Q1

(a) Discuss with examples from different African countries the claim that the military in
Africa has not always performed its mandatory duty of protecting the state against internal
and external enemies but has instead assumed the role of the most powerful state organ
which must be adored by the other institutions of state. (12 marks)

The politicization of the military is the tip of an iceberg that very often conceals an active
competition among politicians for military support. In fact, a majority of military coups that have
occurred in Africa were backed by competing political actors. When these competing interests
are within the ruling party, “palace revolutions” instead of a complete interruption of
constitutional order are more likely to occur. In Togo, for instance, upon the death of President
Gnassingbé Eyadéma in 2005, his son Faure Gnassingbé replaced him after generals loyal to his
father denied the leader of the National Assembly from taking over as prescribed by the
constitution.

Some political parties will try to find sympathizers within the military with the aim of usurping
power during times of crisis. Tellingly, the 2012 military coup in Mali gained support from
several political parties despite unanimous condemnation from the international community. In
Côte d’Ivoire, loyalists to former President Laurent Gbagbo continued to enlist the support of
sympathizers within the military to help undermine President Alassane Ouattara’s authority.
These politico-military imbroglios are illustrations of a common African theme: political actors
relying on the military rather than the populace for support of their causes.

While high levels of military professionalism in certain Western countries have made obsolete
the notion that individual politicians can subvert the security apparatus, the manipulation of
military allegiances remains common in many African countries. But such an approach is
inherently unstable. This was vividly illustrated in the experience of Côte d’Ivoire. When Côte
d’Ivoire’s first president, Félix Houphouët-Boigny, assumed control of the security sector, he
reduced its size and created a militia loyal to the party consisting mostly of Baoulé (Houphouët-
Boigny’s ethnic group). Furthermore, he practiced a form of manipulation of the military by
paying military officers high salaries compared to other civil servants and by giving top officers
positions in the party and other perquisites.

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This imbalanced patronage paved the way for the subsequent spiral of political instability and
insecurity in Côte d’Ivoire. Upon Houphouët-Boigny’s death in 1993, the president of the
National Assembly, Henri Konan Bédié, seized power with the help of a few officers of the
gendarmerie belonging to his tribe. By this act—unprecedented in the political and constitutional
history of Côte d’Ivoire—the security forces cast aside their image of unity and neutrality and,
from that point on, became central players in the political game.35 The same gendarmerie,
subsequently better equipped and trained than the rest of the Ivorian armed forces, later installed
Laurent Gbagbo as head of state following the 2000 elections in which his rival presidential
candidate, the late General Robert Guéï, proclaimed himself winner. As in other African
countries, elements of the security forces had become kingmakers.

The consequence of such relationships is a military that is more partisan and less professional in
the eyes of society, thereby diminishing respect for the institution—something that is necessary
in order to recruit committed, disciplined, and talented soldiers. The need for military support,
meanwhile, explains why politicians are often willing to tolerate and, at times, encourage
military leaders’ use of public resources for personal enrichment. The reality represents not only
a politicization of the military but also the “militarization” of politics.

he professionalism of a military relies on effective command and control systems, skills, and
resources to carry out successful missions. The weak operational capacity within many African
militaries renders them unable to play this role, calling into question their very relevance. The
rout of the Malian military by Islamist rebels in 2012, the capture of Goma by the now defunct
M23 rebel group in the Democratic Republic of the Congo the same year, and the disintegration
of the Central African Republic military following the rapid and easy conquest of Bangui by
Seleka rebel forces in 2013, are illustrative of the weak operational capacity of many Sub-
Saharan militaries. Among the multitude of reasons that could explain this inefficacy, the
following issues stand out: gaps in the chain of command leading to indiscipline, inadequate
oversight of procurement practices, weak resource management diminishing operational
capacity, poor morale, and a misaligned or obsolete mission.

Gaps in chain of command leading to indiscipline. A functional chain of command is a

prerequisite for any military institution. It reflects good leadership and discipline and promotes
accountability. Unfortunately, reports from around Africa paint a picture of militaries whose left

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hand does not appear to know what the right hand is doing. There is apparently very little
connection between official military policy and the acts of the rank and file. One such example is
in northern Nigeria where soldiers fighting Boko Haram insurgents have been accused of
atrocities by civilians. Senior Nigerian military leaders have been at a loss to explain these
actions despite being articulate in their understanding of the potential exacerbating effects that
heavy-handed domestic security measures can cause among local populations.

The vast majority of African militaries are governed by legislative texts, such as the armed
forces’ staff regulations and the military disciplinary code. However, criminal acts committed
outside the barracks often go unpunished due to gaps in the chain of command and in the
disciplinary protocol, perpetuating a view that military personnel in some countries are above the
law. This reinforces a culture of impunity that undermines a military’s reputation and fosters
deviant behavior among troops.

In Côte d’Ivoire under Laurent Gbagbo, no sanctions were taken against the perpetrators of a
massacre in 2000—when soldiers loyal to Gbagbo killed civilians contesting the legitimacy of
Gbagbo’s election. Nor was there any accountability for the killings during protest marches in
2004. After the democratic regime of Alassane Ouattara came to power in 2011, those
perpetrators were indicted. However, the Ouattara government has yet to do the same with
soldiers under its authority who committed crimes in the aftermath of the disputed 2010
elections.

There are exceptions, of course. In Benin, the judiciary on several occasions arrested detectives
from the gendarmerie and the police for unlawful imprisonment and ill-treatment of citizens in
police custody. In Burkina Faso, 566 soldiers involved in the mutiny of 2011 were discharged
from the army, and 217 leaders of the mutiny were arrested, prosecuted by a military tribunal,
and jailed for dishonoring the armed forces, causing public disorder, and violating human rights.

Inadequate oversight of procurement practices. Another visible manifestation of poor governance

in the military is in the procurement of supplies and equipment for the forces. Most troops will
complain that life in the barracks is inhospitable, pay negligible, and opportunity for
advancement nonexistent. Yet, the budget for the military is larger than most other public
services. In Nigeria, for example, many military barracks remained in serious disrepair even after
the military spent almost N12 billion (approximately $76 million) on barrack rehabilitation and

3
construction.39 Allegations of corruption in the procurement of inferior equipment and diversion
of supplies to Boko Haram have further eroded trust in the Nigerian military and directly
compromised its effectiveness.

