indifferent to"theexistenceof a materialworld-beliefs to whichI feeljusti-
fiedin assentingnotbecauseof sensoryevidencebutbecauseof thetestimony
of theintellect,of reasonitself4:perhaps"arithmetic, geometry,andothersub-

An Intellectual Biography (Oxford, 1995), argues persuasively that combatting skepticism

was not of great concern to Descartes, not because Descartes was a skeptic but because his
concerns were not primarilyepistemological.
" Of the many reconstructionsand analyses of the argumentsand overall strategyof the
Meditations, the more popular and useful are MargaretWilson, Descartes (Boston, 1978);
BernardWilliams, Descartes: The Project of Pure Enquiry; Anthony Kenny, Descartes: A
Studyof His Philosohpy (New York, 1968); Curley,Descartes Against the Skeptics;and, most
important,MartialGueroult'sDescartes selon l'ordre des raisons (2 vols.; Paris, 1953).
12 MeditationsI,
AT,VII, 18; CSM, II, 12.
13Meditations
I, AT, VII, 19; CSM, II, 13.
14 There is some dispute among Descartes scholars over whether or not the beliefs that
survive the dreamargumentare supposedto be true independentof the existence of a material

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Rene Descartes 45

jects of this kind,whichdeal only withthe simplestandmostgeneralthings

regardlessof whethertheyreallyexistin natureornot,containsomethingcer-
tainandindubitable. ForwhetherI am awakeor asleep,two andthreeadded
together are five, and a squarehas no morethanfour sides."15 Even if one
cannottrustone'ssensesto guaranteetruthsaboutthe world,surelyone must
stillbe ableto trustreasonto provideabstract,universaltruths?
Now if Descartesis to succeedin playinghis role to the extremedegree
required by hisepistemologicalproject,he mustconfrontthemostradicalskep-
ticalhypothesisconceivable.

Firmlyrootedin my mindis the long-standing opinionthatthereis an

omnipotent God who made me the kindof creaturethatI am.Howdo
I knowthathe hasnotbroughtit aboutthatthereis no earth,no sky,no
extendedthing,no shape,no size, no place,while at the sametime
ensuringthatall thesethingsappearto meto existjustas theydo now?
Whatis more,sinceI sometimesbelievethatothersgo astrayin cases
wherethey thinkthey have the most perfectknowledge,may I not
similarlygo wrongeverytimeI addtwoandthreeorcountthesidesof
a square,or in someevensimplermatter,if thatis imaginable?16

But,he continues,let us not yet get boggeddownin contentioustheological

issuesaboutdivinegoodness.

I will suppose,therefore,thatnotGod,whois supremelygoodandthe

sourceof truth,butrathersomemaliciousdemonof theutmostpower
and cunning [geniumaliquem malignumeundemquesummepotentem
& callidum]has employedall his energiesin orderto deceiveme. I
shallthinkthatthe sky,the air,the earth,colours,shapes,soundsand
all externalthingsaremerelythe delusionsof dreamswhichhe has
devisedto ensnaremyjudgement."7

Notetwothingsaboutthisevilgeniushypothesis.First,regarding its scope,

thefictionof thegeniusmalignuscando alltheskepticalworkDescartesneeds
done:it canundermine bothhisconfidenceinthetestimonyof hissenses(some-
thingwhich,forreasonsof method,he left initiallyto less radicalarguments)
world. Some, following HarryFrankfurtin Demons, Dreamers, and Madmen, have insisted
that all the skeptical arguments of the First Meditation are directed at the senses and the
beliefs thought to be derived from them, including those argumentsmeant to undermineour
confidence in mathematics(see Frankfurt,73). I do not agree with that interpretation,but this
is not the place for an extended argumentin defense of the less empiricisticreading.
15Meditations I, AT,VII, 20; CSM,
II, 12.
16 Meditations
I, AT,VII, 21; CSM II, 14.
17Meditations
I, AT,VI, 22; CSM, II, 15.

