Petitioner Respondent: First Division

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 153845. September 11, 2003.]
EFREN SALVAN y PRESENES, petitioner, vs. THE PEOPLE OF

THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J : p
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, which
seeks to set aside the Order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 13 of Malolos,
Bulacan, dated February 12, 2002, denying due course to petitioner Efren
Salvan's Notice of Partial Appeal, and the Order of the same court, dated June
6, 2002, denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration. 1 The petition also
specifically prays for the issuance of an Order directing the trial court to give
due course to the petitioner's Notice of Partial Appeal. 2
Petitioner Efren Salvan, a bus driver, was charged with Reckless

Imprudence Resulting in Homicide for the death of John Barry Abogado, in
Criminal Case No. 718-M-00 before the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan,
Branch 13. 3 At his arraignment, petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge. The
trial court then proceeded to receive evidence to determine the civil liability of
petitioner. During the course of the hearing, petitioner and private complainant
Edna Abogado, the mother of the accused, agreed to amicably settle the civil
aspect of the case. 4
On October 23, 2001, the trial court promulgated its Decision, the
decretal portion of which provides:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds the accused
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of simple negligence
resulting in homicide as per the recitals in the information, punished
under the second paragraph of Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code,
and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of six (6) months of
arresto mayor. Accused is directed to pay to the heirs of the deceased
the net sum of P100,000.00, representing the difference between the
P100,000.00 earlier paid by way of amicable settlement herein and the
sum of: ACTIHa
a) P50,000.00 in actual damages;

b) P50,000.00 in civil indemnity; and
c) P100,000.00 in moral damages.
SO ORDERED. 5
Petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration praying for the

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deletion of the additional award of damages. 6 He also filed an Application for
Probation on the same date. 7 On January 28, 2002, the trial court denied the
petitioner's Motion for Partial Reconsideration, but gave due course to the
petitioner's Application for Probation. 8
Petitioner then filed a Notice of Partial Appeal on February 8, 2002. On

February 12, 2002, the trial court issued the first assailed Order, the dispositive
portion of which states:
Considering that the application for probation of the accused was
given due course as per the Order of this Court dated January 28,
2002, and the application for probation is deemed under the law to be
a waiver of the right to appeal, the Notice of Appeal is hereby DENIED
due course.
SO ORDERED. 9
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied on June 6,

2002. 10
Petitioner is now before us, alleging that:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DENIED GIVING DUE COURSE
TO ACCUSED'S NOTICE OF PARTIAL APPEAL EXCLUSIVELY ON THE
AWARD OF DAMAGES. 11
In Rule 41 of the 1964 Rules of Court, the dismissal of appeals was

governed by the following provisions:
SEC. 13. Effect of failure to file notice, bond, or record on
appeal. — Where the notice of appeal, appeal bond or record on appeal
is not filed within the period of time herein provided, the appeal shall
be dismissed.
SEC. 14. Motion to dismiss appeal. — A motion to dismiss an

appeal on any of the grounds mentioned in the preceding section, may
be filed in the Court of First Instance prior to the transmittal of the
record to the appellate court.
Rule 41, Section 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, provides for the
grounds to dismiss appeals, to wit: TSacAE
Sec. 13. Dismissal of appeal. — Prior to the transmittal of the

original record or the record on appeal to the appellate court, the trial
court may motu proprio or on motion dismiss the appeal for having
been taken out of time or for non-payment of the docket and other
lawful fees within the reglementary period. 12
The above-quoted rule limits the grounds for dismissal of appeals to very
specific instances. The filing of an application for probation is not one of them.
In the parallel case of Ortigas & Company Limited Partnership v. Velasco ,
13 we held:
His Honor was apparently incognizant of the principle that
dismissals of appeals from the judgment of a Regional Trial Court by
the latter are authorized only in the instances specifically set forth in
Section 13, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. The succeeding provision,
Section 14 of said Rule 41, provides that "(a) motion to dismiss an
appeal may be filed in the (Regional Trial) Court . . . prior to the
transmittal of the record to the appellate court;" and the grounds are
limited to those "mentioned in the preceding section," i.e., Section 13
to wit: where "the notice of appeal, appeal bond, or record on appeal is
not filed within the period of time herein provided. . ."
These two (2) sections clearly establish "that. . . . (A) trial court
may not dismiss an appeal as frivolous, or on the ground that the case
has become moot and academic, such step devolving upon the
appellate courts. Otherwise, the way would be opened for (regional
trial) courts . . . to forestall review or reversal of their decisions by
higher courts, no matter how erroneous or improper such decisions
should be. 14
Although the aforementioned ruling was made in a civil case, we see no

reason why the principles enunciated therein cannot be applied, by analogy, to
a criminal case, such as the one at bar. Thus, aside from its competence to
dismiss withdrawn appeals, 15 the Regional Trial Court's power to dismiss an
appeal is limited to the instances provided for in Rule 41, Section 13.
Going now to the issue of probation, we recall that the law which governs
all matters relating to probation is Presidential Decree No. 968, commonly
known as the Probation Law, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1990. The
provision of the law that is pertinent to the current controversy reads:
SEC. 4. Grant of Probation. — Subject to the provisions of this
Decree, the trial court may, after it shall have convicted and sentenced
a defendant, and upon application by said defendant within the period
for perfecting an appeal, suspend the execution of the sentence and
place the defendant on probation for such period and upon such terms
and conditions as it may deem best; Provided, That no application for
probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has
perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction.
Probation may be granted whether the sentence imposes a term