One reason for this disconnect is that defense ministries’ financial and administrative affairs
departments are commonly just empty shells—severely understaffed and lacking the means to
carry out their duties. The resulting weak oversight of procurement contracts by defense
ministries enables widespread corruption and creates a governance problem. For example, in an
assessment of 19 African defense sectors, Transparency International found 90 percent scored in
the bottom two quintiles for transparency in the procurement cycle. Even if administrative
procedures are respected in the early phases of the budget-making process, it only takes a stamp
of “secret” or “classified” on these tenders to bypass audit by the public finance units. And while
some military procurements may need to be confidential for national security purposes, the vast
majority do not.

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b) Some Pan Africanists assert that the military in Africa has always behaved as an anti-
people institution because it was established as a colonial coercive force to compel Africans
to accept colonial rule. Discuss this claim with examples from different African countries.
(13 marks)

Colonialism altered the existing social and cultural patterns in Africa by creating arbitrary
boundaries that sought to put together ethnically, culturally and religiously diverse people in
somewhat artificial states. Colonial policies further created a stratified society with structural and
regional inequalities. For example, according to the divide-and-rule policy, ethnic groups that
were deemed loyal to, and cooperative with, the colonial powers were treated better, and their
regions received more resources, education and representation in the armed forces. For example,
in Anglophone West Africa, the British colonial policy of indirect rule contributed to the class
variation between the upper class (civilian politicians) and the lower class (military and common
people). Colonial policies also provided an unfavourable environment for political stability and
peace in the former colonies after independence. In particular, the political culture that emerged
out of colonial rule has been one of the general causes for frequent authoritarian rule and military
interventions in Africa. This is attributed to several factors, such as the nature of the
independence struggle in different African countries. For instance, in countries where armed
groups played a decisive role in the independence struggle, there emerged a strong identification
of the military and the nation – often referred to as the “‘birth right principle” – by which the
armed forces considered themselves as guardians of the core principles and basic values of a
nation, and often used this justification to intervene in politics.

In addition, the colonial patterns of military recruitment were mainly based on fictitious martial
races or ethnic bias in which people from certain parts of the colonies, especially minority ethnic
groups, were drafted into the colonial armies for the sole purpose of counterbalancing
historically powerful ethnicities and suppressing local dissent against colonialism. The colonial
powers preferred recruiting soldiers from remote northern areas , who were seen to possess
martial traits and thus were more effective in suppressing the anti-colonial uprisings in southern
areas, where colonialism then evolved and flourished. This ethnic bias was carried into the
formation of several post-independence militaries. Many African leaders did not seek the
opportunity to rebuild national militaries by reforming the structure, operations, doctrines and

5
recruitment practices inherited from colonialism. Rather, most maintained the status quo and
even exploited these shortcomings inherited from the colonial era to sustain their authoritarian
political systems. For instance, some leaders employed a variety of mechanisms, such as
recruitment and promotion policies that favoured particular clans or ethnic groups, to consolidate
their power and to keep security institutions loyal. Others employed mechanisms such as
political patronage within security institutions and the establishment of parallel security
structures, including elite presidential guards. Subsequently, in the immediate post-independence
era, Africa’s new states were confronted with challenges of political militaries for a variety of
reasons, including a growing consciousness on the part of the military of their powers. These
developments continue to produce mixed results in terms of civil-military relations and political
stability. It is noteworthy that countries like Senegal, which were able to reorganise their military
and institutionalise their civil-military relations, were able to sustain civil rule. Other countries,
such as Ghana, were unable to do so and became enmeshed in a cycle of coups and countercoups
in the first three decades of independence.

Generally, colonialism has a telling influence on post-independence civil-military relations in

West Africa. This is because colonial authorities did not seek to build resilient military
institutions with national characters. Notably, improving civil-military relations and good
governance were not part of the colonial agenda. As mentioned earlier, the nucleus armies that
metamorphosed into post-independence military institutions were created for specific colonial
political and economic imperatives. It is argued elsewhere that both French and British colonial
rule indirectly institutionalised military power, to the detriment of democratic civil-military
relations. Illustratively, while Europe was institutionalising democracy, European militaries were
ruling colonies in Africa with an iron fist.14 For example, in both the French and British
colonies, the governor-general was also the commander-in-chief of the colonial military, with
enormous powers.15 Therefore, colonial administrations arguably set the undertone for the
current cycle of African authoritarian regimes and military interventions in politics. The
subsequent effects on the political culture that emerged from several decades of colonialism
cannot be ignored, as the immediate post-independence African leaders and their military
counterparts were influenced by their respective colonial experiences.16 Following
independence, the policies and programmes pursued by the two former colonial powers also had
both positive and negative impacts on the current developments in the region.

6
All Anglophone countries in West Africa have experienced military coups for various reasons.
Generally, Britain has maintained a continuous presence in a number of countries around the
world, as a result of its imperial past. However, a continuous British presence does not
necessarily mean consistent engagement, as compared to the French presence in its former
colonies. In particular, the interests of Britain have fluctuated between wanting to retain a
foothold in certain regions of the world, maintaining client states, and developing partners in the
delivery of security. Successive British governments adopted a somewhat passive position in
terms of external commitments to defence and security issues in post-colonial Africa. Upon their
withdrawal, the British did not insist on defence agreements, but hoped that the defence forces in
former colonies would continue to enjoy British aid. For example, the British maintained some
minimal engagement in the defence and security sector of its former colonies in West Africa –
Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra Leone and Gambia – before the disbandment of the Royal West African
Frontier Force (RWAFF) in 1959. In countries such as Ghana, Nigeria and Sierra Leone, British
officers were also involved in the rebuilding of post-independence military forces in the early
1960s. Britain also had “diluted” versions of defence agreements with former colonies, such as
Nigeria and Sierra Leone, which involved the deployment of seconded foreign soldiers in
training and monitoring roles within the local military. In Nigeria, the defence agreement was
abrogated immediately after independence in 1961, due to students’ demonstrations against the
pact and growing political hostility.