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46 StevenNadler

as well as his faithin his purelyrationalfaculties,whathe will latercall the

"natural light."Theevil geniushypothesisis sufficientto generateuncertainty
whetherthereis, in fact, an externalworldcorresponding to sensoryappear-
ances(and,in thecontextof theMeditations, while
uncertainty, fallingshortof
demonstrative falsehood,is nonethelesssufficientto warrantdoubt,whichfor
Descartesmeanssimplywitholdingassent18). Thehypothesisis also sufficient
to bringit aboutthathe is uncertainas to whetherthe mathematical andother
beliefsthathe onceregarded,fromthetestimonyof the "natural light,"as true
are in facttrue.In bothof thesearenas-sensoryexperienceandreason-be-
liefs arecertainas long as one is actuallyattendingto theircontent(I cannot
doubtthattwo plus threeequalsfive while I am thinkingthatit does).How-
ever,whiletheyalsoseemto be indubitable inretrospect,
whenoneremembers
having been certainof them they nonetheless become uncertain anddubitable
in the lightof the evil geniushypothesis.Thedemonfictionforcesone to ask
thequestion:is thatwhichis subjectivelycertain(whenit is beingattendedto)
alsoobjectivelyandindubitably true?19 Justbecausemy sensestell me,witha
persuasiveauthority, that there is an external worldout there,can I therefore
confidentlyconcludethatthereis sucha world?Justbecausemy reasontells
me, with even greaterpersuasiveauthority,that2+3=5, am I thereforewar-
rantedin adoptingthatbelief?
Second,regarding howtheevil geniushypothesisworks,thereseemsto be
a differencebetweenthe caseof the sensesandthatof reason.Withrespectto
the senses,the deceiveris responsiblefor the activeandongoingcreationof
illusionsthattakeme in by theirseemingreality.Sensoryappearances arepre-
sentedto me to entrapmy belief,and"allexternalthingsaremerelythedelu-
sionsof dreamswhichhe [thedeceiver]hasdevisedto ensnaremyjudgement."
Thedemonthusmakesit seemas thoughthereis a deskanda lampin frontof
me when,in fact,thereareno suchthings.
Inthe case of reason,however,the deceiver'sworkis muchmoresystem-
atic andthoroughgoing. It is not thatthe deceiveris responsiblefor actively
causingcertainfalsemathematical beliefsto presentthemselvespersuasively
to my facultiesfor my assent.Thegenie mauvaisdoes not danglea shadow
playof temptingabstractpropositions in frontof reason;nordoeshe playwith
andchangemathematical reality itself so thatmy beliefs fail to correspond
withit. Rather,themaliciousanddeceitfuldemonis chargedwithcreatingand
18
See, for example, Meditations I, AT, VII, 18; CSM, II, 12: "Reason now leads me to
think that I should hold back my assent from opinions which are not completely certain and
indubitablejust as carefully as I do from those which are patently false."
19Some argue that this is not the question that concerns Descartes, that he is afterpersist-
ing certainty,not truth;see Frankfurt,Demons, Dreamers, and Madmen. I do not think that
Frankfurtis right about this. I agree that his readingmay perhapssave Descartes from certain
troublingproblems (e.g., the "Cartesiancircle" objection) but only at the cost of greatly wa-
tering down his epistemological project (and his science).

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Rene Descartes 47

providingmewithmyrationalfaculties.Itis reasonitselfthatis supposedto be

sabotagedfromthe start:it is inherentlyfaultyand unreliable,havingbeen
createdandplacedin me (on this skepticalhypothesis)by a cunningandma-
levolentbeing.EvenwhenI employthatfacultyproperlyandwitholdassent
fromall butthe mostclearlyanddistinctlyperceivedideas,I might,for all I
know,endup withnothingbutfalsehood.

WhenI wasconsideringsomethingverysimpleandstraightforward in
arithmeticorgeometry,forexamplethattwo andthreeaddedtogether
makefive,andso on....DidI notsee atleastthesethingsclearlyenough
to affirmtheirtruth?Indeed,the only reasonfor my laterjudgement
thattheywereopento doubtwas thatit occurredto me thatperhaps
someGodcouldhavegivenme a naturesuchthatI wasdeceivedeven
in matterswhichseemedmostevident.20