of imprisonment or a fine only. An application for probation shall be
filed with the trial court. The filing of the application shall be deemed a
waiver of the right to appeal.
An order granting or denying probation shall not be appealable.
Relying solely on the letter of the law, the filing of the application for
probation should be deemed a waiver of the right to appeal. However, in the
case of Budlong v. Apalisok, 16 we had occasion to rule that the above provision
of the Probation Law clearly provides only for the suspension of the sentence
imposed on the accused by virtue of his application for probation. It has
absolutely no bearing on civil liability. This ruling was clarified in Salgado v.
Court of Appeals, 17 wherein we ruled that, although the execution of sentence
is suspended by the grant of probation, it does not follow that the civil liability
of the offender, if any, is extinguished.
This intertwining of criminal and civil liability is best understood by
analyzing the criminal act itself which, by its very nature, causes two (2)
classes of injury. The first is the social injury produced by the criminal act which
is sought to be repaired thru the imposition of the corresponding penalty and
the second is the personal injury caused to the victim of the crime which injury
is sought to be compensated thru indemnity, which is civil in nature. 18 This has
been codified in our criminal law, where every person criminally liable for a
felony is also civilly liable. 19 Thus, Article 113 of the Revised Penal Code
provides that, except in case of extinction of civil liability, the offender shall
continue to be obliged to satisfy the civil liability resulting from the crime
committed by him, notwithstanding the fact that he has served his sentence
consisting of deprivation of liberty or other rights, or has not been required to
serve the same by reason of amnesty, pardon, commutation of sentence or any
other reason. Furthermore, this principle has found its way into our rules of
criminal procedure, where it is provided that an action for recovery of civil
liability is deemed instituted in the criminal action unless reserved by the
offended party. 20 And yet it must be remembered that the civil liability of the
accused is not part of the penalty for the crime committed: it is personal to the
victim. 21
The Probation Law prohibits a judge from entertaining or granting an
application for probation if the defendant has perfected an appeal from the
judgment of conviction. The fact of conviction most certainly refers to the
criminal liability of the accused, as a result of a finding made by a judge that he
is guilty of the crime charged. However, the appeal in this case involved only
the civil aspect of the trial court's judgment. Hence, we see no reason why,
between the conjoined criminal and civil aspects of a felony, a line cannot be
drawn marking where the one springs from the other. Even if by definition civil
liability ex delicto arises from the criminal act, once its existence is established,
it should be treated separately from the criminal liability. Indeed there is even
categorical statutory basis to state that it subsists despite the extinguishment
of the criminal liability from which it arose. This was the finding in Budlong v.
Apalisok and Salgado v. Court of Appeals.
Thus, we rule that, in an appeal from a judgment of conviction, the
criminal liability and the civil liability ex delicto should be considered
independently, each with its own corresponding effects. In the present case, the
law that bars an appeal of the judgment of conviction, as well as its
corresponding criminal liability, should not bar an appeal of the civil aspect of
the same judgment.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED. The

Orders of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 13 of Malolos, Bulacan, dated
February 12, 2002, and June 6, 2002 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Let this
case be REMANDED to the court of origin which is ORDERED to give due course
to the petitioner's Notice of Partial Appeal. ASIDTa
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Vitug and Carpio, JJ., concur.
Azcuna, J., is on leave.
Footnotes
1. Rollo , p. 42; penned by Judge Andres B. Soriano.

2. Rollo , p. 17.
3. Rollo , p. 24.
4. Rollo , p. 11.
5. Rollo , p. 27.
6. Rollo , p. 37.
7. Rollo , p. 38.
8. Rollo , p. 39.
9. Rollo , p. 42.
10. Rollo , p. 49.
11. Rollo , p. 13.
12. As amended by A.M. No. 00-2-10-SC, 21 May 2000.
13. G.R. No. 109645, 25 July 1994, 234 SCRA 455.

14. Id., at 493-494.
15. RULES OF COURT, Rule 122, Section 12.
16. 207 Phil. 804 (1983).
17. G.R. No. 89606, 30 August 1990, 189 SCRA 304.

18. Ramos v. Gonong, G.R. No. 42010, 31 August 1976, 76 SCRA 559, cited in
Budlong v. Apalisok, 207 Phil. 804 (1983).
19. REVISED PENAL CODE, Art. 100, cited in Cruz v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
123340, 29 August 2002.
20. RULES of COURT, Rule 111, Sec. 1, cited in Cruz v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 123340, 29 August 2002.
21. U.S. v. Neery , 25 Phil. 600, cited in Budlong v. Apalisok, 207 Phil. 804
(1983).

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FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 153845. September 11, 2003.]

EFREN SALVAN y PRESENES, petitioner, vs. THE PEOPLE OF

Petitioner Efren Salvan, a bus driver, was charged with Reckless

a) P50,000.00 in actual damages;

c) P100,000.00 in moral damages.

Petitioner ﬁled a Motion for Partial Reconsideration praying for the

Petitioner then ﬁled a Notice of Partial Appeal on February 8, 2002. On

Petitioner ﬁled a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied on June 6,

Petitioner is now before us, alleging that:

In Rule 41 of the 1964 Rules of Court, the dismissal of appeals was

SEC. 14. Motion to dismiss appeal. — A motion to dismiss an

Sec. 13. Dismissal of appeal. — Prior to the transmittal of the

Although the aforementioned ruling was made in a civil case, we see no

Probation may be granted whether the sentence imposes a term

An order granting or denying probation shall not be appealable.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED. The

1. Rollo , p. 42; penned by Judge Andres B. Soriano.

13. G.R. No. 109645, 25 July 1994, 234 SCRA 455.

17. G.R. No. 89606, 30 August 1990, 189 SCRA 304.

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