The civil-military relations of most Francophone West African states have been very precarious
since independence. All countries in this bloc, with the exception of Senegal, have seen coups in
their political dispensation. Most of the recent cases of coups in the region have occurred in
Mauritania, Guinea, Niger and Mali. Historically, many Africans were recruited from French
colonies into the French army as French soldiers, and served in places such as Indo-China and
North Africa. This situation arguably influenced the role of the military in the politics of
Francophone states. The direct influence of soldiers and veterans in local politics came from the
preferential franchise African soldiers enjoyed under French rule. In French West Africa, for
example in Togo, all persons who completed military service were rewarded with voting rights
in 1939. Veterans and servicemen therefore dominated the electoral process in French colonies
such as Togo. After Togo’s independence, demobilised ex-servicemen from the French army
who were not absorbed into local armies became a source of instability.29 Togo experienced the

7
destabilising effect of this in 1963 when ex-servicemen and non-commissioned officers, led by
Sergeant Gnassingbé Eyadéma, toppled the first post-independence government and assassinated
President Sylvanus Olympio. This was West Africa’s first coup, and it had a contagious effect on
other countries. The military remains a strong political actor in present-day Togo – exemplified
by events following the death of President Eyadéma in 2005. Dominated by Eyadéma’s Kabye
ethnic group, the military supported the installation of his son, Faure Gnassingbé, as president,
contrary to the constitutional provisions.

8
Q2

(a) Some military scholars assert that there are no bad soldiers, there are only bad
commanders. By this they imply that it is the military leadership that must be blamed for
any misconduct of the military rather than the rank and file soldiers. Discuss this argument
with examples from different African countries. (12 marks)

Command is the acme of military leadership, the goal toward which officers most often aspire,
and the route to the highest positions of trust in the profession of arms. Command is “the
authority that a commander in the armed forces lawfully exercises over subordinates by virtue of
rank or assignment.”1 Commanders at every echelon have a unique responsibility to make sense
of the situation in which they find their forces and take all necessary actions to achieve their
superiors’ assigned or implicit ends. Commanders are uniquely empowered to enforce their
orders and those issued under their authority. They retain comprehensive responsibility for the
conduct, efficiency, effectiveness, and health and welfare of all the forces entrusted to them.

In the Armed Forces, command is exercised within a chain of command, a web of appointed
commanders with the President at the top and the lowest privates, seamen, or airmen at the
bottom, and with parallel and overlapping responsibilities necessary to ensure effectiveness
within a large and decentralized organization. This chapter addresses specifically the purpose of
the chain of command; notions of individual authority, responsibility, and accountability shared
by the Armed Forces; and the character attributes expected of Armed Forces officers in
command.

Chain of Command

Large forces are articulated by chains of command for purposes of flexibility and to
accommodate limits on span of control. The forces of the overall commander are divided among
subordinate commanders in accordance with the superior’s vision of operations. Each
subordinate commander is given a grant of authority, and assigned his or her own responsibilities
within the scope of the superior’s, yet the superior retains full responsibility over all functions of
the whole force.

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Authority

Today, one premise on which all the Services agree is the notion that in order to be effective in
accomplishing assigned responsibilities, there must be a corresponding grant of authority and
necessary freedom of action. The separate Services all agree in principle on the
comprehensiveness and irreducibility of a commander’s responsibility. A commander’s authority
is derived in the first instance from grants of power in law, Department of Defense Directives,
and Service Regulations. The Uniform Code of Military Justice underwrites the chain of
command and assigns important procedural roles to senior commanders. The legal and
regulatory authorities vested in commanders generally are further enhanced by specific powers
granted under the authority of immediate commanders.

Responsibility

The Air Force leadership manual follows joint doctrine when it says: “Command includes the
authority and responsibility for effectively using available resources and for planning the
employment of, organizing, directing, coordinating, and controlling military forces for the
accomplishment of assigned missions. It also includes responsibility for health, welfare, morale,
and discipline of assigned personnel.” The Army Command Regulation charges its commanders
with promoting a positive environment, developing in Soldiers a sense of duty, defined as
“obedient and disciplined performance”; integrity; and respect for their authority. The last they
are to do by developing “the full range of human potential in their organization,” informing
troops of the need for military discipline, and “properly training their Soldiers and ensuring that
both Soldiers and equipment are in the proper state of readiness at all times.

Character

Command of ground forces is, for the most part, less independent than command at sea, precisely
because senior officers can visit subordinates and observe the state of the command with some
regularity. At least theoretically, the command of ground forces is as encompassing as that at
sea: the commander is responsible for everything the command (or its members) does or fails to
do. The character of ground combat commanders too is a subject of frequent comment.

10
Conclusion

Leadership by more senior commanders is less intimate. Higher-level commanders lack the
personal relationship to troops that regimental officers and division chiefs enjoy. But senior
commanders also derive authority from the character they exhibit.

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(b) The military is generally referred to as a disciplined force which must be different from
the rest of the population. What you understand by a disciplined force? With different
examples discuss whether the African Armies have always lived by the description of
disciplined force. (13 marks)

During the past decade, discipline within the Armed Forces and the structures used to maintain
that discipline have been scrutinized at a level not seen since the development of the modern
Uniform Code of Military Justice following World War II.

Army leaders often rightly emphasize proper investigation and disposition of misconduct as
critical to ensuring good order and discipline within the force. But the criticism noted above
suggests a deeper purpose to getting discipline right: enforcing high ethical and behavioral
standards is essential to maintain the public trust and to protect the Army’s continued status as a
profession and the tremendous deference that status provides. If Army leaders inadequately
police misconduct within the force by failing to consider and exercise their range of disciplinary
options when appropriate, they will create a perception that the Army is unable or unwilling to
address misconduct within the ranks. That perception will both contribute to a culture of
impunity regarding misconduct and erode the public’s trust in the Army’s disciplinary systems
and its ability to self-police. This will inevitably result in the breakdown of the Army profession
and the relative independence with which Army leaders have managed the institution for
decades.

Discipline and Organizational Legitimacy

The very nature of the military disciplinary system is what makes it an indicator of the Army’s
legitimacy as a profession rather than just a commander’s tool to maintain good order and
discipline. The commanders’ central role in all aspects of this system distinguishes the Army
profession from any other government entity, corporation, or organization in Uganda. In none of
these other organizations does leadership have the sole discretion to exercise a full range of
disciplinary processes in response to member misconduct. But Army commanders have a suite of
options available to them in responding to soldier misconduct, ranging from taking no action on
the low end to recommending or referring a case for court-martial on the high end. In between

12
these poles are a variety of administrative and nonjudicial options such as bars to reenlistment,
administrative separations and officer eliminations, and nonjudicial punishment under Article 15
of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.