ThatDescartesusesthe deceiverhypothesisin thiswayto undermine rea-

son is especiallyobviouswhenhe enterstheanti-skeptical phase of his project
andbeginsto resolvethedoubtsraisedabouttheintellect.Fortheresolutionof
thosedoubtsinvolvesprovingnotthatthereis no evil deceiver(andthusno one
activelytemptinghimwithfalse beliefs),northatGodis morepowerfulthan
the evil deceiver(andthusableto overwhelmor counteract the deceiver'sat-
to but
tempts mislead), that, even if thereis an evil deceiver,Descartesknows
(by theThirdMeditation proofsof God'sexistence)thathe wascreatednotby
thatdeceiverbutby a benevolent,non-deceivingGod.Hence,he knowsthat
thebeingthatcreatedhimgavehiminherentlyreliablecognitivefacultiesthat,
whenusedproperly,providetruth.
Deceitby a powerfulevil genius,whetherthroughactivelycreatedsensory
illusionsor(whichis moresinister)through thecreationinoneof anundetectably
faultyreasonwas, for Descartes,an unlikelybutnonethelessphilosophically
compellingpossibilitythatmustbetakenseriouslyintheepistemological project
of legitimizinghis naturalphilosophy.Forunlessthismostradicalof skeptical
hypothesesis overcome,Descartesbelievedhe couldnotclaimto haveproven
absolutelythe reliabilityof the cognitivefacultiesandtheirconceptualtools
(clearanddistinctideas)thatwereto serveandgroundthenewscienceof the
seventeenth century.Moreover,if Popkinis right,thedefenseof reasonagainst
thethreatof anevil deceiverwouldbe recognizedby Descartes'scontemporar-
ies as beingof morethanmerelyepistemological(andscientific)importance.
For Cervantes,it goes rightto the heartof the questionof the relationship
betweenrationality andmadness.
20 MeditationsIII,AT,VII, 35-36; CSM,
II, 25. Descartesrefershere to "someGod [aliquem
Deum],"andI see no reasonwhy it cannotbe an equivocalreferenceeitherto Godor to some
beinglike Godwithmaliciousintentions(suchas the deceiver).

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48 StevenNadler

"A Knight ErrantPersecuted..."

Inthecourseof thenovel,severalexplanations
areofferedforDonQuixote's
mentalinfirmity,
bothby thenarratorandbytheKnightof LaMancha'sfriends
andvictims.Perhaps,one suggests,it wasthe sunbeatingdownall dayon his
unprotectedheadwhilehewasmounteduponhis steed.Thenarrator believesit
was simplyfromreadingtoo manybooksof knighterrantry andtryingto un-
derstandtheirdeepermeanings:"Thesewritingsdrovethe poorknightoutof
his wits ... he so buriedhimself in his books that he spent the nights reading
fromtwilighttill daybreakandthedaysfromdawntill dark;andso fromlittle
sleepandmuchreading,his braindriedupandhe lost his wits."2'By thetime
we meet him, his brainis "nobiggerthana hazelnut,"rattlingaroundin his
skull.
Whatinterestsme, however,is DonQuixote'sownexplanation of thelack
of fit betweenappearance andreality,betweenhowthingsseemto him(or,on
occasion,others) to be and how they are in themselves.Consider,first,the
famouscaseof thewindmills.Earlyduringhis secondexpeditionthereappear,
off in the distance,standingon the plain,fortywindmills.Don Quixotede-
claresto SanchoPanzahis intentionto attack:"Lookoverthere,friendSancho
Panza,wheremorethanthirtymonstrousgiantsappear.I intendto do battle
withthemandtakealltheirlives."Inspiteof Sancho'sproteststhattheyarenot
giantsbutwindmills,DonQuixotecharges,onlyto be sweptupby a sailof one
of themills andthrownacrosstheplain.

"Omy goodness!"criedSancho."Didn'tI tell yourworshipto look

whatyou were doing,for they were only windmills?Nobodycould
mistakethem,unlesshe hadwindmillson the brain."
"Silence,friendSancho,"repliedDon Quixote."Mattersof warare
moresubjectthanmostto continualchange.Whatis more,I think-
andthatis thetruth-thatthesamesageFristonwhorobbedme of my
roomandmy bookshas turnedthosegiantsinto windmills,to cheat
me of the gloryof conqueringthem.Suchis the enmityhe bearsme;
butin theveryendhisblackartsshallavailhimlittleagainstthegood-
ness of my sword."22

Whois thisFriston?He is, DonQuixoteexplainedearlierto a perplexedhouse-

keeper,

21
Don Quixote I.1, XV, 51; Cohen, 32.
22 Don
Quixote 1.8, XV, 116; Cohen, 69.

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Rene Descartes 49

a learnedenchanter[sabioencantador], anda greatenemyof mine,for

throughhis artsandspellshe knowsthatin the fullnessof timeI shall
engagea favouriteknightof his in singlecombat,andthatI shallcon-
querhim,andhe will not be ableto preventit. Thatis why he triesto
serveme everyill-turnhe can.23

