Turkish Contract Law

İlhan Helvacı
Turkish
Contract
Law
Turkish Contract Law
İlhan Helvacı
Turkish Contract Law

İlhan Helvacı
Faculty of Law
Istanbul University
Istanbul, Turkey
ISBN 978-3-319-60060-4 ISBN 978-3-319-60061-1 (eBook)

DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-60061-1
Library of Congress Control Number: 2017947826
© Springer International Publishing AG 2017

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usun . . .
To F€
Preface
In Turkish law, obligations may arise from legal transactions, in particular from
contracts, and also from torts, cases of unjust enrichment, agency relationships
without authorisation (quasi-contractus) and the law itself. However, since the
most important source of obligations is contracts, this book focuses on contracts.
With the objective of providing an overview of the subject, the author analyses
in particular the general provisions of the Turkish Code of Obligations (TCO arts.
1–48 and arts. 83–206) in five parts. The first part is concerned with the provisions
pertaining to obligations arising from contracts (TCO arts. 1–48). In the second
part, the provisions relating to the effect of obligations, especially performance and
non-performance of obligations (TCO arts. 83–126) are analysed. The effect of
obligations on third parties (TCO arts. 127–130) is also discussed in this part. The
third part focuses on the extinguishment of obligations and limitation periods (TCO
arts. 131–161). In the fourth part, joint and several debtors and creditors, conditions,
earnest and forfeit money and penalty (TCO arts. 162–182) are explained. The last
part concerns the assignment of claims, assumption of debt, transfer of contract and
the joining of parties to an existing contract (TCO arts. 183–206).
It is evident that contract law is a broad subject. However, in this introductory
book, the objective is to provide the reader with the main principles of Turkish
contract law. That is why the author analyses particularly the general provisions of
the Turkish Code of Obligations. Nevertheless, in order to provide a complete
overview, certain provisions of the Turkish Code of Obligations relating to specific
contracts, which are regulated in the second part of the Code, are also analysed.
Moreover, in order to clarify certain subjects, provisions of the Turkish Civil Code,
the Turkish Commercial Code and the Turkish Bankruptcy and Enforcement Law
are also considered to the necessary extent.
Having regard to the objective of giving a complete and clear overview of
Turkish contract law, the author seeks to avoid contentious arguments and to
explain the subjects with the use of simple examples.
The author hopes that this book will be beneficial, especially for law students
and practitioners who are not familiar with Turkish contract law.
vii
viii Preface
The author wishes to express thanks to Istanbul University faculty members

Catherine McKimm and Paul Sludds and to Peter Murphy, who helped in the
discussion and refinement of the legal terminology in this book. Further thanks
are due to M. Cansu Ünal, Samed Can Yılmazlar and Binesh Hass for their
assistance with the book prior to publication.
Oxford, UK İlhan Helvacı

May 2017
Introduction
Contracts usually constitute an obligational relationship (rapport d’obligation,

Schuldverh€ altnis) between the contracting parties and specifically give rise to
obligations. The obligational relationship created by a contract is referred to as a
contractual obligational relationship, and the obligations arising out of it are
referred to as contractual obligations.
However, certain contracts do not give rise to an obligational relationship; they
amend or terminate an existing obligational relationship between the parties.
Indeed, a contract that is concluded in order to amend the place or time of
performance of an existing obligation is an example of a contract of this nature.
Moreover, certain contracts are concluded in order to transfer, to amend, to termi-
nate or to restrict a right. These contracts are further examples of contracts that do
not give rise to any obligations.
Furthermore, there are also certain contracts concerning family law, for exam-
ple, contracts relating to engagement or marriage, or the law of inheritance such as
testamentary agreements and inheritance partition agreements. The Turkish Civil
Code No 4721 of 22.11.2001 governs these contracts.1
The contracts that give rise to an obligational relationship are governed by the
new Turkish Code of Obligations No 6098 of 11 January 2011, which came into
force on 1 July 2012.2
1
Official Gazette 08.12.2001; No: 24607. The new Turkish Civil Code replaced the former Turkish
Civil Code No 743 of 17 February 1926, which had come into force on 4 October 1926 (Official
Gazette 04.04.1926; No: 339). The former Civil Code was heavily influenced by the Swiss Civil
Code. The new Civil Code is also similar to the Swiss Civil Code, albeit to a lesser degree.
2
Official Gazette 04.02.2011; No 27836. The new Turkish Code of Obligations replaced the
former Turkish Code of Obligations No 818 of 22 April 1926, which had come into force on
4 October 1926 (Official Gazette 08.05.1926; No: 366). The former Code was heavily influenced
by the Swiss Code of Obligations. The new Code is also similar to the Swiss Code of Obligations,
albeit to a lesser degree.
ix
x Introduction
The Turkish Code of Obligations arts. 1–48 regulate contracts that give rise to an
obligational relationship. However, these and the other general provisions of the
Turkish Code of Obligations may also be applied to contracts regarding family law
or the law of inheritance. Indeed, according to TCC art. 5, the general provisions
laid down in the Code of Obligations (and Civil Code) also apply to other legal
relationships concerning private law, provided that their applications are appropri-
ate to the nature of the legal relationship. In addition, pursuant to TCO art. 646, the
Turkish Code of Obligations completes the Turkish Civil Code as it forms Part V of
the Civil Code.
The Turkish Code of Obligations arts. 49–76 govern obligational relationships
arising from tort, and arts. 77–82 govern obligational relationships arising out of
unjust enrichment. As the subject matter of this book is contract law, these
obligational relationships arising from tort and unjust enrichment are not analysed.
As mentioned above, contractual obligational relationships or, in short, contracts
usually give rise to obligations. An obligation is a legal tie (vinculum iuris) between
the debtor (obligor) and the creditor (obligee) by which the debtor is bound to
perform or refrain from performing specified conduct. In this context, the creditor
may be under an obligation to give (e.g., to transfer ownership of a car), to do (e.g.,
to build a house) or not to do (to refrain from doing) (e.g., not to compete).
A contract may give rise to several obligations (duties). Some of them are
primary in nature, whereas some of them are subsidiary in nature. For example,
in a contract of sale, the primary obligation (main duty) of the seller is to transfer
ownership of the subject matter of the contract to the buyer. However, the seller
may be under certain subsidiary obligations (subsidiary duties) along with the
primary obligation, such as packing the goods, giving necessary information or
instructions for their proper use. The primary obligations are what define the
contract.
As a general rule, the non- or improper performance of the primary obligation
may give rise to secondary obligations such as compensation (damages).
A contractual obligational relationship or, in short, a contract may also be the
source of formative rights (droit formateur, Gestaltungsrecht) such as the right to
terminate a contract or the right to withdraw from a contract. Furthermore, a
contract may lead to certain defences where there has been a non- or an improper
performance on the part of one of the parties. For example, in a sale contract, if the
subject matter of the contract is defective, then the buyer may raise the defect as a
defence.
It should be noted that when persons engage with one another in order to make a
contract, they are also under a duty to protect each other’s assets and personal
rights. The basis of these pre-contractual duties is the principle of good faith (TCC
art. 2).
Contents
Part I Obligations Arising from Contracts

1 Formation of the Contract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2 The Offer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.3 Binding Effect of the Offer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.3.1 Offer with Time Limit for Acceptance . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.3.2 Offer Without Time Limit for Acceptance . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.4 Acceptance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.5 Invitation to Offer (Invitation to Treat) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.6 Intention to Create a Contract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.7 Content of the Agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.8 Revocation of Offer and Revocation of Acceptance . . . . . . . . . 11
1.9 Coming into Effect of the Contract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.10 Pre-contractual Duties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2 Public Promise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.2 Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.3 Consequences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.4 Revocation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.5 Prize Competition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3 Form of the Contract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3.1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3.2 Form Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3.2.1 Sources of Form Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3.2.2 Written Form . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3.2.3 Official Form . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
xi
xii Contents
3.2.4 Signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
3.3 Content of the Form . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
3.4 Amendment of the Contract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
3.5 Breach of the Form Requirement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
4 Standard Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
4.1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
4.2 Definition and Interpretation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
4.3 Invalid Standard Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
4.3.1 Non-written Standard Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
4.3.2 Partial Invalidity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
4.3.3 Prohibition of Unilateral Amendments . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
4.4 Control of Content . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
5 Content of the Contract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
5.1 Freedom of Contract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
5.2 Restrictions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
5.2.1 Mandatory Rules of Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
5.2.2 Rules of Law Protecting Personal Rights . . . . . . . . . . . 36
5.2.3 Morality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
5.2.4 Public Order . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
5.2.5 Initial Impossibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
5.3 Breach of Restrictions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
5.3.1 Nullity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
5.3.2 Partial Nullity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
6 Abstract Acknowledgement of Debt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
6.1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
6.2 Validity of Abstract Acknowledgement of Debt . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
7 Obligation to Contract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
7.1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
7.2 Pre-contract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
7.2.1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
7.2.2 Form . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
7.2.3 Consequences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
7.3 Obligation to Contract Arising from the Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
8 Contract Interpretation and Simulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
8.1 Interpretation of the Contract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
8.1.1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
8.1.2 Principles of Interpretation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
Contents xiii
8.2 Common Mistake and Simulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

8.2.1 Common Mistake . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
8.2.2 Simulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
9 Incomplete Contracts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
9.1 Gap in the Contract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
9.2 Principles of Filling Contractual Gaps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
9.3 Reservation of Form Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
10 Revision of the Contract (Hardship) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
10.1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
10.2 Principles of Hardship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
11 Mistake, Fraud and Duress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
11.1 Mistake . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
11.1.1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
11.1.2 Mistake in Declaration of Will (Intention) . . . . . . . . . . 67
11.1.3 Mistake in Communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
11.1.4 Mistake in Motive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
11.1.5 Consequences of Material Mistake . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
11.2 Fraud . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
11.2.1 Fraud by a Contracting Party . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
11.2.2 Fraud by a Third Party . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
11.2.3 Consequences of Fraud . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
11.3 Duress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
11.3.1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
11.3.2 Consequences of Duress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
12 Unfair Exploitation (Lesion) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
12.1 Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
12.2 Consequences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
13 Agency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
13.1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
13.2 Direct Agency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
13.2.1 Authority to Represent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
13.2.2 Conduct in the Name of the Principal . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
13.3 Agency Without Authorisation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
13.4 Limitation, Revocation and Termination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
13.4.1 Limitation and Revocation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
13.4.2 Death, Incapacity and Other Circumstances . . . . . . . . . 86
13.4.3 Return of the Instrument Conferring Authority . . . . . . 87
xiv Contents
13.4.4 Restriction to the Claim of Termination . . . . . . . . . . . 87

13.5 Indirect Agency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
13.6 Reservation of Special Provisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
Part II The Effect of Obligations, Performance, Non-Performance,

the Effect on Third Parties
14 Performance of Obligation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
14.1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
14.2 Legal Nature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
15 The Object of Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
15.1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
15.2 Partial Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
15.2.1 In Principle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
15.2.2 Exceptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
15.3 Indivisible Obligations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
15.4 Specific Obligations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
15.5 Generic Obligations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
15.6 Alternative Obligations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
15.7 Pecuniary Obligations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
15.7.1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
15.7.2 National Currency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
15.7.3 Pecuniary Obligations in Foreign Currency . . . . . . . . . 104
15.7.4 Interest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
15.7.5 Appropriation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
16 Performance of the Debtor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
16.1 Performance in Person . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
16.2 Performance by a Third Party . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
16.2.1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
16.2.2 Subrogation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
17 Place of Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
17.1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
17.2 Default Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
18 Time of Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
18.1 Obligation Without a Time Limit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
18.2 Obligation with a Time Limit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
18.3 Calculation of the Time Limit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
18.3.1 Monthly Term . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
Contents xv
18.3.2 Other Time Limits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121

18.3.3 Holidays and Performance During Working Hours . . . . 121
18.3.4 Extension of the Time Limit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
18.3.5 Early (Premature) Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
18.4 Performance of Bilateral Contracts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
18.4.1 Determination of the Performance Order . . . . . . . . . . . 123
18.4.2 Uncertainty of the Performance Order . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
18.4.3 One Party’s Insolvency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
19 Proof of Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
19.1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
19.2 Forms of Proof . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
19.2.1 A Receipt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
19.2.2 Return of a Document Acknowledging the Debt . . . . . 130
19.2.3 Cancellation of the Document Acknowledging
the Debt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
19.3 Presumptions of Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
20 Default of the Creditor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
20.1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
20.2 Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
20.3 Consequences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
20.3.1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
20.3.2 In Obligations Relating to Delivery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
20.3.3 In Other Obligations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
20.4 Other Reasons Preventing Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
20.5 Impossibility of Performance Due to the Creditor . . . . . . . . . . . 138
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
21 Natural Obligations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
21.1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
21.2 Types of Natural Obligations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
21.2.1 Obligations Resulting from Gambling and Betting . . . . 142
21.2.2 Obligations Resulting from Marriage Brokerage . . . . . 142
21.2.3 Time-Barred Obligations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
21.2.4 Promise Concerning the Performance of a Moral
Duty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
21.2.5 Another Case of Natural Obligation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
22 Non-performance of the Obligation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
22.1 Specific Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
22.1.1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
22.1.2 Specific Provisions for Obligations to Give . . . . . . . . . 146
22.1.3 Specific Provisions for Obligations to Do . . . . . . . . . . 146
22.1.4 Specific Provisions for Obligations Not to Do . . . . . . . 148
xvi Contents
22.1.5 Specific Provisions for Pecuniary Obligations . . . . . . . 148

22.2 Action for Damages in Lieu of Specific Performance . . . . . . . . 149
22.2.1 Subsequent Impossibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
22.2.2 Other Causes of Action for Damages . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
22.2.3 Requirements of Action for Damages . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
22.3 Improper Performance of the Obligation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
22.4 Contractual Exclusion of Liability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
22.4.1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
22.4.2 Restrictions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
22.5 Debtor’s Liability for Assistants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
22.5.1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
22.5.2 Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
22.6 Pre-contractual Liability (Culpa in Contrahendo) . . . . . . . . . . . 162
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
23 Default of the Debtor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
23.1 Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
23.2 General Consequences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
23.2.1 Compensation for Damage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
23.2.2 Liability for Force Majeure and Fortuitous Events . . . . 170
23.3 Consequences In Pecuniary Obligations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
23.3.1 Interest for Default . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
23.3.2 Contractual Default Interest Rate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
23.3.3 Legal Default Interest Rate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
23.3.4 Legal Nature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
23.3.5 In Case of Interest, Annuities and Gifts . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
23.3.6 Further Damage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
23.4 Consequences In Bilateral Contracts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174
23.4.1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174
23.4.2 Additional Alternative Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
23.4.3 Certain Specific Provisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179
24 Effects of the Obligation on Third Parties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
24.1 Privity of the Obligational Relationship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
24.1.1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
24.1.2 Exceptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
24.2 Subrogation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184
24.2.1 Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184
24.2.2 Consequences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
24.2.3 Specific Provisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186
24.3 Guarantee of Performance by a Third Party . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186
24.3.1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186
24.3.2 Legal Nature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187
Contents xvii
24.3.3 Consequences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188

24.3.4 Recourse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189
24.3.5 Duration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189
24.3.6 Limitation Period . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190
24.4 Contracts in Favour of Third Parties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190
24.4.1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190
24.4.2 Consequences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193
Part III Extinguishment of Obligations and Limitation Period

25 Extinguishment of Obligations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197
25.1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197
25.2 Discharge by Agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198
25.2.1 The Concept and Legal Nature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198
25.2.2 Form Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199
25.2.3 Consequences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200
25.3 Novation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200
25.3.1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200
25.3.2 Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201
25.3.3 Consequences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202
25.3.4 Current Account . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202
25.4 Merger . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203
25.4.1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203
25.4.2 Specific Provisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203
25.5 Impossibility for Which the Debtor Is Not Responsible . . . . . . . 204
25.5.1 Subsequent Impossibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 204
25.5.2 In Bilateral Contracts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 206
25.5.3 Partial Impossibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207
25.6 Hardship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208
25.7 Set-Off . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208
25.7.1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208
25.7.2 Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 209
25.7.3 Consequences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 214
26 Limitation Period . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217
26.1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217
26.2 Limitation Periods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 218
26.2.1 Ten Years . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 218
26.2.2 Five Years . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 218
26.2.3 Mandatory Limitation Periods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219
26.2.4 Commencement of Limitation Periods . . . . . . . . . . . . 219
26.2.5 Calculation of Limitation Periods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 220
26.3 Effects on Ancillary Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221
26.4 Prevention and Suspension of Limitation Periods . . . . . . . . . . . 221
xviii Contents
26.5 Interruption of Limitation Periods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223

26.5.1 Causes of Interruption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223
26.5.2 Effects of Interruption Among Co-debtors . . . . . . . . . . 224
26.5.3 Commencement of a New Limitation Period . . . . . . . . 224
26.6 Extension of the Limitation Period . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225
26.7 Waiver . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 226
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 226
Part IV Joint and Several Debtors and Creditors, Conditions,

Earnest and Forfeit Money, and Penalty
27 Joint and Several Debtors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 231
27.1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 231
27.2 Reasons for Joint and Several Liabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 231
27.2.1 Legal Transactions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 231
27.2.2 The Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232
27.3 Relationship Between the Debtors and the Creditor . . . . . . . . . 233
27.3.1 Liability of the Debtors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233
27.3.2 Defences of the Debtors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 234
27.3.3 Personal Conduct of Individual Debtors . . . . . . . . . . . 235
27.4 Extinguishment of the Obligation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 236
27.5 Relationship Between the Debtors Themselves . . . . . . . . . . . . . 237
27.5.1 Apportionment and Right of Recourse . . . . . . . . . . . . . 237
27.5.2 Subrogation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 238
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 239
28 Joint and Several Creditors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 241
28.1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 241
28.2 Consequences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 242
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 243
29 Conditional Contracts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245
29.1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245
29.2 Suspensive Conditions (Conditions Precedent) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 246
29.2.1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 246
29.2.2 The Creditor’s Expectant Right . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 246
29.2.3 Suspensive Conditions in Dispositive Transactions . . . . 248
29.2.4 Benefits Enjoyed in the Interim Period . . . . . . . . . . . . 248
29.3 Resolutive Conditions (Conditions Subsequent) . . . . . . . . . . . . 249
29.4 Common Provisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 251
29.4.1 Fulfilment of the Condition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 251
29.4.2 Prevention Against Good Faith . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 251
29.4.3 Prohibited Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 251
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 252
Contents xix
30 Earnest Money and Forfeit Money . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 255

30.1 Earnest Money . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 255
30.2 Forfeit Money . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 256
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 257
31 Contractual Penalty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 259
31.1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 259
31.2 Legal Nature and Form . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 260
31.2.1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 260
31.2.2 Form Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 260
31.2.3 Ancillary Nature of Penalties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 261
31.3 Types of Contractual Penalties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 262
31.3.1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 262
31.3.2 Penalty in Lieu of Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 262
31.3.3 Penalty in Addition to Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 263
31.3.4 Withdrawal or Termination by Payment of Penalty . . . . 263
31.4 The Role of the Debtor’s Fault . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 264
31.5 The Role of the Creditor’s Damage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 264
31.6 Reduction of the Penalty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 265
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 266
Part V Assignment of Claims, Assumption of Debts, Transfer

of Contracts and Joining a Party to an Existing Contract
32 Assignment of Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 269
32.1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 269
32.2 Assignment of Claims by Agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 269
32.2.1 Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 269
32.2.2 Consequences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 273
32.2.3 The Position of the Debtor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 275
32.2.4 Warranty of the Assignor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 277
32.3 Assignment by Court Order or by Operation of Law . . . . . . . . . 278
32.4 Special Provisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 279
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 280
33 Assumption of Obligations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 281
33.1 Promise to Discharge from a Debt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 281
33.1.1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 281
33.1.2 Legal Nature and the Promisor’s Performance . . . . . . . 282
33.2 Agreement for Assumption of Debt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 283
33.2.1 Formation of the Agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 283
33.2.2 Legal Nature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 284
33.2.3 Effects of Substitution of Debtor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 284
33.2.4 When an Assumption Agreement Becomes Invalid . . . . 287
33.3 Cumulative Assumption of Debt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 288
33.4 Assignment of an Estate or a Business . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 289
33.4.1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 289
xx Contents
33.4.2 Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 289

33.4.3 Consequences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 290
33.5 Merger and Acquisition of Businesses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 290
33.6 Special Provisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 291
33.6.1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 291
33.6.2 Partition of an Inheritance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 291
33.6.3 Transfer of Encumbered Real Estate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 292
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 292
34 Transfer of Contracts and Joining a Party to an Existing
Contract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 295
34.1 Transfer of Contracts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 295
34.2 Joining a Party to an Existing Contract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 296
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 296
Article Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 299
Subject Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 307

List of Abbreviations
art. Article
BGB German Civil Code
cf Confer
DSA Digital Signature Act
éd Editeurs
eds. Editors
e.g. exempli gratia
etc. et cetera
FCC French Civil Code
ff. foliis
fn Footnote
i.e. id est
LIA Legal Interest and Default Interest Act
LRA Land Registry Act
N Number, Numéro, Nummer
No Number
NPA Notary Public Act
p Page
par Paragraph
RLR Regulation of Land Registry
SCO Swiss Code of Obligations
Sect. Section
sent Sentence
subcl Subclause
subs Subsection
TCBE Turkish Code of Bankruptcy and Enforcement
TCC Turkish Civil Code
xxi
xxii List of Abbreviations
TCO Turkish Code of Obligations

TComC Turkish Commercial Code
TCPA Turkish Consumer Protection Act
TCPC Turkish Civil Procedure Code
TL Turkish Lira
TPC Turkish Penal Code
Part I
Obligations Arising from Contracts
Chapter 1
Formation of the Contract
1.1 General1
A contract is a legally binding agreement (a legal transaction)2 that is usually

concluded between two parties. Therefore, it is generally referred to as a bilateral
legal transaction. For instance, in a sale contract, there are two parties: a buyer and a
seller. In a lease contract, there are also two parties: a lessor and a lessee. However,
a contract may be concluded between more than two parties—e.g., a partnership
contract with multiple partners. Another example is an inheritance partition agree-
ment made between more than two heirs. These kinds of contracts are referred to as
multilateral legal transactions or, more precisely, as multilateral contracts.
The Turkish Code of Obligations regulates contracts as bilateral legal trans-
actions. That is why the general provisions relating to contracts in the Turkish Code
of Obligations are applicable to multilateral contracts only by analogy. As the
Turkish Code of Obligations governs contracts as bilateral legal transactions, this
book will also treat them as such.
The elements that are required for the formation of a contract are offer and
acceptance. In addition, the parties must have the intention to establish a legal
1
Antalya (2012), pp. 155–198; Aybay (2011), pp. 25–32; Becker (1941), art. 1–10; Berger (2012),
pp. 207–221; Engel (1997), pp. 184–209; Eren (2015), pp. 227–263; Feyzio glu (1976),
pp. 59–101; Gauch et al. (2008), pp. 53–90; Honsell et al. (2003), art. 1–10; Kılıço glu (2013),
pp. 52–75; Kocayusufpaşao glu (2014), pp. 165–213; Nomer (2015), pp. 36–48; Oser
and Sch€onenberger (1929), Vorbemerkungen zum ersten Abschnitt (Art. 1–40), art. 1–10;
Oguzman and Öz (2015), pp. 49–79; Özsunay (1983), pp. 61–70; Reiso glu (2014), pp. 62–70;
Schwenzer (2009), pp. 182–210; Tekinay et al. (1993), pp. 81–99; Tercier (2004), pp. 112–129;
Tercier et al. (2016), pp. 147–205; Thévenoz and Werro (2012), art. 1–10, and von Tuhr and Peter
(1979), pp. 181–193.
2
A juridical act, (acte juridique, Rechtsgesch€
aft).
© Springer International Publishing AG 2017 3

İ. Helvacı, Turkish Contract Law, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-60061-1_1
4 1 Formation of the Contract
relationship.3 This intention may be express or implied. An agreement cannot be

binding as a contract if it was made without any intention to create legal relations.
The offer is the first declaration of will (intention)4 in time,5 whereas acceptance
is the second. In order for a contract to be concluded, the offer and the acceptance
must be mutual and consistent (TCO art. 1 par. 1). The offer and the acceptance
may be express or implied (TCO art. 1 par. 2).
1.2 The Offer
An offer is a unilateral declaration of will (intention) expressed by the offeror. This

declaration contains the offeror’s proposal to enter into a contract with the offeree.
An offer may be made by a person who intends to undertake an obligation, that is to
say, who intends to become a debtor. Furthermore, an offer may also be made by a
person who intends to be entitled to a right, in other words, who intends to become a
creditor.6 In certain contracts, both parties undertake an obligation. Such contracts
are referred to as bilateral contracts (e.g., a sale contract, a lease contract).7 Any of
the parties may also make an offer on the conclusion of these types of contracts.
An offer must be addressed to a prospective contracting party. In this sense, it
may be addressed to determined or undetermined persons (e.g., the general public).8
For instance, when a seller S makes an offer to sell a chattel for a determined price
to a prospective buyer B, this offer is addressed to a determined person. On the
other hand, an example of an offer being addressed to undetermined persons is
when a shopkeeper displays a chattel indicating its price in the shop window.
Indeed, according to TCO art. 8 par. 2, displaying goods with an indication of
their price is considered to be an offer, unless the contrary is understood readily and
clearly.
By the offer, the offeror expresses his willingness to enter into a contract on a
specific set of terms on the mere acceptance of the offeree. Consequently, the offer,
as a rule, must contain the objectively and subjectively necessary elements of the
contract so that the offeree can form the contract with his mere acceptance.9 In
order for an offer to be valid, there are no specific form requirements. However, in
3
It is obvious that the parties must have the necessary capacity to act (exercise des droits civils,
Handlungsf€ ahigkeit) required to enter into a contract. For further explanations see Esener (2000),
pp. 48–52; Ansay and Wallace (2002), pp. 84–87.
4
Déclaration de volonté, Willenserkl€
arung.
5
Gauch et al. (2008), p. 69; Eren (2015), p. 244.
6
von Tuhr and Peter (1979), §24, II, p. 182; Eren (2015), pp. 243–244; Feyzio glu (1976), p. 69;
Reisoglu (2014), p. 64.
7
Oguzman and Öz (2015), p. 45; Eren (2015), p. 210; Reisoglu (2014), p. 52; Thévenoz and Werro
(2012), art. 1, N. 65; Tercier (2004), p. 59.
8
Reisoglu (2014), p. 65; Eren (2015), p. 244.
9
For the objectively and subjectively essential elements of the contract, see Sect. 1.7.
1.3 Binding Effect of the Offer 5
certain cases, the contract to be concluded may require a specific form due to the
law itself or due to the parties’ agreement. In such cases, the offer must be made in
compliance with this form requirement. Otherwise, the offer is invalid, and an
invalid offer does not provide the offeree with the right to conclude the contract by
accepting it. For example, a sale contract relating to real estate must be made before
a land registry officer. Thus, if the owner of a field intends to sell it and erects a sign
on the field indicating that it is to be sold and also indicates the price, then this is not
deemed to be an offer.
As mentioned above, according to TCO art. 8 par. 2, displaying goods with an
indication of their price, sending a price list, a tariff, etc. are considered to be offers
unless the contrary is understood readily and clearly. However, merely sending
unsolicited goods does not constitute an offer. In addition, the recipient does not
have an obligation to keep or to return the goods (TCO art. 7).
1.3 Binding Effect of the Offer
The offeror is bound by the offer.10 This means that the offeree’s mere acceptance
will result in the formation (conclusion) of the contract. In addition, the offeror, as a
rule, is not entitled to revoke the offer and, thus, may not preclude the formation of
the contract. The offeree (addressee) may reject the offer. Furthermore, he may
make a counter-offer. In both cases, the binding effect of the original offer is
terminated.
If the offeror dies or loses the capacity to act, which is necessary in order to enter
into a contract, then the binding effect of the offer must be analysed according to
two separate possibilities:11 (1) if the person or the personal skills of the offeror are
important for the offeree, then the offer is terminated. For example, an offer made
by a well-known surgeon to a patient regarding vital surgery is terminated by the
offeror’s death or his subsequent incapacity to act; (2) in cases where the person or
personal skills of the offeror are not important for the offeree, the binding effect of
the offer nevertheless stands. For instance, if a seller makes an offer to sell a chattel
to a buyer, then the death or subsequent incapacity of the seller does not affect the
offer’s binding effect. Consequently, where the offeror dies, the offer will bind his
heirs. Similarly, if the offeror loses the capacity to act, the binding effect of the offer
remains nevertheless. Another factor that may terminate the binding effect of an
offer is the lapse of time, which is analysed in the paragraphs below.
10
Eren (2015), p. 250; O
guzman and Öz (2015), p. 57; Tekinay et al. (1993), p. 86; Feyzio glu
(1976), p. 71; Thévenoz and Werro (2012), art. 1, N. 84; Engel (1997), p. 194; Gauch et al.
(2008), p. 73.
11
von Tuhr and Peter (1979), § 24, III, p. 187; Reiso
glu (2014), pp. 67–68; Eren (2015), p. 260;
Oguzman and Öz (2015), p. 64.
1.3.1 Offer with Time Limit for Acceptance
If an offeror sets a time limit for acceptance, then the offeror will be bound by the
offer until the fixed time expires. Where the addressee wants to accept the offer, his
acceptance should reach the offeror before the set time expires (TCO art. 3).
1.3.2 Offer Without Time Limit for Acceptance
Where the offeror does not set a time limit for acceptance, it will be useful to
consider two possibilities separately.
1.3.2.1 Among Persons Present
In cases where an offer is made without a time limit in the presence of the offeree, if
the offeree wants to accept it, he must declare this forthwith. Otherwise, the offeror
will no longer be bound (TCO art. 4 par. 1). It is worth noting that if the contracting
parties communicate directly by telephone, electronically, etc., the offer is deemed
to be made between persons present (TCO art. 4 par. 2). If, at the stage of the
contract negotiations, both the contracting parties’ agents are present or one party
and the other party’s agent are present, then the offer is nevertheless deemed to be
made between persons present.
1.3.2.2 Among Persons Not Present
Where an offer is made without a time limit in the absence of an offeree, the offeror
will remain bound for a reasonable time. That is to say, the offeror will be bound
until such time as he might expect a reply, which is sent properly and in due time to
reach him (TCO art. 5 par. 1).
A reasonable time is determined according to what a reasonable person would
consider sufficient time to accept the offer.12 It means that the offeree will need
time for the offer to reach him, to think about the offer and to send the acceptance.
Therefore, the expiration time varies according to the specific circumstances. For
instance, the offeree in a contract for the sale of a car needs a longer period of time
in comparison to the offeree in a simple book sale contract.
In certain cases, the offeror sends the offer properly but the offer is late in
reaching the offeree. If the offeror does not know of this delay, then he may
presume that the offer reached the offeree in due time (TCO art. 5 par. 2).
12
Honsell et al. (2003), art. 5, N. 3; Gauch et al. (2008), p. 75; Eren (2015), p. 253; Reiso
glu
(2014), p. 67; Tekinay et al. (1993), p. 89; Nomer (2015), pp. 46–47.
1.4 Acceptance 7
Moreover, although the offeree sends the acceptance in due course and time, it may
reach the offeror after a reasonable period of time has expired. In this case, where
the offeror does not want to be bound by the offer any longer, he must give notice
immediately to the offeree of his intent not to be bound (TCO art. 5 par. 3).
Otherwise, the contract will be formed.
1.4 Acceptance
Acceptance is a unilateral declaration of will (intention)13 by the offeree and must

be addressed to the offeror. For example, a seller S proposes to sell a chattel for a
determined price to a prospective buyer B. Where this offer is accepted by B and
this acceptance is addressed to S, the contract may be concluded. However, if the
offer was accepted by a person other than the offeree (addressee), the contract may
not be concluded. This is because, according to TCO art. 1 par. 1, the parties’
declarations of will (intention) must be mutual. In addition, according to TCO art.
1 par. 1, acceptance must be in compliance with the offer. Otherwise, the contract
will not be formed. For instance, despite the fact that a seller wants to sell a car for
TL 10,000, a buyer may not wish to pay this amount and may propose to pay TL
8000 instead. In this case, the contract will also not be concluded.
There are no specific form requirements regarding the validity of an acceptance.
However, if the contract to be concluded requires a form by virtue of law or of the
parties’ agreement, then the validity of the acceptance is subject to compliance with
these form requirements. If the acceptance is non-compliant with the form require-
ments, then the contract is nevertheless concluded but is void.14
If the offeree dies or loses the capacity to act after sending the acceptance but
before the acceptance reaches the offeror, this precludes the formation of the
contract in cases where the offeree’s person or his personal skills are important
for the offeror.
Acceptance can be either express or implied (TCO art. 1 par. 2). When an offeree
states his will clearly and explicitly to the offeror, the acceptance is deemed to be
express. However, where the offeree does not state his will directly but demon-
strates this will by any acts indicating assent, the acceptance is deemed to be
implied. For instance, where a shopper selects an item in a supermarket and
hands it to the cashier, such conduct demonstrates that he accepts the supermarket
owner’s offer at the price stated on the item. As mentioned above, TCO art. 8 par.
2 states that the display of goods with an indication of their price is, as a rule,
considered to be an offer.
Even silence may constitute an implied acceptance. In certain cases, the offeror
does not have to receive an express acceptance if the law, the special nature of the
13
arung.
14
See Chap. 3.
transactions or the circumstances do not require it. In such a case, if the offeree does
not reject the offer in a reasonable time, then the contract is considered to be
concluded (TCO art. 6). For instance, TCO art. 503 does not require an express
acceptance for the conclusion of an agency contract. Indeed, pursuant to said
article, an agency contract is deemed to be concluded when an agent receives an
offer with respect to the services he carries out in an official capacity or on a
professional basis or he has publicly announced that he will accept offers relating to
these services, unless the agent immediately rejects this offer.
1.5 Invitation to Offer (Invitation to Treat)15
Where the offeror, in his offer, declares that he reserves the right not to be bound by
the offer or where such reservation arises from the nature or the circumstances of
the transaction, there is only an invitation to make an offer (invitation to treat).16
Therefore, mere acceptance of the invitation to offer by the addressee does not
result in the formation of the contract. Accordingly, where the addressee intends to
enter into a contract, he should make an offer.
The most common example of the difference between the offer and the invitation
to offer is in ascending price auctions. For example, a seller wishes to sell certain
goods by such an auction. If the seller declares that the subject matter of the auction
is to be sold to the highest bidder, then the seller’s declaration is deemed to be an
offer and the highest bid is deemed to be an acceptance. However, if the seller does
not intend to make a sale contract but merely wishes to collect certain proposals
with regard to a probable sale contract and declares this intention, then this
declaration is deemed to be an invitation to offer. Consequently, the participants’
bids are deemed to be an offer (TCO art. 275 par. 1). These explanations are also
applicable to reverse auctions (procurement auctions)—i.e., a type of auction in
which the price of the goods is decreased with each bid.17
Advertisements in newspapers, on TV or on the Internet18 may not be considered
to be an offer, even if they contain the price of the goods to be sold or the service to
be rendered. On the contrary, such advertisements must be considered as an
invitation to offer. Accordingly, the purchaser’s conduct, such as clicking on an
advertisement on the Internet, is deemed to be an offer. In such a case, the counter-
party’s acceptance may be express or implied. For example, accepting online
15
Invitatio ad offerendum.
16
Tercier (2004), p. 120; Gauch et al. (2008), p. 69; von Tuhr and Peter (1979), § 24, II, p. 183;
Tekinay et al. (1993), pp. 84–85; Eren (2015), pp. 246–247; Reiso glu (2014), p. 65; Tercier et al.
(2016), p. 190; Kocayusufpaşao glu (2014), p. 182.
17
For instance, a company intends to purchase certain goods or services and the price will be
determined by the lowest bid. Thus, prospective sellers or providers underbid each other.
18
For contracts that are concluded on the Internet see İnal (2005), Erten (2009).
1.6 Intention to Create a Contract 9
payment by credit card is deemed to be an implied acceptance. However, in cases

where a person is able to download a program online, the advertising of the program
on the Internet is deemed to be an offer and the customer clicking on the adver-
tisement is deemed to be an acceptance.19
Even though a vending machine displays goods and indicates their price, the
conduct of the seller who operates the vending machine, in the view of the author,
may only be deemed as an invitation to offer, rather than an offer. Consequently,
when a customer puts the necessary money for the item that he wishes to buy in the
machine’s slot, then his act is deemed to be an offer and the machine’s delivery of
the goods is deemed to be an acceptance.20
Tenders are also considered to be an invitation to offer. Indeed, where a person
invites others to submit tenders regarding a particular project, a sale contract or a
lease contract, as a rule, this invitation is simply an invitation to offer. The offers are
made by the persons who submit the tenders. If the person who invited them to
submit tenders accepts one of them, then the contract is concluded.
1.6 Intention to Create a Contract
As a general principle, a person who makes or accepts an offer must have the
intention to be legally bound. If a person makes a declaration of will21 without
having the intention to be legally bound, there is either a reservatio mentalis
(mental reservation) or a declaration that is not serious.
In the case of reservatio mentalis, a person declares that he intends to make a
contract but, in reality, he does not have such an intention. In this case, if the
declaring party’s real intention is hidden from the other party, then the contract is
concluded according to the receiving party’s understanding.22 The declaring party
is not entitled to assert that the contract is not concluded.23 As an example, in a sale
auction, a bidder does not intend to buy the goods to be sold. However, he
participates in the auction and makes an offer by submitting the highest bid. The
auctioneer, being unaware of the real intention of the bidder, accepts this offer. In
this case, the contract is concluded and the bidder is not entitled to assert that his
real intention was, for example, to increase the price of the goods but not to buy the
goods.
In the case of a frivolous declaration, there is a declaration apparently made as a
joke, on stage, or for teaching purposes. The declaring party’s real intention is not to
19
Oguzman and Öz (2015), p. 54; Kocayusufpaşao
glu (2014), p. 188.
20
See Kocayusufpaşao glu (2014), p. 181.
21
arung.
22
Engel (1997), p. 223; Thévenoz and Werro (2012), art. 18, N. 76; O
guzman and Öz (2015),
pp. 90–91.
23
See BGB §116.
create a contract. In this instance, as opposed to the above-mentioned case,

the declaration of will has no legal effect. However, pursuant to the ‘trust theory’
(théorie de la confiance, Vertrauenstheorie), if the addressee does not know of
and, as a reasonable person, should not know that this declaration is frivolous, then
the contract is concluded according to his understanding.24 In such a case, the
declaring party (for example, the joking party) is entitled to rescind (avoid) the
contract according to the provisions relating to mistake in the declaration of will
(intention).25
1.7 Content of the Agreement
In order to form a contract, the parties must agree on all of the necessary elements of
the contract. The necessary elements of a contract are divided into two categories:
(1) objectively essential elements and (2) subjectively essential elements.
Objectively essential elements (essentialia negotii) constitute the minimum
contents of a contract in order for it to be valid and legally binding. Such elements
form the core of the contract by themselves (per se), and thus, they are indispens-
able (conditio sine qua non) for the conclusion of the contract. In other words, they
must be determined in order to individualise the contract.26 As a general rule, where
the parties do not agree on the objectively necessary elements, the contract will not
be concluded. For instance, in a sale contract, a description of the goods and the
price are the objectively necessary elements. If the parties do not agree on these
elements, the contract will not be concluded.27 At this point, it should be kept in
mind that in a sale contract, the price of the goods does not have to be determined. It
is sufficient for this price to be determinable. Indeed, according to TCO art.
233, where the buyer has placed a definite order without indicating the price, the
goods are deemed to have been sold at the average market price at the time and
place of performance. Moreover, the objectively essential elements of the contract
may be determinable. In other words, the parties may agree as to how these
elements will be determined in the future.
Subjectively essential elements are subsidiary elements of the contract. They are
not objectively indispensable for the formation of the contract, but they may be
necessary for one or both of the parties in order to form the contract. In other words,
24
See BGB §118.
25
Oguzman and Öz (2015), p. 91; Eren (2015), p. 348, See Sect. 11.1.2.
26
von Tuhr and Peter (1979), § 20, VIII, 1, p. 155; Becker (1941), art. 2, N. 4; Gauch et al. (2008),
p. 62; Tercier (2004), pp. 113–114; Reiso glu (2014), p. 63; Eren (2015), p. 234; Oguzman and Öz
(2015), p. 72; Feyzio glu (1976), pp. 65–66; Kocayusufpaşao glu (2014), pp. 174–175; Nomer
(2015), p. 45; Tercier et al. (2016), p. 179.
27
von Tuhr and Peter (1979), § 20, VIII, 1, p. 155; Becker (1941), art. 2, N. 5; O guzman and Öz
(2015), p. 72.
1.8 Revocation of Offer and Revocation of Acceptance 11
they do not form the core of the contract by themselves (per se).28 However, they
are added to the core of the contract by virtue of the intentions of the parties or of
one of the parties. For instance, a suspensive condition (condition precedent)29 or a
resolutive condition (condition subsequent)30 may constitute a subjectively essen-
tial element for all contracting parties or for only one of them. If the parties do not
agree on such a subsidiary element, then the contract will not come into existence.
Furthermore, there are also secondary elements of a contract, which neither form
its core nor are a part of it. In other words, they are not objectively or subjectively
indispensable for the formation of the contract. For instance, in a sale contract, the
time of performance and the place of delivery of the goods are accepted as
secondary elements. According to TCO art. 2 par. 1, if the parties have agreed on
the essential elements of the contract, then the contract is deemed to be concluded,
even if they have not negotiated the secondary elements at all.31 It is also possible
that the parties may negotiate the secondary elements before the formation of the
contract and decide that they will be determined at a later time. In such a case, the
contract is also deemed to be concluded.32 Actually, TCO art. 2 par. 1 does not state
this possibility; it only regulates situations where the parties have not negotiated the
secondary elements at all. However, it is appropriate to accept that the scope of the
provision may also apply to these situations.
Where the parties negotiate the secondary elements of the contract at the stage of
contract negotiations but do not come to an agreement, the contract cannot be
concluded. This is because a secondary element is deemed to have become a
subjectively necessary element of the contract due to the wishes of one or both
parties.33
1.8 Revocation of Offer and Revocation of Acceptance
If contract negotiations take place between persons present, then the offeror is not
entitled to revoke his offer. This is because once the offer is made between persons
present, it is known by the offeree.
If the contract negotiations take place between persons not present, the following
rules are applied: (1) if the offeror intends to revoke the offer, he must make a
revocation statement. This revocation statement should reach the offeree prior to
the offer. In this case, the offer is deemed not to have been made (TCO art. 10 par.
28
Tercier (2004), p. 114; Gauch et al. (2008), pp. 64–65; Eren (2015), pp. 235–237; O
guzman and
Öz (2015), p. 73; Kocayusufpaşao glu (2014), pp. 175–176; Nomer (2015), p. 45; Tercier et al.
(2016), p. 179.
29
See Sect. 29.2.
30
See Sect. 29.3.
31
32
33
Tekinay et al. (1993), pp. 75–76; O guzman and Öz (2015), p. 73.
1); (2) however, if the offeror’s revocation statement reaches the offeree at the same
time as or after the offer, then in order for the offeror to be able to revoke the offer,
the offeree should have knowledge of the revocation statement before he has
knowledge of the offer (TCO art. 10 par. 1). The above-mentioned rules are also
applicable to the revocation of acceptance (TCO art. 10 par. 2).
1.9 Coming into Effect of the Contract
Where contract negotiations take place among persons present, the conclusion of
the contract and its coming into effect occur at the same time.34 In other words, the
contract is concluded and comes into effect at the time the offeree declares
acceptance.
If contract negotiations take place between persons who are not in each other’s
presence, then the conclusion of the contract and its coming into effect occur at
different times. The contract is concluded when the acceptance reaches the offeror
(cf. TCO art. 5 par. 1). However, the contract comes into effect when the acceptance
is sent (TCO art. 11 par. 1).35
Where an express acceptance is not necessary, the contract is concluded when
the reasonable time limit for the rejection of the offer expires or at the time the act
that constitutes implied acceptance occurs.36 In this case, the contract comes into
effect at the time the offer reaches the offeree (TCO art. 11 par. 2).
1.10 Pre-contractual Duties
Persons commencing negotiations for a contract must act in accordance with the
principles of good faith (TCC art. 2). During negotiations, each party must provide
the other with any information that may affect their decisions regarding the
conclusion of the contract.37 In addition, they must avoid deceptive conduct. If
one of the parties realises that the other is mistaken, he must warn the mistaken
party. Moreover, the negotiating parties must take precautionary measures in order
to protect the assets and personal rights of each other.38 This duty to protect the
other also arises from the principles of good faith. For instance, if the floors are wet
in a restaurant, the owner must warn the customers of this fact. Another example is
34
Thévenoz and Werro (2012), art. 10, N. 1; Engel (1997), p. 208; Eren (2015), p. 262; O
guzman
and Öz (2015), pp. 73–74; Feyzio glu (1976), p. 94.
35
von Tuhr and Peter (1979), § 24, VI, p. 191.
36
37
von Tuhr and Peter (1979), § 24, VIII, p. 192; Gauch et al. (2008), p. 202.
38
Oguzman and Öz (2015), pp. 77–78; Tekinay et al. (1993), p. 976.
References 13
that in a supermarket, the items on the shelves must be properly stacked so as to

avoid harming customers.
If a negotiating party breaches these kinds of pre-contractual duties and is at
fault (culpa in contrahendo, fault in contracting) and the other party suffers damage
as a result, he must compensate the other party for that damage.39
References
Ansay T, Wallace D (eds) (2002) Introduction to Turkish law. Turan, Ankara

Antalya OG (2012) Borçlar hukuku genel hükümler, vol 1. Legal, İstanbul
Aybay A (2011) Borçlar hukuku dersleri genel b€ olüm. Filiz, İstanbul
Becker H (1941) Kommentar zum Schweizerischen Zivilgesetzbuch, Volume VI,
Obligationenrecht, 1. Abteilung: Allgemeine Bestimmungen, Art. 1-183. Stämpfli, Bern
Berger B (2012) Allgemeines Schuldrecht. Stämpfli, Bern
Engel P (1997) Traité des obligations en droit Suisse. Stämpfli, Bern
Eren F (2015) Borçlar hukuku genel hükümler. Yetkin, Ankara
Erten A (2009) Türk ve Alman hukukunda mesafeli s€ ozleşmeler. Banka ve ticaret hukuku
araştırma enstitüsü, Ankara
Esener T (2000) Turkish business law, vol 1. Boğaziçi University Library, İstanbul
Feyzioglu FN (1976) Borçlar hukuku genel hükümler, Volume 1. Fakülteler, İstanbul
Gauch P, Schluep WR, Schmid J (2008) Schweizerisches Obligationenrecht, Allgemeiner Teil, vol
1. Schulthess, Zürich
Honsell H, Vogt NP, Wiegand W (eds) (2003) Basler Kommentar zum Schweizerischen
Privatrecht, Obligationenrecht 1: Art. 1-529 OR. Helbing Lichtenhahn, Basel
İnal E (2005) E-ticaret hukukunda gelişmeler ve internette s€ ozleşmelerin kurulması. Vedat,
İstanbul
Kılıçoglu AM (2013) Borçlar hukuku genel hükümler. Turhan, İstanbul
Kocayusufpaşaoglu N (2014) Borçlar hukuku genel b€ olüm, vol 1 (Kocayusufpaşao glu/Hatemi/
Serozan/Arpacı). Filiz, İstanbul
Nomer HN (2015) Borçlar hukuku genel hükümler. Beta, İstanbul
Oguzman K, Öz T (2015) Borçlar hukuku genel hükümler, vol 1. Vedat, İstanbul
Oser H, Sch€onenberger W (1929) Kommentar zum Schweizerischen Zivilgesetzbuch, Volume V:
Das Obligationenrecht, Erster Halbband: Art. 1-183. Schulthess, Zürich
Özsunay E (1983) Borçlar hukuku, vol I. Filiz, İstanbul
Reisoglu S (2014) Türk borçlar hukuku genel hükümler. Beta, İstanbul
Schwenzer I (2009) Schweizerisches Obligationenrecht, Allgemeiner Teil. Schulthess, Bern
Tekinay SS, Akman S, Burcuo glu H, Altop A (1993) Tekinay borçlar hukuku genel hükümler.
Filiz, İstanbul
Tercier P (2004) Le droit des obligations. Schulthess, Zurich
Tercier P, Pichonnaz P, Develio glu HM (2016) Borçlar hukuku genel hükümler. On iki levha,
İstanbul
Thévenoz L, Werro F (éd) (2012) Commentaire romand code des obligations 1: art. 1-529 CO.
Helbing Lichtenhahn, Bâle
von Tuhr A, Peter H (1979) Allgemeiner Teil des Schweizerischen Obligationenrecht, Volume
39
See Sect. 22.6.
Chapter 2
Public Promise
2.1 General1
TCO art. 9 regulates public promises. At first sight, a public promise2 might be
thought of as an offer, since art. 9 is found between art. 1 and art. 11, being the
provisions of the Code concerned with the formation of the contract. However, in
spite of its place in the Code, a public promise is not an offer. It is a unilateral legal
transaction,3 according to which a public promisor incurs an obligation.4
2.2 Conditions
According to TCO art. 9 par. 1, a person who publicly promises a reward in

exchange for the performance of an act is bound to provide this reward in accor-
dance with the terms of his announcement. A public promisor may require the
performance of any act as long as this act is not illegal or immoral. For instance, the
1
Antalya (2012), pp. 114–120; Aybay (2011), p. 29; Becker (1941), art. 8; Berger (2012), p. 87;
Engel (1997), pp. 209–211; Eren (2015), pp. 460–465; Feyzio glu (1976), pp. 101–119; Gauch
et al. (2008), pp. 224–226; Honsell et al. (2003), art. 8; Kılıço glu (2013), pp. 268–272;
Kocayusufpaşaoglu (2014) pp. 257–269; Nomer (2015), p. 48; Oser and Sch€ onenberger (1929),
art. 8; Oguzman and Öz (2015), pp. 202–205; Özsunay (1983), pp. 127–131; Reiso glu (2014),
pp. 78–80; Schwenzer (2009), pp. 213–214; Tekinay et al. (1993), pp. 467–473; Tercier (2004),
p. 44; Tercier et al. (2016), p. 54; Thévenoz and Werro (2012) art. 8, and von Tuhr and Peter
(1979), p. 182 fn. 6, 324. See in particular İnan (1961).
2
Promesse publique, Auslobung.
3
A juridical act, (acte juridique, Rechtsgesch€aft).
4
von Tuhr and Peter (1979), § 24, II, p. 182 fn. 6, § 38, II, 6, p. 324; Becker (1941), art. 8, N. 5;
Eren (2015), p. 460 ff; O guzman and Öz (2015), p. 203.

16 2 Public Promise
object of the public promise can be the discovery of stolen property, the return of
lost property or the apprehension of a thief.
A public promise should contain a reward such as a sum of money, a holiday or a
travel ticket.5 A public promise can be addressed to the public generally or to a class
of persons, such as college students, or to the population of a small district.6 A
public promise may be made via television, radio, newspapers, the Internet or any
other means of communication.7 There are no restrictions on how the reward may
be announced.
2.3 Consequences
When a person performs the act required by a public promisor, the latter is obliged
to fulfil his obligation in accordance with the announcement.8 For instance, if the
public promisor offers a sum of money in return for finding a lost pet and someone
finds the pet, the public promisor must pay the sum offered.
It should be noted that even if the performer does not know of the existence of
the public promise at the time of his action, he may request the reward as long as he
has fulfilled the conditions of the promise.9
2.4 Revocation
The public promisor can revoke the promise before the performance of the required
act. For a valid revocation, the intention to revoke a promise does not have to be
declared in the same manner as a public promise (cf. BGB § 658 subs. 1).10 After
the revocation, even if a person performs the expected act, he is not entitled to
demand the reward.
However, where the public promisor revokes the promise before the perfor-
mance of the act or precludes its performance, he must reimburse the expenses that
are incurred by any person acting in good faith in order to meet the requirements of
the public promise (TCO art. 9 par. 2 sent. 1). TCO art. 9 par. 2 sent. 2 sets a limit on
the reimbursement of the expenditure. According to this provision, even if the
5
Gauch et al. (2008), p. 225; Oguzman and Öz (2015), p. 203.
6
Gauch et al. (2008), p. 224; Oguzman and Öz (2015), p. 203.
7
Engel (1997), p. 210; Thévenoz and Werro (2012), art. 8, N. 3.
8
Thévenoz and Werro (2012), art. 8, N. 8.
9
Thévenoz and Werro (2012), art. 8, N. 8; Oguzman and Öz (2015), p. 204.
10
Becker (1941), art. 8, N. 11; Eren (2015), p. 465, Reiso
glu (2014), p. 80; Tekinay et al. (1993),
p. 472; Kocayusufpaşao glu (2014) pp. 267–268, See on the contrary Engel (1997), p. 211;
Thévenoz and Werro (2012), art. 8, N. 9; O guzman and Öz (2015), p. 204.
References 17
public promisor is obliged to reimburse the expenses of one or more persons

incurred in good faith, this reimbursement cannot exceed the amount of the stated
reward. Where the public promisor proves that it would have been impossible for
the person demanding reimbursement of the expenses to satisfy the conditions of
the public promise, then the public promisor can be released from his obligations
(TCO art. 9 par. 3).
2.5 Prize Competition
TCO art. 9 does not regulate prize competitions,11 though it may be applied to such
practices by analogy.
References

Obligationenrecht, 1. Abteilung: Allgemeine Bestimmungen, Art. 1-183. Stämpfli, Bern.
Feyzioglu FN (1976) Borçlar hukuku genel hükümler, vol 1. Fakülteler, İstanbul
İnan AN (1961) Türk hukukunda ilan suretiyle yapılan vaadler. Ankara üniversitesi hukuk
fakültesi, Ankara
Kocayusufpaşaoglu N (2014) Borçlar hukuku genel b€ olüm, vol 1 (Kocayusufpaşao
glu/Hatemi/
Filiz, İstanbul
İstanbul
11
Preisausschreiben.
18 2 Public Promise
von Tuhr A, Peter H (1979) Allgemeiner Teil des Schweizerischen Obligationenrecht, vol
Chapter 3
Form of the Contract
3.1 General1
The freedom of form is one of the main principles of the Turkish Code of
Obligations. This principle has its basis in TCO art. 12 par. 1, according to which
the validity of a contract does not require any specific form unless it is provided for
by law. Consequently, the parties may enter into contracts that do not require a
specific form depending on their own preferences as to form. In this context, subject
to certain exceptions, a contract for the sale of movable property may be concluded
in any form. A lease contract for movable or immovable property may also be made
orally or in writing.
It is apparent that an orally concluded contract may give rise to disputes between
the parties. When a dispute arises, if a defendant admits the claimant’s assertion
regarding the existence or the contents of the contract, then the claimant is relieved
of the burden of proof to establish these facts. However, if the defendant denies the
existence of the contract, the claimant must prove its existence. As a rule, if the
value of the contract exceeds TL 2500 at the time of its conclusion, the claimant
must prove the existence of the contract by specific evidence, which is not subject to
the judge’s discretion, such as a deed (TCPC art. 200). In other words, the claimant
may not prove the contract’s existence, say, solely by the testimony of witnesses.
The claimant may only prove the existence of the contract by a deed, by the
1
Antalya (2012), pp. 324–353; Aybay (2011), pp. 32–36, 61–62; Becker (1941), Vorbemerkungen
zu art. 11–16 (Formen der Verträge), art. 11–16; Berger (2012), pp. 245–258; Engel (1997),
pp. 246–266; Eren (2015), pp. 264–296; Feyzio glu (1976), pp. 303–349; Gauch et al. (2008),
pp. 91–119; Honsell et al. (2003), art. 11–16; Kılıço glu (2013), pp. 104–112, 122–171;
Kocayusufpaşaoglu (2014) pp. 270–330, 609–619; Nomer (2015), pp. 61, 99–120; Oser
and Sch€onenberger (1929), art. 11–16; O guzman and Öz (2015), pp. 138–160, 176–177; Özsunay
(1983), pp. 71–77; Reisoglu (2014), pp. 80–97, 147; Schwenzer (2009), pp. 228–245, 18; Tekinay
et al. (1993), pp. 99–136; Tercier (2004), pp. 130–136; Tercier et al. (2016), pp. 206–220;
Thévenoz and Werro (2012) art. 11–16, and von Tuhr and Peter (1979), pp. 228–229, 233–247.

20 3 Form of the Contract
defendant’s admission (TCPC art. 188) or by the defendant’s refusal to swear an

oath (TCPC art. 229).
In brief, the Turkish Code of Obligations does not generally require a particular
form for contracts. In contrast, the Turkish Civil Procedure Code sets certain strict
rules for the proof of contracts in which the value exceeds TL 2500.2 Due to these
strict rules concerning proof, in practice, the contracting parties generally prefer
certain specific forms, particularly the written form.
3.2 Form Requirements3
3.2.1 Sources of Form Requirements
3.2.1.1 By Law
As mentioned above, the Turkish Code of Obligations does not generally require a
specific form for the validity of contracts (TCO art. 12 par. 1). Nevertheless, certain
contracts do require a specific form. The reasons for this requirement are as
follows:4 (1) to invite the parties to consider the contract and (2) to provide certainty
regarding the terms of the contract. Moreover, in certain cases, the legislature sets
stricter form requirements (the official form) in order to give official registers a
secure base.
3.2.1.2 By the Contracting Parties
Even though, according to the Turkish Code of Obligations, a contract is not subject
to a specific form, the parties can agree on a specific form requirement. In this case,
they will not be bound by the contract until such a form requirement is satisfied
(TCO art. 17 par. 1).5 For instance, a lease agreement relating to immovable
property does not require a legal form, but the parties may agree that the contract
will not be valid unless it is concluded before a notary. Under these circumstances,
if the parties make the lease contract in a simple written form, it will not be valid.
If the parties agree on a written form, without providing any specifications, as a
condition for the validity of the contract, the provisions governing the legal written
form apply to this form requirement (TCO art. 17 par. 2).
2
Eren (2015), p. 271; Oguzman and Öz (2015), p. 138.
3
For further explanations see Tug (1994), Kavak (2015).
4
Tercier (2004), p. 131; Thévenoz and Werro (2012), art. 11; N. 4; Eren (2015), p. 265; O
guzman
and Öz (2015), pp. 139–140.
5
Tercier (2004), p. 132; O
guzman and Öz (2015), p. 139; Eren (2015), p. 269.
3.2 Form Requirements 21
3.2.2 Written Form
3.2.2.1 Simple Written Form
According to the Turkish Code of Obligations, certain contracts must be in writing.

For instance, the promise of a gift6 concerning movable property must be executed
in writing (TCO art. 288 par. 1).7 Other examples may be a pre-emption contract
(TCO art. 237 par. 3), an assignment of a claim (TCO art. 184 par. 1) and a life
annuity contract (TCO art. 608). It should be added that a promise to conclude an
assignment of a claim need not be in writing (TCO art. 184 par. 2).
3.2.2.2 Qualified Written Form
Occasionally, the legislature requires a qualified written form for certain trans-
actions.8 Article 538 is the only example of this rule in the Turkish Civil Code.
According to this article, a handwritten will must be entirely in the testator’s
handwriting (including the year, the month and the day it was made) and must be
signed by the testator.
In terms of the law of obligations, the sole example of a qualified written form is
a suretyship contract. TCO art. 583 par. 1 states that a surety contract must be in
writing and that the date and maximum amount of the surety’s liability must be
indicated in the surety’s own handwriting. If the surety contract is joint and several,
this fact must also be included on the surety bond in the surety’s handwriting.
3.2.3 Official Form
According to the Turkish Code of Obligations, certain contracts require an official

form. For instance, a sale contract relating to immovable property must be con-
cluded as a public deed (TCO art. 237 par. 1). Contracts purporting to transfer the
ownership of immovable property must be made before a land registry officer and
authenticated by the officer (LRA art. 26).9 The promise to make a gift of immov-
able property or of rights in rem requires a public deed (TCO art. 288 par. 2) and
6
Although “donation” is widely used in European texts, the author has preferred the use of “gift”
throughout this book as “donation” has a narrower and more specific meaning in English.
7
However, even if the parties breach this rule, the promisor can deliver the goods stated in the
contract to the donee. In this case, the contractual relationship between the parties will be treated as
a gift “from hand to hand” as the delivery of the movable property by the donor to the donee
constitutes a gift “from hand to hand” (TCO art. 289).
8
Thévenoz and Werro (2012), art. 11, N. 19; Eren (2015), p. 283.
9
Land Registry Act, No 2644 of 22 December 1934 (Official Gazette 29.12. 1934; No: 2892).
must also be made before a land registry officer and authenticated by him (LRA art.
26).
3.2.4 Signature
3.2.4.1 General
Where the contract requires a written form, the person who undertakes an obliga-
tion must sign the contract (TCO art. 14 par. 1). For instance, in a surety contract,
the obliged party is the surety. The creditor undertakes no obligations. Conse-
quently, in a surety contract, the surety’s signature will be necessary, whereas the
creditor’s signature will not be required. However, in a real estate sale contract that
is subject to an official written form, both parties incur an obligation, and thus, both
parties’ signatures are required. The signatures indicate that the parties accept all
the terms of the contract, and therefore the signature must be at the end of the
document.
Unless the contrary is stipulated by law, a signed letter or the original copy of a
telegram that has been signed by the obliged party is deemed to be in writing.
Moreover, recoverable texts that are sent by fax or similar means or by secure
electronic signature are considered to be in writing, provided that they are con-
firmed (TCO art. 14 par. 2).
As a rule, a signature must be handwritten (TCO art. 15 par. 1 sent. 1). However,
this rule has two exceptions, which are explained below. The first exception to this
rule is a secure digital signature.10 A secure digital signature will have the same
legal force as a handwritten signature (TCO art. 15 par. 1 sent. 2). Nevertheless,
DSA art. 5 par. 211 states that security contracts (e.g., a surety, guarantee,12
pledge,13 etc.) and transactions that are subject to an official form (e.g., the sale
of immovable property, mortgages, etc.) or a specific procedure (e.g., marriage)
cannot be signed by digital signature. It should be added that negotiable instruments
are subject to a similar rule as a handwritten signature is obligatory in such cases.
The second exception to the aforementioned rule is a signature produced by seal. A
seal is acceptable where its use is customary or in the case of the signing of
securities that are issued in large numbers (TCO art. 15 par. 2).
10
For further explanations see Keser Berber (2002).
11
Digital Signature Act, No 5070 of 15.1.2004 (Official Gazette 23.01.2004; No: 25355).
12
Performance bonds issued by banks can be signed by an electronic signature.
13
The art. 4 par. 3 of the Act on Movable Pledge on Commercial Transactions, No 6750 of
20.10.2016 (Official Gazette 28.10.2016; No: 29871) in relation to digital signature is reserved.
3.4 Amendment of the Contract 23
3.2.4.2 Substitutes for a Signature
The legislature allows those who are unable to sign the contract (e.g., disabled or
illiterate persons) to substitute for their signatures a fingerprint, a handmade mark
or a stamp, provided that these are duly certified (TCO art. 16 par. 1). In Turkish
law, the authority that certifies these substitutes for a signature is the notary public
(see NPA art. 60 subcl. 1).14
The provisions pertaining to negotiable instruments15 are reserved (TCO art.
16 par. 2). Indeed, according to the Turkish Commercial Code, bills of exchange
(art. 756), promissory notes (art. 778 par. 1 subcl. i) and cheques (art. 818 par.
1 subcl. r) must be signed by hand. This rule also applies to signatures on avals16
and endorsements.17
3.2.4.3 Signature of Blind Persons
Blind persons may sign the contract by themselves or request the testimony of a
witness while signing it (TCO art. 15 par. 3).18
3.3 Content of the Form
As explained above, in order to form a contract, the parties must agree on all
necessary elements of the contract.19 That is to say, the agreement must contain the
necessary elements—specifically, objectively and subjectively essential elements.
Therefore, if a contract is subject to a particular form, all necessary elements must
be included in the form.
3.4 Amendment of the Contract20
After concluding the contract, the parties may wish to amend it. Where a contract
does not require a legal written form, the parties may amend it either orally or in
writing without any form requirement.
14
Notary Public Act, No 1512 of 18.1.1972 (Official Gazette 5.02.1972; No: 14090).
15
For further explanations see Ansay and Schneider (2002), p. 66 ff.
16
For further explanations see Ansay and Schneider (2002), pp. 57–58, 73.
17
For further explanations see Ansay and Schneider (2002), pp. 72–73.
18
For further explanations see Helvacı (2007), pp. 1865–1876; Helvacı (2016), pp. 419–428, cf.
SCO.art.14/par. 3, see Engel (1997), pp. 253–254; Thévenoz and Werro (2012), art. 14, N. 25–29.
19
See Sect. 1.7.
20
For further explanations see Öz (2016).
Where the contract requires a legal written form, every amendment must be in
writing (TCO art. 13 par. 1 sent. 1). For instance, in a sale contract in which the
subject matter is immovable property, which requires an official form, the parties
determine, and clearly describe, the immovable property and the price in the
contract. After this determination, if the parties wish to increase or decrease the
price, this amendment must also be made in an official form.21
It should be noted that pursuant to TCO art. 583 par. 3, subsequent variations that
increase a surety’s liability will not be valid unless the form requirement for the
surety is satisfied. However, in a surety contract, the parties can make an agreement
that reduces the amount of the surety’s liability without complying with any
particular form.
As has been seen, the above-mentioned amendment relates to an essential
element of the contract. As to the supplementary non-essential (collateral) amend-
ments that do not conflict with the terms of the contract, the legislature adopts a
different rule. Pursuant to TCO art. 13 par. 1 sent. 2, such amendments are not
subject to any specific form.22 That is to say, in a contract that is subject to a specific
form by law, such as in a sale contract for immovable property, if the parties do not
determine, for example, the due time for performance of the obligation in the
contract and they determine it afterwards, such an amendment will qualify as a
supplementary non-essential amendment. Consequently, such an amendment will
not be subject to a particular form.
It should be kept in mind that according to TCO art. 132, even where the contract
requires a particular form either by law or by the parties’ agreement, the parties can
partially or wholly discharge an obligation regardless of any specific form.23
3.5 Breach of the Form Requirement
Where the parties do not comply with the aforementioned form requirements, the
contract will not be binding, i.e., the contract will be invalid (TCO art. 12 par.
2 sent. 2).24 Invalidity of this nature can be referred to as a nullity, and it arises by
operation of law.25 Consequently, it is not necessary to file a lawsuit in order to
establish that the contract is void. However, if the validity of a contract is disputed,
21
Oguzman and Öz (2015), pp. 152–153, compare to von Tuhr and Peter (1979), § 30, VI,
pp. 242–243.
22
Thévenoz and Werro (2012), art. 12, N. 3; O guzman and Öz (2015), p. 153; Eren (2015),
pp. 287–288.
23
See Sect. 25.2.2.
24
Becker (1941), art. 11, N. 8.
25
von Tuhr and Peter (1979), § 30, III, p. 237 ff.; Eren (2015), p. 291; Tando
gan (1989), p. 242.
3.5 Breach of the Form Requirement 25
the party who asserts that it is invalid may file a declaratory lawsuit.26 There is no
limitation period for relying on the nullity of a contract. Furthermore, even if the
parties do not assert the invalidity of the contract in a lawsuit, the judge must take
this nullity into consideration ex officio.27 Moreover, the ratification or good faith of
the parties does not remedy this invalidity.28
As mentioned above, if the parties do not comply with the form requirement, the
contract will be void. Nevertheless, this consequential nullity has two exceptions,
which are explained in the paragraphs below.29
The first exception arises from TCC art. 2, which states that every person is
bound to exercise his rights and fulfil his obligations according to the principles of
good faith; the law does not protect the manifest abuse of rights. Indeed, in certain
cases, the assertion of invalidity can be against the principles of good faith (bona
fides). For instance, as mentioned above,30 the sale of immovable property must be
made before a land registry officer. However, it is possible for the parties to make
the contract without respecting this requirement of form. Despite this
non-compliance with the form requirement, both parties may perform their obliga-
tions according to the contract as if it were valid. After the fulfilment of their
obligations, if one of the parties asserts that the contract is invalid due to
non-compliance with the form requirements,31 then this assertion will be against
the principles of good faith and the judge must reject it.32
Moreover, in the above-mentioned example, despite the nullity of the contract
due to the lack of form, if the buyer pays the sale price and the seller transfers
possession of the immovable property to the buyer, the latter may demand that the
immovable property be registered in the land register under his name. In such a
case, if the seller alleges that the contract is void due to the lack of form, such a
defence may be considered to be against the principles of good faith by the court
and the court may grant the claimant’s demand to register his ownership in the land
register.33
The second exception is ‘reinterpretation’. Actually, this is not regulated under
the Turkish Code of Obligations. In contrast, the German Civil Code (BGB)
26
According to the TCPC art. 106 in the case of a declaratory action, the claimant seeks a court
declaration that a right or a legal relationship exists or does not exist. For further explanations see
Kuru and Budak (2010).
27
Thévenoz and Werro (2012), art. 11, N. 33; Engel (1997), p. 262.
28
29
For further explanations see Altaş (1998).
30
See Sect. 3.2.3.
31
See and compare BGB §311 b subs. 1.
32
Tercier (2004), pp. 135–136; Thévenoz and Werro (2012), art. 11, N. 37; O guzman and Öz
(2015), pp. 155–158; Eren (2015), p. 290.
33
Tandogan (1989), p. 242, See Decision to Unify the Jurisprudence of the Court of Cassation,
30.09.1988, File No: 1987/2, Decision No: 1988/2 (Official Gazette 21.12.1988; No: 20026).
In Turkish law, the decisions of the Court of Cassation are not binding with one exception;
namely, decisions to unify the jurisprudence, resolving inconsistencies between its divisions.
regulates reinterpretation (Umdeutung) under § 140. Certain Swiss34 and Turkish

scholars35 analyse this notion having regard to the approach of commentators on the
German Civil Code under the concept of conversion (conversion).36 Furthermore,
the Turkish Court of Cassation has applied this principle in its decisions.
In the author’s opinion, the concept of reinterpretation can be considered as
follows: if the parties enter into a contract without respecting the compulsory form
requirements, the contract will be void. However, if the form of the invalid contract
satisfies the form requirements of another contract relating to the same subject
matter and it can be assumed that the latter contract is covered by the presumed
intention of the parties, then the invalid contract will have the same full effect as the
presumed contract. For instance, parties make a land sale contract before a notary
public, although such a contract must be executed before a land registry officer.
Nevertheless, this invalid sale contract would be recognised as a pre-contract to a
land sale contract if (1) it satisfies the form requirements of a pre-contract for the
sale of land and (2) it can be shown that had the parties been aware of the invalidity
of their sale contract, then they would have entered into a pre-contract for the land
sale contract. The Turkish Court of Cassation consistently adopts this approach in
its decisions.37
References
Altaş H (1998) Şekle aykırılı

gın olumsuz sonuçlarının düzeltilmesi. Yetkin, Ankara
Ansay T, Schneider EC (eds) (2002) Introduction to Turkish business law. Turan, Ankara
Becker H (1941) Kommentar zum Schweizerischen Zivilgesetzbuch, vol VI, Obligationenrecht,
1. Abteilung: Allgemeine Bestimmungen, Art. 1-183, Stämpfli, Bern
Helvacı İ (2007) “Özürlüler hakkında kanun”un borçlar kanunu, ticaret kanunu ve medeni kanun
ve noterlik kanunu bakımından getirdi gi degişiklikler üzerine (Türk borçlar kanunu ve Türk
ticaret kanunu tasarıları hakkında bazı saptamalar). Prof. Dr. Hüseyin Ülgen’e Arma gan, vol
II. İstanbul, pp. 1865–1876
34
Thévenoz and Werro (2012) art. 11, N. 44–46; Engel (1997), p. 265.
35
Oguzman and Öz (2015), p. 155; Eren (2015), pp. 295–296.
36
For further explanations see Kaneti (1972).
37
13th Civil Division of Court of Cassation, 08.05.1985, File No: 1985/2723, Decision No: 1985/
3153; 15th Civil Division of Court of Cassation, 13.05.1976, File No: 1976/811, Decision No:
1976/2152; General Assembly of Civil Division of Court of Cassation, 13.10.1976, File No: 1975/
13-108, Decision No: 1976/2617 (Kazancı İçtihat Bilgi Bankası).
References 27
Helvacı İ (2016) Görme engelli kişilerin imzaları ve ispat yükü üzerine bazı düşünceler. İstanbul
kültür üniversitesi hukuk fakültesi dergisi 15(2):419–428
Kaneti S (1972) Hukuki işlemlerin çevrilmesi (tahvili). İstanbul üniversitesi, İstanbul
Kavak Y (2015) Borçlar hukukunda yazılı şekil. Kayhan, İstanbul
Keser Berber L (2002) İnternet üzerinde yapılan işlemlerde elektronik para ve dijital imza. Yetkin,
Ankara
Serozan/Arpacı). Filiz, İstanbul.
Kuru B, Budak AC (2010) Tespit davaları. On iki levha, İstanbul
Oser H, Sch€onenberger W (1929) Kommentar zum Schweizerischen Zivilgesetzbuch, vol V: Das
Obligationenrecht, Erster Halbband: Art. 1-183. Schulthess, Zürich
Öz K (2016) Tadil s€ozleşmesi. Filiz, İstanbul
Tandogan H (1989) Borçlar hukuku, € ozel borç ilişkileri, vol I/1. Vedat, İstanbul
Filiz, İstanbul
İstanbul
Thévenoz L, Werro F (éd) (2012) Commentaire romand code des obligations 1: art. 1-529 CO, Art.
8. Helbing Lichtenhahn, Bâle
Tug A (1994) Türk €ozel hukukunda şekil. Mimoza, Konya
Chapter 4
Standard Terms
4.1 General1
During the formation of a contract, the parties generally negotiate the terms of the
contract. However, in certain cases, one of the parties prepares the contract’s terms
in advance and, without negotiation, imposes them on the other party. Generally,
banks, insurance companies, travel agencies and public institutions providing
utility services use such terms prepared in advance, which are referred to as
‘standard terms’, ‘general conditions’2 or ‘adhesion contracts’.
4.2 Definition and Interpretation
According to TCO art. 20 par. 1, standard terms are the provisions that are prepared
in advance by the imposing party to use in several similar contracts.3 The preparing
party imposes these provisions on the other party without negotiating with him. It is
irrelevant whether these provisions appear in the contract itself or in its annexures.
Also, the form, the font or the typeface and the scope of these provisions are not
relevant to their status as standard terms (TCO art. 20 par. 1 sent. 2).
1
Antalya (2012), pp. 285–323; Aybay (2011), pp. 44–46; Berger (2012), pp. 309–321; Engel
(1997), pp. 165–175; Eren (2015), pp. 214–223; Gauch et al. (2008), pp. 244–258; Honsell et al.
(2003), art. 1; Kılıço
glu (2013), pp. 112–122; Kocayusufpaşao glu (2014), pp. 225–257; Nomer
(2015), pp. 72–76; Oguzman and Öz (2015), pp. 160–169; Reiso glu (2014), pp. 70–78; Schwenzer
(2009), pp. 324–338; Tekinay et al. (1993), pp. 154–166; Tercier (2004), pp. 160–164; Tercier
et al. (2016), pp. 263–280; Thévenoz and Werro (2012), arts. 19–20, and von Tuhr and Peter
(1979), pp. 11, 143–144. For further explanations see Yelmen (2014).
2
Conditions générale des affaires, Allgemeine Gesch€
aftsbedingungen.
3
Gauch et al. (2008), p. 246; O guzman and Öz (2015), p. 162; Eren (2015), p. 215.