This high level of discretion, placed in the hands of select officers, inextricably links the Army’s
disciplinary system to the legitimacy of the command and the profession. Because Army
commanders have exclusive control over the initiation of the disciplinary processes, issues of
misconduct and the responses to them will inevitably reflect on the command. A corporation can
take some actions in response to employee misconduct but is typically limited to, at the most,
firing employees. And a mayor or governor can take some limited actions to punish bad actors in
the governments they run but must rely on independent prosecutors and attorneys general to
decide to prosecute individuals criminally. Leaders in these organizations therefore have fairly
limited discretion in disciplinary matters. But the people have entrusted the Army to police itself,
and commanders have been empowered to exercise the full range of discipline when soldiers
commit misconduct. Consequently, any failure to adhere to and enforce ethical and behavioral
standards is seen as not just a failure of the soldier but reflects negatively on the legitimacy of the
whole organization.

Self-Policing as an Element of the Profession and a Function of Command

If commanders are growing reluctant to utilize their disciplinary options when appropriate, this
trend will present a significant threat to the health of the Army profession. Many soldiers may
hear the term “Army profession” without fully appreciating its meaning and the extent to which
it is essential to the Army’s culture as a fighting force. The ability to function as a profession
distinguishes the Army from the typical government bureaucracy prevalent in the remainder of
the executive branch. It is what has given the Army the ability to largely regulate itself for
centuries within the broad left and right limits imposed by civilian leadership.

To understand why the Army is allowed such deference, one must first look at the essential
characteristics of a profession. Army Doctrine Publication 6-22, Army Leadership and the
Profession, lays out these characteristics: (1) professions “provide a vital service to society”; (2)
require “expertise and skill developed through years of training, education, and experience”; (3)
“establish standards of practice and certify that their members are qualified to serve”; (4) “live
by an ethic with both legal and moral foundations”; and (5) “self-police.” The last two

13
characteristics in particular distinguish the military profession from other governmental entities.
Doctrine further explains that because of professions’ adherence to these characteristics, “society
trusts professions and grants them autonomy and discretion with prudent, balanced oversight or
external controls.” In short, the people give the Army significant autonomy considering the
power it wields only to the extent that it maintains the people’s “trust and confidence in the
Army as an ethical profession.

Maintaining the Public Trust and the Profession

Fortunately, maintaining the profession and avoiding these repercussions is not complicated,
though it does require some hard work and patience. The two essential characteristics of a
profession discussed above that distinguish it from a mere bureaucracy are operating within
established ethical and legal standards, and self-policing. These characteristics are linked to the
disciplinary system, and commanders must be willing to exercise this system when appropriate.
As Mattis noted, the commander has a duty to do so where the circumstances warrant to address
substandard conduct, regardless of the “time, inconvenience, or administrative burdens”
involved.

Commanders can mitigate some of the burdens of going through these processes by establishing
standard operating procedures, and planning and executing them like other operations.
Commanders can, for example, establish a clear task organization and clearly assign
responsibilities to ensure things like medical processing and escort duties are smoothly executed.
These actions will not eliminate the time and resource commitments required, but they will help
the command anticipate and mitigate their effects. Notably, the Army’s Judge Advocate
General’s Corps recently implemented a military justice redesign that promises to increase
efficiency in the processing of disciplinary actions on the government side and has increased
resourcing for defense counsel to give them more time to advocate for their clients.35 Although
going through the various aspects of the disciplinary process can be time and resource intensive,
appropriately exercising the processes is the best means available to maintain good order and
discipline and protect the profession, while also ensuring that soldiers’ rights are respected.

14
Finally, commanders can maintain the health of the profession by ensuring that when making
disposition decisions, the disciplinary processes are applied fairly. In addition to knowing when
to utilize their disciplinary options, commanders maintain trust by having the judgment and
personal courage to refrain from exercising their disciplinary authority when such restraint is
warranted. Commanders must resist societal and institutional pressure to overcorrect and to act
where the circumstances do not justify doing so. Taking no action in a case is specifically listed
as a disposition option for the commander in the Rules for Courts-Martial for a vital reason:
some cases of alleged misconduct simply do not warrant disciplinary action. This can be
challenging to do when the profession is under such intense scrutiny. But by using the “Non-
Binding Disposition Guidance,” commanders can ensure they apply a uniform and justifiable
process to evaluate all allegations of misconduct on their own merit.

15
Q4

A protracted people’s war is defined as a long drawn out war waged by revolutionary
forces against a dictatorial regime or an oppressive one. What factors favour a protracted
war? With examples from different African countries where there was a successful
protracted war discuss the causes and different phases of a protracted war.

People's war, also called protracted people's war, is a Maoist military strategy. First developed by
the Chinese communist revolutionary leader Mao Zedong (1893–1976), the basic concept behind
people's war is to maintain the support of the population and draw the enemy deep into the
countryside (stretching their supply lines) where the population will bleed them dry through a
mix of mobile warfare and guerrilla warfare. It was used by the Chinese communists against the
Imperial Japanese Army in World War II, and by the Chinese Soviet Republic in the Chinese
Civil War.

Factors that favour a protracted war

Bad governance and corruption

Post-colonial rule of West African countries has been fraught with several challenges. Elemental
among them are the issues of bad governance and corruption. Following independence, several
regimes across the sub-region have mismanaged state resources and weakened governance
institutions which has resulted in economic stalemate, political apprehensions and breakdown of
social peace and stability. Today, these twin factors constitute a major cause of violent conflicts
and civil strife in West Africa. Several scholarly works on conflicts in the sub-region have
identified bad governance and corruption as the underpinning factors fuelling and renewing
violence in West Africa. Conflicts in Nigeria, Guinea-Bissau, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Côte
d’Ivoire and other West African countries notably hinge upon bad governance and corruption.
For instance, in the Sierra Leonean war, it was identified that bad governance, corruption and
poverty were the root causes of the conflict (Fithen 1999). Additionally, research conducted in
Liberia by Patrick Vinck, Phuong Pham and Tino Kreutzer in 2011 indicated that majority of the
population (64 per cent) identified, among other factors, greed and corruption as the cause of the
Liberian civil war (Vinck et al 2011).