Thereare a numberof ways of lookingat whatthe enchanterallegedly

doesto afflictDon Quixote,dueto a greatdealof confusionin thenovelover
the sorcerer'sexactrole.Nowheredoes the narrator providea systematicand
universallyapplicable account of how Don Quixotebelievesthe enchanterto
workhis magic;we only get Don Quixote'sownexcuses.Nor is thereconsis-
tencyin Don Quixote'sexplanationsof whatthe enchanteris supposedto be
doingto himandto others;therearevariationsbetweenthedifferentenchant-
mentsandevenwithina singleepisode,andtryingto makecoherentsenseof it
all is a maddeningexercise.Thisis ultimatelypartof thenovel'scharm,andI
amnot interested-nordo I thinkmyselfable-in bringingtoo muchorderto
the chaos.
In the case of the windmillsit is not clearwhetherthe enchanteris, in
bringingabouthis deceptions,playingwithappearances or withrealityitself.
Don Quixotedoes initiallysee giants,butthenafterwards sees windmills.If
theenchanter is changingreality,thenbothsetsof hisperceptions areveridical,
but only because-Don Quixotewould have us believe-giants have been
changedintowindmills.Sancho'sperceptionsare consistentlyof windmills;
butthiswouldhaveto be becausehis firstset of perceptions-when,according
to Don Quixote,therearegiants-are illusory(presumably broughtaboutby
the enchanter). Onthe otherhandperhapstherearestillgiantsthere,butnow
the evil enchanteris causingit to look as thoughthereareonly windmills.In
thatcase, whileDon Quixote'sinitialperceptionsareveridical,his secondset
of perceptions-alongwithall of Sancho'sperceptions-areillusory.
Back on the road,Don QuixoteandSancholaterfindthemselvesat one
pointcaughtbetweentwo approaching cloudsof dust.Theconvergingclouds
arecausedby two flocksof sheepbeingdrivenin oppositedirections;butto
Don Quixotetheyarearmiesof "variousandinnumerable nations"marching
outto do battle.Onearmyis led by thegreatEmperor Alifanfaron,lordof the
greatislandof Taprobana, and the otheris commandedby the King of the
Garamantas, Pentapolin of theNakedArm("so-calledbecausehe alwaysrides
intobattlewiththisrightarmbare").Theselordshateeachother.DonQuixote
decidesto do battleon behalfof the ChristianPentapolin, whosedaughterthe
MuslimAlifanfaron insolentlyinsistson Sancho
marrying. soon hearsthebleat-
ing of ramsandewes andquicklysees thattheyareonlyflocks;Don Quixote

23 Don
Quixote 1.7, XV, 109; Cohen, 65.

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50 StevenNadler

insists that Sancho's fear preventshim from seeing aright,"for one of the ef-
fects of frightis to disturbthe senses and make things appearas they are not."
At this point, then, it literally appears to Don Quixote, both visually and
audibly,thatthereare two armieson the road.And when, afterhaving speared
many sheep, he is stoned by the angry shepherds,Don Quixote once again has
recourseto the powers of his evil enchanter:

What a way that scoundrel of an enchanter,my enemy, has of trans-

forming things and making them invisible! You must know, Sancho,
that it is a very easy thing for enchantersto give things whateverap-
pearancethey please. For this wicked sorcerer,my persecutor,being
envious of the glory he saw I was sure to gain from this battle has
turnedthe hostile squadronsinto flocks of sheep. If you do not believe
me, Sancho, do one thing, I beg of you, and you will discoverthatyou
are mistaken and that I am speaking the truth.Get on your ass, and
follow them stealthily.Thenyou will see thatas soon as they get a little
way from here they will turnback to their original shapes.24

