Tilahun Esmael
Tilahun Esmael
Tilahun Esmael
145
146 Mizan Law Review, Vol. 8, No.1 September 2014
Introduction
The high cost of doing business across borders in Ethiopia is said to have
become a major constraint to economic development.1 Ethiopia is one of the
countries with the highest set of challenges in cross border trade. The world
Bank study of trading across borders ranking puts the country at 166th in the
world.2 while, on average, sub-Saharan African customs delays are the longest
in the world, the average delay is 12 days in the region compared with 7 days in
Latin America; the longest delays in the region are in Ethiopia - where the
average trader has to wait more than 30 days for customs to clear goods.3
Transportation delays along the Ethiopia-Djibouti transport corridor are also
widespread. Numerous stages in the process of clearing and transporting
commercial goods in transit from the port of Djibouti to Addis Ababa can take
more than 20 days. This has contributed to the country’s current 132nd rank out
of 189 nations in the World Bank doing business index.
The cost of accessing information, discrepancy and unpredictability in
government policy decisions, general issues of custom which in particular
includes customs valuation, and anticompetitive practices in transport,
especially road and sea transport are directly related to the costs of trading in
addition to the delay in time taken from the port to the inland destination, or the
vice versa. The longer the time taken for import/export procedures or journey,
the more expensive imports, exports and production becomes rendering
Ethiopian exports less competitive.
The ability of countries to deliver goods and services on time and at the
lowest possible cost is a key determinant of integration into the world economy
today.4 With the expansion in the volume of trade, policies that remove non
tariff barriers and expedite the movement of goods and services across borders,
i.e., ‘international trade facilitation’, have emerged at the forefront of the trade
1 Tsegaye Teklu and Endris Negus (2011), The Impact of Border Clearance Procedures
on the Cost of Doing Business in Ethiopia, Private Sector Development Hub, Addis
Ababa Chamber of Commerce and Sectoral Associations.
2 See World Bank Trading Across Borders (2013),
<http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploretopics/trading-across-borders> (Last
accessed April 2014).
3 The country’s score on the Logistics Performance Index (LPI), which measures the
extent of trade facilitation in the country, is 2.59, on a scale of 1 to 5, ranked to be
104th among 160 countries. See World Bank Logistics Performance Index
<http://lpi.worldbank.org/international/global/2014> (Last accessed April 2014)
4 Jayanta Roy and Shweta Bagai (2005) “Key Issues in Trade Facilitation, Summary of
World Bank/ EU Workshops in Dhaka and Shanghai - 2004”, World Bank Policy
Research Working Paper 3703, (September 2005), p. 4.
Trade Facilitation in Ethiopia: The Role of WTO Accession in Domestic Reform 147
agenda.5 As Grainger notes; “over the last few decades customs tariffs have
been significantly reduced. [...] Consequently, the gap between tariff duties and
transaction costs has narrowed; ... in view of such low trade tariffs, the
transaction cost associated with paying duties is actually higher than the duties
themselves.”6
Experience shows that trade facilitation is highly dependent on infrastructural
developments.7 However, trade facilitation is not only about the physical
infrastructure for trade.8 Studies indicate now that, “only about a quarter of the
[trade] delays is due to poor road or port infrastructure.”9 “Seventy five percent
is due to administrative hurdles - numerous customs procedures, tax procedures,
clearances and cargo inspections - often before the containers reach the port.” 10
Accordingly, while undertaking the necessary infrastructural changes to
implement deep trade facilitation is still important, most other measures seem to
depend on strong political will.11 Development of this political will requires a
clear understanding of the needs and benefits of trade facilitation in an
economy.
This seems to be one part of the trade facilitation challenges in Ethiopia
which suffers from excessive border bottlenecks, lack of reform and drawbacks
in private investment.12 This has affected Ethiopia’s international trade relation
and has hampered its trading across borders track record at the face of global
competition for foreign direct investment. This article, inter alia, examines the
extent to which reforms on import and export procedures in Ethiopia that target
at reducing the cost and time needed to execute trade across border can
effectively move it closer to the global economy. The focus will be on the legal,
economic, political, and administrative framework, i.e. soft infrastructure, rather
than on traditional infrastructural challenges.