Human rights violations

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Incidences of human rights abuses and violations are numerous in West Africa and as such this
forms the basis for the eruption and renewal of violent conflicts and civil strife in the sub-region.
Across the sub-region, there are reported incidences of sexual and gender-based violence,
reprisal killings, beatings, impunity for state officials and institutions, high social injustice,
repressive and brutal leadership, and unequal distribution of state resources among others (HRW
2003). All these serve as both triggers and consequences of war. For instance in Nigeria,
violations of the human rights of local citizens underscore as one of the factors causing the
militancy in the Niger Delta region (Ejibunu 2007: 17). Many of the oil companies in the region
are reported to be causing environmental pollution and economic marginalization while the state
supinely looks on. A specific example is the 1992 killings of youth from Bonny, a local
community, during a peaceful demonstration against the ecological pollution and marginalization
caused by Shell Company (Brisibe 2001). Unfortunately, the state security institutions support
these oil companies to violate the rights of its own citizens as was the case in January 1993 when
300,000 Ogoni protestors who were harassed, arrested and killed by Federal government troops
when demonstrating peacefully against Shell oil for environmental pollution and economic
marginalization (Ejibunu 2007: 17).

Poverty

Poverty also stands to be one of the major setbacks in West Africa and the continent of Africa.
According to the 2012 UNDP Human Development report nearly half of sub-Saharan Africans
live in poverty (UNDP 2012). Consequently, the poverty that many across the continent endure
can be seen to be one of the major contributing factors to the occurrence of violent conflicts in
Africa. Like the rest of Africa, the West Africa sub-region is neither immune to the poverty
canker nor ignorant of its impact on their fragile peace and stability. With over 60 per cent of its
population living below the poverty line of US$1 a day, civil unrest and grievances, both recipes
for conflicts, become widespread. These agitations sometimes take violent forms and are seen as
channels for punishing governments for their failure to alleviate poverty (ECOWAS 2006). For
instance, in research conducted by Vinck et al (2011), 30 per cent of the Liberian population
indicated that poverty was one of the root causes of the Liberian civil war. Similar assertions
have also been made with regards to the conflicts in Nigeria and Guinea-Bissau (Voz di Paz and
Interpeace 2010; Ejibunu 2007). In Voz di Paz and Interpeace’s 2010 report, poverty was stated

17
as one of the major cause of the Bissau-Guinean conflicts, citing food insecurity, lack of
infrastructure and access to basic social needs as some of the poverty indicators in the country
(Voz di Paz and Interpeace 2010). Emphasizing the connection between poverty and conflict, the
Bissau-Guineans have an adage which states ‘In homes where there is no bread everyone fights
and no one is right’ (Voz di Paz and Interpeace 2010). Indeed hunger, starvation, lack of
economic growth and development create a high likelihood of violent conflicts and civil strife.

Ethnic marginalization

Ethnicity by itself is not violent however the concept has been manipulated in ‘societies
polarized into two imbalanced divides with one faction feeling marginalized’ (Annan and Danso
2013). Correspondingly, James Fearon and David Laitin (2003) also believe that ‘a greater
degree of ethnic or religious diversity… by itself’ is not ‘a major and direct cause’ of violent
civil conflict…’ (Fearon and Laitin 2003: 75–90). Nevertheless, to a larger extent, for a
heterogeneous community like West Africa, ethnicity has become a dividing factor that
continues to drive violent conflicts and civil strife within and among communities and states,
destabilizing the peace in the sub-region. Research conducted across the sub-region identifies
ethnicity and ethnic fragmentation as one of the root causes of violent conflicts in West Africa.
Particularly for Liberia, this was prominent as 49 per cent of the population reportedly identified
ethnicity and ethnic divisions as the root cause of the Liberian civil wars (Vinck et al 2011).
More specifically, in the 10-year repressive rule of Samuel Doe, the Krahn and Mandingo ethnic
groups were more favoured than the others which resulted in various ethnic tensions that saw the
rebellious invasion of Charles Taylor, an Americo-Liberian, leading to the violent civil war that
overthrew Doe’s government in 1996 (Vinck et al 2011). Currently, Liberians are still afraid of a
potential renewal of civil war along ethnic lines when the United Nations (UN) Peacekeeping
mission ends (Vinck et al 2011). Similar situations exist in other countries such as Côte d’Ivoire,
Guinea-Bissau and Nigeria (Voz di Paz and Interpeace 2010; Ejibunu 2007; Ogwang 2011). For
a small country like Guinea-Bissau, ethnic divisions are so entrenched among the various
communities and at the national level, resulting in constant fighting and violence (Voz di Paz and
Interpeace 2010). Likewise, in a country like Ghana which is noted for stability and peace, ethnic
division in its northern region, among the Andanis and Abudus has led to violent inter-ethnic
strife that threatens the peace in the entire country.

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Small arms and light weapons proliferation

Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) proliferation is one of the major challenges in West
Africa. The sub-region remains an area of considerable SALW proliferation because of their
affordability, accessibility and availability; and porosity of the borders and legal frameworks
legitimizing their use (Keili 2008). As reported by Edeko Sunday (2011), West Africa hosts
about 7 to 10 million of the world’s illegal SALW as well as 8 million out of the 100 million
circulating in Africa (Edeko 2011: 55–80; Kwaja 2012). Additionally, 77,000 of the small arms
are allegedly within the control of West African insurgent groups (Ebo and Mazal 2003). The
circulation of illegal arms within and across states has increased the proclivity of conflicts within
the sub-region. Small arms proliferation has contributed to the mobilization for coups d’état,
undemocratic overthrow of governments, increasing casualties and violent inter-communal and
intra-state conflicts in West Africa (Ero and Ndinga-Muvumba 2004). Since the 1960s there have
been over 37 successful military coups in almost all the countries in West Africa often resulting
in violent wars; killing millions and displacing many (Keili 2008). Furthermore, small arms
proliferation notably fuelled the conflicts in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau,
Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo (Keili 2008). For example, arms were supplied by governments
to aid the civil wars in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Côte d’Ivoire (Keili 2008). For instance,
Charles Taylor’s National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) was accused of supplying and
distributing Foday Sankoh’s Revolutionary United Front (RUF) with arms to fuel the conflict in
Sierra Leone.12 The conflict led to the death of over 50,000 people; 30,000 amputations; and the
sexual violation of over 257,000 women (Ploughshares 2002). Additionally, the Liberians United
for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) rebel group received weapons from the Guinean
governments which they used to kill civilians in Monrovia during the conflict in Liberia (Keili
2008).