Perhapsthis time the enchanteris more clearlyplaying with appearancesrather

than with reality: he is making things seem other than as they are. What the
enchanteris doing hereis nothingbut causingthe armiesto takeon the outward
form-the appearance-of sheep while remaining(ontically) armies. Sancho
decides not to confirmthis, and stays to help Don Quixote pick up his teeth.
The moral of such experiences, given (the theory of) the existence of an
evil enchanter,for a sufficiently philosophically reflective knight (one well-
versed in the lessons of the First Meditation), would be that one's sensory
faculties are not to be trusted.If the enchantercan literallychange one thing (a
giant) into another(a windmill), then what one's senses reportto be the case at
one moment is no reliable testimony that the next reportby the same senses
aboutthe same object underapparentlythe same conditionswill be consistent
with the first report.Or if the sensory reportsare consistent (as they were for
Sancho,for he always saw windmills), one cannotbe sure,given the possibility
of mutationcaused by the enchanter,thatboth reports(or either)are veridical;
and if at least one reportis veridical, one could not tell which one it is. Similar
skeptical problems arise if the enchanteris content to leave reality alone and
simply generate misleading and deceptive appearances,sensory reportsthat
misrepresentthe natureof reality.
Things become even more confusing in the episode of Mambrino'shelmet.
A barberridinga mule is approachingDon Quixote and Sancho;he is wearing
his shining, brass barber'sbasin on his head to protect his new hat from the

24
Don Quixote 1.18, XV, 242; Cohen, 139.

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Rene Descartes 51

rain.Don Quixoteinitiallysees-his first sensoryappearances presenthim

with-"a knightcomingtowardsus on a dapple-gray steedwitha goldhelmet
on his head."In fact,he exclaims,it is the famoushelmetof Mambrino. Don
Quixoteattacks,intending to recoverthe helmet, and the frightened barber
wisely runsawayand leaveshis basinbehind.Don Quixoteagreesthatthe
objectnow,uponcloserinspection,has thelookof a barber'sbasin,butinsists
thatit is only becausesomeoneignorantof the helmet'spedigreemusthave
refashionedit into thatshape.Undeterred, he putsthe basinon his headand
theycontinueon theirway.
In the end Don Quixoteand Sanchoagreethatthe externalformof the
objectis barber-basin-like. Sanchoproteststhatitis a barberbasin.DonQuixote
replies thatit reallyis Mambrino's helmet,at leastaccordingto its history.But
he quicklyforgetshis initialsensibleexplanation of whyit looks likea barber's
basin,and chides Sancho for notrealizingby now that,in a worldsubjectto the
whimsof enchanters, evil andbenevolent,appearances arenotto be trusted.

Is it possiblethatall this while you havebeenwithme you havenot

discoveredthateverythingto do withknightserrantappearsto be chi-
maera,folly andnonsense,andto go all contrariwise? Thisis not re-
the
ally case, butthere is a crew of enchanters alwaysamongstus who
changeandalterall ourdeeds,andtransform themaccordingto their
pleasure andtheirdesire eitherto favourus or injureus. So whatseems
to youto be a barber'sbasinappearsto me be Mambrino's helmet,and
to anotheras somethingelse. It showsa rareforesightin the sagewho
is on my side to makewhat is reallyand trulyMambrino'shelmet
seemto everyonea basin.Forit is of suchgreatvalue,thewholeworld
wouldpersecuteme in orderto get it fromme. However,as theysee
thatit is nothingmorethana barber'sbasin,theydo nottroubleabout
it.25

DonQuixoteeventuallytakestheepistemological lessonto heart,andlearns

howto live in sucha world.Thus,at one point,he restrainshimselfand(con-
traryto thereader'sexpectations)refrainsfromattackinga wagonloadof actors
dressedfora CorpusChristiperformance, withone of the actorscostumedas
the Devil himself." 'On the faithof a knighterrant,'answeredDon Quixote,
'whenI sawthiscartI imaginedthatsomegreatadventure waspresentingitself
to me. Butnow I declarethatappearances arenotalwaysto be trusted.Go, in
God'sname,goodpeople,andholdyourfestival;andthinkwhetheryou have
anyrequestto makeof me.' "26 (It is significantthatin the one instancewhen