The article is aimed at filling the information gap in Ethiopia that is
important to the political impetus with the objective of carrying out a ‘reality
check’ on ground level challenges and prospects for reform. A particular focus
will be the role of trade facilitation - or lack of it - in explaining Ethiopia’s trade
performance, trade facilitation problems and the role of reform in this area. in
doing so, this article examines whether Ethiopia’s accession to the world Trade
Organization (WTO) will provide strategic opportunity for the country to
reinvigorate its trade facilitation reform objectives in line with international
principles and standards. As indicated by the World Bank, “these standards are
primarily found within WTO obligations and the Kyoto Convention. Meeting
one's WTO obligations and pursuing the objectives of trade facilitation” are
interrelated and this calls for “the additional trade policy efficiencies by
adopting the trade facilitation agenda.”13 Moreover, joining the WTO binds
member countries to commitments and rules that include transparency of trade
laws and regulations and progressive liberalization and modernization of
international trade procedures. It will also be emphasized that joining the WTO
inspires confidence in the stability, predictability, and fairness of the country’s
treatment of its trading and investment partners.14
The article is organized into four sections. In the first section, a brief
introductory review will be made on the nature, economics and benefits of trade
facilitation. The section will also highlight on the current level of trade
facilitation challenges in Ethiopia. The second section identifies the main trade
facilitation challenges in Ethiopia that are mostly within customs law. In
particular a detailed evaluation of the customs valuation practice in Ethiopia will
be made with the aim of assessing the role and impact of the WTO Customs
Valuation Agreement. Section three discusses the linkages between logistics
trade.org/library/files/Staples%20-%20October%201998%20-
%20Trade%20Facilitation.pdf> (Last accessed April 2014).
14 USAID Ethiopia (2007), Ethiopia Commercial Law & Institutional Reform And
Trade Diagnostic, p. 7.
Trade Facilitation in Ethiopia: The Role of WTO Accession in Domestic Reform 149
sector reform and in particular maritime transport sector liberalization and its
role for trade facilitation. To this end, brief review assessment will be made on
the legislative and institutional framework of Ethiopia’s maritime transport
followed by an overview on Ethiopia’s WTO accession negotiation and its role,
if any, for maritime services reform in the country. Finally a short discussion is
made on the new WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement and its implications on the
state of trade facilitation in Ethiopia is presented.
15 Jayanta Roy and Shweta Bagai, (2005) “Key Issues in Trade Facilitation, Summary
of World Bank/ EU Workshops in Dhaka and Shanghai - 2004”, World Bank Policy
Research Working Paper 3703, (September 2005), p. 4.
16 Moi'se, E., T. Orliac and P. Minor (2011), “Trade Facilitation Indicators: The Impact
on Trade Costs”, OECD Trade Policy Working Papers, No. 118, OECD Publishing, p
7. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5kg6nk654hmr-en> (Last accessed April 2014).
17 Gainmore Zanamwe, (2005) “Trade facilitation and the WTO: a critical analysis of
proposals on trade facilitation and their implications for African countries”, tralac
Working Paper No 5/2005, p. 5.
18 WTO, Trade Facilitation, <http://gtad.wto.org/trta_subcategory.aspx?cat=33121>
narrow in a sense to deal the barriers to trade in goods and services.25 According
to World Bank, “there is no standard definition of trade facilitation. In a narrow
sense, trade facilitation simply addresses the logistics of moving goods through
ports or more efficiently moving customs documentation associated with cross
border trade. In recent years, the definition has been broadened to include the
environment in which trade transactions take place, including the transparency
and professionalism of customs and regulatory environments, as well as
harmonization of standards and conformance to international or regional
regulations.”26
Thus, trade facilitation looks at how the procedures and controls governing
the movement of goods across national borders can be improved to reduce
associated costs and maximize efficiency while safeguarding legitimate
regulatory objectives.27 In its narrow sense, it addresses the logistics of moving
goods through ports or customs. More broadly, it encompasses several inter
related factors such as customs and border agencies, transport infrastructure,
services and information technology (as it relates to better logistics), regulatory
environment, product standards, technical barriers to trade etc. in order to lower
cost of moving goods between destinations and across international borders.28 It
is thus clear that trade facilitation cuts across a wide range of issues and sectors,
from government regulations and controls, business efficiency, transportation,
information and communication technology to the financial sector. Not only is it
a technical issue, but also includes economic, business, administrative and
policy matters.29
This article uses the broader meaning for trade facilitation in evaluating the
trade facilitation challenges, potentials and reform proposals in Ethiopia. This
considers that the concept of trade facilitation has grown beyond “fixing
borders”.30 The reason behind those efforts that aim to address the trade
25 Prabir De Cesifo (2006), “Regional Trade In Northeast Asia: Why Do Trade Costs
Matter? ”, Working Paper No. 1809 Category 7: Trade Policy, p 3. Presented At
Cesifo Venice Summer Institute,Workshop On Understanding The Latest Wave of
Regional Trade And Cooperation Agreements July 2006.