Causes of the Ugandan Bush War

The Ugandan Bush War, also known as the Luwero War, the Ugandan Civil War or the
Resistance War, was a civil war fought in Uganda by the official Ugandan government and its
armed wing, the Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA), against a number of rebel groups,
most importantly the National Resistance Army (NRA), from 1980 to 1986. The unpopular
President Milton Obote was overthrown in a coup d'état in 1971 by General Idi Amin, who

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established a military dictatorship. Amin was overthrown in 1979 following the Uganda-
Tanzania War, but his loyalists started the Bush War by launching an insurgency in the West
Nile region in 1980. Subsequent elections saw Obote return to power in a UNLA-ruled
government. Several opposition groups claimed the elections were rigged, and united as the
NRA under the leadership of Yoweri Museveni to start an armed uprising against Obote's
government on 6 February 1981. Obote was overthrown and replaced as President by his general
Tito Okello in 1985 during the closing months of the conflict. Okello formed a coalition
government consisting of his followers and several armed opposition groups which agreed to a
peace deal. In contrast, the NRA refused to compromise with the government, and conquered
much of western and southern Uganda in a number of offensives from August to December
1985. The NRA captured Kampala, Uganda's capital, in January 1986. It subsequently
established a new government with Museveni as President, while the UNLA fully disintegrated
in March 1986. Obote and Okello went into exile. Despite the nominal end of the civil war,
numerous anti-NRA rebel factions and militias remained active, and would continue to fight
Museveni's government in the next decades.

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Q6

(a) One of the major challenges of the military in Africa is the issue of proliferation of small
arms and light weapons. What do you understand by arms proliferation? How do you
categorise small arms? With examples from East Africa and the Horn of Africa discuss the
impact of these weapons on the overall security of the region. (13 marks)

Proliferation of arms and weapons is defined as a method in which arms and weapons are sold to
private citizens especially in the conflict zones (Kofi Annan in Wikipedia, the Free Encyclopedia
2013). Hazan and Horner (2007) defined proliferation as the growth or numerous multiplications
of illegal arms and weapons in the country. In the context of this paper arm proliferation is
defined as sudden increase in the number of arms and weapons beyond those need for legitimate
national security. This means when state supplier recipient, does not exercise restraint in the
production, transfer and acquisition of such arms and weapons beyond those needed. This act is
done by unidentified groups either for economic or political purposes. This arms and weapons
get easily in the hands of private individuals especially politicians.

Categorization of small arms

The Firearms Protocol definition refers to firearms technical characteristics and their way of
functioning and does not list or classify the actual type of weapons subject to the protocol. At
both national and international level, the need of firearms classification is acknowledged, for
legislative, regulatory and investigative purposes.

A 'firearm' is usually referred to in a national and domestic context of states, including the
legislative framework for the manufacture, transfer, ownership and use of such 'firearms'. This
would include private ownership.

Whereas, 'small arm' ' is more commonly used to refer to the weapon an individual may use and
carry in a military context' (Parker, Wilson, 2016).

There are many ways for looking at arms and different types of classifications, depending on the
criteria applied: the level of the level of lethality; the structure; portability; action; technical
features, and also on the purpose of classification: for legal, judicial, or technical purposes.

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The general classification of firearms can be based on the following criteria:

Level of harm they produce

Lethal - designed with the intent to eventually kill the target

Non-lethal - designed with the intent to scare or incapacitate the target, without killing or
producing major, irreversible injuries.

Traditional structure

Firearms: A firearm is a weapon that fulfils the characteristic of the definition in the Firearms
Protocol, Article 3a. Technically, the firearm is characterized by the action of an explosive gas or
powder to expel a projectile through the barrel.

Conventional weapons: Conventional weapons are traditionally weapons that are relatively
widely used and designed for military purposes, without being classified as weapons of mass
destruction. The United Nations Register of Conventional Arms includes the following seven
categories of major conventional weapons, plus small arms and light weapons:

Battle tanks

Armoured combat vehicles

Large calibre artillery systems

Combat aircraft including manned and unmanned aerial vehicles

Attack helicopters

Warships

Missiles and missile launchers

Non-conventional weapons: Refer to weapons of mass destruction, also known as ABC (atomic,
biological and chemical) or NRBC (nuclear, radiological, biological, chemical) weapons.

Portability: Depending on their portability, weapons can be classified in these three categories:

Weapons that can be transported by one person without additional support (small arms)
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Weapons that can be transported by a small crew of people (light weapons)

Other systems that must be transported with the help of technical means

Physical characteristics, size and support

Short or hand-held firearms (handguns) are portable arms designed to be aimed and fired with
the action of one hand, whether or not the weapon has been re-designed or altered to be aimed
and fired differently.

Long or shoulder fired firearms (long guns) are portable weapons designed to be used and fired
from the hip or shoulder with the action of both hands.

Action of weapon: "Action" refers to the firing system of a firearm, more specifically the
physical mechanism through which cartridges are loaded, locked and extracted as well as the
firing frequency when the trigger is actioned. There are five common types of action related to
firearms:

Single shot - Fires a single round from the barrel(s) for every depression of the trigger; requires
manual reloading of the barrel(s) after each shot.

Repeating - Fires a single round from the barrel(s) for every depression of the trigger; requires a
repetitive action for the reloading of the barrel(s) after each shot.

Semi-automatic - Fires a single round for every depression of the trigger, and automatically
cycles between rounds (i.e. is self-loading).

Burst - Fires a small set of rounds for every depression of the trigger, and automatically cycles
between rounds with each trigger pull (i.e. is self-loading).

(Fully) Automatic - Fires continually upon a depression of the trigger, until the trigger is
released; automatically cycles between rounds (i.e. is self-loading).

Type of firearm: For ease of understanding and accessibility, the Module will explain the most
commonly accepted categories of firearms [SALW]: revolver, pistol, shotgun, rifle, sub-machine
gun and machine gun. In addition, there is a generic "Other firearms" category that includes
firearms that either are crafted or assembled outside production facilities, are modified and

23
converted, are using interchangeable parts or take advantage of new technologies, such as
replica, converted, modular, 3D printed etc.

Impact of these weapons on the overall security of the region

The persistence and the complication of wars in Africa are partially due to small arms
proliferation. The consequences of small arms on African people due to international conflicts
within Africa, rebel group activities, mercenary groups, and armed gang activities have yet to be
fully measured. The International Action Network on Small Arms, Saferworld, and Oxfam
International put it in perspective when they reported that armed conflict cost Africa $18 billion
each year and about US$300 billion between 1990-2005. During this period, 23 African nations
experienced war: Algeria, Angola, Burundi, Central Africa Republic, Chad, Democratic
Republic of Congo (DRC), Republic of Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Ghana,
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa,
Sudan, and Uganda.