25 Don
Quixote 1.25, XV, 355-56; Cohen, 204.
26
Don Quixote II.11, XVII, 146; Cohen, 535.

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52 StevenNadler

Don Quixoteself-consciouslyrecognizesthingsforwhattheyare,andfailsto
have explanatoryrecourseto maliciousenchantment, it involvesa situation
wherea kindof enchantment is naturallyalreadyat work.Fortheseareactors
in costume,whosejob just is to play with appearances andcreatea kindof
illusion.Inthiscasetherealreadyis a gapbetweenappearance andreality,and
thewickedenchanter's skillsarenotneeded.)
ThehardestthingforDonQuixoteto cometo termswithis hisgreatdisap-
pointmentwhen, comingacrossa coarsepeasantwoman,he believes(per-
suadedby Sancho,whois playinga trickonhim)thathehasfoundhisDulcinea,
his "loveandinspiration." He discoversher(whomhe hadneverseenbefore),
he latertells his royalhosts,"adifferentpersonfromtheone I sought.I found
herenchantedandtransformed froma princessintoa country-girl,
frombeauty
to ugliness,fromangelto devil,fromsweet-smellingto pestiferous,fromelo-
quentto rustic,fromgentleto skittish,fromlightto darknessand,to conclude,
fromDulcineadel Tobosoto a Sayaganpeasantgirl."Whenaskedwho could
have robbedher of her beauty,grace,and modesty,Don Quixote'sreplyis
appropriate:

Whocanithavebeenbutsomemalignenchanter [malignoencantador],
one of themanythatenvyandpersecuteme?Thataccursedrace,born
intotheworldto obscureandobliteratetheexploitsof thegood,andto
lightup andexaltthe deedsof the wicked.PersecutedI havebeenby
enchanters.Enchanterspersecuteme, and enchanterswill persecute
me till theysinkme andmy highchivalriesintotheprofoundabyssof
oblivion.Theydamageandwoundme wheretheysee I feel it most.27

Thisis, of course,exactlythe sameexplanationhe hadgivento the poor

womanherself.WhenDon Quixotefirstsees her,he is incredulous thatthisis
indeedthepeerlessDulcinea("Icansee nothing,Sancho,butthreevillagegirls
on threedonkeys").Buthe quicklyrealizeswhatis goingon, andtriesto calm
anydoubtsshe mighthaveabouthim:

"Andyou, O perfectionof all desire!Pinnacleof humangentleness!

Sole remedyof this afflictedheart,thatadoresyou!Now thatthema-
lignantenchanter persecutesme, andhasputcloudsandcataractsinto
my eyes, andfor them alone,andforno others,haschangedandtrans-
formedthepeerlessbeautyof yourcountenanceintothesemblanceof
a poorpeasantgirl,if he hasnotat the sametimeturnedmineintothe
appearance of somespectreto makeit abominable to yoursight,donot

27
Don Quixote II.32, XVII, 399-400; Cohen, 680.

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Rene Descartes 53

refuseto look at me softlyandamorously,perceivingin this submis-

sion andprostration,whichI makebeforeyourdeformedbeauty,the
humilitywithwhichmy soul adoresyou."28

She,naturally, tellshimto get lost(" 'Tellthatto my grandmother!'

replied
thegirl").He is heartbroken,
notbecauseshe spurnshimbutbecauseshe,too,
hasbecomean innocentvictimof the evil enchanter's magic.

Do you see nowwhata spitetheenchanters haveagainstme, Sancho?

See to whatextremesthe maliceandhatredtheybearme extend,for
theyhavesoughtto depriveme of thehappinessI shouldhaveenjoyed
in seeingmy mistressin hertrueperson.In truth,I was borna very
patternforthe unfortunate,andto be a targetandmarkforthearrows
of adversity.Youmustobservealso, Sancho,thatthesetraitorswere
not satisfiedwith changingandtransforming my Dulcinea,buttrans-
formedherandchangedherintoa figureas low anduglyas thatpeas-
antgirl's.Andtheyhavedeprivedhertoo of somethingmostproperto
greatladies,whichis the sweetsmelltheyhavefromalwaysmoving
amongambergisandflowers.ForI musttell you, Sancho,thatwhenI
wentto helpmyDulcineaonto herhackney-as yousayit was,though
it seemeda she-assto me-I got sucha whiffof rawgarlicas stankme
out andpoisonedme to the heart.29

Inhis mind,it is still Dulcinea.Onceagain,theenchanters areresponsiblefor

hidingthe truthbehinddeceptiveappearances (andthis time, for good mea-
sure,they work on the sense
olfactory as well). Sadly,in thiscaseDonQuixote
neverevengetsa briefglimpseof theunderlying reality,as he hadintheadven-
turesof thewindmillsandthe sheep.
What,then,is Don Quixote'sproblem?He is, he believes,plaguedby an
evil enchanter(or a teamof them)andthus(fromhis own perspective)finds
himselfin a worldin whichthe reportsof his sensoryfacultiesareno longer
trustworthy.Eitherobjectsthemselvesareliterally(ontologically)andunpre-
dictablytransformed ormanipulated; or,whatseemsmoreoftento be thecase,
things arenot what theyappear to be. The evil enchanteris wreakinghavoc
withappearances, causingthingsto lookotherthanwhattheyreallyare.What
DonQuixoteknowsto be giantslook(to others,andperhapsevento him)like
windmills;whatarearmieslooklikeflocksof sheep;a hero'shelmetlookslike
a barber'sbasin;andthe mostbeautifulandnoblewomanin the worldlooks
andactsandsmellslike,well,a mule-driver. DonQuixotethusfindshimselfin