30 4 Standard Terms
The provisions concerning standard terms in the Turkish Code of Obligations are
also applied to contracts that are prepared by persons and institutions that perform
services with the permission of a competent authority or of the law itself. Indeed,
public institutions providing utility services such as natural gas, electricity, water or
sewage disposal use standard terms in their contracts. Thus, these persons and
institutions must comply with the provisions governing standard terms. Further-
more, the legal nature of these institutions’ contracts does not affect the application
of these provisions (TCO art. 20 par. 4).
In certain cases, the texts of contracts prepared with the same objective may
differ. In spite of this difference, the provisions of these contracts are deemed to be
standard terms (TCO art. 20 par. 2). Also, the preparing party may insert and
impose certain clauses explaining that each of the standard terms has been agreed
upon by negotiation. These clauses themselves do not affect the legal nature of the
standard terms (TCO art. 20 par. 3). If a provision of the standard terms is not clear
and understandable or is ambiguous, it is interpreted to the detriment of the drafting
party (indubio contra stipulatorem) and to the advantage of the adhering party
(TCO art. 23).
4.3 Invalid Standard Terms
4.3.1 Non-written Standard Terms
For standard terms that are contrary to the interests of the adhering party to form
part of the contract, all of the following conditions must be satisfied on formation of
the contract: (1) the preparing party must clearly inform the adhering party of the
existence of these standard terms, (2) the preparing party must provide the oppor-
tunity for the adhering party to be informed of the content of these standard terms
and (3) the adhering party must accept these standard terms. Otherwise, the
standard terms are deemed to be non-written (TCO art. 21 par. 1). It should be
noted that the term ‘non-written’ is not typical for the Turkish Code of Obligations.
This term means ‘non-existent’. That is to say, invalid standard terms are deemed to
be non-existent.4
Standard terms that are unusual given the purpose of the contract and the nature
of the transaction are deemed to be non-written as well (TCO art. 21 par. 2). These
clauses may be defined as ‘surprising’ clauses in parallel with the German Civil
Code § 305c. For example, if a mortgagor is not the debtor of a secured obligation
and if he then unknowingly accepts being a surety5 under the standard terms of the
4
5
Under the former Turkish Code of Obligations such a risk was quite possible. This is because the
provisions relating to the surety have only required a simple written form for the contract to be
valid. That is why it was possible for a third party mortgagor to sign a surety contract unknowingly.
4.3 Invalid Standard Terms 31
mortgage contract, the clause relating to the suretyship is deemed to be non-written.

This is because a mortgagor who is not the debtor of the secured debt must merely
forfeit the value of the realisation of the mortgaged property in the case of
non-performance of the obligation. If the money obtained from the realisation of
the mortgagor’s property does not meet the amount of the obligation, the creditor is
not entitled to demand payment of the remaining amount from the mortgagor.
However, although within the limit of the surety contract, a surety is liable for all
his seizable assets for the non-performance of the obligation. Thus, standard terms
of a mortgage contract that encumber a third party mortgagor with an obligation of
suretyship are unusual given the nature of such a mortgage contract. Consequently,
such ‘surprising’ clauses are deemed to be non-written.
Banks use standard terms in their loan agreements that allow them to unilaterally
increase interest rates in line with inflation. Such standard terms are valid as they
are not alien to the nature of loan agreements. This approach has been adopted by
the Turkish Court of Cassation.6
4.3.2 Partial Invalidity
The invalidity of the standard terms does not affect the validity of the other terms of
the contract. In such a case, the preparing party cannot argue that he would not have
entered into the contract without the standard terms that are deemed to be
non-written (TCO art. 22).
TCO art. 22 is distinct from TCO art. 27 par. 2 sent. 2 as the latter states that if it
is obvious that the parties would not have concluded the contract without the invalid
provisions, then the entire contract will be void. It is apparent that if the legislature
had not set a special rule for partial invalidity of the contract with respect to
standard terms, TCO art. 27 par. 2 sent. 2 would be applied and, thus, the judge
would take into consideration the presumed intentions of the parties.
4.3.3 Prohibition of Unilateral Amendments
In certain cases, the preparing party may insert clauses allowing them to unilaterally
amend or add new provisions to the detriment of the adhering party. Indeed, in
practice, banks promote such clauses. The preparing party may insert them either in
However, the TCO art. 583 par. 1 states that a contract of surety must be in writing and that the date
and maximum amount of the surety’s liability must be indicated in the surety’s own handwriting. If
the surety contract is joint and several, this fact must also be included on the surety bond in the
surety’s handwriting. Given this qualified written form requirement of the new Code, a third party
mortgagor may not readily become a joint and several surety unknowingly.
6
Reisoglu (2014), p. 75.
32 4 Standard Terms
the contract containing the standard terms or in a separate contract. TCO art.
24 accepts that these clauses are deemed to be non-written. For example, a travel
agency offers package tours. If in its standard terms, there is a provision that allows
the travel agency to unilaterally downgrade the accommodation (such as a three-
star hotel instead of a five-star hotel) without decreasing the price, then these
standard terms are deemed to be non-written.
4.4 Control of Content
The drafter is not entitled to insert provisions to the standard terms that are to the
detriment of the adhering party or that may aggravate the adhering party’s position
in a manner contrary to the principles of good faith (TCO art. 25). For example, in
the standard terms, there might be a provision allowing the drafter to terminate the
contract without any justifiable reason and without paying any compensation.
However, the same provision allows the adhering party to terminate the contract
only in specific and enumerated cases. Moreover, the same provision may require
the adhering party to pay a significant penalty. This provision is non-written as it is
indeed against the principles of good faith7 and is seriously unfair or inequitable.
As has been seen, the Turkish Code of Obligations sets two stages of control.8
The first is governed by art. 21, while the second is regulated under art. 25. In this
way, the legislature has aimed to protect the adhering party. In brief, for the
standard terms to be part of the contract, the preparing party must respect the
rules stated under TCO art. 21, and furthermore, the content of the standard terms
must not breach the rules stated in TCO art. 25.
References

Atamer MY (1999) S€ ozleşme €
ozgürlü günün sınırlandırılması sorunu çerçevesinde genel işlem
şartlarının denetlenmesi. Beta, İstanbul
Aydogdu M (2014) Genel işlem koşullarının ve tüketici hukukunda haksız şartların denetimi.
Seçkin, Ankara
7
8
For further explanations, see Atamer (1999), Havutçu (2003), Aydo
gdu (2014).
References 33
Havutçu A (2003) Açık içerik denetimi yoluyla tüketicinin genel işlem şartlarına karşı korunması.
Güncel, İzmir
Filiz, İstanbul
İstanbul
Yelmen A (2014) Türk borçlar kanununa g€ ore genel işlem şartları. Yetkin, Ankara
Chapter 5
Content of the Contract
5.1 Freedom of Contract1
The principle of freedom of contract has its basis in TCO art. 26. Pursuant to this
article, the parties may freely determine the content of the contract, their obliga-
tions, duties, responsibilities, liabilities, rights, entitlements, remedies, etc. within
the limits of the law. According to this principle, within the limits of the law,
persons are free to conclude or not to conclude a contract and they also have
freedom of choice with respect to the contracting parties.2
When parties intend to enter into a contract, they may agree on a type of contract
regulated by law. For instance, the parties can adopt contract types that are
regulated in the Turkish Code of Obligations such as sale (arts. 207–281), barter
(arts. 282–284), gift (art. 285–298), lease (art. 299–378), loan (art. 379–392),
employment (art. 393–447), agency (art. 502–514), work (art. 470–486), surety
(art. 581–603), life annuities (art. 607–610), simple partnership (art. 620–645), etc.
In addition, the parties may choose another type of contract regulated by other
legislation. Moreover, the parties can freely create their own contracts within the
limits of the law. While doing so, they can create sui generis contracts (e.g., a
settlement agreement) or mixed contracts (e.g., a software contract related to design
and maintenance of software).
1
Antalya (2012), pp. 273–284; Aybay (2011), pp. 37–41; Becker (1941), art. 19–20; Berger
(2012), pp. 58–59, 370–385; Engel (1997), pp. 94–99, 267–297; Eren (2015), pp. 297–301,
316–345; Feyzioglu (1976), pp. 231–248, 266–273; Gauch et al. (2008), pp. 120–152; Honsell
et al. (2003), art. 19–20; Kılıço
glu (2013), pp. 75–80, 86–104; Kocayusufpaşao glu (2014),
pp. 525–619; Nomer (2015), pp. 56–81; Oser and Sch€ onenberger (1929), art. 19–20; Oguzman
and Öz (2015), pp. 81–90, 173–183; Özsunay (1983), pp. 55–59; Reiso glu (2014), pp. 133–140;
Schwenzer (2009), pp. 246–259; Tekinay et al. (1993), pp. 362–364, 369–407; Tercier (2004),
pp. 98–111, 137–146; Tercier et al. (2016), pp. 221–236; Thévenoz and Werro (2012), art. 19–20,
and von Tuhr and Peter (1979), pp. 223–233, 247–266.
2
Such freedom has two exceptions that are considered below. See Chap. 7.

36 5 Content of the Contract
5.2 Restrictions
TCO art. 27 par. 1 states that contracts that are contrary to the mandatory rules of
law, morality (boni mores), public order, personal rights3 or contracts in which the
object is impossible to perform are void. These restrictions are elucidated in detail
below.
5.2.1 Mandatory Rules of Law
Mandatory rules of law are defined as rules of law that cannot be derogated from by
agreement between the contracting parties. In certain rules of law, the mandatory
nature is clearly understood from the wording. For instance, the contracting parties
are not entitled to agree in advance to a clause that excludes their liability for gross
fault (unlawful intent or gross negligence—culpa lata). Such a clause will be void
(TCO art. 115 par. 1). Another example: TCO art. 160 states that a party may not
exclude the limitation period defence in advance.
However, in certain cases, the question of whether a rule of law is mandatory or
not cannot be readily answered from the wording of the rule. In such cases, a judge
must consider the objective (ratio legis) of the rule.4 Rules of law that aim to protect
public order, public interest, moral public values, personal rights and a socially,
economically or physically weaker party in a contract, such as employees or
consumers, are generally mandatory.5
5.2.2 Rules of Law Protecting Personal Rights
As has been pointed out, rules of law that aim to protect personal rights are
mandatory. Thus, if a contract breaches a specific rule of law that protects personal
rights, then the contract actually violates this mandatory rule.
However, even if there is not a specific rule in the legislation, a contract may
nevertheless violate personal rights. Indeed, according to the Turkish Civil Code
art. 23, no person may wholly or partially renounce his legal capacity (TCC art. 8)
or his capacity to act (TCC art. 9). No person may renounce his freedom or restrict
its use contrary to law and morality. Consequently, for instance, no person may
promise that he will not marry or divorce or change his religion. Moreover,
contracts that specify an excessively long term, such as 30 or 40 years, may be
3
For further explanations see Helvacı (2001).
4
Engel (1997), p. 107.
5
von Tuhr and Peter (1979), § 31, II, pp. 250–251; O
guzman and Öz (2015), p. 82; Reiso
glu
(2014), p. 134.
5.2 Restrictions 37
deemed illegal. For example, a person cannot make a commitment not to sell a
property during his lifetime.6
5.2.3 Morality7
Certain mandatory rules of law are based on morality. For example, TPC art.
272 imposes punishments for falsely testifying under oath (perjury). Accordingly,
a contract that concerns perjury breaches this mandatory rule and is deemed
immoral and illegal.8 However, it is apparent that public moral values are not
usually defined by specific rules of law. Thus, even if there is not a specific rule
based on morality in the legislation if the content of the contract or the contracting
parties’ objectives are contrary to morality, then the content of the contract will be
deemed to be immoral.
It should be kept in mind that if one of the parties aims to obtain an immoral
outcome and the other party does not adopt this immoral aim, then the contract
cannot be deemed immoral.9 In order to decide whether or not the contract is moral,
the judge may not take his subjective moral beliefs into consideration; instead,
moral principles that are generally accepted within society at the time of judgment
must be considered.
The following are examples of immoral contracts: (1) a contract concluded in
order to direct a journalist to publish a false news item and (2) a partnership contract
concluded to manage a disorderly house (a brothel) without having the necessary
permission from the government. Nonetheless, it should be noted that a lease
agreement between an owner of immovable property and a manager of a disorderly
house is binding. This is due to the fact that the Turkish Court of Cassation has
decided that if the management of a disorderly house is permitted by law, such a
contract is valid.10
5.2.4 Public Order
Certain mandatory rules of law have their basis in concerns for public order. Even
though it is not easy to define public order, it is possible to define the rules
6
Oguzman and Öz (2015) p. 84.
7
For further explanations see Ateş (2007).
8
In most cases illegality and immorality may overlap. Kocayusufpaşao glu (2014), p. 555.
9
Kocayusufpaşaoglu (2014), pp. 556–557, see and compare to von Tuhr and Peter (1979) § 31, V,
1, pp. 257–258; Oguzman and Öz (2015) p. 86.
10
Decision to Unify the Jurisprudence of the Court of Cassation, 14.01.1948, File No: 30, Decision
No: 2 (Official Gazette 30.07.1948; No: 6971).
concerning public order as the rules that protect the fundamental interests of the
public and the structure of social life.11 These kinds of rules may derive from either
public law12 or private law.13 For instance, rules concerning construction or pro-
tection of the environment result from public law, whereas rules protecting lessees
of dwelling houses and business premises have their basis in private law. Another
example arising from private law is TCO art. 148. According to this article,
limitation periods described under the second chapter of the third title of the
Turkish Code of Obligations cannot be modified by agreement between the parties.
Moreover, besides the mandatory written rules defining public order, there is an
independent concept of public order based on unwritten rules.14 In this sense, public
order has social, economic, philosophical and moral content, and this content can
change over time.15 Where a contract’s content is contrary to these written or
unwritten rules, the contract is illegal.
5.2.5 Initial Impossibility16
The conditions for the initial impossibility of the object of a contract are as follows:
(1) it must be impossible to perform the obligation at the time the contract is
concluded, (2) this impossibility must be objective—that is to say, it must be the
case for any person.
Whether the cause of the initial impossibility is legal or factual is not relevant.
Indeed, an initial impossibility of performance can emerge due to a legal prohibi-
tion.17 For instance, the legislature sets forth certain height restrictions for buildings
and the specification in the parties’ agreement exceeds these limits. An initial
impossibility of performance can also be based on factual grounds.18 For example,
in a sale contract regarding specific goods, the goods have already been destroyed
by the time the contract is concluded. The debtor’s knowledge of the initial
impossibility is not relevant.
11
Kocayusufpaşaoglu (2014), p. 546. For further explanations see Honsell et al. (2003), art. 19–20,
N. 23.
12
Becker (1941), art. 19, N. 28.
13
Becker (1941), art. 19, N. 25.
14
Kocayusufpaşaoglu (2014), p. 549.
15
Kocayusufpaşaoglu (2014), p. 546.
16
For further explanations see Altunkaya (2005).
17
Thévenoz and Werro (2012), art. 19–20, N. 76; Engel (1997), p. 270; Gauch et al. (2008), p. 124;
Honsell et al. (2003), art. 19–20, N. 46; Tekinay et al. (1993), p. 404; O guzman and Öz (2015),
p. 88; Feyzioglu (1976), p. 268.
18
Tekinay et al. (1993), pp. 405–406; O guzman and Öz (2015), p. 88; Feyzio glu (1976),
pp. 267–268; Nomer (2015), pp. 80–81.
5.3 Breach of Restrictions 39
5.3 Breach of Restrictions
5.3.1 Nullity
As mentioned above, according to TCO art. 27 par. 1, contracts that are against the
mandatory rules of law, morality (boni mores), public order, personal rights and
contracts that comprise objects that are impossible to perform19 are void. That is to
say, the contract is deemed invalid by operation of law. Therefore, it is unnecessary
to bring an action to establish its invalidity. However, if the validity of the contract
is disputed, the party that asserts that it is invalid may file a declaratory lawsuit.20
There is no limitation period for relying on the nullity of a contract. Furthermore,
even if the parties do not assert the invalidity of the contract in a lawsuit, the judge
must take this nullity into consideration ex officio.21 Moreover, the ratification or
good faith (bona fides) of the parties cannot remedy this invalidity.22
It should be noted that in cases of initial impossibility, the contract is void, even
if the debtor does not know of the impossibility. Where the debtor has knowledge of
this fact, the contract will also be void. However, in such a case, the debtor must pay
compensation to the creditor for negative damage. This type of liability is an
example of culpa in contrahendo (fault in contracting) as the fault of the debtor
arises during contract negotiations.23
5.3.2 Partial Nullity24
It is possible that only some of the terms of the contract are invalid. In this case, the
contract will be partially invalid. In other words, a partial nullity will occur. Indeed,
according to TCO art. 27 par. 2 sent. 1, the invalidity of certain provisions of a
contract does not affect the validity of other provisions. For instance, with regard to
partial nullity, consider the following example: under TCC art. 949, in a pledge
contract, any agreement by which the pledged chattel becomes the property of the
19
Impossibilium nulla obligatio est: No-one has a legal obligation to do the impossible or there is
no obligation to perform an impossible act.
20
For further explanations see Kuru and Budak (2010).
21
von Tuhr and Peter (1979), § 29, II, p. 225; Becker (1941), art. 20, N. 11; Gauch et al. (2008),
p. 138; Tercier (2004), p. 101; Thévenoz and Werro (2012), art. 19–20, N. 94.
22
Oguzman and Öz (2015), p. 175; Kocayusufpaşao glu (2014), pp. 585–586; Nomer (2015), p. 58;
Reisoglu (2014), p. 146; Eren (2015), p. 334; Tercier et al. (2016), p. 156.
23
See Sects. 1.10 and 22.6.
24
For further explanations see Başpınar (1998), Üçer (2013).
pledgee in the event of non-performance of the debt is void.25 Therefore, according

to TCO art. 27 par. 2 sent. 1, if the parties to the pledge contract stipulate a provision
of this nature, this provision will be void, but the other provisions of the pledge
agreement will remain unaffected and valid.26
As mentioned above, if some of the provisions of the contract are invalid, as a
rule, the other provisions of the contract remain valid. Nonetheless, under TCO art.
27 par. 2 sent. 2, if it is obvious that the parties would not have concluded the
contract without the invalid provisions, then the entire contract will be void. It
should be noted that, in practice, even if this is true for only one of the parties, the
entire contract is considered to be void.27 For instance, a buyer wants to purchase a
loading machine and a packaging machine. The loading machine’s price is €40,000
and the packaging machine costs €10,000. The buyer pays €50,000 for these
specific goods. However, it is subsequently discovered that the loading machine
had been destroyed at the time of formation of the contract, while the packaging
machine was still merchantable. The seller argues that the provision of the contract
relating to the loading machine is void due to the initial impossibility of perfor-
mance, while the provision relating to the packaging machine remains valid.
Accordingly, the seller keeps the €10,000; delivers the packaging machine to the
buyer; and repays the loading machine’s price – i.e., €40,000. However, the buyer
argues that the entire contract is invalid as if he had known that the loading machine
was damaged at the time of formation of the contract, he would not have purchased
the packaging machine. In this case, the judge will determine the extent of the
invalidity of the contract by taking into consideration the presumed intentions of the
parties, especially of the buyer. It should be added that if the buyer still wishes to
purchase the packaging machine, the seller must comply with the contract. The
seller may not argue that if he had known of this partial invalidity, he would not
have sold the packaging machine. Such an assertion is against the principles of good
faith (TCC art. 2 par. 2).
TCO art. 27 par. 2 sent. 2 states that if it is obvious that the parties would not
have entered into the contract without the invalid provisions, then the entire
contract will be void. Consequently, in such a case, the judge must take the
presumed intentions of the parties into consideration in order to determine whether
the contract is partially invalid. However, in certain cases, the protective aim of the
violated provision or the principles of good faith do not allow the judge to take the
presumed intentions of the parties into consideration. For example, in Turkish law,
contracting parties may agree on a clause that excludes their liability. However, the
25
It should be kept in mind that the Act on Movable Pledge on Commercial Transactions sets a
specific rule. According to article 14 of this Act, in the case of non-performance of a loan
agreement the creditor may demand that ownership of the pledged assets be transferred to him
in lieu of performance. However, if the value of the pledged asset exceeds the amount of the
secured debt, the creditor must pay this difference to the pledgor or, if there are other creditors in
the subsequent rank, to them.
26
For further explanations see Helvacı (1997), pp. 102–107.
27
Kocayusufpaşaoglu (2014), pp. 598–599.
References 41
provisions of an agreement in advance purporting to exclude liability for gross fault

(unlawful intent or gross negligence—culpa lata) will be void (TCO art. 115 par.
1). In this case, the provisions of the agreement excluding liability for gross fault
will be invalid but the provisions will remain valid to the extent of excluding
liability for slight negligence (culpa levis).28
With this in mind, it will be helpful to mention that, pursuant to TComC art.
1530, transactions and terms prohibited by commercial provisions are invalid
unless the contrary is stipulated. However, where a maximum limit is prescribed
by law or by the competent authorities and a provision of a contract exceeds that
limit, then the maximum prescribed limit will be deemed to apply to the contract. In
that respect, TCO art. 27 par. 2 sent. 2 is not applicable. For instance, the legislature
may limit interest rates in commercial loan agreements to 10% per annum. If, in
these circumstances, the parties agree to an interest rate of 25% per annum, the
judge will deem the contract to be concluded within the maximum limit (i.e., 10%)
without taking into consideration their presumed intentions.
References
Altunkaya M (2005) Edimin başlangıçtaki imkânsızlı gı. Yetkin, Ankara

Ateş D (2007) Borçlar hukuku s€ ozleşmelerinde genel ahlaka aykırılık. Turhan, Ankara
Başpınar V (1998) Borç s€ozleşmelerinin kısmi butlanı. Güncel, Ankara
Helvacı İ (1997) Türk medenı̂ kanununa g€ ore lex commissoria (mürtehinin merhunu temellük)
yasagı (mk. m. 788/c.2 ve mk. m. 863). Alfa, İstanbul
Helvacı S (2001) Türk ve İsviçre hukuklarında kişilik hakkını koruyucu davalar (mk. md. 24/a
fıkra I/imk. md. 28a fıkra I). Beta, İstanbul
glu/Hatemi/
Kuru B, Budak AC (2010) Tespit davaları. On iki levha, İstanbul
28
Kocayusufpaşaoglu (2014), pp. 599–600, 602.

Filiz, İstanbul
İstanbul
Üçer M (2013) Roma hukukunda ve karşılaştırmalı hukukta s€ozleşmelerin kısmi butlanı. Yetkin,
Ankara
Chapter 6
Abstract Acknowledgement of Debt
6.1 General1
Initially, one might think that an acknowledgement of debt2 is a unilateral legal

transaction. However, this is not true; on the contrary, an acknowledgement of debt
is a contract.3 In fact, such a contract does not require any specific form.4 Never-
theless, in practice, this kind of legal transaction is usually concluded in
written form.
Within an acknowledgement of debt, the parties may state the legal ground
(causa) of the obligation. For instance, in a deed, D acknowledges that he is obliged
to pay €10,000 to C because he has bought a car from C. In this case, the
acknowledgement of debt comprises its cause (legal ground); this cause is referred
to as causa credendi (for the sake of obtaining a claim). This is because D is obliged
to pay €10,000 in order to have a claim for the transfer of the ownership of the car.
1
Antalya (2012), pp. 81, 268–273; Aybay (2011), pp. 54–55; Becker (1941), art. 17; Berger
(2012), pp. 96–97; Engel (1997), pp. 156–157; Eren (2015), pp. 190–198; Feyzio glu (1976),
pp. 286–297; Gauch et al. (2008), pp. 263–265; Honsell et al. (2003), art. 17; Kılıço glu (2013),
and Sch€onenberger (1929), art. 17; O guzman and Öz (2015), pp. 205–210; Özsunay (1983),
pp. 79–82; Reisoglu (2014), pp. 100–102; Schwenzer (2009), pp. 19–21; Tekinay et al. (1993),
pp. 137–142; Tercier (2004), pp. 69–70; Tercier et al. (2016), pp. 101–103; Thévenoz and Werro
(2012), art. 17, and von Tuhr and Peter (1979), pp. 266–273.
2
Reconnaissance de dette, Schuldbekenntnis.
3
Honsell et al. (2003), art. 17, N. 3; O
guzman and Öz (2015), p. 207; Tekinay et al. (1993), p. 137;
Nomer (2015), p. 49; Eren (2015), p. 193, on the contrary see Thévenoz and Werro (2012), art.
17, N. 4.
4
Honsell et al. (2003), art. 17, N. 3.

44 6 Abstract Acknowledgement of Debt
6.2 Validity of Abstract Acknowledgement of Debt
It is possible that the parties may create an acknowledgement of debt without

stating its reason.5 For instance, in a deed, D acknowledges that he is obliged to
pay €10,000 to C without stating the legal ground of the debt. This is an example of
an abstract acknowledgement of debt. According to TCO art. 18, even if an
acknowledgement of debt does not state its cause, it is nevertheless valid. The
cause of the debt may be a sale contract (causa credendi) or a deed that constitutes a
promise of a gift (causa donandi).
However, it is possible that an acknowledgement of debt does not have a valid
legal ground. In this case, the validity of the acknowledgement of debt is
contentious.
Certain scholars are influenced by FCC art. 1131 (version in force from 17th
February 1804 to 1st October 2016), which states that an obligation without cause
or with a false cause, or with an unlawful cause, may not have any effect. Therefore,
these scholars are of the opinion that the validity of the acknowledgement of debt
depends on its cause. That is to say, if there is no valid cause, then the acknowl-
edgement of debt is invalid.6 In accordance with this point of view, an acknowl-
edgement of debt does not constitute a new obligation in addition to the obligation
resulting from the principal obligational relationship; it only affects the burden of
proof of the creditor, that is to say, the creditor may bring an action based on this
acknowledgment of debt, and thus, he does not have to prove the cause of his claim.
On the contrary, if there is no valid cause, the burden of proof lies with the debtor.
According to this point of view, if the court establishes that the acknowledgement
of debt has no valid cause, then the absence of a valid cause must be taken into
consideration ex officio.
Other scholars, influenced by BGB § 780, accept that an acknowledgement of
debt constitutes a new obligation in addition to the obligation resulting from the
principal obligational relationship.7 From this perspective, even if the acknowl-
edgement of debt has no valid cause, it is nevertheless valid; however, it constitutes
a case of unjust enrichment to the advantage of the creditor. Therefore, the court is
not entitled to take into consideration the lack of legal ground (causa) of its own
motion (ex officio).
In the Turkish Code of Obligations, art. 82 may be considered to support this
second point of view. According to par. 2 of this article, if the enrichment consists
of a claim against the impoverished party, he can refuse the demand of the enriched
party in respect of performance even if the claim of unjust enrichment is time-
barred. As has been seen according to TCO art. 82 par. 2, if a claim has no valid
5
For further explanations see Sungurbey (1957), Karlı (2008).
6
Oser and Sch€onenberger (1929), art. 17, N. 13, 19 ff; Tekinay et al. (1993), p. 141; Eren (2015),
pp. 194–195.
7
von Tuhr and Peter (1979), § 32, III, pp. 270–272; Sungurbey (1957), p. 40 ff; O guzman and Öz
(2015), p. 208.
References 45
cause, it constitutes a case of unjust enrichment in the assets of the creditor. If it

were not possible to acquire a claim in the absence of a valid cause, this article
would have been unnecessary.8
However, this second point of view must be restricted in certain cases. If the
cause of the acknowledgement of debt is unlawful or immoral, the court must take
this into consideration ex officio and must declare that it is void. Indeed, according
to TCO art. 604 par. 1, claims resulting from gambling and betting may not be sued
upon and may not be enforced. In addition, TCO art. 605 par. 1 states that even if an
acknowledgement of debt or a negotiable instrument (a bill of exchange, a prom-
issory note or a cheque) signed by the gambler or the bettor to cover a gambling or
betting transaction is transferred to a third party, no person may file a lawsuit or
demand the enforcement of these instruments.9 As has been seen, these provisions
accept that if the legal ground of an acknowledgement of debt is gambling or
betting, the acknowledgement of debt may not give rise to legal claims; in other
words, it constitutes a natural obligation.10 Therefore, the court must take this fact
into consideration ex officio and dismiss demands based on such acknowledgements
of debt. Since the legislature explicitly accepts that an acknowledgement of debt
relating to gambling or betting constitutes a natural obligation, then if the cause of
the acknowledgement of debt is unlawful or immoral, it must be inferred a fortiori
that it is void.11
Regardless of which point of view is accepted, the burden of proof relating to the
existence of the illegality or immorality of the cause is on the debtor.
References

8
9
The rights of third parties in good faith arising from negotiable instruments are reserved (TCO art.
605 par. 1 sent. 2).
10
See Sect. 21.2.1.
11
Sungurbey (1957), p. 99; Kocayusufpaşao glu (2014), p. 128; Feyzio
glu (1976), p. 294. See on
the contrary von Tuhr and Peter (1979), § 32, III, p. 271.
46 6 Abstract Acknowledgement of Debt
Karlı Ö (2008) Sebebi g€ osterilmeyen borç tanıması (mücerret borç ikrarı bk. mad. 17). Vedat,
İstanbul
Kocayusufpaşaoglu N (2014) Borçlar hukuku genel b€ olüm, Volume 1 (Kocayusufpaşao glu/
Hatemi/Serozan/Arpacı). Filiz, İstanbul.
Sungurbey İ (1957) Borç ikrarı ve borç vaadi, İstanbul
Filiz, İstanbul
İstanbul
Chapter 7
Obligation to Contract
7.1 General1
According to the principle of freedom of contract, within the limits of the law, each
person is free to enter into a contract or not. However, in certain circumstances, a
person may have an obligation to contract.
The obligation to contract may arise from an agreement called a pre-contract
(preliminary agreement) or by virtue of the law itself. In this section, these two
bases of an obligation to contract will be analysed.
7.2 Pre-contract2
7.2.1 General3
According to TCO art. 29, a pre-contract to enter into a main contract at a later time
is valid. A pre-contract (pactum de contrahendo) is binding and ensures the
conclusion of the main contract. Its binding effect means that the parties undertake
1
Antalya (2012), pp. 261–267; Aybay (2011), pp. 41–43; Becker (1941), art. 22; Berger (2012),
p. 58; Engel (1997), pp. 99–102, 181–183; Eren (2015), pp. 301–315; Feyzio glu (1976),
pp. 273–286; Gauch et al. (2008), pp. 233–244; Honsell et al. (2003), art. 22; Kılıço
glu (2013),
pp. 75–78, 265–268; Kocayusufpaşao glu (2014), pp. 100–110, 505–525; Nomer (2015),
pp. 50–53; Oser and Sch€ onenberger (1929), art. 22; O
guzman and Öz (2015), pp. 183–190;
Özsunay (1983), pp. 83–85; Reiso glu (2014), pp. 97–100, 133; Schwenzer (2009), pp. 172–177;
Tekinay et al. (1993), pp. 142–148, 365–367; Tercier (2004), pp. 109–110; Tercier et al. (2016),
pp. 171–173; Thévenoz and Werro (2012), art. 19–20, 22, and von Tuhr and Peter (1979),
pp. 273–285.
2
Précontrat, promesse de contracter, Vorvertrag.
3
For further explanations see Ayrancı (2006), Dogan (2006).

48 7 Obligation to Contract
to enter into the main contract subject to the conditions agreed in the pre-contract.
In a pre-contract, one or both parties may undertake to enter into the main contract.
The reason or purpose for postponement of the main contract may be various.
The economic or legal conditions at the time of the conclusion of the pre-contract
may not be convenient for entering into the main contract, for example, in circum-
stances where prices or foreign currency rates fluctuate or a party responsible for
obtaining any necessary official permission may not yet have been granted such
permission, etc.
In order for there to be a pre-contract, the main contract must be of an obligatory
nature.4 In this context, the principal contract may be a sale, lease or work contract.
For instance, in a sale contract, which is an obligatory legal transaction (acte géné
rateur d’obligation, Verpflichtungsgesch€ aft),5 the buyer does not acquire ownership
of the property sold. With the conclusion of the sale contract, the buyer only
becomes entitled to claim that the property is to be transferred to him.
However, if the main contract to be entered into does not create or constitute any
obligations, then the existence of the pre-contract will not be in question.6 For
example, an assignment of a claim transfers the assignor’s claim to the assignee.
Consequently, if the parties promise to make an assignment of a claim, such a
contract will not qualify as a pre-contract.
7.2.2 Form
Pursuant to TCO art. 29 par. 2, where the law requires a specific form for the
validity of a main future contract, the pre-contract must also be made in that form.
However, there are certain exceptions to this rule. According to this article, for
example, since the law requires a specific form for the validity of a surety contract, a
pre-contract relating to a surety contract (that is, the promise to stand surety) must
also be made in that form. Indeed, TCO art. 583 par. 2 sent. 1 confirms this
requirement.
As to the exceptions, the following is an example: a sale contract relating to
immovable property must be concluded before a land registry officer (TCO art.
237 par. 1, LRA art. 26). Therefore, in accordance with TCO art. 29 par. 2, a
pre-contract relating to the sale of real estate must be concluded in the same form.
Nevertheless, according to NPA art. 89, the parties may also conclude such a
pre-contract before a notary public.
4
Obligatory: Imposing obligation, creating or constituting an obligation.
5
A suggested translation for Verpflichtungsgesch€aft is ‘transaction of obligation’ (Foster and Sule
(2010), p. 416 fn. 22). According to certain scholars, an appropriate term that defines
Verpflichtungsgesch€ aft is ‘obligatory transaction’ (Häcker (2013), p. 20 fn. 14). In this sense,
Zekoll and Reimann (2005), p. 234; Faber and Lurger (2011), p. 563.
6
von Tuhr and Peter (1979), § 33, I, p. 274; O guzman and Öz (2015), p. 188; Reiso glu (2014),
p. 98; Eren (2015), p. 311; Nomer (2015), p. 50; Kocayusufpaşao glu (2014), p. 100.
7.3 Obligation to Contract Arising from the Law 49
7.2.3 Consequences
If the parties fulfil their obligations to enter into a main contract arising from a
pre-contract, the expectations of the parties will be satisfied. However, a party
undertaking to conclude a main contract may breach the pre-contract and fail to
fulfil his obligation. In such a case, the other party may seek a court order to enforce
the conclusion of the main contract. The court order stands for the failing party’s
declaration of will (intention),7 which is necessary for the formation of the main
contract,8 and thus, the main contract is deemed to be concluded.9
In practice, the most common type of obligation to contract concerns the sale of
immovable property.10 If the prospective seller does not conclude the main con-
tract, the other party may demand a court order for its conclusion. In such cases, the
court order constitutes the main contract. However, in practice, the claimants
usually demand the transfer of the ownership of the immovable property as if a
sale contract existed. As a result, if the court accepts the demand, then the court
orders not only constitute the main contract but they also give effect to the transfer
of ownership of the immovable property to the claimant (TCC art. 716 par. 1).11
Such a result is theoretically not satisfactory because it denies the difference
between a sale contract and a pre-contract for sale. Nevertheless, it is obvious
that it simplifies and economises the procedure.12
7.3 Obligation to Contract Arising from the Law
In certain cases, a specific provision may encumber a person with the obligation to
conclude a contract. According to TCPA art. 6 par. 1, the sale of goods, which are
displayed in shop windows, on shelves, in electronic media or anywhere else where
the goods are clearly visible, is mandatory, unless it is indicated that the goods are
not for sale.
Moreover, an obligation to contract may arise from the principles of good faith
(TCC art. 2).13 Indeed, in certain cases, failing to conclude a contract may breach
this article. For instance, the sole pharmacy or the sole baker in a small village is not
entitled to refuse to contract without any justifiable reason.14 Furthermore, an
7
arung.
8
Reisoglu (2014), p. 98; Nomer (2015), p. 51.
9
Engel (1997), p. 182; Kocayusufpaşao glu (2014), p. 107.
10
11
Eren (2015), p. 315; Nomer (2015), p. 51; O guzman and Öz (2015), p. 190, 376.
12
Oguzman and Öz (2015), pp. 189–190, 376; Eren (2015), pp. 314–315.
13
Oguzman and Öz (2015), p. 185, Cf. Gauch et al. (2008), p. 243.
14
Compare to Engel (1997), p. 100.
50 7 Obligation to Contract
obligation to contract may also arise out of public law.15 Indeed, public institutions
that supply utility services, such as water, electricity, telecommunications16 and
natural gas, or that supply public transportation, such as railways, subways, etc., are
not entitled to refuse to contract without any justifiable reason.
If a person who is under an obligation to contract fails to conclude the contract—
i.e., does not declare his will, which is necessary for the formation of the contract—
the claimant may file a lawsuit and the contract will be deemed to be concluded by
the court order. In such a case, the court decision replaces the abstaining person’s
declaration of will (intention).17
References

Ayrancı H (2006) Ön s€ ozleşme. Yetkin, Ankara
Dogan G (2006) Ön s€ozleşme (s€ ozleşme yapma vaadi). Yeditepe, İstanbul
Faber W, Lurger B (eds) (2011) National reports on the transfer of movables in Europe, vol 6.
Sellier, München
Foster N, Sule S (2010) German legal system and laws. Oxford Publishing, New York
Häcker B (2013) Consequences of impaired consent transfers, a structural comparison of English
and German law. Hart Publishing, Oxford and Portland, Oregon
Kocayusufpaşaoglu N (2014) Borçlar hukuku genel b€ glu/Hatemi/
olüm, vol 1 (Kocayusufpaşao
Filiz, İstanbul
15
Tekinay et al. (1993), p. 365; Eren (2015), pp. 304–305.
16
For further explanations see Yıldız (2012).
17
arung.
References 51

İstanbul
von Tuhr A, Peter H (1979) Allgemeiner Teil des Schweizerischen Obligationenrecht, Volume
Yıldız MG (2012) Son kullanıcıyla akdedilen elektronik haberleşme hizmeti s€
ozleşmesi. On iki
levha, İstanbul
Zekoll J, Reimann M (eds) (2005) Introduction to German law. Kluwer Law International, The
Hague
Chapter 8
Contract Interpretation and Simulation
8.1 Interpretation of the Contract1
8.1.1 General
If the interpretation of the contract is not contested by the parties, then their
common interpretation will be applied. However, in the event that each party
interprets the text (wording) of the contract in a different manner and the parties’
interpretation is contradictory, this dispute will be determined by a judge.2
According to TCO art. 19 par. 1, in evaluating the provisions of the contract, the
judge will seek to establish the real and common intentions of the parties. When it is
not possible to establish the real and common intentions of the parties, the judge
will determine the presumed intentions of the parties in light of the ‘trust theory’
(théorie de la confiance, Vertrauenstheorie).3 According to this principle, the judge
must seek the meaning that the parties would have assumed, pursuant to the
1
Antalya (2012), pp. 201–210, 354–360; Aybay (2011), pp. 46–55; Becker (1941), art. 18; Berger
(2012), pp. 231–236, 386–393; Engel (1997), pp. 223–226, 235–242; Eren (2015), pp. 349–365,
466–475; Feyzioglu (1976), pp. 187–210, 350–361; Gauch et al. (2008), pp. 217–224, 271–282;
Honsell et al. (2003), art. 18; Kılıço
glu (2013), pp. 171–180, 250–254; Kocayusufpaşao glu (2014),
pp. 331–338, 345–363; Nomer (2015), pp. 42–45, 90–96; Oser and Sch€ onenberger (1929), art. 18;
O guzman and Öz (2015), pp. 127–133, 190–193; Özsunay (1983), pp. 70, 91–103; Reiso glu
(2014), pp. 102–114; Schwenzer (2009), pp. 226–228, 263–266; Tekinay et al. (1993),
pp. 148–153, 407–415; Tercier (2004), pp. 115–116, 173–175; Tercier et al. (2016),
pp. 182–183, 290–303; Thévenoz and Werro (2012), art. 18, and von Tuhr and Peter (1979),
pp. 285–297.
2
Oguzman and Öz (2015), p. 190; Eren (2015), p. 466; Kocayusufpaşao glu (2014), p. 331; Tercier
et al. (2016), p. 297; Gauch et al. (2008), p. 271.
3
von Tuhr and Peter (1979), § 34, I, p. 287; Reiso glu (2014), p. 102; Nomer (2015), p. 43; Tercier
et al. (2016), p. 300; Tekinay et al. (1993), p. 150; O guzman and Öz (2015), p. 191; Eren (2015),
p. 469; Feyzioglu (1976), pp. 355–356.

54 8 Contract Interpretation and Simulation
principles of good faith, to their reciprocal declaration of will (intention),4 while

taking into account all the circumstances.
8.1.2 Principles of Interpretation
In establishing either the real and common intentions or presumed intentions of the
parties, the judge must, first, take the text (wording) of the contract into consider-
ation.5 That is to say, the judge will make an evaluation on the basis of the actual
words and phrases used in the contract (literal construction). In that respect, the
judge has to assign the ordinary and common meaning to the contract provisions.
However, the contracting parties may use expressions in a special or technical
sense. In this case, the judge will consider how these expressions are normally used
by persons within the relevant business or profession and interpret them in that
sense.6 The judge, in establishing the meaning of a particular provision in the
contract, is not entitled to evaluate it separately. On the contrary, the provision
must be analysed within the context of the entire contract.7 When dealing with
matters of interpretation, the judge must evaluate all of the circumstances that
preceded or accompanied the formation of the contract.
There are additional principles relating to the interpretation of the contract. For
example, the judge may take into account the parties’ negotiations and conduct
before the formation of the contract (drafts of the contract, exchanges of corre-
spondence such as traditional mail and emails, etc.). The judge may also take into
consideration the parties’ conduct after the formation of the contract.8
There are also subsidiary rules for the interpretation of contracts. Where the
judge cannot determine the real or presumed common intentions of the parties, the
following rules can be applied: (1) an ambiguity is generally interpreted to the
detriment of the drafter (indubio contra stipulatorem), particularly in adhesion
contracts; (2) an ambiguity is interpreted in favour of the party that is under
obligation ( favor debitoris); and (3) any superfluous or meaningless provisions or
terms must be interpreted in a way that supports the validity of the contract.9
4
arung.
5
von Tuhr and Peter (1979), § 34, I, p. 286; Gauch et al. (2008), p. 274; Thévenoz and Werro
(2012), art. 18, N. 15; O guzman and Öz (2015), p. 192; Tercier et al. (2016), p. 298.
6
Gauch et al. (2008), p. 274; Tercier et al. (2016), p. 298, compare to Kocayusufpaşao glu
(2014), p. 333.
7
Gauch et al. (2008), p. 275; Eren (2015), p. 472; O guzman and Öz (2015), p. 192; Feyzio glu
(1976), p. 356; Tekinay et al. (1993), p. 151; Tercier et al. (2016), p. 301; Nomer (2015), p. 44.
8
Eren (2015), pp. 470–471; Kocayusufpaşao glu (2014), pp. 334–335.
9
Kocayusufpaşaoglu (2014), p. 336; O guzman and Öz (2015), p. 193; Eren (2015), p. 473.
8.2 Common Mistake and Simulation 55
8.2 Common Mistake and Simulation10
As mentioned above, when the judge interprets a contract, he must establish the real
and common intention of the parties. Indeed, the judge, first and foremost, will
interpret the wording of the contract. However, the parties might have used certain
expressions that are not accurate or precise. Inaccuracy in the terminology used can
result from the parties’ common mistake or may be intended with the objective to
disguise their real intention (simulation). In the following paragraphs, the concept
of common mistake and the concept of simulation will be analysed respectively.
8.2.1 Common Mistake
The parties to a contract while determining the terms and conditions of the contract
might have made a common mistake. In such a case, the judge must establish the
common and real intention of the parties without taking into consideration inaccu-
rate expressions erroneously used by them (TCO art. 19 par. 1). For instance, in a
car sale contract, the parties specified the subject matter of the contract as a
Mercedes E 200 with the number plate 00 XX 1234, but in the contract they record
the number plate of the car erroneously as 00 X 1234. In such a case, the contract is
deemed to be concluded in accordance with the parties’ common and real intention
( falsa demonstratio non nocet).11
8.2.2 Simulation
In the case of simulation, the inaccuracy of the terms used by the parties arises from
their objective to disguise their real intention.12 Even so, in the case of simulation,
the judge must establish the common and real intention of the parties without taking
into consideration inaccurate or misleading expressions used by them (TCO art.
19 par. 1). The concept of simulation, which is regulated under TCO art. 19, can be
divided into three types: absolute, relative and partial.
10
For further explanations see Esener (1956), Aday (1992), Özmen and Özkaya (1993),
Özkaya (2017).
11
Honsell et al. (2003), art. 18, N. 46–49; Tercier (2004), p. 115; O
guzman and Öz (2015), p. 91.
12
Becker (1941), art. 18, N. 28.
8.2.2.1 Absolute Simulation (Simple Simulation)
In absolute simulation, although the parties make a contract, they agree that this
contract will not have any legal effect.13 The author’s opinion is that an absolutely
simulated contract will be void (compare to TCO art. 19 par. 1).14
This rule also applies to a written acknowledgement of debt. Thus, an absolutely
simulated written acknowledgement of debt is void. However, even if it is abso-
lutely simulated and therefore void, the creditor may attempt to assign his pseudo-
claim to a third party. In these circumstances, this assignment is also invalid.
Nevertheless, if the third party relies on this written acknowledgement of debt,
the debtor cannot plead to the third party that the transaction is simulated. For
example, there is a written real estate lease contract and the rent is determined at TL
100,000 per year but the contracting parties agree that this contract has no legal
effect. Despite this simulation, if the creditor attempts to assign this pseudo-claim
to a third party who relies on this written lease contract, the debtor cannot plead to
the third party that this contract is simulated and, consequently, he must pay the
amount stated in the contract (TCO art. 19 par. 2).
8.2.2.2 Relative Simulation
In relative simulation, there are two contracts between the parties: an apparent and a
concealed contract. The apparent contract is agreed to have no legal effect. How-
ever, at the same time, the parties make another contract and agree that this
concealed contract will be valid.15 In such a case, scholars widely accept that the
apparent contract is void as it is simulated and that the concealed contract is valid
unless there are circumstances that affect its validity.16
At this point, it is necessary to mention three examples. Example 1: a father, who
has one son and two daughters, wants to gift his real estate to his son. However, the
father makes a simulated sale contract with his son before a land registry officer in
order to avoid adverse reactions by his daughters. In this case, the real estate sale
contract (the apparent contract) that has been concluded before the land registry
officer is void since it is simulated. As to the promise to gift the real estate (the
concealed contract), which has been orally concluded between the parties, it is also
13
Honsell et al. (2003), art. 18, N. 50; Tercier (2004), p. 115; O
guzman and Öz (2015), p. 128; Eren
(2015), p. 353.
14
Certain scholars are of the opinion that a simulated contract is void, see O
p. 130; Reisoglu (2014), p. 106. Other scholars argue that a simulated contract is non-existent, see
Eren (2015), pp. 356–357; Kocayusufpaşao glu (2014), pp. 354–355.
15
Honsell et al. (2003), art. 18, N. 50; Tercier (2004), p. 115; O
(2015), p. 353.
16
Reisoglu (2014), p. 108; Nomer (2015), p. 91; O guzman and Öz (2015), p. 131; Tercier et al.
(2016), p. 182; Feyzio glu (1976), pp. 199–200; Kocayusufpaşao glu (2014), p. 356; Eren (2015),
p. 361; Tercier (2004), p. 115; von Tuhr and Peter (1979), § 35, III, p. 293.
8.2 Common Mistake and Simulation 57
invalid as the contract does not satisfy the official written form requirement (TCO
art. 288 par. 2).
Example 2: in the above-mentioned case, assume that the subject matter of the
contract is movable property. The father makes a written sale contract with his son
in order to avoid adverse reactions by his daughters. Additionally, they conclude a
written promise to make a gift relating to this movable property. In this situation,
the sale contract (the apparent contract) that has been concluded in written form
between the parties is void since it is simulated. However, the promise to make a
gift (the concealed contract) is valid since it satisfies the form requirement for
promises of a gift relating to movable property (TCO art. 288 par. 1).
Example 3: in the second example, if the father had orally made a promise to
make a gift to his son, this contract would have been invalid. However, even though
the promise to make a gift is invalid, the father might, regardless, transfer owner-
ship of the movable property to his son. In such a case, the promise to make a gift
will be deemed valid. This is because, according to TCO art. 288 par. 3, if a promise
to make a gift is invalid due to a lack of form but it is nonetheless performed by the
donor, it will be treated as a gift from hand to hand. Indeed, TCO art. 289 states that
a gift from hand to hand is concluded by delivering the object from the donor to the
donee.
8.2.2.3 Partial Simulation
In certain cases, only certain clauses of a contract may be simulated rather than the
entire contract. In such a case, there is a partial simulation.17 The explanations
relating to absolute and relative simulations are also applicable. In Turkish law, the
most common example occurs in real estate sale contracts; namely, the contracting
parties may appear to agree on a sale price that is higher or lower than the real sale
price. For example, the real sale price is TL 100,000, whereas the contracting
parties represent it as TL 50,000. In this case, the sale price determined in the
apparent contract is lower than the real price. In other words, the price is simulated
and the contract clause relating to the price is invalid. The real sale price determined
in the concealed contract is also invalid since it does not satisfy the form require-
ments. Nevertheless, if claiming the invalidity of the concealed contract is contrary
to the principles of good faith (TCC art. 2 par. 2), then the sale price determined in
the concealed contract will be valid.18
17
Thévenoz and Werro (2012), art. 18, N. 78; Eren (2015), p. 357; Kocayusufpaşao
glu (2014),
p. 346; Gauch et al. (2008), p. 219; Honsell et al. (2003), art. 18, N. 50.
18
Oguzman et al. (2016), p. 379.
References
Aday N (1992) Taşınmaz mülkiyetinin naklinde muvazaa (konuya ilişkin Yargıtay kararları ile).
Kazancı, İstanbul
Esener T (1956) Türk hususi hukukunda muvazaalı muameleler. Fakülteler, İstanbul
glu/Hatemi/
Oguzman K, Seliçi Ö, Oktay-Özdemir S (2016) Eşya Hukuku. Filiz, İstanbul
Özmen İ, Özkaya E (1993) Muvazaa davaları. Adalet, Ankara
Özkaya E (2017) İnançlı işlem ve muvazaa davaları. Seçkin, Ankara
Filiz, İstanbul
İstanbul
Chapter 9
Incomplete Contracts
9.1 Gap in the Contract1
As mentioned in the section concerning the formation of the contract,2 in order to

form a contract, the parties must agree on all the necessary elements of the contract.
The necessary elements of a contract are divided into two categories: objectively
essential elements and subjectively essential elements. Furthermore, there are also
secondary elements of a contract, but, as a rule, they are not indispensable for the
conclusion of the contract.
Since the objectively essential elements constitute the minimum contents of a
contract in order for it to be valid, where the parties do not agree on them, the
contract cannot be formed.3 For instance, in a lease contract, a description of the
leased object and the rental fee are objectively necessary elements of the contract. If
the parties do not agree on these elements, the contract will not be concluded and
there will be no question of a gap in the contract to be filled by a judge.
Subjectively essential elements are, in fact, subsidiary elements of the contract.
Nevertheless, even if they are not conditio sine qua non for the formation of
the contract, they are necessary by virtue of the intentions of one or both of the
1
Antalya (2012), pp. 164–168; Aybay (2011), pp. 48–49; Berger (2012), pp. 394–397; Engel
(1997), pp. 218–220, 243–244; Eren (2015), pp. 233–239, 475–480; Feyzio glu (1976), pp. 66–67;
Gauch et al. (2008), pp. 283–291; Honsell et al. (2003), art. 2, 18; Kocayusufpaşao glu (2014),
pp. 172–179, 338–341; Nomer (2015), pp. 42–45; O guzman and Öz (2015), pp. 72–73, 193–196;
Reisoglu (2014), pp. 63–64; Schwenzer (2009), pp. 222–224, 266–269; Tekinay et al. (1993),
pp. 74–81; Tercier (2004), pp. 176–177; Tercier et al. (2016), pp. 303–305; Thévenoz and Werro
(2012), art. 2, 18, and von Tuhr and Peter (1979), pp. 189–191, 291.
2
See Sect. 1.7.
3
Thévenoz and Werro (2012), art. 2, N. 2; Honsell et al. (2003), art. 1, N. 44; Engel (1997), p. 219;
Gauch et al. (2008), p. 288; Oguzman and Öz (2015), p. 72; Eren (2015), p. 234; Reiso glu (2014),
p. 63; Nomer (2015), p. 42; Tekinay et al. (1993), p. 78; Kocayusufpaşao glu (2014), p. 173;
Tercier et al. (2016), p. 179.

60 9 Incomplete Contracts
parties.4 For instance, a penalty clause in a contract may constitute a subjectively

essential element for both of the contracting parties or for just one of them. Where
the parties do not agree on such a subsidiary, but subjectively essential, element,
then the contract may not be formed and consequently there will be no question of a
gap in the contract to be filled by a judge.
As to the secondary elements of a contract, they do not form its core and are not a
part of it. They are not objectively or subjectively conditio sine qua non for the
formation of the contract.5 For instance, in a sale contract, the time of performance
and the place of delivery of the goods are accepted to be secondary elements.
According to TCO art. 2 par. 1, if the parties have agreed on objectively or
subjectively essential elements of the contract, the contract is deemed to be formed,
even if they have not negotiated the secondary elements at all. Where the parties do
not agree on such a secondary element, then the contract can be formed but there
will be a question of a gap in the contract to be filled by a judge.
9.2 Principles of Filling Contractual Gaps6
As mentioned above, if the parties have agreed on the necessary elements of a

contract, then the fact that they have not negotiated the secondary elements does not
preclude the contract’s formation. In this case, a judge will determine the secondary
elements in accordance with the default rules of the Code. For instance, in a sale
contract, the parties agree on the subject matter of the sale and its price, but they do
not negotiate the place and the time of performance. In such a case, a judge will fill
this contractual gap by relying on the default rules of the Turkish Code of Obliga-
tions. Indeed, the judge will fill the gap relating to the place of performance in
accordance with TCO art. 89 and the gap relating to the time of performance in
accordance with TCO art. 90 ff. Another example is that of parties that have only
agreed that the debtor will fulfil the obligation at the beginning or at the end of a
month and have not determined the exact time for the performance. In this case, a
judge will fill this gap, with reference to TCO art. 91 par. 1, according to which the
beginning or the end of a month means the first or last day of the stated month,
respectively (TCO art. 91 par. 1).
Where the judge cannot find an applicable default rule in the law, he must fill the
contractual gap according to customary law. In the absence of customary law, the
judge will fill the contractual gap according to the rules that he would have laid
down if he were acting as the legislature (TCC art. 1).7
4
Engel (1997), p. 219; Gauch et al. (2008), p. 288; Eren (2015), p. 235; Kocayusufpaşao
glu (2014),
pp. 175–176; Tercier et al. (2016), 179; Tekinay et al. (1993), p. 76; O guzman and Öz
(2015), p. 73.
5
Engel (1997), p. 219; Thévenoz and Werro (2012), art. 2, N. 6; O guzman and Öz (2015), p. 73;
Feyzioglu (1976), p. 66; Eren (2015), p. 237; Reiso glu (2014), p. 64.
6
For further explanations see Dursun (2008).
7
Eren (2015), p. 476 ff; compare to O guzman and Öz (2015), p. 194 ff.
References 61
It is also possible that the parties have agreed on the necessary elements of a
contract and have negotiated the secondary elements before the formation of the
contract and decide to determine the secondary elements later. In this case, there are
two possibilities: (1) if the parties come to an agreement regarding these secondary
elements after the formation of the contract, this agreement will be binding and
there is no question of a gap to be filled by a judge; (2) where the parties are not able
to come to an agreement with regard to the secondary elements after the formation
of the contract, then this lack of agreement constitutes a contractual gap. Conse-
quently, a judge will fill this gap, but he is not entitled to rely on the default rules of
the Code in the filling of the gap. This is because the parties have negotiated the
secondary elements before the formation of the contract. The judge will fill this gap,
taking into consideration the nature of the contract, its (financial) objective and all
other circumstances (TCO art. 2 par. 2).8
It should be kept in mind that if the parties negotiate the secondary elements of
the contract during the contract negotiations and do not come to an agreement
regarding them, then the contract cannot be formed. This is because a secondary
element is deemed to become a subjectively necessary element of the contract due
to the wishes of one or both of the parties.9
9.3 Reservation of Form Requirements
TCO art. 2 par. 3 states that the provisions relating to the form of contracts are
reserved. Indeed, if the contract requires a specific legal form in order to be valid,
even if the parties agree on the necessary elements of the contract, the contract will
not be valid unless the parties comply with the form requirement.
Furthermore, even if the contract does not require a specific legal form, the
parties may determine that the contract’s validity will be subject to a specific form
(TCO art. 17). In this case, even if the parties agree on the necessary elements of the
contract, unless the parties comply with this specific form requirement, the contract
is deemed not to be concluded.10
References

Aybay A (2011) Borçlar hukuku dersleri genel b€
olüm. Filiz, İstanbul
Dursun SA (2008) Borçlar hukukunda hâkimin s€ozleşmeyi tamamlaması. On iki levha, İstanbul
8
Kocayusufpaşaoglu (2014), pp. 178–179; Nomer (2015), p. 43.
9
Oguzman and Öz (2015), p. 73; Eren (2015), p. 235.
10
See and compare to Oguzman and Öz (2015), p. 73.
62 9 Incomplete Contracts

glu/Hatemi/
Filiz, İstanbul
İstanbul
Chapter 10
Revision of the Contract (Hardship)
10.1 General1
In determining the terms of a contract, the parties consider the existing circum-
stances that constitute the basis of the contract (e.g., cost, price, regulations related
to performance, etc.). However, after the conclusion of the contract, a change in
these circumstances may occur and significantly affect the obligations to be
performed.2 For instance, the price of the raw materials to be used in the perfor-
mance of the obligations may increase substantially, and consequently a funda-
mental imbalance in the rights, obligations and entitlements of the parties to the
contract may arise.
These cases that substantially affect the obligations of the parties to a contract
and thereby create a fundamental imbalance are referred to as hardship.3 Hardship
is regulated by TCO art. 138. However, if there is a specific rule related to this issue
in the applicable law, then this rule will be applied instead of the general rule (lex
specialis derogat legi generali). For example, TCO art. 480 states4 that in a work
contract, where the exact price is fixed in advance, the contractor must perform the
work for the agreed amount and is not entitled to claim a price increase even though
he may incur unforeseen labour costs or other expenses. Nevertheless,
1
Aybay (2011), p. 136; Berger (2012), pp. 397–403; Engel (1997), pp. 785–794; Eren (2015),
pp. 330–331, 480–487; Feyzio glu (1977), pp. 467–481; Gauch et al. (2008), pp. 292–297; Honsell
et al. (2003), art. 18, N. 95–125; Kılıço
glu (2013), pp. 254–265; Nomer (2015), pp. 323–327;
O guzman and Öz (2015), pp. 196–201, 559–564; Reisoglu (2014), pp. 413–418; Schwenzer
(2009), pp. 269–272; Serozan (2014), pp. 264–278; Tekinay et al. (1993), pp. 368–369,
1004–1007; Tercier (2004), pp. 177–179; Tercier et al. (2016), pp. 233–234, 305–313; Thévenoz
and Werro (2012), art. 18, N. 193–215, and von Tuhr and Escher (1974), pp. 170–172. For further
explanations see Gürsoy (1950), Kaplan (1987), Burcuo glu (1995), Arat (2006), Baysal (2017).
2
Engel (1997), p. 786; Feyzioglu (1977), pp. 469–470; Eren (2015), pp. 480–481.
3
Tekinay et al. (1993), p. 1004.
4
For further explanations see Erman (1979).

64 10 Revision of the Contract (Hardship)
extraordinary circumstances, which could not be foreseen or which were excluded

by the parties, may prevent or seriously hinder the performance of the work. In this
case, the contractor may demand that the contract be revised according to the new
circumstances. If this revision is not possible or if it cannot be borne by the other
party, the contractor may withdraw from the contract (ex tunc).5 However, the
principles of good faith may only allow termination (ex nunc)6 but not withdrawal
from the contract.
10.2 Principles of Hardship
If there is no specific rule in the law or the contract,7 the effect of the fundamental
imbalance in the rights, obligations and entitlements of the parties to the contract
due to supervening circumstances will be considered according to TCO art. 138.
This article states that, in cases of hardship, the disadvantaged party may apply to
the court and demand variation of the contract having regard to the new circum-
stances. Where the judge cannot vary the contract to accommodate the new
circumstances, the disadvantaged party may withdraw from the contract (ex
tunc).8 Nevertheless, if there is a continuing contract between the parties, the
disadvantaged party, as a rule, may terminate the contract (ex nunc) instead of
withdrawing from it.
The disadvantaged party may exercise these rights if all of the following
conditions are met: (1) an extraordinary event that is not foreseen or not expected
to be foreseen by the parties at the time of formation of the contract occurs; (2) the
disadvantaged party is not the cause of the supervening event; (3) this event alters
the circumstances as they were at the time of formation of the contract to the
detriment of the debtor, to such an extent that the demand for performance would
violate the principles of good faith (TCC art. 2); and (4) the debtor has not yet
performed his obligation or has performed it by reserving his rights resulting from
hardship.
These rules also apply to contracts that include foreign currency debts (TCO art.
138 par. 2). For example, in a sale contract, if the price is in a certain currency and it
is devalued by 70–80% as a result of an unexpected economic crisis, this fact will be
considered a case of hardship.
5
Termination of the contract takes effect retroactively (résolution, R€
ucktritt).
6
Termination of the contract takes effect prospectively (résiliation, K€
undigung).
7
The parties may adopt a specific rule in their contract for supervening circumstances that may
affect their obligations. In such a case, this rule will be applied in order to revise the contract.
Gauch et al. (2008), p. 293; Berger (2012), p. 399; O guzman and Öz (2015), p. 196; Eren
(2015), p. 483.
8
In this sense, von Tuhr and Escher (1974), § 74, IV, 6, p. 170.
References 65
It should be added that hardship was not regulated directly in the former Turkish
Code of Obligations. At the time when the former Code was in effect, cases of
hardship were considered according to the principles of good faith (TCC art. 2).
References
Arat A (2006) S€ozleşmenin de gişen şartlara uyarlanması. Seçkin, Ankara

Baysal B (2017) S€ozleşmenin uyarlanması. On iki levha, İstanbul
Burcuoglu H (1995) Son mahkeme kararları ve Yargıtay kararları ışı gında hukukta beklenmeyen
hal ve uyarlama, taşınmaz kirası s€ ozleşmelerinde ve d€ ovize endeksli kira s€ozleşmelerinde
uyarlama uygulaması. Filiz, İstanbul
Erman H (1979) İstisna s€ ozleşmesinde beklenilmeyen haller (bk 365/2). Fakülteler, İstanbul
Gürsoy KT (1950) Hususi hukukta clausula rebus sic stantibus - emprevizyon nazariyesi. Ankara
üniversitesi, Ankara
Kaplan İ (1987) Hâkimin s€ ozleşmeye müdahalesi (s€ ozleşmenin yorumu - s€ ozleşmenin
tamamlanması - s€ ozleşmenin de gişen hal ve şartlara uydurulması). Seçkin, Ankara
Serozan R (2014) Borçlar hukuku genel b€ olüm, vol 3 (Kocayusufpaşao glu/Hatemi/Serozan/
Arpacı). Filiz, İstanbul
Filiz, İstanbul
İstanbul
von Tuhr A, Escher A (1974) Allgemeiner Teil des Schweizerischen Obligationenrecht, vol
Chapter 11
Mistake, Fraud and Duress
11.1 Mistake1
11.1.1 General2
According to TCO art. 30, a party entering into a contract under a material
(fundamental) mistake (error) will not be bound by such a contract. In the Turkish
Code of Obligations, there are two types of mistake: the first is a mistake in
declaration of will (intention), and the second is a mistake in motive.
11.1.2 Mistake in Declaration of Will (Intention)3
When a contracting party is declaring his will, if there is a discrepancy between his
will and his declaration and such a discrepancy occurs unintentionally,4 the
1
Antalya (2012), pp. 218–250; Aybay (2011), pp. 63–70; Becker (1941), Vorbemerkungen zu art.
23–31, art. 23–31; Berger (2012), pp. 323–344; Engel (1997), pp. 315–368; Eren (2015),
pp. 375–416; Feyzio glu (1976), pp. 120–182; Gauch et al. (2008), pp. 161–199; Honsell et al.
(2003), Vorbemerkungen zu art. 23–31, art. 23–31; Kılıço glu (2013), pp. 184–218;
Kocayusufpaşaoglu (2014), pp. 342–344, 393–478; Nomer (2015), pp. 81–90; Oser
and Sch€onenberger (1929), Vorbemerkungen zu art. 23–31, art. 23–31; O guzman and Öz
(2015), pp. 90–127; Özsunay (1983), pp. 105–119; Reiso glu (2014), pp. 117–132; Schwenzer
(2009), pp. 273–303; Tekinay et al. (1993), pp. 425–457; Tercier (2004), pp. 147–157; Tercier
et al. (2016), pp. 237–257; Thévenoz and Werro (2012), art. 23–31, and von Tuhr and Peter (1979),
pp. 297–342. For further explanations see Özkaya (2014).
2
For further explanations, see Kocayusufpaşaoglu (1968), Edis (1973), Özsunar (2005).
3
Erreur dans la déclaration, Erkl€
arungsirrtum.
4
Where this discrepancy is created intentionally there is either a reservatio mentalis (mental
reservation) or a declaration which is frivolous. See Sect. 1.6.