26 Ibid.
27 Poul Hansen And Liliana Annovazzi-Jakab (2008), “Facilitating Cross-Border
Movement of Goods: A Sustainable Approach”, (in) The Global Enabling Trade
Report (eds.), p. 67.
28 Jayanta Roy and Shweta Bagai (2005), “Key Issues in Trade Facilitation, Summary
of World Bank/ EU Workshops in Dhaka and Shanghai - 2004”, World Bank Policy
Research Working Paper 3703, p. 4
29 Gainmore Zanamwe, supra note 17, p. 5.
30 Barbara Rippel, (2011), “Why Trade Facilitation is Important for Africa”, Africa
challenges beyond the traditional areas is the impact on trade costs of factors
along the whole trading chain. The broader meaning examines the costs that
traders and producers face from production until the delivery of their goods and
services to the overseas buyer and thereby includes all the transaction costs both
directly and indirectly associated with the trading process. Trade facilitation
measures must therefore be designed to assist countries to lower trade costs and
become more competitive in regional and global markets.
Accordingly, trade facilitation is a diverse and challenging subject with
benefits for both business and government at national, regional and international
levels.31 It involves economic, political, business, administrative, technical and
technological as well as financial issues all of which converge at easing the cost
and time of trading across borders.32 Thus any measure that eases transaction
and leads to time and cost reductions in the transaction cycle fits into the
category of trade facilitation.33 Accordingly, the linkages between trade
facilitation, trade, and development are relatively simple in theory.34
Development is enhanced through income growth, which comes from the
expansion of trade, investment, and production opportunities. Trade facilitation
initiatives, with the aim of lowering trade transactions costs, can enhance trade
competitiveness, and expand trade flows, while at the same time playing an
important role in supporting a positive business climate.35 As Krista Lucenti
argues, “the benefits of improving trade facilitation include: increasing trade in
goods and services; promoting competition which can spur productivity gains as
well as lower prices; enhancing efficiency in both the state sector and the private
sector; improving the business environment and so encouraging foreign direct
<http://www.economonitor.com/blog/2012/07/facilitating-trade-facilitating-
development/> July 18th, 2012 Also see John S. Wilson, Policy Research Working
Paper ,298 8 Trade Facilitation and Economic Development Measuring the Impact,
The World Bank Development Research Group Trade.
35 Matthias Helble, “Aid for Trade Facilitation”, Policy Research Working Paper 5064,
The World Bank Development Research Group Trade and Integration Team (2009).
Trade Facilitation in Ethiopia: The Role of WTO Accession in Domestic Reform 153
36
Krista Lucenti, (2004), Is There A Case For More Multilateral Rules On Trade
Facilitation? (in) Joseph E. Stiglitz (eds.) Agenda for the Development Round of
Trade Negotiations in the Aftermath of Cancun, Commonwealth Secretariat, p 109.
37
FlorianA. Alburo (2006) “Customs Valuation Issues and Research Methodologies”,
UNDP/ESCAP ARTNeT Trade Facilitation Research Team Meeting, , Bangkok (15
March 2006), p. 3.
38
Id, p. 4.
39
Ibid.
40 Yann Duval (2007), “Trade Facilitation beyond the Doha Round of Negotiations”,
Asia-Pacific Research and Training Network on Trade Working Paper Series, No.
50, p. 9.
41
Pushpa Raj Rajkarnikar (2006), “Implementation of the WTO Customs Valuation
Agreement in Nepal: An Ex-ante Impact Assessment “, Asia-Pacific Research and
Training Network on Trade , Working Paper Series, No. 18, p 7.
42
For instance see Walsh, T. J (2003), “Customs Valuation, Changing Customs”, IMF,
Washington , p. 2.