28
Don Quixote II.10, XVII, 137; Cohen, 530.
29
Don Quixote II.10, XVII, 139; Cohen, 531.

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54 StevenNadler

the same predicamentas Descartes'smeditator.Descartes'sevil genius may be

causing it to appearas if there is an external world populatedin a particular
way by specific bodies when in fact the world is nothingat all like that,or when
in fact thereis no such world at all; and he may be causingit to appearas if two
plus three equals five (by having provided faulty rationalfaculties), when in
fact two plus threedoes not equal five. Don Quixote, in the light of his belief in
the evil enchanter,finds himself plunged into the same epistemologicalstraits.
He shouldno moretrusthis facultiesthanDescartes'smeditatordoes. He should
in fact be experiencinga skepticalcrisis of majorproportions.
Unlike Descartes, Don Quixote does not considerthe possibility thatthe
evil enchanterhas enchantedhim by giving him bedevilledfaculties.I suppose
this is because, as the old wisdom has it, thatone who is insaneneverquestions
his faculties, never asks whetherhis reason itself might be faulty.On the other
handDescartescasually and quickly dismisses the possibility thathe mightbe
mad.30

PerhapsI were to liken myself to madmen,whose brainsare so dam-

aged by the persistentvapoursof melancholia that they firmly main-
tain they are kings when they are paupers,or say they are dressed in
purple when they are naked, or that their heads are made of earthen-
ware, or thatthey are pumpkins,or made of glass. But such people are
insane, and I would be thought equally mad if I took anythingfrom
them as a model for myself.31

Madness, for Descartes,consists in a lack of controlover one's faculties.Even

if one considers those faculties to be systematically faulty, originatingin the
diabolical powers of an enchanter,one is still reasonableas long as one is in
control over those faculties. Descartes's meditatoris, at least, in controlof his
reason, although that reason may be sabotaged. Don Quixote does not think
that it is his faculties thatare enchanted,it is the world;but then again it is not
clear that he is in control of those faculties, and therein,perhaps,lies his mad-
ness.

There are, then, some interestingparallels (and contrasts)between Des-

cartes's most radical skepticalhypothesis of the First Meditation-the genius
malignus-and the kindof maliciouslycauseddeceptionto which Don Quixote
believes himself subject.At the heartof the novel is an importantand (for the
seventeenthcentury)timely epistemologicalproblemthatgets raisedin a simi-

30 AsFrankfurtplausibly puts it, Descartes wants to see what a sane, reasonableperson

can know; see Demons, Dreamers, and Madmen, 38-39.
31
MeditationsI, AT, VII, 19; CSM, II, 13.

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ReneDescartes 55

larbutmoremethodicalway by Descartesin his Meditations.Descartes,of

course,intendshis methodof doubtto be universalizable, capableof being
usedby anysufficientlyreflectiveandself-consciousperson.Theprimaryfas-
cinationof Don Quixote,on the otherhand,lies in his particularity
andpecu-
liarity.Butif he is to be morethana merecuriosity,he must,like anyworth-
while literarycharacter,representsomethingrecognizablygeneral.Reading
DescartesandCervantestogetherhelpsilluminateat leastone elementof the
novelthatis of broadphilosophicalinterest.Conversely, DonQuixoteprovides
a fineliteraryrenderingof whatthepracticalimplicationsare-for ourmoral
andsociallives,forourrelationswithnatureas well as ourrelationswithother
humanbeings,for actiongenerally-of tryingto live in a worldgovernedby
thekindof radicalskepticalhypothesisto whichDescartesbelieveswe should
give seriousconsideration at leastonce in ourlives.32

Universityof Wisconsin,Madison.

32 See Meditations I, AT,VII, 17; CSM, II, 12; the phrasehe uses is semel in vita.

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