68 11 Mistake, Fraud and Duress
declaring party is said to be mistaken. If the recipient knows or should have known
that the declaring party was mistaken, in other words his real intention, then there
are two possibilities with regard to the formation of the contract: (1) if the
declaration of will of the recipient is consistent with the real intention of the
mistaken party, then the contract is concluded according to the mistaken party’s
real intention, that it to say, according to the parties’ mutual and consistent
declarations of will; (2) if the declaration of will of the recipient is not consistent
with the real intention of the mistaken party, then the contract cannot be concluded.
For example, although the buyer wishes to purchase a black Opel Astra, he declares
mistakenly that he wants to buy a white Opel Astra. If the seller knows or should
have known that the real intention of the buyer was the purchase of a black Opel
Astra and the seller’s declaration of will is consistent with the buyer’s real intention,
then the contract is deemed to be concluded for the black Opel Astra. Even if the
seller knows or should have known that the buyer wishes to purchase a black Opel
Astra, if the seller’s declaration of will relates to the sale of a white Opel Astra, then
the contract cannot be concluded as the parties’ declarations of will are not
consistent.
If the recipient, according to the principles of good faith acting as a reasonable
person and taking into consideration all the circumstances, does not know and
should not have known the real intention of the mistaken party, then the contract is
deemed to be concluded in accordance with his (objective) justifiable understand-
ing. However, in such a case, the mistaken party may avoid the contract according
to the rules relating to a material mistake (TCO art. 39).
Where the mistake is not material (fundamental), it does not affect the validity of
the contract. In order to say that the mistaken party is not bound by the contract, the
mistake must be material (fundamental). According to TCO art. 31, the mistake is
material, in particular, in the following cases: (1) the mistaken party declares his
will for a contract other than the contract that he intended (error in negotio); (2) the
mistaken party declares his will for a subject matter other than the subject matter
that he intended (error in corpore); (3) the mistaken party addresses his declaration
of will to someone other than to the person intended (error in persona); (4) although
the mistaken party intends to enter into a contract relating to a person who has
specific qualifications, he declares his will for another person; and (5) the mistaken
party declares his will for a contractual performance significantly greater than he
actually intends to undertake or for a consideration significantly less than he
actually intends (error in quantitate).
With regard to these cases, consider the following examples: (1) the owner of
immovable property, who wants to conclude a lease agreement, signs a partnership
contract (i.e., an error in the nature of the contract); (2) although a person wants to
buy a laptop on the Internet, he declares his intention to purchase a tablet computer
(i.e., an error in object); (3) a manager wants to enter into an employment contract
with candidate X but sends the proposal to candidate Y and the latter accepts it (i.e.,
an error in person); (4) a nurse intends to make a patient care contract with a
hospital manager for an old but healthy woman X but enters into a contract for an
old and paralysed woman Y; and (5) a retailer intends to buy 100 pairs of jeans from
11.1 Mistake 69
a wholesaler but offers to buy 500 pairs of jeans in his proposal (i.e., an error in
quantity).
Errors in calculations do not affect the contract’s validity; they will be the
subject of correction (TCO art. 31 par. 2).
11.1.3 Mistake in Communication
Where the declaration of will (intention)5 with regard to the formation of the
contract is wrongly conveyed by an intermediary (e.g., a messenger or an inter-
preter) or by other means of communication, the provisions relating to mistake will
apply (TCO art. 33). For instance, a Turkish nut wholesaler actually wants to export
5 tons of nuts to an Italian merchant in consideration of €14,000, but his secretary
wrongly translates this intention as an importation offer and the Italian party
accepts it. In this case, the validity of the importation contract is affected by the
secretary’s mistake.
11.1.4 Mistake in Motive6
If, when entering into a contract, there is a discrepancy between a party’s knowl-
edge and the actual circumstances relevant to the contract, such a discrepancy is
deemed to be a mistake in motive.7 A mistake in motive, as a rule, is not considered
to be a material mistake because the one who is wrong must bear the
consequences.8
However, in certain cases, a mistake in motive is deemed to be material. For a
mistake in motive to be material and to affect the validity of the contract, all of the
following conditions must be realised9: (1) a party must be mistaken about one or
more facts that form the basis of the contract; (2) the mistake must be related to an
essential component of the contract for the mistaken party (conditio sine qua
non)—i.e., if the mistaken party had known of the mistake, he would not have
concluded the contract or would not have entered into it under the existing condi-
tions; (3) it must be the case that the mistaken party’s motive is known or could be
5
arung.
6
Erreur sur la base nécessaire du contrat, Grundlagenirrtum.
7
von Tuhr and Peter (1979), § 36, II, p. 300; Tercier (2004), p. 152; Thévenoz and Werro (2012),
art. 23–24, N. 7; Eren (2015), p. 379; O guzman and Öz (2015), p. 99.
8
von Tuhr and Peter (1979), § 36, II, p. 300; Becker (1941), art. 24, N. 31, art. 23, N. 5; Tercier
(2004), p. 152; Berger (2012), p. 324; Reiso glu (2014), p. 120; Eren (2015), p. 381.
9
von Tuhr and Peter (1979), § 37, V, pp. 308–309; Tercier (2004), pp. 152–153; Honsell et al.
(2003), art. 24, N. 20–23; Berger (2012), pp. 327–329; O guzman and Öz (2015), pp. 99–105.
known by the other party10; and (4) according to the principles of good faith in
business relations, the claim that the mistake affects the validity of the contract
must be justifiable.
In light of the above-mentioned conditions, the two following examples are
worth considering: (1) a person buys a painting for €1,000,000, which he thinks was
painted by Picasso but was not a Picasso; (2) a person thinks that the land he has
bought is suitable for construction of a 20-storey building when, in fact, the
maximum permissible height for the building is 10 storeys. If the above-mentioned
conditions are met, the mistakes in motive will be deemed material in these
examples.
11.1.5 Consequences of Material Mistake
In accordance with TCO art. 39 par. 1, in the case of a material mistake, the
mistaken party may rescind (avoid) the contract. Where the mistaken party intends
to rely on this right of rescission, this right needs to be exercised within 1 year. This
one-year period commences from the date the error was discovered by the mistaken
party.
The mistaken party must notify the rescission of the contract or demand the
restitution of the performance made by him within a one-year period from the
discovery of the mistake. If he fails to do so, the contract is deemed to be ratified
Under TCO art. 34 par. 1, the mistaken party may not rescind the contract in a
manner that is contrary to the principles of good faith (TCC art. 2). In particular,
where the other party accepts the formation of the contract according to the real
intention of the mistaken party, the latter is not entitled to rescind the contract (TCO
art. 34 par. 2). In this case, the mistaken party’s rescission will be contrary to the
principles of good faith. For instance, S intends to sell a mobile phone for TL 700 to
B. S sets its price by mistake at TL 500 in his declaration of will, and B accepts
it. Afterwards, S discovers this mistake and wants to rescind the contract. However,
B declares that he is ready to pay TL 700 for the mobile phone. In this case, if S still
wishes to rescind the contract relying on the mistake, such an attempt will be
contrary to the principles of good faith (TCC art. 2), and thus, it must be rejected.11
The fact that the mistaken party has been negligent does not affect his right of
rescission.12 Even though the mistaken party has been negligent, he may rescind the
contract, but in this case he must compensate the injured party for any damage
resulting from the rescission (TCO art. 35 par. 1 sent. 1). Where the injured party
knew or should have known of this mistake, he is not entitled to demand any
10
Kocayusufpaşaoglu (1968), p. 161; O
11
12
Engel (1997), p. 339.
11.2 Fraud 71
compensation (TCO art. 35 par. 1 sent. 2). It should be noted that this rule cannot be
applied to mistakes in declaration of will because the ‘trust theory’ (théorie de la
confiance, Vertrauenstheorie) precludes its application. This is because if the other
party knew or should have known of the mistake in the declaration, then the
contract would be concluded according to the real intent of the mistaken party,
provided that the other party’s intention is consistent with it.13
Where, due to rescission the negligent mistaken party is required to compensate
the damage of the injured party, this compensation will include the negative
damage14 of the injured party—e.g., the expenses relating to the conclusion of
the contract or any damage for loss of an opportunity to make another contract with
better conditions.15 For instance, A and B enter into a contract that is notarised and
B pays the notary expenses, but A makes a mistake that is attributable to his own
negligence and rescinds the contract. In this case, B is entitled to claim compensa-
tion for the notary expenses (negative damage) that he would not have incurred if
this contract had not been entered into with A.
Where it is equitable, the judge may award further compensation to the injured
party (TCO art. 35 par. 2). For instance, in the above example, if B has made a
resale contract with C, which will result in a profit of €2000, and misses this
opportunity because of the rescission of the contract, then B may demand compen-
sation for this loss of profit (positive damage) provided that this demand is equita-
ble. It should be kept in mind that the damages to be paid by the negligent mistaken
party may not exceed the interest that the injured party might obtain in the event of
the proper performance of the obligation (TCO art. 35 par. 2).
11.2 Fraud16
11.2.1 Fraud by a Contracting Party
Where a party has been induced to enter into a contract by the wilful fraud of the
other party, he is not bound by the contract even though his mistake is not material
(TCO art. 36 par. 1). According to this provision, the conditions relating to fraud by
the contracting party are as follows17: (1) a party must make a mistake in motive,18
(2) this mistake must result from the other party’s conduct, (3) the other party’s
13
14
For further explanations see Ergüne (2008).
15
In this sense Oguzman and Öz (2015) p. 106.
16
Dol, Absichtliche T€auschung. For further explanations, see Yıldırım (2002), Kurşat (2003).
17
Oguzman and Öz (2015), pp. 110–112.
18
Tercier (2004), p. 155; Oguzman and Öz (2015), p. 109; von Tuhr and Peter (1979), § 38, II,
1, p. 320.
fraudulent conduct must be wilful and (4) this fraudulent conduct must lead to the
formation of the contract.19
The fraudulent conduct of the other party may be active or passive. The
fraudulent party may misrepresent or suppress the truth with false representations,20
for instance, where a jeweller sells a worthless necklace as if it were gold.
Moreover, the fraudulent conduct of the other party may be created by mere silence
or by inaction (passive conduct). Where a party does not represent a fact to the other
party, which requires representation according to the principles of good faith, the
fraud arises from his passive conduct.21 That is to say, if a party is aware of the other
party’s mistake and does not warn him, contrary to the principles of good faith, then
this will constitute a case of passive fraud.22 For instance, in a reputable art gallery,
a buyer believes that a painting is by Picasso and offers a substantial amount of
money for it. However, in fact, the painting is not by Picasso and is worthless. If the
art gallery’s owner is aware of this mistake and does not warn the buyer, this
omission constitutes a passive fraud.
11.2.2 Fraud by a Third Party
Fraud may also result from a third party. Where a party has been induced to enter
into a contract by the wilful fraud of a third party, he is not bound by the contract if
the other contracting party knew or should have known of the fraud at the time of
the formation of the contract. According to TCO art. 36 par. 2, the conditions
relating to fraud by a third party are as follows23: (1) a party must make a mistake in
motive, (2) this mistake must be a result of the third party’s conduct, (3) the third
party’s fraudulent conduct must be wilful, (4) this fraudulent conduct must lead to
the formation of the contract, and (5) the party, who is not the victim of the fraud,
knew or should have known of the fraud when entering into the contract.
11.2.3 Consequences of Fraud
In accordance with TCO art. 39 par. 1, the deceived party may rescind (avoid) the
contract. Where the deceived party intends to use the right of rescission, this right
19
von Tuhr and Peter (1979), § 38, II, 5, p. 322; Engel (1997), p. 354; Thévenoz and Werro (2012),
art. 28, N. 1.
20
Gauch et al. (2008), p. 181; Engel (1997), p. 351; Tekinay et al. (1993), p. 446; Kurşat
(2003), p. 50.
21
von Tuhr and Peter (1979), § 38, I, 4, p. 321; Thévenoz and Werro (2012), art. 28, N. 9; Engel
(1997), p. 352; Gauch et al. (2008), p. 182; Tekinay et al. (1993), p. 446; Kurşat (2003), p. 51.
22
23
von Tuhr and Peter (1979), § 38, II, 6, p. 323; Honsell et al. (2003), art. 28, N. 15–17; Thévenoz
and Werro (2012), art. 28, N. 31–33; O guzman and Öz (2015), p. 112; Eren (2015), p. 400.
11.3 Duress 73
must be exercised within one year. This one-year period commences from the date
the deceived party became aware of the fraud.
Where the deceived party does not notify the rescission of the contract or
demand the restitution of performance made by him within one year from the
discovery of the fraud, the contract is deemed to be ratified (TCO art. 39 par. 1).
Even though the deceived party ratifies the contract, either explicitly or implic-
itly, his right to compensation for damage remains unaffected. That is to say, the
deceived party, despite ratification of the contract, is entitled to demand compen-
sation for his damage (TCO art. 39 par. 2). The basis of the other party’s liability is
culpa in contrahendo (fault in contracting), whereas the third party’s liability is
subject to the rules of tort (TCO art. 49 ff ).24
11.3 Duress25
11.3.1 General26
According to TCO art. 37 par. 1, a party that was induced to enter into a contract
under duress27 by the other contracting party or a third party is not bound by the
contract.
In order to determine whether duress exists, it must be shown that28 (1) a party
must be faced with a threat; the specific form of the threat is unimportant—e.g., it
may or may not be verbal. The threat may also result from the behaviour of the other
party or of a third party. In the case of threat by a third party, whether the
advantaged party knows of the duress or not does not affect the invalidity of the
contract.29 (2) The threatened party must believe that he will suffer harm if he does
not conclude the contract. This threat must be serious and imminent. If a threat is
related to an insignificant or prospective risk, it does not affect the validity of the
contract. (3) The threat must be directed to the threatened party himself or to
persons close to him. The threat may concern personal rights (life, body, honour,
etc.) or assets (house, car, etc.). (4) This threat must be unlawful, such as a threat of
murder or kidnapping. Also, the threat of enforcement of a legal right or of a legal
power may constitute an unlawful threat, provided that the other party extorts
24
Eren (2015), p. 254; Ergüne (2008), pp. 172–173; O guzman and Öz (2015), p. 113; Kurşat
(2003), p. 127 ff.
25
Crainte fondée, Furchterregung.
26
For further explanations see Karakocalı (2016).
27
Where a person is forced to enter into a contract by direct physical violence there is no
declaration of will (intention) made at all, and, thus, the contract cannot be formed.
28
von Tuhr and Peter (1979), § 38, III, pp. 325–329; Gauch et al. (2008), pp. 185–187; Engel
(1997), pp. 364–368; O guzman and Öz (2015), pp. 114–116.
29
excessive advantages from the threatened party’s distress (TCO art. 38 par. 2).
(5) This threat must lead to the formation of the contract. That is to say, if there had
not been an unlawful threat, the innocent party would have concluded this contract
with other clauses or would not have concluded it at all.
It would be helpful to mention examples in which duress is present. For instance,
B intends to buy S’s house but S does not want to sell it. B tells S that if S does not
accept the offer, then he will kill him or will kidnap his child or will burn the house
down. Another example: B intends to buy S’s car. B knows that S has committed a
crime. The actual value of the car is €100,000, but B wants to pay only €5000 for it
and threatens S with submitting a deposition to the public prosecutor for the crime
he has committed.
11.3.2 Consequences of Duress
In accordance with TCO art. 39 par. 1, the threatened party may rescind (avoid) the
contract. Where the threatened party intends to use the right of rescission, this right
must be exercised within one year. This one-year period runs from the time that the
effect of the duress ended.
Where the threatened party does not notify the rescission of the contract or
demand the restitution of performance made by him within one year from the time
that the duress ended, the contract will also be binding on him (TCO art. 39 par. 1).
The threatened party may demand compensation for damage arising from the
threat.30 The source or cause of duress is not important. Thus, a contracting party
issuing threats, or a third party doing so, is liable for the damage resulting from the
threats. The basis of the other party’s liability is culpa in contrahendo (fault in
contracting), whereas the third party’s liability is subject to the rules of tort (TCO
art. 49 ff ).31
It should be noted that in the case of a threat by a third party, the threatened party
may rescind the contract even if the other party did not know, or could not have
known, of the existence of the duress. In this case, where equity requires, the
rescinding party must compensate the damage of the other party (TCO art.
37 par. 2). However, the rescinding party who compensates the damage of the
other party may have recourse to the third party for the compensation paid by him.32
As mentioned above, where the threatened party does not notify the rescission of
the contract or demand the restitution of the performance made by him within a
one-year period from the time that the duress ended, the contract is deemed to be
ratified (TCO art. 39 par. 1). Even though the threatened party ratifies the contract
30
Thévenoz and Werro (2012), art. 31, N. 41–49; Tercier (2004), p. 157; O guzman and Öz
(2015), p. 116.
31
Eren (2015), p. 254; Ergüne (2008), pp. 175–176; O
32
References 75
either explicitly or implicitly, his claim for compensation for damage is unaffected.
That is to say, the threatened party, despite the ratification of the contract, remains
entitled to demand compensation for the damage (TCO art. 39 par. 2).
References

Edis S (1973) Türk /İsviçre borçlar hukuku sistemine g€ore akdin lüzumlu vasıflarında hata. Ankara
üniversitesi hukuk fakültesi, Ankara
Ergüne S (2008) Olumsuz zarar. Beta, İstanbul
Karakocalı A (2016) Roma Hukukunda ve Türk Hukukunda Korkutma (Metus). Seçkin, Ankara
Kocayusufpaşaoglu N (1968) Güven nazariyesi karşısında borç s€ ozleşmelerinde hata kavramı.
İstanbul üniversitesi hukuk fakültesi, İstanbul
Kocayusufpaşaoglu N (2014) Borçlar hukuku genel b€ olüm, vol. 1 (Kocayusufpaşao glu/Hatemi/
Kurşat Z (2003) Borçlar hukuku alanında hile kavramı. Kazancı, İstanbul
Özkaya E (2014) Yanılma, Aldatma, Korkutma Davaları (Hata-Hile-İkrah). Seçkin, Ankara
Özsunar E (2005) Roma ve Türk hukukunda hata. Turhan, Ankara
Filiz, İstanbul
İstanbul
Thévenoz L, Werro F (éd) (2012) Commentaire romand code des obligations 1: art. 1-529 co.
Yıldırım MF (2002) Borçlar hukukuna g€ ore s€ozleşmenin kuruluşunda hile. Nobel, Ankara
Chapter 12
Unfair Exploitation (Lesion)
12.1 Requirements1
When the parties to a contract are reciprocally obliged so that the obligation of one
party is correlative to the obligation of the other, this contract is called a bilateral
contract. In other words, a bilateral (synallagmatic) contract is a contract formed by
the exchange of mutual or reciprocal promises between the parties.2 For example, in
a sale contract, the seller has an obligation to transfer ownership of the goods
specified in the contract, and the buyer is obliged to pay the agreed price. Similarly,
in lease, employment or work contracts, each party undertakes reciprocal
obligations.
Usually, there is equivalence between the parties’ reciprocal obligations. How-
ever, in certain cases, the parties’ obligations are not proportionate. This dispro-
portion may have different causes. For example, a mother sells her car to her
daughter for a price that is significantly lower than its market value. The mother’s
intention is to make a partial gift to her daughter, and the latter accepts it. In this
case, the disadvantaged party is not exploited by the advantaged one. On the
contrary, the mother knows that there is a clear disparity between the market
value and the agreed price, but she intends to donate this amount to the advantaged
party, and the latter has no intention to exploit the disadvantaged one. Such a
contract is valid provided that there are no other reasons that affect its validity.
1
Antalya (2012), pp. 251–260; Aybay (2011), pp. 70–71; Becker (1941), art. 21; Berger (2012);
pp. 357–359; Engel (1997), pp. 298–306; Eren (2015), pp. 417–423; Feyzio glu (1976),
pp. 248–266; Gauch et al. (2008), pp. 153–161; Honsell et al. (2003), art. 21; Kılıço
glu (2013),
and Sch€onenberger (1929), art. 21; O guzman and Öz (2015), pp. 134–138; Reiso glu (2014),
pp. 141–144; Schwenzer (2009), pp. 260–262; Tekinay et al. (1993), pp. 458–466; Tercier
(2004), pp. 157–159; Tercier et al. (2016), pp. 257–262; Thévenoz and Werro (2012), art.
21, and von Tuhr and Peter (1979), pp. 342–347.
2
Engel (1997), p. 161; Tercier (2004), p. 59; Berger (2012), p. 98.

78 12 Unfair Exploitation (Lesion)
However, if the evident disparity arises from the exploitation of the distress,
inexperience or improvidence (incautiousness) of the disadvantaged party, TCO
art. 28 par. 1 applies.
According to TCO art. 28 par. 1, where there is an evident disproportion between
the obligations of the parties in a bilateral contract3 and such disproportionality is
obtained by exploiting the disadvantaged party’s distress, inexperience or improv-
idence,4 an unfair exploitation (lesion)5 is deemed to exist.6 For there to be an unfair
exploitation, the advantaged party must know and exploit the circumstances of the
disadvantaged party. It should be noted that it is not important who the offeror is.7 It
may be the disadvantaged or the advantaged party.
It will be useful to explore the concepts of distress, inexperience and improvi-
dence8: (1) the distress of the disadvantaged party may result from economic
factors, for instance, a person sells his very valuable property for significantly
less than its actual worth due to financial difficulties. Furthermore, the distress of
the disadvantaged party may have psychological origins, for example, a mother
agrees to the payment of a large sum of money because her child urgently needs
surgery. (2) The inexperience of the disadvantaged party means that he is not
knowledgeable enough to conclude the contract. For instance, a grandfather dies
and leaves a very valuable stamp collection to his grandson, who has no experience
of such things. The grandson sells it for considerably less than its actual value
without consulting experts. (3) Improvidence means that one makes a decision
without paying the necessary attention to the effects of the concluded contract, for
example, where an elderly person with significantly weakened mental abilities
enters into a contract that seriously affects his assets and liabilities.
12.2 Consequences
In the case of unfair exploitation, according to the circumstances, the disadvantaged

party has two rights: (1) to rescind (avoid) the contract and to demand the restitution
of the performed obligation9 or (2) to elect to remain bound by the contract and to
3
von Tuhr and Peter (1979), § 40, I, 1, pp. 343–344; Tercier (2004), p. 158; Engel (1997), p. 300;
Becker (1941), art. 21, N. 1–4; Berger (2012), p. 358; Eren (2015), p. 418; Reisoglu (2014), p. 141;
Oguzman and Öz (2015), pp. 134–135.
4
von Tuhr and Peter (1979), § 40, I, 2, pp. 344–345; Becker (1941), art. 21, N. 5–9; Berger (2012),
p. 358; Tercier (2004), p. 158; Engel (1997), p. 303; Eren (2015), p. 421; Reiso glu (2014), p. 142;
O guzman and Öz (2015), pp. 135–136.
5 €
Laesio enormis, lésion, Ubervorteilung.
6
For further explanations see Elbir (1957), Aslan (2006).
7
8
For further explanations see Tekinay et al. (1993), p. 463; Eren (2015), p. 421.
9
Eren (2015), p. 422; Nomer (2015), p. 97; Engel (1997), p. 305; Thévenoz and Werro (2012), art.
21, N. 15–17; von Tuhr and Peter (1979), § 40, II, p. 346; Becker (1941), art. 21, N. 10.
References 79
demand the removal of the disproportionality between performance and consider-

ation (TCO art. 28 par. 1).10 For instance, in the above-mentioned example of the
grandson selling his grandfather’s valuable stamp collection, the grandson may
rescind the sale contract and demand the return of the collection. However, if the
buyer has already sold the collection to a third party, it will not be possible to
demand its return. In that case, the grandson will be entitled to resolve the disparity
by claiming the difference between the actual price and the agreed price in the
contract.
It should be noted that the disadvantaged party must exercise either of the two
aforementioned rights depending on the circumstances: (1) where the
disproportionality arises from his improvidence or inexperience, the disadvantaged
party must notify the rescission or the removal of this disproportionality within
1 year of becoming aware of the relevant situation, but in any case, within 5 years of
the formation of the contract, or (2) where the disproportionality arises from his
distress, the disadvantaged party may exercise these rights within 1 year of the relief
of the distress, but in any case, within 5 years of the formation of the contract (TCO
art. 28 par. 2).
References

Aslan ÇM (2006) Gabinin unsurları ve hukuki sonuçları (bk. md. 21). Yetkin, Ankara
1. Abteilung: Allgemeine Bestimmungen, Art. 1-183. Stämpfli, Bern
Elbir HK (1957) Türk pozitif hukukunda gabin. İstanbul
glu/Hatemi/
10
Eren (2015), p. 422; Nomer (2015), p. 97; Engel (1997), p. 305; Thévenoz and Werro (2012), art.
21, N. 18–22.
80 12 Unfair Exploitation (Lesion)
Filiz, İstanbul
İstanbul
Chapter 13
Agency
13.1 General1
A person (the agent) may enter into a legal transaction, especially a contract, in the
name of and on behalf of another person (the principal). In the case of a contract,
there may be three persons: an agent, a principal and the other party to the contract. If
the agent has the authority and acts in the name of and on behalf of the principal, the
contract binds the principal. The agent has neither rights nor obligations with regard
to the concluded contract between the parties. Such a case is referred to as direct
agency.2 It should be noted that there are certain legal transactions that cannot be
entered into by an agent such as an engagement, a marriage and a testamentary
disposition.
The basis of the authority to represent the principal may be the law itself or the will
of the principal.3 For instance, parents, within the limits of their parental power, may
act as agents for their children in transactions with third parties (TCC art. 342 par. 1).
In this case, the parents’ authority to represent arises from the law itself. This kind of
representation (legal representation) is regulated under the Turkish Civil Code and is
1
Antalya (2012), pp. 361–406; Aybay (2011), pp. 71–79; Becker (1941), Vorbemerkung zu art.
32–40 (Stellvertretung), art. 32–40; Berger (2012), pp. 273–293; Engel (1997), pp. 372–416; Eren
(2015), pp. 424–459; Feyzio glu (1976), pp. 376–439; Gauch et al. (2008), pp. 299–328; Honsell et al.
(2003), art. 32–40; Kılıço
glu (2013), pp. 226–250; Kocayusufpaşao glu (2014), pp. 620–772; Nomer
(2015), pp. 121–135; Oser and Sch€ onenberger (1929), Vorbemerkungen zu art. 32–40, art. 32–40;
Oguzman and Öz (2015), pp. 210–246; Özsunay (1983), pp. 132–145; Reiso glu (2014), pp. 148–161;
Schwenzer (2009), pp. 303–324; Tekinay et al. (1993), pp. 166–207; Tercier (2004), pp. 82–95;
Tercier et al. (2016), pp. 121–145; Thévenoz and Werro (2012), art. 32–40, and von Tuhr and Peter
(1979), pp. 347–405. For further explanations see Esener (1961), Özdemir (1994), Akyol (2009).
2
von Tuhr and Peter (1979), § 41, I, p. 348; Thévenoz and Werro (2012), art. 32, N. 4; Engel
(1997), p. 374; Eren (2015), p. 427; O guzman and Öz (2015), p. 212.
3
von Tuhr and Peter (1979), § 41, I, 1, p. 349; Engel (1997), pp. 373–374; Berger (2012), p. 273;
Oguzman and Öz (2015), p. 217; Nomer (2015), p. 125.

82 13 Agency
dealt with as a matter of family law. As mentioned above, the basis of the authority to
represent may arise from the principal’s will, and such agency is regulated under the
Turkish Code of Obligations and will be analysed in this section.
13.2 Direct Agency4
According to the Turkish Code of Obligations, the existence of direct agency5

requires two conditions: (1) the agent must be authorised to represent the principal;
(2) the agent must act in the name of and on behalf of the principal.
13.2.1 Authority to Represent
13.2.1.1 Legal Nature
An agent may represent the principal only if he has authority to do so. The granting
of the authority to represent is a unilateral legal transaction by the principal.6 The
principal’s declaration of will (intention)7 relating to the authority to represent may
be express or implied. It should be directed to the agent and will come into force
when it reaches the agent.8
An agent may act in accordance with the authority or not. That is to say, the
granting of the authority to represent does not bind the agent personally. Accord-
ingly, the principal may grant authority to represent to a person having mental
capacity notwithstanding that he is a minor or a person placed under a guardianship
order (TCC art. 16 par. 1 sent. 1).
13.2.1.2 Comparison with Agency Contract
At this point, it is useful to compare agency contract (mandate) and agency.

Granting someone the authority to represent another is a unilateral transaction,
whereas an agency contract is a bilateral transaction whereby the agent undertakes
to carry out business transactions or services entrusted to him by the principal.9
4
Représentation directe, direkte Stellvertretung.
5
For further explanations see İnceoglu (2009).
6
Oser and Sch€onenberger (1929), art. 32, N. 19; Engel (1997), p. 381; Berger (2012), p. 278;
Reisoglu (2014), p. 151; O guzman and Öz (2015), p. 220.
7
Déclaration de volonté, Willenserkl€arung.
8
Engel (1997), p. 381.
9
Eren (2015), p. 440; Oguzman and Öz (2015), pp. 218–219.
13.2 Direct Agency 83
As mentioned above, the principal may grant the authority to represent to a

minor or to a person placed under a guardianship order who has mental capacity
without the consent of their legal representatives. However, these persons are not
entitled to enter into an agency contract as an agent without the consent of their
legal representatives (TCC art. 16 par. 1 sent. 1).
Although the concepts of agency and agency contract are different, they may
overlap in certain cases. Where an agency contract is concerned, if the agent’s
obligations include carrying out a legal transaction, then it also includes the
authority to represent (TCO art. 504 par. 2).
13.2.1.3 Independence of the Authority to Represent
The authority to represent may be incorporated into other types of contract such as
employment, construction or partnership contracts. Granting the authority to rep-
resent is independent of the above-mentioned contracts, that is to say, the invalidity
of the contract does not affect the validity of the authority to represent.10 For
example, where the authority to represent is incorporated into a construction
contract, the customer may terminate the contract but the authority to represent
may remain valid. It is also possible that the customer may revoke the authority to
represent but the contract may remain binding.
Moreover, as mentioned above,11 a minor who has mental capacity may not be an
agent in an agency contract without the consent of his legal representatives. If the legal
representatives do not consent, then the agency contract will be invalid. However, if
the principal grants the authority to represent through this agency contract, then the
latter’s invalidity does not affect the validity of the authority to represent.
13.2.1.4 Scope of the Authority to Represent
Where the authority to represent arises from public law provisions, its scope will be
determined according to these rules. If the basis of the authority to represent is a
legal transaction, its scope will be determined having regard to the content of the
legal transaction (TCO art. 41 par. 1). Furthermore, the principal may inform a third
party of the existence of an authority to represent. In such a case, its scope will be
determined according to the terms of the communication (TCO art. 41 par. 2).
The authority to represent may be general or specific.12 If the authority is
general, the agent may conclude legal transactions of any kind within the limits
10
Oser and Sch€onenberger (1929), art. 32, N. 26, art. 34, N. 2; von Tuhr and Peter (1979), § 42, II,
p. 359; Engel (1997), p. 382; Berger (2012), p. 280; Tekinay et al. (1993), p. 176; O
guzman and Öz
(2015), p. 219.
11
Section 13.2.1.1.
12
von Tuhr and Peter (1979), § 42, IV, 3, p. 361; Engel (1997), p. 389; Gauch et al. (2008), p. 310;
Eren (2015), pp. 441–442; Feyzio glu (1976), p. 411.
84 13 Agency
of the authority. However, there are certain legal transactions that require a specific
authority to represent, such as concluding a settlement agreement, consenting to
arbitration, signing negotiable instruments (bills of exchange, promissory notes and
cheques), becoming a surety, making a gift, and alienating or encumbering real
estate (TCO art. 504 par. 3).
13.2.1.5 Form Requirement
Generally, the granting of the authority to represent does not require a specific form.
It may be express or implied.13 However, in certain cases, the granting of the
authority to represent requires a specific form in order to be valid.14 According to
TCO art. 583 par. 1, a surety contract requires a specific form. If a surety intends to
make this contract by means of an agent, he must grant the necessary specific
authority in compliance with the form requirements of a surety contract (TCO art.
583 par. 2). Otherwise, the authority to represent will be void.
In addition, according to RLR art. 18 par. 4, an authority to represent, which
allows the making of a transaction before a land registry officer, requires a specific
form. It must be drafted before a notary (NPA art. 89). However, in the event that a
principal fails to comply with these rules, the authority to represent will remain
legally valid. This is due to the fact that the RLR is a regulation and, therefore, does
not have the power to govern the form of the validity of the authority to represent.
13.2.2 Conduct in the Name of the Principal
As mentioned above, with regard to direct agency, the agent has the authority to
represent, and he acts in the name of, and on behalf of, the principal. Accordingly,
the rights and obligations arising from the contract will be attributed to the
principal. Although the agent acts with the intention of representing the principal,
it is possible that he may fail to disclose this to a third party. In this case, as a rule,
there is no agency. However, although an agent does not disclose that he is acting as
an agent, in certain circumstances, agency may exist. TCO art. 40 par. 2 regulates
two exceptions in this case: (1) the third party infers or should infer from the
circumstances that there is an agency relationship. For example, a supermarket
customer enters into a contract with a shop assistant. Even if the shop assistant does
not disclose the fact that he is an agent, the contract binds the owner of the
supermarket as the customer must infer the shop assistant’s agency. (2) Where
13
Oser and Sch€onenberger (1929), art. 32, N. 25; von Tuhr and Peter (1979), § 42, I, p. 355;
Thévenoz and Werro (2012), art. 33, N. 9; Gauch et al. (2008), p. 308.
14
Engel (1997), p. 384; Thévenoz and Werro (2012), art. 33, N. 9; Nomer (2015), p. 126; Tekinay
et al. (1993), pp. 173–174.
13.3 Agency Without Authorisation 85
the identity of the contracting counter-party does not matter to a third party, e.g., in
a cash transaction, the identity of the party making the payment is of no
importance.15
Apart from these exceptions, even if an agent acts in the name of and on behalf
of a principal, where he does not disclose the agency, the contract is formed
between the agent and the third party. However, such an agent may demand that
the principal assume the rights and obligations arising from the contract. The rights
will be assigned (TCO art. 183 ff),16 and the obligations will be assumed (TCO art.
195 ff)17 in accordance with the applicable principles (TCO art. 40 par. 3).
13.3 Agency Without Authorisation18
If a person does not have the authority to represent another person but nonetheless
purports to act as an agent and enters into a contract in the name of the alleged
principal, initially, this contract will only bind the third party (TCO art. 46 par. 1).19
At this stage, it is not certain whether the alleged principal will be bound by the
contract. With the aim of ending this uncertainty, the third party may demand that
the alleged principal ratify the contract within a reasonable time. If the alleged
principal ratifies this contract, he will be bound from the time of formation.20
Otherwise, where the alleged principal does not ratify the contract within a reason-
able time, the third party will no longer be bound by this contract. Thus, the contract
will be void (TCO art. 46 par. 2).21
The alleged principal may ratify the contract expressly or impliedly.22 If the
alleged principal does not ratify the contract, then the third party may demand
compensation from the unauthorised agent for the damage that is a consequence of
the invalidity of the contract. However, if the unauthorised agent proves that the
third party knew or should have known of the lack of authority, then he will not be
liable for this damage (TCO art. 47 par. 1). It should be noted that the damage
arising from the invalidity of the contract is referred to as negative damage. Where
equity requires it and the unauthorised agent is at fault, the third party may demand
compensation for other damage, which is referred to as positive damage23 (TCO art.
47 par. 2).
15
For further explanations see Akünal (1975).
16
See Chap. 32.
17
See Chap. 33.
18
Représentation sans pouvoir, Vertretung ohne Erm€ achtigung.
19
For further explanations see Kutlu Sungurbey (1988).
20
Oguzman and Öz (2015), p. 241; Tercier et al. (2016), p. 137.
21
Tercier (2004), p. 91.
22
Tercier et al. (2016), p. 137; Tercier (2004), p. 91.
23
See Sect. 22.2.3.3.1.
86 13 Agency
It is explained above that if the alleged principal does not ratify the contract
within a reasonable period of time, it will be void. However, the third party might
fulfil his obligations even though the contract’s validity is uncertain. In this case, if
the alleged principal is unjustly enriched, then the third party may sue for this unjust
enrichment. For example, a third party pays the amount determined in the contract
to the alleged principal. When the contract becomes invalid because of the failure to
ratify, he may demand to have this amount refunded (TCO art. 47 par. 3).
13.4 Limitation, Revocation and Termination
13.4.1 Limitation and Revocation
The principal may, at any time, limit or revoke the authority to represent arising
from a legal transaction (TCO art. 42 par. 1 sent. 1). However, if there is a legal
relationship between the principal and the agent such as a relationship of employ-
ment, mandate or partnership, then the rights and obligations of the parties arising
from them remain unaffected (TCO art. 42 par. 1 sent. 2). For instance, in an
employment contract, the employer grants the authority to represent to the
employee. However, after a period of time, the employer may revoke the authority
to represent, but the employment contract may remain unaffected. In effect, this
rule confirms the independence (abstractness) of the authority to represent.24
The principal may not waive the right of limitation and revocation of the
authority to represent in advance (TCO art. 42 par. 2). This rule is mandatory,
and the parties are not entitled to agree to the contrary.
The principal may give notice of the authority to represent expressly or
impliedly to third parties. After a period of time, he may limit or revoke it. If the
principal does not give notice of this limitation or revocation, he is not entitled to
claim that the authority to represent has been limited or revoked against third parties
acting in good faith (TCO art. 42 par. 3).
13.4.2 Death, Incapacity and Other Circumstances
Unless otherwise agreed, or unless implied by the nature of the transaction, an

authority conferred by means of a legal transaction expires when either the agent or
the principal dies, is declared a missing person (TCC art. 32) or bankrupt or loses
the capacity to act (TCO art. 43 par. 1). This rule is also applicable in cases of
dissolution of a legal entity (TCO art. 43 par. 2).
24
Eren (2015), p. 439; Tekinay et al. (1993), p. 176; Berger (2012), p. 280.
13.4 Limitation, Revocation and Termination 87
In the above-mentioned cases, the authority to represent expires automatically.

However, the parties may agree to the contrary. For example, a principal may grant
an authority to represent that remains effective after his death (mandatum post
mortem).
It should be noted that where the authority to represent expires automatically, the
parties’ mutual rights are not thereby affected (TCO art. 43 par. 3). For instance, in
an employment contract, the employer grants the authority to represent to the
employee. After a period of time, the employer dies. According to TCO art.
43 par. 1, the authority to represent expires automatically, unless otherwise agreed
or unless apparent from the nature of the legal transaction. However, although the
authority to represent may expire, the employee’s rights will not necessarily be
affected—e.g., he may demand the payment of wages due and owing.
13.4.3 Return of the Instrument Conferring Authority
As a general rule, the granting of the authority to represent does not need to meet
any form requirements for its validity. Nevertheless, in practice, the parties may
prefer to use a written form or, in certain cases, must use a written form.25
Accordingly, the principal may give the agent a written authority to represent. In
such a case, if the authority to represent expires, the agent must return the written
authority to the principal or deposit it with a court (TCO art. 44 par. 1). Also, when
the authority to represent expires, the principal or his successors must enforce the
return or the deposit of the instrument. If they fail to do so, they are liable to pay
compensation for damage sustained by third parties acting in good faith in reliance
on the authority (TCO art. 44 par. 2).
13.4.4 Restriction to the Claim of Termination
Although the authority to represent expires, it is possible that the agent and the third
parties do not know of this fact. In this case, the contract binds the principal or his
successors. This is because TCO art. 45 states that so long as the agent does not
know of the expiration of the authority to represent, the principal or his successors
are bound by the legal transaction. This rule does not apply where the third parties
know of the expiration of the authority to represent. In addition, in fact, TCO art.
45 does not state explicitly that the principal or his successors will be bound if the
agent or third parties ‘should have known’ of the expiration of the authority to
represent. That is to say, the said article does not clearly require that the agent or
third parties act in good faith (TCC art. 3). However, certain scholars believe that
25
TCO.art.583/par.2.
88 13 Agency
the contract does not bind the principal or his successors if the agent or the third
parties should have known of the expiration of the authority to represent even
though TCO art. 45 does not explicitly state this.26
13.5 Indirect Agency27
In certain cases, the agent acts in his own name and on behalf of the principal.28
Indeed, if the agent does not disclose the agency while acting as an agent, then this
is a case of an indirect agency.29 In such cases, initially, the rights and the
obligations belong to the agent himself. Later, the agent may assign his rights to
the principal and the principal may assume the obligations of the agent. This
indirect agency is not regulated under arts. 40–48 of the Turkish Code of Obliga-
tions. However, other articles refer to specific examples of this type of agency. For
instance, according to TCO art. 532 par. 1, a buying or selling agent undertakes, in
return for a commission, to buy or to sell properties or securities in his own name
and on behalf of the principal.
13.6 Reservation of Special Provisions
Special provisions relating to the authority of representatives and boards of com-

panies and commercial agencies (TCO arts. 547–554) are reserved (TCO art. 48).
References
Akünal T (1975) Türk-İsviçre borçlar kanununda ilgili için işlem teorisi. İstanbul üniversitesi,
İstanbul
Akyol Ş (2009) Türk medeni hukukunda temsil. Vedat, İstanbul
26
Kocayusufpaşaoglu (2014), pp. 702–703; Nomer (2015), p. 132; O guzman and Öz
(2015), p. 235.
27
Représentation indirecte, indirekte, mittelbare Stellvertretung.
28
Engel (1997), p. 407; Tercier (2004), p. 94; Berger (2012), p. 274; Kocayusufpaşao
glu (2014),
p. 630; Tercier et al. (2016), p. 144; Nomer (2015), p. 123.
29
von Tuhr and Peter (1979), § 41, I, p. 348. For further explanations see Yavuz (1983).
References 89

Esener T (1961) Sâlahiyete müstenit temsil. Ankara üniversitesi hukuk fakültesi, Ankara
İnceoglu MM (2009) Borçlar hukukunda do grudan temsil. On iki levha, İstanbul
Kocayusufpaşaoglu N (2014) Borçlar hukuku genel b€ olüm c: 1 (Kocayusufpaşao glu/Hatemi/
Kutlu Sungurbey A (1988) Yetkisiz temsil özellikle culpa in contrahendo (sözleşmenin
görüşülmesinde kusur) ve olumsuz zarar. İstanbul
Özdemir E (1994) Türk hukukunda yetkiye dayanan temsil ve nam-ı müstear uygulaması. Adalet,
Ankara
Filiz, İstanbul
İstanbul
Yavuz C (1983) Türk-İsviçre ve Fransız medeni hukuklarında dolaylı temsil. İstanbul üniversitesi,
İstanbul
Part II
The Effect of Obligations, Performance,
Non-Performance, the Effect on Third
Parties
Chapter 14
Performance of Obligation
14.1 General1
A debtor may be obliged to give, to do or not to do something. The debtor must

perform what he is obliged to perform. The following examples may be given for
each type of obligation.
Obligation to give: if the debtor is obliged to transfer ownership of a chattel (e.g.,
a car) or real estate (land), he must transfer ownership of these properties to the
creditor. Furthermore, a pecuniary obligation is also a kind of obligation to give.
Obligation to do: if the debtor undertakes to construct a building, complete a
painting, compose a song or write a book, he must perform what he is obliged to
do. Other examples of obligations to do include an employee who has a duty to
carry out certain work or a doctor who is obliged to treat a patient.
Obligation not to do: if the debtor is obliged not to compete, he has a duty not to
start a similar company in a certain field during a fixed time period, or if he is
obliged not to disclose any confidential information, he must keep it secret.
When the debtor fulfils his obligation, the obligation is extinguished. After the
extinguishment of the obligation, any ancillary2 rights, such as a mortgage, pledge,
surety, etc., are also terminated.
1
Aybay (2011), p. 112; Becker (1941), Vorbemerkungen zu art. 68–96; Berger (2012),
pp. 417–418; Engel (1997), pp. 607–610; Eren (2015), pp. 906–914; Feyzio glu (1977), pp. 3–9;
Gauch et al. (2008), pp. 1–5; Honsell et al. (2003), Vorbemerkungen zu art. 68–74; Kılıço glu
(2013), p. 536; Nomer (2015), pp. 265–266; Oser and Sch€ onenberger (1929), art. 68–96; O
guzman
and Öz (2015), p. 249; Reiso glu (2014), pp. 292–294; Schwenzer (2009), pp. 39–41, 495–498;
Serozan (2014), pp. 3–22; Tekinay et al. (1993), pp. 758–761; Tercier (2004), pp. 169–172;
Tercier et al. (2016), pp. 290–295, 314–320; Thévenoz and Werro (2012), Introduction aux art.
68–83, p. 627–630, and von Tuhr and Escher (1974), pp. 1–11.
2
Although ‘accessory’ is widely used in European texts, the author has preferred the use of
‘ancillary’ throughout this book to refer to subordinate or dependent rights which cannot exist
without the principal obligation.

94 14 Performance of Obligation
14.2 Legal Nature
As mentioned above, if the debtor undertakes to do something, he must do what has

to be done. Where the debtor undertakes not to do something, he must avoid doing
it. In such cases, the intention of the debtor regarding the performance of the
obligation does not have any importance. Also, it is not important whether he has
the capacity to act.3
However, if the debtor undertakes to give something, such as to transfer property
or to assign a claim, his intention of performance and capacity to act are important.4
For instance, when transferring property, if the debtor does not have mental
capacity, the transfer of the property is void. Another example is that of the
assignment of a claim: if the assignor is a minor who has mental capacity or a
person who has mental capacity but who is under guardianship, he is not entitled to
assign the claim to the assignee without the consent of his legal representatives
(TCC art. 16 par. 1 sent. 1, TCC art. 451 par. 1).
At this point, it should be added that if the performance of the obligation requires
a dispositive transaction5 (acte de disposition, Verf€ ugungsgesch€aft)6 with regard to
the debtor, such as the transfer of property or the assignment of a claim, the debtor
must also have the power of disposition (pouvoir de disposer, Verf€ ugungsmacht).7
If the debtor does not have the power of disposition, then his dispositive act is void.
It is possible that a person who has the capacity to act may not have the power of
disposition. For instance, a debtor may have the capacity to act, but if he is a person,
such as a merchant, who is subject to bankruptcy proceedings, after the commence-
ment of bankruptcy procedures against him by a competent judge, although he will
continue to have the capacity to act, his authority to dispose of the assets that form
part of his bankrupt’s estate will become restricted as against his creditors (TCBE
art. 191 par. 1).8
In certain cases, the debtor may fulfil the obligation without the participation of
the creditor. For example, obligations to refrain from acting, such as an obligation
not to compete or not to disclose, do not require the creditor’s participation. In these
3
Nomer (2015), p. 266; Thévenoz and Werro (2012), Introduction aux art.68–83, N. 3; von Tuhr
and Escher (1974), § 55, IX, 1, p. 8, compare to Engel (1997), p. 609.
4
Thévenoz and Werro (2012), Introduction aux art.68–83, N. 3; von Tuhr and Escher (1974), §
55, IX, 1, p. 8.
5
Dispositive: Relating to disposal. Where a legal transaction reduces one person’s assets, such as
the transfer of property or assignment of a claim, this transaction can be defined as a dispositive
transaction with regard to him. For further explanations see Ayiter (1953).
6
Verf€
ugungsgesch€ aft can be literally translated in to English as ‘transaction of disposal’ (Foster
and Sule (2010), p. 416 fn: 23). In order to define Verf€ ugungsgesch€ aft, a possible translation is
‘dispositional transaction’, Posch (1996), p. 42. Another possible translation is ‘dispository
transaction’ (Häcker (2013), p. 20 fn: 15). The author in this book prefers ‘dispositive transaction’
or ‘dispositive act’ (in this sense, O
guzman (1996), p. 33).
7
von Tuhr and Escher (1974), § 55, VIII, p. 7.
8
Oguzman and Öz (2015), p. 256; von Tuhr and Escher (1974), § 55, IX, 2, p. 9.
14.2 Legal Nature 95
cases, it is obvious that the creditor’s capacity to act has no relevance to the
performance of the obligation.9
However, in certain cases, the debtor cannot fulfil the obligation without the
participation of the creditor. Indeed, with regard to obligations to do, the creditor’s
participation is often necessary. For instance, if the debtor is obliged to repair a
machine in the factory of the creditor or to repair a demolished wall in the garden of
the creditor, the latter must permit the debtor to enter the building or the garden.
The participation of the creditor is also needed for the performance of obliga-
tions to give. Moreover, the performance of certain obligations to give may require
a legal transaction.10 For example, in the transfer of ownership of movable property
to a creditor, the possession of the movable property must be transferred to the
creditor, and while doing so, the parties must agree on the transfer of ownership of
the movable property. In other words, the parties must accept that the possession of
the movable property is transferred in order to satisfy the debtor’s obligation.11
In cases where a legal transaction is needed for the performance of the obliga-
tion, the creditor must have the capacity to act. For example, if the creditor does not
have mental capacity, the debtor cannot perform the obligation. In addition, if the
creditor is a minor who has mental capacity or a person having mental capacity but
under guardianship, he is not entitled to accept the performance of the obligation
without the consent of his legal representative (TCC art. 16 par. 1 sent. 1, TCC art.
451 par. 1).
It should be noted that performance extinguishes the obligation. That is why in
cases where the participation of the creditor is needed, the creditor must have the
power of disposition.12 Otherwise, the debtor may not be discharged from the
obligation. For example, according to TCBE art. 192 par. 1, after the commence-
ment of bankruptcy procedures by the competent judge against the creditor, the
creditor may no longer accept any performance of an obligation due to him.
9
Eren (2015), p. 935; O guzman and Öz (2015), p. 265.
10
Oguzman and Öz (2015), pp. 265–266.
11
The transfer of possession is of a factual nature. The material transfer of possession must be
complemented by the parties’ agreement concerning the transfer of ownership. This agreement is
referred to as ‘a real agreement’. It is a bilateral legal act and does not require any specific form. It
may be formed by the parties’ express or implied declarations of will (intention). Real agreement
(dinglicher Vertrag) is a dispositive act and it is to be distinguished from the causa that is to say the
underlying contract which constitutes the obligation to transfer ownership. Real agreements are
also different from real contracts (contractus realis) in Roman law. In contractus realis the transfer
of possession of the subject matter of the contract represents a constitutive component. See and
compare to Kocayusufpaşao glu (2014), pp. 96–97; Tercier (2004), p. 131.
12
Pouvoir de disposer, Verf€ugungsmacht.
96 14 Performance of Obligation
References

Ayiter K (1953) Medeni hukukta tasarruf muameleleri. Siyasal bilgiler fakültesi, Ankara
Foster N, Sule S (2010) German legal system and laws. Oxford Publishing, New York
Gauch P, Schluep WR, Emmenegger S (2008) Schweizerisches Obligationenrecht, Allgemeiner
Teil, vol 2. Schulthess, Zürich
Häcker B (2013) Consequences of impaired consent transfers, a structural comparison of English
and German law. Hart Publishing, Oxford and Portland, Oregon
Kocayusufpaşaoğlu N (2014) Borçlar hukuku genel bölüm, vol 1 (Kocayusufpaşaoğlu/Hatemi/
Oğuzman K (1996) Turkey. In: Blanpain R, Herbots J (eds) International encyclopaedia of laws.
Contracts Suppl. 12, vol 5. Kluwer Law International, The Hague
O
guzman K, Öz T (2015) Borçlar hukuku genel hükümler, vol 1. Vedat, İstanbul
Posch W (1996) Austria. In: Blanpain R, Herbots J (eds) International encyclopaedia of laws.
Contracts Suppl. 13, vol 1. Kluwer Law International, The Hague
Filiz, İstanbul
İstanbul
von Tuhr A, Escher A (1974) Allgemeiner Teil des Schweizerischen Obligationenrecht, Volume
Chapter 15
The Object of Performance
15.1 General1
A debtor must perform exactly what he is obliged to perform. If the debtor offers
performance of an obligation that is different from the original, then the creditor
does not have to accept it.2 Even if the value of the debtor’s proposal is higher than
the original obligation, the creditor need not accept it.3 Similarly, a creditor is not
entitled to demand performance of an obligation that is different from the original.4
In other words, the debtor does not have to accept such a proposal. Even if the value
of the creditor’s proposal is less than the original obligation, the debtor need not
accept it either.
However, at the time of fulfilment, the contracting parties may agree that the
obligation is deemed to be fulfilled by the performance of an act other than that owed
pursuant to the contract. This kind of performance is referred to as ‘an acceptance in
lieu of performance’.5 In the case of acceptance in lieu of performance, if the value
of the given object is higher than the value of the original obligation, the debtor must
bear its disadvantageous consequences. In other words, the creditor does not have to
1
Aybay (2011), pp. 112–117; Becker (1941), art. 69–73, 84–87; Berger (2012), pp. 420–432;
Engel (1997), pp. 619–622, 633–649; Eren (2015), pp. 914–924, 957–985, 1009–1010; Feyzio glu
(1977), pp. 9–75; Gauch et al. (2008), pp. 31–54; Honsell et al. (2003), art. 69–73, 84–87;
Kılıçoglu (2013), pp. 590–596, 604–613, 616–622; Nomer (2015), pp. 266–290; Oser
and Sch€onenberger (1929), art. 69–73, 84–87; Oguzman and Öz (2015), pp. 271–309; Reisoglu
(2014), pp. 298–323; Schwenzer (2009), pp. 48–50, 52–63, 498–504; Serozan (2014), pp. 77–119;
Tekinay et al. (1993), pp. 761–766, 771–800, 811–818; Tercier (2004), pp. 180–185, 197–201;
Tercier et al. (2016), pp. 314–323, 341–351; Thévenoz and Werro (2012), art. 69–73, 84–87,
and von Tuhr and Escher (1974), pp. 11–17. For further explanations see İpek (2016).
2
Engel (1997), p. 619; Tercier (2004), p. 180.
3
Oguzman and Öz (2015), pp. 271–272; Tekinay et al. (1993), p. 761.
4
Feyzioglu (1977), p. 9; Eren (2015), p. 914.
5
Dation en paiement, Zahlungsstatt. See Annahme an Erf€ ullungs statt: BGB §364.

98 15 The Object of Performance
pay any excess. In parallel, if the value of the given object is lower than the value of
the original obligation, then the creditor must bear its disadvantageous conse-
quences.6 That is to say, the debtor does not need to compensate for the deficiency.
For example, D owes €20,000 to C. At the time of fulfilment, the debtor does not
perform his obligation and proposes to transfer a boat, and the creditor accepts that
transfer in lieu of performance. It is irrelevant whether the boat’s value is €30,000 or
€10,000. Thus, in both cases, the original obligation is extinguished by the transfer
of ownership of the boat to the creditor (datio in solutum).
Moreover, at the time of fulfilment, the debtor may propose to perform an act other
than the original object of the obligation. For example, the debtor may propose to the
creditor to deliver an object, which is different from the original object of the
obligation, and to allow the creditor to realise it, and the creditor may accept this
proposal.7 In this case, the original obligation is not automatically extinguished by the
parties’ agreement. On the contrary, the original obligation is extinguished only to the
extent of the money obtained from the realisation of the object. In cases where the
realised value does not satisfy the value of the original obligation, the debtor must
perform the remaining part of the debt. In addition, where the realised amount exceeds
the value of the original debt, the creditor must return the excess amount.8
In the above-mentioned cases, the creditor must act as if he were an agent. That
is to say, the creditor, in the realisation of the object, must act diligently and
faithfully. Otherwise, the creditor is liable for the damage of the debtor.
As has been seen, it is important to determine if there is a datio in solutum
(an acceptance in lieu of performance) or not as these kinds of agreements extin-
guish the original obligations. If the agreement is not clear enough, it is assumed
that the parties do not agree on the datio in solutum; on the contrary, their
agreement is made with the aim of fulfilment.
15.2 Partial Performance
15.2.1 In Principle
If the object of an obligation is indivisible by nature or by law, it is impossible for a

debtor to partially perform the obligation.9 For instance, in a sale contract relating
6
von Tuhr and Escher (1974), § 56, I, p. 11; Engel (1997), p. 619; Berger (2012), p. 428; Reiso
glu
(2014), p. 299; Serozan (2014), p. 91.
7
Dation en vue du paiement, Zahlungshalber.
8
von Tuhr and Escher (1974), § 56, II, pp. 13–14; Engel (1997), p. 620; Berger (2012),
pp. 427–428; Feyzio glu (1977), p. 13; O guzman and Öz (2015), p. 274; Tekinay et al.
(1993), p. 763.
9
Thévenoz and Werro (2012), art. 69, N. 2; Oser and Sch€onenberger (1929), art. 69, N. 1; Becker
(1941), art. 69, N. 8.
15.2 Partial Performance 99
to a car, a house or a machine, the subject matter of the contract is indivisible by

nature.10 If the subject matter of the sale contract is land, the land is divisible in
principle. However, it may be indivisible in law. For example, public authorities
may have restricted its partition. Thus, in such cases, the obligation cannot be
partially performed.
Obligations not to do are indivisible. In principle, certain obligations to do (e.g.,
to create an artistic work) are also indivisible. Therefore, such obligations cannot be
partially performed either.11
If the object of an obligation is divisible, whether by nature or by law, the
obligation may be partially performed. For example, generic obligations, especially
pecuniary obligations, may be partially performed. However, even if the object of
the obligation is divisible, the creditor does not have to accept a partial performance
where the entire obligation is determined and due (TCO art. 84 par. 1). Therefore, if
the creditor refuses partial performance, he does not fall into creditor’s default.12
On the contrary, the debtor falls into default for the entirety of the obligation.13
In cases where partial performance is possible, the creditor may demand partial
performance. The debtor may accept or refuse this proposal. That is to say,
notwithstanding a claim for partial performance by the creditor, the debtor is
entitled to perform the obligation entirely in accordance with the contract. How-
ever, in cases where the creditor demands partial performance and the debtor
accepts it, the latter is not entitled to refuse to perform the accepted part of the
obligation (TCO art. 84 par. 2).
15.2.2 Exceptions
In certain cases, the creditor must accept partial performance. This necessity may
result from the parties’ agreement, the principles of good faith (TCC art. 2), the
nature of the circumstances or specific provisions, as set out in the paragraph
below.14
(1) The parties may specify in the contract that the creditor must accept a partial
performance. Another example is related to an instalment debt. In such a case, the
debtor must only perform the instalment unless the entirety of the obligation is due.
(2) If the refusal of partial performance is against the principles of good faith, the
creditor must accept the partial performance. For example, the amount of a loan is
€344,499. The total amount is due, but the debtor pays €344,000. In this case, the
creditor is not entitled to refuse the partial payment. It should be noted that the
10
Reisoglu (2014), p. 299.
11
Oguzman and Öz (2015), p. 275; Feyzioglu (1977), p. 29; Becker (1941), art. 70, N. 2.
12
See Chap. 20.
13
See Chap. 23.
14
Feyzioglu (1977), pp. 34–35; Tekinay et al. (1993), pp. 764–765.
remaining claim of the creditor is reserved. (3) In certain cases, it may be nearly
impossible or too difficult to perform the obligation in a single action. For example,
if the debtor is obliged to deliver 10,000 tons of wheat, he may not be able to deliver
the entirety of the order in one consignment. (4) Although the Turkish Code of
Obligations, in principle, denies the right to partial performance, the Turkish
Commercial Code, which is an inseparable part of the Turkish Code of Obligations,
allows the debtor to make partial payment in certain cases. According to TComC
art. 709 par. 2, relating to a bill of exchange, a holder is not entitled to refuse partial
payment. This rule, unless it is contrary to its nature, also applies to promissory notes
(TComC art. 778 par. 1 subcl. c) and to cheques (TComC art. 818 par. 1 subcl. h).
It should be noted that if a part of the obligation is disputed, the debtor may
perform the undisputed part and the creditor is not entitled to refuse this partial
performance. Scholars infer this outcome by way of argumentum a contrario from
the wording of TCO art. 84 par. 1.15
It is worth noting that the payment of rents that arise at specific times (such as
every month) is not categorised as a partial performance. Furthermore, in a contract
that is successively performed, each act of fulfilment is not a partial performance.
Moreover, in a pecuniary obligation, capital and interest debts are separated. Hence,
the payment of interest is not a partial payment.16
15.3 Indivisible Obligations
If an obligation is indivisible by nature or by law and there is one debtor and one
creditor, performance of the obligation has no specific features.17 However, if an
indivisible claim belongs to more than one creditor or the obligation is undertaken
by more than one debtor, TCO art. 85 will apply.
If an indivisible obligation is due to several creditors, each of them may demand
that performance be rendered to all of them jointly. In such a case, the debtor must
perform the obligation jointly for all creditors (TCO art. 85 par. 1). If an indivisible
obligation is due by several debtors, each of them must perform the entire obliga-
tion (TCO art. 85 par. 2). Unless the contrary is understood from the circumstances,
the performing debtor is subrogated to the creditor and is entitled to proportional
contributions from the other debtors (TCO art. 85 par. 3).
15
Oguzman and Öz (2015), p. 279; Reiso
glu (2014), p. 300.
16
von Tuhr and Escher (1974), § 57, VI, p. 16; O
17
15.5 Generic Obligations 101
15.4 Specific Obligations18
In specific obligations, the object of the obligation is particularly specified and

cannot be substituted by another item. In other words the object of the obligation is
irreplaceable because it is ‘unique’. Generally, non-fungible items19 become the
object of a specific obligation.20 For example, if a debtor is obliged to transfer
ownership of an Opel Astra whose number plate is 00 XX 0000 or a painting by
Picasso named Guernica, then the objects of the contract are individually and
specifically identified.
In the above-mentioned cases, if the debtor intends to perform the obligation, then
he must transfer ownership of these specifically identified objects. In other words, the
debtor must perform his obligation by delivering the particular thing specified in the
contract. The debtor is not entitled to offer to transfer another Opel Astra or another of
Picasso’s paintings in lieu of the original specific goods, unless otherwise agreed.
15.5 Generic Obligations21
In generic obligations, the object of the obligation is purely generic. In other words, the
object of the obligation is replaceable, and it forms an undifferentiated portion or
quantity of the same type of things. Generally, fungible items22 become the object of
generic obligations.23 For instance, if a debtor is obliged to deliver 2000 litres of milk,
3 tons of wheat or 3 Opel Astras, such obligations are referred to as ‘generic obligations’.
According to TCO art. 86, unless the contrary is understood from the legal
relationship and the nature of the circumstances, the debtor may select which object
is to be given. However, the debtor is not entitled to select an object of below
average quality. Otherwise, the creditor may reject the performance as
non-conforming to the contract. In such cases, the debtor must bear the conse-
quences of the non-performance. TCO art. 86 is not mandatory. Thus, the parties
18
Obligatio in specie, dette de corps certain, Speziesschuld or St€
uckschuld.
19
A non-fungible item is not destroyed by use, has a specific individual value and cannot be
replaced by another item. See O guzman et al. (2016), p. 13.
20
However, a non-fungible item may be the object of a generic obligation, such as three Picasso
paintings (without specifying which three Picasso paintings).
21
Obligatio in genere, obligation de genre, Gattungsschuld.
22
A fungible item is something which is destroyed by being used and can be replaced by equal
quantities of the same quality, such as oil, wine, cotton, money, etc. See O guzman et al.
(2016), p. 12.
23
However, fungible items (res fungibiles, choses fongibles, vertretbare Sachen) may also be the
object of a specific obligation. For example, a football club W won a coin toss against another
football club L after their championship match ended in a draw. This coin has been displayed in the
winning club’s museum for years. This coin, notwithstanding being a fungible item, may be sold in
an auction and become the object of a specific obligation.
may agree otherwise, or the nature of the circumstances may require that this right
of selection belongs to the creditor or to a third party.
In an obligation to give, the parties may define the object of the contract in generic
terms, but they may agree on certain specific features.24 For instance, in Turkey, apples
grown in Amasya have particular features. If the parties agree that the debtor must deliver
3 tons of Amasya apples, he is not entitled to deliver 3 tons of another kind of apple.
In a generic obligation, the parties may intend to restrict the object of the
obligation. For example, if the parties agree that the debtor must deliver 3 tons of
wheat from a particular silo or 10,000 kg of grapes from a specific vineyard, then
these kinds of obligations are referred to as ‘restricted generic obligations’.25 In
such a case, the debtor may not deliver any 3 tons of wheat or any 10,000 kg of
grapes.26 In addition, the debtor is not entitled to select objects below average
quality from these stocks.27
15.6 Alternative Obligations
Where there is more than one choice for the subject matter of the obligation and
either one of the different acts (prestations) is to be performed, this is referred to as
an alternative obligation.28 For example, in a contract, a debtor is obliged to deliver
either a Mercedes Benz C 180 or a studio flat. In another example, the debtor is
obliged to construct a house or to deliver a boat. The debtor is allowed to perform
either one of these acts.
In such a case, the parties or the nature of the circumstances may grant the right
to choose which act is to be performed either to the creditor or to the debtor.29 The
right of choice may also belong to a third party.30 If the parties or the nature of the
circumstances do not determine to whom this right of choice belongs, the debtor has
the right of choice (TCO art. 87). Once the debtor exercises this right of choice
and determines which act is to be performed, then the object of the obligation
becomes definitive. Other acts are no longer possible objects of the obligation.31
In alternative obligations, if the debtor or the third party who has the right of
choice omits to exercise this right, the creditor may file an alternative lawsuit. If the
24
Tekinay et al. (1993), pp. 761–762.
25
Begrenzte Gattungsschuld.
26
Oser and Sch€onenberger (1929), art. 71, N. 6; Serozan (2014), p. 84.
27
Oser and Sch€onenberger (1929), art. 71, N. 6; Serozan (2014), p. 84.
28
von Tuhr and Peter (1979), § 11, I, p. 77; Tercier (2004), p. 184; Berger (2012), p. 422; Nomer
(2015), pp. 274–275; Tercier et al. (2016), p. 321.
29
Becker (1941), art. 72, N. 3–4.
30
Becker (1941), art. 72, N. 5.
31
Becker (1941), art. 72, N. 7; Oser and Sch€ onenberger (1929), art. 72, N. 8; Oguzman and Öz
(2015), p. 284.
15.7 Pecuniary Obligations 103
court accepts the claim, it can order the debtor to perform one of the alternative
obligations. If the debtor does not voluntarily perform the obligation despite the
court decision, then the creditor who intends to enforce the court order must elect
one of the acts determined in the court order as the object of his enforcement.
Despite this election, the debtor may still perform the other act (TCPC art. 112).32
It should be noted that an alternative obligation is distinct from a facultative
obligation. In the latter, there is only one object of obligation, but the debtor has the
right to substitute the object of obligation ( facultas alternativa).33 Therefore, the
debtor does not have to obtain the creditor’s permission. Furthermore, the debtor
does not have to exercise this right, although he may choose to do so.
The importance of the difference between alternative obligations and facultative
obligations becomes apparent in cases in which performance is impossible. For
example, with regard to alternative obligations relating to two different acts, if one
of them becomes impossible to perform, then the act that remains possible must
constitute the object of the obligation. In contrast, in cases of facultas alternativa
where the principal act becomes impossible, the obligation is extinguished.34
15.7 Pecuniary Obligations
15.7.1 General
A pecuniary obligation is a kind of obligation to give.35 Money is a fungible thing,

and pecuniary obligations are a particular type of generic obligations. Therefore,
the performance of pecuniary obligations can never become impossible.36
15.7.2 National Currency
As a rule, pecuniary obligations must be paid in the national currency (TCO art.
99 par. 1). In Turkey, the national currency, at the present time, is the Turkish lira.37
There is no other recognised currency.
32
Nomer (2015), p. 275.
33
Becker (1941), art. 72, N. 16; Tercier (2004), p. 184; Oguzman and Öz (2015), p. 282, for further
explanations see Serozan (2014), pp. 88–90.
34
Oguzman and Öz (2015), pp. 282–283. In this sense, Reiso glu (2014), p. 303.
35
Engel (1997), pp. 634–635.
36
Eren (2015), p. 971; Serozan (2014), p. 97; Tercier et al. (2016), p. 342; Tercier (2004), p. 198.
37
The national currency of the Turkish Republic was the Turkish Lira as of 1 June 1938. See Act on
Recognition of Lira in State Accounts, No 3290 of 24 December 1937 (Official Gazette 30.12.1937;
No: 3796). However, the legislature, with a specific act, erased six zeros and accepted a new currency
15.7.3 Pecuniary Obligations in Foreign Currency
15.7.3.1 Literal Performance
As mentioned above, in principle, pecuniary obligations must be paid in the

national currency. Nevertheless, this rule is not mandatory, and thus, the parties
may agree to the contrary. In this case, the debtor must perform the obligation in the
specified foreign currency.38
15.7.3.2 Performance in the National Currency
With regard to pecuniary obligations in foreign currency, if a creditor does not want
to accept performance in the national currency, the parties must agree on the literal
performance of the pecuniary obligations. Otherwise, the debtor may perform the
foreign pecuniary obligation in the national or in the foreign currency. In fact, with
respect to pecuniary obligations in foreign currency, unless there is a clause
requiring literal performance or an expression that has the same effect in the
contract, the debtor may perform it in the national currency according to the rate
of exchange on the due date (TCO art. 99 par. 2). However, in the above-mentioned
case, if the debtor does not perform his obligation on the due date, the creditor may
demand that the debtor perform literally or in the national currency according to the
rate of exchange on the due date or the actual performance date (TCO art. 99 par. 3).
It is worth noting that, under TCO art. 99 par. 2, the legislature gives the right to a
debtor to replace the foreign currency debts with the national currency. That is why this
rule may be defined as an example of facultas alternativa. Nevertheless, if a debtor does
not pay the pecuniary debt on the due date, the granted faculty to do so is extinguished.39
15.7.4 Interest
15.7.4.1 General
The parties may agree whether or not the pecuniary obligation involves the pay-
ment of interest. For example, in a non-commercial loan agreement, the lender may
as the New Turkish Lira as of 1 January 2005. Therefore, before this enactment, e.g., the price of a cup
of coffee was TL3,000,000 and after it the price became New TL3. See Act on the National Currency
of Republic of Turkey, No 5083 of 28 January 2004 (Official Gazette 31.01.2004; No: 25363).
Subsequently, following a decree of the Council of Ministers ‘New’ was abrogated as of 1 January
2009. In effect, e.g., the price of a cup of coffee became TL3. See Decree of the Council of Ministers,
No 2007/11963 of 04 April 2007 (Official Gazette 05.05.2007; No: 26513).
38
For further explanations see Pekcanıtez (1988), Baygın (1997).
39
Serozan (2014), p. 102.
only demand interest if so agreed (TCO art. 387 par. 1). However, in certain cases,
even if the parties do not agree that interest is to be paid, payment of interest may be
implied by law. Indeed, in commercial loan agreements, even if the parties do not
agree to it, the lender may demand that the borrower pay interest (TCO art. 387 par.
2). In brief, the obligation to pay interest may arise from the parties’ agreement or
from the law itself. This kind of interest is referred to as capital interest and is
different from default interest.40
In cases where pecuniary obligations involve the payment of interest, the parties
may determine its rate. Should the contractual (e.g., annual) interest rate not be
determined by the parties, this rate is to be determined according to the relevant
legislation at the time the interest liability arises (TCO art. 88 par. 1).
According to LIA art. 1 par. 1, in cases where payment of interest on capital is
required, under the Code of Obligations and the Commercial Code, if the rate is not
determined in the contract, then previously the rate was deemed to be 12% per
annum.41 However, LIA art. 1 par. 2 allows the Council of Ministers to determine a
monthly rate. Further, the Council of Ministers has the authority to determine the
annual rate to be as low as 10% of the rate determined by the legislation or to be as
high as 100% of that rate. As of 1 January 2006, the Council of Ministers has
determined this rate to be 9% per annum.42
It is worth noting that in non-commercial affairs, the interest rate determined by
the parties may not be more than 50% greater than the legal interest rate (TCO art.
88 par. 2). Since the current legal interest rate is 9% per annum, the parties may
determine the interest rate provided that it does not exceed 13.5% per annum.
However, pursuant to TComC art. 8 par. 1, in commercial affairs, the parties have
more freedom to determine the interest rate provided that this rate is not immoral or
contrary to the rules protecting personal rights (TCO art. 27 par. 1 and TCC art. 23).
Pursuant to LIA art. 3 par. 1, compound interest (interest on the accrued interest)
is prohibited. Nevertheless, LIA art. 3 par. 2 states that the provisions of the Turkish
Commercial Code are reserved. Indeed, according to TComC art. 8 par. 2, a clause
imposing compound interest, based on intervals of no less than three months, is
allowed only in current accounts and loan agreements that qualify as a commercial
transaction for both parties. Nevertheless, this paragraph only applies to contracts in
which the parties are merchants. Further, the rules protecting consumers are
reserved (TComC art. 8 par. 3).
The rules explained above also apply to pecuniary obligations in foreign currency.
However, the legal interest rate on capital is equivalent to the maximum interest rate
40
See below Sect. 23.3.1.
41
See Act on the Legal Interest and Default Interest, No 3095 of 4.12.1984 (Official Gazette
19.12.1984; No: 18610) and Act on the Amendment of Certain Acts and Decree-Laws, art.14, No
5335 of 21.4.2005 (Official Gazette 27.04.2005; No: 25798).
42
Decree of the Council of Ministers, No 2005/9831 of 19.12.2005 (Official Gazette 30.12.2005;
No: 26039).
that the state banks pay on a term deposit account opened in the relevant foreign
currency with a one-year maturity (see and compare to LIA art. 4 a).
15.7.4.2 Legal Nature
Interest debts are ancillary to the principal debt.43 Thus, the interest debt requires
the existence of a principal pecuniary obligation. In other words, if the principal
pecuniary obligation is extinguished, the obligation to pay interest is also
extinguished. This is due to the fact that when the principal pecuniary obligation
is extinguished, it may no longer generate interest. As to accrued interest, it can
only be claimed if such a right is reserved in the contract or is reserved by the
creditor’s notification, which must be made by the date of performance, or if such a
reservation is inferred from the circumstances (TCO art. 131 par. 2).
Given the fact that an interest debt is an ancillary right arising out of a principal
pecuniary obligation, it is worth mentioning certain specific rules as set out in the
following paragraphs.
If the creditor gives a receipt for the entire performance of the principal pecuniary
obligation, the interest is presumed to have also been paid (TCO art. 104 par. 2).
Where the creditor assigns the claim to a third party, arrears of interest are presumed to
be assigned together with the principal pecuniary claim (TCO art. 189 par. 2). Also,
the assignee will be entitled to interest that accrues after assignment.
When the principal claim is time-barred, interest claims are also time-barred
(TCO art. 152). However, the claim for interest is subject to a different period of
limitation. Actually, unless otherwise provided by law, all claims become time-
barred after 10 years (TCO art. 146), whereas interest payable on the principal
becomes time-barred after 5 years (TCO art. 147 subcl. 1). Given these provisions,
it can be seen that the obligation to pay interest may be time-barred before the
principal claim becomes time-barred.
Although the claim for interest is an ancillary right of the principal claim, the
former may be assigned44 or sued for independently of the principal claim.45
The interest claim does not form part of the principal claim. Therefore, the payment
of interest cannot constitute a partial performance, and so the creditor is not entitled
to refuse a proposal for payment of interest without payment of the principal
pecuniary obligation.46
43
Oguzman and Öz (2015), p. 303; Tekinay et al. (1993), p. 786; von Tuhr and Peter (1979), §
10, II, p. 71; Engel (1997), p. 647; Thévenoz and Werro (2012), art. 73, N. 3; Becker (1941), art.
73, N. 3; Oser and Sch€ onenberger (1929), art. 73, N. 14.
44
Tercier (2004), p. 200.
45
Feyzioglu (1977), pp. 61–62; Eren (2015), p. 979; Thévenoz and Werro (2012), art. 73, N. 3;
Oser and Sch€onenberger (1929), art. 73, N. 15.
46
15.7.5 Appropriation
15.7.5.1 General
With regard to pecuniary obligations, if the debtor pays the principal debt (the
capital), its interest and expenses, then appropriation is not in question. However, if
the debtor’s payment does not satisfy the entire obligation, the manner of allocation
constitutes a legal problem. The Turkish Code of Obligations deals with this
problem by setting out two possibilities, which are stated in the paragraphs below.
15.7.5.2 In the Case of Partial Payment
If the debtor is not in arrears with interest or expenses, then he is entitled to

appropriate the partial payment to the principal (TCO art. 100 par. 1). It should
not be forgotten that, because the interest debt is not part of the principal debt, the
payment of interest does not constitute any partial performance. For example, the
principal debt is €10,000 and the interest debt is €3000. If the debtor pays €13,000,
that is to say, the entire debt, then there is no need for appropriation. However,
where the debtor intends to pay €3000, he may only appropriate this partial payment
to the principal debt provided that he is not in arrears with the interest debt. If the
debtor is in arrears with the interest debt, then he may not appropriate this partial
payment to the principal debt. TCO art. 100 par. 1 is a mandatory rule. Thus, the
parties are not entitled to agree to the contrary (TCO art. 100 par. 1 sent. 2).
The pecuniary obligation may be secured by a surety, pledge, mortgage, etc. If the
security guarantees the entire debt, the partial payment by the debtor does not create a
risk for the creditor. However, if the security does not guarantee the entire debt, in cases
where the debtor partially fulfils the debt, he is not entitled to appropriate this partial
payment to that part of the debt that is covered by the security or by a better security
(TCO art. 100 par. 2). For example, a debtor is obliged to pay €10,000 to a creditor, and
there is a surety for €3000 and a pledge for €2000. In this case, if the debtor pays €5000,
he is not entitled to appropriate this partial payment to the secured part of the debt.
15.7.5.3 In the Case of Several Debts
15.7.5.3.1 According to the Parties’ Declarations
If a debtor is under several obligations to be performed for the same creditor, then the
debtor is entitled to declare which debt he intends to satisfy at the time of performance
(TCO art. 101 par. 1). If the debtor does not exercise this right, it belongs to the
creditor. In this case, the payment is appropriated to the debt that the creditor
acknowledges in his receipt. However, the debtor may immediately object to this
appropriation (TCO art. 101 par. 2).
15.7.5.3.2 According to the Law
In certain cases, there may be no legally valid declaration or any indication in the
receipt relating to the appropriation. In these cases, the payment is deemed to have
been appropriated to the debt that falls due. In the event that several debts fall due,
the payment is deemed to have been appropriated to the debt that has first been
enforced. Where none of the debts have been enforced, the payment is deemed to
have been appropriated to the debt that falls due first (TCO art. 102 par. 1).
Where several debts fall due at the same time, the payment is deemed to have
been appropriated proportionately. Should none of several debts fall due, the
payment is deemed to have been appropriated to the debt with the least security
References

Baygın C (1997) Yabancı para üzerinden borçlanmalar ve hukuki sonuçları. Kazancı, İstanbul
İpek E (2016) Edime uygun ifa kuralı ve bu kuralın ihlaline ba glanan hukuki sonuçlar. Filiz,
İstanbul
O guzman K, Öz T (2015) Borçlar hukuku genel hükümler, vol 1. Vedat, İstanbul
Oguzman MK, Seliçi Ö, Oktay-Özdemir S (2016) Eşya Hukuku. Filiz, İstanbul
Pekcanıtez H (1988) Medenı̂ us^ ul ve icra - iflâs hukukunda yabancı para alacaklarının tahsili.
Yetkin, Ankara
Filiz, İstanbul
İstanbul
References 109
Chapter 16
Performance of the Debtor
16.1 Performance in Person1
According to TCO art. 83, a debtor, as a rule, need not fulfil the obligation in person.
However, where the debtor’s specific personal skills and experience is of importance
to the creditor, the obligations under the contract may not be fulfilled by a third party.
In this respect, the following examples can be mentioned: (1) according to TCO art.
395, unless the contrary is understood from the contract or the circumstances, an
employee must perform the work in person; (2) TCO art. 506 par. 1 states that an
agent, subject to certain exceptions, must carry out the obligation in person; and
(3) TCO art. 471 par. 3 sent.1 states that, subject to certain exceptions, a contractor
must carry out the work in person or have it carried out under his specific direction.
Certain specific examples can be referenced for work contracts. For instance, a
patient enters into a contract for plastic surgery with a highly experienced and well-
known surgeon. In this case, this operation must be performed by this surgeon, and
another surgeon may not carry out this operation. Other examples include the
painting of a picture by a famous artist, the sewing of a dress by a well-known
tailor or the undertaking of an architectural project by an award-winning architect.
Where performance by the debtor in person is necessary, the debtor is not
entitled to substitute himself, but he may work with assistants.2 Such
co-operation does not breach the contract. In the example of the well-known
1
Aybay (2011), pp. 117–119, 149–150; Becker (1941), art. 68; Berger (2012), pp. 418–419, 778–779;
Engel (1997), pp. 611–615; Eren (2015), pp. 924–934; Feyzio glu (1977), pp. 82–93; Gauch et al.
(2008), pp. 7–11; Honsell et al. (2003), art. 68; Kılıçoglu (2013), pp. 559–568; Nomer (2015),
pp. 273–274; Oser and Sch€ onenberger (1929), art. 68; Oguzman and Öz (2015), pp. 250–264;
Reisoglu (2014), pp. 295–297; Schwenzer (2009), pp. 50–52; Serozan (2014), pp. 22–31; Tekinay
et al. (1993), pp. 766–770; Tercier (2004), pp. 187–189; Tercier et al. (2016), pp. 326–329; Thévenoz
and Werro (2012), art. 68, and von Tuhr and Escher (1974), pp. 23–32.
2
Serozan (2014), p. 23; O guzman and Öz (2015), p. 251; von Tuhr and Escher (1974), § 59, I,
p. 24; Engel (1997), p. 611; Thévenoz and Werro (2012), art. 68, N. 5.