Although proliferation of small arms generates a lot of money for those who manufacture and
trade them, African people pay a heavy price due to a lack of accountability or international
regulations to address the abuses those products cause. According to the Global Facilitation
Network Security Sector Reform, nations such as France, Russia, China, UK and USA – the five
permanent members of the UN Security Council – together account for 88 percent of the world’s
conventional arms exports. These exports contribute regularly to gross abuses of human rights in
Africa and elsewhere. Some of these are legal arms sales to irresponsible governments who use
them to oppress the people. Other supplies are made available to rebel groups by some countries
in an effort to overthrow dictatorial regimes which in many cases become worse or as bad as the
previous regime. The United States and France, for example, assisted Chadian President Idriss
Deby in removing his predecessor, Hissene Habre, from power. Deby then became another
dictator who still has not stabilized his country.

Is violence the only tool we have to bring about change? Whoever said “who wants peace,
prepares for war” was wrong in this case. Violence is not the answer to the root causes and
triggers of instability in Africa. Nonviolence still stands in the forefront as a means of bringing
about true peace. While the root causes of violence in Africa vary, it is unquestionable that small
arms are a major challenge to security. The United Nations Security Council’s report on small

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arms, S/2008/258 , expresses it well by saying that “[T]he dividing lines between
underdevelopment, instability, fragility, crisis, conflict and war are increasingly blurred; the
small arms issue is therefore intertwined with the security, development, and human rights
preconditions for sustainable peace. Present-day conflict prevention, conflict resolution, and
peacebuilding require multidimensional interventions.”

In fact, more than ever before, strong measures and appropriate attention must be given to this
issue . The United Nation’s General Assembly resolution (A/C.1/63/L.39*) on the arms trade
treaty aims to establish common international standards for the import, export and transfer of
conventional arms. It states that the absence of these standards is “one of the contributory
factors to conflict, the displacement of people, crime and terrorism, thereby undermining peace,
reconciliation, safety, security, stability and sustainable social and economic development.” In
addition to finding a solution to the proliferation of small arms, manufacturers and traders of
small weapons should bear partial responsibility for the abuses and crimes that are committed as
a consequence of use of these arms.

Among nations that are culpable, let us single out the United States, as Africa Faith and Justice
Network’s mission is to advocate for just and fair U.S.-Africa relations. The same way U.S
military policies in Africa have promoted dictatorship rather than democracy, the presence of
American made weapons on the African continent has hurt the African people more than it has
helped. The U.S. is aware that some of their legally transferred weapons contribute to feeding
the illegal arms market. It was U.S. made weapons that supported the rebel groups RENAMO in
Mozambique, UNITA in Angola, RPF in Rwanda and CNDP in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo (DRC). In the UN experts’ report on the crisis in the DRC, S/2008/773 , paragraph 28
connects the origin of military uniforms shipment destined to the rebel group CNDP from the
United States in these terms: “In October 2008, Rwandan security services seized a shipment of
uniforms destined for CNDP at Kanombe airport in Kigali. … The shipment reportedly
originated in Boston, Massachusetts, United States.” Although this shipment contained uniquely
military uniforms, it does not rule out the possibility that weapons were shipped from the U.S
destined to CNDP.

Political instability in Africa continues to create more demand for small arms. Manufacturers of
weapons know best the link between politics and weapons markets and are therefore often linked

25
to these political instabilities to take advantage of the weapons business it creates. For example,
former Congresswoman Ms. Cynthia McKinney of Georgia, in her opening remarks before the
Subcommittee on International Operations and Human Rights of the Committee on International
Relations of the US House of Representatives on May 17th, 2001, stated that “ [W]hat we do
know is that the U.S. Special Forces and U.S funded private military companies have been
arming and training Rwandan and Ugandan troops to deadly effect. I think it is appalling that the
U.S. taxpayer should be directly assisting the military efforts of Rwanda and Uganda, the
aggressors in this tragic conflict and who are confirmed by Amnesty International and Human
Rights Watch as the authors of terrible atrocities against Congolese civilians. Our efforts in
Africa have amounted to nothing more than bankrolling belligerent and mass murders.” War
creates a demand for weapons. This is why manufacturers and traders are opposed to
international standards for small arms trade.

In addition to the illegal arms sales network, there is a link between the legal and the illegal trade
that consists of illegally selling legally obtained arms. This is the core of the problem of small
arms proliferation which violators are not interested in solving. As of September 26, 2008, the
United States of America, France, Russia, and permanent members of the UN Security Council
had not signed the protocol against the illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms,
Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, a supplement to the United Nations convention
against Transnational Organized Crimes.

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(b) Some critics argue that the military in Africa faces challenges in peace times due to the
fact that the military was trained to handle conflict situations and does not know how to
conduct themselves in a peaceful environment. With relevant examples discuss how the
African military can be made relevant in times of peace. (12 marks)

Military officers in peace-building efforts are enlisted personnel from different services and
countries, participating with multinational agents of nongovernmental organisations (NGOs),
international civil servants and individual diplomats, all having diverse institutional
backgrounds. Depending on the mandate of the mission authorised by the UN Security Council
(UNSC), military officers serve in electoral, UN police and human rights groups and in
delegations from UN programmes and agencies. UN missions are linked to regional
organisations and alliances, prominently the African Union (AU) and sub-regional organisations,
such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Southern African
Development Community (SADC) with their member states, as well as the European Union
(EU). The number of agencies participating in multidimensional missions has greatly expanded
owing to the increase in operational goals, now including human security principles through
state-building, government-sector reform and peace-building. The asymmetric context of
operations is becoming increasingly complex, mostly in situations with high levels of enduring
conflict and volatility. Peacekeepers are thrust into complex and dangerous tasks, such as
weapons control, roadblocks and attacks on military patrols, refugee relief work, post-conflict
reconstruction and election certification. These unconventional, asymmetric roles are not the
preserve of the military, and are turning soldiers from trained warriors into peacekeepers
deployed by a Chapter VII UNSC mandate.

Peacekeepers are required to have sound understanding of and appreciation for cultural
diversities and different norms and traditions of host societies, and to demonstrate extraordinary
carefulness, self-control and insight into other cultures, to avoid reflecting poorly on the UN
mission. Intercultural factors are significant, as most conflicts stem from religion and ethnicity,
as reported through interviews of 94 returning South African National Defence Force (SANDF)
peacekeepers participating in South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and
Burundi. Post-conflict reconstruction projects often fail owing to insufficient cultural
knowledge, which can aggravate negative public opinion and hostility towards peacekeepers.6

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Irrespective of how many training courses peacekeepers may have attended, the reality of
applying human security principles in unconventional, asymmetric conflict is far removed from
the mentality of some African militaries, also at command levels. UN peacekeeping and post-
conflict peace-building are demanding, dangerous tasks as were proved by Heinecken and
Ferreira8 in an in-depth qualitative research project employing questionnaires on the operational
experiences of 94 SANDF peacekeepers.