154 Mizan Law Review, Vol. 8, No.1 September 2014
(ERCA) has helped in introducing several policy measures which have not only
streamlined the role of the customs department but has also helped the economy
in a major way without compromising the collection of essential government
revenue. However, various private sector surveys in Ethiopia have been able to
identify that customs valuation is still an issue of particular concern.43
The customs authorities may reject the transaction value by following the
procedures laid down in the WTO decision on shifting the burden of proof when
they have doubts about the truth or accuracy of the transaction value declared by
the importer. In all such cases the agreement puts limitations on the discretion of
customs authorities in determining value, requiring that the value be determined
by applying the following five methods, in the hierarchical (sequential) order in
which they are listed: value of identical goods, value of similar goods, deductive
value calculated on the basis of the unit price at which identical or similar
imported goods are sold in the domestic market, less applicable deductions for
costs incurred within the country of import; constructed value computed on the
basis of cost of production and finally, the “fallback” method.
Except as provided in Article 4, it is only when the Customs value cannot be
determined under the provisions of a particular Article that the provisions of the
next Article in the sequence can be used. If the importer does not request that
the order of Articles 5 and 6 be reversed, the normal order of the sequence is to
be followed. If the importer does so request but it then proves impossible to
determine the Customs value under the provisions of Article 6, the Customs
value is to be determined under the provisions of Article 5, if it can be so
determined.
The agreement also provides a list of methods that may not be used: selling
price of competing domestic products, choice of the higher value when two
alternative values are available, use of the selling price on the market of the
exporting country or on another export market, use of production costs except if
computing according to the fifth method, the price of goods for export to a
country other than the country of importation, and minimum values, other
arbitrary or fictitious values. The agreement requires customs authorities to
accept transaction values not only in cases of “arm’s-length transactions” but
also in instances where transactions are between “related parties.”49 Such
relationships may result, for example, from partnership, control by one company
of the other, or transactions among parent companies and their subsidiaries or
affiliates. In all these cases the agreement urges customs authorities not to reject
customs value unless they consider that the relationship has influenced the value
declared by the importer.
The Customs valuation agreement also contains several special provisions
that apply to developing-country members. They have the right not to apply the
agreement until five years after their accession to the WTO, (for original
members, this means until January 2000), and may request an extension of this
period. They are given an extra three years before they can use the fifth
(computed value) method. Those developing countries which currently value
2.2 Consistency of Current State of the Law and Practice with the
WTO Customs Valuation Agreement
As highlighted above customs valuation is one of the challenging bottlenecks to
trade facilitation. Generally, the existing rules virtually allowed customs
authorities to exercise a large amount of discretion. Accurate, reliable and
timely information is costly to acquire and the rules fail to provide specific
instructions when to use one valuation rule over another. The virtually multiple
valuation rules regime subject businesses to uncertainty and compel importers to
make deals with customs authorities to secure the most privately profitable
terms for their businesses.50 Complications of this sort have compounded the
situation by increasing the incentive to negotiate for the appropriate tariff and
tax payments, and a favorable decision had to be reciprocated illegally. This
regime and practice have spawned integrity problems in Ethiopian customs
administration. in addition to the above, many business operators complain that
when customs officers were dissatisfied with declared values, they frequently
re-assess the value by uplifting it in accordance with administrative guidelines.
No justification for increasing the import value was required other than the
officer not being satisfied, and there were no adequate mechanisms for resolving
valuation disputes.
Since the early 2000’s, the Government of Ethiopia decided to gradually
eliminate the systematic problems in the field of customs valuation (CV) via
modernization of its customs practice. Yet the main observation in the context
of the modernization program was the mere inclusion of valuation principles
included in the WTO Customs Valuation Agreement (CVA). Recently ERCA
has initiated efforts to introduce voluntary compliance of the customs and tax
payers by implementing the Authorized Economic Operators program.51 These
measures certainly display obvious intention of the government to initiate some
genuine reforms in the field of CV. Yet the problem still persists despite such
endeavors. The first obstacle that hinders the effective operation of the CVA in
Ethiopia is the absence of political will and sufficient legal framework that
overhaul of the Ministry and the two tax authorities into the Ethiopian Revenues and
Customs Authority now supervised by the Ministry of Finance while the National
Lottery Administration was made accountable to the Ethiopian Revenue and Customs
Authority, by Proclamation No.256/2001.