112 16 Performance of the Debtor
surgeon, during the operation, the surgeon may work with certain assistants such as
nurses, anaesthetists, etc. In the other examples, the tailor, the famous painter or the
award-winning architect may also fulfil their obligations with the assistance of third
parties. Whether the debtor substitutes himself or fulfils the obligations with the
help of assistants, he is liable for any damage resulting from the acts of the
substitute or the assistants that are contrary to the obligations under the contract.
16.2 Performance by a Third Party
16.2.1 General
If the debtor’s personal qualifications or skills are not relevant to the creditor, the
obligation may be fulfilled by a third party.3 For example, in pecuniary obligations,
the personal qualifications or skills of a debtor have no importance for the creditor.
Hence, the debtor may leave the payment of the pecuniary obligations to a third
party. These third parties are referred to as substitute persons.4
It should be noted that this fact is not restricted to pecuniary obligations. For
example, if a contractor’s specific skills and experience are not important for the
customer, then the contractor is not obliged to personally carry out the work. The
contractor may leave the performance to a substitute person.
Moreover, in the case of obligations that can be performed by a third party, the
latter may fulfil the obligation. The consent of the debtor is irrelevant.
16.2.2 Subrogation
As a rule, whether the debtor or a third party fulfils the obligation, the obligation is
extinguished. However, in cases regulated by TCO art. 127, the fulfilment of the
obligation by a third party satisfies the creditor, but the obligation is not
extinguished, and the claim passes to the third party. This is referred to as
subrogation.5
3
Eren (2015), p. 924; O
guzman and Öz (2015), p. 251; Tekinay et al. (1993), p. 767; Tercier et al.
(2016), p. 327; Engel (1997), p. 611; Thévenoz and Werro (2012), art. 68, N. 1; von Tuhr and
Escher (1974), § 59, I, p. 24; Becker (1941), art. 68, N. 4.
4
Serozan (2014), p. 23; Oguzman and Öz (2015), p. 251.
5
See Sect. 24.2.
References 113
References

Teil, vol 2. Schulthess, Zürich
Filiz, İstanbul
İstanbul
Chapter 17
Place of Performance
17.1 General1
A debtor must perform the obligation at the place determined for performance. If
the debtor does not do so, the creditor may reject the performance. In that case, the
debtor must bear the consequences of non-performance.2 However, the creditor
may also accept performance that is offered at a different place. In such a case, the
obligation is deemed to be performed and, is thus, extinguished.3
As explained above, determining the place of performance is important. The
place of performance may be determined by the law itself. For example, according
to TCO art. 566, a bailed chattel must be returned at the place where it had been
kept. However, this article is not mandatory; thus, the parties may change the place
of performance.
Furthermore, the place of performance may be determined according to the
nature of the transaction.4 For example, dental treatment is generally performed
in a dental surgery. However, the parties may amend the place of performance by
agreeing that the dentist will come to the patient’s house.
1
Aybay (2011), pp. 119–120; Becker (1941), art. 74; Berger (2012), pp. 433–434; Engel (1997),
pp. 629–632; Eren (2015), pp. 938–946; Feyzio glu (1977), pp. 100–107; Gauch et al. (2008), pp. 14–19;
Honsell et al. (2003), art. 74; Kılıço
glu (2013), pp. 537–546; Nomer (2015), pp. 292–294; Oser
and Sch€onenberger (1929), art. 74; O guzman and Öz (2015), pp. 320–324; Reiso glu (2014),
pp. 326–328; Schwenzer (2009), pp. 42–46; Serozan (2014), pp. 40–51; Tekinay et al.
(1993), pp. 807–811; Tercier (2004), pp. 194–196; Tercier et al. (2016), pp. 338–340; Thévenoz
and Werro (2012), art. 74, and von Tuhr and Escher (1974), pp. 39–44.
2
Reisoglu (2014), p. 326; Tekinay et al. (1993), pp. 807–808.
3
4
Eren (2015), p. 941; Serozan (2014), p. 43; Engel (1997), p. 629; Thévenoz and Werro (2012), art.
74, N. 5; Oser and Sch€ onenberger (1929), art. 74, N. 6.

116 17 Place of Performance
Nevertheless, in certain cases, the place of performance may not be amended.5

For instance, if a debtor undertakes to look for oil on land belonging to the creditor,
the debtor, obviously, must carry out this exploration on the creditor’s land.
It is evident that if a place is not mandatorily determined by law itself as the
place of performance or is not the unique place for the performance of the
obligation, the parties may simply specify the place of performance.
17.2 Default Rules
Apart from the above-mentioned cases, the place of performance will be deter-
mined according to TCO art. 89. This article clearly states that the parties may
determine the place of performance in a manner that is express or implied. How-
ever, where the parties do not determine the place of performance, the following
rules will be applied: (1) pecuniary obligations are to be paid at the creditor’s place
of residence at the time of payment; (2) obligations relating to specific objects are to
be performed—that is to say, the specific objects are to be delivered—where the
object was located when the contract was formed; (3) other obligations are to be
performed at the debtor’s place of residence where these obligations originated.
It should be noted that in order for TCO art. 89 par. 1 subcl. 2 to apply in cases
where the specific object of an obligation is located at a place other than the debtor’s
place of residence, the parties must be aware of this fact.6 For example, an
American seller whose place of residence is Istanbul sells a machine, which is in
Washington, D.C., to a Turkish buyer who lives in Istanbul. They negotiate and
agree on the essential elements of the contract. However, they do not determine the
place of performance. The American seller, according to TCO art. 89 par. 1 subcl.
2, claims that delivery of the machine must take place in Washington as it was
located there when the contract was concluded. If the buyer did not know that the
machine was in Washington, he may require that the machine be delivered to the
seller’s place of residence at the time that the obligation originated.
The creditor of an obligation, which is to be performed at his place of residence,
may change this place after the obligation originates. Consequently, the perfor-
mance of the obligation may become excessively difficult. In such a case, the debtor
may perform the obligation at the creditor’s original place of residence (TCO art.
89 par. 2).
5
Tekinay et al. (1993), p. 808.
6
von Tuhr and Escher (1974), § 61, II, p. 42; Oser and Sch€ onenberger (1929), art. 74, N. 16;
Serozan (2014), p. 43; Oguzman and Öz (2015), p. 322, compare to Nomer (2015), p. 293.
References 117
References

O
Filiz, İstanbul
İstanbul
Chapter 18
Time of Performance
18.1 Obligation Without a Time Limit1
If the time of performance is not determined either by the parties’ agreement, by the
nature of the legal transaction or by the law itself, the obligation falls due imme-
diately (TCO art. 90). Accordingly, if the obligation may be performed immedi-
ately, then immediate performance may be demanded.
18.2 Obligation with a Time Limit
The parties may specify the time of performance in the contract.2 For example, in a
work contract relating to the installation of windows in a house, the parties may
determine the due date as nine months after the formation of the contract.
The parties may agree that the creditor will determine the time when the obligation
falls due.3 That is to say, they may agree on a maturity clause. In that case, the creditor is
able to determine the time of performance. Moreover, the law itself may grant this right to
1
Aybay (2011), pp. 121–125; Becker (1941), art. 75–83; Berger (2012), pp. 434–438; Engel (1997),
pp. 623–628, 655–660; Eren (2015), pp. 946–957, 985–1001; Feyzio glu (1977), pp. 108–138; Gauch et al.
(2008), pp. 20–31; Honsell et al. (2003), art. 75–83; Kılıço
glu (2013), pp. 546–559, 597–603; Nomer
(2015), pp. 294–302; Oser and Sch€onenberger (1929), art. 75–83; Oguzman and Öz (2015), pp. 310–320,
330–349; Reisoglu (2014), pp. 328–335; Schwenzer (2009), pp. 46–48, 445–448; Serozan (2014),
pp. 51–76; Tekinay et al. (1993), pp. 800–807, 825–837; Tercier (2004), pp. 191–194; Tercier et al.
(2016), pp. 333–337; Thévenoz and Werro (2012), art. 75–83, and von Tuhr and Escher (1974),
pp. 44–69. For further explanations see Yüce (2015).
2
Thévenoz and Werro (2012), art. 75, N. 7; Tercier (2004), p. 194; Berger (2012), p. 434; Reiso glu
(2014), p. 329; Oguzman and Öz (2015), p. 314.
3
Thévenoz and Werro (2012), art. 75, N. 7; Serozan (2014), p. 57; O guzman and Öz (2015), p. 316;
Feyzioglu (1977), p. 110.

120 18 Time of Performance
the creditor. For example, TCO art. 392 states that in the absence of any stipulation for the
repayment of a loan on a certain day or after a period of notice or on demand, the lender
has the right to determine the time of performance. However, the borrower may not be
required to repay the loan prior to the expiration of 6 weeks after the lender’s first demand.
Also, the time of performance may be determined by the nature of the transac-
tion.4 For example, in a work contract for the design of a website, in the event that
the parties fail to fix a time of performance, the nature of the legal transaction will
imply a time of performance. This is because it is assumed that the contractor will
require a reasonable period of time for the completion of the website.
Moreover, the law itself may determine the time of performance. For instance,
TCO art. 314 states that unless otherwise agreed or unless local custom requires it,
the lessee must pay the rent and, if necessary, ancillary charges at the end of each
month and, at the latest, at the end of the rental period. Another example: TCO art.
406 par. 1 sent. 1 states that unless custom requires otherwise, the employer must
pay the employee’s salary at the end of each month.
If the time of performance is determined either by the parties, the nature of the legal
transaction or the law itself, the creditor may not demand the performance of the
obligation before it falls due. However, the debtor, as a rule, may perform the obligation
before the due date. It should be noted that the parties may agree that the debtor cannot
perform the obligation before the due date. Furthermore, this may be inferred from the
nature of the contract or the circumstances (TCO art. 96 sent. 1). Indeed, in certain cases,
the time limit is not only for the advantage of the debtor but also for the advantage of the
creditor.5 For example, in a work contract for the manufacture of certain furniture, the
parties determine the due date as 3 months after the formation of the contract as the
manufacturer requires time to complete the work. In addition, the customer also needs
such a time limit to rent a store in which he will display and sell the furniture to be
manufactured. In this case, it is obvious that the party ordering the work (the customer)
may not demand performance before it falls due. Further, even if the contractor completes
the manufacture of the furniture and wishes to give delivery before the date specified in
the contract, he is not entitled to demand that the customer accept this early performance.
18.3 Calculation of the Time Limit
18.3.1 Monthly Term
Where the parties determine the beginning or the end of the month as the time of
performance, these terms mean the first or last day of the month, respectively.
Where the time limit is fixed as the middle of the month, the date is deemed to be
the 15th day of the month (TCO art. 91 par. 1).
4
Engel (1997), p. 625; Berger (2012), p. 434; Gauch et al. (2008), p. 23; Becker (1941), art.
75, N. 3; Eren (2015), p. 950; Tercier et al. (2016), p. 335; O
5
Feyzioglu (1977), p. 119; O
guzman and Öz (2015), p. 312; Engel (1997), p. 628.
18.3 Calculation of the Time Limit 121
If the parties stipulate a month without specifying a certain day for performance of
the obligation, the date is deemed to be the last day of that month (TCO art. 91 par. 2).
18.3.2 Other Time Limits
Where an obligation or any other responsibility is to be performed within a certain

period after the conclusion of the contract, the following rules set out under TCO
art. 92 par. 1 will apply.
If the time limit is fixed by days, the obligation falls due on the last day of the
period. This period does not include the date on which the contract was formed. If
the agreed time limit is specified as 8 or 15 days, it should not be interpreted as
1 week or 2 weeks; on the contrary, it should be interpreted exactly as it is,
excluding the date of formation (subcl. 1).
If the time limit is fixed by weeks, the obligation is due on the day of the last
week that corresponds to the day when the contract was formed (subcl. 2).
If the time limit is fixed by months or a period including several months such as a
year, a half-year or a quarter-year, the obligation falls due in the last month of the
period, on the date that corresponds to the date when the contract was formed. If
there is no such corresponding day in the final month, the obligation is deemed to be
due on the last day of that month (subcl. 3). For example, a contract is entered into
on 31 January 2016. The parties fix a one-month time limit after the formation of
the contract. In 2016, the month of February has 29 days. Therefore, the obligation
falls due on the last day of February 2016—i.e., 29 February.
The period of half a month is deemed to be understood as 15 days. When the time
limit is determined as one or more months plus half a month, this period is
determined by adding 15 days to the last month (subcl. 4). For example, in a
contract entered into on 20 March, the parties fix a time limit of one and a half
months. In this case, the obligation falls due on 5 May.
These rules also apply to cases where the time limit runs from a date other than
that of the contract’s formation (TCO art. 92 par. 2).
When a certain period is specified for the debtor to perform an obligation, the
debtor must perform it before the period expires (TCO art. 92 par. 3).
18.3.3 Holidays and Performance During Working Hours
Where the time of performance or the last day of a time limit corresponds with a
legally recognised holiday,6 the time of performance or the last day of the time limit
6
National and General Holidays Act, No 2429, 17.03.1981 (Official Gazette 19.03.1981; No:
17284).
will automatically extend to the first working day after the holiday (TCO art. 93 par.
1). This rule is not mandatory; thus, the parties may agree to the contrary (TCO art.
93 par. 2).
The performance of the obligation must be carried out and must be accepted
during normal working hours (TCO art. 94). This is a default rule, and thus, the
parties may agree to the contrary. For example, a concert pianist may undertake to
give a recital outside of normal working hours—e.g., at 9 pm.
18.3.4 Extension of the Time Limit
The parties may extend the time limit. In such a case, the new time limit begins on
the first day after the expiration of the former time limit (TCO art. 95). For example,
the parties determine the time limit as 5 January. If they extend this time limit for
4 days, the revised time limit will be 9 January. However, if the parties extend this
time limit for a month, the revised time limit will end on 6 February. TCO art. 95 is
not mandatory, and thus, the parties may agree to the contrary.
18.3.5 Early (Premature) Performance
As mentioned above, a creditor may not demand the performance of an obligation

before it falls due, but a debtor, as a rule, may perform an obligation before the due
date. This is because, pursuant to TCO art. 96 sent. 1, unless the terms or nature of
the contract or the circumstances indicate that the parties intended otherwise, the
debtor is entitled to perform the obligation before the due date.
The time limit is usually to the advantage of the debtor, and generally, the debtor
will not wish to perform the obligation before it falls due. However, exceptionally, a
debtor may perform the obligation before it is due. In this case, the creditor, as a
rule, must accept this early performance. Nevertheless, the debtor is not entitled to a
discount unless the law, the contract or custom requires it (TCO art. 96 sent. 2). For
instance, in a loan contract, the borrower may not expect any discount due to early
repayment.
It should be noted that in certain cases, the time limit is intended to be to the
advantage of both parties. In such a case, the debtor may not perform the obligation
before it falls due and the creditor does not have to accept early performance.7
7
See mentioned example following footnote 5.
18.4 Performance of Bilateral Contracts 123
18.4 Performance of Bilateral Contracts
18.4.1 Determination of the Performance Order
A bilateral (synallagmatic) contract is a contract formed by the exchange of mutual

or reciprocal promises between the parties.8 For example, in a sale contract, the
seller must transfer ownership of the goods sold to the buyer and the buyer must pay
the price of the goods in return.
In a bilateral contract, the parties, the law, the nature of the transaction or custom
may determine the order of performance.9 For example, in a sale contract, the
parties agree that first the seller transfers ownership of the goods sold and then the
buyer pays the price, which is the consideration. In such a case, the seller is not
entitled to claim payment without transferring ownership of the goods. Another
example relating to the order of performance is regulated by TCO art. 406 par.
1, according to which, unless custom requires otherwise, an employer must pay his
employee’s salary at the end of each month.
As mentioned above, the order of performance may be determined by the nature
of the transaction.10 For example, in the case of services rendered by a public utility
such as those supplying water, electricity and natural gas, first, the service provider
renders these services to consumers and then the consumers pay for them. It is
obvious that the price of the services is proportionate to their usage.11
The order of performance may also be determined by custom.12 For instance, in
a self-service restaurant, customers pay the price of the food in advance. However,
in other types of restaurant, the customers pay for the meals after they have finished
their meal.13
18.4.2 Uncertainty of the Performance Order
18.4.2.1 Simultaneous Performance
In a bilateral contract, it is possible that the order of performance is not determined.

In such a case, neither party must perform his obligation in advance of the other.
That is to say, the parties’ reciprocal obligations must be performed simultaneously.
For example, in a contract of sale, according to TCO art. 207 par. 2, unless
8
Tercier (2004), p. 59; Engel (1997), p. 655; Becker (1941), art. 82, N. 7.
9
Reisoglu (2014), p. 332; Nomer (2015), p. 298; O guzman and Öz (2015), p. 333.
10
Oguzman and Öz (2015), p. 333; Tekinay et al. (1993), p. 827.
11
Reisoglu (2014), p. 332; O
12
von Tuhr and Escher (1974), § 64, I, p. 58.
13
otherwise provided by the agreement or by custom, transfer of the ownership of the

property and payment must be made simultaneously.
It should be noted that this rule relating to simultaneous performance will readily
apply if the places of the mutual obligations’ performance are the same. However, if
these places are different, the application of this rule becomes difficult. That is why,
in such a case, one of the parties may have to perform his obligation in advance of
the other.14
18.4.2.2 Exceptio non Adimpleti Contractus
In a bilateral contract, if the performance order is not determined, the party who
claims that the counter-party’s obligation must be performed should first perform
his own obligation or offer to do so (TCO art. 97). Otherwise, the counter-party may
raise the fact that the claimant party has not performed his own obligation or offered
its performance (exceptio non adimpleti contractus).15
Exceptio non adimpleti contractus is a dilatory defence.16 It can be raised, as a
rule, in bilateral contracts and only applies to reciprocal primary obligations.17 This
defence allows the defendant to withhold his own performance and gives him a
right to ward off a claim for performance until the claimant has duly performed or
offered to perform his obligation.18
It should be noted that this kind of defence may not be taken into consideration
by the judge ex officio.19 Therefore, if the defendant intends to ward off a claim for
performance, he must raise this defence. For the defendant to raise this defence:
(1) there must be a bilateral contract, (2) the reciprocal obligations must not be
extinguished, (3) the reciprocal obligations must be simultaneously performed;
(4) the reciprocal obligations must have fallen due and (5) the claimant must not
have performed or offered to perform his obligation.20
The defence of exceptio non adimpleti contractus may be applied by analogy to
imperfect bilateral contracts.21 For example, in an agency contract, without remu-
neration, related to a sale agreement, the (indirect) agent may become the owner of
the goods. In such a case, the latter must transfer ownership of the property to the
principal (TCO art. 508 par. 1). Even if the principal is not obliged to pay any
14
von Tuhr and Escher (1974), § 64, II, pp. 58–59; O guzman and Öz (2015), p. 334.
15
For further explanations see Kaneti (1962).
16
von Tuhr and Escher (1974), § 64, IV, p. 61; Berger (2012), p. 436; Engel (1997), p. 656;
17
Feyzioglu (1977), p. 134; O guzman and Öz (2015), p. 339; Thévenoz and Werro (2012), art.
82, N. 5.
18
Eren (2015), p. 986.
19
Eren (2015), p. 986; Tekinay et al. (1993), p. 827.
20
Kaneti (1962), p. 46 ff.
21
Tercier et al. (2016), p. 336; Thévenoz and Werro (2012), art. 82, N. 9.
18.4 Performance of Bilateral Contracts 125
remuneration, he must pay the price of the sold goods, the expenses and advances,
with interest, paid by the agent (TCO art. 510 par. 1). As has been seen, the legal
relationship between the obligations of the agent and the principal is similar to the
relationship between the obligation and its equivalent in a bilateral contract.
Therefore, if the principal demands that the agent transfer ownership of the goods
sold to him without performing or offering to perform his obligations, the agent
may raise the defence of exceptio non adimpleti contractus.22
Moreover, the defence of exceptio non adimpleti contractus may also be applied,
by analogy, to obligations arising from the invalidity or rescission of a bilateral
contract.23 For instance, in a contract of sale relating to immovable property that is
invalid due to the lack of form, the seller transfers possession of the immovable
property to the buyer and the buyer pays its price in return. However, the seller does
not transfer ownership of the property to the buyer. In such a case, the seller must
reimburse the paid amount and the buyer must return possession of the immovable
property.24 As has been seen, the relationship between the parties’ obligations is
similar to the reciprocal obligations arising from a bilateral contract. Therefore, if
the seller demands that the buyer transfer possession of the immovable property
without performing or offering to perform his obligation related to the reimbursement,
the buyer may raise the defence of exceptio non adimpleti contractus.25 The Turkish
Court of Cassation, in its decisions, accepts this approach as raised by scholars.26
In brief, when the defendant raises the exceptio non adimpleti contractus, the
counter-party will have to offer to perform or will have to perform his obligation.
Unless he does so, the defendant may withhold the performance of his own
obligation. It is obvious that this defence provides a kind of security by allowing
the defendant to withhold his own performance until the other party duly performs
the obligation or offers its performance.
18.4.3 One Party’s Insolvency
In a bilateral contract, the party who has to perform the obligation later may become
insolvent after the conclusion of the contract. Clearly, this fact may jeopardise the
party who is required to perform his own obligation first. That is why the legislature
has aimed to protect the first performer and enacted TCO art. 98. According to this
article, in a bilateral contract, if one party’s claim is jeopardised by the counter-party’s
22
Kaneti (1962), pp. 85–86.
23
Feyzioglu (1977), p. 137; Thévenoz and Werro (2012), art. 82, N. 5; Kaneti (1962), pp. 86–87.
24
See and compare to Sect. 3.5.
25
Kaneti (1962), pp. 86–87.
26
Kaneti (1962), p. 99 ff; Decision to Unify the Jurisprudence of the Turkish Court of Cassation,
10.07.1940, File No: 1939/2, Decision No: 1940/77 (Official Gazette 01.02.1941; No: 4723). In
this decision, the Court of Cassation seems to apply this defence without analogy.
insolvency and, in particular, as a result of bankruptcy or an unsuccessful execution,

then the jeopardised party may withhold performance until the insolvent party’s
prospective performance has been secured (TCO art. 98 par. 1). Moreover, the party
whose rights are jeopardised may withdraw from the contract (ex tunc)27 unless his
claim for security is satisfied within a reasonable time (TCO art. 98 par. 2).
It is worth noting that if the debtor was insolvent at the time of the formation of
the contract and the counter-party was not aware of this fact, then he may rescind
the contract provided that the conditions of material mistake or fraud28 are
satisfied.29
TCO art. 98 does not explicitly state that the jeopardised party must perform his
own obligation first. However, if the jeopardised party does not have to perform his
obligation first, then he may simply raise the defence of exceptio non adimpleti
contractus, without referring to TCO art. 98. That is why the rights regulated by
TCO art. 98 are especially important in cases where the jeopardised party must
perform the obligation first.30
TCO art. 98 gives three rights to the party whose rights are jeopardised: (1) he
may withhold performance until the necessary security is provided. This defence
arising from the said article must be raised by the jeopardised party. The judge may
not take it into consideration ex officio. When the necessary securities such as a
mortgage or suretyship are provided, the defendant may no longer withhold per-
formance. (2) He may demand that the debtor provide security for performance. In
this case, he should grant a reasonable time to the debtor. These securities may be
provided either directly by the debtor or by third parties. For example, a mortgage
or a pledge may be provided. Furthermore, a suretyship or a guarantee may be
provided by a third party. (3) He may withdraw from the contract (ex tunc) if the
necessary security is not provided within a reasonable time.31 If there is a continu-
ing contract between the parties, according to TCO art. 126 applied by analogy, the
debtor may terminate the contract (ex nunc)32 instead of withdrawing from it.
It should be noted that there are certain specific rules in the Turkish Code of
Obligations that are similar to art. 98. For instance, according to art. 332, if a lessee
becomes bankrupt, then the lessor may demand security for the rents that will fall
due in the future. With this objective, the lessor grants a reasonable period of time to
the lessee and to the bankrupt’s estate. If the necessary security is not provided
within that period, the lessor is entitled to terminate the contract immediately.
Another example is TCO art. 436, according to which if an employer becomes
27
Termination of the contract takes effect retroactively (résolution, R€ucktritt).
28
29
See Chap. 11.
30
Oguzman and Öz (2015), p. 346; Serozan (2014), pp. 65–66.
31
The jeopardised party is not entitled to bring an action in order for the necessary securities to be
provided. Consequently if security is not offered voluntarily by the debtor then the only option for
the claimant is to withdraw from the contract.
32
Termination of the contract takes effect prospectively (résiliation, K€undigung).
References 127
insolvent, then the employee may immediately terminate the employment contract
unless the employer provides the necessary securities within a reasonable time with
respect to the employee’s rights arising from the contract, such as wages. These
specific rules override TCO art. 98, which is a general rule (lex specialis derogat
legi generali).33
References

Gauch P, Schluep W R, Emmenegger S (2008) Schweizerisches Obligationenrecht, Allgemeiner
Kaneti S (1962) Akdin ifa edilmedi gi def’i. İstanbul üniversitesi hukuk fakültesi, İstanbul
O
Filiz, İstanbul
İstanbul
Yüce MB (2015) Alacaklı ve borçlu açısından ifa zamanı. Vedat, İstanbul
33
Oguzman and Öz (2015), p. 346 fn. 345.
Chapter 19
Proof of Performance
19.1 General1
The Turkish Code of Obligations sets out three specific provisions relating to proof
of performance of pecuniary obligations. However, these specific provisions are
also applicable to other types of obligation.2
19.2 Forms of Proof
19.2.1 A Receipt
A debtor who fulfils his obligation either partially or entirely is entitled to request a
receipt (TCO art. 103 par. 1). If the debtor requests a receipt during the course of
fulfilling the obligation but the creditor does not agree to this request, the debtor
may abstain from performing the obligation. Further, in this case, the creditor is
deemed to be in default and the debtor may exercise his rights as regulated by the
provisions relating to the creditor’s default (TCO art. 107 ff ).3
1
Aybay (2011), pp. 125–126; Becker (1941), art. 88–90; Berger (2012), pp. 438–439; Engel
(1997), pp. 650–654; Eren (2015), pp. 1002–1009; Feyzio glu (1977), pp. 75–82; Gauch et al.
(2008), pp. 57–60; Honsell et al. (2003), art. 88–90; Kılıço
glu (2013), pp. 631–636; Nomer (2015),
pp. 290–292; Oser and Sch€ onenberger (1929), art. 88–90; O guzman and Öz (2015), pp. 324–330;
Reisoglu (2014), pp. 323–325; Schwenzer (2009), pp. 504–505; Serozan (2014), pp. 119–123;
Tekinay et al. (1993), pp. 818–825; Tercier (2004), p. 251; Tercier et al. (2016), p. 437; Thévenoz
and Werro (2012), art. 88–90, and von Tuhr and Escher (1974), pp. 32–39.
2
Thévenoz and Werro (2012), art. 88, N. 2; Engel (1997), p. 650; Eren (2015), p. 1003; O guzman
and Öz (2015), pp. 324–325; Serozan (2014), p. 119.
3
See Chap. 20.

130 19 Proof of Performance
19.2.2 Return of a Document Acknowledging the Debt
In certain cases, a debtor might give a document to the creditor acknowledging the
debt. In such a case, where the debtor fulfils the entire debt, he is entitled to demand
the return of this document or its cancellation (TCO art. 103 par. 1). However, if the
debtor does not fulfil the entire debt or the document acknowledging the debt grants
other rights to the creditor, the debtor may only demand a receipt and the record of
the payment on such a document (TCO art. 103 par. 2).
19.2.3 Cancellation of the Document Acknowledging

the Debt
Although the debtor is entitled to demand the return of the document acknowledg-
ing the debt, the document might be lost. If the creditor asserts that the document is
lost, the debtor may demand that the creditor declare, by an authenticated or duly
legalised deed, that the lost document is cancelled and the debt is extinguished
(TCO art. 105 par. 1). In this case, these transactions are carried out by a notary
public.
The provisions relating to the cancellation of lost negotiable instruments are
reserved (TCO art. 105 par. 2). Indeed, the specific provisions of the Turkish
Commercial Code require a court decision.
19.3 Presumptions of Performance
If the creditor returns the document acknowledging the debt to the debtor, the debt
that is stated on it is presumed to be performed (TCO art. 104 par. 3). However, if
the creditor proves the contrary, this presumption is refuted. For instance, the
creditor might give the document to the debtor because it has been superseded by
a new document.4
If a creditor gives a receipt for the principal (capital), he is presumed to have
received the interest on it (TCO art. 104 par. 2).
In certain cases, there may be periodical acts (prestations). For example, in a
lease contract, in a loan agreement with interest or in a sale by instalments, the
obligations of the debtor are periodical. In such cases, if the creditor gives a receipt
for a later payment, without reservation, then the previous payments that fall due
are assumed to have been performed (TCO art. 104 par. 1). For instance in a
one-year lease agreement, the lessee does not pay the rent for the first three months
4
References 131
and then wishes to pay the rent for the fourth month, without paying the previous
rents. In this case, if the lessor gives a receipt for the last month’s rent, which is
paid, without reserving his previous claims, then it is presumed that the previous
rents were paid. It should be noted that the creditor may refute this presumption.
References

O
Serozan R (2014) Borçlar hukuku genel b€ olüm, vol 3 (Kocayusufpaşaoglu/Hatemi/Serozan/
Filiz, İstanbul
İstanbul
Chapter 20
Default of the Creditor
20.1 General1
In certain cases, a debtor may fulfil an obligation without the participation of the
creditor. In this context, for an obligation not to do, such as an obligation not to
compete, the creditor’s participation is not needed. In such a case, the default of the
creditor is not in question.2
However, in certain cases, the debtor cannot fulfil the obligation without the
participation of the creditor. Indeed, in obligations to do, the creditor’s participation
is often necessary. For instance, if the debtor is obliged to repair a machine in a
factory belonging to the creditor, the latter must permit the debtor to enter the
building. The participation of the creditor may also be needed for the performance
of obligations to give. For example, in the transfer of ownership of movable
property to the creditor, the participation of the creditor is indispensable.3 In the
event that the participation of the creditor is necessary for the performance of an
obligation, his failure to cooperate constitutes the creditor’s default (mora
creditoris)4 provided that the requirements, which will be examined below, are met.
1
Aybay (2011), pp. 126–129; Becker (1941), Vorbemerkungen zu art. 91–96, art. 91–96; Berger
(2012), pp. 440–449, 542–543; Engel (1997), pp. 661–668; Eren (2015), pp. 1010–1026;
Feyzioglu (1977), pp. 140–159; Gauch et al. (2008), pp. 60–68, 92–93; Honsell et al. (2003),
Vorbemerkungen zu Art. 91–96, art. 91–96; Kılıço glu (2013), pp. 672–683; Nomer (2015),
pp. 302–305; Oser and Sch€ onenberger (1929), Vorbemerkungen zu Art. 91–96, art. 91–96;
O guzman and Öz (2015), pp. 349–365; Reiso glu (2014), pp. 336–343; Schwenzer (2009),
pp. 481–490; Serozan (2014), pp. 142–162; Tekinay et al. (1993), pp. 837–850; Tercier (2004),
pp. 250–255; Tercier et al. (2016), pp. 435–442; Thévenoz and Werro (2012), art. 91–96, and von
Tuhr and Escher (1974), pp. 69–85. For further explanations see Koç (1992).
2
Eren (2015), p. 1011; O
3
See explanations made p. 120 and fn. 11.
4
Demeure du créancier, Verzug des Gl€ aubigers.

134 20 Default of the Creditor
20.2 Requirements
According to TCO art. 106 par.1, for a creditor to be in default, all of the following
requirements must be met: (1) the debtor must propose the performance of the
obligations to do or to give as required, (2) the creditor must refuse to accept it or
fail to carry out any preparations that must be performed by him and (3) the refusal
or the failure of the creditor must not be justifiable.
The creditor is deemed to have refused the properly offered performance only
when the debtor has proposed the performance of the obligation and his proposition
is in accord with the obligation in terms of place, time, quantity and quality. Indeed,
if the debtor’s proposition for fulfilment is not consistent with proper performance,
then the creditor may simply refuse it.5 Further, the proposition for proper fulfil-
ment must be actual.6 In principle, an oral proposition is not sufficient. However, if
the creditor has already declared that he will not accept performance, then an oral
proposal may be sufficient.7
The creditor is deemed to have failed to carry out preparations that must be
performed by him only when8 (1) the debtor has an obligation to give or to do and
(2) the debtor needs the participation of the creditor for the performance of the
obligation and (3) the creditor fails to provide such participation, for example, if a
debtor is obliged to repair a machine in the factory of the creditor and the latter does
not give permission to the debtor to enter the building. Another example, regarding
alternative obligations, is when the creditor does not exercise his right of choice.9
The creditor must not have any justifiable reason for non-acceptance of perfor-
mance or his failure to perform. In other words, if the creditor’s non-acceptance or
failure is justifiable, then he is not in default.10 This can be illustrated by the
following case. In the ‘fixing a machine in a factory’ example, the debtor wishes
to fix the broken machine and his proposal for performance is consistent with the
obligation. However, the creditor refuses the proposal as there is a strike in the
factory. It is rather difficult for even the creditor to enter the factory because of the
workers’ industrial action. In such a case, the non-acceptance of the creditor is
justifiable. It should be noted that for the creditor’s default, his fault is not
necessary.11
5
Engel (1997), p. 663; von Tuhr and Escher (1974), § 65, II, 1, p. 70; Thévenoz and Werro (2012),
art. 91, N. 14–16.
6
Engel (1997), p. 663; von Tuhr and Escher (1974), § 65, II, 2, p. 70.
7
Engel (1997), p. 663; Tekinay et al. (1993), p. 839; O
guzman and Öz (2015), p. 352; Feyzio glu
(1977), p. 143; Nomer (2015), p. 302.
8
Berger (2012), pp. 442–443.
9
Engel (1997), p. 663; Berger (2012), p. 442.
10
von Tuhr and Escher (1974), § 65, IV, p. 72; Berger (2012), pp. 441–442; Thévenoz and Werro
(2012), art. 91, N. 11–13.
11
Reisoglu (2014), p. 338; Serozan (2014), p. 145.
20.3 Consequences 135
If the creditor is in default against one of the joint and several debtors, he is
deemed to be in default against the other joint and several debtors (TCO art.
106 par. 2).
20.3 Consequences
20.3.1 General
In principle, the obligation is not extinguished by the default of the creditor.

However, in a surety contract, if the creditor is in default, the obligation will be
extinguished solely due to this fact. Indeed, where the creditor refuses to accept the
surety’s proposal of payment, without just cause, the surety is released from his
obligations (TCO art. 593 par. 2).
Furthermore, as a rule, the default of the creditor does not give rise to the
creditor’s liability. In other words, the creditor is not liable to pay any compensa-
tion.12 However, in certain cases, the creditor’s acceptance of the debtor’s perfor-
mance is not only a preliminary act but also an obligation with regard to the
creditor.13 For instance, in a sale contract relating to movable property, the buyer
is obliged to accept the seller’s performance; that is to say, the buyer must accept
delivery of the goods (TCO art. 232 par. 1). Therefore, in this case, if the buyer does
not accept the seller’s performance, then the buyer fails to fulfil his obligation.
Thus, the seller may rely on the provisions relating to either the creditor’s default or
non-performance of the obligation.14
20.3.2 In Obligations Relating to Delivery
20.3.2.1 Right of Deposit
If the debtor is obliged to deliver movable property to the creditor and the latter is in
default, then the debtor is entitled to perform his obligation by depositing the
movable property at a specific place at the creditor’s risk and expense (TCO art.
107 par. 1). Pursuant to TCO art. 107 par. 2 sent. 1, the place of deposit is
determined by a court whose jurisdiction includes the place where the obligation
is to be performed. The court is not required to consider whether the debtor has the
12
Eren (2015), p. 1017; Thévenoz and Werro (2012), art. 91, N. 2; Engel (1997), p. 665; von Tuhr
and Escher (1974), § 65, V, p. 73.
13
Thévenoz and Werro (2012), art. 91, N. 2, fn. 2.
14
Oguzman and Öz (2015), p. 355; Nomer (2015), p. 302, compare to Serozan (2014),
pp. 146–147.
right of deposit; it has only to determine the place of deposit. Further, commercial
goods may be deposited in a warehouse without the decision of a judge (TCO art.
107 par. 2 sent. 2).
When the debtor deposits the object of the performance, he makes an agreement
of bailment with the bailee, and this contract must be made for the benefit of the
creditor in accordance with TCO art. 129.15 When the debtor deposits the object of
the performance, he is discharged from his obligation. Consequently, the securities
that are ancillary to the claim, such as a surety, a pledge or a mortgage, will also be
extinguished.
20.3.2.2 Right of Taking Back Deposited Objects
Unless the creditor declares that he accepts the deposited object or unless the
deposit of the object gives rise to the redemption of a pledge, the debtor is entitled
to take back the deposited object (TCO art. 109 par. 1). In the event that the debtor
exercises his right to take back the deposited object, the claim stands with all
ancillary rights (TCO art. 109 par. 2). In this regard, the deposit is distinct from
the performance of the obligation. That is to say, a deposit may be revocable, but
the performance of an obligation is irrevocable in nature.16
20.3.2.3 Right of Sale
The characteristics of the object of the contract or the nature of the transaction may
preclude the deposit of the object; the object may be perishable (e.g., milk, meat,
fresh vegetables, etc.) or its maintenance, protection or deposit may require sub-
stantial expense.17 For instance, where the object of a sale contract is a circus
animal such as a tiger, an elephant or a lion, their maintenance or deposit requires
substantial expense. In such cases, after a warning, the debtor may deposit the sale
proceeds.
The sale of the object, as a rule, can only take place with the permission of a
judge and by public auction (TCO art. 108 par. 1). The judge must consider whether
or not the conditions of the creditor’s default have been fulfilled, the necessity of the
sale and the presence of a warning. The judge’s order for sale does not resolve the
dispute relating to the creditor’s default and is not binding for any future court that
will settle the case.18
15
See. Sect. 24.4.
16
17
Engel (1997), p. 667.
18
von Tuhr and Escher (1974), § 66, II, p. 83 fn. 62; O
20.3 Consequences 137
Where the object to be delivered is quoted on the stock exchange or has a market
price or has a small value in proportion to the expense of selling it at auction, the
judge may permit an ordinary sale. Moreover, the judge may permit the sale without
requiring a previous notification to have been made (TCO art. 108 par. 2).
The debtor, after the deposit of the sale price, is released from his obligation.
However, according to TCO art. 109 par. 1, it is possible for the debtor to revoke
this deposit. If the debtor revokes this deposit, it is reasonable to accept that his
obligation to give becomes an obligation to pay the sale proceeds.19
20.3.3 In Other Obligations
In the case of obligations other than those concerning the delivery of objects, such
as in obligations to do, if the creditor falls into default, the debtor may withdraw
from the contract (ex tunc)20 according to the provisions relating to the debtor’s
default.21
As a rule, the debtor must grant a reasonable period of time to the creditor for the
acceptance of the performance or the fulfilment of any preliminary stages of
performance. Furthermore, the debtor may demand that the court determine this
period of time (TCO art. 123). If the creditor does not meet these demands, the
debtor may withdraw from the contract (ex tunc) by immediate notification to the
creditor (TCO art. 125 par. 2).
In cases that are regulated by TCO art. 124, the debtor does not have to grant a
period of time to the creditor. For instance, where the creditor’s conduct indicates
that granting such a period of time would be useless, the debtor may withdraw from
the contract (ex tunc) without granting such a period.
It should be noted that certain scholars accept that, as a rule, the withdrawing
debtor is not entitled to demand compensation for his negative damage.22 Certain
other scholars argue that the defaulting creditor must pay damages to the debtor for
his negative damage.23
Furthermore, if there is a continuing contract between the parties, according to
TCO art. 126 applied by analogy, the debtor may terminate the contract (ex nunc)24
instead of withdrawing from it.
19
20
ucktritt).
21
See Sect. 23.4.2.
22
Oguzman and Öz (2015), p. 362; Serozan (2014), p. 151.
23
See Tekinay et al. (1993), p. 846; Eren (2015), pp. 1025–1026; von Tuhr and Escher
(1974), p. 84.
24
undigung).
20.4 Other Reasons Preventing Performance25
In certain cases, the debtor, through no fault of his own, cannot perform the
obligation for the creditor or for his agent, for instance, where the debtor does not
have knowledge of the creditor’s identity—i.e., the person to whom the claim
belongs. Furthermore, the debtor may fail to perform his obligation because of
the personal circumstances of the creditor. In such a case, the debtor is entitled to
deposit or to withdraw from the contract as in the case of a creditor’s default (TCO
art. 111). The following are examples of such cases: the creditor passes away, and
the debtor does not know the identity of his heirs; the creditor assigns the claim, but
the assignment is disputed; or the creditor has neither mental capacity nor a legal
representative.
20.5 Impossibility of Performance Due to the Creditor
Even if the debtor wishes to perform his obligation, the performance of the
obligation may be impossible due to the creditor’s circumstances or conduct. For
instance, if a traveller who buys a plane ticket misses the flight, then the obligation
of the airline becomes impossible on account of the conduct of the creditor. The
general provisions of the Turkish Code of Obligations (arts. 1–206) do not regulate
such possibilities. Therefore, there is a lacuna (praeter legem). Indeed, the fact that
BGB § 326 subs. 2 regulates such circumstances supports this thesis. It is possible to
fill this gap by considering certain specific provisions. Indeed, in the second
division of the Turkish Code of Obligations, relating to types of contractual
relationship, there are certain specific provisions that are relevant to some extent
to the type of situations under consideration. These specific provisions will be
evaluated in the following paragraphs.
In a lease contract, the lessor is obliged to deliver the leased object in a fit
condition for the use agreed in the contract and to maintain it in this condition
during the contract. Assume that the lessor performs his obligations but the lessee
does not use the leased object or uses it in a restricted manner as a result of his own
circumstances. According to TCO art. 324, in such a case, the lessee must pay the
rent. However, if the lessor saves some expenses, the latter must permit their
deduction from the rental fee.
Similarly, an employee might wish to perform his obligations, but the
employer’s conduct may preclude it. In such a case, according to TCO art.
408, the employer must pay the employee’s salary. However, if the employee
saves some expenses because he was prevented from working, this amount will
be deducted from the salary payable.
25
For further explanations see Akkanat (1996).
References 139
If it is accepted that there is a gap in the Turkish Code of Obligations relating to

the impossibility of the performance due to the creditor, then it is possible to fill this
gap by considering the above-mentioned specific provisions. Consequently, in the
event of performance of an obligation becoming impossible due to the creditor, it is
proper to accept that the debtor will be released from his obligation. Furthermore, in
a bilateral contract, he may demand performance in return; in addition, if the debtor
is relieved of some expenses or if he gains a benefit or intentionally fails to gain a
benefit, these amounts are to be deducted.26
References
Akkanat H (1996) Alacaklı temerrüdü dışında alacaklı yüzünden borcun ifa edilemedi gi başlıca
durumlar ve sonuçları. Filiz, İstanbul
Honsell H, Vogt NP, Wiegand W (eds) (2003) Basler Kommentar zum Schweizerischen Privatrecht,
Obligationenrecht 1: Art. 1-529 OR. Helbing Lichtenhahn, Basel
Koç N (1992) İsviçre-Türk hukukunda alacaklının temerrüdü. Dokuz eylül üniversitesi, Ankara
Filiz, İstanbul
İstanbul
26
Oguzman and Öz (2015), p. 365; Serozan (2014), pp. 154–158.
Chapter 21
Natural Obligations
21.1 General1
It is not easy to give an exact definition that encompasses all types of natural
obligations (obligatio naturalis). That is why, in this section, each type of natural
obligation will be analysed individually. However, a common characteristic of
natural obligations, except for time-barred obligations, is that when a creditor
seeks an order against a debtor to perform the obligation, the court must dismiss
the case.2 As to time-barred obligations, the court may not take into consideration
ex officio the fact that the obligation is time-barred (TCO art. 161).3 If the debtor
raises the fact that the obligation is time-barred, then the court must dismiss the
case. In addition, there is a further attribute that all natural obligations share;
namely, if a debtor performs the obligation voluntarily, then it may not be
recovered.4
1
Antalya (2012), pp. 24–27; Aybay (2011), p. 9; Becker (1941), Allgemeine Bestimmungen,
N. 5–15; Berger (2012), p. 22; Engel (1997), pp. 43–53; Eren (2015), pp. 88–95; Feyzio glu
(1976), pp. 764–774; Gauch et al. (2008), p. 21; Honsell et al. (2003), art. 63; Kılıçoglu (2013),
and Sch€onenberger (1929), Vorbemerkungen zum ersten Titel (art. 1-67), pp. 10–12; O guzman
and Öz (2015), pp. 18–20; Reiso glu (2014), pp. 38–39; Schwenzer (2009), p. 33; Tekinay et al.
and Werro (2012), art. 63, and von Tuhr and Peter (1979), pp. 32–39.
2
Eren (2015), p. 88; Tercier et al. (2016), p. 98; Engel (1997), p. 43; Kocayusufpaşaoglu (2014),
pp. 44–46; Oguzman and Öz (2015), p. 18; von Tuhr and Peter (1979), § 4, p. 32; Becker (1941),
Allgemeine Bestimmungen, N. 5.
3
See Sect. 26.1.
4
Tekinay et al. (1993), p. 24; Engel (1997), p. 45; Kocayusufpaşao glu (2014), p. 58.

142 21 Natural Obligations
21.2 Types of Natural Obligations
21.2.1 Obligations Resulting from Gambling and Betting
According to TCO art. 604 par. 1, claims resulting from gambling and betting may
not be sued upon and enforced. In addition, TCO art. 605 par. 1 states that even if an
acknowledgement of debt or a negotiable instrument signed by the gambler or the
bettor for a gambling or betting transaction is transferred to a third party, no person
may bring an action or demand the enforcement of these instruments.5 However,
pursuant to TCO art. 605 par. 2 sent. 1, payments effected voluntarily for obliga-
tions resulting from gambling and betting may not be recovered.
It should be noted that an obligation resulting from gambling or betting cannot
be secured by a surety, a mortgage or a pledge.6 This is because these securities are
ancillary to the principal obligation. Indeed, in the event that the obligation is
secured by a surety contract, the surety may plead that the obligation has resulted
from gambling or betting even if he was aware of this fact at the time that the surety
contract was concluded (TCO art. 591 par. 4).
21.2.2 Obligations Resulting from Marriage Brokerage
Pursuant to TCO art. 524, an obligation resulting from marriage brokerage may not
be sued upon and enforced. Nevertheless, if the debtor voluntarily pays his debt, the
paid fee may not be recovered. These obligations cannot be secured by a surety, a
mortgage or a pledge, as in the case of obligations resulting from gambling or
betting. This is because these securities are ancillary to the principal obligation.7
21.2.3 Time-Barred Obligations
The expiration of the limitation period does not give rise to the extinguishment of
the obligation. Thus, the creditor may demand its performance or enforcement.
Nevertheless, if the debtor pleads that the obligation is time-barred, then the court
must dismiss the action. It should be noted that the court is not entitled to take into
consideration ex officio that the obligation is time-barred (TCO art. 161).
5
The rights of third parties in good faith arising from negotiable instruments are reserved
(TCO art. 605 par. 1 sent. 2).
6
Ergüne (2002), p. 113.
7
Ergüne (2002), p. 113.
References 143
If the debtor performs a time-barred obligation voluntarily, it does not constitute

a case of unjust enrichment. However, the legislature, for the sake of clarity, states
that its restitution is excluded (TCO art. 78 par. 2).
A time-barred obligation, in contrast with other types of natural obligation, may
be secured by ancillary securities, such as a surety, mortgage or pledge.8 It should
be noted that if the surety knows that the obligation is time-barred, he is not entitled
to plead this fact (TCO art. 591 par. 1 sent. 2).
21.2.4 Promise Concerning the Performance of a

Moral Duty
A moral duty is distinct from an obligation. A moral duty may not be sued upon and
enforced. Nevertheless, if a person voluntarily performs a moral duty, its restitution
is excluded (TCO art. 78 par. 2). Furthermore, the performance of a moral duty is
not considered to be a donation (TCO art. 285 par. 3). A promise concerning the
performance of a moral duty may be secured by ancillary securities, such as a
surety, mortgage or pledge.9
21.2.5 Another Case of Natural Obligation
An engagement to be married may not give rise to an action to enforce the marriage.
Where a penalty or a forfeiture clause has been agreed by the parties, it may not be
sued upon. However, if the promisor has paid the penalty or forfeit money, then he
is not entitled to reclaim it (TCC art. 119).
References

Ergüne MS (2002) Hukukumuzda taşınır rehninin, € ozellikle teslime ba
glı taşınır rehninin
kuruluşu. Filiz, İstanbul
8
Ergüne (2002), p. 113.
9
Ergüne (2002), p. 113.
144 21 Natural Obligations

glu/Hatemi/
O
Filiz, İstanbul
İstanbul
Helbing Lichtenhahn, Bâle
Chapter 22
Non-performance of the Obligation
22.1 Specific Performance1
22.1.1 General2
If a debtor fails to perform an obligation, in principle, as long as the performance of

the obligation is possible, the creditor may only demand and sue for specific
performance3 of that obligation.4 If the court accepts a lawsuit filed by a creditor
against a debtor for performance of an obligation, then two possibilities arise:
(1) the debtor may comply with the court order, fulfil the obligation and thereby
extinguish it or (2) the debtor may fail to obey the court order, and the obligation
will remain unfulfilled. In the latter case, the creditor is entitled to enforce the court
order according to the provisions of the Turkish Code of Bankruptcy and
Enforcement.
1
Aybay (2011), pp. 130–142; Becker (1941), Vorbemerkungen zu art. 97–109, art. 97–101; Berger
(2012), pp. 503–541, 556–562, 607–616, 624–630, 689–692; Engel (1997), pp. 697–724; Eren
(2015), pp. 1027–1089, 1128–1139; Feyzio glu (1977), pp. 160–219; Gauch et al. (2008a),
pp. 203–208; Gauch et al. (2008b), pp. 69–105, 137–185; Honsell et al. (2003), Einleitung zu
art. 97–109, art. 97–101; Kılıçoglu (2013), pp. 80–86, 636–672; Nomer (2015), pp. 307–333,
376–379; Oser and Sch€ onenberger (1929), Vorbemerkungen zum zweiten Abschnitt (97–109), art.
97–101; Oguzman and Öz (2015), pp. 366–455; Reiso glu (2014), pp. 344–368; Schwenzer (2009),
pp. 338–345, 439–461, 474–481; Serozan (2014), pp. 130–141, 198–215, 246–263, 278–301;
Tekinay et al. (1993), pp. 851–911, 972–983; Tercier (2004), pp. 203–229; Tercier et al. (2016),
pp. 353–398; Thévenoz and Werro (2012), Introduction aux articles 97–109 CO, art. 97–101; von
Tuhr and Escher (1974), pp. 86–131, and von Tuhr and Peter (1979), pp. 192–193.
2
For further explanations see Başo
glu (2012).
3
Performance in kind, exécution en nature.
4

146 22 Non-performance of the Obligation
22.1.2 Specific Provisions for Obligations to Give
In cases where an obligation to give is not performed by the debtor, the creditor may
bring an action and demand performance of the obligation. If the court accepts the
demand and the debtor, honouring the court order, fulfils his obligation to give, then
the obligation is performed and, thus, extinguished.
In the event of the debtor failing to comply with the court order, the dispute
should be resolved in accordance with the characteristics of the subject matter of the
obligation to give, such as movable property, immovable property or a claim. For
example, assume that the debtor is obliged to deliver movable property to the
creditor but does not perform his obligation. The creditor sues and the court accepts
the demand, but the debtor does not comply with the court order. In this case, the
creditor may have the court order executed through the debt enforcement office.
This office is entitled to take the movable property from the debtor’s possession and
deliver it to the creditor (TCBE art. 24).5
In certain cases of non-performance, it is not necessary for the court order to be
executed. This is because when the court order becomes final, the creditor auto-
matically becomes the owner of the subject matter of the order. For instance, a
seller is obliged to transfer ownership of immovable property to a buyer, but the
seller does not fulfil his obligation. The buyer brings an action, and the court accepts
the demand. In this case, it is not necessary for the court order to be executed. This
is because the buyer automatically becomes the owner of the immovable property
when the court order becomes final (TCC art. 716 par. 1).6
A similar provision is that of TCO art. 185. According to this article, where a
creditor is obliged to assign a claim to an assignee but does not perform his
obligation, the assignee may bring an action against the assignor. If the court
accepts the demand of the assignee, the claim sued upon automatically transfers
to the assignee when the court order becomes final. Thus, it is not necessary for the
court order to be executed.7
22.1.3 Specific Provisions for Obligations to Do
In cases where an obligation to do is not performed by the debtor, the creditor may
bring an action and demand performance of the obligation. If the court accepts the
demand and the debtor, honouring the court order, fulfils his obligation to do, then
the obligation is performed and, thus, extinguished.
5
Oguzman and Öz (2015), p. 374. For further explanations see Kuru (2016), pp. 412–414;
Pekcanıtez et al. (2013), pp. 477–478.
6
Oguzman and Öz (2015), p. 374. For further explanations see O guzman et al. (2016),
pp. 407–408; Steinauer (2002), p. 61.
7
Oguzman and Öz (2015), p. 374; O
22.1 Specific Performance 147
In the event the debtor fails to comply with the court order, the dispute should be
resolved in accordance with the characteristics of an obligation to do. This is
because obligations to do are of two types: (1) obligations that must be fulfilled
by the debtor in person and (2) obligations that do not have to be fulfilled by the
debtor in person.8
Certain obligations to do may only be fulfilled by the debtor himself. For
instance, when a famous composer is obliged to compose a concerto or when a
well-known painter undertakes to complete a painting, other persons cannot fulfil
these obligations. If the court order is related to an obligation that only the debtor
can fulfil and he does not obey the court order, without a justifiable cause, then the
creditor may demand that the debtor be sentenced to prison according to TCBE art.
343. However, despite the threat of imprisonment, of which the maximum duration
is 3 months, it is possible that the debtor fails to fulfil his obligation to do. In such a
case, the creditor cannot obtain performance of the obligation.9 He must be content
with compensation for damage according to TCO art. 113 par. 1.10
Certain obligations to do may be performed by the debtor or by other persons.
For example, when a debtor is obliged to paint a wall or to fix a hedge, the personal
qualifications of the debtor are irrelevant. In cases where the obligation to do may
be performed by other persons and the debtor does not comply with the court order,
the creditor may demand its enforcement.11 First, an expert nominated by the debt
enforcement official determines the costs of the third party’s prospective perfor-
mance. Thereafter, there are two alternatives: (1) the creditor may pay the necessary
expenses in advance, and after a third party fulfils the obligation to do, under the
direction of the debt enforcement office, the creditor may then demand that the
debtor pay the expenses for the performance of the obligation, or (2) the creditor
may refuse to pay the necessary expenses in advance and demand that the debtor
pay them. In such a case, if the debtor does not pay these expenses, then the seizable
assets of the debtor that are sufficient for the performance of the obligation can be
seized and realised. With the proceeds obtained from the realisation of the debtor’s
assets, the debt enforcement office will authorise a third party to carry out the
obligation to do (TCBE art. 30).
In cases where the obligation to do may be performed by other persons, the
creditor may rely on TCO art. 113 par. 1, rather than the above-mentioned general
provisions and the specific provision of TCBE art. 30. According to TCO art.
113 par. 1, where a debtor does not fulfil an obligation to do, the creditor is entitled
to demand from the court the authority to fulfil the performance of the obligation
himself or to have a third party fulfil it at the debtor’s expense. Further, the creditor
may demand compensation for damage.12
8
See Chap. 16.
9
Kuru (2016), p. 421; Pekcanıtez et al. (2013), p. 484; Oguzman and Öz (2015), p. 375.
10
Tekinay et al. (1993), p. 921; O
11
Kuru (2016), p. 421; Pekcanıtez et al. (2013), p. 484.
12
For further explanations see Aydıncık (2013).
22.1.4 Specific Provisions for Obligations Not to Do
The debtor may be obliged not to perform certain acts, in other words, to refrain
from certain acts. For instance, a debtor may be obliged not to compete or not to
disclose a trade secret (e.g., a formula, a practice, a design, a patent, etc.). As long as
the fulfilment of the obligation not to do is possible, in principle, the creditor may
only demand its performance. For instance, the debtor is obliged not to compete for
5 years from the conclusion of the contract but breaches this obligation in the
second year. In this case, the creditor may bring an action, and the court may accept
his demand. Then there are two possibilities: (1) the debtor may comply with the
court order. In this case, the dispute is resolved by the honouring of the court order.
However, if the non-performance of the debtor has caused damage to the creditor,
the latter may also demand compensation for the damage arising from the breach of
the non-competition agreement. (2) the debtor may fail to comply with the court
order without a justifiable cause. In this case, the creditor may demand that the
debtor be sentenced to prison according to TCBE art. 343.13 However, despite the
threat of imprisonment, the maximum duration of which is 3 months, the debtor
may continue to breach his obligation not to do (e.g., in a non-competition agree-
ment, he may continue competing). In such a case, the creditor cannot procure
performance of the obligation. He must be content with compensation for damage
according to TCO art. 113 par. 2. This article states that where a debtor who is under
an obligation not to perform certain acts violates this obligation, he is then liable to
compensate the creditor for damage.14
It should be added that the non-performance of the debtor might result in certain
consequences that must be remedied. For instance, a debtor builds a wall blocking
the view of a neighbour despite an obligation not to do so. Another example is
where a debtor, obliged by a non-disclosure agreement not to reveal a trade secret,
such as a formula, nonetheless discloses the trade secret on a website. In these
cases, it is evident that the wall must be demolished and that the information
published on the website must be removed. Therefore, the creditor may demand
that the situation created by the debtor is remedied, or he may demand authorisation
to remedy it at the debtor’s expense (TCO art. 113 par. 3).15
22.1.5 Specific Provisions for Pecuniary Obligations
The performance of pecuniary obligations may not become impossible. As men-

tioned above, as long as the performance of the obligation is possible, the debtor
13
Kuru (2016), pp. 421–422; Pekcanıtez et al. (2013), p. 484.
14
Tekinay et al. (1993), pp. 923–924; Eren (2015), p. 1034; O
guzman and Öz (2015), pp. 377–378,
pp. 428–429.
15
Eren (2015), p. 1034; Tekinay et al. (1993), p. 924; Oguzman and Öz (2015), p. 429.
22.2 Action for Damages in Lieu of Specific Performance 149
must fulfil it. Therefore, when a debtor does not pay his pecuniary obligation, the
creditor is entitled to bring an action. If the court accepts the demand and the debtor,
in compliance with the court order, pays the debts, then the dispute is resolved.
However, if the debtor does not obey the court order, the creditor may demand its
enforcement. In such a case, as a general rule,16 the seizable assets of the debtor that
are sufficient for the performance of the obligation are seized and realised under the
authority of the debt enforcement office.17 With the proceeds obtained from the
realisation of the debtor’s assets, the obligation is fulfilled and, thus, the creditor’s
claim is satisfied.18
In addition to the general provisions, the legislature gives the creditor the right to
commence enforcement proceedings without a court order (TCBE art. 42).19 Indeed,
the creditor can initiate execution proceedings by submitting an enforcement request
to the competent debt enforcement office. In this case, the enforcement office must
issue a summons to pay and serve it on the debtor. When the debtor receives this
summons to pay, he may pay the debt within 7 days, thereby resolving the dispute.
On the other hand, the debtor might not pay the debt and might not object to the
summons to pay. In such a case, the summons to pay becomes enforceable and the
creditor may request that the enforcement proceedings be continued. Consequently,
the seizable assets of the debtor are seized and realised under the authority of the debt
enforcement office. With the proceeds obtained from the realisation of the debtor’s
assets, the obligation is fulfilled and, thus, the creditor’s claim is satisfied. A third
possibility is that the debtor might not pay the debt and might object to the order. In
such a case, the execution proceedings are suspended, and if the creditor wishes to
continue the execution, there are two alternatives: (1) the creditor must bring an
action before a civil court within 1 year of the debtor’s objection (TCBE art. 67), or
(2) the creditor must commence proceedings before a court of enforcement within
6 months (TCBE arts. 68–70). The debtor’s objection may be dismissed by the civil
court or annulled by the court of enforcement. In these cases, the creditor can request
continuation of the enforcement proceedings.
22.2 Action for Damages in Lieu of Specific Performance
22.2.1 Subsequent Impossibility20
In the event that the performance of the obligation becomes impossible after the
formation of the contract, clearly, the creditor may no longer demand its specific
16
The specific rules relating to the bankruptcy are reserved.
17
Pekcanıtez et al. (2013), pp. 476–477. For further explanations see Kuru (2016), pp. 400–404.
18
Oguzman and Öz (2015), p. 373; Reiso glu (2014), p. 347.
19
For further explanations see Kuru (2016), p. 107 ff; Pekcanıtez et al. (2013), p. 182 ff.
20
For further explanations see Gündo gdu (2014).
performance.21 If performance of an obligation cannot be obtained through the debt

enforcement office, then performance of the obligation is deemed to have become
impossible. In this case, the creditor may only demand compensatory damages
provided that the debtor is responsible for the impossibility of performance.22 As a
general rule, if the debtor is at fault for the subsequent impossibility, then he will be
liable for compensation for the creditor’s damage (TCO art. 112). However, even if
the debtor is not at fault for the subsequent impossibility, he may be held liable for
compensation for the creditor’s damage provided that the law itself or the agree-
ment of the parties imposes a liability of this nature.23
At this point, it should be remembered that impossibility of performance, which
is analysed under this section, is distinct from initial impossibility. In the case of
initial impossibility, the performance of the obligation is impossible when the
contract is formed and this impossibility is objective; that is to say, the performance
of the obligation by any person is not possible. The initial impossibility results in
the nullity of the contract (TCO art. 27 par. 1).24 In the case of subsequent
impossibility, the performance of the obligation becomes impossible after the
formation of the contract. Moreover, according to certain scholars, it is irrelevant
whether the impossibility of performance is objective or subjective.25 In either case,
the performance of the obligation becomes impossible.
22.2.2 Other Causes of Action for Damages
In certain cases, although performance of the obligation is possible, the creditor

may instead demand compensation for damage resulting from non-performance of
the obligation.
This right may be granted to the creditor by the contract.26 For instance, the
parties may agree that a penalty in lieu of performance must be paid in the event of
the debtor failing to perform his obligation (TCO art. 179 par. 1).27
This right may also be granted to the creditor by the law itself.28 Indeed, in
bilateral contracts, if the debtor does not perform his obligation and falls into
21
Impossibilium nulla obligatio est: No-one has a legal obligation to do the impossible or there is
no obligation to perform an impossible act.
22
If the debtor is not responsible for the impossibility of the performance, then the debtor is
released from his obligation (TCO art. 136). Cases in which the debtor is not responsible for the
impossibility of performance will be analysed below under Sect. 25.5.
23
Oguzman and Öz (2015), pp. 411–412; Oser and Sch€ onenberger (1929), art. 99, N. 12, N. 13.
24
See Sect. 5.2.5.
25
See Sect. 25.5.1.
26
27
See Sect. 31.3.2.
28
default (TCO art. 117), the creditor may grant a reasonable time period for the
performance of the obligation to the debtor or demand the court to set such time
period (TCO art. 123). If the debtor does not cure his default by the end of this time
period, then the creditor may demand compensation for damage in lieu of specific
performance (TCO art. 125 par. 2).29
Moreover, in certain cases, the nature of the circumstances may entail an action
for damages in lieu of specific performance. This is the case, for example, in
obligations to do if the obligation may not be performed by a third party. In other
words, if the debtor must perform his obligation in person and refuses to perform it,
it is reasonable to assume that the creditor may demand that the debtor compensate
him for damage.30
Finally, even if performance of the obligation is possible and the creditor is not
entitled to bring an action for compensation for damage in lieu of specific perfor-
mance, he may still file a lawsuit with this objective. In such a case, if the debtor
does not defend himself or prove that the performance of the obligation is still
possible, the court may decide that the debtor must pay compensation, provided that
the debtor is responsible for non-performance of the obligation.31
22.2.3 Requirements of Action for Damages
In order for the debtor to be liable for non-performance of the obligation, the
following conditions are necessary: (1) the debtor must fail to fulfil his obligation;
(2) the debtor must be responsible for the non-performance of the obligation; (3) the
creditor must incur certain damage, which can be moral or pecuniary; and (4) there
must be an adequate causal link between the non-performance and the damage.
22.2.3.1 Non-performance
In principle, as long as the performance of the obligation is possible, a creditor is

not entitled to demand compensation in lieu of specific performance. Therefore, as
a rule, in order for the debtor to be required to pay compensation to the creditor for
non-performance of the obligation, the performance of the obligation must have
become impossible (subsequent impossibility).32 However, in certain cases,
although the performance of the obligation is possible, the creditor may instead
demand compensation for damage resulting from the non-performance provided
29
See Sect. 23.4.2.
30
Compare to Oguzman and Öz (2015), p. 375 and fn. 36 and pp. 426–427.
31
32
See Sect. 22.2.1.
that this right is given to him by the contract, by the law itself or by the nature of the
circumstances as referred to above (other causes of action for damages).33
22.2.3.2 Responsibility of the Debtor for Non-performance
22.2.3.2.1 Presumption of Fault
According to TCO art. 112, if a debtor fails to fulfil the obligation, then he is liable
for damage, unless he proves that there is no fault on his part. A debtor is presumed
to be at fault in the event of non-performance of the obligation. However, the debtor
may refute this presumption of fault.
If the debtor is at fault for non-performance, then he is liable to compensate the
creditor’s damage. For example, in a sale contract relating to a specific object, if the
seller is responsible for the object being destroyed, then he is liable to compensate
the buyer for damage. Where the debtor is not at fault, he is not liable to pay
damages to the creditor. For instance, in a sale contract relating to a specific object,
if, after the formation of the contract, the object is destroyed by a lightning strike,
then the debtor is not at fault regarding the non-performance. In this case, the
obligation is extinguished due to subsequent impossibility, and thus, the debtor is
released from his obligation (TCO art. 136 par. 1).34
The conduct of the debtor resulting in non-performance may be intentional or
negligent. The negligence of the debtor may be gross or slight. The degree of the
debtor’s fault is irrelevant. In other words, the debtor is generally liable for any fault
(TCO art. 114 par. 1 sent. 1).35
The parties may mitigate the liability of the debtor. By argumentum a contrario,
as set out in TCO art. 115 par. 1, the parties may agree that the debtor is not liable to
pay damages in cases where he is at slight fault (culpa levis).36 Furthermore, the law
itself may mitigate the responsibility of the debtor. For instance, according to TCO
art. 294 par. 1, a donor is not liable to a donee for any damage arising from a gift
except where he has caused this damage by gross fault (culpa lata – intentionally or
by gross negligence).37
33
See Sect. 22.2.2.
34
See Sect. 25.5.
35
36
See Sect. 22.4.
37
For further explanations see Tercier (2003), p. 239; Thévenoz and Werro (2012), art. 248, N. 9;
Tandogan (1990), p. 374; Yavuz (2014), p. 351.
22.2.3.2.2 Refutation of Presumption
The debtor may prove that he is not at fault for the non-performance of the
obligation, and thus, he may be released from his liability. For instance, the
non-performance might result from a force majeure, a fortuitous event (such as
an accident)38 or the creditor’s or a third party’s fault. It is also possible that the
debtor does not have mental capacity (capacity of discernment). In such cases, no
fault can be attributed to the debtor.39 The debtor may also refute this presumption
of culpability proving that he fulfilled his duty of care objectively as required by
law, by the contract and by the principles of good faith for the performance of the
obligation.
A debtor who permanently lacks mental capacity (capacity of discernment)
cannot be considered culpable and, thus, cannot be held liable for his breach of
contract. Nevertheless, where equity requires, the court may order a debtor who
does not have mental capacity to pay total or partial compensation for the damage
he has caused (TCO art. 65).40 If a debtor has temporarily lost his mental capacity
and has caused damage to the creditor, he must pay compensation to the creditor.
However, where the debtor proves that he has lost this capacity without fault, he can
be released from such liability (TCO art. 59).41 Indeed, according to TCO art.
114 par. 2, provisions relating to tort liability are applied by analogy to contractual
breaches.
It is worth elaborating upon force majeure and fortuitous events. Fortuitous
events (casus fortuitus, unavoidable accidents) are events that are proximate to
the parties or the object of the obligation,42 for example, a boiler explosion in a
factory.43 On the other hand, force majeure (vis major) covers extraordinary events
or circumstances—for example, natural disasters such as hurricanes, floods, earth-
quakes, volcanic eruptions, lightning strikes, etc. or social or commercial disrup-
tions such as war, strikes, riots, interdictions of importation or exportation—that are
beyond the control of the debtor and therefore prevent the performance of the
obligation.44 A fortuitous event is any event that was not foreseen but if it had been
foreseen, it could have been avoided; on the other hand, force majeure is any event
that is beyond the control of the parties, whether or not it is foreseen.
38
For further explanations see G€ ozübüyük (1957).
39
Oguzman and Öz (2015), pp. 403–405.
40
von Tuhr and Escher (1974), § 69, IV, p. 117; Becker (1941), art. 97, N. 58; O guzman and Öz
(2015), p. 412.
41
von Tuhr and Escher (1974), § 69, IV, p. 117; O guzman and Öz (2015), p. 404.
42
von Tuhr and Escher (1974), § 69, VII, pp. 120–121; Engel (1997), p. 467; Thévenoz and Werro
(2012), art. 43, N. 33, art. 103, N. 7.
43
Reisoglu (2014), p. 359; Oguzman and Öz (2015), p. 405.
44
Tekinay et al. (1993), pp. 1002–1004; Feyzioglu (1977), p. 226; Engel (1997), p. 468; Thévenoz
and Werro (2012), art. 41, N. 46, art. 103, N. 7; von Tuhr and Escher (1974), § 69, VII,
pp. 121–122.
In certain cases, the parties may exacerbate the responsibility of the debtor and
agree that the debtor will be liable for his non-performance even in cases of force
majeure or fortuitous events.45 Alternatively, the parties may agree that the perfor-
mance of the obligation will be suspended as long as the circumstances remain.
Further, the law itself may exacerbate the responsibility of the debtor. Pursuant
to TCO art. 563 par. 2, without a bailor’s consent, a bailee must not use the bailed
chattel. Otherwise, the bailee is responsible for any accidental damage that occurs,
unless he proves that the chattel would nevertheless have been damaged in the same
accident.46
22.2.3.3 The Creditor’s Damage
22.2.3.3.1 Pecuniary Losses
The creditor must prove both the existence of any damage and its amount. If the
creditor fails to prove the exact amount of the damage, the extent of liability of the
debtor will be determined in accordance with the provisions relating to tort liability.
This is because TCO art. 114 par. 2 states that the rules relating to tort liability47
apply by analogy to cases of breach of contract. Therefore, TCO art. 50 par. 2 will
be applicable in such cases. According to this provision, if the exact amount of the
damage is not proven, then it is determined by the court at its discretion; the court
must take into consideration the ordinary course of events and the measures taken
by the creditor.48
Damage resulting from the non-performance of the obligation is referred to as
‘positive damage’, and this includes both actual damage (damnum emergens) and
the deprivation of the opportunity to obtain a benefit (lucrum cessans) and avoid a
loss.49 For example, a bailee is obliged to return the bailed object (e.g., a car) to the
bailor. However, the bailed car is destroyed due to the fault of the bailee. In this
case, the bailor (creditor) may demand that the bailee (debtor) pay damages for the
market value of the car (damnum emergens). The difference between the value of
the creditor’s assets in the event of performance and non-performance represents
the creditor’s damage, and the debtor must compensate for that diminution in
value.50
In a car sale contract, assume that the buyer has made a resale agreement for the
car, according to which the car would be sold to a third party resulting in a profit of
45
Cf. Oguzman and Öz (2015), p. 412.
46
47
For further explanations see Nomer (1996).
48
Oguzman and Öz (2015), p. 390; Oser and Sch€
onenberger (1929), art. 42, N. 3–7; Becker (1941),
art. 42, N. 4–5.
49
Oguzman and Öz (2015), p. 387; Becker (1941), art. 97, N. 34–45.
50
Becker (1941), art. 97, N. 34; O
€20,000. However, the car is destroyed due to the fault of the seller. In this case,
where the buyer proves that there was such a prospective sale, he may demand that
the seller compensate for this damage (loss of profit—lucrum cessans).51
22.2.3.3.2 Non-pecuniary Losses52
Non-performance of the obligation may give rise to the infringement of the