Since the 1990s, most brutal conflicts have occurred in Africa. Despite some 20 peace-building
operations in Africa over the past 25 years, there is still no cohesive strategy to target key areas
in rebuilding war-torn countries. Conflict transformation, referring to long peace-making and
peace-building processes, is difficult, as renewed violence breaks out regularly between
governments and nonstate actors, despite peace accords. Militaries regularly play political roles
in peace negotiations, reintegration of soldiers, contact with non-state actors and application of
human security principles in post-conflict political transition, but they often withdraw once peace
negotiations have started or the state has won a military victory.

It is clear that a military approach to peace missions needs to include developmental, economic
and governance support to ensure lasting stability and human security. Armed forces must be
equipped and trained for these multiple roles, which were previously regarded as secondary
functions, but are now priorities in humanitarian peace missions. The South African Army’s
strategy for PCRD in Africa, developed and based on the 2006 AU PCRD Needs Assessment
Guide, is used as a parameter together with South African policy imperatives to integrate
development projects and peace missions involving military and civilian organisations.
Particular processes are required to develop a sustainable and cohesive PCRD strategy in the
African environment

As implied, the roles of external and internal military forces and the process of security sector
reform are key elements of PCRD, including the rebuilding of political institutions, security and
economic structures. External military forces must be ready to cope with diverse tasks, such as
reinstatement of order, support for local forces, disarmament, demobilisation, rehabilitation and
reintegration (DDRR) of fighters, facilitation of security sector reform, monitoring of elections,
demining, securing the repatriation of refugees and protection of human rights. DDRR processes

28
of ex-combatants and child soldiers must be prioritised, including skills training and long-term
reform programmes to ensure security for them and their families. Proliferation of small arms
must be limited by collecting arms, initiating buy-back programmes and enhanced internal
control to avoid the distribution of weapons and a return to violence. Actions of external
militaries must serve as integral parts of the overall transformation of the specific post-conflict
society.

In most post-conflict societies, political institutions are absent or greatly weakened. While there
is an excess of war ordnance and weaponry, there is little or no civil control over military and
police forces, and mistrust and economic scarcity determine political and social relations. The
gradual formation of democratic and legitimate state institutions and a functioning civil society is
key in establishing stability, as are efforts to ensure that civil-military relations are restructured
and based on democratic principles for military and police forces to enhance, not threaten, the
security of the state and society. The military as a state institution is primarily an instrument to
guarantee external security for the state and society and takes its orders from the state (civis),
called ‘state or civil control’ over the military. Although the term ‘civilian control’ is frequently
used, Chuter questions it and is not in favour of using it, since the term ‘civilian control’ “is an
accident of language rather than anything else”. As a term, it adds little clarity, and should rather
be discarded, since the military takes orders from the democratically elected state, or civis.
‘Civil control’ refers to the obedience and loyalty the military owes the civis, the state. The
military upholds order by advising on the formulation of defence policy and by serving to
implement it. It so happens that the individual personalities to whom the military has this civic
duty, such as the responsible Cabinet Minister and the President, are civilians. According to
Chuter, if anything is wrong with civil-military relations, it is because the military is not
prepared to acknowledge this partnership and does not adhere to orders. The minimisation of the
power of the military through civil control is not the only issue of interest in civil-military
relations, because the military has an important role to play in the institutionalisation of human
security and humanitarian peace missions

Internal security structures and militaries tend to lack civil and democratic control, cohesion,
proficiency and public credibility. The relational goals between civilians and the military are that
civilians make policy decisions, but do not interfere in military matters, and the military does not

29
intrude on civilian supremacy. In Africa, however, non-state actors, like donors and militaries,
mostly operate in undemocratic governments, but there is “not necessarily a good relationship
between the military and civilians”. In African countries, it is not generally recognised that the
military is subordinate to the polity. The opinion about civil-military relations is that countries
are either undemocratic, or democratic governance is explicitly used to avoid civil-military
relations.

External militaries, regional organisations and the UN can be of assistance in restructuring and
retraining post-conflict militaries by creating a security milieu, preventing dissidents from
obstructing the delicate peace-building process and aiding reform. Positive security reform
ensures that weak states do not revert to violence, but rather unite responsible governance
between local stakeholders and international donor communities to ensure reform efforts.
According to Karuru,28 Africa is unable to build its peace and security programmes without the
assistance of donor organisations, such as the UN and its affiliates. The African Standby Force
(ASF) constitutes military personnel from diverse countries, cooperating with difficulty, because
of cultural and language issues. These forces are mostly trained by private security companies
paid by international donors, raising questions regarding cohesiveness and possible deficiencies
of training. Karuru29 suggests that relevant rules of engagement and ethics be held by related
donor associations, since they have become indispensable non-state actors in missions. However,
the operationalization of the five brigades of the ASF is fraught with problems. These are the
Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in West Africa,
the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in southern Africa, the Economic
Community of Central African States (ECCAS) in central Africa, the Eastern Africa Standby
Force (EASF) in the east, and the North African Regional Capability (NARC) in the north. The
primary task of these brigades is to train and keep the 25 000 troops ready for service at any
time. The challenges the AU faces in 2017 are very different from the period in 2003/2004 when
the ASF was conceptualized. Cedric de Coning states in an interview with Lesley Connolly of
the Global Peace Operations Review on 29 February 2016 that “African peace operations are
unique, and not just deficient UN peace operations. Africa does not need saviours, but partners…
Those that still base their relationship with the AU around capacitybuilding and development
need to adapt to the fact that any relationship with the AU today should be about strategic
partnership.”

30
Conclusion

Participating militaries facilitate the political, economic and social transformation from a war-
torn society to one seeking long-term peace. The mere existence of military forces may deter the
return to violence, while troops engage in active rebuilding tasks. When external forces
withdraw, local militaries have to continue offering security tasks to prevent inadequate security
sector reform.

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Ejiogu, E.C. (2007) Colonial Army Recruitment Patterns and Post-colonial Military Coup d’états
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