54 Evgeny Polyakov and Wendwesson Shewarega (2006), WTO Customs Valuation
Agreement: Impact Assessment Study for Ethiopia, Ministry of Trade and Industry,
Ethiopia, Institutional Support to Trade Integration and Implementation of the IF Plan
of Action in Ethiopia Project, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia , p. 21.
55 Id, p. 22.
56 Ibid.
57 WTO Customs Valuation Agreement, Articles 2 and 3.
160 Mizan Law Review, Vol. 8, No.1 September 2014
Customs Duty and Tax Value Price Tariff: directive number 94/2006, with the
objective of making the valuation system of used vehicles and goods
transparent, equitable and accountable. The directive implemented a valuation
mechanism for used vehicles and goods that is not applicable on other goods. it
generally provides that the value of used vehicles and goods is to be based on
the C.i.F. price of the good when it was bought sold as a new good. Based on
this price, a depreciation allowance of 10% is subtracted each year with a
maximum allowance for three consecutive years. This valuation method does
not conform to the methods listed in the wTO valuation Agreement.
2.2.3 Ethiopian Revenue and Customs Authority Directive
ERCA still makes use of a directive, apparently given a confusing name;
Ethiopian Customs Authority implementation Directive to implement the
Directive on “customs price database preparation, distribution and utilization
directive” No. 2/1996 (E.C.), issued by its predecessor (the former ECuA) with
the objective of implementing Directive No. 10/1996. The directive, 2/1996,
embodies new principles which contradict with provisions in the working
Customs Proclamation 622/2009.
Primarily Article 3(2) of the directive provides for one additional test to be
applied sequentially to determine identical good. it provides that identical goods
include goods produced by a different producer but in the same country. Where
no value is found using this method it provides that goods produced in another
“country with similar level of development” can be used. The additional method
of using a different producer in the same country is actually in line with CVA;
however the second supplementary assessment of using products of other states
is inconsistent with Article 15 of the WTO valuation agreement which clearly
prohibits consideration of goods produced in different countries as identical
goods.58 Article 3 (4) of the directive establishes four sets of groups of countries
which are considered to be in like economic development conditions. These
groups are (1) European states including United States, Canada, Australia,
Japan; (2) all countries in Asia except Japan; (3) countries in Latin American;
and (4) all countries in Africa.59 This system is not in line with the WTO
Customs Valuation Agreement. it presupposes the same production and sale
value for countries in one group simply because they have comparable levels of
economic development. This is a simplistic basis to establish customs value of
goods.
2.3 Analysis of the Impact and Role of WTO CVA for Trade
Facilitation in Ethiopia
As illustrated in the above sections, the purpose of the Customs Valuation
Agreement, as treaty among signatory countries, is to provide reciprocity
between nations when they impose import duties. By using the same valuation
methods in every signatory country, countries avoid the problem of using
valuation as a tool for trade wars. Moreover, businesses can predict their cost of
doing business in another country. Using the same valuation methods, each
country then applies its own ad valorem import duty to the product. This
enhances the predictability of the cost of transactions, thereby encouraging
international trade.60
Today the majority of countries in the WTO share the common view that the
introduction of the CVA provisions in their national customs law will play a
significant positive role in the liberalization of their economies. Therefore, the
reason why a number of countries choose to carry out these measures
unilaterally before they join the WTO is understandable. Nevertheless, when it
concerns the implementation of the WTO-CVA, many countries have
incessantly confronted a number of problems that prevented the universal
incorporation of the CVA provisions in their national laws. Even if most of
these countries are developing countries like Ethiopia, they eventually can
manage to adopt WTO-CVA amenable provisions. Today such countries have
come to realize that applying the CVA means a lot more than simple
introduction of the CVA articles in their national laws.61
Consequently this translates to addressing the trade facilitation needs of
commerce and business in Ethiopia. Generally, the direct positive effect of
switching to valuation based on CVA is the creation of a fair, uniform, and
neutral system for the valuation of goods for customs purposes, that conforms to
commercial realities and that prohibits the use of arbitrary or fictitious customs
values, where all importers and producers are on the same level playing field.
Accompanying reforms will lead to an improved trade environment, better
compliance, and trade facilitation (with reduction in transaction costs).62
60 David Laro and Shannon P. Pratt (2005), Business Valuation and Taxes; Procedure,
Law, and Perspective, John Wiley & Sons, Inc, p. 147.