creditor’s personal rights and may thus cause moral damage. In such a case, the
creditor is entitled to demand that his moral damage be compensated. For instance,
a television star has breast cancer and wishes to be operated on by a well-known
plastic surgeon. In fact, surgeons are not permitted to reveal any medical informa-
tion about their patients without their permission. Despite this fact, the surgeon
describes the patient’s surgery in a book. In this case, the non-performance of the
obligation—that is to say, the disclosing of the patient’s condition and treatment—
infringes the personal rights of the patient, and so she may demand that the surgeon
compensate her moral damage. Indeed, TCO art. 114 par. 2 states that the rules
relating to tort liability apply by analogy to cases of breach of contract. Therefore,
TCO art. 58 will be applicable in such cases.53
It should be noted that, since TCO art. 114 par. 2 states that the rules relating to
tort liability apply by analogy to cases of breach of contract, pursuant to TCO art.
56 par. 1, if a breach of a contract causes personal injury to a creditor, he may
demand moral compensation for his injuries. As a consequence of TCO art. 114 par.
2, if the breach of the contract results in either the death or serious injury of the
creditor, persons in a close relationship with him may be entitled to moral damages
22.2.3.4 Causation (Adequate Causal Link)
The debtor must compensate the creditor’s damage resulting from non-performance.
Nevertheless, a mere causal link between the non-performance of the debtor and the
creditor’s damage is not sufficient. Indeed, the debtor does not have to compensate
all damage resulting from non-performance. There must be an adequate (proximate)
causal link54 between the non-performance of the debtor and the creditor’s damage.
In other words, the debtor is liable solely for the normal, expected results of his
non-performance.55 For instance, according to a contract between a car owner and a
51
Becker (1941), art. 97, N. 37–39; Oguzman and Öz (2015), p. 387.
52
For further explanations see Genç Arıdemir (2008).
53
Becker (1941), art. 97, N. 26; Oguzman and Öz (2015), pp. 388–389; Tekinay et al. (1993),
p. 857; Reisoglu (2014), p. 356.
54
For further explanations see Eren (1985).
55
mechanic, the latter is obliged to fix the brakes of the car. However, the mechanic
returns it without fixing the brakes. The car owner has an accident and misses his
flight and catches the following flight, but the airplane crashes and the car owner
dies. In this case, it is obvious that the mechanic is liable for the car accident. This is
due to the fact that there is an adequate causal link between the non-performance and
the car accident. However, the mechanic is not liable for the car owner’s death.
It is obvious that there is a causal link between the non-performance of the
obligation and the car owner’s fate. One may say that if the car had been fixed as
required, then the car owner would not have had the car accident, would not have
missed the flight and, thus, would not have died. However, there is no adequate
(proximate) causal link between the non-performance of the obligation and the
plane crash. This is because, in the course of life, not fixing a car’s brakes is quite
likely to give rise to a car accident but does not normally give rise to death in a plane
crash. In other words, the causal link must be foreseeable in order to be considered
adequate.
22.2.3.5 The Extent of Compensation
The extent of the debtor’s liability depends on the special nature of the legal
transaction. In particular, where the transaction does not provide any benefit to
the debtor, his liability is assessed less severely (TCO art. 114 par. 1 sents. 2 and 3).
The maximum limit of the compensation is the extent of the creditor’s damage.56
Within this limit, the judge may determine the extent and the form of the compen-
sation (TCO art. 51 par. 1). This is due to the fact that the provisions relating to tort
liability are applied by analogy to breaches of contract (TCO art. 114 par. 2). In this
regard, the liability of the debtor is determined taking into consideration the
circumstances and the degree of the debtor’s fault (TCO art. 51). Therefore, if the
debtor is at gross fault—in other words, if he breaches the obligation intentionally
or by gross negligence (culpa lata), then his liability is more severe in comparison
to a debtor who is at slight fault (culpa levis).57
The court, while determining the extent of the compensation, must also take into
account the aggrieved party’s fault58 (TCO art. 52 par. 1). If the injured party
consented to the breach of the contract or caused or increased the damage or
exacerbated the debtor’s position, then the judge may reduce the compensation or
may dismiss the claim.59 For instance, there is an employment agreement between a
car owner and his driver. The car crashes due to the fault of the driver, and the car
56
Tekinay et al. (1993), p. 855; Eren (2015), p. 1069; Reisoglu (2014), p. 361; Oguzman and Öz
(2015), p. 425.
57
Tekinay et al. (1993), pp. 870–872; Eren (2015), p. 1064; Reisoglu (2014), p. 361; O
guzman and
Öz (2015), p. 425.
58
For further explanations see Baysal (2012); Altınok Ormancı (2016).
59
22.3 Improper Performance of the Obligation 157
owner is injured. However, the owner refuses to be treated for tetanus and, thus,
dies needlessly. In this case, the debtor (driver) may not be held liable for the death
of the creditor; he is only liable for the creditor’s other injuries resulting from the
car crash.
Moreover, the judge may reduce the compensation in cases where the debtor
would be impoverished were he to pay the full compensation, provided that the
debtor is at slight fault and equity requires it (TCO art. 52 par. 2).
22.3 Improper Performance of the Obligation
The debtor fulfils his obligation; nevertheless, the performance may be improper.
That is to say, the debtor’s performance may be inconsistent with the obligation in
terms of the quantity, the quality, the place of performance or the time of perfor-
mance, etc. In such cases, the creditor may refuse this improper performance and
may demand the performance to be as required by the contract.60 As explained
above, as long as the performance of the obligation is possible, the creditor may
demand performance in accordance with the contract. Therefore, the author’s
explanations regarding specific performance are also applicable in this case.61
However, it is possible that the creditor will accept the improper performance of
the obligation and demand compensation for damage.62 In order for the debtor to be
liable for the compensation for the creditor’s damage resulting from improper
performance, the following conditions are necessary: (1) the debtor must fail to
fulfil the obligation as required; (2) the debtor must be responsible for the improper
performance of the obligation; (3) the creditor must incur certain damage, which
can be pecuniary or non-pecuniary; and (4) there must be an adequate causal link
between the improper performance and the damage. The author’s explanations
regarding an action for damages in lieu of specific performance are also applicable
in this case.63
It is worth noting that late performance of an obligation is a specific case of
improper performance. Consequently, the legislature sets out specific provisions for
the default of the debtor.64
60
61
See Sect. 22.1.
62
Oguzman and Öz (2015), pp. 467–468.
63
See Sect. 22.2.3.
64
See Chap. 23.
22.4 Contractual Exclusion of Liability65
22.4.1 General
If the debtor does not perform his obligation, he will be liable for the damage
arising from non-performance of the obligation. Nevertheless, the parties may agree
in advance that the debtor will not be liable for such damage. An agreement for the
non-liability of the debtor may be included by the parties as a clause in the contract.
Such clauses are referred to as ‘exemption clauses’. Further, the parties may also
make a separate agreement that excludes the debtor’s liability. Such agreements are
referred to as ‘non-liability agreements’ or ‘agreements excluding the debtor’s
liability’. The term ‘non-liability agreement’ includes both exemption clauses and
separate agreements.66
The Turkish Code of Obligations accepts the validity of such agreements.
However, the Code sets certain restrictions on the contractual exclusion of liability.
These restrictions are analysed in the following paragraphs.
22.4.2 Restrictions
The first restriction is that, according to TCO art. 115 par. 1, any agreement in
advance purporting to exclude liability for unlawful intent or gross negligence
(culpa lata) is void. This is a case of partial nullity. Thus, the other terms of the
contract, apart from the clause relating to the exclusion of the debtor’s liability,
remain valid. That is to say, the debtor is not entitled to claim that if the exemption
clause had not existed, he would not have concluded the contract.67
The second restriction arises from TCO art. 115 par. 2. As a rule, according to
the first paragraph of the said article, an agreement that excludes the debtor’s
liability for his slight fault (culpa levis) is valid. However, the legislature accepts
that, in certain cases, such agreements are also void. Pursuant to TCO art. 115 par.
2, any agreement concluded in advance that accepts that a debtor will not be liable
for any obligations arising from an employment contract is void. Nevertheless, at
this point, it should be noted that the paragraph referred to above is written in a
manner that exceeds the ratio legis of the provision. In fact, pursuant to the terms of
this paragraph, the agreement that excludes the employee’s liability for slight fault
will also be void. However, such an interpretation is considered unfair as an
employer is almost never in a position to be unfairly exploited by an employee.
65
For further explanations see Akman (1976), Başalp (2011).
66
The parties to a contract are also entitled to make an agreement in advance that restricts the
debtor’s liability instead of excluding it. The rules concerning non-liability agreements are also
applied to these kinds of agreements.
67
See Sect. 5.3.2.
22.5 Debtor’s Liability for Assistants 159
On the contrary, it is more likely that an employer would be in a position to unfairly

exploit an employee. That is why it should be accepted that there is a lacuna sensu
lato. Indeed, the text of the corresponding article of the former Code of Obligations
(art. 99 par. 2) supported this thesis as it required the waiving party to be employed
by the other party at the time of the formation of the agreement excluding liability.
Therefore, TCO art. 115 par. 2 must be understood in the sense that a provision in
an employment contract that exempts the liability of the employer for slight fault is
void. However, a provision in an employment contract that exempts the liability of
the employee for slight fault will be deemed to be valid.68
The third restriction is a consequence of TCO art. 115 par. 3, according to which
if a service or profession requires proficiency that can only be undertaken with the
permission of competent authorities or the law, then any agreement concluded in
advance that accepts that the debtor will not be liable for his slight fault (culpa
levis) is void. For example, being a doctor, an attorney-at-law or an architect
requires proficiency and can only be exercised with the permission of competent
authorities or the law.69 Therefore, any agreements excluding liabilities for slight
fault on the part of these persons are void.70
22.5 Debtor’s Liability for Assistants
22.5.1 General71
A debtor may perform a contractual obligation himself or with the help of assis-
tants. Furthermore, provided that a specific debtor is not determined in the contract,
a debtor may replace himself with a substitute for the performance of an obligation.
Moreover, the debtor may exercise the rights arising from the contract or allow
assistants, such as the people who live with or work for him, to exercise these rights.
If the debtor is not permitted to do so, he will be liable for breaching the obligation
(TCO art. 112).72 However, even if the debtor is permitted to do so, he will be liable
for any conduct of his assistants that is contrary to the obligation. Indeed, according
to TCO art. 116 par. 1, a debtor who delegates the performance of an obligation or
the exercise of a right resulting from an obligational relationship to assistants is
liable to compensate the damage that they may cause to the other party while they
carry out such tasks, even if their delegation was lawful.
68
69
Oser and Sch€onenberger (1929), art. 100, N. 5.
70
71
For further explanations see Şenocak (1995).
72
Eren (2015), p. 1079; Reisoglu (2014), pp. 364–365; O
22.5.2 Conditions
In order for a debtor to be liable for his assistants, the following conditions must be
met: (1) the debtor must delegate the performance of an obligation or the exercise of a
right resulting from an obligational relationship to assistants; (2) this delegation must
not be contrary to the obligation; (3) the assistants’ conduct must breach the debtor’s
obligation and cause damage to the creditor; (4) it must be the case that if the debtor
had performed the obligation himself, he would have been liable; and (5) there must
not be an agreement excluding liability of the debtor for the conduct of the assistants.
The first condition required for the debtor’s liability for assistants is that the debtor
must delegate the performance of an obligation or the exercise of a right resulting from
an obligational relationship to his assistants.73 For instance, assume that a moving
company is obliged to transport a piano belonging to a virtuoso. The performance of
the obligation will be carried out by its employees who are deemed to be its assistants.
As another example, consider that a woman leases a car from a rental company. She is
entitled to drive this car herself, but she may also allow her driver or spouse to drive
it. In this case, the driver or the spouse would be considered an assistant.
An assistant may be any person. For a person to be considered an assistant, a
superior–subordinate relationship between the debtor and the assistant is not neces-
sary. Furthermore, any person who is participating in the performance of the obliga-
tion or the exercise of the right, with the consent of the debtor, is an assistant.74 In the
‘piano’ example, even if a passer-by helps the employee to move the piano with the
consent of the debtor, he is considered to be an assistant. The consent of the debtor may
be express or implied. If the debtor does not give his consent to a third party to
participate in the performance of the obligation or to exercise the rights, then he is not
liable for the conduct of the third party.75 This is due to the fact that the third party
cannot be deemed to be an assistant. It should be noted that the managing boards of
legal entities are also not deemed to be assistants.76
The second condition required for the debtor’s liability for his assistants is that
the delegation of the performance of the obligation or the exercise of the rights
arising from the obligational relationship must not be contrary to the obligation.
Otherwise, the debtor will not be liable according to TCO art. 115; on the contrary,
his liability will be based on TCO art. 112.77 For example, a well-known architect
promises to design a project himself, without the use of assistants. If he acts
contrary to the agreement and makes use of assistants, he will be liable for
breaching the obligation.
73
von Tuhr and Escher (1974), § 70, I, 122; Tekinay et al. (1993), p. 892; O
p. 413; Eren (2015), p. 1073; Feyzio glu (1977), pp. 192–193.
74
von Tuhr and Escher (1974), § 70, II, 123; Becker (1941), art. 101, N. 9; Engel (1997), p. 740;
Oguzman and Öz (2015), pp. 414–415; Eren (2015), p. 1074.
75
76
guzman and Öz (2015), p. 417; Reiso glu (2014), p. 364.
77
22.5 Debtor’s Liability for Assistants 161
The third condition required for the debtor’s liability for assistants is that the
assistant must breach the debtor’s obligation and cause damage to the creditor.78 In
the ‘piano’ example, if the employees damage the piano while moving it, the debtor,
that is to say, the moving company, is liable for the damage. In the ‘rental car’
example, if the lessee’s spouse causes damage to the car while driving it, the lessee
is liable for this damage.
At this point, it should be noted that the conduct of the assistants must be
contrary to the obligation of the debtor. If not, the debtor is not liable.79 For
instance, in the ‘piano’ example, an employee of the moving company steals a
wallet from one of the virtuoso’s guests. In such a case, it is obvious that the
employee is liable for the theft, but the moving company is not liable. This is
because the moving company is not obliged to protect the assets or personal rights
of third parties, for example, the guests of the virtuoso.
The fourth condition required for the debtor’s liability for assistants is that it
must be the case that if the debtor had performed the obligation himself, he would
have been liable.80 The debtor’s liability for assistants does not require fault on the
part of either the debtor or the assistants.81 Furthermore, the debtor will not be
released from his liability even if he proves that he exercised all due care while
choosing (cura in eligendo), instructing (cura in instruendo) and supervising (cura
in custodiendo) his assistants.82 However, this does not mean that the debtor is
liable in every case. This is because the liability of the debtor is not based solely on
the fact that he used an assistant. Therefore, in the event that the damage arises from
the fault of a third party, from the fault of the creditor, from a force majeure (vis
major) or from a fortuitous event (casus fortuitus), the debtor may claim that if he
had performed the obligation himself, he would not have been liable and, conse-
quently, may be released from liability.83 For instance, in the ‘piano’ example, if
there is an earthquake while the employees move the piano and the stairs collapse
and, thus, the piano is destroyed, the debtor will not be liable for the damage
incurred.
The fifth condition required for the debtor’s liability for assistants is that there
must not be an agreement excluding liability of the debtor for the conduct of his
assistants. If there is such an agreement, the debtor will not be held liable.84 Indeed,
according to TCO art. 116 par. 2, the liability of the debtor for the assistants may be
78
Engel (1997), p. 742; O
guzman and Öz (2015), p. 419; Reiso glu (2014), p. 365; Tekinay et al.
(1993), p. 896; Eren (2015), p. 1079.
79
80
von Tuhr and Escher (1974), § 70, III, p. 129; Becker (1941), art. 101, N. 14; O
guzman and Öz
(2015), p. 422; Serozan (2014), p. 286, Cf. Thévenoz and Werro (2012), art. 101, N. 25–30.
81
Engel (1997), p. 743; O
guzman and Öz (2015), p. 422; Nomer (2015), p. 312.
82
von Tuhr and Escher (1974), § 70, I, p. 122; Engel (1997), pp. 743–744; O guzman and Öz
(2015), p. 422; Nomer (2015), p. 312; Tercier et al. (2016), pp. 391–392.
83
Engel (1997), p. 744; Nomer (2015), p. 312.
84
Tekinay et al. (1993), pp. 899–900; Eren (2015), p. 1085; O guzman and Öz (2015), p. 423;
Reisoglu (2014), pp. 366–367.
excluded wholly or partially in advance by an agreement. However, according to

TCO art. 116 par. 3, if a service or profession requires proficiency, which can only
be undertaken with the permission of competent authorities or the law, then any
agreement concluded in advance that purports to exclude the debtor’s liability for
the conduct of assistants is void.
In the event of the debtor being liable for the conduct of assistants, the creditor,
as a rule, is not entitled to demand that the assistants compensate the damage. This
is due to the fact that there is no contractual relationship between the creditor and
the assistants. However, if the assistants’ conduct, which breaches the debtor’s
obligation, constitutes a tort against the creditor, the latter may demand that the
assistants compensate for the damage, according to the provisions relating to tort
(TCO art. 49 ff ).85
If a debtor who is liable for his assistants’ conduct compensates the creditor’s
damage, he may have recourse to the assistants. In such a case, there are two
possibilities: (1) if there is an agreement between the debtor and the assistants and
the assistants’ conduct breaches this agreement, the debtor may have recourse to the
assistants based on this contractual relationship; (2) if there is no agreement
between the debtor and the assistants, then the debtor may have recourse to the
assistants provided that the latter’s conduct constitutes a tort against the creditor. In
such a case, according to TCO art. 62, in considering the apportionment of the
compensation among the people who are jointly and severally liable for the same
damage, the judge must take into consideration all the circumstances—particularly
the degree of fault attributed to each and the severity of the risk created by each.
22.6 Pre-contractual Liability (Culpa in Contrahendo)86
As analysed in the formation of the contract, the negotiating parties must protect
each other’s assets and personal rights.87 If one of the negotiating parties breaches
this duty of care, resulting from the principles of good faith (TCC art. 2), and the
other party suffers certain damage, the breaching party must compensate for the
injured party’s damage.
As a rule, in order for the breaching party to be liable for the other’s damage, he
must be at fault. However, if the breaching party’s legal position requires that he be
held liable without fault, then he must compensate the other party’s damage arising
from the contractual negotiations even if he is not at fault.
The breaching party’s pre-contractual liability does not require the conclusion of
the contract.88 In other words, even if negotiations between the parties do not result
85
von Tuhr and Escher (1974), § 70, V, p. 130; Oser and Sch€
onenberger (1929), art. 101, N. 13.
86
For further explanations see Yalman (2006).
87
See Sect. 1.10.
88
von Tuhr and Peter (1979), § 24, VII, p. 193.
22.6 Pre-contractual Liability (Culpa in Contrahendo) 163
in the formation of a contract or if the contract is void, the breaching party may still
be held liable.89 At this point, it is worth noting that if persons do not intend to
negotiate a contract, the fact that they are in social contact is not sufficient for the
principles of good faith to give rise to an obligation to protect each other’s assets
and personal rights.90
Since there is no specific rule for the pre-contractual liability of negotiating
parties in the Turkish Code of Obligations, the basis of this liability is contentious.
Certain scholars are of the opinion that the breaching party should be held liable in
accordance with the provisions relating to tort (TCO art. 49 ff).91 Other scholars
argue that the liability of the breaching party is based on the provisions pertaining to
non-performance of the obligation (TCO art. 112 ff).92 The latter opinion is to the
advantage of the party who has incurred the damage, especially with regard to the
period of limitation and the burden of proof. Indeed, in tort law, pursuant to TCO
art. 72 par. 1, the claim for compensation becomes time-barred after 2 years from
the date when the injured party has become aware of the damage and of the person
liable, but in any case, after 10 years from the date when the act causing the injury
occurred. However, the claim for damages resulting from a breach of contract
becomes time-barred after 10 years. Furthermore, if the bases of pre-contractual
liability are the provisions relating to tort, then the damaged party must prove that
the defendant is at fault (TCO art. 50 par. 1), whereas if the bases of pre-contractual
liability are the provisions pertaining to non-performance of an obligation, then the
injured party does not have to prove that the defendant is at fault (TCO art. 112).
Even if there is no specific provision governing pre-contractual liability (culpa in
contrahendo, fault in contracting) in the Turkish Code of Obligations,93 there are
certain provisions relating to this type of liability. For instance, TCO art. 35 states
that if the mistaken party is at fault and rescinds the contract because of the material
mistake, then he must compensate the other party’s damage resulting from the
rescission.94 Another example is TCO art. 47 par. 1 sent. 1, which states that if a
person attempts to conclude a contract in the name of another without the authority
of agency and the alleged principal does not ratify the contract, then the alleged
agent must compensate the third party’s damage resulting from the nullity of the
contract.95
89
Reisoglu (2014), p. 345; Oguzman and Öz (2015), p. 38; Tercier (2004), p. 125.
90
Oguzman and Öz (2015), pp. 39–40, Cf. Kocayusufpaşao glu (2014), pp. 10–11.
91
Kılıçoglu (2013), pp. 85–86; Oser and Sch€onenberger (1929), art. 26, art. 39.
92
Schwenzer (2009), p. 345; Tekinay et al. (1993), pp. 205, 979; Eren (2015), pp. 1131–1132;
Ergüne (2008), pp. 115–116; von Tuhr and Peter (1979), pp. 193, 318, 404; Serozan (2014),
pp. 252–255.
93
There is a specific rule in BGB relating to pre-contractual liability (See BGB § 311 subs. 2, 3).
94
See Sect. 11.1.5.
95
See Sect. 13.3.
References
Akman GS (1976) Sorumsuzluk anlaşması. Sulhi garan matbaası, İstanbul

Altınok Ormancı P (2016) Zararı azaltma külfeti. On iki levha, İstanbul
Aydıncık Ş (2013) Yapma borçlarının ifa edilmemesi ve hukuki sonuçları € ozellikle tbk m. 113/I
kapsamında nama ifa. Vedat, İstanbul
Başalp N (2011) Sorumsuzluk anlaşmaları. On iki levha, İstanbul
Başoglu B (2012) Türk hukukunda ve mukayeseli hukukta aynen ifa talebi. On iki levha, İstanbul
Baysal B (2012) Zarar g€ orenin kusuru (müterafik kusur). On iki levha, İstanbul
Eren F (1985) Sorumluluk hukuku açısından uygun illiyet ba gı teorisi. Ankara üniversitesi hukuk
fakültesi, Ankara
Ergüne MS (2008) Olumsuz zarar. Beta, İstanbul
Gauch P, Schluep WR, Emmenegger S (2008a) Schweizerisches Obligationenrecht, Allgemeiner
Gauch P, Schluep WR, Schmid J (2008b) Schweizerisches Obligationenrecht, Allgemeiner Teil,
vol 1. Schulthess, Zürich
Genç Arıdemir A (2008) S€ozleşmeye aykırılıktan do gan manevi tazminat. On iki levha, İstanbul
G€ozübüyük AP (1957) Hukuki mesuliyet bakımından mücbir sebepler ve beklenmeyen haller.
Kazancı, Ankara
Gündogdu F (2014) Borca aykırılık hallerinden kusurlu ifa imkânsızlı gı ve hukuki sonuçları. On
iki levha, İstanbul
Kuru B (2016) İstinaf sistemine g€ ore yazılmış icra ve iflas hukuku. Legal, İstanbul
Nomer HN (1996) Haksız fiil sorumlulu gunda maddi tazminatın belirlenmesi. Beta, İstanbul
Oguzman K, Seliçi Ö, Oktay Özdemir S (2016) Eşya hukuku. Filiz, İstanbul
Pekcanıtez H, Atalay O, Sungurtekin Özkan M, Özekes M (2013) İcra ve iflas hukuku. Yetkin,
Ankara
Şenocak Z (1995) Borçlunun ifa yardımcılarından dolayı sorumlulu gu. Dayınlarlı, Ankara
Steinauer PH (2002) Les droits réels, vol 2. Stämpfli, Bern
Tandogan H (1990) Borçlar hukuku € ozel borç ilişkileri, vol I/1. Evrim, İstanbul
Filiz, İstanbul
References 165
İstanbul
Tercier P (2003) Les contrats spéciaux. Schulthess, Zurich
Yalman S (2006) Türk-İsviçre hukukunda s€ ozleşme g€
orüşmelerinden do
gan sorumluluk. Seçkin,
Ankara
Yavuz C (2014) Türk borçlar hukuku € ozel hükümler. Beta, İstanbul
Chapter 23
Default of the Debtor
23.1 Requirements1
When an obligation becomes due, the fact that the debtor does not perform the
obligation creates a delay in performance of the obligation. As a general rule, a
delay in performance of the obligation does not automatically constitute the
debtor’s default2 by itself. According to TCO art. 117 par. 1, in order for a debtor
to fall into default, the obligation must be due, the debtor must fail to perform the
obligation and the creditor must give notice for performance.
Even if TCO art. 117 par. 1 seems not to require any other conditions for the
debtor to be in default, the following requirements must be met:3 (1) the obligation
must have fallen due. Since the creditor cannot demand the performance of the
obligation before it falls due, the debtor cannot be in default earlier than this.
(2) The debtor must have failed to perform the obligation; in other words, the
debtor must have been delayed in the performance of his obligation. (3) The
performance of the obligation must still be possible. As mentioned above, if the
performance of the obligation becomes impossible after the formation of the
contract, then the provisions pertaining to the default of the debtor cannot be
1
Aybay (2011), pp. 142–148; Becker (1941), art. 102–09; Berger (2012), pp. 570–595; Engel
(1997), pp. 684–696, 725–738; Eren (2015), pp. 1089–1128; Feyzio glu (1977), pp. 229–266;
Gauch et al. (2008), pp. 106–136; Honsell et al. (2003), Vorbemerkungen zu art. 102–109, art.
102–109; Kılıçoglu (2013), pp. 683–737; Nomer (2015), pp. 334–375; Oser and Sch€ onenberger
(1929), Vorbemerkungen zu art. 102–109, art. 102–109; O guzman and Öz (2015), pp. 455–467,
479–530; Reisoglu (2014), pp. 369–392; Schwenzer (2009), pp. 461–474; Serozan (2014),
pp. 216–246; Tekinay et al. (1993), pp. 911–972; Tercier (2004), pp. 230–240; Tercier et al.
(2016), pp. 399–420; Thévenoz and Werro (2012), art. 102–109, and von Tuhr and Escher (1974),
pp. 135–160.
2
Demeure du débiteur, Verzug des Schuldners.
3
Engel (1997), pp. 684–690; Thévenoz and Werro (2012), art. 102, N. 10–32; Eren (2015),
pp. 1092–1099; Oguzman and Öz (2015), pp. 456–465; Tekinay et al. (1993), pp. 911–919.

168 23 Default of the Debtor
applied. On the contrary, the provisions relating to the impossibility of perfor-

mance—i.e., the provisions concerning subsequent impossibility4—must be
applied. For example, a pianist is obliged to give a concert on a specific date—
e.g., during the opening ceremony of the Olympics. If she does not perform the
obligation on this date, it is obvious that the performance of the obligation becomes
impossible. Depending on the circumstances, she may be responsible for any
damage resulting from the impossibility of the obligation. (4) The creditor must
be able to accept performance of the obligation. If the creditor is not able or willing
to accept performance of the obligation, then the debtor cannot be in default. For
instance, in an alternative obligation, the parties agree that the right of choice
belongs to the creditor. If the creditor does not elect which obligation is to be
performed, the debtor cannot be in default. Finally, (5) the creditor must give notice
to the debtor demanding the performance of the obligation. A notice of default is a
notification given to a debtor stating that he must fulfil the obligation. The notice of
default comes into force when it reaches the debtor. As a rule, the validity of the
notice of default does not require any particular form. However, according to the
TComC art. 18 par. 3, notices of default between merchants must be made by means
of a formal notice from a notary, a registered letter, a telegram or a registered
electronic mail system using a secure electronic signature.5
In certain cases, the giving of notice of default is not necessary: (1) the parties
may determine the time of performance of the obligation by agreement or (2) one of
the parties may determine the time of performance using a right granted to him by
virtue of the parties’ agreement; in these cases, the relevant principle is dies
interpellat pro homine—that is to say, no express demand need be made as the
date acts as the demand—or (3) for a tortfeasor, or for a person acting in bad faith
who is unjustly enriched, giving a notice of default is not necessary. However, if the
unjustly enriched person acts in good faith, notice of default is nevertheless
necessary (TCO art. 117 par. 2).6
If giving a notice of default is necessary for the debtor’s default, he falls into
default when the notice reaches him. In the event that the date acts as the demand
(dies interpellat pro homine), the debtor falls into default as soon as the time of
performance has passed. The tortfeasor is in default when he commits the tortious
act. Further, a person unjustly enriched acting in bad faith is in default as of the time
of enrichment.
4
See Sect. 22.2.1.
5
It is worth noting that even if the creditor does not comply with this article, the claim for
performance may be valid and enforceable as these form requirements relate not to the validity
of the notification but to proof.
6
Oguzman and Öz (2015), p. 460; Nomer (2015), p. 339; Reiso
glu (2014), p. 372.
23.2 General Consequences 169
23.2 General Consequences
When the debtor is in default, the creditor may simply continue to demand specific
performance of the obligation. Indeed, a specific performance demand is the normal
consequence of the obligational relationship. The consequences of the debtor’s
default are as follows7: (1) the creditor may demand compensation for damage
resulting from the debtor’s default (TCO art. 118), and (2) the debtor is liable for
force majeure or fortuitous events that occur following his default (TCO art. 119).
23.2.1 Compensation for Damage
As mentioned above, where the debtor’s default results in certain damage, the
creditor may demand that the debtor compensate for the damage (TCO art. 118).
The creditor must prove both the existence and the extent of the damage. If he fails
to prove the exact amount of the damage, the extent of liability of the debtor will be
determined in accordance with the provisions relating to tort liability. This is
because TCO art. 114 par. 2 states that the rules relating to tort liability8 apply by
analogy to cases of breach of contract. Therefore, according to TCO art. 50 par. 2, if
the exact amount of the damage is not proven, it is determined by the court at its
discretion; the court must take into consideration the ordinary course of events and
the mitigating measures taken by the creditor.
The default of the debtor does not require that the debtor be at fault.9 Neverthe-
less, where the debtor is not at fault in falling into default, then he is not liable to pay
damages (TCO art. 118 par. 1). It is worth remembering that, as a rule, the debtor is
presumed to be at fault, but he may refute this presumption of fault (TCO art.
112).10 However, if the debtor cannot prove that he is not at fault, he must
compensate for the creditor’s damage resulting from his default.11
Such damage is referred to as positive damage, and this includes both actual
damage (damnum emergens) and the loss of opportunity to obtain a benefit (lucrum
cessans) and avoid a loss.12 For instance, a lessor is obliged to lease a car to a travel
agency, and the travel agency is obliged to pay a lease fee of €400 per day. If the car
is not delivered on the due date and the travel agency is required to lease another car
7
Tekinay et al. (1993), pp. 920–929; O
guzman and Öz (2015), pp. 480–485; Tercier et al. (2016),
pp. 405–406.
8
For further explanations see Nomer (1996).
9
von Tuhr and Escher (1974), § 72, V, p. 141; Feyzio glu (1977), p. 241; Tekinay et al. (1993),
p. 919; Oguzman and Öz (2015), pp. 465–466; Eren (2015), pp. 1098–1099; Nomer (2015), p. 340.
10
See Sect. 22.2.3.2.2.
11
Eren (2015), p. 1102; Oguzman and Öz (2015), p. 482; Reisoglu (2014), p. 374.
12
Becker (1941), art. 103, N. 14 ff.; Feyzio
glu (1977), p. 243; Tekinay et al. (1993), p. 925;
Oguzman and Öz (2015), pp. 480–481; Eren (2015), pp. 1103–1104.
from a rental company for €500 per day, then the difference between the two rates is
the quantum of the lessee’s damage, and this is referred to as actual damage.
Furthermore, the travel agency subleases the car to a tourist for €600 per day for
one week. Thus, it expects to obtain a profit of €200 per day and €1400 in total. In
addition, there is a penalty clause13 in the agreement that states that in the event of
the travel agency failing to deliver the car, it will pay €1000. Due to the lessor’s
default, the travel agency is not able to deliver the car to the sublessee. Conse-
quently, the travel agency pays a penalty of €1000 (actual damage) to the sublessee
and, in addition, is deprived of the opportunity to obtain a profit of €1400 (loss of
profit). The lessor must compensate this damage resulting from his default. How-
ever, the lessor is discharged from this liability if he can prove that the delay is, in
no respect, his fault.
23.2.2 Liability for Force Majeure and Fortuitous Events
The second consequence of the debtor’s default is liability for any accidents that
occur following the default. The debtor is discharged from this liability by proving
that (1) he is not at fault in falling into default or (2) even if he had performed the
obligation in a timely manner, the accident would have affected the subject matter
of the obligation (TCO art. 119).14
For instance, a car repair company is obliged to fix a car, and the parties set the
specific date by which the car is to be repaired and delivered. However, the debtor
fails to fix the car and deliver it in the required time and, thus, falls into default
(TCO art. 117 par. 2). Afterwards, the car is completely destroyed in a fire that
arises from a lightning strike while in the possession of the defaulting debtor. In this
case, even if the fire is not the fault of the debtor, he is nevertheless liable for the
damage suffered by the car owner. However, where the debtor proves that he is not
at fault15 for falling into default or that punctual performance would not have
prevented the car from being burned in the same fire,16 then he is released from
this liability.
13
See Sect. 31.3.2.
14
Tekinay et al. (1993), pp. 927–928; O guzman and Öz (2015), pp. 483–485; Eren (2015),
pp. 1105–1106; Nomer (2015), p. 346.
15
See Sect. 22.2.3.2.2.
16
Becker (1941), art. 103, N. 22; Oser and Sch€
onenberger (1929), art. 103, N. 12; Tekinay et al.
(1993), p. 928; Oguzman and Öz (2015), p. 485. See on the contrary, von Tuhr and Escher (1974),
§ 73, I, pp. 145–146 fn. 18; Thévenoz and Werro (2012), art. 104, N. 14; Eren (2015), p. 1106.
23.3 Consequences In Pecuniary Obligations 171
23.3 Consequences In Pecuniary Obligations
23.3.1 Interest for Default
The first consequence of the debtor’s default concerning pecuniary obligations is

that the creditor may demand that the debtor pay default interest.17 The debtor may
not be discharged from the payment of default interest even if he is not at fault in his
default.18 Further, for the payment of default interest, the creditor’s damage is
irrelevant—i.e., the default interest must be paid even if the creditor has not
incurred any damage. In other words, the creditor does not have to prove his
damage.19
23.3.2 Contractual Default Interest Rate
The parties may determine the default interest rate. However, in non-commercial
affairs, the annual default interest rate determined by the parties may not exceed
twice the amount of the legal interest rate (TCO art. 120 par. 2). Since the legal
interest rate for non-commercial affairs is 9% per annum,20 the parties may
determine the default interest rate as up to but not more than 18% per annum.21
It is worth noting that pursuant to TComC art. 8 par. 1, in commercial affairs, the
parties are free to determine the default interest rate, provided that this rate is not
immoral and is not contrary to the provisions protecting personal rights (TCO art.
27 par. 1 and TCC art. 23).22
23.3.3 Legal Default Interest Rate
In the event of the parties failing to determine the default interest rate, it is
determined according to the legislation at the time that the liability for the default
interest arises (TCO art. 120 par. 1).
17
For further explanations see Öçal (1965), Barlas (1992), Helvacı (2000).
18
von Tuhr and Escher (1974), § 73, II, p. 146; Thévenoz and Werro (2012), art. 104, N. 4; Eren
(2015), p. 1100; Oguzman and Öz (2015), p. 486; Serozan (2014), p. 224.
19
von Tuhr and Escher (1974), § 73, II, p. 146; Thévenoz and Werro (2012), art. 104, N. 4; Eren
(2015), p. 1100; Oguzman and Öz (2015), p. 486; Tekinay et al. (1993), p. 930; Reiso
glu (2014),
p. 376; Tercier et al. (2016), p. 406.
20
See Sect. 15.7.4.
21
22
According to LIA art. 2 par. 1, the legal default interest rate is determined
according to the capital interest rate indicated in LIA art. 1. Since the legal capital
interest rate is 9% per annum,23 according to this article, the legal rate of the default
interest is also 9% per annum, but only in non-commercial affairs.24
As to commercial affairs, if the interest rate for short-term advances set by the
Turkish Central Bank on 31 December of the preceding year is higher than the rate
indicated in LIA art. 1—e.g., 9% per annum, then, even if there is no contractual
relationship between the parties, the creditor may demand that this higher rate be
applied. If there is a difference of five or more points between the said advance
interest rate set on 31 December of the preceding year and the advance interest rate
set on 30 June, then the latter is applied for the second part of the year (LIA art.
2 par. 2).25
It should be noted that even if the parties do not determine the default interest
rate, they may determine the capital interest rate. Should the capital interest rate be
higher than the default interest rate as determined with regard to LIA art. 2 par.
1 and par. 2, then the default interest rate cannot be lower than the capital interest
rate (LIA art. 2 par. 3). This principle is applicable in both commercial and
non-commercial affairs. Indeed, TCO art. 120 par. 3 supports this view. According
to the said article, if the parties have not determined the default interest rate, but
they have determined the capital interest rate, and the capital interest rate is higher
than the legal default interest rate, then the contractual capital interest rate applies
as the default interest rate.26
The rules explained above also apply to pecuniary obligations in foreign cur-
rency. However, the legal default interest rate will be equivalent to the maximum
interest rate that the state banks pay on a term deposit account opened in the
relevant foreign currency with a one-year maturity (compare to LIA art. 4 a).
23.3.4 Legal Nature
A default interest debt is an ancillary right of a principal pecuniary obligation. Thus,

a default interest debt requires the existence of a principal pecuniary obligation.
Consequently, if the principal pecuniary obligation is extinguished, the default
interest debt will also be extinguished.27 Where the debtor has paid the pecuniary
obligation, then the default interest debt can only be claimed if such a right is
reserved in the contract or is reserved by the creditor’s notification, which must be
made by the date of performance, or if such a reservation is inferred from the
circumstances (TCO art. 131 par. 2).
23
See Sect. 15.7.4.
24
Reisoglu (2014), p. 375; Oguzman and Öz (2015), pp. 487–488; Nomer (2015), p. 354.
25
Oguzman and Öz (2015), pp. 488–489; Nomer (2015), p. 354; Reiso glu (2014), p. 375.
26
Tercier et al. (2016), p. 407; O
27
23.3 Consequences In Pecuniary Obligations 173
Although the default interest debt is an ancillary right of the principal pecuniary
obligation, a claim relating to the former may be assigned or sued upon indepen-
dently of the latter.28
23.3.5 In Case of Interest, Annuities and Gifts
Where a debtor does not fulfil a pecuniary obligation, the creditor is entitled to
demand that the debtor pay default interest. In principle, on the demand of the
creditor, the debtor must pay default interest from the time when he falls into
default until the pecuniary obligation is discharged or extinguished.29
However, in certain cases, the creditor may only demand interest from the day
that enforcement proceedings were initiated or the lawsuit was filed. Pursuant to
TCO art. 121 par. 1, where a debtor is in default with the payment of interest,
pension or donated sum, he need only pay default interest commencing from the
date on which the enforcement is initiated or the lawsuit is filed. An agreement that
is contrary to the said article is subject to the provisions concerning penalties (TCO
art. 121 par. 2). Thus, if a penalty is considered to be excessively high by a judge, it
may be reduced at the judge’s discretion ex officio (TCO art. 182 par. 3).30
It should be noted that compound interest (default interest charged on accrued
default interest) is prohibited (TCO art. 121 par. 3).
23.3.6 Further Damage31
In certain cases, default interest is not sufficient for the reparation of the creditor’s
damage. In other words, the creditor’s damage is higher than the default interest
paid by the debtor. In these cases, the creditor may demand that the debtor
compensate the damage that is not satisfied by the payment of the default interest.
For any demand relating to additional damage to be accepted, the creditor must
prove that such damage was actually incurred.32 However, if the debtor proves that
there is no fault on his part,33 then he is released from the demand to pay
compensation for the creditor’s further damage (TCO art. 122 par. 1).34
28
Oguzman and Öz (2015), p. 494; Nomer (2015), pp. 283–284; Eren (2015), p. 1102.
29
von Tuhr and Escher (1974), § 73, fn. 23, p. 146; Becker (1941), art. 104, N. 7; Engel (1997),
p. 692; Oguzman and Öz (2015), p. 492; Reiso glu (2014), p. 376.
30
Oguzman and Öz (2015), p. 492; Eren (2015), p. 1101; Reiso glu (2014), p. 377.
31
For further explanations see Domaniç (1993), Ayrancı (2006).
32
Engel (1997), p. 694; Thévenoz and Werro (2012), art. 106, N. 6; O guzman and Öz (2015),
p. 495; Eren (2015), p. 1108; Tercier et al. (2016), p. 408; Feyzio
glu (1977), p. 252.
33
See Sect. 22.2.3.2.2.
34
Engel (1997), p. 694; Eren (2015), p. 1108.
If the additional damage can be determined in advance in a pending lawsuit,

then, upon demand by the creditor, the court may award the quantum of the
additional damage in its judgment for payment of the principal claim (TCO art.
122 par. 2).
23.4 Consequences In Bilateral Contracts
23.4.1 General
As a general rule, a creditor may demand performance of an obligation as long as

performance is possible. This demand is a natural consequence of the obligational
relationship (contract). The default of a debtor has two general consequences:
(1) the creditor may demand compensation for damage resulting from the debtor’s
default (TCO art. 118), and (2) the debtor is liable for any force majeure or
fortuitous events subsequent to the default (TCO art. 119).
Where bilateral contracts are concerned, the Turkish Code of Obligations grants
particular rights to the creditor, which will be considered in this section. In order for
the creditor to exercise these rights, he must grant a certain period of time to the
defaulting debtor, and this period of time must be reasonable. Furthermore, the
creditor may demand that the court determine this period of time (TCO art. 123). In
the latter case, the court decision precludes prospective disputes relating to the
reasonableness of the period of time.35
In certain cases, the creditor is not obliged to grant a period of grace to the debtor
for performance. Pursuant to TCO art. 124, granting a period of time is not
necessary in the following cases: (1) if it is inferred from the circumstances or
from the conduct of the debtor that granting a period of grace would be futile—e.g.,
if the debtor declares that he will not perform his obligation36; (2) if the perfor-
mance of the obligation has become meaningless for the creditor due to the default
of the debtor—e.g., a mother orders a birthday cake for her daughter’s birthday and
prepares a big celebration party but the baker does not deliver the cake on time37;
and (3) if it is inferred from the contract that performance is no longer acceptable
for the creditor after a fixed time or after a certain period of time—e.g., in a contract
pertaining to a specific machine, the machine is to be delivered on a precise date and
35
Oguzman and Öz (2015), p. 502; Eren (2015), p. 1111; Reisoglu (2014), p. 384.
36
von Tuhr and Escher (1974), § 73, IV, 1, p. 150; Becker (1941), art. 108, N. 3; Engel (1997),
p. 729; Thévenoz and Werro (2012), art. 108, N. 4–5; O guzman and Öz (2015), p. 523; Tekinay
et al. (1993), p. 950; Serozan (2014), p. 230.
37
von Tuhr and Escher (1974), § 73, IV, 2, pp. 150–151; Engel (1997), p. 730; Thévenoz and
Werro (2012), art. 108, N. 6–8; Becker (1941), art. 106, N. 8; O guzman and Öz (2015), p. 523;
Tekinay et al. (1993), p. 950; Eren (2015), p. 1113; Feyzio
glu (1977), p. 257.
23.4 Consequences In Bilateral Contracts 175
the parties agree that late performance will not be acceptable. In that case, the
debtor may not deliver it after the due date.38
If the debtor fulfils his obligation by the end of the granted period of time, the
obligation is extinguished by performance. Where the debtor fails to fulfil his obliga-
tion by the end of this period of time or where it is not necessary to grant a period of
time to the debtor, the creditor may exercise one of two additional rights arising from
TCO art. 125. These rights will be analysed in the following paragraphs. At this point,
it should be noted that, as a rule, the creditor may have these additional rights only
when the debtor’s default relates to his primary obligations (main duty). For instance,
in a sale contract, the primary obligation (main duty) of the seller is to transfer
ownership of the subject matter of the contract to the buyer. The seller may also be
under certain subsidiary obligations (subsidiary duties), along with the primary obli-
gation, such as packing the goods or giving necessary information or instructions for
their proper use. In such a case, if the debtor’s default relates to his primary obligation,
that is to say the transfer of ownership, then the creditor may have these additional
rights, whereas if the debtor’s default relates to his subsidiary obligations, such as
giving necessary information, then the creditor may not have these additional rights.39
23.4.2 Additional Alternative Rights
According to TCO art. 125 par. 2, if a creditor waives the right to specific performance
and compensation for damage arising from the debtor’s default, then the creditor may,
in lieu thereof, demand compensation for damage for non-performance of the obliga-
tion40 or may withdraw from the contract (ex tunc). If the creditor intends to exercise
these rights, he must declare his intention immediately.41
23.4.2.1 Right to Compensation
If the creditor intends to demand compensation for damage arising from

non-performance of the obligation, then he must give notice of this intention to
the debtor. As a rule, this notification does not require a form, and this right may be
exercised orally or in writing. Nevertheless, in certain cases, T.Com.C art. 18 par.
38
Engel (1997), pp. 730–731; Thévenoz and Werro (2012), art. 108, N. 9–14; O guzman and Öz
(2015), p. 524; Tekinay et al. (1993), p. 952; Eren (2015), p. 1114; Serozan (2014), p. 231; Nomer
(2015), p. 364; von Tuhr and Escher (1974), § 73, IV, 3, p. 151.
39
Oguzman and Öz (2015), p. 499. However, where the non-performance of a subsidiary obliga-
tion is so fundamental that performance of the main obligation cannot be performed as required, in
those circumstances the creditor may rely on these alternative rights.
40
For further explanations see Havutçu (1995).
41
Engel (1997), p. 732; Thévenoz and Werro (2012), art. 107, N. 17; Tercier et al. (2016), p. 411;
3 requires a specific form for this notification. Pursuant to this article, between
merchants, the demand for compensation for damage must be notified through a
notary public or in a registered letter or in a telegram or through a registered
electronic mail system using a secured electronic signature.42
When the creditor demands compensation for damage arising from
non-performance of the obligation, the debtor must pay compensation for this
damage unless he proves that he is not at fault43 in respect of the default (TCO
art. 112).
In the event of the creditor demanding compensation for damage resulting from
non-performance of the obligation, as a rule, he must still perform his own
obligation. However, according to the difference theory (Differenztheorie),44 the
creditor will be released from his obligation. Assume, for example, a contract under
which H is obliged to transfer ownership of immovable property to C, and in return
C is obliged to transfer ownership of a car to H. However, H does not perform his
obligation in due time determined by the agreement of the parties, and thus, he falls
into default (TCO art. 117 par. 2). C grants a period of time in order for H to
perform his obligation (TCO art. 123). But when the period of time has passed, H
has still not transferred ownership to C. Subsequently, C wishes to claim compen-
sation for the non-performance of the obligation. In such a case, his obligation to
transfer the car to H stands. However, certain scholars argue that C does not have to
transfer ownership of the car to H and, being released from the obligation, C may
demand the difference in value between the two acts (prestations).45 For instance, if
the value of the immovable property is €100,000 and the value of the car is €80,000,
C may demand that H pay €20,000.
23.4.2.2 Right to Withdraw
As mentioned above, the creditor also has the right to withdraw from the contract.46
If the debtor does not perform his obligation by the end of the granted time period or
in cases where granting an additional period of time is not necessary, the creditor
may withdraw from the contract (ex tunc).47 In such a case, the creditor must give
notice of this intention immediately.48
The creditor’s notification relating to withdrawal does not require a specific
form. As a rule, he may exercise this right orally or in writing. Nevertheless, in
42
It is worth noting that even if the creditor does not comply with this article, the claim for
compensation may be valid and enforceable as these form requirements relate not to the validity of
the notification but to proof.
43
See Sect. 22.2.3.2.2.
44
Oguzman and Öz (2015), p. 391 ff.; Eren (2015), p. 1068; Tekinay et al. (1993), pp. 869–870.
45
46
For further explanations see Buz (1998), Serozan (2007).
47
ucktritt).
48
23.4 Consequences In Bilateral Contracts 177
certain cases, T.Com.C art. 18 par. 3 requires a specific form. Pursuant to this
article, between merchants, the declaration of withdrawal must be notified through
a notary public or in a registered letter or in a telegram or through a registered
electronic mail system using a secured electronic signature.49
Where a creditor withdraws from the contract, as a rule, the contract is
extinguished ex tunc, which is to say, from the date of the formation of the contract.
Indeed, in a contract in which obligations are to be performed at one time (‘instan-
taneous’ contracts), such as a sale contract, the contract is extinguished as though it
had never come into existence. Therefore, both parties are reciprocally released
from their responsibilities to perform their obligations and must restitute the acts
(prestations) received under the contract (TCO art. 125 par. 3 sent. 1). For instance,
if the creditor performs his obligation under the contract by, say, paying the price of
the counter-act (counter-prestation) and withdraws from the contract, then he may
demand restitution of the money paid. In other words, the debtor must reimburse the
money received under the contract.
In cases where a creditor withdraws from the contract (ex tunc), he may incur
damage due to the withdrawal. This is referred to as negative damage.50 That is to
say, the creditor may demand compensation for damage that he would not have
incurred if the contract had not been formed, such as expenses paid towards the
conclusion of the contract. When the creditor demands compensation for damage
arising out of withdrawal from the contract, the debtor must pay these damages
unless he proves that the default is not his fault51 (TCO art. 125 par. 3 sent. 2).
It should be noted that negative damage does not only consist of the expenses
incurred in the course of the formation of the contract.52 Another example of
negative damage is the expenses incurred by the creditor in the expectation that
the obligation would be performed. For instance, the creditor rents a warehouse for
a machine to be delivered under a contract but subsequently withdraws from said
contract upon default by the debtor. In this case, the rent paid for the warehouse is
an example of negative damage. A second example is when the creditor is deprived
of an opportunity to benefit from another contract offer. For example, the buyer
buys a car for €10,000, but the seller does not deliver it. At the same time, another
seller offers a similar car for €12,000. The buyer refuses this offer, believing that
the first seller would transfer ownership of the car. Afterwards, the first seller falls
into default, and the buyer, withdrawing from the sale contract, is forced to enter
into a contract with the second seller. However, the second seller has already sold
the car to a third party, and the buyer must now pay €14,000 to purchase a similar
49
It is worth noting that even if the creditor does not comply with this article, the declaration of
withdrawal may be valid as these form requirements relate not to the validity of the notification but
to proof.
50
For further explanations see Ergüne (2008).
51
See Sect. 22.2.3.2.2.
52
von Tuhr and Escher (1974), § 73, VII, p. 156; Becker (1941), art. 109, N. 9; Engel (1997),
pp. 734–736; Thévenoz and Werro (2012), art. 109, N. 14; Nomer (2015), pp. 373–374; Reiso glu
(2014), pp. 390–391.
car from a third seller. In this case, the difference of €2000 between the prices of the
second and third offers constitutes an example of negative damage.53
As to contracts in which obligations are to be performed over a period of time—
i.e., continuing contracts—the creditor is not entitled to terminate the contract
retroactively, but he may terminate it ex nunc;54 in other words, he may terminate
it from the moment that the notification of termination reaches the debtor.55 TCO
art. 126 states that in continuing contracts, on condition that the parties have already
begun to perform the obligations, if the debtor is in default, then the creditor may
demand performance of the obligation and compensation for damage resulting from
default by the debtor. Further, he may, contemporaneously with terminating the
contract, demand compensation for damage arising from early (premature) termi-
nation of the contract.
23.4.3 Certain Specific Provisions
The legislature has set certain specific provisions regarding the debtor’s default in
relation to certain types of contract. In the following paragraphs, only the specific
provisions relating to the default of a seller or buyer in the sale of movable property
are analysed.
According to TCO art. 212 par. 1, in the event that a seller falls into default, the
general provisions relating to the default of the debtor will apply. However, in
commercial sale contracts, if the parties determine a period of time for the transfer
of possession of the goods sold and the seller falls into default, it is assumed that the
buyer renounces delivery and claims compensation for the damage arising out of
non-performance (TCO art. 212 par. 2). Where the buyer intends to demand
delivery, he must notify the seller of this demand immediately after the expiration
of the agreed period of time (TCO art. 212 par. 3).
Pursuant to TCO art. 235, if a buyer falls into default in cases where the sold
goods are to be delivered after or at the time of payment, the seller may withdraw
from the sale contract without further formality, provided that the seller immedi-
ately notifies the buyer of this intention. Where the goods have passed to the
possession of the buyer prior to payment, the buyer’s default does not entitle the
seller to withdraw from the contract and to claim the return of the goods, unless he
has explicitly reserved such a right in the contract.
53
54
undigung).
55
For further explanations see Seliçi (1977).
References 179
References

Ayrancı H (2006) Türk borçlar hukukunda munzam zarar, bk.m.105. Yetkin, Ankara
Barlas N (1992) Para borçlarının ifasında borçlunun temerrüdü ve bu temerrüt açısından
düzenlenen genel sonuçlar. İstanbul
Buz V (1998) Borçlunun temerrüdünde s€ ozleşmeden d€onme. Yetkin, Ankara
Domaniç H (1993) Faizle karşılanamayan zararların giderilmesini sa glayan bk. 105 ve di ger
hükümler. Beta, İstanbul
Ergüne MS (2008) Olumsuz zarar. Beta, İstanbul
Havutçu A (1995) Tam iki tarafa borç yükleyen s€ ozleşmelerde temerrüt ve müsbet zararın tazmini.
İzmir
Helvacı M (2000) Para borçlarında faiz kavramı. Beta, İstanbul
Nomer HN (1996) Haksız fiil sorumlulu gunda maddi tazminatın belirlenmesi. Beta, İstanbul
Öçal A (1965) Türk hususi hukukunda gecikme faizi. Eskişehir iktisadi ve ticari ilimler akademisi,
İstanbul
Seliçi Ö (1977) Borçlar kanununa g€ ore s€
ozleşmeden do gan sürekli borç ilişkilerinin sona ermesi.
İstanbul üniversitesi, İstanbul
Serozan R (2007) S€ozleşmeden d€ onme. Vedat, İstanbul
Filiz, İstanbul
İstanbul
Chapter 24
Effects of the Obligation on Third Parties
24.1 Privity of the Obligational Relationship1
24.1.1 General
An obligational relationship is a legal bond (vinculum iuris) solely between a debtor

and a creditor. Thus, as a general rule, an obligational relationship may not give
rights to third parties.2 This principle is referred to as privity of the obligational
relationship.
The first consequence of this principle is that third parties are not entitled to
demand performance of the obligation.3 However, in certain cases, the legislature
allows a third party to demand performance of the obligation (TCO art. 129).
The second consequence of the said principle is that third parties are not obliged
to perform the obligation and are not liable for the non- or improper performance of
the obligation. For instance, a seller S is obliged to transfer ownership of a chattel to
a buyer B, but S breaches his obligation and transfers ownership of the subject
matter of the sale contract to a third party. In this case, B does not have any rights
1
Antalya (2012), p. 138; Aybay (2011), pp. 10–12, 149–151; Becker (1941), art. 110–113; Berger
(2012), pp. 25, 802–811, 826–836; Engel (1997), pp. 10, 417–436, 613–615; Eren (2015),
pp. 52–56, 1141–1160; Feyzio glu (1976), pp. 22–23; Feyzio glu (1977), pp. 267–291; Gauch
et al. (2008), pp. 324–339; Honsell et al. (2003), art. 110–113; Kocayusufpaşao glu (2014),
pp. 15–26; Kılıçoglu (2013), pp. 564–587; Nomer (2015), pp. 14–24, 411–417; Oser
and Sch€onenberger (1929), Vorbemerkungen zum dritten Abschnitt (art. 110–113), art.
110–113; Oguzman and Öz (2015), pp. 21–23, 27–29; O guzman and Öz (2016), pp. 411–458;
Reisoglu (2014), pp. 34–36, 394–402; Schwenzer (2009), pp. 22–25, 535–546; Serozan (2014),
pp. 28–31; Tekinay et al. (1993), pp. 60, 208–239; Tercier (2004), pp. 188–191, 245–246; Tercier
et al. (2016), pp. 42–44, 328–332, 426–427; Thévenoz and Werro (2012), art. 110–113, and von
Tuhr and Escher (1974), pp. 28–32, 236–254.
2
von Tuhr and Peter (1979), § 2, p. 9; Engel (1997), p. 10; Kocayusufpaşaoglu (2014), p. 18.
3
Tercier (2004), p. 38; Tercier et al. (2016), p. 43; O

182 24 Effects of the Obligation on Third Parties
against the third party. In the same example, assume that after the formation of the
contract between S and B, but before B becomes the owner, a third party causes
damage to the subject matter of the contract. In this case, B is not entitled to demand
any compensation from the third party.4 At this point, it should be noted that, if the
third party buys the object aiming to cause damage to B in an immoral manner
(contra bonos mores), then he is liable to compensate for B’s damage (TCO art.
49 par. 2).5
The third consequence of the aforementioned principle is that if the debtor does
not perform the obligation at all or as required, he is only obliged to compensate for
the creditor’s damage, even if the third party has also incurred damage.6 For
instance, a yacht contractor C is obliged to construct and deliver a yacht to a
buyer B. There is a contract between C and E according to which E must deliver
the yacht’s engines. In addition, the buyer B enters into a lease contract with
L. However, E does not deliver the engines in due time. Subsequently, C is not
able to deliver the yacht to B in due time. As a result, B is not able to fulfil the lease
contract, and thus, the lessee L is forced to lease another yacht, for which the rental
fee is higher than that of B. In this case, even though L’s damage arises from E’s late
performance, it is not possible for L to demand compensation for his damage
directly from E. This is due to the fact that there is no contractual relationship
between L and E.
However, where the debtor’s non- or improper performance constitutes a tort
against a third party, the latter, even if he is not entitled to demand compensation
from the debtor based on the obligational relationship between the debtor and the
creditor, may demand compensation based on tort.7 For example, a yacht owner O
leases his yacht to a lessee L, and during the lease contract, L enters into a mooring
contract with the manager of a marina, M. The employees of M, in performing their
duties, cause damage to the yacht. In this case, even if there is no contractual
relationship between O and M, O may nevertheless demand that M compensate for
the damage. Since M owes a duty of care in tort with regard to his employees’
conduct, he is liable to pay damages for their unlawful actions (TCO art. 66 par. 1).8
It should be noted that M can be released from this liability if he can prove that he
exercised all due care (cura in eligendo, cura in instruendo, cura in custodiendo) to
prevent the damage or that the damage would have occurred regardless of his
precautions (TCO art. 66 par. 2).9
4
Kocayusufpaşaoglu (2014), p. 16; Feyzioglu (1976), p. 23; O
(2015), p. 54.
5
Oser and Sch€onenberger (1929), art. 41, N. 99; Kocayusufpaşao glu (2014), p. 17; O
guzman and
Öz (2015), p. 21; Nomer (2015), p. 15; Eren (2015), p. 55. For further explanations see
Kapancı (2016).
6
Oguzman and Öz (2015), pp. 21–22.
7
Oguzman and Öz (2015), pp. 21–22.
8
For further explanations see Reisoglu (1958).
9
Thévenoz and Werro (2012), art. 55, N. 17 ff; Engel (1997), pp. 537–538.
24.1 Privity of the Obligational Relationship 183
24.1.2 Exceptions
24.1.2.1 Annotation of Personal Rights in the Land Register
The legislature allows for only a limited number (numerus clausus) of personal
rights (rights in personam) to be noted in the land register.10 By the annotation of
these personal rights, they become enforceable as against holders of any right
subsequently acquired over the land.11 For instance, a landowner enters into a
lease contract with a lessee but subsequently transfers ownership of this land to a
third party. In such a case, due to the privity of the contractual relationship, it is
apparent that the lessee is not entitled to demand that the new owner be bound by
the lease contract. However, according to TCO art. 312, the right of the lessee may
be noted in the land register. In the above-mentioned example, had the right of the
lessee been noted, the new owner would have been bound by the lease contract.
The following examples may also be given for rights that can be noted in the
land register12: a pre-contract for the sale of real estate (TCC art. 1009), a donor’s
right of reversion (TCO art. 292 par. 2), an agreement providing for the advance-
ment in rank of a mortgagee (TCC art. 871 par. 3), a construction agreement in
return for a land share (TCC art. 1009), a usufructuary lease (TCO art. 358), a right
of emption (TCC art. 736), a right of pre-emption resulting from a contract (TCC
art. 735) and a right of repurchase (TCC art. 736).
24.1.2.2 Contracts with the Effect of Protecting Third Parties13
As mentioned above, since the obligational relationship exists between the debtor
and the creditor, even if the debtor’s non- or improper performance causes damage
to a third party, the latter is not entitled to demand that the debtor compensate for
this damage according to the provisions relating to non- or improper performance of
the obligation (TCO art. 112).
However, certain scholars are of the opinion that third parties who are proximate
to the performance of the obligation should be entitled to demand that the debtor
compensate for their damage according to the provisions relating to non- or
improper performance of the obligation.14 This is because, according to the prin-
ciples of good faith (TCC art. 2), the debtor is obliged to protect the creditor and
third parties who are proximate to the performance of the obligation. In other
10
For further explanations see Sungurbey (1963), Gümüş (2003).
11
Steinauer (2007), p. 280; O guzman et al. (2016), pp. 249–251; Nomer and Ergüne (2016),
pp. 131–137; Oguzman and Öz (2015), pp. 27–29.
12
For further explanations see Oguzman et al. (2016), pp. 213–216; Nomer and Ergüne (2016),
pp. 129–130.
13
For further explanations see Karaba
g Bulut (2009).
14
Eren (2015), p. 1152; Kocayusufpaşao
glu (2014), pp. 20–21.
words, according to TCC art. 2, there is an obligational relationship between the

debtor and third parties whose rights may be jeopardised by the performance of the
obligation.15 Indeed, if, by the nature of the obligational relationship, the risks
relating to performance affect third parties as much as they affect the creditor, then
the former should be able to sue the debtor according to the provisions relating to
non- or improper performance of the obligation. For instance, a woman gets into a
taxi with her three-year-old daughter. Subsequently, the taxi driver is at fault in an
accident in which the mother and daughter are injured. In this case, the injured
woman may demand that the taxi driver compensate her for damage, according to
the provisions relating to non- or improper performance of the obligation (TCO art.
112). This is because there is a contractual relationship between the woman and the
taxi driver. However, the three-year-old is not in a contractual relationship with the
taxi driver. Despite this fact, certain scholars argue that the three-year-old may also
demand compensation for damage, based on the same provisions.16
Another example is as follows: a seller installs a machine in a factory but,
contrary to his obligations, does not give instructions on how it is to be used.
Subsequently, a factory worker is injured due to the lack of instructions. In this
case, despite the fact that there is no contractual obligational relationship between
the seller and the factory worker, the latter is, according to the above-mentioned
scholars’ opinion, entitled to demand compensation for damage based on the pro-
visions relating to non -or improper performance of the obligation. Nevertheless, in
this example, if the injured third party is a visitor of the factory worker, then he is
not entitled to demand compensation for damage from the seller. This is because the
visitor is not sufficiently proximate to the performance of the obligation.
As mentioned above, a contract for the benefit of third parties is one of the most
common exceptions to the principle of privity of the obligational relationship.
Other exceptions are subrogation, assignment of claim and assumption of debt.
Due to their importance, these concepts are individually analysed.17
24.2 Subrogation18
24.2.1 Requirements
In cases where the debtor’s personal skills are not important for the creditor, such as
in a pecuniary obligation, then the obligation may be performed by a third party.19
15
Oguzman and Öz (2015), p. 39; O guzman and Öz (2016), pp. 443–445. For further explanations
16
Serozan (2014), pp. 246–247; O guzman and Öz (2016), pp. 443–445; Eren (2015), p. 1058.
17
See Sect. 24.4, Chaps. 32 and 33.
18
For further explanations see Kılıço
glu (1979).
19
Becker (1941), art. 68, N. 4; O
24.2 Subrogation 185
As a rule, regardless of whether the debtor or a third party fulfils the obligation, the
obligation is extinguished. However, in cases regulated by TCO art. 127, the
fulfilment of the obligation by a third party satisfies the creditor, but the obligation
is not extinguished, and thus, the claim passes to the third party.20 This is referred to
as subrogation. TCO art. 127 par. 1 regulates two possibilities giving rise to
subrogation. According to TCO art. 127 par. 1, the performing third party sub-
rogates the creditor’s rights to the extent of his performance in the circumstances set
out in the following paragraphs.
Pursuant to TCO art. 127 par. 1 subcl. 1, subrogation arises where a third party
redeems an object pledged for another’s debt and where he is the owner or has a
limited right in rem to it. For example, the owner pledges his goods to secure the
debtor’s obligations, and the debtor does not fulfil his obligation. The creditor
intends to realise the pledge, but if he does so, the owner of the pledged goods
will lose his right of ownership. The owner fulfils the obligation in order to prevent
the realisation of the pledge, and he thereby subrogates the creditor’s rights. That is
to say, the creditor’s rights pass to the third party who fulfils the obligation.21
At this point, it is useful to mention TCC art. 884, according to which where a
third party mortgages his immovable property for another person’s obligation and
fulfils the obligation under the mortgage on the same conditions as required by the
debtor, then the third party may demand the discharge of the mortgage. In this case,
the claim passes to the owner who fulfils the obligation. As has been seen, TCC art.
884 applies only to immovable property and merely regulates the rights of the
owner who fulfils the debt. In comparison to TCO art. 127 par. 1 subcl. 1, its
regulation is quite restricted. Taking into consideration this fact, it is accepted that
TCO art. 127 par. 1 subcl. 1 may be applied to movable and immovable property.22
According to TCO art. 127 par. 1 subcl. 2, subrogation arises where the debtor
notifies the creditor that a third party will fulfil the obligation and will replace him.
This notification must be done before the third party’s performance and does not
require any particular form.23
24.2.2 Consequences
Subrogation means that the claim, to which the creditor is entitled, legally and
automatically passes to the extent of his performance to the fulfilling third party. As
20
21
Thévenoz and Werro (2012), art. 110, N. 14; O guzman and Öz (2015), pp. 262–263; Tekinay
et al. (1993), p. 209; Serozan (2014), p. 28.
22
Thévenoz and Werro (2012), art. 110, N. 23; O guzman and Öz (2015), p. 263; Tekinay et al.
(1993), p. 210.
23
Engel (1997), p. 614; Thévenoz and Werro (2012), art. 110, N. 31; O guzman and Öz (2015),
p. 263; Tekinay et al. (1993), p. 211; Reisoglu (2014), p. 297; Eren (2015), p. 932.
the claim passes to the third party, all privileges and ancillary rights pass as well,
except those that are inseparable from the creditor’s person.24
24.2.3 Specific Provisions
The Turkish Code of Obligations regulates other instances of subrogation. Conse-

quently, art. 127 par. 2 states that these cases are reserved. For example, according
to TCO art. 168 par. 1, a joint and several debtor who is entitled to have recourse
against other debtors is subrogated to the rights of the creditor to the extent that he
fulfils the obligation.25 Another example is related to surety contracts. A surety is
subrogated to the rights of the creditor to the extent of the fulfilment of his own
obligation (TCO art. 596 par. 1).
Further, the Turkish Commercial Code, which is an inseparable part of the
Turkish Civil Code, regulates certain subrogation cases. One of these cases is
related to insurer’s subrogation. TComC art. 1472 par. 1 sent.1 states that when
the insurer pays the insurance indemnity, the insurer legally replaces the assured.
24.3 Guarantee of Performance by a Third Party26
24.3.1 General27
According to TCO art. 128 par. 1, a person (the guarantor) who warrants a third
party’s performance to another party (the creditor) is liable for damage resulting
from the non-performance of the third party. Since the third party is not a party to
the contract between the creditor and the guarantor, he does not have any rights and
does not undertake any obligations arising from this contract.28
A guarantee of performance by a third party may be provided by a separate
contract or by a clause in a contract.29 Such contracts are generally concluded in
order to provide a guarantee to the creditor. The most common example of such a
contract is a performance bond.30 In such a relationship, there are two parties: the
24
von Tuhr and Escher (1974), § 59, III, p. 28; Oguzman and Öz (2015), p. 263; Serozan (2014),
p. 28; Tekinay et al. (1993), p. 214 ff.
25
See Sect. 27.5.2.
26
Porte-fort, Vertrag zu Lasten eines Dritten.
27
For further explanations see Tando gan (1959), Reiso
glu (1963), Yüce (2007).
28
guzman and Öz (2016), p. 419; Tekinay et al. (1993), p. 230.
29
30
For further explanations see Reiso glu (1977), Reiso
glu (1983), Barlas (1986), Kahyao glu
(1996), Reisoglu (1997), Do gan (2002).
24.3 Guarantee of Performance by a Third Party 187
bank (guarantor) and the creditor. In a performance bond, the guarantor promises
that if the third party fails to perform his obligation at all or as required, the
guarantor will be liable for the non-performance of the third party. That is to say,
the guarantor irrevocably and unconditionally undertakes to pay a determined
amount of money to the creditor on first demand.
24.3.2 Legal Nature
The author’s opinion is that a contract relating to a guarantee of performance by a

third party is a type of guarantee contract.31
The obligation of the guarantor is independent of the third party’s obligation. If
the third party fails to perform his obligation, then the guarantor may not be
required to perform that obligation. On the contrary, the guarantor performs his
own obligation, which is generally pecuniary.32
At this point, it will be useful to draw an analogy with a suretyship:33 (1) the
obligation of the surety is of an ancillary nature. Therefore, if the principal
obligational relationship secured by a surety is void, then the surety is also void.
However, a guarantee of performance by a third party is not ancillary in nature.
Consequently, even if the principal obligational relationship is void, the guarantee
stands. (2) In a suretyship contract, the surety has the right to raise the defences that
can be brought by the principal debtor against the creditor. Moreover, he is obliged
to raise them (TCO art. 591 par. 1).34 On the other hand, the guarantor, as a rule, is
not entitled to raise the defences resulting from the principal obligational relation-
ship between the creditor and the debtor. (3) In a suretyship contract, when the
surety performs his own obligation, the creditor’s rights pass to the surety. In
contrast, a guarantor does not have a right of recourse based on the subrogation.
(4) Another difference is that a suretyship contract requires a qualified written
form,35 whereas a guarantee contract, which is executed by legal entities, does not
require a particular form (TCO art. 603).
31
Engel (1997), p. 430; Becker (1941), art. 111, N. 2; O guzman and Öz (2016), p. 414; Tekinay
et al. (1993), p. 228; Eren (2015), p. 1153; Reiso
glu (2014), p. 395; Feyzio
glu (1977), pp. 286–287.
32
33
Engel (1997), p. 435; Thévenoz and Werro (2012), art. 111, N. 19–25; Feyzio glu (1977),
pp. 288–289; Tekinay et al. (1993), pp. 233–238; Eren (2015), pp. 1155–1156; O guzman and
Öz (2016), pp. 415–418.
34
For further explanations see Elçin Grassinger (1996), Özen (2016).
35
See Sect. 3.2.2.2.
24.3.3 Consequences
As mentioned above, in a contract relating to the guarantee of performance by a

third party, the obligation of the guarantor becomes due and he becomes liable
when the third party fails to perform his obligation (TCO art. 128 par. 1). In other
words, until the third party fails to perform the obligation, the creditor has only an
expectant right against the guarantor. Therefore, as long as the creditor has the
power of disposition36 in respect of this right, he may assign it or may discharge the
guarantor from obligations arising out of the contract. It is worth remembering that
in cases where the creditor assigns his expectant right, the assignee may only
demand compensation for the assignor’s damage rather than for his own damage.37
When the guarantor’s obligation becomes due, he must perform his obligation.
As mentioned above, this obligation is generally pecuniary and aims to compensate
the creditor for damage resulting from the non-performance of the third party. Even
if the principal obligational relationship secured by the guarantee is void, the
guarantor may not raise this defence against the creditor. This is because the
guarantee is independent of the secured principal obligational relationship. How-
ever, if the guarantee contract is invalid, then the guarantor may raise this invalidity
with the creditor.
As a rule, the guarantor undertakes a pecuniary obligation in order to secure the
third party’s performance. However, in exceptional cases, the guarantor undertakes
the same obligation as the third party but as a type of compensation in kind. For
example, a third party is obliged to deliver 3 tons of tea leaves to C, and G
guarantees that if the third party fails to perform, then he will become obliged to
deliver 3 tons of tea leaves to C instead.38
In practice, the amount to be paid by the guarantor is generally determined in the
guarantee contract. This is almost always true for performance bonds issued by
banks. However, if this amount is not determined in the guarantee contract,39 in the
event of the non-performance of the third party’s obligation, the guarantor must
compensate the creditor for damage arising from that non-performance. Conse-
quently, the guarantor must compensate the creditor’s positive damage. In other
words, the guarantor must compensate the difference between the value of the
creditor’s assets had the obligation been performed as required and the value of the
36
37
38
Engel (1997), p. 430; O guzman and Öz (2016), p. 429; Eren (2015), p. 1159; Reiso glu
(2014), p. 394.
39
It should be kept in mind that if the guarantor is a natural person, then the maximum amount of
the guarantor’s liability must be indicated in the guarantor’s own handwriting. This is because the
TCO art. 583 par. 1 states that a surety contract must be in writing and that the date and maximum
amount of the surety’s liability must be indicated in the surety’s own handwriting. These rules are
applied by analogy to guarantees provided by natural persons (TCO art. 603). Consequently, in
such a case, if the maximum amount of the guarantor’s liability is not indicated in the guarantor’s
own handwriting, then the guarantee contract is void.
24.3 Guarantee of Performance by a Third Party 189
creditor’s assets resulting from non-performance. This difference constitutes the

creditor’s positive damage, and the guarantor is liable to compensate for it.40
24.3.4 Recourse
Where the guarantor compensates the creditor for damage, the issue of recourse
arises. If the guarantor and the third party make an agreement concerning recourse,
then the guarantor will have recourse to the third party in accordance with this
agreement. In banking, the legal consequences of the bank’s performance are
almost always determined by a general loan agreement.41
In certain cases, there is no specific agreement between the third party and the
guarantor concerning recourse. In such cases, the guarantor may have recourse to
the third party in the following instances: (1) if the compensation for the creditor’s
damage by the guarantor discharges the third party, and this is to the advantage of
the third party, and the latter has not validly prohibited the payment of compensa-
tion, then the guarantor may have recourse to the third party according to TCO art.
529 par. 1. Consequently, the guarantor may demand that the third party repay the
amount paid by way of compensation. (2) if it is not possible to apply TCO art.
529 par. 1—for example, due to a valid prohibition by the third party—then the
guarantor may have recourse to the third party according to the rules pertaining to
unjust enrichment (TCO arts. 77–82) or TCO art. 530.42
24.3.5 Duration
In a contract relating to the guarantee of a third party’s performance, the parties may
determine the duration of the contract.43 When this time limit passes, the contract is
terminated, and thus, the obligation of the guarantor is extinguished by operation of
law.44
Even if the parties do not determine the duration of the guarantee contract, they
may nevertheless determine a time limit for non-performance by the third party. In
such a case, if non-performance by the third party does not occur within this
specified duration, the guarantor’s liability will also be terminated.45
40
Becker (1941), art. 111, N. 14; Oser and Sch€ onenberger (1929), art. 111, N. 10; Engel (1997),
p. 435; Oguzman and Öz (2016), p. 429; Nomer (2015), p. 412; Eren (2015), p. 1159.
41
Cf. Oguzman and Öz (2016), p. 431.
42
Oguzman and Öz (2016), pp. 431–432.
43
Engel (1997), p. 434; Reisoglu (2014), p. 399; Eren (2015), p. 1160.
44
45
24.3.6 Limitation Period
The limitation period runs from the maturity of the obligation (TCO art. 149 par. 1).
As mentioned above, the obligation of the guarantor becomes due when the third
party fails to perform his obligation and the creditor incurs damage.46 Consequently,
the limitation period commences at that time. According to TCO art. 146, unless
otherwise set by law, all claims are subject to a limitation period of 10 years.47
If the parties specify only the duration for non-performance by the third party,
then the obligation of the guarantor will be subject to a limitation period of 10 years,
provided that the non-performance by the third party occurs within this specified
duration.48 If the parties specify the duration for both non-performance by the third
party and for demand by the creditor, the obligation of the guarantor is terminated at
the expiration of that period of time. Indeed, according to TCO art. 128 par. 2, in
such cases, the parties may agree that if the creditor does not demand performance
from the guarantor in written form until the expiration of the specified period of
time, then the guarantor’s obligation will be terminated.49
24.4 Contracts in Favour of Third Parties50
24.4.1 General51
A contract, as a general rule, gives rights only to the parties. However, it is possible
that a contract may grant certain rights to a third party. In such a case, the
components of this legal relationship are as follows: a promisor,52 a promisee53
and a beneficiary.54 The contract in favour of the third party is concluded between
the promisor and the promisee.55 For instance, a lessee makes a lease contract
pertaining to certain immovable property with a lessor, and the parties agree that the
leased property will be used by the lessee’s daughter. In this case, the parties have
the following characteristics: the lessee is the promisee, the lessor is the promisor
and the daughter is the beneficiary.
46
47
Engel (1997), p. 434.
48
Reisoglu (2014), p. 400; O guzman and Öz (2016), p. 435; Eren (2015), p. 1160.
49
Oguzman and Öz (2016), p. 435–436; Eren (2015), p. 1160; Reiso glu (2014), p. 399.
50
Stipulation pour autrui, Vertrag zugunsten eines Dritten.
51
For further explanations see Akyol (2008).
52
Promettant, Promittent.
53
Stipulant, Promissar, Versprechensempf€ anger.
54
Tiers, Dritte; Bénéficiaire, Beg€
unstigte.
55
Engel (1997), p. 417; Tercier (2004), p. 190; O guzman and Öz (2016), p. 438; Feyzioglu (1977),
p. 271; Becker (1941), art. 112, N. 1.
24.4 Contracts in Favour of Third Parties 191
In a contract in favour of a third party, generally, the third party is determined by

the contracting parties. However, at the time of the formation of the contract, the
beneficiary may not be determined. In such cases, it is sufficient that the beneficiary
is determinable.56
In a contract in favour of a third party, the legal position of the beneficiary may
differ: (1) only the promisee may have the right to demand performance for the
beneficiary (TCO art. 129 par. 1), or (2) the beneficiary may also have the right to
demand performance for himself (TCO art. 129 par. 2).
It should be noted that the promisee enters into a contract only on behalf of
himself. That is why the promisee cannot be described as the agent of the benefi-
ciary.57 In addition, the promisor is not only authorised to but also must perform the
obligation for the beneficiary. The beneficiary accepts the performance on behalf of
himself. As a result, the beneficiary does not act as the agent of the promisee.58
The parties to a contract cannot encumber a third party.59 Nevertheless, the
promisee and the promisor may agree that the beneficiary is only able to demand
performance of the obligation if he performs a specified obligation or duty.60
Furthermore, the parties to a contract are not entitled to make a dispositive legal
transaction61 in favour of a third party. For instance, a claim may not be transferred
to a third party by agreement between the assignor and the assignee.62
Moreover, the beneficiary may not preclude formation of the contract in favour
of himself. The beneficiary may only refuse or accept performance.63
24.4.2 Consequences
24.4.2.1 Where Only the Promisee May Demand Performance
In certain cases, the beneficiary is not a creditor. That is to say, he is not entitled to
demand performance of the obligation and is only authorised to accept perfor-
mance.64 Since the beneficiary does not hold the right to claim, he does not have the
56
Engel (1997), p. 420; Thévenoz and Werro (2012), art. 112, N. 7; Tekinay et al. (1993), p. 219;
57
Thévenoz and Werro (2012), art. 112, N. 5; Eren (2015), p. 1142; O guzman and Öz (2016),
p. 438; Tekinay et al. (1993), p. 227; Becker (1941), art. 112, N. 4.
58
59
Oguzman and Öz (2016), pp. 446–447.
60
61
Acte de disposition, Verf€
ugungsgesch€aft. See Chap. 14, fn. 5–6.
62
Engel (1997), p. 421; Oguzman and Öz (2016), pp. 447–448.
63
Oguzman and Öz (2016), pp. 448–449.
64
Tercier (2004), p. 190; Engel (1997), p. 419; Thévenoz and Werro (2012), art. 112, N. 10;
Tekinay et al. (1993), p. 220; Nomer (2015), p. 414.
power of disposition65 and, thus, may not dispose of it.66 For example, an assign-
ment by the beneficiary is void.
In cases where the beneficiary is not a creditor, if the promisor fails to perform
the obligation, the beneficiary is not entitled to demand that the promisor compen-
sate his damage. The right to demand compensation belongs solely to the promisee,
but this compensation must be paid to the beneficiary.67
As the promisee is the holder of the right to claim, he is the one who may dispose
of it. Therefore, the promisee may discharge the promisor. The promisee may also
set off his claim against his obligation to the promisor. The beneficiary may not
intervene in this type of legal transaction.68
24.4.2.2 Where the Beneficiary May Also Demand Performance
In certain cases, the beneficiary becomes a creditor at the time of the conclusion of
the contract between the promisor and the promisee.69 In order for the beneficiary to
become a creditor, his consent is not necessary. Even if the beneficiary does not
know of the contract, he may become a creditor.70
In cases where the beneficiary becomes a creditor, he may, along with the
promisee, also demand performance of the obligation. The successors of the
beneficiary—e.g., heirs or assignees—may also demand that the obligation be
performed for their benefit (TCO art. 129 par. 2 sent. 1).
It is evident that the promisee and the beneficiary are not joint and several
creditors.71 This is because regardless of whether the promisee or the beneficiary
demands performance of the obligation, the promisor must perform the obligation
for the beneficiary.72
The beneficiary’s right to demand performance may result from the contracting
party’s intentions (e.g., when a mother deposits money into her daughter’s bank
account)73 or from custom (e.g., customarily it is the lessee, not the lessor, who pays
a concierge’s monthly fee).74 The right of the beneficiary may also arise from the
law itself. For instance, TCO art. 130 par. 1 states that if an employer was insured
65
66
67
von Tuhr and Escher (1974), § 82, I, 1, p. 237; Engel (1997), p. 419–420; compare to Becker
(1941), art. 112, N: 23, 24, cf. O
guzman and Öz (2016), p. 451 fn. 123.
68
von Tuhr and Escher (1974), § 82, I, 1, p. 237; Tekinay et al. (1993), p. 226; O
guzman and Öz
(2016), pp. 451–452.
69
Tercier (2004), p. 190; Engel (1997), p. 420; Thévenoz and Werro (2012), art. 112, N. 16.
70
von Tuhr and Escher (1974), § 83, I, p. 246; Oguzman and Öz (2016), p. 452.
71
See Chap. 28.
72
Becker (1941), art. 112. N. 27; O
73
Engel (1997), p. 422; Oguzman and Öz (2016), p. 441.
74
References 193
against the consequences of legal liability provided by law, the rights resulting from
the insurance contract belong exclusively to the employee. It should be noted that
the insurance benefits will be deducted from the compensation to be paid according
to the general provisions (TCO art. 130 par. 2).
Moreover, legislative provisions pertaining to other civil liability insurances are
reserved (TCO art. 130 par. 3). For example, according to TComC art. 1454 par.
1, in insurance contracts in favour of a third party, the rights resulting from the
insurance contract belong to the insured party. Unless otherwise agreed by the
parties, the latter may demand that the insurer pay the insurance indemnity to him.
In cases where the beneficiary becomes a creditor, the promisee will lose the
power of disposition75 on the claim when the beneficiary or his successors notify
the promisor (debtor) of their intention to exercise their right to demand perfor-
mance. The notification does not require a specific form. After this notification, the
promisee (creditor) may no longer discharge the promisor (debtor) or change the
quality or content of the obligation (TCO art. 129 par. 2 sent. 2).
In cases where the beneficiary is a creditor, if the promisor fails to perform the
obligation, then the beneficiary may demand that the promisor compensate him for
damage.76
References
Akyol Ş (2008) Tam üçüncü şahıs yararına s€ozleşme. Vedat, İstanbul

Barlas N (1986) Türk hukuk sisteminde banka teminat mektupları. İstanbul
Dogan V (2002) Banka teminat mektupları. Savaş, Ankara
Elçin Grassinger G (1996) Borçlar kanununa g€ ore kefilin alacaklıya karşı sahip oldu
gu savunma
imkânları. Alfa, İstanbul
Gauch P, Schluep W R, Emmenegger S (2008) Schweizerisches Obligationenrecht, Allgemeiner
Gümüş MA (2003) Türk medeni kanununun getirdi gi yeni şerhler. Vedat, İstanbul
Kahyaoglu EC (1996) Banka garantileri. İstanbul
Kapancı KB (2016) Ahlaka aykırı bir fiille kasten verilen zararın tazmini. Vedat, İstanbul
Karabag Bulut N (2009) Üçüncü kişiyi koruyucu etkili s€
ozleşme. On iki levha, İstanbul
75
Pouvoir de disposer, Verf€
ugungsmacht.
76
Kılıçoglu A (1979) Türk borçlar hukukunda kanuni halefiyet. Ankara üniversitesi, Ankara
Nomer HN, Ergüne S (2016) Eşya hukuku. On iki levha, İstanbul
Oguzman K, Seliçi Ö, Oktay-Özdemir S (2016) Eşya hukuku. Filiz, İstanbul
Özen B (2016) 6098 sayılı Türk borçlar kanunu çerçevesinde kefalet s€ ozleşmesi. Vedat, İstanbul
Reisoglu K (1958) İstihdam edenlerin mesuliyeti. Ankara
Reisoglu S (1963) Garanti mukavelesi. Ajans-Türk, Ankara
Reisoglu S (1977) Banka teminat mektupları ve uygulamada ortaya çıkan sorunlar. Ankara
Reisoglu S (1983) Türk hukukunda ve bankacılık uygulamasında teminat mektupları -
kontrgarantiler. Ankara
Reisoglu S (1997) Banka teminat mektupları ve kontrgarantiler. Ankara
Serozan R (2014) Borçlar hukuku genel b€ olüm, Volume 3 (Kocayusufpaşao glu/Hatemi/Serozan/
Sungurbey İ (1963) Kişisel hakların tapu kütü güne şerhi. İstanbul
Tandogan H (1959) Garanti mukavelesi. Ankara
Filiz, İstanbul
İstanbul
Yüce MB (2007) Garanti s€ ozleşmesinin bir türü olarak üçüncü kişinin fiilini taahhüt s€
ozleşmesi.
Vedat, İstanbul
Part III
Extinguishment of Obligations and
Limitation Period
Chapter 25
Extinguishment of Obligations
25.1 General1
There are several causes of extinguishment of obligations. The normal manner of

extinguishment of an obligation is its performance as required.2 The other causes
are set out in the Turkish Code of Obligations in the following order: discharge by
agreement, constitution of a new obligation (novation), merger, impossibility of
performance and set-off.
Before analysing these causes, it is useful to first consider the consequences of the
extinguishment of obligations. For whichever reason the obligation is extinguished,
the debtor is released from the obligation, and any right to demand performance of the
obligation by the creditor comes to an end. According to TCO art. 131 par. 1, where an
obligation is extinguished by its performance or for other reasons, the ancillary rights,
such as any pledge or surety, are also extinguished automatically. As a rule, when an
obligation is extinguished, the right to demand accrued interest and the performance of
any penalty clause are extinguished simultaneously. These rights are also ancillary to
the principal obligation. However, according to TCO art. 131 par. 2, the creditor’s
rights relating to liability for payment of any accrued interest and performance of any
penalty clause may be reserved in the contract or may be reserved by the creditor’s
notification, which must be made by the date of performance. Moreover, this kind of
1
Aybay (2011), pp. 152–162; Becker (1941), Vorbemerkung zu art. 114–142, art. 114–126; Berger
(2012), pp. 450–472; Engel (1997), pp. 669–681, 761–784; Eren (2015), pp. 1257–1281,
1299–1307; Feyzioglu (1977), pp. 409–517; Gauch et al. (2008), pp. 187–216; Honsell et al.
(2003), Vorbemerkungen zu art. 114–142, art. 114–126; Kılıço glu (2013), pp. 835–866; Nomer
(2015), pp. 381–391; Oser and Sch€ onenberger (1929), Vorbemerkungen zum dritten Titel (art.
114–142), art. 114–126; Oguzman and Öz (2015), pp. 531–579; Reiso glu (2014), pp. 404–423;
Schwenzer (2009), pp. 506–518; Tekinay et al. (1993), pp. 984–1030; Tercier (2004),
pp. 257–279; Tercier et al. (2016), pp. 444–479; Thévenoz and Werro (2012), art. 114–126,
and von Tuhr and Escher (1974), pp. 161–211.
2
von Tuhr and Escher (1974), § 74, I, p. 161; Tercier (2004), p. 259.