61 Azizjon Nazarov (2007), Contemporary Implementation Problems of the WTO
Agreement On Customs Valuation Into Domestic Legislation: What Can The
Experience Of Some WTO Members Teach Uzbekistan?, World Trade Institute,
Master Thesis), p. 51.
62 For example, the WTO Committee on Customs Valuation acknowledged strong link
of implementation of this Agreement with trade facilitation. See Nirmal Sengupta &
Moana Bhagabati, (2003) A Study of Trade Facilitation Measures From WTO
Perspective, Revised Interim Report, Madras Institute of Development Studies, p. 7.
162 Mizan Law Review, Vol. 8, No.1 September 2014
Changanaqui and Messerlin (in a study on minimum import prices), show the
need to consider other perverse economic effects. The findings reveal that, in
addition to the farness argument raised above, minimum import prices reduce
price differentials between high-priced and low-priced imported goods falling
within the same product category.63 Consequently, adverse quality effects result,
as there is an incentive for domestic producers to concentrate on the
manufacture of low-quality goods, and an inducement for foreign suppliers to
shift exports toward higher quality products.64
in the mean time, the basic implication of the Agreement in terms of trade
facilitation objectives is to protect the interests of traders by requiring that
Customs should accept, for determining dutiable value, the price actually paid
by the importer in a particular transaction. This applies to both arms-length and
related-party transactions. The Agreement recognizes that the prices obtained by
different importers for the same products may vary. The mere fact that the price
obtained by a particular importer is lower than other importers have imported
the product, cannot be used as a ground for rejecting the transaction value.
Customs can reject the transaction value in such situations only if it has reasons
to doubt the truth or accuracy of the declared price of the imported goods. Even
in such cases, it has to give importers an opportunity to justify their price and if
this justification is not accepted, to give them in writing the reasons for rejecting
the transaction value and for determining the dutiable value by using other
methods. Furthermore, by providing importers the right to be consulted
throughout all stages of the determination of value, the Agreement ensures that
the discretion available to Customs for scrutinizing declared value is used
objectively.
However, implementation of the wTO Customs Valuation Agreement should
not be taken for granted in terms addressing all the trade facilitation needs of the
country. it should also be noted that implementation of the wTO disciplines
comes up with various capacity needs. in this regard Finger and Schuler rightly
remarked that customs valuation is only an inch in the whole yard of customs
operations.65 Indeed, implementation of the customs valuation agreement cannot
be done in isolation without undertaking extensive reforms and without putting
in place institutional safeguards to prevent misuse of the liberal valuation
methods under the agreement since its provisions mostly rely on transparency in
66 Id, p .3.
67 Azizjon Nazarov (2007), Contemporary Implementation Problems of the WTO
Agreement On Customs Valuation Into Domestic Legislation: What Can The
Experience Of Some WTO Members Teach Uzbekistan?, World Trade Institute,
Master Thesis, p 51.
164 Mizan Law Review, Vol. 8, No.1 September 2014
71 Ibid.
72 UNCTAD (2003), Development Of Multimodal Transport And Logistics Services”,
Report by the UNCTAD secretariat, TD/B/COM.3/EM.20/2, p 3.
73 John Arnold (2007), The Role of Trade Facilitation in Export Growth”, (in) SADIQ
AHMED and EJAZ GHANI (eds.), South Asia, Growth and Regional Integration,
The World Bank, p 197.
74 Ibid.
such as the adoption, under the auspices of UNCTAD, of the Convention on a Code
of Conduct for Liner Conferences, 1974.
166 Mizan Law Review, Vol. 8, No.1 September 2014
September 2007.
Trade Facilitation in Ethiopia: The Role of WTO Accession in Domestic Reform 167
84 Freight Forwarding and Ship Agency License Regulation, Reg No. 37-1998.
85 Multimodal - Transport of Goods Proclamation; Proclamation No. 548/2007, Federal
Negarit Gazeta of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 13th Year, No. 59,
Addis Ababa, 04 September 2007.