198 25 Extinguishment of Obligations
reservation may be inferred from the circumstances. In such cases, the creditor, despite
performance of the obligation, may still demand payment of accrued interest and
performance of the penalty clause. For instance, in a work contract relating to the
construction of a house, the parties agree that if the contractor falls into default, he will,
as a penalty, pay €10,000 for every delayed month. The builder delivers the house
4 months late. If the customer accepts the delivery of the house without any reserva-
tion, since the obligation to construct the house will have been performed and, thus,
extinguished, then the ancillary debt of €40,000 arising from the penalty clause will
also be extinguished (TCO art. 131 par. 2, TCO art. 179 par. 2)3.
The provisions relating to any mortgage, negotiable instruments4 or composition
agreements are reserved. In fact, when an obligation secured by a mortgage is
extinguished, the latter is extinguished as well. However, the entry on the land
register stands. That is why if a debt secured by a mortgage is extinguished, then the
mortgagor may demand the creditor authorise the removal of the entry from the
land register (TCC art. 883).5
25.2 Discharge by Agreement6
25.2.1 The Concept and Legal Nature7
Although the debtor does not perform the obligation, the parties may agree that the
obligation is extinguished through a discharge agreement.8 In a discharge agree-
ment, the creditor waives his claim to the performance of the obligation and
releases the debtor. It is worth noting that the creditor’s waiver, by itself, is
insufficient for the extinguishment of the obligation. In order for the obligation to
be extinguished, the debtor must accept the creditor’s waiver.9
A discharge agreement may extinguish the obligation wholly or partially.10
Obviously, where the discharge agreement is partial, the non-discharged part of
the obligation stands and must be performed.
3
Eren (2015), p. 1185; Reiso
glu (2014), p. 459; O
guzman and Öz (2015), pp. 535–536.
4
Although the principal obligation is extinguished, the liability for interest connected to any
coupons that are independent of the principal deed is not extinguished. O guzman and Öz
(2015), p. 535.
5
For further explanations Helvacı (2008), pp. 402–404; Steinauer (2003), p. 177.
6 €
Remise conventionnelle, Aufhebung durch Ubereinkunft.
7
For further explanations see Turanboy (1998), Gümüş (2015).
8
von Tuhr and Escher (1974), § 75, I, p. 173; Reiso
glu (2014), p. 405; Nomer (2015), p. 382; Eren
(2015), p. 1270; Oguzman and Öz (2015), p. 536.
9
Tercier (2004), p. 266; Thévenoz and Werro (2012), art. 115, N. 2; O guzman and Öz (2015),
pp. 538–539; Tekinay et al. (1993), p. 986; Feyzio glu (1977), p. 426.
10
Engel (1997), p. 765; Thévenoz and Werro (2012), art. 115, N. 2; Berger (2012), p. 452.
25.2 Discharge by Agreement 199
A discharge agreement is a dispositive legal transaction11 with regard to the

creditor.12 Consequently, in order for a discharge agreement to be validly formed,
the creditor must have the capacity to act and the power of disposition13 in relation
to the claim.14 Otherwise, the discharge agreement is void.
It is worth noting that the discharge agreement is distinct from a pactum de non
petendo, which is an agreement whereby a creditor promises not to enforce an
obligation. This is due to the fact that in a pactum de non petendo, the obligation is
not extinguished but the creditor is obliged not to demand performance of the
obligation, generally for a specific duration, whereas in a discharge agreement, it is
evident that the obligation is extinguished.15
It should be noted that in certain cases, the creditor and debtor require the
consent of a third party to form a discharge agreement. For instance, according to
TCC art. 820, for a discharge agreement relating to a usufruct claim, the consent of
the usufructuary is also necessary. Similarly, the consent of the pledgee is also
necessary for a discharge agreement relating to a pledged debt (TCC art. 961).16
25.2.2 Form Requirements
According to TCO art. 132, even if the legal transaction creating the obligation
requires a specific form whether arising from the agreement of the parties or the
law, the discharge agreement itself does not require any specific form.17 Conse-
quently, the parties may make a discharge agreement in oral or written form.
Moreover, the parties’ declaration of will (intention)18 relating to a discharge
agreement may be express or implied.19 However, if the discharge agreement is
concluded orally, then certain evidentiary difficulties may arise. In order to avoid
this potential problem, it is recommended that the discharge agreement be made in
written form.
11
Acte de disposition, Verf€ugungsgesch€ aft. See Chap. 14, fn. 5–6.
12
Tercier (2004), p. 266; Thévenoz and Werro (2012), art. 115, N. 11; Tekinay et al. (1993), p. 987.
13
Pouvoir de disposer, Verf€ ugungsmacht.
14
Tercier (2004), p. 266; Thévenoz and Werro (2012), art. 115, N. 11; O guzman and Öz (2015),
pp. 538–539; Eren (2015), p. 1271.
15
Thévenoz and Werro (2012), art. 115, N. 7; Tercier (2004), p. 266; Gauch et al. (2008), p. 194;
von Tuhr and Escher (1974), § 75, IV, pp. 177–178; O guzman and Öz (2015), p. 540; Feyzio glu
(1977), p. 427.
16
17
Berger (2012), pp. 452–453; Becker (1941), art. 115, N. 3.
18
arung.
19
Reisoglu (2014), p. 405; Tercier et al. (2016), p. 456; O
25.2.3 Consequences
As mentioned above, with a discharge agreement, the obligation is extinguished.

The natural consequence of the extinguishment of the obligation is that ancillary
rights are also extinguished (TCO art. 131 par. 1).20 For instance, consider a loan
agreement between a borrower and a lender where the lender enters into a surety
contract with a third party. When a discharge agreement is formed between the
borrower and the lender, the third party is released from his obligation arising from
the surety contract. This is because the right arising from the surety contract is an
ancillary right to the principal obligation.
25.3 Novation21
25.3.1 General22
Novation is the extinguishment of an existing obligation by the creation of a new

obligation.23 In novation, an existing obligation is extinguished without being
performed,24 and the extinguishment of the existing obligation is dependent upon
the creation of the new obligation. In the case of extinguishment of an existing
obligation by agreement, there is no presumption of novation. This is due to the fact
that the parties’ clear intentions are an essential element of novation (TCO art.
133 par. 1).
In novation, the parties may change the object of the obligation.25 For example,
D is obliged to transfer ownership of a car to C. After a period of time, the parties
make an agreement whereby they agree that D is obliged to pay €100,000 to C in
lieu of transferring ownership of the car. Furthermore, the parties may change the
cause (causa) of the obligation.26 For instance, assume there is a sale agreement
between the parties according to which the buyer must pay €10,000. Subsequently
the parties make a new agreement according to which the cause of the buyer’s
obligation becomes a loan agreement.
20
Engel (1997), p. 765; Tercier (2004), p. 267.
21
Novation, Neuerung.
22
For further explanations see Koyuncuo glu (1972), Önay (2016).
23
Oser and Sch€onenberger (1929), art. 116, N. 2; Gauch et al. (2008), p. 195; Tercier (2004),
p. 261; Thévenoz and Werro (2012), art. 116, N. 1; Tekinay et al. (1993), p. 989; O
guzman and Öz
(2015), p. 540.
24
Nomer (2015), p. 389.
25
Oser and Sch€onenberger (1929), art. 116, N. 9; Engel (1997), p. 769; Reiso glu (2014), p. 407;
26
Oguzman and Öz (2015), p. 542; Tekinay et al. (1993), p. 992, cf. Eren (2015), p. 1265.
25.3 Novation 201
The parties may agree to substitute parties to the obligation. If the parties agree
that the creditor is to be substituted, then the transaction is similar to the assignment
of a claim. However, in novation, an existing obligation is extinguished and a new
obligation is created, whereas in the assignment of a claim, the obligation is not
extinguished, only the creditor is substituted.27 Furthermore, the parties may agree
that the debtor is to be substituted; in this case, the transaction is similar to the
assumption of a debt. Nevertheless, in novation, an existing obligation is
extinguished and a new obligation is created, whereas in the assumption of a
debt, the obligation does not extinguish, only the debtor is substituted.28
It should be noted that novation is distinct from renewal. In the latter, an expiring
obligation is renewed and its duration is extended.29 For example, according to
TCO art. 347, in fixed term lease agreements concerning dwelling houses and
business premises, unless the lessee gives at least 15 days’ notice prior to the
expiration of the agreement, the agreement is deemed to be extended with the
same provisions for 1 year. In contrast, in novation, the new obligation extinguishes
the former one.
25.3.2 Conditions
Novation requires the agreement of the parties. In order for this agreement to be
valid, the creditor must have both the capacity to act and the power of disposition.30
In order for a novation to exist, the following conditions must be met: (1) there must
be a valid obligation, (2) a new valid obligation must be created and (3) the parties
must have the intention to novate.31
The most important element of this agreement is the parties’ clear intentions
relating to novation.32 If there are no such intentions, then it is inferred that the
parties’ intent is to amend the contract without extinguishing the original obliga-
tions (TCO art. 133 par. 1). Regarding the intention to novate, TCO art. 133 par.
2 states that, in particular, the signing of negotiable instruments (bills of exchanges,
promissory notes and cheques) in respect of an existing obligation or the issue of a
new document establishing an acknowledgement of obligation or a new surety bond
does not create novation, unless the parties have a clear intention to novate.
27
Engel (1997), p. 769; Feyzio glu (1977), p. 437; Reiso
glu (2014), p. 407; Oguzman and Öz
(2015), p. 542.
28
Engel (1997), p. 769; Feyzio glu (1977), p. 437; Reiso
glu (2014), p. 407; Oguzman and Öz
(2015), p. 542.
29
Feyzioglu (1977), p. 434; Oguzman and Öz (2015), p. 541.
30
31
Tercier (2004), p. 261; Thévenoz and Werro (2012), art. 116, N. 1.
32
Eren (2015), p. 1265; Oguzman and Öz (2015), p. 542; Reisoglu (2014), p. 408.
25.3.3 Consequences
As mentioned above, in the case of novation, an existing obligation is extinguished.

Consequently, ancillary rights relating to the existing obligation, such as pledges
and sureties, are also extinguished (TCO art. 131 par. 1). A new obligation arises
and is independent of the extinguished obligation. If the creditor wishes to secure
this new obligation, new securities, such as a pledge or a surety, must be provided.33
A new limitation period will arise in respect of the new obligation.34
25.3.4 Current Account
Pursuant to TComC art. 89 par. 1, in a current account, both parties may recipro-
cally waive any possible claims arising for any legal reason or from the legal
relationship individually and separately and may record their claims and debts
and demand the balance after the account is drawn down.35
The Turkish Code of Obligations sets out a specific provision relating to current
accounts, according to which the mere entry of various items in a current account
does not constitute a novation (TCO art. 134 par. 1). However, in certain cases, the
holder of a current account may draw the balance and notify the other party. In this
case, the receiving party’s acknowledgement of the drawn balance constitutes a
novation. Thus, the existing obligation is extinguished, and a new obligation arises
It should be noted that, pursuant to TCO art. 134 par. 3, in the event that there is
security for one of the items, the acknowledgement of the drawn balance does not
extinguish the security unless otherwise agreed upon. For instance, S sells
smartphones to L, and L sells laptops to S. In addition, there is a current account
agreement between S and L, and L pledges certain chattels to S for a specific
smartphone purchase. During the course of this commercial relationship, L
becomes obliged to pay €10,000, whereas S is obliged to pay €8000. Then S
draws down the balance and notifies L that the balance is €2000. L acknowledges
the balance. In this case, even if L’s specific obligation arising from the particular
smartphone purchase is extinguished, the pledge constituted by L remains valid and
secures this new obligation unless otherwise agreed upon.
33
Feyzioglu (1977), p. 451; Tekinay et al. (1993), p. 996; O
34
Reisoglu (2014), p. 409.
35
For further explanations see Toksal (1956).
25.4 Merger 203
25.4 Merger36
25.4.1 General
In certain cases, the capacities of the debtor and the creditor may merge in the same
person. For example, a mother is obliged to pay a certain amount of money to her
daughter; subsequently, the mother dies, and her daughter becomes her sole heir.37
In this case, the creditor has also become the debtor in respect of this obligation.38
Similarly, a creditor may transfer his claim to his debtor, making the debtor also the
creditor of the obligation.39
In the above-mentioned cases, according to TCO art. 135 par. 1 sent. 1, when the
capacities of the creditor and the debtor are merged in the same person, the
obligation is extinguished by the merger. Indeed, an obligation is a legal tie
whereby a debtor is obliged to render performance of an act to a creditor. When
the debtor and the creditor are the same person, since no one is able to be bound to
render a performance to himself, the obligation comes to an end.40
Even if the obligation is extinguished, a third party might have had certain rights
in respect of the claim, such as usufructuary rights or pledges. In such a case,
according to TCO art. 135 par. 1 sent. 2, the existing rights of third parties in
relation to the claim are not affected by the merger. For instance, D is obliged to pay
€10,000 to C, and C grants a right of usufruct to U. Subsequently, D becomes
entitled to the claim, or C becomes the debtor in respect of this obligation. In both
cases, U’s right of usufruct stands.41
Even if the obligation is extinguished by the merging of the capacities of the
debtor and the creditor in the same person, this extinguishment may be negated.
Indeed, according to TCO art. 135 par. 2, if the merger is terminated retroactively,
the obligation is deemed to have never been extinguished. For example, if the sole
heir, who is the creditor of the deceased, disclaims the inheritance (TCC art.
605 par. 1), the merger is extinguished retroactively.
25.4.2 Specific Provisions
According to TCO art. 135 par. 3, specific provisions pertaining to a mortgage and
negotiable instruments are reserved. In fact, when an obligation secured by a
36
Confusion, Vereinigung.
37
Engel (1997), p. 778.
38
Oser and Sch€onenberger (1929), art. 118, N. 2; von Tuhr and Escher (1974), § 77, I, p. 187.
39
40
Tercier (2004), p. 262.
41
Oguzman and Öz (2015), p. 548; Reisoglu (2014), p. 409; Eren (2015), p. 1269.
mortgage is extinguished, the mortgage is extinguished as well. However, the entry

on the land register still stands. That is why if the debt that is secured by a mortgage
is extinguished, then the mortgagor may demand that the creditor authorise the
removal of the entry from the land register (TCC art. 883).42
Regarding negotiable instruments, there are several specific rules in the Turkish
Code of Commerce. According to these specific rules, if a negotiable instrument
payable to order is endorsed in favour of the debtor or if a negotiable instrument
payable to the bearer, such as a cheque, is delivered to the debtor, the obligations
that are inherent in them are not extinguished. On the contrary, the rights may be
transferred again to a third party.43
25.5 Impossibility for Which the Debtor Is Not

Responsible44
25.5.1 Subsequent Impossibility
It is worth remembering that subsequent impossibility of performance, which is

analysed under this section, is distinct from initial impossibility of the obligation.
Indeed, in the case of initial impossibility, the performance of the obligation is
impossible at the time the contract is formed, and this impossibility is objective—
that is to say, it must be the case for any person. Initial impossibility results in the
nullity of the contract (TCO art. 27 par. 1). For instance, in a sale contract relating to
a specific object, e.g., Picasso’s painting Guernica, if the object has been
completely destroyed before the formation of the contract, then the contract is
void.45
In the case of subsequent impossibility, the performance of the obligation
becomes impossible after the formation of the contract. According to TCO art.
136 par. 1, if the debtor is not responsible for the subsequent impossibility, then his
42
Helvacı (2008), pp. 402–404. On the contrary O guzman and Öz (2015), p. 549.
43
The Turkish Commercial Code sets certain specific rules relating to the transfer of negotiable
instruments. For example, any bill of exchange may be transferred by endorsement and the
delivery of possession of it even if it is not expressly made out to order (TComC art. 681 par. 1,
compare to SCO art. 1001). The endorsement may be made out to the drawee, regardless of
whether he has accepted the bill or not, to the drawer or to any other person liable for it. These
persons may re-endorse the bill (TComC art. 681 par. 3); Pursuant to the
TComC art. 778 par. 1, subcl. a, these rules, unless they are contrary to its nature, also apply to
promissory notes. Moreover, a cheque made payable to a specific person with or without the
explicit comment ‘to order’ may be transferred by endorsement and the delivery of possession of it
(TComC art. 788 par. 1; compare to SCO art. 1108). The endorsement may be made out to the
drawer or to any other person liable for it. These persons may re-endorse the cheque
(TComC art. 788 par. 3).
44
For further explanations see Dural (1976), Kurt (2016).
45
See Sect. 5.2.5.
25.5 Impossibility for Which the Debtor Is Not Responsible 205
obligations are extinguished. For instance, in a sale contract relating to a specific

object, if, after conclusion of the contract, the specific object is destroyed by a fire
for which the debtor is not responsible, then the obligation is extinguished.
It is pivotal that, as a general rule, responsibility of the debtor requires fault.
According to TCO art. 112, the debtor is presumed to be at fault; unless the debtor
proves that he is not at fault,46 then he will be held responsible for the impossibility
of the performance. However, in certain cases, the debtor may nevertheless be held
responsible even if he is not at fault, for example, in the case of a debtor’s liability
for his assistants (TCO art. 116).47
Subsequent impossibility for which the debtor is not responsible may result from
either factual or legal reasons.48 For example, a seller is obliged to transfer
ownership of immovable property, but after formation of the contract, the subject
matter is expropriated (legal impossibility); in a sale contract pertaining to a
specific object, the object is destroyed by fire after the formation of the contract
due to a lightning strike (factual impossibility). As seen, in both cases, the debtors
are not responsible for the impossibility of performance. Therefore, the obligations
are extinguished; in other words, the debtors are released from their obligations.
According to certain scholars, it is irrelevant whether the impossibility of
performance is objective or subjective. In either case, the performance of the
obligation becomes impossible.49
However, certain other scholars believe that for subsequent impossibility, for
which the debtor is not responsible, to give rise to the extinguishment of the
obligation, the impossibility must be objective.50 The examples of the object
destroyed due to a lightning strike and the expropriation of the immovable property
are examples of objective subsequent impossibility. According to these scholars, in
cases where subsequent impossibility of performance is subjective, the obligation is
not extinguished.51 However, if the personal skills of the debtor are important for
the creditor, the fact that the debtor becomes unable to perform the obligation will
extinguish that obligation.52 For example, a renowned composer is commissioned
to compose a national anthem. Subsequently, the composer becomes deaf due to an
illness. In such a case, the national anthem may be composed by another composer.
However, since the object of the contract was not the composition of a national
anthem but its composition by this specific composer, the obligation will be
extinguished.
46
See Sect. 22.2.3.2.2.
47
See Sect. 22.5.
48
Oser and Sch€onenberger (1929), art. 20, N. 4; Tercier (2004), p. 269; Reiso
glu (2014), p. 411;
Tekinay et al. (1993), p. 999.
49
50
Tercier (2004), p. 269; Eren (2015), p. 1300; Dural (1976), p. 89, 114.
51
Eren (2015), p. 1300; Dural (1976), p. 89.
52
Tercier (2004), p. 269; Honsell et al. (2003), art. 19/20, N. 46.
Performance of generic obligations53 cannot become impossible (genus non

perit). However, if the obligation to be performed is a restricted generic obligation,
performance may become impossible. For example, if the debtor is obliged to
supply 3 tons of tea leaves from a specific stock and these tea leaves are destroyed
due to a flood, then the obligation of the debtor is extinguished.54
It should be noted that in certain cases, the impossibility of the performance may
be temporary, and it may be unknown when the circumstances giving rise to this
impossibility will come to an end. If the parties’ presumed intentions allow the
performance of the obligation to be postponed until the performance becomes
possible again, then the obligation is not extinguished. If the performance of the
obligation may not be postponed, it is reasonable to accept the extinguishment of
the obligation.55
25.5.2 In Bilateral Contracts
If there is a unilateral contract between the parties and the debtor’s obligation
becomes impossible to perform without responsibility on his part, then the debtor’s
obligation is extinguished, and he is discharged. However, if there is a bilateral
contract between the parties and the debtor’s obligation is extinguished due to
subsequent impossibility for which he is not responsible, then the question of
whether the counter-party’s obligation will be extinguished arises. According to
TCO art. 136 par. 2, the counter-party’s obligation is also extinguished. Therefore,
if the party, whose performance of the obligation has become impossible without
responsibility on his part, has already obtained the performance of the counter-
party, then this constitutes a case of unjust enrichment. Thus, the discharged party
must make restitution in accordance with the provisions relating to unjust enrich-
ment (TCO arts. 77–82). Moreover, it is apparent that since the obligations to be
performed by the counter-party are also extinguished, then the party whose perfor-
mance of the obligation has become impossible without responsibility on his part
may not demand their performance.
However, according to TCO art. 136 par. 2 sent. 2, this provision does not apply
to cases where the risk passes, either by law or by agreement, to the creditor before
the performance of the obligation. Indeed, the parties may agree that even if the
performance of the debtor’s obligation becomes impossible without responsibility
on his part, he may nevertheless demand the performance of the counter-obligation.
Moreover, the law itself may regulate such a consequence. For example, according
to the former TCO art. 183 par.1, in a sale contract relating to a specific object,
subject to particular circumstances or agreements, the benefit and the risk relating to
53
See Sect. 15.5.
54
Serozan (2014), p. 84; O
55
Oguzman and Öz (2015), p. 551, compare to Eren (2015), pp. 1300–1301.
25.5 Impossibility for Which the Debtor Is Not Responsible 207
the property pass to the buyer when the contract is formed. Pursuant to this now
abolished rule, even if the sold property was destroyed after the formation of the
sale contract without responsibility on the seller’s part, the buyer nevertheless
would have had to pay the purchase price.56
If the debtor does not immediately notify the creditor of the subsequent impos-
sibility of the performance or does not take necessary measures to mitigate the
resulting damage, he is liable to pay compensation for damage arising from this
omission (TCO art. 136 par. 3).
In certain cases of subsequent impossibility of an obligation for which the debtor
is not responsible, he may obtain certain benefits in lieu of the extinguished
obligation. For example, the debtor may receive insurance indemnity for the
specific object that was destroyed, or he may obtain a price through expropriation.
In such cases, the question of whether the debtor must give these pecuniary benefits
to the creditor arises. There is no specific provision in the Turkish Code of
Obligations regarding this question. There is a lacuna (praeter legem).57 Indeed,
the fact that BGB § 285 and FCC art. 1303 (version in force from 17th February
1804 to 1st October 2016) regulate such circumstances supports this thesis. In the
author’s opinion, in the above-mentioned examples, if the counter-party wishes to
receive these pecuniary benefits, the debtor must pass them on to the creditor, and
thus, the creditor must perform his counter-obligation.58
25.5.3 Partial Impossibility59
If the performance of the obligation becomes partially impossible due to factors for
which the debtor may not be held responsible, then the debtor is released only from
that part of the obligation that has become impossible to perform (TCO art. 137 par.
1 sent. 1). However, if it is clearly understood that such a contract would not have
been formed had one or both of the parties foreseen this partial impossibility, then
the debtor is released from the entire obligation (TCO art. 137 par. 1 sent. 2).
In bilateral contracts, if a party’s obligation becomes partially impossible to
perform and the creditor consents to partial performance, then the counter-
obligation will also be performed to that extent. However, if the creditor does not
accept partial performance or the counter-obligation is indivisible, then TCO art.
136 par. 2 will apply (TCO art. 137 par. 2).
56
Engel (1997), p. 783; Tercier (2004), p. 272; Tandogan (1990), pp. 104–118; Nomer and Engin
(2017), art. 208, N. 23.
57
58
Thévenoz and Werro (2012), art. 119, N. 20; Eren (2015), pp. 1304–1305; O guzman and Öz
(2015), pp. 556–557.
59
For further explanations see Ercoşkun Şenol (2016).
25.6 Hardship
According to TCO art. 138, in cases of hardship,60 the disadvantaged party may
apply to the court and demand the variation of the contract having regard to the new
circumstances. Where the judge cannot vary the contract to accommodate the new
circumstances, the disadvantaged party may withdraw from the contract (ex tunc).61
Nevertheless, if there is a continuing contract between the parties, then the disad-
vantaged party, as a rule, may terminate the contract (ex nunc)62 instead of
withdrawing from it.
In the case of withdrawal from a contract, all obligations, whether already
performed or not, are extinguished. Pursuant to TCO art. 77 par. 2, the obligations
that have already been performed by the debtor create a case of unjust enrichment in
the assets of the creditor (condictio ob causam finitam).63 Thus, the enriched party
must restitute this performance upon the retroactive termination of the contract, in
accordance with the provisions pertaining to unjust enrichment (TCO arts.
79–82).64
On the other hand, in the case of termination, the obligations that have already
been performed are not affected. The termination will end only the obligations to be
performed.
25.7 Set-Off 65
25.7.1 General66
In general terms, where two persons are obliged to each other and their obligations
are due and are of a similar kind, each party may set off his obligation against his
claim, provided that he has not waived the right of set-off.67 For instance, D is
obliged to pay €10,000 to C, and C is obliged to pay €8000 to D. In this case, it is
possible that D pays €10,000 to C and expects C to pay €8000, or in lieu of these
payments, D may set off his obligation against his claim. Thus, the parties’ mutual
obligations are discharged to the amount of the lesser obligation, and D becomes
60
See Chap. 10.
61
ucktritt).
62
undigung).
63
Tekinay et al. (1993), pp. 742–743.
64
Cf. Öz (1990), pp. 108–111.
65
Compensation, Verrechnung.
66
For further explanations see Aral (1994), Develio glu (2012).
67
Tercier et al. (2016), p. 469; Nomer (2015), p. 385; O guzman and Öz (2015), p. 564.
25.7 Set-Off 209
obliged to pay only €2000. It should be noted that, in this example, C may also
exercise the right of set-off, provided that he has not waived this right.
As has been seen, the right of set-off helps to preclude unnecessary transactions
relating to performance.68 Moreover, the right of set-off provides a form of security
to the party who exercises this right. In the above-mentioned example, if D, not
exercising this right, performs his obligation, he undertakes the risk of C’s
non-performance.69
According to TCO art. 143 par. 1 sent. 1, the right of set-off is exercised by a
unilateral declaration of will (intention).70 In other words, acceptance by the
counter-party is not required. However, it should be borne in mind that for certain
obligations, the legislature requires the creditor’s consent to the set-off (TCO art.
144).
Within the limits of freedom of contract, it is possible that the parties may set off
their obligations by agreement.71 Furthermore, the parties may agree that their
future mutual obligations will automatically be set off.72
25.7.2 Conditions
In order for a party to exercise a right of set-off, the following conditions must be
met: (1) each party must have a claim against the other; (2) the claims must be of the
same kind; (3) the setting-off party’s claim must be due, and his obligation must be
able to be performed; (4) the setting-off party must not have waived his right of
set-off; and (5) the party who intends to exercise the right of set-off must declare his
intention to do so.
25.7.2.1 Mutuality of Obligations
The first condition of the right of set-off is that the parties must have a claim against
each other.73 In order for a party to exercise his right of set-off, he must be obliged
to the counter-party and must have a claim against the counter-party.
68
Oguzman and Öz (2015), p. 565; Eren (2015), p. 1274; Feyzio glu (1977), pp. 482–483.
69
Tekinay et al. (1993), p. 1012; Oguzman and Öz (2015), p. 565.
70
Déclaration de volonté, Willenserkl€arung.
71
Engel (1997), p. 670; Tercier et al. (2016), p. 470; Eren (2015), p. 1275; Nomer (2015), p. 385;
72
von Tuhr and Escher (1974), § 79, III, pp. 208–209; O guzman and Öz (2015), p. 566; Eren
(2015), p. 1275.
73
Tercier et al. (2016), p. 472; Eren (2015), p. 1275; Oguzman and Öz (2015), p. 566; Thévenoz
and Werro (2012), art. 120, N. 2; Tercier (2004), p. 275; Gauch et al. (2008), p. 206.
The obligations to be set off do not have to arise from the same obligational
relationship; they may also arise from different obligational relationships.74 For
instance, the lessee D is obliged to pay €10,000 to the lessor C with respect to a
lease contract. However, C must pay a tort compensation of €12,000 to D. In this
case, even though the parties’ mutual obligations arise from different obligational
relationships, these obligations may be set off by a unilateral declaration by one
party.
In the above-mentioned example, consider that the lessor C assigns his claim
against D to a third party. In this case, neither C nor D may exercise the right of
set-off. This is because the condition relating to the mutuality of the claims is no
longer met. It should be noted that for the same reason, a surety is not entitled to set
off his obligation arising from the surety contract against the principal debtor’s
obligation to the creditor. However, pursuant to TCO art. 140, so long as the
principal debtor has a right of set-off against the creditor, the surety may refuse
to perform his obligation.
In certain cases, a party may have contracted for the benefit of a third party. For
instance, in a sale contract, the parties agree that the buyer pays €10,000 for the
price of goods sold to a third party. In this case, even if the seller is obliged to pay
€8000 to the buyer, the buyer is not entitled to set off his obligation against the third
party with his claim relating to the seller (TCO art. 141).
If one of the parties who are mutual debtors and creditors assigns his claim to a
third party, neither party to the original obligational relationship may exercise the
right of set-off against the other. This is due to the fact that, with the assignment of
the claim, the condition relating to the mutuality of the claims is no longer met.
However, TCO art. 188 par. 2 must be considered. Assume that D is obliged to pay
€10,000 to C and C is obliged to pay €12,000 to D. Subsequently, C assigns his
claim to a third party T. In this case, D may no longer exercise the right of set-off
against C. Nevertheless, according to TCO art. 188 par. 2, if the debtor D’s counter-
claim was not yet due at the time he became aware of the assignment by C, he may
set off the counter-claim on the condition that it becomes due before or simulta-
neously with the assigned claim.75
25.7.2.2 Obligations of the Same Kind
The second condition of the right of set-off is that the claims must be of the same
kind.76 Pecuniary obligations are of the same kind, and thus, they may be set off.
Indeed, in practice, generally pecuniary obligations are set off. However,
74
Feyzioglu (1977), pp. 496–497; Oguzman and Öz (2015), p. 567; Eren (2015), p. 1277.
75
See Sect. 32.2.3.3.
76
Tercier (2004), p. 276; Thévenoz and Werro (2012), art. 120, N. 11; O
p. 568; Feyzioglu (1977), p. 494; Oser and Sch€onenberger (1929), art. 120, N. 7; Gauch et al.
(2008), p. 207.
25.7 Set-Off 211
obligations other than pecuniary obligations may also be set off, provided that they
are of the same kind or nature.77 For instance, D is obliged to transfer 2 tons of
wheat to C, and C is obliged to transfer 3 tons of wheat to D. In this case, these
obligations may be set off as they are of the same kind.
At this point, it is worth discussing whether or not pecuniary obligations in
national currency and foreign currency are considered to be of the same kind. For
example, consider that D is obliged to pay €10,000 to C and C is obliged to pay TL
12,000 to D. If the parties have agreed that D must perform his obligation literally,
the parties’ obligations are not deemed to be of the same kind. However, if the
contract does not require literal performance, then D may perform the obligation in
the national currency (TCO art. 99 par. 2). If D elects this alternative, then he may
set off the obligation with his claim against C.78
25.7.2.3 Maturity and Performability of the Obligations
The third condition of the right of set-off is that the setting-off party’s claim must be
due and his obligation must be able to be performed.79 According to TCO art.
139 par. 1, the parties’ mutual obligations of the same kind must be due. However,
in cases where the time limit is to the advantage of the debtor, even if the debtor’s
obligation is not due, he may exercise the right of set-off, provided that his counter-
claim is due. This is because in cases where the time limit is to the advantage of the
debtor, early performance is possible (TCO art. 96).80 Since the debtor may perform
his obligation before it becomes due, it is reasonable to accept that he may exercise
the right of set-off prior to the due date.
Pursuant to TCO art. 142, where the debtor has become bankrupt, the creditors
may set off their claims, even if they are not yet due, against the debts that are owed
to the bankrupted party.
It should be acknowledged that it is possible for the setting-off party’s claim to
be disputed. Even if this is the case, he may still set off his obligation against his
counter-claim (TCO art. 139 par. 2). If the legislature had not enacted this provi-
sion, the debtor could intentionally create a dispute in order to preclude the counter-
party exercising his right of set-off. However, if it is subsequently discovered that
the setting-off party’s disputed claim had never existed or is extinguished, then the
set-off is void.81
77
78
Engel (1997), pp. 672–673; Eren (2015), p. 1276, cf. Oguzman and Öz (2015), p. 569.
79
Thévenoz and Werro (2012), art. 120, N. 8; Tercier (2004), p. 277; Eren (2015), p. 1278;
Tekinay et al. (1993), p. 1017; O guzman and Öz (2015), p. 570; Oser and Sch€ onenberger
(1929), art. 120, N. 8; Gauch et al. (2008), pp. 208–209.
80
See Sect. 18.3.5.
81
guzman and Öz (2015), pp. 571–572.
25.7.2.4 Non-existence of a Waiver
The fourth condition of the right of set-off is that the setting-off party must not have
waived his right of set-off.82 According to TCO art. 145, a debtor may waive his
right of set-off in advance.83 In such a case, it is evident that the debtor no longer
has the right of set-off and, thus, may not exercise it.
It should be kept in mind that a debtor or creditor may waive this right after the
other conditions for set-off have been met. In such a case, he may not exercise the
right of set-off either.84
25.7.2.5 Declaration of Set-off
The fifth condition of the right of set-off is that the party who intends to exercise the
right of set-off must declare his intention to do so.85 This declaration does not
require a specific form.86 The setting-off party must have both the capacity to act
and the authority to dispose87 of his claim.88 The declaration of set-off must be
addressed to the counter-party, and it becomes effective when it reaches him (TCO
art. 143 par. 1 sent. 1). The declaration of set-off may also be raised in a
pending case.
In certain cases, in order for a debtor to exercise the right of set-off, the creditor’s
consent is necessary. According to TCO art. 144, the following claims may not be
set off without the creditor’s consent:
1. Claims relating to the return of or the value of bailed objects. If the subject
matter of the bailment is a specific item, this provision may not be relied upon.
This is because in such a case, the second condition of set-off, which requires
claims to be of the same kind, cannot be satisfied. Therefore, this provision may
only be applied to fungible goods or the value of specific objects.89
2. Claims relating to the return of or the value of objects unlawfully obtained or
retained by fraud. The legislature disapproves of a creditor who is a victim of tort
or fraud being faced with a set-off without his consent.
82
Engel (1997), p. 680; Tercier (2004), p. 278; O
guzman and Öz (2015), p. 573; Reiso glu (2014),
p. 422; Gauch et al. (2008), pp. 209–210.
83
A waiver is an agreement between the debtor and creditor (pactum de non compensando), and
not a unilateral legal transaction by either party. Gauch et al. (2008), p. 210; Tercier (2004),
pp. 278–279, on the contrary see Engel (1997), p. 680.
84
85
Tercier (2004), p. 274; Engel (1997), p. 675; Nomer (2015), p. 385; Tercier et al. (2016), p. 471;
86
87
88
89
25.7 Set-Off 213
3. Claims that are necessary for the subsistence of the debtor and his family and
that must be paid directly to the creditor due to their nature, such as alimony and
wages. If the legislature had not set out this provision, certain creditors with low
incomes would be deprived of the minimum amount necessary for their and their
families’ subsistence, on account of the debtors’ declaration of set-off.
In addition, according to TCO art. 407 par. 2, an employer is not entitled to set
off a claim on his employee against the employee’s salary without the latter’s
consent. However, if the employee has intentionally caused damage to the
employer, which has been determined by a decision of a court, the employer’s
claim for compensation may be set off against the employee’s salary but only to the
extent of the seizable part of his salary as determined by law.
It is relevant to note that claims relating to life annuities, compensation for loss
of support and a grantee’s claims arising from a life-long support agreement may
also not be set off without the creditor’s consent.90
25.7.3 Consequences
When a declaration of set-off reaches the counter-party, the parties’ mutual obli-
gations are discharged to the extent of the lesser obligation. Moreover, these
obligations are deemed to be discharged at the earliest possible time that they
could have been set off (TCO art. 143 par. 1 sent. 2). For instance, S sells a car to
B for €10,000, and B’s obligation becomes due on 1 July 2016 in accordance with
the parties’ agreement. Furthermore, S is also obliged to pay €7000 to B, and this
obligation becomes due on 1 August 2016. Consider that B exercises his right of
set-off on 1 December 2016. In such a case, it is apparent that S’s obligation is
discharged completely, whereas B’s obligation is discharged partially, being
reduced to €3000. In this case, even though B exercised his right of set-off on
1 December 2016, this has a retroactive effect and extinguishes the parties’ obli-
gations at the earliest possible time B could have exercised his right of set-off. That
is to say, B’s set-off is effective as of 1 August 2016. Clearly, the conditions of B’s
right of set-off are met on this date because that is when S’s obligation falls due.
Moreover, it is worth analysing certain cases in order to examine the retroactive
effect of set-off:
1. In the above-mentioned example, it is evident that if B does not perform his
obligation on 1 July 2016, then he falls into default (TCO art. 117 par. 2) and
becomes liable for default interest. However, even though B exercises his right
of set-off on 1 December 2016, due to the retroactive effect of set-off, his default
is extinguished as of 1 August 2016 and his obligation to pay default interest on
90
Engel (1997), p. 679; Feyzio
glu (1977), pp. 510–511; Eren (2015), p. 1279; O
guzman and Öz
(2015), p. 576.
the sum of €10,000 is extinguished. Thereafter he will be liable for the default
interest only on the balance of €3000.
2. Consider that S pledges his claim to a third party or S’s creditors seize this claim
against B on 1 October 2016. When B exercises his right of set-off on
1 December 2016, and since this set-off is effective retroactively as of 1 August
2016, the pledge constituted by S on the claim on 1 October 2016 is partially
extinguished to the extent of the sum of €7,000. The same also holds true for the
seizure by S’s creditors on 1 October 2016.91
3. Special customs governing commercial current accounts are reserved (TCO art.
143 par. 2). In fact, the time when the set-off of mutual claims entered in a
current account becomes effective is determined, first and foremost, according to
special customs. In the absence of such special customs, the provisions of the
Turkish Commercial Code will apply (TComC art. 90).92
4. If a creditor brings an action for a time-barred claim, the debtor may raise as a
defence that the claim is time-barred. Therefore, a creditor may not set off his
time-barred claim against the debtor’s counter-claim. However, due to the
retroactive effect of set-off, a time-barred claim may be set off on the condition
that it was not time-barred at the time when the conditions of the right of set-off
were first met (TCO art. 139 par. 3).
References
Aral F (1994) Türk borçlar hukukunda takas. Savaş, Ankara

Develioglu HM (2012) Takas. Vedat, İstanbul
Dural M (1976) Borçlunun sorumlu olmadı gı sonraki imkânsızlık (bk. 117). İstanbul
Ercoşkun Şenol HK (2016) Borçlar hukukunda kısmi imkânsızlık. On iki levha, İstanbul
Gümüş MA (2015) Türk-İsviçre borçlar hukukunda ibra s€ ozleşmesi. Vedat, İstanbul
Helvacı İ (2008) Eski medenı̂ kanunumuzla karşılaştırmalı olarak Türk medenı̂ kanununa g€
ore
s€ozleşmeden dogan ipotek hakkı. On iki levha, İstanbul
Koyuncuoglu T (1972) Türk ve İsviçre hukukunda borcun yenilenmesi (novatio). İstanbul
91
Oguzman and Öz (2015), pp. 577–578.
92
Eren (2015), p. 1281; Reiso
glu (2014), p. 423; O
References 215
Kurt LM (2016) Borçlunun sorumlu olmadı gı sonraki imkânsızlık. Yetkin, Ankara

Nomer HN, Engin Bİ (2017) Türk borçlar kanunu şerhi, € ozel borç ilişkileri, Volume 1: satış
s€ozleşmesi. Seçkin, Ankara
Önay I (2016) Yenileme. On iki levha, İstanbul
Öz T (1990) Sebepsiz zenginleşme. Kazancı, İstanbul
Tandogan H (1990) Özel borç ilişkileri, vol I/1. Evrim, İstanbul
Tekinay SS, Akman S, Burcuoglu H, Altop A (1993) Tekinay borçlar hukuku genel hükümler.
Filiz, İstanbul
İstanbul
Toksal BM (1956) Hukuki cephesiyle hesabı cari. İstanbul
Turanboy KN (1998) İbra s€ ozleşmesi. Ankara
Chapter 26
Limitation Period
26.1 General1
As a rule, claims are subject to limitation periods.2 When an obligation becomes

time-barred, it remains valid but becomes a natural obligation.3 Thus, the debtor
may perform the time-barred obligation or raise a defence that the claim is time-
barred. When the debtor asserts that the obligation is time-barred, the court must
dismiss the case provided that this defence is not contrary to the principles of good
faith (TCC art. 2 par. 2).4
As mentioned above, even if the obligation is time-barred, the debtor may
nevertheless fulfil it, and this fulfilment will not constitute an unjust enrichment
(TCO art. 78 par. 2). Essentially, a time-barred obligation is a type of natural
obligation.5 Furthermore, even if the debtor does not know that the obligation is
time-barred and fulfils the obligation, the debtor is not entitled to assert that he
fulfilled the obligation in the erroneous belief that he was obliged to do so. This is
because a time-barred obligation is not an extinguished obligation.6
1
Aybay (2011), pp. 162–169; Becker (1941), Vorbemerkungen zu art. 127-142, art. 127-142;
Berger (2012), pp. 478–496; Engel (1997), pp. 795–824; Eren (2015), pp. 1281–1298; Feyzio glu
(1977), pp. 518–606; Gauch et al. (2008), pp. 217–239; Honsell et al. (2003), Vorbemerkungen zu
art. 127-142, art. 127-142; Kılıçoglu (2013), pp. 866–898; Nomer (2015), pp. 391–410; Oser
and Sch€onenberger (1929), Vorbemerkung zu art. 127-142, art. 127-142; O guzman and Öz (2015),
pp. 579–606; Reisoglu (2014), pp. 424–440; Schwenzer (2009), pp. 519–533; Tekinay et al.
and Werro (2012), art. 127-142, and von Tuhr and Escher (1974), pp. 211–235.
2
Prescription, Verj€
ahrung. For further explanations see Akçay (2010), Erdem (2010).
3
Tekinay et al. (1993), p. 1030.
4
Eren (2015), p. 1298; O guzman and Öz (2015), pp. 602–603.
5
See Sect. 21.2.3.
6
Tercier (2004), p. 288; Berger (2012), p. 478; O

218 26 Limitation Period
The judge may not take into consideration ex officio the fact that an obligation
has become time-barred. This defence may only be raised by the debtor (TCO art.
161).
26.2 Limitation Periods
26.2.1 Ten Years
According to TCO art. 146, unless otherwise provided by law, all claims become
time-barred after 10 years.
26.2.2 Five Years
In certain cases, the legislature determines the limitation period to be 5 years.

Pursuant to TCO art. 147, the following claims become time-barred after 5 years:
(1) periodic payments such as rent, capital interest and wages. However, if the
rental fee is to be paid non-periodically or if the capital interest is to be added to
the capital, these claims become time-barred after 10 years.7 Furthermore,
default interest is not covered by this article8;
(2) accommodation fees at such places as hotels, motels, bed and breakfasts and
resorts and food and beverage costs at restaurants and other such places;
(3) claims arising from small-scale retail sales and work performed by artisans on a
small scale;
(4) in a partnership, claims arising out of the partnership contract, which are
between partners or between partners and the partnership; claims arising
between the directors, agents or auditors of the partnership and the partnership
or the partners;
(5) claims arising from agency contracts, commission and agent contracts or
brokerage contracts except those relating to commercial brokerage fees; and
(6) claims arising from work contracts, except those relating to non- or improper
performance by the contractor based on gross fault (culpa lata).
7
8
Tercier et al. (2016), p. 485; Nomer (2015), p. 398; O
26.2 Limitation Periods 219
26.2.3 Mandatory Limitation Periods
The limitation periods regulated under the second chapter of the third title of the
Turkish Code of Obligations are mandatory. Thus, they cannot be amended by
agreement between the parties. Even if such an amendment is agreed upon, it will
be void (TCO art. 148).
26.2.4 Commencement of Limitation Periods
26.2.4.1 General
The limitation period commences when the obligation becomes due (TCO art.
149 par. 1). It is useful to remember that in cases where the time of performance
is determined, the claim becomes due when the time limit expires. In such cases,
immediate performance may not be claimed. In other words, the creditor must wait
for the obligation to become due.9 Therefore, it is evident that the limitation period
does not begin until the claim falls due.
In contrast, according to TCO art. 90, if the time of performance is not deter-
mined either by the parties’ agreement, by the nature of the legal transaction or by
the law itself, the obligation falls due immediately. Accordingly, immediate per-
formance may be demanded.10 Therefore, in cases in which the time of perfor-
mance is not determined, the limitation period commences as soon as the obligation
arises.11
It is possible that the taking effect of the obligation may depend upon the
occurrence of a future uncertain event. In such a case, the obligation takes effect
only when and if the event occurs. This is referred to as a suspensive condition
(condition precedent).12 In cases where there is a suspensive condition, the limita-
tion period starts when the condition is fulfilled.13
In certain cases, the maturity of the claim depends on the giving of notice by the
creditor. Thus, if the creditor does not give notice, then the claim will not become
due, and the limitation period will not commence.14 That is why the legislature
accepts that where an obligation falls due on the giving of notice by the creditor, the
limitation period commences as soon as such notice is able to be given (TCO art.
9
See Sect. 18.2.
10
See Sect. 18.1.
11
Engel (1997), p. 803; Thévenoz and Werro (2012), art. 130, N. 6; Feyzioglu (1977), p. 537;
Oguzman and Öz (2015), p. 587; Reiso glu (2014), p. 431, compare to Tekinay et al. (1993),
pp. 1044–1045.
12
See Sect. 29.2.
13
Feyzioglu (1977), pp. 538–539; O
glu (2014), p. 432.
14
See Sect. 18.2.
149 par. 2). Essentially, if the legislature had not set this provision, the creditor
could preclude the maturity of the claim and, thus, the commencement of the
limitation period.15
If the maturity of the claim depends on the giving of notice by the debtor, then
TCO art. 149 par. 2 will not apply.16 Consequently, in such a case, the limitation
period will commence when the obligation falls due. If TCO art. 149 par. 2 were to
be applied to such cases, the debtor, by failing to give notice on maturity of the
obligation, could preclude the creditor from demanding performance. As a result,
the debtor could also cause the obligation to become time-barred.17
26.2.4.2 In Case of Annuities
In the case of life annuities and similar periodic obligations, the limitation period
begins to run in respect of the entire obligation when the first act of performance
that is delayed falls due (TCO art. 150 par. 1). Where the entire obligation is time-
barred, the individual obligations that have not been performed are also deemed to
be time-barred (TCO art. 150 par. 2).
26.2.5 Calculation of Limitation Periods
The day on which the limitation period commences is not included in the calcula-
tion of the limitation period, and the limitation period only expires when the last day
of the period lapses without the right, that is subject to the limitation period, being
exercised (TCO art. 151 par. 1). In the calculation of limitation periods, the pro-
visions relating to the time limits for the performance of obligations are also
applicable (TCO art. 151 par. 2).
If the last day of the limitation period corresponds to a legally recognised
holiday, then the limitation period ends on the first working day following the
holiday (TCO art. 93 par. 1).
15
Engel (1997), pp. 804–805; Tekinay et al. (1993), p. 1043; O
pp. 588–589.
16
17
Oguzman and Öz (2015), p. 588; Reiso
glu (2014), p. 432.
26.4 Prevention and Suspension of Limitation Periods 221
26.3 Effects on Ancillary Claims
When the principal claim is time-barred, the interest and other ancillary claims also
become time-barred (TCO art. 152). This article refers to both capital and default
interest.18 However, it should be noted that in cases where a claim for interest has
already been time-barred, then this article is of no relevance. Indeed, according to
TCO art. 146, the general limitation period is 10 years, whereas the limitation
period for interest on capital is 5 years (TCO art. 147). Thus, this article only applies
to claims for interest that have not become time-barred after 5 years.19
TCO art. 152 also applies to penalties. This is because penalties are ancillary
claims. Assume, for example, in a contract that includes a penalty clause that the
principal claim becomes time-barred. In such a case, if the creditor attempts to
demand that the debtor pay the penalty, then the debtor may defend the claim on the
basis that the penalty claim is time-barred due to the fact that the principal claim is
time-barred.
It should be noted that ancillary securities in rem, such as pledges or mortgages,
do not become time-barred. According to TCO art. 159, if a claim is secured by a
pledge, this does not preclude the claim from becoming time-barred. However,
even if the secured claim becomes time-barred, the creditor may demand that the
pledge be realised under the authority of the debt enforcement office. The impor-
tance of this provision is demonstrated in the following example: a debtor is obliged
to pay TL 10,000, and this obligation is secured by a pledge. After a period of time,
the principal claim becomes time-barred. In spite of this, the creditor demands
realisation of the pledge and receives TL 8000 from the debt enforcement office. In
such a case, if the creditor demands that the debtor pay the balance of TL 2000, the
debtor may at that time raise the fact that the principal claim is time-barred.
Moreover, according to TCC art. 864, when an obligation is secured by a
mortgage or other security that is entered in the land register, the limitation period
does not commence, or is suspended if it has already commenced, until after the
discharge of the mortgage or security.20
26.4 Prevention and Suspension of Limitation Periods
In certain cases, an action cannot reasonably be initiated. For instance, spouses

cannot readily sue each other given the emotions that are involved. Moreover, it is
extremely difficult for a person under guardianship to file a lawsuit against his
18
Thévenoz and Werro (2012), art. 133, N. 2; Feyzio
glu (1977), p. 605; O
p. 602, on the contrary see Nomer (2015), pp. 398–399.
19
Feyzioglu (1977), pp. 604–605; Oguzman and Öz (2015), p. 601.
20
guardian. That is why the legislature accepts that the limitation period will not
commence or will be suspended in order to protect the creditor in such cases.21
According to TCO art. 153, the limitation period does not commence or, if it has
commenced, will be suspended in the following cases:
(1) In relation to claims by children against their parents for so long as they are
under parental power. The difficulty with a child suing his parent/parents is
evident.
(2) In relation to claims by wards against their guardians or against the state in
relation to guardianship, for so long as they are under guardianship. The reason
for this provision is also due to the great difficulty of the ward suing his
guardian or the state.
(3) In relation to claims by spouses against each other during their marriage. This is
because should spouses have to bring an action against each other fearing that
the obligation will become time-barred, it would lead to conflicts within their
marriage.
(4) In relation to claims by household employees against their employers, during
the period of their employment. If household employees were required to bring
an action under the pressure of the obligation becoming time-barred, it would
jeopardise the continuing relationship with their employers. This provision
applies whether the employee’s claim arises from an employment contract or
from another obligational relationship.22
(5) In relation to a usufructuary right, as long as the debtor enjoys that right.
Indeed, in such a case, even if the creditor brings an action and the court accepts
it, as long as the debtor enjoys the usufructuary right, the creditor cannot benefit
from the court decision. This is due to the fact that the debtor retains the
usufruct for the money that he has paid. For this reason, the legislature
considers this kind of arrangement as a factor for the postponement or suspen-
sion of the limitation period.23
(6) In circumstances where the claim cannot be brought before the Turkish courts.
For example, in cases of force majeure, such as earthquakes, war, riots, it may
be impossible to bring an action for the time being. That is why the legislature
considers such circumstances to be valid reasons for the postponement or
suspension of the limitation period.
(7) In relation to cases where the capacities of the debtor and the creditor are
merged in the same person. Where this merger is terminated retroactively, the
limitation period will be suspended until the time of termination.
It should be added that there are other factors that preclude the commencement
or the continuation of the limitation period. For example, as mentioned above,
21
Thévenoz and Werro (2012), art. 134, N. 1; Tekinay et al. (1993), p. 1052; O
guzman and Öz
(2015), p. 589; Eren (2015), p. 1291.
22
Feyzioglu (1977), pp. 571–572; O
23
26.5 Interruption of Limitation Periods 223
according to TCC art. 864, while an obligation is secured by a mortgage or other

security entered in the land registry, the limitation period does not commence, or is
suspended if it has already commenced.24
The period of limitation begins or continues from the end of the day on which the
circumstances that preclude the commencement or the continuation of the limita-
tion period cease to have effect (TCO art. 153 par. 2).
It should be kept in mind that in cases where an obligation is secured by the
debtor’s mortgage or by a third party’s mortgage with the consent of the debtor,
even if the mortgage is discharged, a new limitation period starts to run. This is due
to the fact that when the debtor or a third party grants a mortgage with the consent of
the debtor, the continuity of the limitation period will be interrupted (TCO art.
154 par. 1 subcl. 1). When the circumstances that interrupted the limitation period
are terminated, a new limitation period commences ab initio (TCO art. 156 par. 1).
26.5 Interruption of Limitation Periods
26.5.1 Causes of Interruption
Pursuant to TCO art. 154, the limitation period is interrupted in the following
cases25:
(1) where the debtor acknowledges the debt, particularly if he pays interest, par-
tially fulfils the obligation, gives a pledge or mortgage or provides a surety. The
debtor’s acknowledgement of debt may be in oral or written form. In any case,
the declaration of will (intention)26 relating to the acknowledgement of debt
must be directed to the creditor.27 In addition, the debtor’s acknowledgement of
debt may be implicit. For example, as mentioned above, where the debtor
provides a surety or pledges a chattel or mortgages immovable property, these
legal transactions are considered to be acknowledgements of debt. Further, if the
debtor exercises a right of set-off and thus, partially extinguishes the obligation,
this is also considered to be an implicit acknowledgement of debt.28 It should be
kept in mind that if a third party performs the obligation wholly or partially, pays
interest, gives a pledge or a mortgage or provides a surety, these may only
interrupt the limitation period subject to the consent of the debtor29; and
24
25
For further explanations see Ergenekon (1960).
26
arung.
27
Feyzioglu (1977), p. 581; Oguzman and Öz (2015), p. 594; Tercier et al. (2016), p. 491.
28
Feyzioglu (1977), pp. 580–581; Eren (2015), p. 1293; Oguzman and Öz (2015), p. 594; Tercier
et al. (2016), p. 491.
29
Oguzman and Öz (2015), p. 594; Reiso glu (2014), p. 434; Feyzio
glu (1977), p. 581.
(2) where the creditor brings an action, or raises a defence before a court or an
arbitration tribunal, initiates enforcement proceedings or files a claim in bank-
ruptcy proceedings.
In cases where the limitation period is interrupted, a new limitation period
commences, and, in principle, this new period has the same duration as the previous
period. In other words, if the interrupted limitation period is 10 years, then the new
period will also be 10 years, or if the interrupted limitation period is 5 years, then
the new period will also be 5 years (cf. TCO art. 156 par. 1).30
26.5.2 Effects of Interruption Among Co-debtors
In certain cases, several debtors may be jointly and severally liable for an obliga-
tion. Where the limitation period is interrupted for one person who is jointly and
severally liable for an obligation, it is also interrupted for the other joint and several
debtors (TCO art. 155 par. 1).
In addition, an indivisible obligation may be owed by several debtors. In this
case, each debtor is liable to carry out the entire obligation (TCO art. 85 par. 2).31
Where the limitation period is interrupted for one debtor who is liable to perform
an indivisible obligation, it is also interrupted for the other debtors (TCO art.
155 par. 1).
In obligations secured by a suretyship contract, if the limitation period for the
principal debtor is interrupted, then it is also interrupted for the surety (TCO art.
155 par. 2). However, where the limitation period for the surety is interrupted, it is
not interrupted for the principal debtor (TCO art. 155 par. 3).
26.5.3 Commencement of a New Limitation Period
26.5.3.1 In Case of Acknowledgement of Debt or Judgment
When a limitation period is interrupted, the new limitation period has the same
duration as the previous period (TCO art. 156 par. 1). Actually, this is not explicitly
stated in this article. However, it can be inferred by way of argumentum a contrario
from the second paragraph of the said article as it states that when the obligation has
been acknowledged by the issue of a document or determined by a court or
arbitration tribunal decision, the new limitation period will be 10 years.32
30
See Sect. 26.5.3.1.
31
See Sect. 15.3.
32
Tekinay et al. (1993), p. 1062; O
glu (2014), p. 437.
26.6 Extension of the Limitation Period 225
26.5.3.2 In Case of Acts by the Creditor
Where the limitation period is interrupted by the filing of a lawsuit or any pleading,
a new limitation period commences on any action taken by the parties relating to the
proceedings or any decision or ruling by the court during the litigation (TCO art.
157 par. 1).
Where the limitation period is interrupted by enforcement proceedings, a new
limitation period commences after each act during enforcement of the claim (TCO
art. 157 par. 2).
Where the limitation period is interrupted by the filing of a claim in a bank-
ruptcy, a new limitation period commences as of the time when the claim can be
reasserted according to the provisions relating to bankruptcy (TCO art. 157 par. 3).
26.6 Extension of the Limitation Period
Only a duly brought action or defence may interrupt the limitation period. However,
an action or a defence may be dismissed on account of (1) a court having no
jurisdiction in relation to the subject matter or having no territorial jurisdiction,
(2) a defect that can be corrected or (3) prematurity. In addition, the limitation
period may expire during these proceedings. In such a case, the legislature grants an
additional period of 60 days to the creditor for reasserting the claim (TCO art. 158).
It should be noted that in the Turkish legal system, certain rights must be exercised
within a specific time period.33 For instance, legal and nominated heirs have the right
to disclaim the inheritance that has accrued to them (TCC art. 605 par. 1). The heirs
must exercise this right within 3 months (TCC art. 606 par. 1).34 If an heir does not
make his declaration to the court within this period of time, then he will be deprived of
the right to disclaim the inheritance. In addition, the court must take into consideration
ex officio whether or not the period of time to disclaim the inheritance has expired.
That is why this period of time is distinct from a limitation period.35 However,
TCO art. 158 may also be applied in cases where the exercise of a right is subject to
a period of time.
33
Péremption, Verwirkung.
34
In the case of a legal heir, the period runs from the date the heirs become aware of the death of
the deceased, unless they can prove that they were not aware of their entitlement until a later time;
and, in the case of a nominated heir, the period runs from the date on which they were officially
notified of the disposition in their favour (TCC art. 606 par. 2). For further explanations see
Helvacı (2014), p. 73 ff.
35
Engel (1997), p. 798.
26.7 Waiver36
A debtor may not waive his right of defence arising from a limitation period in
advance (TCO art. 160 par. 1). The fact that a debtor who is jointly and severally
liable37 has waived the limitation period may not be asserted against the other
debtors (TCO art. 160 par. 2). The same provision applies to several debtors of an
indivisible obligation38 (TCO art. 160 par. 3). The principal debtor’s waiver may
not be asserted against a surety (TCO art. 160 par. 4).
However, after expiration of the limitation period, the debtor may waive this
defence. The waiver may be express or implied. For an implied waiver, it is
necessary that the debtor has knowledge of the fact that the obligation has become
time-barred. The debtor’s acknowledgement of debt or the debtor’s provision of
security will constitute an implicit waiver only under these circumstances. More-
over, even if the debtor raises the fact that the obligation is time-barred, he may
later withdraw this defence and perform his obligation.39
References
Akçay E (2010) Türk borçlar kanunu’na g€ ore zamanaşımı. On iki levha, İstanbul
Erdem M (2010) Özel hukukta zamanaşımı. On iki levha, İstanbul
Ergenekon Y (1960) Türk borçlar hukukunda müruruzamanın kat’ı. Ankara
Feyzioğlu FN (1977) Borçlar hukuku genel hükümler, vol 2. Fakülteler, İstanbul
Helvacı İ (2008) Eski medenı̂ kanunumuzla karşılaştırmalı olarak Türk medenı̂ kanunu’na g€
ore
Helvacı İ (2014) Eski medenı̂ kanunumuzla karşılaştırmalı olarak Türk medenı̂ kanunu’na g€
ore
mirasın reddi, (mk. m. 605 - mk. m.618). Filiz, İstanbul
Oğuzman K, Öz T (2015) Borçlar hukuku genel hükümler, vol 1. Vedat, İstanbul
36
For further explanation see Paksoy (2012).
37
See Chap. 27.
38
See Sect. 15.3.
39
Oguzman and Öz (2015), p. 600, see and compare to, Oser and Sch€
onenberger, Art. 141, N: 4.
References 227

Paksoy MS (2012) Zamanaşımından feragat (tbk 160). On iki levha, İstanbul
Filiz, İstanbul
İstanbul
von Tuhr A, Escher A (1974) Allgemeiner Teil des Schweizerischen Obligationenrecht, vol 2.
Schulthess, Zürich
Part IV
Joint and Several Debtors and Creditors,
Conditions, Earnest and Forfeit Money,
and Penalty
Chapter 27
Joint and Several Debtors
27.1 General1
In certain cases, there may be several debtors liable to perform the same obliga-
tion.2 If the creditor has the right to demand that each debtor perform the entire
obligation, then these debtors are referred to as joint and several debtors.3 This
situation may only arise from a legal transaction, generally a contract, or the law
itself.
27.2 Reasons for Joint and Several Liabilities
27.2.1 Legal Transactions
According to TCO art. 162 par. 1, if each of several debtors declares that he will be
liable for the performance of the entire obligation, then they are joint and several
1
Aybay (2011), pp. 170–174; Becker (1941), Vorbemerkung zu art. 143-150, art. 143-149; Berger
pp. 302–337; Gauch et al. (2008), pp. 295–305; Honsell et al. (2003), art. 143-149; Kılıçoglu
(2013), pp. 740–754; Nomer (2015), pp. 417–423; Oser and Sch€ onenberger (1929),
Vorbemerkungen zum ersten Abschnitt (art. 143-150), art. 143-149; O guzman and Öz (2016),
pp. 458–492; Özsunay (1983), pp. 176–182; Reiso glu (2014), pp. 442–447; Schwenzer (2009),
pp. 546–560; Tekinay et al. (1993), pp. 285–327; Tercier (2004), pp. 289–297; Tercier et al.
(2016), pp. 497–510; Thévenoz and Werro (2012), art. 143-149, and von Tuhr and Escher (1974),
pp. 290–321.
2
For further explanations see Akıntürk (1971), Canyürek (2003), Da gdelen (2011),
Özdogan (2015).
3
Débiteurs solidaires, Solidarschuldnern.

232 27 Joint and Several Debtors
debtors. In other words, the creditor may demand the performance of the entire
obligation from all or any of them.4
If there is no such agreement between the debtors and the creditor, the latter may
only demand proportional performance from the debtors. For example, if D1 and D2
are obliged to pay €10,000 to C and there is no agreement for their joint and several
liability, then C may only demand that each debtor pay €5000 towards the total sum
owing of €10,000. However, it is not absolutely necessary that the liability of the
debtors is explicitly stated to be joint and several. Such liability may be inferred
from the interpretation of the legal transaction.5
Moreover, according to TComC art. 7 par. 1 sent. 1, if two or more persons are
obliged to another person on account of a transaction that is of a commercial nature
in respect of only one or all of them, then they are jointly and severally liable, unless
otherwise agreed upon by the parties or stipulated by law.
Another type of joint and several liability is created by TCO art. 201. This article
defines a cumulative assumption of debt as an agreement formed between a new
debtor and the creditor, and as a result of this agreement, the new debtor becomes
liable jointly and severally along with the existing debtor.6
Specifically, joint and several liability generally arises from contracts.7 How-
ever, it may also arise from a unilateral legal transaction, such as a testamentary
disposition,8 for instance, a testator declares that all of his legatees will be jointly
and severally liable against a third party for the payment of a certain sum of money.
27.2.2 The Law
Joint and several liability may arise from the law itself (TCO art. 162 par. 2). For
instance, according to TCC art. 641 par. 1, heirs are jointly and severally liable for
the obligations of the deceased. Furthermore, according to TCC art. 681 par. 1, heirs
will remain jointly and severally liable to the extent of their entire seizable personal
assets for the obligations of the estate even after its partition, provided that the
creditors have not explicitly or implicitly consented to the division of the liability
among the heirs or to its delegation to one or more of them. This liability continues
for a period of 5 years. This time limit starts on the date of partition in respect of the
debts that are due; for debts that are not yet due, the time limit starts on the date they
become due (TCC art. 681 par. 2).9
4
5
Tekinay et al. (1993), p. 293; Feyzio
glu (1977), p. 305; O
6
See Sect. 33.3.
7
Tercier (2004), p. 293.
8
Oser and Sch€onenberger (1929), art. 143, N. 3; Tekinay et al. (1993), p. 294; Eren (2015),
p. 1204; Oguzman and Öz (2016), p. 468; Thévenoz and Werro (2012), art. 143, N. 6.
9
Dural and Öz (2015), p. 526.
27.3 Relationship Between the Debtors and the Creditor 233
For joint and several liabilities that arise from the Turkish Code of Obligations,
the following may be given as examples: where several persons have jointly
borrowed an object (art. 382) or where an agent has been appointed by several
persons (art. 511) or where several bailees jointly receive a chattel (art. 567). In
each case, they become jointly and severally liable. Moreover, in an ordinary
partnership, if the partners have jointly or through an agent undertaken a certain
obligation towards a third party within the scope of the partnership, then they
become jointly and severally liable, unless otherwise agreed (art. 638 par. 3).
27.3 Relationship Between the Debtors and the Creditor
27.3.1 Liability of the Debtors
According to TCO art. 163, a creditor may demand partial or full performance from
one or all of the debtors. As long as the obligation is not entirely fulfilled, the
debtors’ liability stands.10 For instance, D1 and D2 are jointly and severally obliged
to pay €10,000 to C. C may bring an action against either D1 or D2 for the payment
of the entire obligation, or C may bring an action against both D1 and D2 for the
payment of the entire obligation. However, C may not collect more than €10,000.
Moreover, C may demand that D1 pay €5000 and that D2 pay €5000.11
In the aforementioned example, even if C demands that D1 pay the entire
obligation, D2 may nevertheless perform the obligation. Furthermore, whether or
not the creditor brings an action against only one of the debtors is irrelevant. In
other words, until the obligation is fulfilled entirely, even if C has brought an action
against one of the debtors, the other debtor may nevertheless fulfil the obligation.12
Moreover, even if the creditor brings an action against one of the joint and
several debtors, he still has the right to bring an action against the other debtors.13
The other debtors may not raise as a defence that the creditor has already com-
menced proceedings against one of the other debtors, even if the court has accepted
the case.14
It is evident that if the creditor brings an action against one of the joint and
several debtors, the court decision may not bind the other debtors and may not be
enforceable against them.
10
11
Feyzioglu (1977), p. 317; Tekinay et al. (1993), p. 285; Oguzman and Öz (2016), p. 471; Nomer
(2015), p. 417.
12
13
Oser and Sch€onenberger (1929), art. 144, N. 3; Engel (1997), p. 839; Berger (2012), p. 842.
14
27.3.2 Defences of the Debtors
27.3.2.1 Personal Defences
According to TCO art. 164 par. 1, one of the joint and several debtors may raise a
defence that results from his personal relationship with the creditor. The reason for
this provision is that if an ordinary debtor loses the right to rely on certain personal
defences as a result of becoming a joint and several debtor, then this will be unfair
to him. Therefore, if one of the joint and several debtors becomes a party to the
contract due to mistake, fraud or duress or has performed his obligation or has set
off his obligation with a counter-claim he has against the creditor, then he may raise
these defences in an action with the creditor.15
However, there is an exception to the aforementioned rule. Pursuant to TCO art.
155 par. 1, where the limitation period is interrupted for one person who is jointly
and severally liable to perform an obligation, it is also interrupted for the other joint
and several debtors. Consequently, even if the limitation period of only one of the
joint and several debtors has been interrupted, this interruption will cause the other
debtors to lose their limitation period defences and will exacerbate their position.16
27.3.2.2 Common Defences
According to TCO art. 164 par. 1, a joint and several debtor may raise defences
arising from the cause or contents of the joint and several liability. These defences
are referred to as common defences. For example, if a contract that establishes joint
and several liability is void due to lack of form, breach of mandatory rules or
immorality, then the joint and several debtors may raise these as common
defences.17
In certain cases, reasons for the nullity of a contract may arise from the
circumstances relating to only some of the joint and several debtors. For example,
only one of them may lack mental capacity (capacity of discernment) or may be
represented by an unauthorised agent at the time of the formation of the contract. In
these cases, in order to ascertain whether or not the other debtors may raise these
defences, it is necessary to determine the presumed intention of the other debtors.
That is to say, if it is presumed that the other debtors would not have concluded the
contract if they had known of this nullity, then they may raise these defences. If the
contrary is presumed, then they are not entitled to raise these defences.18
15
Eren (2015), p. 1207; O guzman and Öz (2016), p. 472; Reiso
glu (2014), p. 445.
16
Feyzioglu (1977), pp. 323–324; Oguzman and Öz (2016), p. 472; Reiso glu (2014), p. 445, cf.
Tekinay et al. (1993), pp. 299, 1057–1059; Tercier et al. (2016), p. 505.
17
Oguzman and Öz (2016), p. 473; Eren (2015), p. 1206; Tercier et al. (2016), p. 506.
18
27.3 Relationship Between the Debtors and the Creditor 235
In cases where a joint and several debtor has the right to rescind a contract, for
example due to mistake, fraud or duress, this right of rescission cannot be raised by
the other debtors in lieu of the vitiated party. However, if the party who has been
subject to, for example fraud or duress, rescinds the contract, then the other debtors
may raise this common defence.19
It should be kept in mind that if the obligation of one of the joint and several
debtors is extinguished, then this constitutes a common defence. Raising common
defences is not only a right but a duty for joint and several debtors. Pursuant to TCO
art. 164 par. 2, if a joint and several debtor does not raise common defences, then he
becomes liable against the other joint and several debtors. For instance, D1 and D2
are jointly and severally obliged to pay €10,000 to C. The debtors decide to
apportion the obligation to pay the total amount equally between them. D1 sets
off his obligation against his counter-claim of €5000 from C. Therefore, the joint
and several obligation is reduced to €5000. Despite this fact, C demands that D2 pay
the full amount of €10,000 and the latter, not raising the defence that the obligation
is reduced to €5000 because of D1’s set-off, pays it. In this case, if D2 is at fault for
not raising this common defence and attempts to seek recourse against D1 for his
share of the obligation, then D1 may refuse this demand.20
27.3.3 Personal Conduct of Individual Debtors
27.3.3.1 General
According to TCO art. 165, one of the joint and several debtors may not prejudice the
position of the other debtors by his personal conduct, unless otherwise provided by
agreement or by law. Pursuant to this article, if a joint and several debtor does not raise
a common defence in the course of litigation and loses the case, this fact will not affect
the other debtors’ positions. In other words, the creditor will have to bring an action
against the other debtors, and they remain entitled to raise common defences.21
If some of the joint and several debtors, agreeing with the creditor, wish to
accept a penalty clause, increase the amount of the obligation or shorten the period
for maturity of the obligation, these terms will only bind those who accept them.
The creditor is not entitled to rely on his rights resulting from this variation of the
contract as against the other debtors. It is evident that if a joint and several debtor,
for example, pays the penalty or pays the increased amount, then he may not have
recourse to the remaining debtors who have not concluded any additional obliga-
tions under the contract.22
19
20
21
Oguzman and Öz (2016), p. 480; Eren (2015), pp. 1207–1208.
22
Reisoglu (2014), p. 445; O
If one of the joint and several debtors fails to perform an obligation and becomes
liable for payment of compensation for the creditor’s damage, then this liability will
not affect the other debtors.23 The creditor may only demand compensation from
the debtor in breach.24
27.3.3.2 Exceptions
There is an exception to TCO art. 165. According to TCO art. 155 par. 1, where the
limitation period is interrupted for one person who is jointly and severally liable for
an obligation, it is also interrupted for the other joint and several debtors. If only one
of the joint and several debtors acknowledges the debt, partially performs the
obligation, pays a certain amount of interest or provides certain securities, then
this conduct interrupts the limitation period, and the other debtors will be affected
by this interruption. Consequently, the other debtors are not entitled to raise TCO
art. 165 as a defence.25
As mentioned above, at the time of the formation of the contract that gives rise to
joint and several liability, the parties may agree that the conduct of one of the joint
and several debtors can exacerbate the position of the other debtors. For instance,
the parties may agree that if one of the joint and several debtors breaches the
contract, all joint and several debtors will be liable for compensation for the damage
suffered by the creditor.
27.4 Extinguishment of the Obligation
According to TCO art. 166 par. 1, if one of the joint and several debtors extin-
guishes the obligation wholly or partially by performance or by set-off, the other
debtors will also be discharged to that extent. For instance, D1 and D2 are jointly
and severally obliged to pay €10,000 to C. D1 sets off his obligation against his
counter-claim of €5000 from C. In this case, the creditor may only demand the
remaining €5000 from the debtors.26
Pursuant to TCO art. 166 par. 2, if one of the joint and several debtors is
discharged from an obligation without performance, then the other debtors may
benefit from this fact only to the extent that the circumstances or the nature of the
obligation allows. For example, if the performance of the obligation becomes
23
von Tuhr and Escher (1974), § 90, V, 2, p. 307; Thévenoz and Werro (2012), art. 146, N. 3;
Tercier (2004), p. 294.
24
Tercier et al. (2016), p. 505; Nomer (2015), p. 419.
25
Oguzman and Öz (2016), pp. 481–482; Reiso glu (2014), p. 445; Nomer (2015), pp. 418–419.
26
Tekinay et al. (1993), p. 297; Eren (2015), p. 1213; O guzman and Öz (2016), p. 477; Tercier
et al. (2016), p. 505; Feyzio glu (1977), p. 328.
27.5 Relationship Between the Debtors Themselves 237
impossible without any fault on the part of any of the joint and several debtors, then
all debtors will be discharged from the obligation.27 It should be noted that if the
obligation becomes impossible to perform by all joint and several debtors due to
fault on the part of one of them, then only the debtor who is at fault will be liable for
non-performance of the obligation.
If the creditor makes a discharge agreement with one of the joint and several
debtors, this agreement discharges the other joint and several debtors to the extent
of the discharged party’s share of the obligation (TCO art. 166 par. 3).
27.5 Relationship Between the Debtors Themselves28
27.5.1 Apportionment and Right of Recourse
According to TCO art. 167 par. 1, unless otherwise agreed by the joint and several
debtors or unless inferred from the nature of the legal relationship between them,
each debtor must assume an equal share of the performance carried out in favour of
the creditor. In light of this provision, joint and several debtors may determine their
share of the performance when they have recourse to each other in the future, or this
determination may arise from the nature of the legal relationship between the
debtors. Furthermore, if there is no such determination, then it is presumed that
their shares will be equal.29
If one of the joint and several debtors performs the obligation partially or wholly,
then he does not have to bear the consequences of this performance; he may have
recourse to the other debtors. However, in order for a joint and several debtor to
have recourse to the other debtors, he must have performed more than his share, and
he may only have recourse to the other debtors in accordance with the apportion-
ment of the obligation between them (TCO art. 167 par. 2).
It is worth considering examples in order to analyse these provisions. For
instance, D1 and D2 are jointly and severally obliged to pay €10,000 to C. The
debtors decide that D1’s share will be 25% and D2’s share will be 75% of the
obligation. In this case, if D1 pays the entire obligation, he may have recourse to D2
for his share of the obligation. That is to say, D2 will have to pay €7500 to D1. In
another example, D1 and D2 are jointly and severally obliged to pay €10,000 to
C. However, they do not determine how they will share the obligation between
them. In such a case, if D1 pays the entire obligation, he may have recourse to D2 in
respect of only half of the obligation (TCO art. 167 par. 1). In order for the debtor
who performs the obligation to have the right of recourse against the other debtors,
it is not necessary that he performs the entire obligation. In the above-mentioned
27
28
For further explanations see Kapancı (2015).
29
Feyzioglu (1977), p. 331; Eren (2015), pp. 1209–1210; O
example, if D1 pays €6000 to C, he may have recourse to D2 for the excess amount
of €1000.
As mentioned above, the apportionment of the liability between the joint and
several debtors may also arise from the nature of the legal relationship. For
example, several persons are co-owners of immovable property (TCC art. 688),
and they are jointly and severally liable to a creditor but do not determine their
shares as between themselves. If one of the co-owners performs the entire obliga-
tion and wishes to have recourse to the others, then their liability will be determined
according to their share in the co-ownership.30
It should be kept in mind that pursuant to TCO art. 164 par. 2, if a joint and
several debtor does not raise common defences, then he loses the right to seek
recourse as against the other debtors.
In cases where a joint and several debtor has recourse against the other debtors
but cannot recover one of the joint and several debtors’ shares as against him, the
amount that cannot be recovered must be equally distributed among the other
debtors (TCO art. 167 par. 3). In order to apply this provision, the debtor from
whom the amount cannot be recovered must be insolvent in accordance with the
provisions of the Turkish Code of Bankruptcy and Enforcement.31 For instance, D1,
D2 and D3 are jointly and severally obliged to pay €300,000 to C. The debtors
decide to apportion the total amount of the obligation equally between them. D1
pays the entire obligation and subsequently has recourse to D2 and D3. However, D3
is insolvent. In this case, D3’s share will be assumed equally by D1 and D2.
Consequently, D2 will pay first his share of €100,000 and half of D3’s share,
€50,000.
27.5.2 Subrogation
Pursuant to TCO art. 168 par. 1, a joint and several debtor who has the right of
recourse against the other debtors is subrogated to the creditor’s rights to the extent
of his performance. The legislature aims to protect the joint and several debtor who
has performed more than his share by providing him with the right of recourse. In
addition, the legislature gives a right of subrogation to him.32 For example, D1 and
D2 are jointly and severally obliged to pay €100,000 to C. The debtors decide to
apportion the obligation equally between them. A third party P pledges certain
movable properties, and another third party S provides surety. If D1 performs the
entire obligation, it is evident that he may have recourse against D2. In addition,
30
31
Oguzman and Öz (2016), p. 490; Tekinay et al. (1993), p. 319; Reiso
glu (2014), p. 446; Nomer
(2015), p. 422.
32
References 239
according to TCO. art. 168 par. 1, D1 is subrogated to the creditor’s rights and, thus,
becomes entitled to the benefit of the pledge and the surety.
It is worth adding a second possibility. In the above-mentioned case, if D1 pays
€70,000, then he may have recourse against D2 only for €20,000. In addition, as he
is subrogated to the creditor’s rights to the extent of his performance, he will also
obtain the benefit from the pledge and the surety to that extent. That is to say, the
securities provided by P and S continue to secure C’s remaining claim of €30,000
while also securing D1’s claim by way of recourse against D2 for €20,000. It should
be noted that C will be the primary beneficiary of the securities.33
According to TCO art. 168 par. 2, if the creditor improves the legal position of
one of the joint and several debtors to the detriment of the other debtors, he must
bear its consequences. This provision especially aims to preclude the creditor from
releasing the securities to the detriment of the other debtors. For example, D1 and
D2 are jointly and severally obliged to pay €100,000 to C. The debtors decide to
share the obligation equally between them. A third party M provides a mortgage.
Subsequently, C releases M’s mortgage and then brings an action against D1. D1
performs the entire obligation and wishes to have recourse to D2. However, D2
cannot pay his share. In this case, since D1 has lost his entitlement in respect of M’s
mortgage due to C’s act, he may demand that C compensate him for damage arising
from the release of the mortgage. This is due to the fact that if C had not released the
mortgage when D1 had recourse to D2, then he would have been in a position to
realise the mortgage and recover D2’s share of the obligation.
References
Akıntürk T (1971) Müteselsil borçluluk. Ankara

Canyürek M (2003) Müteselsil borçlulukta iç ve dış ilişkiler. Vedat, İstanbul
Dagdelen AH (2011) 818 ve 6098 sayılı borçlar kanunlarında borçlular arasında teselsül. On iki
levha, İstanbul
Dural M, Öz T (2015) Miras hukuku. Filiz, İstanbul
Kapancı KB (2015) Birlikte borçlulukta borçlular arası ilişkiler. Vedat, İstanbul
33
Feyzioglu (1977), pp. 336–337, fn. 58; Tekinay et al. (1993), p. 321; O
pp. 491–492.

Özdogan N (2015) Müteselsil sorumluluk. Seçkin, Ankara
Özsunay E (1983) Borçlar hukuku I. Filiz, İstanbul
Filiz, İstanbul
İstanbul
Chapter 28
Joint and Several Creditors
28.1 General1
In certain cases, there are several creditors of the same obligation.2 As long as the
obligation is divisible, each creditor may only demand partial performance.3 How-
ever, if any of these creditors have the right to demand the entire performance of the
obligation and the debtor can be discharged by performing the obligation for one of
the creditors, then there is a joint and several claim.4
According to TCO art. 169 par. 1, such joint and several claims may arise from a
legal transaction or from the law itself. The legal transaction may be a contract or a
unilateral one. A contract between the creditors and the debtor may explicitly state
that there is a joint and several claim, or this fact may be inferred from the
circumstances.5 In practice, the most common example of joint and several cred-
itors that arises from a contract is joint accounts in banking.6
In addition to contracts, unilateral legal transactions may also give rise to joint
and several claims. For example, in a testamentary disposition, a testator may
1
pp. 291–295; Honsell et al. (2003), art. 150; Kılıço glu (2013), pp. 754–757; Nomer (2015),
pp. 423–424; Oser and Sch€ onenberger (1929), art. 150; Oguzman and Öz (2016), pp. 492–501;
Özsunay (1983), pp. 174–175; Reiso glu (2014), pp. 447–450; Schwenzer (2009), pp. 560–563;
Tekinay et al. (1993), pp. 327–328; Tercier (2004), pp. 298–300; Tercier et al. (2016),
pp. 511–514; Thévenoz and Werro (2012), art. 150, and von Tuhr and Escher (1974), pp. 321–325.
2
For further explanations see Acar (2003).
3
von Tuhr and Escher (1974), § 91, I, p. 321; Eren (2015), p. 1218; Feyzio glu (1977), p. 340.
4
Solidarité entre plusieurs créanciers, Solidarit€
at unter mehreren Gl€aubigern.
5
6
Engel (1997), p. 837.

242 28 Joint and Several Creditors
bequeath a sum of money to several creditors and may indicate that any of them
may demand the entire performance.7
As mentioned above, joint and several claims may also arise from the law itself.
According to TCO art. 322 par. 3, if a lessee subleases the leased property and the
sublessee does not use the subject matter of the sublease in accordance with the
head lease, then the lessor and the lessee may demand that the sublessee use the
leased property in accordance with the terms of the lease.8
It should be noted that a joint and several claim may also arise from the fact that a
new creditor becomes a party to an existing contract, according to TCO art. 206 par.
2. Pursuant to this provision, unless the parties agree to the contrary, the existing
party and the added party who has joined become joint and several creditors.9
In cases of joint and several claims, the debtor may perform the obligation for
one of the creditors and consequently be fully discharged from the obligation (TCO
art. 169 par. 2).
28.2 Consequences
Each joint and several creditor may demand the entire performance of the obligation
from the debtor. In addition, the debtor may voluntarily perform the obligation for
any of the joint and several creditors. However, according to TCO art. 169 par. 3, if a
joint and several creditor brings an action or initiates enforcement procedures, unless
notice of this fact is served on the debtor, the latter will continue to hold the right to
perform the obligation in respect of any of the joint and several creditors.
If the debtor’s obligation becomes impossible as a consequence of the debtor’s
fault, then he must compensate the creditors for damage. In such a case, the claim
for compensation also constitutes a joint and several claim.10
Each joint and several creditor has the right to amend the conditions of the claim
by entering into an agreement with the debtor. However, this agreement and, thus,
this amendment binds only the parties who accept the variation. Moreover, a joint
and several creditor may conclude a discharge agreement with the debtor, but this
agreement may not extinguish the claim of the other joint and several creditors.11
Each joint and several creditor may assign his claim to a third party. As a result,
the assignee becomes a new joint and several creditor.12
7
8
Engel (1997), p. 833; Oguzman and Öz (2016), p. 496; Eren (2015), p. 1219; Tercier et al. (2016),
p. 513; Nomer (2015), p. 423.
9
See Sect. 34.2.
10
11
Engel (1997), p. 834; Berger (2012), p. 853; O guzman and Öz (2016), pp. 499–500; Nomer
(2015), p. 424.
12
Engel (1997), p. 834; Oguzman and Öz (2016), p. 497; Eren (2015), p. 1220.
References 243
If a security is provided for all joint and several creditors, unless otherwise
agreed, then all joint and several creditors may benefit from the security.13
Unless otherwise agreed upon or inferred from the nature of the legal transaction
between the creditors, each joint and several creditor has equal rights with regard to
the performance of the obligation (TCO art. 169 par. 4). If a joint and several
creditor obtains more than his share, he is obliged to pay the excess amount to the
other joint and several creditors (TCO art. 169 par. 5). For instance, C1 and C2 are
joint and several creditors of a claim against D. The amount of D’s obligation is
€10,000. D pays the entire obligation to C1. In such a case, unless otherwise agreed
or inferred from the nature of the legal transaction between the creditors, C1 is
obliged to pay the excess amount of €5000 to C2.14
References
Acar F (2003) Türk - İsviçre medenı̂ hukukunda alacaklılar arası teselsül. Seçkin, Ankara
Filiz, İstanbul
İstanbul
13
14
Engel (1997), p. 834.
Chapter 29
Conditional Contracts
29.1 General1
As a rule, most legal transactions, whether they are unilateral or bilateral, may be
made conditional.2 Contracts in particular, whether obligatory3 or dispositive,4 may be
made dependent on the occurrence or non-occurrence of a future uncertain event.
There are two types of condition: suspensive (precedent) and resolutive (subsequent).
In the following paragraphs, conditional contracts are analysed. However, before
considering these types of contracts, it is worth stating that certain transactions cannot
be made conditional. Especially, legal transactions pertaining to family law or the law
of persons, such as marriage or the recognition of a child, cannot be made dependent on
a condition.5 Moreover, certain transactions relating to the law of inheritance, such as
disclaimer of an inheritance, may also not be made conditional (TCC art. 609 par. 2).6
It should be kept in mind that there are certain exceptions in family law and the
law of inheritance. For instance, engagements, prenuptial agreements, testamentary
1
Aybay (2011), pp. 174–179; Becker (1941), Vorbemerkung zu art. 151-157, art. 151-157; Berger
pp. 343–372; Gauch et al. (2008), pp. 340–353; Honsell et al. (2003), Vorbemerkungen zu art.
151-157, art. 151-157; Kılıço glu (2013), pp. 758–771; Nomer (2015), pp. 424–432; Oser
and Sch€onenberger (1929), Vorbemerkungen zum zweiten Abschnitt (art. 151-157), art.
151-157; Oguzman and Öz (2016), pp. 501–529; Özsunay (1983), pp. 154–160; Reiso glu
(2014), pp. 451–455; Schwenzer (2009), pp. 63–71; Tekinay et al. (1993), pp. 328–338; Tercier
(2004), pp. 166–167; Tercier et al. (2016), pp. 283–287; Thévenoz and Werro (2012), art. 151-157,
2
For further explanations see Pulaşlı (1989), Sirmen (1992).
3
Acte générateur d’obligation, Verpflichtungsgesch€aft. See Chap. 7 fn. 5.
4
Acte de disposition, Verf€ugungsgesch€ aft. See Chap. 14 fn. 5–6.
5
Oser and Sch€onenberger (1929), Vorbemerkungen zum zweiten Abschnitt art. 151-157, N. 17;
6

246 29 Conditional Contracts
dispositions (wills) and nominations of heirs may be made dependent on a

condition.7
29.2 Suspensive Conditions (Conditions Precedent)8
29.2.1 General
A condition is an uncertain future event.9 The parties to a contract may agree that
the contract takes effect in the event that an uncertain future event occurs or fails to
occur. Moreover, one or several obligations arising from a contract may be depen-
dent on the occurrence or non-occurrence of an uncertain future event, which is
referred to as a suspensive condition or a condition precedent (TCO art. 170 par. 1).
In this book, the author prefers to use the term ‘suspensive condition’.
According to TCO art. 170 par. 2, unless otherwise agreed upon, a contract
dependent on a suspensive condition takes effect from the time the condition is
fulfilled. Even if a contract is made dependent on the occurrence of an uncertain
future event and the event has yet to happen, the contract is nevertheless in
existence. In other words, neither of the parties to this contract may unilaterally
terminate the contract.10 For instance, a father is obliged to gift a car to his son if the
son passes his university entrance exams and is admitted to a law faculty. In this
case, whether or not the son is successful in the university entrance exams and gains
admission to a law faculty is a future uncertain event—i.e., a suspensive condition.
Even if the father’s obligation to gift will only take effect if his son is successful in
the university entrance exams, a contract to gift has been entered into between the
parties, and neither party may unilaterally terminate it.
29.2.2 The Creditor’s Expectant Right
Pursuant to TCO art. 171 par. 1, as long as the condition is pending, the debtor must
refrain from any acts that prevent the performance of the obligation. With this
provision, the legislature accepts that before the condition is fulfilled, the creditor has
an expectant right.11 If the debtor violates this expectant right,12 then he is liable for the
7
glu (1977), pp. 352–353; O guzman and Öz (2016), p. 510.
8
Condition suspensive, Aufschiebende Bedingung.
9
Engel (1997), p. 846; Feyzio glu (1977), p. 344; O
guzman and Öz (2016), p. 505; Tercier et al.
(2016), p. 284.
10
Feyzioglu (1977), pp. 348–349; Tekinay et al. (1993), p. 333; Oguzman and Öz (2016), p. 516.
11
Tekinay et al. (1993), pp. 333, 334; Eren (2015), p. 1173; Oguzman and Öz (2016), p. 517.
12
Anwartschaftsrecht.
29.2 Suspensive Conditions (Conditions Precedent) 247
damage of the creditor. For example, a professor working at the Sorbonne intends to be
a visiting scholar at Istanbul University for a year if her application is accepted. The
professor and a landlord in Istanbul make a lease agreement on the condition that the
professor commences work at Istanbul University. In other words, this lease agreement
is dependent upon a suspensive condition. The owner’s obligation to make available
the property and the professor’s obligation to pay rent take effect when the professor’s
application is accepted. However, before the professor’s application is accepted, the
owner of the property sells the house to a third party. In this case, if the professor’s
application is accepted and she commences work at Istanbul University, then she may
demand that the original owner pay compensation for damage resulting from the
subsequent impossibility of performance (TCO art. 112, TCO art. 171 par. 1).13
Pursuant to TCO art. 171 par. 2, if a conditional right of a creditor is jeopardised,
then the creditor is entitled to the same protections that he would have if the
obligation was not conditional. For instance, in a contract of sale relating to immov-
able property that is dependent on a suspensive condition, if the seller attempts to
transfer the immovable property to a third party, then the prospective buyer whose
right is conditional may demand that the court impose an interim injunction on the
seller in order to prevent the transfer of the property (TCPC art. 389 ff).14
In a conditional obligation, even if the creditor’s right does not arise prior to the
fulfilment of the condition, he may dispose of his expectant right. A conditional
right may be transferred to a third party.15 In addition, a creditor may demand that
the debtor provide certain securities for his conditional claim.16
In an obligation dependent on a suspensive condition, the debtor is not entitled to
perform the obligation before the suspensive condition is fulfilled. Despite this fact,
if the debtor performs his obligation, then he may demand that the creditor perform
restitution, provided that he is able to prove that he did not know that the obligation
was dependent on a suspensive condition or that he believed that the condition had
been fulfilled (TCO art. 78 par. 1).17
If the debtor performs the obligation knowing that the suspensive condition has
not been fulfilled, then he may not demand that the creditor perform restitution
(TCO art. 78 par. 1). Nevertheless, when it is understood that the suspensive
condition will not be fulfilled,18 the debtor may demand restitution of the perfor-
mance (TCO art. 77 par. 2).19
13
Oser and Sch€onenberger (1929), art. 152, N. 9; Oguzman and Öz (2016), p. 517.
14
Oser and Sch€onenberger (1929), art. 152, N. 7; Thévenoz and Werro (2012), art. 152, N. 20-25;
Eren (2015), p. 1173; Tekinay et al. (1993), pp. 333–334; O guzman and Öz (2016), p. 518.
15
Thévenoz and Werro (2012), art. 151, N. 41, art. 164, N. 63; Engel (1997), p. 856; Feyzio glu
(1977), p. 357; Nomer (2015), p. 430.
16
Engel (1997), p. 856; Nomer (2015), p. 430; Reiso glu (2014), p. 452.
17
von Tuhr and Peter (1979), § 52, IV, 2, p. 479 ff; Thévenoz and Werro (2012), art. 152, N. 31;
Oguzman and Öz (2016), pp. 354, 518; Öz (1990), p. 85 fn. 39, 97–98.
18
Condictio ob causam futuram or condictio causa data causa non secuta.
19
Thévenoz and Werro (2012), art. 152, N. 32; Engel (1997), p. 856; von Tuhr and Peter (1979), §
52, V, pp. 487–488; O guzman and Öz (2016), pp. 361 and 518–519; Öz (1990), p. 98.
29.2.3 Suspensive Conditions in Dispositive Transactions
The general provisions of the Turkish Code of Obligations are essentially related to
contracts that constitute obligations.20 This is also true of conditional contracts.
However, certain transactions that are dispositive may also be made dependent on
suspensive conditions. For example, an assignment of a claim is a dispositive
transaction with regard to the assignor21 and may be made dependent on a suspen-
sive condition. In addition, the transfer of the right of ownership of movable
property may be dependent on a suspensive condition (TCC arts. 764–765). Fur-
ther, a discharge agreement may also be made conditional.22
In cases where a dispositive transaction is dependent on a suspensive condition,
the dispositive transaction does not take effect until the future uncertain event
occurs. Therefore, the beneficiary’s conditional right may readily be jeopardised.
That is why the legislature aims to protect the beneficiary of a dispositive transac-
tion by virtue of TCO art. 171 par. 3, according to which any dispositive transaction
made before the fulfilment of the condition is void to the extent that the transaction
impairs the effects of the suspensive condition. For instance, a chattel has been sold
with a reserve of ownership23 in accordance with TCC art. 764. In this case, even if
the seller transfers possession of the sold item to the buyer, the latter may not
become its owner unless he pays its price. That is to say, the transfer of ownership
of the chattel is dependent on a suspensive condition, and the seller remains the
owner of the chattel until the condition is fulfilled. The seller who has reserved the
right of ownership may attempt to transfer ownership of the chattel to a third party.
In such a case, if the buyer (prospective owner) pays the price of the sold item, then
he may demand that the court determine the acquisition by the third party to be
void. In this example, assume that the seller pledges the chattel to a third party
(TCC art. 979 par. 1, TCC art. 939 par. 1). In this case, the buyer has the same rights
and is entitled to assert the nullity of the pledge.24
29.2.4 Benefits Enjoyed in the Interim Period
In cases of obligations to give, even if the suspensive condition is not fulfilled, the
object of the contract may be delivered to the creditor, and thus, he may obtain
certain benefits arising from the subject matter of the contract. In such a case, if the
suspensive condition is fulfilled, then the creditor has the right to retain the benefit
obtained from it in the interim (TCO art. 172 par. 1). For example, a machine is sold
20
Acte générateur d’obligation, Verpflichtungsgesch€aft. See Chap. 7 fn. 5.
21
22
Tekinay et al. (1993), p. 334; Oguzman and Öz (2016), p. 519.
23
Reserve de propriété, Eigentumsvorbehalt. Retention of ownership, reservation of title.
24
Oguzman and Öz (2016), pp. 519–520.
29.3 Resolutive Conditions (Conditions Subsequent) 249
with ownership reserved to the seller (TCC art. 764) and is delivered to the buyer.
The buyer rents this machine before the suspensive condition is fulfilled and obtains
rental fees. After a period of time, the buyer pays the price of the sold machine—
i.e., the suspensive condition is fulfilled—at which time he becomes the owner of
the machine. In this case, the buyer may retain the rental fees he received in the
interim.
However, if the suspensive condition is not fulfilled, then the creditor is not
entitled to retain the benefits enjoyed in the interim. Indeed, pursuant to TCO art.
172 par. 2, the creditor must return such benefits to the debtor. The restitution will
be carried out in accordance with the provisions pertaining to unjust enrichment
(TCO arts. 77–82).25 It is apparent that the creditor must also return the subject
matter of the contract, in the aforementioned example the machine, to the debtor.
29.3 Resolutive Conditions (Conditions Subsequent)26
According to TCO art. 173 par. 1, the termination of a contract may be made
dependent on a future uncertain event, which is referred to as a resolutive condition.
Where a contract is dependent on a resolutive condition, until the condition is
fulfilled, the contract is effective as a non-conditional contract.27 When the
resolutive condition is fulfilled, the contract becomes ineffective (TCO art.
173 par. 2). In other words, so long as the resolutive condition is not fulfilled, the
contract is effective, and thus, the creditor may demand the performance of the
obligation arising from such a contract; similarly, the debtor must perform his
obligation.
When the resolutive condition is fulfilled, the contract is automatically termi-
nated. As a rule, unless the parties agree to the contrary or the nature of the
circumstances requires it, this termination is not retroactive (TCO art. 173 par. 3).
Indeed, in continuous contracts dependent on a resolutive condition, the parties
generally do not agree that the termination of the contract will have a retroactive
effect.28 For instance, in a lease dependent on a resolutive condition, until the
condition is fulfilled, the parties’ obligations continue. However, with the fulfilment
of the resolutive condition, their obligations are terminated. In such a case, the
lessee must return the subject matter of the lease to the lessor. Nevertheless, the
lessee is not entitled to demand restitution of the rent that has already been paid up
to the time of the fulfilment of the condition.
25
Oser and Sch€onenberger (1929), art. 153, N. 3, see and compare to O guzman and Öz (2016),
p. 510 fn. 348.
26
Condition résolutoire, Aufl€
osende Bedingung.
27
Engel (1997), p. 850; Feyzio glu (1977), p. 369; Tekinay et al. (1993), p. 335; O
guzman and Öz
(2016), p. 525.
28
As a rule, in contracts performed by single acts of performance on each side

(‘instantaneous’ contracts) and that are dependent on a resolutive condition, the
termination of the contract has a retroactive effect.29 That is why in such a case, if
one of the parties performs his obligation, then the receiving party must restitute
this performance upon the termination of the contract, in accordance with the
provisions pertaining to unjust enrichment (TCO arts. 77–82). Moreover, the
receiving party must not only make restitution but must also return or compensate
for all benefits enjoyed as a result of the performance of the obligation.30 It should
be kept in mind that the parties may agree that the termination of the contract will
not have a retroactive effect. In such a case, it is evident that any interim benefits
may not be restituted.31
As to dispositive contracts32 dependent on a resolutive condition, they also
become effective at the time of their formation. However, when the resolutive
condition is fulfilled, dispositive contracts are terminated. For example, an assign-
ment of a claim is made dependent on a resolutive condition. In such a case, the
assignment of the claim will become ineffective when the resolutive condition is
fulfilled. Thus, the assignor will again become the owner of the previously assigned
claim.33
Pursuant to TCO art. 292 par. 1, in contracts to gift, the donor may reserve the
reversion of the subject matter of the contract should the donee die before the donor. In
such a case, as soon as the contract is concluded, it becomes effective and the donor
must transfer ownership of the subject matter of the contract to the donee. For movable
property, the donor must transfer its possession (TCC art. 763 par. 1)34; for immovable
property, the donor must request entry of the ownership on behalf of the donee in the
land register (TCC art. 705 par. 1). With these transactions, the donee becomes the
owner of the respective property. However, if the donee dies before the donor, then the
resolutive condition is fulfilled and the ownership of the donee is terminated. In these
cases, the legal nature of the donor’s right is contentious. In the author’s opinion,
according to TCO art. 292 par. 1, the donor does not automatically become the owner
of the subject matter of the donation. He may only demand that the donee’s heirs
transfer its ownership to him. Indeed, the second paragraph of TCO art. 292 supports
this point of view, so that in the case of gifts of immovable property or of rights in rem,
the right of reversion may be noted in the land register.35
29
Thévenoz and Werro (2012), art. 154, N. 15; O guzman and Öz (2016), p. 527; Eren
(2015), p. 1178.
30
31
Oguzman and Öz (2016), pp. 527–528; Eren (2015), p. 1178.
32
Acte de disposition, Verf€ugungsgesch€aft. See Chap. 14 fn. 5–6.
33
Becker (1941), art. 154, N. 6; von Tuhr and Escher (1974), § 86, IV, p. 276; O guzman and Öz
(2016), p. 528; Reiso glu (2014), p. 455; Tercier et al. (2016), p. 287.
34
See Chap. 14 fn. 11.
35
Steinauer (2007), p. 273, fn. 6; Tando
gan (1990), pp. 372–373; O guzman and Öz (2016), p. 529;
Oguzman et al. (2016), p. 214, fn. 666. See on the contrary, Eren (2015), pp. 1177–1178.
29.4 Common Provisions 251
29.4 Common Provisions
29.4.1 Fulfilment of the Condition
In certain cases, the condition may consist of an act to be performed by only one of
the parties. For instance, according to TCO art. 249, in the case of goods sold on
trial or subject to inspection, it is at the discretion of the buyer whether or not to
accept the goods. If the condition depends on a certain act of one of the contracting
parties that does not have to be fulfilled personally, then this condition may be
fulfilled by his heirs upon his death (TCO art. 174). It should be noted that the death
of the counter-party is irrelevant.
29.4.2 Prevention Against Good Faith
If one of the parties precludes the fulfilment of the condition by acting contrary to the
principles of good faith, then the condition is deemed to be fulfilled (TCO art.
175 par. 1). For example, a company undertakes to enter into a contract with another
company on the condition that the latter wins a tender. However, the former precludes
the fulfilment of the condition by rigging the bid. In this case, according to the
aforementioned article, the condition is deemed to be fulfilled, and the party who has
rigged the bid must enter into the contract as if the other party had won the tender.
Where one of the parties ensures the fulfilment of the condition by acting
contrary to the principles of good faith, the condition is deemed not to be fulfilled
(TCO art. 175 par. 2). For instance, an organiser of a marathon undertakes to give a
prize to the athlete who wins the marathon. An athlete completes the race in first
place, thereby winning the prize. However, it is later discovered that he had used
prohibited substances and violated anti-doping rules. In such a case, the condition is
deemed not to be fulfilled, and the athlete must return the prize.36
29.4.3 Prohibited Conditions
If a condition is stipulated in order to encourage an unlawful or immoral act or

omission, then the legal transaction dependent on this condition is void (TCO art.
176). Therefore, if a contract is made dependent on the condition that one of the
parties commits a crime or undertakes an immoral act, then this contract is void.37
36
Tekinay et al. (1993), pp. 337–338; Feyzio
glu (1977), pp. 363–366, 368; O guzman and Öz
(2016), p. 523.
37
Eren (2015), p. 1168; O
glu (2014), p. 452.
Furthermore, conditions that are contrary to a provision protecting personal

rights give rise to the same invalidity. For instance, if one of the parties undertakes
to change his religion, not to marry, to adopt a child or not to acquire ownership of
any property, then the obligations dependent on these conditions are void.38
Where a condition is initially impossible to perform, the following rules are
applied: (1) if an impossible condition is suspensive, then the entirety of the legal
transaction is void,39 and (2) if an impossible condition is resolutive, then the
transaction is valid as if it were not conditional.40
Where some of the provisions of the contract are invalid, as a rule, the other
provisions of the contract remain valid (TCO art. 27 par. 2 sent. 1). Nonetheless,
under TCO art. 27 par. 2 sent. 2, if it is obvious that the parties would not have
concluded the contract without the invalid provisions, then the entire contract will
be void.41
References

Helvacı İ (2014) Eski medenı̂ kanunumuzla karşılaştırmalı olarak Türk medenı̂ kanunu’na göre
mirasın reddi, (mk. m. 605 - mk. m. 618). Filiz, İstanbul
Öz T (1990) Sebepsiz zenginleşme. Kazancı, İstanbul
Pulaşlı H (1989) Şarta ba
glı işlemler ve hukuki sonuçları. Dayınlarlı, Ankara
Sirmen AL (1992) Türk € ozel hukukunda şart. Banka ve ticaret hukuku araştırma enstitüsü, Ankara
38
39
von Tuhr and Escher (1974), § 84, IV, p. 259.
40
41
For further explanations see Sect. 5.3.2.
References 253

Tandoğan H (1990) Özel borç ilişkileri, vol I/1. Evrim, İstanbul
Filiz, İstanbul
İstanbul
von Tuhr A, Peter H (1979) Allgemeiner Teil des Schweizerischen Obligationenrecht, vol 1.
Chapter 30
Earnest Money and Forfeit Money
30.1 Earnest Money1
An amount of money paid by a party when entering into a contract is not deemed to
be forfeit money; on the contrary, it is deemed to be earnest money (TCO art.
177 par. 1).2 That is to say, the money paid serves as proof that the contract is
concluded. For instance, in a car sale contract, the buyer pays €10,000. If the
parties’ intention is not sufficiently determined in the contract, then this amount
is deemed to be earnest money and is deemed to prove that the contract is
concluded.
According to TCO art. 177 par. 2, unless otherwise provided by agreement or
local custom, the creditor must deduct the earnest money from his claim. In the
example mentioned above, if the price of the car is €50,000, then the seller must
deduct €10,000 from the price and can then demand the remaining €40,000 from the
buyer, provided that there is no agreement or local custom to the contrary.
1
pp. 320–323; Honsell et al. (2003), Vorbemerkungen zu Art. 158-163, art. 158; Kılıço
glu (2013),
pp. 771–775; Nomer (2015), pp. 432–433; Oser and Sch€ onenberger (1929), Vorbemerkungen zum
dritten Abschnitt, art. 158; O
guzman and Öz (2016), pp. 550–554; Özsunay (1983), pp. 161–162;
Reisoglu (2014), pp. 456–457; Schwenzer (2009), p. 494; Tekinay et al. (1993), pp. 338–341;
Thévenoz and Werro (2012), Introduction aux articles 158-163 CO, art. 158, and von Tuhr
and Escher (1974), pp. 287–289.
2
Arrhes, Haftgeld.

256 30 Earnest Money and Forfeit Money
30.2 Forfeit Money3
In cases of forfeit money, either party may withdraw from the contract. If the party
who paid the forfeit money withdraws from the contract, then he must relinquish the
amount paid. If the party who received the forfeit money withdraws from the
contract, then he must return twice the amount of the money he received (TCO
art. 178).
The right to withdraw from the contract by asserting that forfeit money has been
paid must be exercised before a principal obligation is performed.4 For instance, in
a lease contract relating to a dwelling house concluded for a period of 1 year, the
lessee pays forfeit money of €3000. Subsequently, the lessee pays the rent that first
becomes due, and the lessor transfers possession of the property to the lessee. In
such a case, the lessee may no longer withdraw from the contract by asserting that
he has paid forfeit money.
As to the question whether the creditor must deduct the forfeit money from the
principal claim, TCO art. 177 par. 2 is applied by analogy.5 Therefore, the creditor
must deduct the forfeit money from his principal claim. In the aforementioned
example, if the monthly rent is €5000, then the lessor must deduct the forfeit money
of €3000 from the first rental payment.
It should be noted that forfeit money is not a penalty. That is why it may not be
reduced by a judge on account of being excessive.6
Even if a party to a contract has paid forfeit money, he may withdraw from the
contract according to the provision relating to the debtor’s default in bilateral
contracts (TCO art. 125).7 In such a case, TCO art. 178 cannot be applied. Thus,
if the withdrawing party is the party who paid the forfeit money, then he may
demand repayment of the forfeiture.8 Similarly, if the withdrawing party is the party
who received the forfeit money, then he need only return the sum he received as
forfeiture.
3
Dédit, Reugeld.
4
Thévenoz and Werro (2012), art. 158, N. 7; O guzman and Öz (2016), p. 553; Nomer
(2015), p. 433.
5
6
Thévenoz and Werro (2012), art. 158, N. 8; Feyzio glu (1977), p. 381; Eren (2015), p. 1193;
O guzman and Öz (2016), p. 553, See on the contrary Tekinay et al. (1993), p. 341.
7
See Sect. 23.4.2.2.
8
References 257
References

Filiz, İstanbul
Schulthess, Zürich
Chapter 31
Contractual Penalty
31.1 General1
As a general rule, if a debtor does not perform his obligation at all or as required and
he is at fault, then the creditor is entitled to demand that the debtor pay compen-
sation for his damage.2 Consequently, the creditor must prove the requirements for
the debtor’s liability for non- or improper performance of the obligation, in partic-
ular the existence and the quantum of his damage.3
In certain cases, proving the quantum of damage may be quite difficult. If a
creditor does not want to assume this burden of proof, then he may instead benefit
from a contractual penalty. Indeed, in a contract with a penalty clause or a contract
relating to a penalty, the debtor generally undertakes to pay a fixed amount of
money in the case of non- or improper performance of the obligations.4 In practice,
it is very common to come across such contracts or clauses. A contractual penalty
may also deter the debtor from failing to perform the obligation and may encourage
him to perform.5
1
Aybay (2011), pp. 181–183; Becker (1941), art. 160-163; Berger (2012), pp. 636–644; Engel
(1997), pp. 862–867; Eren (2015), pp. 1181–1190; Feyzio glu (1977), pp. 388–408; Gauch et al.
(2008), pp. 308–320; Honsell et al. (2003), art. 160-163; Kılıçoglu (2013), pp. 775–790; Nomer
(2015), pp. 433–443; Oser and Sch€ onenberger (1929), Vorbemerkungen zu art. 160-163, art.
160-163; Oguzman and Öz (2016), pp. 529–549; Özsunay (1983), pp. 163–167; Reiso glu
(2014), pp. 457–462; Schwenzer (2009), pp. 490–493; Tekinay et al. (1993), pp. 341–360; Tercier
(2004), pp. 246–249; Tercier et al. (2016), pp. 427–434; Thévenoz and Werro (2012), art. 160-163,
2
For further explanations, see Tunçomag (1963), Uçar (1993), Kocaaga (2003), Erdem (2006).
3
See Sect. 22.2.3.3.
4
von Tuhr and Escher (1974), § 87, I, p. 277; O guzman and Öz (2016), p. 533; Tercier et al.
(2016), p. 427.
5
Thévenoz and Werro (2012), art. 160, N. 2; Tekinay et al. (1993), p. 342; O guzman and Öz
(2016), p. 530.

260 31 Contractual Penalty
As a rule, any obligation may be secured by a penalty, such as an obligation to

give, to do or not to do (to refrain from doing something). However, according to
certain decisions of the Turkish Court of Cassation, pecuniary obligations may not
be secured by a penalty due to the fact that the creditor is entitled to demand default
interest.6 It is reasonable to accept that the parties may also determine a penalty in
the case of pecuniary obligations.7 However, in this case, the creditor is not entitled
to demand default interest unless the parties agree to the contrary.8
In certain cases, it is not possible to determine a penalty for non- or improper
performance of an obligation. For example, pursuant to TCO art. 346, the parties
are not entitled to agree on a penalty for late payment of rental fees.
A penalty is generally agreed for contractual obligations. Nevertheless, obliga-
tions resulting from tort, unjust enrichment or the law itself may also be secured by
a penalty.9
31.2 Legal Nature and Form
31.2.1 General
The obligation to pay a penalty is an obligation subject to a suspensive condition.

The suspensive condition in this case is the non- or the improper performance of the
obligation.10
An obligation to pay a penalty may be determined by the parties as a clause of a
contract or as a separate contract.11
31.2.2 Form Requirements
If the contract, which gives rise to the obligation being secured by a penalty,
requires a specific form, then this requirement also applies to the penalty clause
or penalty contract.12 For example, a sale contract relating to immovable property
6
Oguzman and Öz (2016), p. 532 fn. 394.
7
Tekinay et al. (1993), pp. 343–344; O guzman and Öz (2016), p. 532.
8
9
Becker (1941), art. 160, N. 3; O
guzman and Öz (2016), p. 531; Tekinay et al. (1993), p. 343; Eren
(2015), p. 1182; Reiso glu (2014), p. 458.
10
Tercier (2004), p. 246; Tercier et al. (2016), p. 428; Oguzman and Öz (2016), p. 531; Nomer
(2015), p. 434; Berger (2012), p. 636.
11
Thévenoz and Werro (2012), art. 160, N. 7; Reisoglu (2014), p. 457; Tercier et al. (2016), p. 430;
Oguzman and Öz (2016), p. 531; Berger (2012), p. 637.
12
Thévenoz and Werro (2012), art. 160, N. 7; Tercier (2004), p. 248; Tercier et al. (2016),
pp. 430–431; Nomer (2015), p. 434.
31.2 Legal Nature and Form 261
must be concluded before a land registry officer (TCO art. 237 par. 1, LRA art.
26).13 Therefore, if the parties intend to secure an obligation that arises from this
contract, then they must comply with the form requirement of the sale contract.
That is to say, they must insert the penalty clause in the contract that requires the
official form. If the parties determine the penalty in a separate contract, then this
contract must also be concluded before a land registry officer.
31.2.3 Ancillary Nature of Penalties
A penalty clause or a penalty contract provides the creditor with an ancillary right;
thus, if the principal obligation to be performed is void, then the penalty will also be
void. Pursuant to TCO art. 182 par. 2 sent. 1, penalties aiming to secure an invalid
obligation, such as an illegal or immoral obligation, are void. The reason for the
invalidity of the main contract is irrelevant.14 For example, if the main contract is
void due to simulation,15 lack of form,16 etc., then the penalty will also be void.
Moreover, an obligation, secured by a penalty, that is valid on the formation of
the contract may become impossible to perform. If performance of the obligation
becomes impossible on account of circumstances for which the debtor is not
responsible, the creditor is not entitled to demand payment of the penalty. This is
because the obligation to pay a penalty will also have become invalid (TCO art.
182 par. 2 sent. 1).
It should be noted that even if a penalty is invalid, or becomes impossible to
perform on account of circumstances for which the debtor is not responsible, the
invalidity or the impossibility of the penalty does not affect the validity of the
obligation secured by the penalty (TCO art. 182 par. 2 sent. 2).
Furthermore, the contract that is subject to the penalty may be valid at the outset,
but the creditor may withdraw (ex tunc)17 from the contract or rescind it due to
mistake, fraud or duress. In these cases, the penalty also becomes void.18
If the obligation secured by a penalty becomes time-barred, then the debtor may
plead the fact that the obligation is time-barred and refuse to pay the penalty.19
13
See Sect. 3.2.3.
14
Eren (2015), pp. 1182–1183; O guzman and Öz (2016), p. 535.
15
See Sect. 8.2.2.
16
See Sect. 3.5.
17
ucktritt).
18
Oguzman and Öz (2016), pp. 536, 537; Nomer (2015), p. 437.
19
31.3 Types of Contractual Penalties
31.3.1 General
In practice, parties generally agree on a fixed amount of money as a penalty.20

Nevertheless, any act (prestation) such as an obligation to give or to do may be
determined by the parties as a penalty.21 Moreover, an obligation not to do may be
determined as a penalty, provided that it has monetary value.22
According to TCO art. 181 par. 1, the parties may agree that in the event of the
creditor withdrawing from the contract, the performed part of the obligation is
forfeited to the creditor. Consequently, in a penalty clause or contract, the parties
may agree that in cases of non-performance or of improper performance, the debtor
who breaches the contract will lose certain rights or powers. For example, in a work
contract, the parties agree that if the contractor does not perform the obligation by
the due date, then he will lose a portion of his consideration. However, the pro-
visions regarding sale with payment by instalments are not affected (TCO art.
181 par. 2).
31.3.2 Penalty in Lieu of Performance
According to TCO art. 179 par. 1, where a penalty is agreed for non-performance or
improper performance of an obligation, unless otherwise inferred from the con-
tract,23 the creditor may demand either the performance of the obligation or the
payment of the penalty. In such a case, as a rule, the creditor is not entitled to
demand both the performance of the obligation and the payment of the penalty. For
instance, in a car sale contract, the parties agree that the seller will transfer
ownership of the car to the buyer, and if the seller fails to do so, then the buyer
may demand a penalty of €20,000 in lieu of performance. In this case, if the seller
does not transfer ownership of the car, then the buyer may demand specific
performance24 or payment of the penalty. If the obligation of the seller becomes
impossible where he is responsible, then the creditor may demand only the payment
of the penalty.25
20
Engel (1997), p. 862.
21
Thévenoz and Werro (2012), art. 160, N. 5; Reiso glu (2014), p. 457; O guzman and Öz
(2016), p. 534.
22
Oguzman and Öz (2016), p. 534, compare to Thévenoz and Werro (2012), art. 160, N. 5.
23
Since the TCO art. 179 par. 1 is not mandatory, the parties may agree that the creditor has the
right to demand performance of both. Engel (1997), p. 865; Feyzio
glu (1977), p. 393; Eren (2015),
p. 1185; Oguzman and Öz (2016), p. 539.
24
See Sect. 22.1.2.
25
31.3 Types of Contractual Penalties 263
In cases where either performance of the obligation or payment of the penalty

may be demanded, once the creditor demands payment of the penalty, he may not
change his decision and is not entitled to demand performance of the obligation at a
later time.26
Where the obligation is secured by a pledge or mortgage and the creditor
demands payment of the penalty, these collaterals secure the penalty in lieu of
performance.27 However, a surety cannot be held liable for such a penalty (TCO art.
589 par. 4).
31.3.3 Penalty in Addition to Performance
Where a penalty is agreed for non-compliance with regard to the determined time or
place of performance, the creditor may claim payment of the penalty in addition to
the performance of the obligation, unless he clearly waives this right or accepts
performance of the obligation without any reservation (TCO art. 179 par. 2).
This type of penalty is very common in practice, especially in the case of default
by a debtor. It should be noted that this rule is not mandatory. Therefore, the parties
may agree that in cases where the obligation is not performed at the set time or
place, the creditor may demand either payment of the penalty or performance of the
obligation.28
In cases where both performance of the obligation and payment of the penalty
may be demanded, if the creditor accepts performance of the obligation without any
reservation, then he loses the right to demand the penalty.29 If he wants to preclude
this consequence, then he must demand payment of the penalty before performance
or, at the latest, at the time of performance. If he does not so, he must declare that he
reserves the right relating to the demand for payment of the penalty during the
period of performance.30
31.3.4 Withdrawal or Termination by Payment of Penalty31
In accordance with TCO art. 179 par. 3, the parties may agree that the debtor is
entitled to withdraw from or terminate the contract by paying the determined
26
Thévenoz and Werro (2012), art. 160, N. 11; Engel (1997), p. 864; Tercier (2004), p. 247; Eren
(2015), p. 1184.
27
28
guzman and Öz (2016), p. 540; Reiso glu (2014), p. 459.
29
Becker (1941), art. 160, N. 30; Tercier (2004), p. 247; Eren (2015), p. 1185.
30
Oguzman and Öz (2016), p. 541; Tekinay et al. (1993), p. 351; Eren (2015), pp. 1185–1186,
compare to von Tuhr and Escher § 87, III, 1, b, p. 282.
31
For further explanations Tutar (2016).
penalty. According to the Turkish Code of Obligations, as a rule, a party to a

contract is not entitled to unilaterally withdraw from or terminate the contract. The
legislature provides for an exception to this rule. Indeed, in some circumstances, a
debtor has the right to pay a penalty instead of remaining bound by a contract.
In fact, in cases regulated by TCO art. 179 par. 3, there is no penalty for non- or
improper performance of the obligation. On the contrary, the debtor voluntarily
pays a penalty in order to be able to withdraw from or terminate the contract.
Pursuant to TCO art. 179 par. 3, where a debtor claims that the parties agreed on a
penalty for withdrawal or termination, then he must prove it.
31.4 The Role of the Debtor’s Fault
In principle, in order for a creditor to demand payment of a penalty, the debtor must
be at fault (TCO art. 182 par. 2).32 However, as a general rule, even if the creditor
must prove non-performance or improper performance of the obligation, he does
not have to prove that the debtor is at fault. On the contrary, the debtor must prove
that he is not at fault (TCO art. 112).33
Any type of fault on the part of the debtor is sufficient for his liability to pay a
penalty—e.g., gross fault (intention or gross negligence—culpa lata) or slight fault
(slight negligence—culpa levis).34 However, the parties may agree that the debtor
will pay a penalty even if there is no fault on his part.35
In cases where the debtor is liable for non- or improper performance of the
obligation in the absence of fault, the debtor need not be at fault to be liable to pay a
penalty. For example, TCO art. 116 relating to the debtor’s liability for assistants
does not require the debtor’s fault.36
In relation to a penalty determined as a result of a debtor’s default in a pecuniary
obligation, his fault is irrelevant.
31.5 The Role of the Creditor’s Damage
For the payment of a penalty, the creditor’s damage is irrelevant—i.e., the penalty
must be paid even if the creditor has not incurred any damage (TCO art. 180 par. 1).
However, in certain cases, the creditor may have incurred damage exceeding the
32
See on the contrary Eren (2015), pp. 1186–1187.
33
See Sect. 22.2.3.2.1.
34
35
Oguzman and Öz (2016), p. 545, compare to Eren (2015), p. 1187.
36
See Sect. 22.5.
31.6 Reduction of the Penalty 265
amount of the penalty. If the creditor demands compensation for his damage in
excess of the penalty, then he must prove that the debtor is at fault (TCO art.
180 par. 2).
In the event that the debtor is either legally or contractually liable in the absence
of fault, it is apparent that the creditor is not required to prove that the debtor is at
fault in order to seek compensation for damage in excess of the penalty.37
In cases where the creditor withdraws from (ex tunc)38 or terminates the contract
(ex nunc)39 by paying a penalty (TCO art. 179 par. 3), even if the creditor has
incurred damage exceeding the amount of the penalty, he is not entitled to demand
compensation for damage in excess of the penalty.40
31.6 Reduction of the Penalty41
As a general rule, the parties are free to determine the amount of the penalty (TCO
art. 182 par. 1). However, a judge may reduce excessive penalties ex officio (TCO
art. 182 par. 3). The judge may determine whether a penalty is excessive or not at
his discretion. In the process of determination, the judge must take into account the
parties’ financial position and the debtor’s conduct, especially the degree of fault.
Nevertheless, the judge must not diminish the deterrent effect of the penalty.42
It should be kept in mind that the judge may not change the nature of the
penalty.43 For instance, if the parties agreed on an amount of money as a penalty,
even if the amount is excessive, the judge cannot order that the debtor perform an
obligation instead of paying the pecuniary penalty. Moreover, the judge is not
entitled to quash the penalty completely on account of its excessive nature. The
judge may only reduce the penalty.44
According to T.Com.C art. 22, merchants are not entitled to demand that the
judge reduce the amount of a penalty, asserting that it is excessive. In order to apply
this rule, the debtor must have the status of merchant, and the penalty must be
determined in respect of a commercial obligation. Despite the said article, if the
agreement relating to the penalty is immoral or contrary to the provisions protecting
the personal rights of the debtor, then the debtor may demand that the judge reduce
the amount of the penalty. According to the Turkish Court of Cassation, the judge
37
38
ucktritt).
39
undigung).
40
guzman and Öz (2016), pp. 546–547; Reiso glu (2014), p. 460.
41
For further explanations see Gülseven (2016).
42
Feyzioglu (1977), p. 402; Tekinay et al. (1993), p. 356; O guzman and Öz (2016), p. 547;
Reisoglu (2014), p. 462, fn. 22.
43
Compare to Thévenoz and Werro (2012), art. 163, N. 9.
44
may decide on a reduction of, or even the invalidity of, a penalty in the event that
the payment of the penalty would cause the debtor to become destitute.45
References

Erdem M (2006) La clause pénale: étude comparative de droit suisse et de droit Turc. Ankara
Gülseven H (2016) Cezai şartın indirilmesi. Seçkin, Ankara
Kocaaga K (2003) Türk € ozel hukukunda cezai şart (bk.m.158-161). Yetkin, Ankara
Özsunay E (1983) Borçlar hukuku, vol 1. Filiz, İstanbul
Filiz, İstanbul
İstanbul
Tunçomag K (1963) Türk hukukunda cezai şart. İstanbul üniversitesi, İstanbul
Tutar E (2016) D€onme cezası. Turhan, Ankara
Uçar S (1993) Hukukta cezai şart ve uygulanması. Alfa, İstanbul
45
Tekinay et al. (1993), p. 357; Eren (2015), pp. 1189–1190, compare to O
p. 549; Tercier et al. (2016), p. 432.
Part V
Assignment of Claims, Assumption of
Debts, Transfer of Contracts and Joining a
Party to an Existing Contract
Chapter 32
Assignment of Claims
32.1 General1
A claim arising from a contract or some other source of obligation, such as a tort or
unjust enrichment, may be transferred to third parties.2 A claim may be transferred
by an agreement, by a court order or by law. In this section, assignment of claims3
effected by agreement and those effected by a court decision or operation of law are
analysed respectively.
32.2 Assignment of Claims by Agreement4
32.2.1 Conditions
In order for a claim to be assigned, the following conditions must be met5: (1) there
must be an assignable claim, and (2) there must be an assignment contract between
1
Aybay (2011), pp. 184–192; Becker (1941), Vorbemerkungen zu art. 164-174, art. 164-174;
Berger (2012), pp. 741–779; Engel (1997), pp. 871–893; Eren (2015), pp. 1224–1243; Feyzio glu
(1977), pp. 613–665; Gauch et al. (2008), pp. 243–271; Honsell et al. (2003), Vorbemerkungen zu
art. 164-174, art. 164-174; Kılıço
glu (2013), pp. 790–809; Nomer (2015), pp. 447–454; Oser
and Sch€onenberger (1929), Vorbemerkungen zur Abtretung von Forderungen (art. 164-174), art.
164-174; Oguzman and Öz (2016), pp. 555–596; Özsunay (1983), pp. 183–193; Reiso glu (2014),
pp. 464–475; Schwenzer (2009), pp. 563–581; Tekinay et al. (1993), pp. 240–268; Tercier (2004),
pp. 301–311; Tercier et al. (2016), pp. 515–531; Thévenoz and Werro (2012), art. 164-174,
2
For further explanations, see Kocaman (1989), Dayınlarlı (2008), Günerg€ ok (2014).
3
Cession des créances, Abtretung von Forderungen.
4
Cession volontaire, Freiwillige Abtretung.
5
Becker (1941), art. 164, N. 4.

270 32 Assignment of Claims
the assignor and the assignee. It is not necessary for the debtor to give consent to the
assignment.
It must be kept in mind that, in certain cases, claims that are expected to arise in
the future—i.e., prospective claims—may also be assigned.
32.2.1.1 Assignability of the Claim
A creditor may assign his claim to a third party unless the assignment is forbidden
by law, by virtue of the agreement or by the nature of the legal transaction (TCO art.
183 par. 1). For instance, pursuant to TCO art. 322 par. 2, in lease contracts relating
to dwelling houses or business premises, the lessee may not assign his right of use
without the written consent of the lessor. Another example is that in agreements for
lifelong support, the rights of the grantee cannot be assigned (TCO art. 619 par. 1).
As mentioned above, the parties to a contract may prohibit the assignment of the
claim by agreement (pactum de non cedendo).6 For example, in a lease contract, the
rental fee is assignable, but the parties may agree to the contrary. Furthermore, in
certain cases, the claim may not be assignable due to the nature of the legal
transaction.7 Indeed, in certain cases, there may be a strong relationship between
the claim and the personal characteristics of the creditor. In other words, the
assignment of such a claim will affect the content of the claim. For instance, as a
divorced spouse who has the right to alimony (spousal maintenance) cannot assign
his claim for alimony, neither may a member of an association assign his claims
arising from that membership.
In the aforementioned cases, the creditor is not entitled to assign his claim. If he
attempts to do so, the assignment is void, and the debtor may simply refuse the third
party’s demand by pleading that the claim is not assignable.8 However, in cases
where the assignment of a claim is forbidden due to an agreement, the creditor may
nevertheless attempt to assign his claim. In such a case, the legislature protects a
third party, provided that he acted in good faith. Indeed, pursuant to TCO art.
183 par. 2, if a third party acquires a claim in reliance on a written acknowledge-
ment of debt that does not mention that the claim is unassignable, then the debtor is
not entitled to object to the assignment on the ground that it was prohibited by an
agreement.
6
Tercier (2004), p. 304; Thévenoz and Werro (2012), art. 164, N. 32–35; Eren (2015), p. 1236;
Tercier et al. (2016), p. 521; Engel (1997), p. 872.
7
Eren (2015), p. 1237; Tercier et al. (2016), p. 522; Engel (1997), p. 872; Tercier (2004), p. 305;
8
Tekinay et al. (1993), p. 247; Eren (2015), p. 1237; O guzman and Öz (2016), pp. 571–574;
32.2 Assignment of Claims by Agreement 271
32.2.1.2 The Assignment Contract
The second condition for the assignment of a claim is the requirement for an
assignment contract. This contract must be concluded between the assignor and
the assignee.9 As mentioned above, the consent of the debtor is not required.
The assignment contract must be made in written form (TCO art. 184 par. 1). It
must state the identities of the assignor and the assignee, the assigned claim and the
parties’ intention relating to the assignment. By analogy to TCO art. 14 par. 1, the
assignor’s signature is sufficient. The assignee’s declaration of will (intention)10 for
the contract may be implied.
A divisible claim, such as a pecuniary claim, may be wholly or partially
assigned.11 Where a divisible claim is partially assigned, it is evident that the
unassigned part of the claim remains in the assets of the assignor (principal
creditor).
It should be noted that a promise to make an assignment does not require any
particular form (TCO art. 184 par. 2). Such an agreement does not transfer the claim
to the assignee, but, on the contrary, it obliges the assignor to transfer the claim to
the assignee.12
An assignment contract is a dispositive legal transaction13 with regard to the
assignor.14 Thus, with the conclusion of the contract, the claim that is the subject
matter of the contract is assigned to the assignee. For this reason, the assignor must
have the capacity to act and the power of disposition.15 Although the assignor has
the capacity to act, if he does not have the power of disposition, then the assignment
contract will be void. For instance, if a claim has already been assigned to a third
party, then any subsequent assignment by the assignor relating to this claim will be
void.16 This is on the basis that if a creditor has already assigned the claim, then he
is no longer entitled to the claim and, thus, loses the power of disposition in respect
of the claim.
The cause (causa) of an assignment may be causa solvendi, causa donandi or
causa credendi.17 For instance, creditor C has already promised to assign his claim
to assignee A. When creditor C assigns his claim to assignee A in order to perform
his obligation to assign, then the cause of the assignment is a causa solvendi.
However, if a creditor wishes to assign his claim with the aim of making a gift,
9
Becker (1941), art. 164, N. 5; Tercier (2004), p. 305; Tekinay et al. (1993), p. 240; Tercier et al.
(2016), p. 522.
10
arung.
11
12
Oguzman and Öz (2016), pp. 562–563; Reiso glu (2014), p. 466; Nomer (2015), p. 449.
13
14
Conversely, such a contract is an acquisitive transaction with regard to the assignee.
15
16
Tercier (2004), p. 306.
17
then the cause of the assignment is a causa donandi. Where the creditor assigns a
claim with the aim of acquiring a counter-claim, then the cause of the assignment is
a causa credendi. For instance, in a sale contract, if a buyer entering into a contract
assigns his claim with the aim of becoming entitled to a counter-claim, then the
cause of the assignment is a causa credendi.
Certain scholars argue that an assignment of a claim is a causal legal transac-
tion.18 According to these scholars, if the cause (legal ground) of the assignment is
invalid, then the assignment is invalid as well. For instance, assume that there is an
invalid lease agreement between the lessor and the lessee. The lessee, in order to
pay prospective rental fees, assigns to the lessor a pecuniary claim arising from
another contract that is concluded with a third party. In this case, as the legal ground
of the assignment is invalid, the assignment is invalid as well. However, certain
scholars are of the opinion that the assignment of a claim is an independent
(abstract) legal transaction and so even if the legal ground of the assignment is
invalid, the assignment may be valid, but the transfer of the claim will constitute a
case of unjust enrichment in the assets of the assignee.19 The practical consequence
of this view is that the assignee must assign the claim back to the assignor. If he fails
to do so, then the assignor may bring an action in order to reclaim the assigned
claim.
An assignment contract is void if the assigned claim does not exist.20 However,
even if the claim does not exist, a promise of assignment relating to such a claim
may be valid. This is because such an agreement does not transfer the claim to the
assignee but, on the contrary, obliges the assignor to transfer the claim to the
assignee. In such a case, it is obvious that the promising party who is obliged to
transfer the non-existent claim cannot perform his obligation and will therefore be
liable for non-performance.21
A simulated written acknowledgement of debt is void (TCO art. 19 par. 1).22
Thus, such legal transactions do not give rise to a valid claim. However, even if the
written acknowledgement of debt is simulated, the alleged creditor may attempt to
assign his pseudo-claim to a third party. In such a case, if the third party relies on
this written acknowledgement of debt, then the debtor cannot plead that the
transaction is simulated, and he must pay the amount mentioned in the deed
As indicated above, in certain cases, claims that are expected to arise in the
future—i.e., prospective claims—may also be assigned.23 For example, in a lease
18
Eren (2015), p. 1231; Tekinay et al. (1993), pp. 241–242.
19
von Tuhr and Escher (1974), § 93, II, p. 333; O
glu (2014),
p. 465; Becker (1941), art. 164, N. 1. For further explanations see Honsell et al. (2003), art.
164, N. 23–25.
20
Nomer (2015), p. 449; Oguzman and Öz (2016), p. 569.
21
22
See Sect. 8.2.2.
23
Nomer (2015), p. 449; Oguzman and Öz (2016), pp. 566–567; Eren (2015), pp. 1234–1235.
contract, a lessor may assign the prospective rental fees to a third party. In such a
case, the assignor actually assigns an expectant right. Therefore, if the prospective
rental fees are not payable due to premature termination of the lease, then the
assignment contract relating to this expectant right will be void.
A claim that may arise from any contract subject to a suspensive condition
(condition precedent)24 is also able to be assigned.25 However, if the suspensive
condition does not occur, then this assignment contract will also be void.
Similarly, a claim that may arise from any contract subject to a resolutive
condition (condition subsequent)26 is also able to be assigned.27 However, if the
resolutive condition occurs, then this assignment contract will also be void.
32.2.2 Consequences
32.2.2.1 Transfer of the Claim
With the formation of an assignment contract, the claim that is the subject matter of
the contract is transferred to the assignee.28 The assignor is no longer entitled to the
claim. Thus, the assignor may not accept performance of the obligation and is not
entitled to discharge the debtor. Indeed, upon assignment, these rights belong to the
assignee.29
If the debtor does not perform the obligation, then the assignee may bring an
action for specific performance. In addition, if the conditions for an action for
compensation for damage are met, the assignee may initiate proceedings. Never-
theless, the assignee is not entitled to withdraw from the contract or terminate
it. This is due to the fact that the right of withdrawal or termination requires the
withdrawing person to be a party to the contract.30
32.2.2.2 Transfer of Ancillary Rights
The assignment of a claim also includes the assignment of all privileges and
ancillary rights, except those that are inseparable from the person of the assignor
(TCO art. 189 par. 1). Privileges that are separable from the person of the assignor
include certain rights that are bound to the claim, and they grant certain specific
24
See Sect. 29.2.
25
26
See Sect. 29.3.
27
28
Tekinay et al. (1993), p. 250; Thévenoz and Werro (2012), art. 164, N. 61; Tercier (2004), p. 307.
29
guzman and Öz (2016), pp. 574–575; Eren (2015), p. 1238.
30
priorities to a creditor in the event of a debtor’s bankruptcy (TCBE art. 206). As

mentioned above, these privileges are transferred to the assignee.31
In relation to privileges that are inseparable from the person of the assignor and,
thus, are not transferrable to the assignee, circumstances that preclude the com-
mencement of the limitation period may be given as an example. Pursuant to TCO
art. 153 par. 1 subcl. 3, between spouses, the limitation period does not commence,
or is suspended if it has already started, during the course of the marriage.32 If one
of the spouses assigns his claim to a third party, then the limitation period com-
mences or continues from the date of assignment.33
As to ancillary rights, ancillary securities such as sureties, pledges and mort-
gages may be given as examples. It should be noted that in order for an assignee to
benefit from a mortgage, entry in the land register is not necessary (TCC art. 891).34
Moreover, in order for an assignee to benefit from a pledge, the transfer of
possession of the chattel to the new creditor is not necessary35 (cf. TCC art.
939 par. 1). If an assigned claim has already given rise to a lien36 in favour of the
creditor (TCC art. 950 par. 1), then this right is also transferred to the assignee with
the assignment of the claim.37
According to TCO art. 189 par. 2, interest in arrears is also presumed to be
assigned with the assignment of the principal claim. It should be kept in mind that
interest that has not accrued will also belong to the assets of the assignee. TCO art.
189 par. 2 is not mandatory. Thus, the parties may agree that interest in arrears will
not be transferred to the assignee.38
32.2.2.3 The Obligations of the Assignor
The assignor must deliver to the assignee the proof of debt, such as any bill, and
other available documents evidencing the claim and must provide the assignee with
the necessary information in order for the assignee to assert the claim (TCO art.
190). In particular, the assignor must deliver the deed from which the claim arises,
such as the sale or lease contract. However, if the deed furnishes the assignor with
certain other rights, then he does not have to deliver the document itself to the
31
32
See Sect. 26.4.
33
Tekinay et al. (1993), p. 251; Oguzman and Öz (2016), pp. 577–578.
34
For further explanations, see Helvacı (2008).
35
Thévenoz and Werro (2012), art. 170 fn. 30, cf. Feyzio glu (1977), p. 651; Tekinay et al.
(1993), p. 260.
36
For further explanations see Çetiner (2010).
37
Eren (2015), p. 1240; Oguzman and Öz (2016), p. 576; O guzman et al. (2016), p. 1049, compare
to Thévenoz and Werro (2012), art. 170, N. 9.
38
assignee; he may elect to only provide the assignee with a copy of the document.39
For example, in a lease contract, if the lessor assigns only certain rental fee claims,
then he will need the original lease in order to demand any unassigned claims.
Furthermore, the assignor must provide all documents to the assignee relating to
the securities associated with the assigned claims, such as any surety bond, pledge
or mortgage contract.40
32.2.3 The Position of the Debtor41
32.2.3.1 Performance in Good Faith
With the formation of an assignment contract, the claim that is the subject matter of
the contract transfers to the assignee. The debtor may no longer perform the
obligation in favour of the assignor. If the debtor attempts to perform his obligation
for the benefit of the assignor, this does not result in the discharge of his obligation.
However, if the debtor does not know of the existence of the assignment, then he
may attempt to perform the obligation for the assignor. In such a case, although the
performance of the obligation for the assignor is not possible, TCO art. 186 protects
the debtor acting in good faith. That is to say, if the debtor is not notified of the
assignment by the assignor or the assignee and the debtor performs his obligation
for the benefit of the former creditor, he is released from the obligation.42
In addition, according to the said article, in cases where a claim is assigned
multiple times, if the debtor is not notified of the assignments and performs his
obligation in good faith to one of the previous creditors instead of the latest, then he
is discharged from the obligation. For instance, a creditor assigns his claim to a third
party, and this third party reassigns the claim to another. If the debtor was not made
aware of these assignments, then he may perform the obligation in good faith for the
benefit of the original creditor. Furthermore, if the debtor was aware of the first
assignment, but not the second one, then he may perform the obligation in good
faith for the first assignee.43
32.2.3.2 Refusal of Performance and Deposit
If ownership of the claim is disputed, then the debtor may refuse to perform the
obligation, and he may be discharged by depositing or delivering the subject matter
39
40
Thévenoz and Werro (2012), art. 170, N. 11; Oguzman and Öz (2016), p. 578; Feyzio
glu (1977),
p. 651; Tekinay et al. (1993), p. 260.
41
For further explanations see Günerg€ ok (2014).
42
Tercier (2004), p. 308.
43
Thévenoz and Werro (2012), art. 167, N. 21; O guzman and Öz (2016), pp. 582–583; Nomer
(2015), p. 452; Reiso glu (2014), p. 470.
of the claim at a place determined by a judge (TCO art. 187 par. 1). For determi-
nation of the place of delivery or deposit, the debtor must apply to the court at the
place of performance of the obligation. It should be noted that it is irrelevant
whether the dispute has been brought before a court or not.44
Where the debtor is aware of the fact that ownership of the claim is disputed, it is
not at his discretion to elect the person to whom the performance is directed. On the
contrary, if he performs the obligation in favour of the erroneous creditor, then he
must bear the consequences of this action (TCO art. 187 par. 2). That is to say, the
debtor must perform the obligation in favour of the real creditor again, and then he
may demand that the erroneous creditor return the performed obligation in accor-
dance with the provisions relating to unjust enrichment.45
In cases where the dispute is brought before a court, the parties to the dispute
may demand that the debtor deposit the subject matter of the claim, provided that
the dispute is pending in court and the obligation is due (TCO art 187 par. 3).
32.2.3.3 Defences of the Debtor
The assignment of a claim may not exacerbate the position of the debtor. TCO art.
188 is written with this principle in mind. According to this article, the debtor may
raise against the assignee the defences that he had against the assignor at the time he
was notified of the assignment. Therefore, the debtor may assert46 (1) that no claim
has arisen due to the fact that the obligational relationship that allegedly gave rise to
the claim is invalid or (2) that the claim has been terminated by performance,
discharge or set-off. Moreover, if the claim is time-barred, the debtor is entitled to
raise this defence. In addition, if the conditions of the exceptio non adimpleti
contractus are met,47 the debtor may also raise this defence.48
In the event of a debtor having a counter-claim that was not yet due at the time he
became aware of the assignment, he may set off the counter-claim on the condition
that it becomes due before or at the same time as the assigned claim (TCO art.
188 par. 2). For instance, A is obliged to pay €10,000 to B, and this claim will fall
due on 22 September 2016. In addition, B is obliged to pay €20,000 to A, which will
fall due on 25 December 2016. Assume that, on 3 April 2016, A assigns his claim to
assignee C and B is notified of the assignment on 6 April 2016. In this case, when C
demands that B pay €20,000 on 25 December 2016, B may set off his counter-claim
against A with his obligation to C.
44
Becker (1941), art. 168, N. 7; Engel (1997), p. 884; Thévenoz and Werro (2012), art. 168, N. 4;
Feyzioglu (1977), p. 656; O guzman and Öz (2016), pp. 583–584.
45
Öz (1990), pp. 57–58.
46
Tekinay et al. (1993), p. 252 ff; O
guzman and Öz (2016), p. 586; Eren (2015), p. 1241
47
See Sect. 18.4.2.2.
48
Thévenoz and Werro (2012), art. 169, N. 11; Feyzioglu (1977), p. 658; O
p. 587; Eren (2015), p. 1241.
32.2.4 Warranty of the Assignor49
32.2.4.1 In Assignments Without Consideration
Where a claim is transferred without consideration to an assignee, the assignor

cannot be liable for the non-existence of the claim and the insolvency of the debtor
(TCO art. 191 par. 2). In other words, the assignor does not give any warranty.
Thus, if the debtor does not perform the obligation for the assignee, the latter is not
entitled to demand that the assignor pay compensation for damage. The reason for
this provision is that if a person obtains a claim gratuitously, he must bear the
consequences of the possibility of the non-existence of the claim or the insolvency
of the debtor. If the legislature had made an assignor liable in the case of gratuitous
assignments, then this would result in placing the assignor in an inequitable
position.
32.2.4.2 In Assignments by Law
The provision indicated above also applies to assignments carried out by virtue of
law. That is to say, if a claim is transferred by law, the former creditor warrants
neither the existence of the claim nor the solvency of the debtor (TCO art. 191 par.
2).
32.2.4.3 In Assignments for Consideration
In the case of an assignment for consideration, the assignor warrants the existence
of the claim and the solvency of the debtor at the time of the assignment (TCO art.
191 par. 1). In the following cases, the assignment of claim is deemed to be for
consideration. For instance, when D is obliged to pay €10,000 to C and the latter
assigns this claim to A for €5000, the claim is deemed to be for consideration.
Furthermore, instead of paying this sum of money, A may undertake an obligation
to give or to do or not to do.
The liability of an assignor arises by virtue of the law. Consequently, even if a
non-existent claim is assigned, and the assignment is thereby invalid, the assignor is
liable. If the assignee knows of the non-existence of the claim, the assignor is not
liable.50
The liability of an assignor does not require fault on his part. Thus, even if an
assignor is entitled to presume that a claim exists and that the debtor is solvent, he
may nevertheless be liable.51
49
For further explanations see Engin (2002).
50
51
32.2.4.4 The Extent of the Liability
An assignee may demand the following from a liable assignor: (1) the return of the
consideration paid together with interest; (2) the costs arising from the assignment;
(3) the costs associated with recovery, and any unsuccessful attempts at recovery, of
the claim; and (4) other damage, except where the assignor is able to prove that he is
not at fault (TCO art. 193). For example, C asserts that D is obliged to pay him
€10,000, and subsequently C assigns this claim for €6000 to A. However, D does
not perform the obligation, and A must bring an action. The court dismisses the case
due to the non-existence of the assigned claim. A incurs €1000 in procedural costs.
In this case, even if assignor C is not at fault, he must nevertheless reimburse the
consideration of €6000 plus interest and the procedural costs of €1000. If C is at
fault, he must pay compensation for the damage suffered by the assignee, being
€4000, which is the difference between the claim and the consideration.
If a creditor assigns a claim with the aim of performing an obligation without
fixing the amount for which the claim should be credited, the extent of the
assignor’s warranty is determined according to TCO art. 192. For example, C
asserts that D is obliged to pay him €5000. Furthermore, C is obliged to pay
€10,000 to A, and so C assigns his claim against D to A with the aim of performing
his obligation. In this case, there are three possibilities: (1) if assignee A cannot
obtain performance due to non-existence of the claim or the insolvency of the
debtor, then the whole obligation of assignor C will stand; (2) if assignee A obtains
partial performance, for example a payment of €3000 from D, then this amount will
be credited, and thus the balance of €2000 will stand; and (3) if assignee A could
have recovered €5000 had he proceeded with all due diligence, then this amount
will be credited.
32.3 Assignment by Court Order or by Operation of Law
The transfer of a claim may be by operation of law. For instance, when a creditor
dies, his transferrable claims pass to his heirs automatically. Indeed, according to
TCC art. 599 par. 1, the heirs acquire the inheritance as a whole on the death of the
deceased by operation of law. Another example is regulated by TCO art.
127, according to which the fulfilment of an obligation by a third party satisfies a
creditor but the obligation is not extinguished, and the claim therefore passes by
operation of law to the performing third party.52
The transfer of a claim may also occur by court order. For example, a creditor
promises to assign his claim to a third party. If the creditor does not transfer the
claim to the third party, the latter may bring an action and demand that the creditor
transfer the claim to him. If the court accepts this demand, the claim that is the
52
See Sect. 24.2.
32.4 Special Provisions 279
subject matter of the court order transfers to the claimant when the court order
becomes final (TCO art. 185).
In the above-mentioned cases, the transfer is effective against third parties
without requiring any form or the consent of the former creditor (TCO art. 185).
As mentioned above, if a claim is transferred by law, the assignor warrants neither
the existence of the claim nor the solvency of the debtor (TCO art. 191 par. 2). If a
claim is transferred by a court order and this transfer is for consideration, TCO art.
191 par. 1 may be applied by analogy.53
32.4 Special Provisions
According to TCO art. 194, special provisions governing the assignment of certain
rights are reserved. Indeed, the assignment of claims arising out of negotiable
instruments, such as a bill of exchange, a promissory note or a cheque, is governed
by certain special provisions of the Turkish Commercial Code. That is why it is
necessary to comply with those special provisions in the assignment of these
claims. For instance, pursuant to T.Com.C art. 681, any bill of exchange may be
transferred by the endorsement and delivery of possession of it, even if it is not
expressly made out to order.54 However, it should be kept in mind that where the
drawer has included the words ‘not to order’ or a clause that has the same meaning
in the instrument, then the bill may be transferred only subject to the formal
requirements relating to the assignment of a claim (T.Com.C art. 681 par. 2).
Moreover, the right of ownership and other rights in rem may not qualify as
claims, and the transfer of these rights is governed by special provisions. For
instance, a contract for the transfer of ownership of land must be made by a duly
authenticated instrument (TCC art. 706 par. 1). Furthermore, as a rule, entry in the
land register is required for the acquisition of ownership of land (TCC art. 705 par.
1). As to chattels, the ownership or other rights in rem, as a rule, do not require a
contract in written form but do require the transfer of possession to the acquirer
(TCC art. 763 par. 1).55
53
Tekinay et al. (1993), p. 266; Eren (2015), p. 1227; O
54
See Sect. 25.4.2, fn. 43.
55
The transfer of possession is of a factual nature. The material transfer of possession must be
complemented by the parties’ agreement (referred to as a real agreement) concerning the transfer
of ownership or the constitution of rights in rem. The real agreement is a bilateral legal act and
does not require any specific form. It may be formed by the parties’ express or implied declarations
of will (intention).
References

Çetiner B (2010) Hapis hakkı. Filiz, İstanbul
Dayınlarlı K (2008) Borçlar kanununa g€ ore alacagın temliki. Banka ve ticaret hukuku araştırma
enstitüsü, Ankara
Engin Bİ (2002) Alaca gı temlik edenin garanti sorumlulu gu. Seçkin, Ankara
Günerg€ok Ö (2014) Alaca gın devrinde borçlunun hukuki durumu. Vedat, İstanbul
Helvacı İ (2008) Eski medenı̂ kanunumuzla karşılaştırmalı olarak Türk medenı̂ kanunu’na g€ ore
Kocaman AB (1989) Alaca gın temlikinin benzer üçlü ilişkiler karşısındaki teorik sınırı sorunu.
Banka ve ticaret hukuku araştırma enstitüsü, Ankara
Öz MT (1990) Ögreti ve uygulamada sebepsiz zenginleşme. Kazancı, İstanbul
Filiz, İstanbul
İstanbul
Chapter 33
Assumption of Obligations
33.1 Promise to Discharge from a Debt1
33.1.1 General2
According to TCO art. 195, a third party with respect to an obligational relationship
may promise the debtor to discharge him from the debt. As a result of this
agreement, the promising third party is obliged to discharge the debtor from the
debt. For instance, debtor D is obliged to pay €10,000 to creditor C. A third party
enters into a contract with debtor D and undertakes to discharge him from this debt.
The agreement between the debtor and the third party does not require a specific
form. However, if the promising party is obliged to discharge the debtor without
consideration, this agreement must be in writing. This is because such an agreement
constitutes a promise of a gift (TCO art. 288 par. 1).3
1
Aybay (2011), pp. 192–195; Becker (1941), Vorbemerkungen zu art. 175-183
(Schuldübernahme), art. 175-181, 183; Berger (2012), pp. 812–825; Engel (1997), pp. 894–909;
Eren (2015), pp. 1243–1255; Feyzio glu (1977), pp. 666–701; Gauch et al. (2008), pp. 272–287;
Honsell et al. (2003), art. 175-181, 183; Kılıço glu (2013), pp. 810–829; Nomer (2015),
pp. 420, 454–457; Oser and Sch€ onenberger (1929), Vorbemerkungen zur Schuldübernahme (art.
175-183), art. 175-181, 183; O guzman and Öz (2016), pp. 597–627; Özsunay (1983), pp. 194–207;
Reisoglu (2014), pp. 476–484; Schwenzer (2009), pp. 581–591; Tekinay et al. (1993),
pp. 268–284; Tercier (2004), pp. 316–322; Tercier et al. (2016), pp. 543–553; Thévenoz
and Werro (2012), art. 175-181, 183, and von Tuhr and Escher (1974), pp. 380–403. For further
explanations, see Kahraman (2013), Paket (2014), Kılıç (2014).
2
Reprise de dette interne, interne Schuld€
ubernahme.
3
von Tuhr and Escher (1974), § 99, I, 2, p. 383; Engel (1997), p. 895; Oguzman and Öz (2016),
p. 599; Tekinay et al. (1993), p. 270; Eren (2015), p. 1245; Reiso
glu (2014), p. 477.

282 33 Assumption of Obligations
33.1.2 Legal Nature and the Promisor’s Performance
The agreement between the debtor and the promising third party is an obligatory
transaction with regard to the promising party.4 It does not transfer the debtor’s debt
to the promising party. If the promising party intends to perform his obligation to
discharge the debtor, then he must perform the debtor’s obligation or make an
agreement for assumption of debt with the creditor in order to assume the debtor’s
obligation.
In cases where a promising party attempts to perform a debtor’s obligation, the
creditor must accept performance, provided that the promising party’s fulfilment is
possible (TCO art. 83)5 and appropriate to the obligation.6 Otherwise, the creditor is
entitled to refuse the promising party’s performance.7 However, if fulfilment by the
promising party is possible and appropriate to the obligation and the creditor refuses
or rejects performance without any just cause, then he falls into default.8 It should
be kept in mind that if the debtor’s personal skills are of importance to the creditor,
then he is not required to accept performance by the promising party.9
If the promising party intends to assume the debtor’s obligation, then he must
enter into a contract with the creditor. However, the creditor does not have to enter
into a contract with the promising party for the assumption of the obligation.
Furthermore, the promising party may persuade the creditor to discharge the
debtor.10 If the creditor and the debtor make a discharge agreement, then the
debtor’s obligation is extinguished (TCO art. 132). Moreover, the promising party
may fulfil his obligation by novation.11 In this case, the debtor’s obligation is
extinguished, and a new obligation arises between the creditor and the promising
party (TCO art. 133).
Where the promising party does not perform his obligation to discharge the
debtor, the latter may bring an action in relation to the claim. At this point, it is
worth recalling that the promise to discharge an obligation may be made with or
without consideration. If the agreement is concluded for consideration—i.e., if the
debtor undertakes a certain obligation for his discharge—then the debtor is not
entitled to compel the promising party to carry out his obligation to discharge unless
he fulfils that obligation (TCO art. 195 par. 2). However, this rule is not mandatory.
Thus, the parties may determine the order of performance.12
4
Acte générateur d’obligation, Verpflichtungsgesch€
aft. Chapter 7, fn. 5.
5
See Sect. 16.2.
6
7
Oguzman and Öz (2016), p. 600; Thévenoz and Werro (2012), art. 175, N. 4.
8
See Chap. 20.
9
Tercier (2004), p. 318. See Sect. 16.1.
10
Thévenoz and Werro (2012), art. 175, N. 4; O guzman and Öz (2016), p. 601; Tekinay et al.
(1993), p. 270.
11
Engel (1997), p. 896; Thévenoz and Werro (2012), art. 175, N. 4; Feyzio glu (1977), p. 671;
Tekinay et al. (1993), p. 270; O guzman and Öz (2016), p. 601.
12
Eren (2015), pp. 1246–1247; O guzman and Öz (2016), p. 602.
33.2 Agreement for Assumption of Debt 283
The legislature aimed to protect the debtor by the enactment of TCO art. 195 par.
3, according to which if the promising party does not discharge the debtor from his
obligation, the debtor may demand that the promising party provide security, such
as a surety, a mortgage, a pledge, etc.
33.2 Agreement for Assumption of Debt
33.2.1 Formation of the Agreement
An agreement for assumption of debt13 is formed by the creditor’s and the assuming
party’s mutual and consistent declarations of will (intention).14 It does not require
any specific form.
The offer may be made by the assuming party or by the creditor. In the ordinary
course of life, an agreement for assumption of debt may be made in order to perform
a promise to discharge. That is why the legislature accepts that notification to a
creditor of a promise to discharge by an assuming party, or with the authorisation of
the latter, by the original debtor, is deemed to be an offer (TCO art. 196 par. 2).
Acceptance by the creditor may be express or implied (TCO art. 196 par. 3 sent.
1). Acceptance by the creditor is presumed if he accepts the assuming party’s
fulfilment without any reservation or if he consents to any other act by the assuming
party acting in the capacity of the debtor (TCO art. 196 par. 3 sent. 2).
An offer for an agreement for assumption of debt may be accepted by a creditor
at any time (TCO art. 197 par. 1 sent. 1). However, it should be kept in mind that for
the conclusion of any such contract: (1) where an offer without a time limit is made
to a person present, the offer lapses unless the offeree accepts it forthwith (TCO art.
4 par. 1), and (2) where an offer without a time limit is made to a person who is
absent, the offer is binding for a reasonable time (TCO art. 5 par. 1).
The assuming party or the original debtor may set a period of time for the
acceptance of the offer (TCO art. 197 par. 1 sent. 2). In such a case, if the creditor
remains silent until the fixed period expires, then the offer is deemed to be refused
(TCO art. 197 par. 1 sent. 3). If a new promise to discharge has been agreed upon
and if, before the first promising party’s offer is accepted, an offer is made to the
creditor regarding this new promise, then the first promising party is released from
his offer (TCO art. 197 par. 2). However, it should be kept in mind that in the
formation of any other contract, it is possible that one or more offers may be made
at the same time to the offeree, and he is free to accept any of them.15
13
Reprise de dette externe, externe Schuld€ubernahme.
14
arung.
15
Oguzman and Öz (2016), pp. 607–608.
33.2.2 Legal Nature
As indicated above, a debtor may be released from his debt by an agreement

between the assuming party and the creditor. On the formation of such an agree-
ment, the assuming party becomes the new debtor (TCO art. 196 par. 1).
An agreement for assumption of debt is generally carried out with the aim of
fulfilling a promise to discharge. However, a person may assume the debtor’s
obligation without such a prior obligation.16 In the case of an agreement for
assumption of debt, the debtor is substituted. In other words, a new debtor replaces
the original debtor, who is thereby released from the debt. As a result, such an
agreement qualifies as a dispositive legal transaction17 with regard to the creditor.
Thus, the parties must have the capacity to act, and the creditor must have the power
of disposition.18,19
An agreement for assumption of debt is an independent (abstract) legal transac-
tion. Thus, even if the legal ground—e.g., the promise to discharge—is invalid, the
agreement is nonetheless valid. However, the original debtor’s discharge will create
a case of unjust enrichment in his favour.20
As an agreement for assumption of debt is a dispositive legal transaction with
regard to the creditor, if the assumed debt does not exist at the time of formation of
the contract, then it is void.21 This is because the object of the contract is impossible
to perform at the time the contract is formed (TCO art. 27 par. 1).
33.2.3 Effects of Substitution of Debtor
As mentioned above, the principal consequence of an agreement for assumption of

debt is that the debtor is released from the debt and the new debtor is obliged to
perform the original debtor’s obligation. The creditor may no longer demand
performance by the original debtor. Even if the new debtor does not perform the
obligation, the position of the creditor with respect to the original debtor is
unaffected.22
16
Thévenoz and Werro (2012), art. 176, N. 5; Gauch et al. (2008), p. 275; O
p. 604; Tekinay et al. (1993), p. 273.
17
Acte de disposition, Verf€
ugungsgesch€ aft. See Chap. 14, fn. 5. It should be kept in mind that an
agreement for assumption of debt is an obligatory legal transaction with regard to the assuming
party. Becker (1941), Art. 176, N. 2; Feyzio glu (1977), pp. 685–686; O guzman and Öz (2016),
p. 604; Eren (2015), p. 1248.
18
19
von Tuhr and Escher (1974), § 99, II, p. 388; Feyzioglu (1977), pp. 685–686; O guzman and Öz
(2016), p. 604; Eren (2015), p. 1248.
20
21
22
Oguzman and Öz (2016), p. 610; Reiso glu (2014), p. 478; Eren (2015), p. 1250.
As the new debtor assumes only the debt of the original debtor, the obligational
relationship between the original debtor and the creditor stands; that is, the new
debtor does not become a party to the obligational relationship. For instance, in a
car sale contract, the buyer is obliged to pay €10,000. If a new debtor assumes this
debt, the obligation of the seller relating to the transfer of ownership of the car
remains in favour of the buyer. In other words, the buyer’s rights relating to
ownership of the car are not affected.
In addition to these consequences, the new debtor is in the same position as the
original debtor with regard to the time and the place of performance, etc.
33.2.3.1 Ancillary Rights and Debts
As a rule, an assumption of debt does not affect the creditor’s rights. In addition, the
substitution of the debtor does not affect the ancillary rights of the creditor, unless
they are inseparably connected to the person of the original debtor (TCO art.
198 par. 1). Thus, the creditor may demand that the new debtor pay interest23 and
penalties. If there is a maturity clause in the agreement between the creditor and the
original debtor, then the creditor may exercise his rights under this clause.24
Furthermore, if the original debtor has provided certain securities such as a mort-
gage or a pledge, the creditor may continue to benefit from these securities.25
The creditor may not set off his claim against the new debtor with the debt he
owes to the original debtor.26 Furthermore, if there are grounds that are inseparably
connected to the person of the original debtor that preclude the limitation period
from commencing or continuing,27 then the limitation period commences or con-
tinues when the agreement for assumption of debt is concluded. For instance, if a
husband is obliged to pay €10,000 to his wife, then the limitation period does not
commence so long as they remain married (TCO art. 153 par. 1 subcl. 3) However,
if a new debtor assumes the husband’s debt, the limitation period commences.28
Pledges given by third parties and sureties extinguish when the debt is assumed
by a new debtor, unless the pledgor and surety consent to the assumption of debt in
23
It should be noted that it is contentious as to whether or not the interest or penalties accrued
before the agreement for assumption of debt are transferred to the new debtor. Unless the contrary
is understood from the agreement for assumption of debt, these claims transfer to the new debtor.
Thévenoz and Werro (2012), art. 178, N. 3; Tercier (2004), p. 319; Engel (1997), p. 900; von Tuhr
and Escher (1974), § 99, V, 1, p. 392; Becker (1941), art. 178, N. 2; O guzman and Öz (2016),
pp. 610–611; Tercier et al. (2016), p. 548; Nomer (2015), p. 456, cf. Tekinay et al. (1993), p. 277.
24
25
Oser and Sch€onenberger (1929), art. 178, N. 9; von Tuhr and Escher (1974), § 99, V, p. 393;
Engel (1997), p. 900; Eren (2015), p. 1250; Reiso glu (2014), p. 479.
26
Feyzioglu (1977), pp. 686–687; Tekinay et al. (1993), p. 278; Oguzman and Öz (2016), p. 611;
Reisoglu (2014), p. 480; Eren (2015), p. 1252.
27
See Sect. 26.4.
28
written form (TCO art. 198 par. 2). In fact, for third parties who pledge or provide
surety, the personal, moral and financial position of the original debtor are of
importance. If the legislature had not enacted this provision, the securing third
parties would have been faced with providing pledges or sureties to a person who is
unknown to them.29
It should be kept in mind that if the securing third parties do not consent to the
assumption of debt, this does not preclude the validity of the agreement. The only
consequence of the absence of consent is the extinguishment of their securities. As
noted above, the consent of securing third parties requires a written form. The
consent is invalid if they do not comply with this requirement.30
33.2.3.2 Defences
The right to raise defences in relation to an assumed debt transfers to the new debtor
(TCO art. 199 par. 1). For instance, the obligational relationship that gave rise to the
debt may be invalid. In this case, the new debtor is entitled to assert that the
assumed debt was never in existence. Moreover, the assumed debt may be
extinguished, for example, due to performance, set-off or a discharge agreement.
Thus, the new debtor may raise these defences against the creditor.31
If the assumed debt is already time-barred, then the new debtor may raise this
defence against the creditor. Furthermore, if the original debtor has the defence of
exceptio non adimpleti contractus against the creditor,32 it is evident that the new
debtor may also raise this defence.33 Moreover, if the debt becomes time-barred
after the assumption of debt, then the new debtor may raise this defence against the
creditor.
Unless the contrary is inferred from the agreement for assumption of debt, the
new debtor is not entitled to raise the defences that the original debtor personally
had against the creditor (TCO art. 199 par. 2). Consequently, the new debtor may
not set off his debt to the creditor with any claim that the original debtor may have
against the creditor.34
Certain rights are dependent upon being a party to a contract. That is why if the
contract constituting the original debtor’s obligation is voidable, due to mistake,
fraud or duress,35 the new debtor may not rescind the contract. Moreover, the new
29
von Tuhr and Escher (1974), § 99, V, 2, p. 393; Oguzman and Öz (2016), pp. 611–612; Tekinay
et al. (1993), p. 277; Eren (2015), p. 1251.
30
Oguzman and Öz (2016), p. 612; Eren (2015), p. 1251; Nomer (2015), p. 456.
31
von Tuhr and Escher (1974), § 99, IV, 1, p. 390; Tekinay et al. (1993), p. 278; O
guzman and Öz
(2016), p. 614.
32
See Sect. 18.4.2.2.
33
glu (1977), p. 686; O
34
von Tuhr and Escher (1974), § 99, IV, 2, p. 391; O guzman and Öz (2016), p. 615.
35
See Chap. 11.
debtor is not entitled to withdraw from the contract, which gives rise to the original
debtor’s obligation, due to the default of the counter-party. This is because these
rights still remain with the original debtor. If the original debtor exercises these
rights—i.e., if he rescinds the contract (ab initio) or withdraws from it (ex tunc)36—
then the obligations arising from the contract that have been rescinded or withdrawn
are extinguished retroactively. As a result, in these cases, the new debtor’s obliga-
tions are also extinguished.37
The new debtor is not entitled to raise against the creditor defences that arise
from the promise to discharge (TCO art. 199 par. 3). As noted above, the agreement
for assumption of debt is independent of the promise to discharge. Thus, the new
debtor may not refrain from performing the debt by, for instance, raising the
invalidity or the non-existence of the promise to discharge.38
33.2.4 When an Assumption Agreement Becomes Invalid
If an agreement for assumption of debt becomes invalid, the original debt and all
ancillary liabilities stand, subject to the rights of third parties acting in good faith
(TCO art. 200 par. 1). An assumption agreement becomes invalid especially when a
party to the agreement rescinds it because his declaration of will (intention)39 is
affected by material mistake, fraud and duress. As mentioned above, with the
formation of an agreement for assumption of debt, the original debt does not
extinguish, and a new debt does not arise. The only consequence of the agreement
for assumption of debt is that the debtor is substituted.
If an agreement for assumption of debt becomes invalid, as indicated in TCO art.
200 par. 1, the obligation continues to rest with the original debtor. As a result,
securities, including any pledges, mortgages or sureties, continue. However, if the
securing third parties do not consent to the assumption of debt in written form, then
these securities are extinguished (TCO art. 198 par. 2). TCO art. 200 par. 1 aims to
protect securing third parties acting in good faith. In fact, if the securing third
parties are not aware of the invalidity of the agreement for assumption of debt and
they do not consent to the assumption of debt, the extinguishment of their securities
is unaffected by the assumption agreement becoming invalid. In addition, the
creditor may demand that the assuming party pay compensation for damage
resulting from the loss of securities obtained previously or for any other reason,
unless the assuming party proves that he is not at fault40 for the agreement for
36
ucktritt).
37
Oguzman and Öz (2016), pp. 615–616.
38
guzman and Öz (2016), p. 616; Eren (2015), p. 1252; Reiso
glu
(2014), p. 549.
39
arung.
40
See Sect. 22.2.3.2.2.
assumption of debt becoming invalid and for the consequential damage suffered by
the creditor (TCO art. 200 par. 2).41
In fact, with the assumption of the debt, the creditor may lose the benefit of the
third parties’ securities or incur certain damage due to his belief in the validity of
the agreement for assumption of debt. For instance, the creditor, relying on the
agreement for assumption of debt, may have discharged the securing third parties
from liability. In such a case, the assuming party is liable to compensate the creditor
for damage unless he proves that he is not at fault for the agreement for assumption
of debt becoming invalid and for the creditor incurring damage.42 For example, if
the assuming party induces the creditor to accept the agreement for assumption of
debt by fraud or duress (TCO art. 39 par. 1), then, when the creditor rescinds the
agreement on account of the fraud or duress, the assuming party cannot be released
from paying compensation for the creditor’s damage.
33.3 Cumulative Assumption of Debt43
According to TCO art. 201, a cumulative assumption of debt is an agreement

concluded between a new debtor and the creditor. As a result of this agreement,
the new debtor becomes liable jointly and severally along with the existing debtor.
In comparison to the usual form of debt assumption, in the cumulative assumption
of debt, the original debtor will not be released from his debt. On the contrary, he
remains as a debtor. The remaining party and the new debtor become jointly and
severally liable (TCO art. 201 par. 2).
It should be noted that the consent of the debtor is not necessary for an agreement
relating to a cumulative assumption of debt to be valid. Furthermore, the new
debtor’s liability is not ancillary to the original debtor’s debt.
An agreement relating to a cumulative assumption of debt does not require a
specific form. However, TCO art. 603 should be considered. According to this
article, certain provisions concerning suretyship apply to other personal guarantees
provided by natural persons. Therefore, the provisions pertaining to form, the
capacity to act as surety and the consent of the surety’s spouse apply to cumulative
assumptions of debt that are carried out for the purpose of providing a security.
Consequently, in such a case, a cumulative assumption of debt must be in writing,
and the amount of the new debtor’s liability and the date of the agreement must be
handwritten by the new debtor (TCO art. 583). If the new debtor is married, subject
to certain exceptions, he must also have the written consent of his spouse, at the
41
guzman and Öz (2016), pp. 618–619;
Reisoglu (2014), p. 480.
42
Eren (2015), p. 1252; Tekinay et al. (1993), p. 279; O guzman and Öz (2016), p. 619.
43
For further explanations see Portakal (2016).
33.4 Assignment of an Estate or a Business 289
latest by the time the cumulative agreement for assumption of debt is formed (TCO
art. 584).
In cases where the cumulative assumption of debt is carried out with the aim of
securing the debt, if the new debtor performs the entire debt, then he may have
complete recourse to the original debtor. However, if the original debtor performs
the entire debt, he may not have recourse to the new debtor.44
33.4 Assignment of an Estate or a Business
33.4.1 General45
An owner of an estate46 or of a business may assign the estate or the business with
all its assets and liabilities to a third party. In such a case, the debts of the estate or
the business transfer to the assignee. As mentioned above, the parties to an
agreement for assumption of debt are the creditor and the new debtor. However,
in cases where an estate or business is assigned, the parties are the assignor and the
assignee. The debts of the estate or the business are transferred to the assignee upon
conclusion of the assignment agreement and by the assignee’s notification to the
creditors or the assignee’s publication of the assignment. As has been seen, the
creditors’ consent is not necessary for the transfer of the debts of an estate or a
business.47
33.4.2 Conditions
In order for the debts of an estate or a business to be transferred, the following

conditions must be met: (1) there must be an assignment agreement concerning the
transfer of the estate or the business with all its assets and liabilities between the
assignor and the assignee, and (2) the assignee must notify the creditors or publish a
notice that he has acquired the estate or the business with all its assets and liabilities
44
45
For further explanations see Acemo glu (1971), Arıcı (2008).
46
Patrimoine, Verm€ ogen. Patrimoine: “ . . . is the totality of an individual’s economic assets and
liabilities, for example those rights and duties which are capable of valuation in money terms.”
(See Dahl 2001, p. 243); more concisely the patrimoine is a collection of assets and liabilities
attached to a person; Estate: “The collective assets and liabilities of a person viewed as an entity
capable of owing or being entitled to money, of being solvent or insolvent.” (Simpson and Weiner
1989, p. 408). For further explanations see Ayiter (1968).
47
Engel (1997), p. 905; Oguzman and Öz (2016), p. 623.
The parties may specify the debts to be transferred in the assignment agreement
relating to the transfer of the estate or the business. However, even if they do not
specify the debts to be transferred, the agreement is nevertheless valid.48
In order for the debts to be transferred, the assignee must notify the creditors of
the assignment or publish a notice that he has acquired the estate or the business.
The notification of the assignment to the creditors does not require a specific form.
As to publication, the legislature requires that an announcement of the assignment
must be published in a nationwide newspaper. However, in the case of the assign-
ment of commercial businesses, the announcement must be published in the Trade
Registry Gazette (TCO art. 202 par. 1).
33.4.3 Consequences
When the notification or the publication of the assignment reaches the addressees,
the assignee, along with the original debtor, becomes liable for the debts of the
assigned estate or business. The liability of the original debtor continues for 2 years.
This period of time for debts that are due commences on the date of notification or
publication. As to debts that are not due at the time of notification or publication, the
period of time commences on the date they become due (TCO art. 202 par. 2). As
long as the assignee does not give or publish the notification, the two-year period
does not commence (TCO art. 202 par. 4). In other respects, the assumption of debts
by way of assignment of an estate or of a business has the same effect as the
assumption of a single debt (TCO art. 202 par. 3).
It should be noted that since the original debtor’s liabilities stand for 2 years, the
third party’s securities provided for the original debtor also continue for 2 years. At
the end of this period of time, these securities are released. If the creditors do not
want to lose the benefit of these securities, then they must persuade the securing
third parties to give their written consent to the assumption of the debt before the
period of time lapses (compare to TCO art. 198 par. 2).
33.5 Merger and Acquisition of Businesses49
Two businesses may be merged by mutually taking over the assets and liabilities of
the other. In addition, a business may join another business. In these cases, the
creditors of both businesses, having the same rights arising from the assignment of
an estate, may demand their claims from the new business (TCO art. 203 par. 1).
That is to say, the debts of the merged businesses are transferred to the new
48
49
Esin and Lokmanhekim (2003).
33.6 Special Provisions 291
business. It should be noted that the liability of the original debtor does not
continue.
The same principle applies to the debts of businesses owned by a single
individual that are subsequently converted into a general partnership50 or a limited
partnership51 (TCO art. 203 par. 2).
33.6 Special Provisions
33.6.1 General
Special provisions relating to an assumption of debt in the case of partition of an

inheritance and in the case of transfer of encumbered real estate are reserved (TCO
art. 204).
33.6.2 Partition of an Inheritance
Subject to certain legal exceptions, the debts of the deceased pass ipso iure to the
heirs, and they become personally liable for the debts of the deceased (TCC art.
599 par. 2). If there are several heirs, then they are jointly and severally liable52 for
the debts of the deceased. As long as the heirs do not distribute the estate, their joint
and several liabilities continue. However, the heirs may distribute the estate, and, in
the partition proceedings, they may determine that the debts of the deceased will be
entirely assumed by one of them. Moreover, they may decide which part of the debt
is to be paid by which heir. In such cases, if the creditor explicitly or implicitly
accepts the assumption or the partition of the debt, the joint and several liability of
the heirs is extinguished. However, if the creditor does not consent to this partition,
the joint and several liability of the heirs continues for a period of 5 years. This
period of time commences for debts that are due at the date of partition. For debts
that are not due at the time of partition, the period of time commences on the date
they become due (TCC art. 681). If debts are not paid by the end of this period of
time, then the heirs’ joint and several liabilities are extinguished, and they become
liable in proportion to their legal share of the inheritance.53
In the partition, if an heir receives movable or immovable property, which is a
part of the inheritance, and which is pledged or mortgaged for the debt of the
deceased, this heir assumes the debt secured by this property (TCC art. 655). In this
50
Ansay and Schneider (2002), pp. 85–88.
51
Ansay and Schneider (2002), p. 88.
52
See Chap. 27.
53
Dural and Öz (2015), p. 462.
case, for the assumption of the secured debt by the heir, the consent of the creditor is
not necessary. In addition, if there are several heirs, their joint and several liabilities
extinguish with this acquisition.
33.6.3 Transfer of Encumbered Real Estate
An owner of immovable property that is mortgaged in order to secure a debt may

alienate his property to a third party. As a rule, the alienation of the mortgaged
immovable property affects neither the liability of the mortgagor nor the personal
liability of the debtor, unless agreed to the contrary (TCC art. 888 par. 1). Never-
theless, if a new owner attempts to assume the debt secured by the mortgaged real
estate, the registrar of the land registry must notify the mortgagee that the new
owner has attempted to assume the debt (TCC art. 890 par. 1). If the mortgagee does
not consent to the new owner assuming the debt and the original debtor being
discharged from the debt, then he must notify the debtor of this decision.
In cases where the mortgagee does not consent to the substitution of the debtor,
he must give written notice to the original debtor within 1 year (TCC art. 888 par. 2)
commencing from the date of notification by the registrar (TCC art. 890 par. 2). If
the mortgagee does not notify the debtor of his decision within 1 year, then the new
owner becomes the new debtor of the debt secured by the mortgage, and the original
debtor is released (TCC art. 888 par. 2). As has been seen, the creditor’s consent is
not necessary for the new owner to assume the debt.54
References
Acemoglu K (1971) Borçlar kanununun 179. maddesine g€ ore malvarlı gı veya ticari işletmenin
devri. İstanbul
Ansay T, Schneider E (eds) (2002) Introduction to Turkish business law. Turan, Ankara
Arıcı MF (2008) Ticari işletmenin aktif ve pasifi ile devri. Vedat, İstanbul
Ayiter N (1968) Mamelek kavramı üzerine inceleme. Ankara
Dahl HS (2001) Dictionnaire Juridique Dahl. Paris
Dural M, Öz T (2015) Türk özel hukuku, miras hukuku, vol 4. Filiz, İstanbul
Esin Gİ, Lokmanhekim ST (2003) Uygulamada birleşme ve devralmalar. Beta, İstanbul
54
For further explanations Helvacı (2008), p. 326 ff.
References 293

Helvacı İ (2008) Eski medenı̂ kanunumuzla karşılaştırmalı olarak Türk medenı̂ kanununa g€
ore
Kahraman Z (2013) Karşılaştırmalı hukukta borcun dış üstlenilmesi (borcun nakli). Vedat,
İstanbul
Kılıç M (2014) Türk hukukunda borcun üstlenilmesi. Yetkin, Ankara
Paket S (2014) Borcun dış üstlenilmesi. Yetkin, Ankara
Portakal SY (2016) Borca katılma. On iki levha, İstanbul
Simpson JA, Weiner ESC (1989) The Oxford English Dictionary, vol V. Clarendon, Oxford
Filiz, İstanbul
İstanbul
Chapter 34
Transfer of Contracts and Joining a Party to an
Existing Contract
34.1 Transfer of Contracts1
The transfer of a contract2 is an agreement concluded between the transferor, the

transferee and the remaining party to the contract. In such a case, all the claims and
the debts of the transferor, and the legal position of being a party to the contract, are
transferred to the transferee (TCO art. 205 par. 1).
The agreement relating to the transfer of a contract requires the same legal form
as the contract to be transferred (TCO art. 205 par. 3). For instance, a sale contract
relating to immovable property must be concluded before a land registry officer
(TCO art. 237 par. 1, LRA art. 26). Therefore, if the contract to be transferred is a
sale contract concerning immovable property, the transfer contract must also be
concluded before a land registry officer. However, a sale contract relating to
movable property, as a rule, does not require any legal form. Thus, even if the
parties conclude this contract in a written form, the transfer contract does not
require a specific form.3
A transfer contract may be concluded only between the transferor and the
transferee. However, in order for this contract to be effective, the remaining party’s
consent is necessary (TCO art. 205 par. 2). This consent may be given before or
after the formation of the transfer contract. It should be noted that there is no
specific provision in the Turkish Code of Obligations relating to the form of this
1
Aybay (2011), pp. 195–196; Becker (1941), Vorbemerkungen zu art. 164-174, pp. 765–767;
Berger (2012), pp. 823–825; Eren (2015), pp. 1255–1256; Gauch et al. (2008), pp. 269–270;
Kılıçoglu (2013), pp. 829–834; Nomer (2015), pp. 445–447; O guzman and Öz (2016),
pp. 627–635; Reisoglu (2014), pp. 485–486; Schwenzer (2009), pp. 592–593; Tercier (2004),
pp. 303, 311; Tercier et al. (2016), pp. 531–536, and Thévenoz and Werro (2012), art. 181.
2
For further explanations, see Ayrancı (2003), Çayan (2016).
3

296 34 Transfer of Contracts and Joining a Party to an Existing Contract
consent. Thus, it would be appropriate to infer that this consent does not require any
specific form.4 Moreover, this consent may be given explicitly or implicitly.
According to TCO art. 205 par. 4, subrogation cases resulting from law5 and
other specific provisions relating to the assignment of claims6 and the assumption of
debt7 are reserved.
34.2 Joining a Party to an Existing Contract
In order to join a party to an existing contract, it is necessary that there be a new

contract between the parties to the existing contract and the person wishing to be
joined as a party to that contract.8 As a result of this new contract, the joining party
will have the same rights and obligations as the party to the original contract (TCO
art. 206 par. 1). For instance, in a work contract, if the added party is joined
alongside the contractor, then he will have the same rights and obligations as the
contractor. Or if the added party is joined to the contract alongside the customer,
then he will have the same rights and obligations as the customer.
In the absence of an agreement to the contrary, the added party becomes a joint
and several creditor or debtor (TCO art. 206 par. 2). Therefore, the legal position of
the new joint and several debtor will be governed by TCO arts. 162–168.9 Simi-
larly, the legal position of the new joint and several creditor will be governed by
TCO art. 169.10
The form of the contract that enables the added party to be joined to an existing
contract must be the same as the existing contract (TCO art. 206 par. 3).
References
Aybay A (2011) Borçlar hukuku dersleri genel b€olüm. Filiz, İstanbul

Ayrancı H (2003) S€ozleşmelerin yüklenilmesi (devri). Yetkin, Ankara
Çayan G (2016) S€ozleşmenin devri. Adalet, Ankara
4
Nomer (2015), p. 446; O guzman and Öz (2016), p. 630.
5
See Sect. 24.2.
6
See Chap. 32.
7
See Chap. 33.
8
Cf. Tercier (2004), p. 303.
9
See Chap. 27.
10
See Chap. 28.
References 297

O
İstanbul
Article Index
A Swiss Code of Obligations(SCO)

Digital Signature Act(DSA) 14/3: 23 fn. 18
5/2: 22 1001: 204fn. 43
French Civil Code(FCC) 1108: 204fn. 43
1131: 44 The Act on Movable Pledge on Commercial
1303: 207 Transactions
German Civil Code(BGB) 4/3: 22 fn. 13
§ 116: 9 fn. 23 14: 40 fn. 25
§ 118: 10fn. 24 Turkish Civil Code(TCC)
§ 140: 26 1: 60
§ 285: 207 2: x, 12, 25, 49, 64, 65, 70, 99, 162, 183,
§ 305c: 30 184
§ 311b/1: 25 fn. 31 2/2: 40, 57, 217
§ 311/2,3: 163 fn. 93 3: 87
§ 326/2: 138 5: x
§ 364: 97 fn. 5 8: 36
§ 658/1: 16 9: 36
§ 780: 44 16/1,sent.1: 82, 83, 94, 95
Land Registration Act(LRA) 23: 36, 105, 171
26: 21, 22, 48, 261, 295 32: 86
Legal Interest and Default Interest Act(LIA) 119: 143
1: 171, 172 342/1: 81
1/1: 105 451/1: 94, 95
1/2: 105 538: 21
2/1: 171, 172 599/1: 278
2/2: 172 599/2: 291
2/3: 172 605/1: 203, 225
3/1: 105 606/1: 225
3/2: 105 606/2: 225fn. 34
4/a: 106, 172 609/2: 245
Notary Public Act(NPA) 641/1: 232
60,subcl.1: 23 655: 291
89: 48, 84 681: 291
Regulation of Land Registry(RLR) 681/1: 232
18/4: 84 681/2: 232

İ. Helvacı, Turkish Contract Law, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-60061-1
300 Article Index
Turkish Civil Code(TCC) (cont.) 5/1: 6, 12, 283

688: 238 5/2: 6
705/1: 250, 279 5/3: 7
706/1: 279 6: 8
716/1: 49, 146 7: 5
735: 183 8/2: 4, 5, 7
736: 183 9: 15, 17
763/1: 250, 279 9/1: 15
764: 248, 249 9/2,sent.1: 16
765: 248 9/2,sent.2: 16
820: 199 9/3: 17
864: 221, 223 10/1: 11–12
871/3: 183 10/2: 11–12
883: 198, 204 11/1: 12
884: 185 11/2: 12
888/1: 292 12/1: 19, 20
888/2: 292 12/2,sent.2: 24
890/1: 292 13/1,sent.1: 24
890/2: 292 13/1,sent.2: 24
891: 274 14/1: 22, 271
939/1: 248, 274 14/2: 22
949: 39 15/1,sent.1: 22
950/1: 274 15/1,sent.2: 22
961: 199 15/2: 22
979/1: 248 15/3: 23
1009: 183 16/1: 23
Turkish Civil Procedure Code(TCPC) 16/2: 23
106: 25fn. 26 17: 61
112: 103 17/1: 20
188: 20 17/2: 20
200: 19 18: 44
229: 20 19: 55
389: 247 19/1: 53, 55, 56, 272
Turkish Code of Bankruptcy and 19/2: 56, 272
Enforcement(TCBE) 20/1: 29
24: 146 20/1,sent.2: 29
30: 147 20/2: 30
42: 149 20/3: 30
67: 149 20/4: 30
68–70: 149 21: 32
191/1: 94 21/1: 30
192/1: 95 21/2: 30
206: 274 22: 31
343: 147, 148 23: 30
Turkish Code of Obligations(TCO) 24: 32
1/1: 4, 7 25: 32
1/2: 4, 7 26: 35
2/1: 11, 60 27/1: 36, 39, 105, 150, 171, 204, 284
2/2: 61 27/2,sent.1: 39, 40, 252
2/3: 61 27/2,sent.2: 31, 40, 41, 252
3: 6 28/1: 78, 79
4/1: 6, 283 28/2: 79
4/2: 6 29: 47
Article Index 301
29/2: 48 66/2: 182

30: 67 72/1: 163
31: 68 77: 189, 206, 249, 250
31/2: 69 77/2: 208, 247
33: 69 78/1: 247
34/1: 70 78/2: 143, 217
34/2: 70 79: 208
35: 163 82: 44, 189, 206, 208, 249, 250
35/1,sent.1: 70 82/2: 44
35/1,sent.2: 71 83: 111, 282
35/2: 71 84/1: 99, 100
36/1: 71 84/2: 99
36/2: 72 85: 100
37/1: 73 85/1: 100
37/2: 74 85/2: 100, 224
38/2: 74 85/3: 100
39: 68 86: 101
39/1: 70, 72–74, 288 87: 102
39/2: 73, 75 88/1: 105
40/2: 84 88/2: 105
40/3: 85 89: 60, 116
41/1: 83 89/1,subcl.2: 116
41/2: 83 89/2: 116
42/1,sent.1: 86 90: 60, 119, 219
42/1,sent.2: 86 91/1: 60, 120
42/2: 86 91/2: 121
42/3: 86 92/1: 121
43/1: 86, 87 92/1,subcl.1: 121
43/2: 86 92/1,subcl.2: 121
43/3: 87 92/1,subcl.3: 121
44/1: 87 92/1,subcl.4: 121
44/2: 87 92/2: 121
45: 87, 88 92/3: 121
46/1: 85 93/1: 122, 220
46/2: 85 93/2: 122
47/1: 85 94: 122
47/1,sent.1: 163 95: 122
47/2: 85 96: 211
47/3: 86 96/1,sent.1: 120, 122
48: 88 96/1, sent.2: 122
49: 73, 74, 162, 163 97: 124
49/2: 182 98: 125–127
50/1: 163 98/1: 126
50/2: 154, 169 98/2: 126
51: 156 99/1: 103
51/1: 156 99/2: 104, 211
52/1: 156 99/3: 104
52/2: 157 100/1: 107
56/1: 155 100/1,sent.2: 107
56/2: 155 100/2: 107
58: 155 101/1: 107
59: 153 101/2: 107
62: 162 102/1: 108
65: 153 102/2: 108
66/1: 182 103/1: 129, 130
302 Article Index
Turkish Code of Obligations(TCO) (cont.) 126: 126, 137, 178

103/2: 130 127: 112, 185, 278
104/1: 130 127/1: 185
104/2: 106, 130 127/1,subcl.1: 185
104/3: 130 127/1,subcl.2: 185
105/1: 130 127/2: 186
105/2: 130 128/1: 186, 188
106/1: 134 128/2: 190
106/2: 135 129: 136, 181
107: 129 129/1: 191
107/1: 135 129/2: 191
107/2, sent.1: 135 129/2,sent.1: 192
107/2, sent.2: 136 129/2,sent.2: 193
108/1: 136 130/1: 192
108/2: 137 130/2: 193
109/1: 136, 137 130/3: 193
109/2: 136 131/1: 197, 200, 202
111: 138 131/2: 106, 172, 197, 198
112: 150, 152, 159, 160, 163, 169, 176, 183, 132: 24, 199, 282
184, 205, 247, 264 133: 282
113/1: 147 133/1: 200, 201
113/2: 148 133/2: 201
113/3: 148 134/1: 202
114/1,sent.1: 152 134/2: 202
114/1,sent.2: 156 134/3: 202
114/1,sent.3: 156 135/1,sent.1: 203
114/2: 153–156, 169 135/1,sent.2: 203
115: 160 135/2: 203
115/1: 36, 41, 152, 158 135/3: 203
115/2: 158, 159 136: 150 fn. 22
115/3: 159 136/1: 152, 204
116: 205, 264 136/2: 206, 207
116/1: 159 136/2,sent.2: 206
116/2: 161 136/3: 207
116/3: 162 137/1,sent.1: 207
117: 151 137/1,sent.2: 207
117/1: 167 137/2: 207
117/2: 168, 170, 176, 213 138: 63, 64, 208
118: 169, 174 138/2: 64
118/1: 169 139/1: 211
119: 169, 170, 174 139/2: 211
120/1: 171 139/3: 214
120/2: 171 140: 210
120/3: 172 141: 210
121/1: 173 142: 211
121/2: 173 143/1,sent.1: 209, 212
121/3: 173 143/1,sent.2: 213
122/1: 173 143/2: 214
122/2: 174 144: 209, 212
123: 137, 151, 174, 176 145: 212
124: 137, 174 146: 106, 190, 218, 221
125: 175, 256 147: 218, 221
125/2: 137, 151, 175 147/subcl.1: 106
125/3,sent.1: 177 148: 38, 219
125/3,sent.2: 177 149/1: 190, 219
Article Index 303
149/2: 219–220 173/1: 249

150/1: 220 173/2: 249
150/2: 220 173/3: 249
151/1: 220 174: 251
151/2: 220 175/1: 251
152: 106, 221 175/2: 251
153: 222 176: 251
153/1,subcl.3: 274, 285 177/1: 255
153/2: 223 177/2: 255, 256
154: 223 178: 256
154/1,subcl.1: 223 179/1: 150, 262, 262 fn. 23
155/1: 224, 234, 236 179/2: 198, 263
155/2: 224 179/3: 263–265
155/3: 224 180/1: 264
156/1: 223, 224 180/2: 265
157/1: 225 181/1: 262
157/2: 225 181/2: 262
157/3: 225 182/1: 265
158: 225 182/2: 264
159: 221 182/2,sent.1: 261
160: 36 182/2,sent.2: 261
160/1: 226 182/3: 173, 265
160/2: 226 183: 85
160/3: 226 183/1: 206, 270
160/4: 226 183/2: 270
161: 141, 142, 218 184/1: 21, 271
162/1: 231 184/2: 21, 271
162/2: 232 185: 146, 279
163: 233 186: 275
164/1: 234 187/1: 276
164/2: 235, 238 187/2: 276
165: 235, 236 187/3: 276
166/1: 236 188: 276
166/2: 236 188/2: 210, 276
166/3: 237 189/1: 273
167/1: 237 189/2: 106, 274
167/2: 237 190: 274
167/3: 238 191/1: 277, 279
168/1: 186, 238, 239 191/2: 277, 279
168/2: 239 192: 278
169: 296 193: 278
169/1: 241 194: 279
169/2: 242 195: 85, 281
169/3: 242 195/2: 282
169/4: 243 195/3: 283
169/5: 243 196/1: 284
170/1: 246 196/2: 283
170/2: 246 196/3,sent.1: 283
171/1: 246, 247 196/3,sent.2: 283
171/2: 247 197/1,sent.1: 283
171/3: 248 197/1,sent.2: 283
172/1: 248 197/1,sent.3: 283
172/2: 249 197/2: 283
304 Article Index
Turkish Code of Obligations(TCO) (cont.) 387/2: 105

198/1: 285 392: 119
198/2: 286, 287, 290 395: 111
199/1: 286 406/1: 123
199/2: 286 406/1,sent.1: 120
199/3: 287 407/2: 213
200/1: 287 408: 138
200/2: 288 436: 126
201: 232, 288 471/3.sent.1: 111
201/2: 288 480: 63
202/1: 289, 290 503: 8
202/2: 290 504/2: 83
202/3: 290 504/3: 84
202/4: 290 506/1: 111
203/1: 290 508/1: 124
203/2: 291 510/1: 125
204: 291 511: 233
205/1: 295 524: 142
205/2: 295 529/1: 189
205/3: 295 530: 189
205/4: 296 532/1: 88
206/1: 296 563/2: 154
206/2: 242, 296 566: 115
206/3: 296 567: 233
207/2: 123 583: 288
212/1: 178 583/1: 21, 31 fn. 5, 84, 188 fn. 39
212/2: 178 583/2: 84, 87 fn. 25
212/3: 178 583/2,sent.1: 48
232/1: 135 583/3: 24
233: 10 584: 289
235: 178 589/4: 263
237/1: 21, 48, 261, 295 591/1: 187
237/3: 21 591/1,sent.2: 143
249: 251 591/4: 142
275/1: 8 593/2: 135
285/3: 143 596/1: 186
288/1: 21, 57, 281 603: 187, 188fn. 39, 288
288/2: 21, 57 604/1: 45, 142
288/3: 57 605/1: 45, 142
289: 21fn. 7, 57 605/1,sent.2: 45fn. 9, 142 fn. 5
292: 250 605/2,sent.1: 142
292/1: 250 608: 21
292/2: 183 619/1: 270
294/1: 152 638/3: 233
312: 183 646: x
314: 120 Turkish Commercial Code(TComC)
322/2: 270 7/1,sent.1: 232
322/3: 242 8/1: 105, 171
324: 138 8/2: 105
332: 126 8/3: 105
346: 260 18/3: 168, 175, 177
347: 201 22: 265
358: 183 89/1: 202
382: 233 90: 214
387/1: 105 681: 279
Article Index 305
681/1: 204fn. 43 818/1,subcl.h: 100

681/2: 279 818/1,subcl.r: 23
681/3: 204fn. 43 1454/1: 193
709/2: 100 1472/1,sent.1: 186
756: 23 1530: 41
778/1,subcl.a: 204 fn. 43 Turkish Consumer Protection Act (TCPA)
778/1,subcl.c: 100 6/1: 49
778/1,subcl.i: 23 Turkish Penal Code(TPC)
788/1: 204fn. 43 272: 37
788/3: 204 fn. 43
Subject Index
-A- -agreement for assumption of debt:

Ab initio: 223, 287. 283-288.
Abstract acknowledgement of debt: 43-45. -cumulative assumption of debt:
Acceptance: 7-8. 288-289.
Accident: 153, 154, 156, 170, 184. Assumption of obligations: 281-292.
Action for damages: 149-152, 157. Auction: 8, 9, 101 fn. 23, 136-137.
Adequate causal link Authority to represent: 82-84.
- (see Causation.) -form requirements: 84.
Advertisement: 8-9. -independence: 83.
Agency -limitation: 86.
-direct agency: 81-84. -revocation: 86.
-indirect agency: 88. -scope: 83-84.
-without authorisation: 85-86.
Agency contracts: 8, 82-83, 124, 218.
Alimony: 213, 270. -B-
Alternative obligations: 102-103, 134. Bailee: 136, 154, 233.
Amendment of the contract: 23-24. Bailment: 136, 212.
Ancillary nature of penalties: 261. Bailor: 154.
Ancillary securities: 143, 221, 274. Bankruptcy: 126, 225, 274.
Annotation of personal rights: 183. Bankruptcy proceedings: 94, 224.
Annuities Barter: 35.
-life annuities: 35, 213, 220. Beneficiary: 190-193, 248.
Appropriation: 107-108. Betting: 45, 142.
Arbitration: 84. Bid: 8, 9, 251.
Arbitration tribunal: 224. Bidder: 8, 9.
Argumentum a contrario: 100, 224. Binding effect of the offer
Assignability of the claims: 270. - (see Offer.)
Assignment Bilateral contracts: 4, 78, 123-127, 139,
-contract: 271-273. 174-178, 206-207.
-for consideration: 277. Bill of exchange: 45, 100, 204 fn. 43, 279.
-of claims: 269. Bona fides: 25, 39.
Assignment by court order: 278-279. Boni mores
Assignment by operation of law: 278-279. - (see Morality.)
Assignment of an estate or a business: 289-290. Breach of form requirement: 24-26.
Assumption of debt: 283-289. Burden of proof: 19, 45, 163, 259.

İ. Helvacı, Turkish Contract Law, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-60061-1
308 Subject Index
-C- Creditor’s positive damage: 188-189.

Calculation of limitation periods: 220. Culpa in contrahendo: 13, 39, 73, 74, 162-163.
Calculation of the time limit: 120-122. Culpa lata: 36, 41, 152, 156, 158, 218, 264.
Capacity to act: 5, 86, 94-95, 201, 212, 271. Culpa levis: 41, 152, 156, 158, 264.
Capacity of discernment Cumulative assumption of debt: 232, 288-289.
- (see Mental capacity) Cura in eligendo: 161.
Casus fortuitus: 153, 161. Cura in instruendo: 161.
Causa credendi: 43, 44, 271-272. Cura in custodiendo: 161.
Causa donandi: 44, 271-272. Current account: 202, 214.
Causa solvendi: 271. Customary law: 60.
Causation: 155-156. Customs: 120, 122, 123, 192, 214.
Chattel: 4, 93, 115, 154, 233, 248, 279.
Cheque: 23, 45, 84, 100, 201, 204 fn. 43, 279.
Collateral amendments: 24, 263. -D-
-ancillary collateral: 93, 186, 197. Damage:
Commercial affair: 105, 171-172. -moral damage: 155.
Commercial loan agreements: 41, 104. -negative damage: 39, 71, 137, 177.
Condictio causa data causa non secuta: -non-pecuniary losses: 155.
247 fn. 18. -pecuniary losses: 154-155.
Condictio ob causam finitam: 208. -positive damage: 71, 85, 154, 169,
Condictio ob causam futuram: 247 fn. 18. 188-189.
Conditio sine qua non: 10, 59, 60, 69. Damnum emergens: 154, 169.
Conduct in the name of the principal: 84-85. Datio in solutum: 98.
Consideration Death: 5, 86, 155-157, 225 fn. 34, 251.
-assignments for consideration: 277. Debtor’s liability for assistants: 159-162.
-assignments without consideration: 277. Declaration of set-off: 212-213.
Consumer: 105, 123. Deed: 19, 43-44, 130, 274.
Content of the agreement: 10-11. Default of the creditor: 133-139.
Contracts in favour of third parties: 190-193. Default of the debtor: 167-178.
Contracts with the effect of protecting third -in bilateral contracts: 174-178.
parties: 183-184. -in pecuniary obligations: 171-174.
Contractual exclusion of liability: 158-159. -further damage: 173-174.
Coming into effect of the contract: 12. Defect: 225.
Commencement of limitation periods: Default rules: 60, 116.
219-220. Delivery: 9, 11, 60, 135-137, 178, 204 fn. 43.
Compensation for damage: 150-151, 169-170, Deposit: 87.
175-178. -account: 106, 172.
Condition precedent Determination of the performance order: 123.
- (see Suspensive condition.) Dies interpellat pro homine: 168.
Condition subsequent Discharge
- (see Resolutive condition.) -agreement: 198-200, 237, 248, 282, 286.
Content of the contract: 35-41. -an obligation: 24, 282.
Content of the form: 23. -promise to discharge from a debt: 281-283.
Contra bonos mores: 182. Discretion: 19, 154, 169, 173, 251, 265, 276.
Control of content: 32. Divisible obligation
Contractual default interest rate: 171. - (see Partial performance.)
Conversion: 26. Donee: 21 fn. 7, 57, 152, 250.
Counter-claim: 210-211, 234-236, 272, 276. Donor: 21 fn. 7, 57, 152, 183, 250.
Counter-obligation: 206-207. Duress: 73-75, 288.
Counter-party: 8, 85, 124-126, 206, 209, 211-
213, 251, 287.
Counter-prestation: 177. -E-
Creditor’s expectant right: 246-247. Early performance: 122, 211.
Subject Index 309
Earnest money: 255. Forms of proof: 129-130.

Effects of the obligation on third party: Fortuitous events: 153-154, 161,
181-193. 169, 174.
Effects of the substitution of a debtor: 284-287. Fraud: 71-73.
Employee: 87, 111, 127, 138, 158-161, 182, Freedom of contract: 35.
213, 222.
Employer: 86-87, 126-127, 138, 159, 213, 222.
Enforcement: 73, 142, 147, 149. -G-
-office: 146, 147, 149-150, 221. Gambling: 45, 142.
-proceeding: 149, 173, 224. Gap in the contracts: 59-60.
Error Generic obligations: 99, 101-102, 206.
- (see Mistake.) Genus non perit: 206.
-error in corpore: 68. Gift: 21, 21 fn. 6-7, 56-57, 84, 246, 250.
-error in negotio: 68. -promise of a gift: 21, 44.
-error in object: 68. Good faith: 12, 16-17, 25, 32, 40, 45 fn.9,
-error in person: 68. 70, 72, 86, 142 fn.5, 251, 275.
-error in persona: 68. Gratuitous assignments: 277.
-error in quantitate: 68. Guarantee of performance by a third party:
-error in quantity: 69. 186-190.
Essentialia negotii: 10. -recourse: 189.
Ex officio: 25, 39, 44-45, 124, 126, 141, 142, Guarantor: 186-190.
173, 218, 225, 265.
Ex nunc: 64, 126, 137, 265.
Ex tunc: 64, 126, 137, 175, 176-177, 208, 261, -H-
265, 287. Hardship: 63-65, 208.
Exceptio non adimpleti contractus: 124-125, Holiday: 16, 121-122, 220.
276, 286.
Exclusion of liability: 158-159.
Execution proceeding: 149. -I-
Expiration of the authority to represent: 87-88. Illiterate: 23.
Expropriation: 205, 207. Immoral contract: 37.
Extension of the limitation period: 225. Impossibility of performance due to the
Extension of the time limit: 122. creditor: 138-139.
Extent of compensation: 156-157. Impossibility for which the Debtor is not
Extinguishment of obligations: 197-214, Responsible: 204-207.
236-237. Impossibilium nulla obligatio est: 39 fn.
19, 150 fn. 21.
In rem: 21, 185, 221, 250, 279.
-F- Incapacity: 5, 86-87.
Facultas alternative: 103, 104. Incomplete contracts: 59-60.
Falsa demonstratio non nocet: 55. Indivisible obligations: 100, 224, 226.
Fault Indubio contra stipulatorem: 30, 54.
-gross fault: 36, 41, 152, 156, 181, 264. Initial impossibility: 38.
-slight fault: 152, 156, 158-159, 264. Insolvency: 125-126, 277.
Favor debitoris: 54. Instalment: 99, 130, 262.
Force majeure: 153-154, 161, 169, 170, 174. Insurance: 186, 193, 207.
Foreseeability: 156. Interest
Forfeit money: 143, 256. -interest for default: 171.
Forfeiture: 143, 256. Interpretation of the contract: 53-54.
Form of the contract: 19-20. Interruption of limitation periods: 223-225.
Form requirements: 20-23, 61, 260-261. Invitation to offer: 8-9.
Formation of the contract: 3-13. Ipso iure: 291.
310 Subject Index
-J- Mental reservation: 9, 67 fn. 4.

Joining a party to an existing contract: 296. Merger: 203-204.
Joint and several claim: 241-242. Merger and acquisition of businesses: 290-291.
Joint and several creditors: 241-243. Mora creditoris: 133.
Joint and several debtors: 135, 186, 231-239. Morality: 37.
Mortgage: 93, 107, 126, 185, 198, 203, 221,
222-223, 239, 292.
-K- Mortgage contracts: 31, 275.
Knowledge: 12, 38. Mortgagee: 183, 292.
Minor: 82-83, 94, 95.
Mistake:
-L- -in declaration of will: 67-69.
Lacuna -in communication: 69.
- (see praeter legem) -in motive: 69-70.
Lacuna sensu lato: 159. Mitigation:
Laesio enormis: -mitigation of liability: 152.
- (see Unfair Exploitation.) -mitigation of responsibility: 152.
Lease contract: 3, 4, 19, 20, 138, 183, 270, 274. Mutuality of obligations: 209-210.
Legal default interest rate: 171-172.
Lesion
- (see Unfair Exploitation.) -N-
Lessee: 3, 38, 120, 126, 138, 182, 183, 190, National currency: 103-104, 211.
192, 242. Natural obligations: 141-143.
Lessor: 3, 126, 138, 170, 190, 192. Negative damage: 39, 71, 85, 137, 177-178.
Lex specialis derogat legi generali: 63, 127. Negligence
Liability for force majeure: 170. -gross negligence: 36, 41, 152, 156, 158,
Liability for fortuitous events: 170. 264.
Lien: 274. -slight negligence: 41, 264.
Limitation of the authority to represent Negotiable instruments: 22-23, 45 fn. 9, 142
- (see Authority to represent.) fn. 5, 198, 201, 203-204, 279.
Limitation period: 190, 217-226. Non-commercial affairs: 105, 172.
-calculation: 220. Non-disclosure agreement: 148.
-extension: 225. Non-existence of a waiver: 212.
-interruption: 223-225. Non-performance of the obligation
-prevention: 221-223. - (see Performance.)
-suspension: 221-223. Notary: 20, 84, 168.
Literal performance: 104, 211. -notary expenses: 71.
Loan: 35, 99. -notary public: 23, 26, 48, 130, 176, 177.
Loan agreement: 31, 40 fn. 25, 105, 130, 189, Notification: 106, 137, 168, 172, 175, 185, 193,
200. 290.
Loss of profit: 71, 155, 170. Novation: 200-202.
Lucrum cessans Numerus clausus: 183.
- (see Loss of profit.)
-O-
-M- Object of performance: 97-108, 136.
Mandatory limitation periods: 219. Obligatio naturalis:
Mandatory rules of law: 36, 37, 39. - (see Natural obligations.)
Mandatum post mortem: 87. Obligation to contract: 47-50.
Marriage brokerage: 142. Obligations not to do: 99, 148.
Material mistake: 68, 70-71. Obligations of the same kind: 210-211.
Maturity of obligations: 220, 235. Obligations relating to delivery: 135-137.
Mental capacity: 83, 94, 95, 153. Obligations to do: 146-147.
Subject Index 311
Offer: 4-5. Power of disposition: 94-95, 188, 192, 193,

-binding effect: 5-7. 199, 201, 271, 284.
-with time limit for acceptance: 6. praeter legem: 138, 207.
-without time limit for acceptance: 6-7. Pre-contract: 26, 47-49.
Official form: 21-22. Pre-contractual duties: 12-13.
Order of performance: 123-125, 282. Pre-contractual liability
- (see Culpa in contrahendo.)
Prestations: 102, 130, 176-177.
-P- Presumption of fault: 152.
Pactum de contrahendo Preliminary agreement:
- (see Pre-contract.) - (see Pre-contract.)
Pactum de non cedendo: 270. Prevention of limitation periods: 221-223.
Pactum de non petendo: 199. Privity of the obligation relationship: 181-184.
Partial invalidity: 31, 40. Prize competition: 17.
Partial performance: 98-100. Prohibited conditions: 251-252.
Partition of an inheritance: 291-292. Prohibition of unilateral amendments: 31-32.
Partnership contract: 3, 37, 68, 83. Promise
Pecuniary obligations: 103, 171-174. -concerning the performance of a moral
-in foreign currency: 104, 172. duty: 143.
-in the national currency: 103. -to discharge from a debt: 281-283.
Penalty Promisee: 190-193.
-contractual: 259-266. Promisor: 190-193, 282-283.
-in addition to performance: 263. Promissory note: 23, 45, 84, 100, 201, 204
-in lieu of performance: 150, 262-263. fn. 43, 279.
-reduction: 265-266. Proof of performance: 129-131.
Performability of the obligations: 211. Provisions protecting personal rights: 36-37,
Performance 105, 171.
-by a third party: 112. Pseudo-claim: 56, 272.
-improper performance: 157. Public deed: 21.
-in person: 111-112. Public order: 36-39.
-in the national currency: 104. Public promise: 15-17.
-non-performance: 145-163. Public promisor: 15-17.
-of bilateral contracts: 123-127.
-of obligation: 93-95.
-of the debtor: 111-112. -R-
Perjury: 37. Ratification: 25, 39, 73, 75.
Personal conduct of individual debtors: Ratio legis: 36, 158.
235-236. Receipt: 129-131.
Personal rights: 36-37, 73, 105, 155, 161, 171, Redemption: 136.
183. Reduction of the penalty
Place of performance: 115-116. - (see Penalty.)
Pledge Refusal of performance and deposit: 275-276.
-agreement: 40. Refutation of presumption: 153-154.
-chattel: 39. Reinterpretation: 25.
-contract: 39-40. Representation: 72, 81.
Pledgee: 40, 199. Rescission: 70-74.
Pledgor: 40 fn. 25, 285. Reservatio mentalis: 9.
Positive damage: 71, 85, 154, 169, 188. Resolutive condition: 11, 249-250, 273.
Possession: 95, 146, 170, 178, 204 fn.43, 279. Restitution: 70, 73-74, 78, 177, 247, 249-250.
-transfer: 25, 95 fn. 11, 125, 178, 248, 250, Revision of the contract
256, 274, 279. - (see Hardship.)
312 Subject Index
Revocation of acceptance: 11-12. -T-

Revocation of offer: 11-12. Tender: 9, 251.
Revocation of public promise: 16-17. Termination: 87-88, 178, 208, 249-250, 263-264.
Revocation of the authority to represent Testamentary disposition: 81, 232,
- (see Authority to represent.) 241, 245-246.
Right of deposit: 135-136. Time of performance
Right of sale: 136-137. -obligation with a time limit: 119-120.
Right of taking back deposited objects: 136. -obligation without a time limit: 119.
Rights in personam: 183. Time-barred obligations: 106, 142-143.
Rights in rem: 21, 250, 279. Tort: 73, 162-163, 182.
-tort compensation: 210.
-tort liability: 153-154, 169.
-S- Tortfeasor: 168.
Sale by instalments: 130. Tortious act: 168.
Specific obligations: 101. Trade secret: 148.
Seizure: 214. Transfer of ancillary rights: 273-274.
Set-off: 208-214. Transfer of contract: 295-296.
Signature: 22-23. Transfer of encumbered real estate: 292.
-signature of blind persons: 23. Transfer of the claim: 273.
-substitute for a signature: 23. Trust theory: 10, 53, 71.
Silence: 7, 72.
Simulation
-absolute (simple) simulation: 56. -U-
-partial simulation: 57. Unauthorised agent: 85, 234.
-relative simulation: 56-57. Unfair exploitation: 77-79.
Simultaneous performance: 123-124. Unilateral contract: 206.
Specific provisions Unjust enrichment: 44, 86, 143, 189, 206, 208,
-obligation not to do: 148. 249, 250, 260, 284.
-obligation to do: 146-147. Usage: 123.
Standard terms: 29-42.
-invalid standard terms: 30-32.
-non-written standard terms: 30-32. -V-
Sublessee: 170, 242. Vinculum iuris: 181.
Subrogation: 112, 184-185, 238-239, 296. Vis major: 153, 161.
Subsequent impossibility: 149-150, 204-206.
Substitution of debtor: 284-287.
Sui generis: 35. -W-
Surety Waiver: 198, 212, 226.
-surety contract: 21, 31, 48, 84, 135, 186, Warranty of the assignor: 277-278.
200. Withdrawal: 176-178.
surety’s liability: 21, 24, 31 fn. 5, 188 fn. 39. -by payment of penalty: 263-264.
-suretyship contract: 21, 187, 224. Written form
Suspension of limitation periods: 221-223. -qualified written form: 21.
Suspensive conditions: 246-249. -simple written form: 21.

Turkish Contract Law - İlhan Helvacı

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Turkish Contract Law - İlhan Helvacı

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İlhan Helvacı

ISBN 978-3-319-60060-4 ISBN 978-3-319-60061-1 (eBook)

Library of Congress Control Number: 2017947826

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017

Printed on acid-free paper

This Springer imprint is published by Springer Nature

The author wishes to express thanks to Istanbul University faculty members

Oxford, UK İlhan Helvacı

Contracts usually constitute an obligational relationship (rapport d’obligation,

Part I Obligations Arising from Contracts

8.2 Common Mistake and Simulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

13.4.4 Restriction to the Claim of Termination . . . . . . . . . . . 87

Part II The Effect of Obligations, Performance, Non-Performance,

18.3.2 Other Time Limits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121

22.1.5 Specific Provisions for Pecuniary Obligations . . . . . . . 148

24.3.3 Consequences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188

Part III Extinguishment of Obligations and Limitation Period

26.5 Interruption of Limitation Periods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223

Part IV Joint and Several Debtors and Creditors, Conditions,

30 Earnest Money and Forfeit Money . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 255

Part V Assignment of Claims, Assumption of Debts, Transfer

33.4.2 Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 289

Article Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 299

Subject Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 307

TCO Turkish Code of Obligations

A contract is a legally binding agreement (a legal transaction)2 that is usually

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017 3

relationship.3 This intention may be express or implied. An agreement cannot be

1.2 The Offer

An offer is a unilateral declaration of will (intention) expressed by the offeror. This

1.3 Binding Effect of the Offer

1.3.1 Offer with Time Limit for Acceptance

1.3.2 Offer Without Time Limit for Acceptance

1.3.2.1 Among Persons Present

1.3.2.2 Among Persons Not Present

Acceptance is a unilateral declaration of will (intention)13 by the offeree and must

1.5 Invitation to Offer (Invitation to Treat)15

payment by credit card is deemed to be an implied acceptance. However, in cases

1.6 Intention to Create a Contract

create a contract. In this instance, as opposed to the above-mentioned case,

1.7 Content of the Agreement

1.8 Revocation of Offer and Revocation of Acceptance

1.9 Coming into Effect of the Contract

1.10 Pre-contractual Duties

that in a supermarket, the items on the shelves must be properly stacked so as to

Ansay T, Wallace D (eds) (2002) Introduction to Turkish law. Turan, Ankara

According to TCO art. 9 par. 1, a person who publicly promises a reward in

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017 15

public promisor is obliged to reimburse the expenses of one or more persons

2.5 Prize Competition

Antalya OG (2012) Borçlar hukuku genel hükümler, vol 1. Legal, İstanbul

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017 19

defendant’s admission (TCPC art. 188) or by the defendant’s refusal to swear an

3.2 Form Requirements3

3.2.1 Sources of Form Requirements

3.2.1.2 By the Contracting Parties

3.2.2 Written Form

3.2.2.1 Simple Written Form

According to the Turkish Code of Obligations, certain contracts must be in writing.