86 According to the government the multimodal service is aimed at streamlining
deliver the goods in accordance with the terms of that contract.88 In doing so, the
scope of application of the proclamation is overarched to all multimodal
transport contract after the conclusion of which a multimodal transport
document is issued according to the relevant provisions of the Proclamation.89
Accordingly, the multimodal transport document is to be regarded as
document of title. Thus, where every consignee named in the negotiable or non
negotiable multimodal transport document and every endorsee of such
document as the case may be, to whom the property in the goods mentioned
therein shall pass, upon or by each reason of such consignment or endorsement
shall have all the rights and liabilities of the consignor.90 The Proclamation
further regulates liability for loss, damage or delay arising from multimodal
transport. On final note however, the Proclamation does not regulate specific
issues in multimodal transport administration such as licensing and supervision
of the services providers. These issues were set to be dealt with under a more
technical regulation that would be issued by the Council of Ministers.
Unfortunately, despite various pronouncements from the Maritime Affairs
Authority (MAA) on draft multimodal regulation, the Proclamation as it stands
can hardly be put to use.
officially and clearly indicated from the side of the Government. It appears now that
there is still confusion on the status of the instrument between being a Directive or a
Circular.
170 Mizan Law Review, Vol. 8, No.1 September 2014
multimodal transport deliver their cargoes to dry ports or warehouses that are
authorized by the Ethiopian Revenue and Customs Authority (ERCA). All
private importers, that open Letter of Credit (LC) from local banks, are required
to bring their container shipments to dry ports and ERCA’s warehouses.92 The
Directive is said to be aimed at streamlining shipments from Djibouti Port to
avoid warehouse fees in foreign currency. it also stipulates for the confiscation
of imported goods after shipments lie at the port for more than six months.
Officials state that these schemes will save foreign currency for the country,
which totals 1.4 million dollars, annually incurred as warehouse fees at Djibouti
Port.
The first directive, effective as of January, does not require private importers
to use the multimodal scheme even if they use ESLSE’s service. The circular
issued on February 13, 2012 required not only state banks but also private banks
to undertake their activity under the new directive right away. The letter from
the National Bank of Ethiopia also indicated that all banks have to report
logistical data of their customers to the Maritime Affairs Authority and the
National Bank of Ethiopia within the first five days of the month.93
As the Directive did not see other options until the directive allows private
companies to be involved in the multimodal transport scheme, various interested
groups are now arguing that the government must provide options for the private
firms to compete in the sector.94 Those engaged in private forwarding business
for instance argue that the government should undertake reform in this regard,
inter alia, allowing freight forwarders and shipping agents to use other ships for
cargo that transport from ports or countries that ESLSE’s vessels do not call.95
92 it is interesting to not here that there are complaints against the legislative power of
the Ministry. Freight forwarders said that the ministry does not have the power to
amend these types of enforcements on state or private banks as private multimodal
operators are allowed to be involved in the industry.
93 Addis Fortune, Supra note 50, The directive did not talk about any monopoly
concerning the multimodal transport operation and because of that the ministry office
should wait until private operators can be included in the sector before it amends
enforcement regulations on banks.”
94 interview with Commander Tilahun, Manager, Ethiopian Freight Forwarding and
Association, waiver certificate allowing the sea voyage to be made by another carrier
must be obtained by the importer, at a cost of USD 600-800 per container. See
Private Sector Development Hub,(2009), The Management of Commercial Road
Transport in Ethiopia, Addis Ababa Chamber of Commerce and Sectoral
Associations, p. 159.
Trade Facilitation in Ethiopia: The Role of WTO Accession in Domestic Reform 171
Sector of Ethiopia, Ministry of Trade and Industry, Draft Final Report, p IX.
172 Mizan Law Review, Vol. 8, No.1 September 2014
materials like glass bottles imported for food processing are examples in this
regard. They are not produced domestically and those that could be imported via
road transport from neighboring countries are of poor quality. The available
suspension schemes and drawback mechanisms are unable to reduce such costs
for exporters and should be reformed. Accordingly, shipping costs will be
brought to the forefront in increasing the costs for the nascent manufacturing
sector in the country. Consequently, studies have indicated that the preference
for ESLSE under the foreign exchange directives may increase shipping costs
by an estimated 30% - 50%.99 Currently ESLSE has also received very low
mark for its punctuality.100
3.5 Ethiopia’s WTO Accession and GATS Service Commitments:
Implication for Maritime Services Liberalization
The General Agreement on Trade in Services GATS is an agreement that lays
down a framework of international rules for trade in services. The main
principles that apply to the GATS101 are market access and national treatment
while the schedule of commitments provides the basic framework for the results
of negotiations. In terms of market access, GATS does not provide positive and
normative definition for market access but only provides six types of restrictions
that a member cannot impose, unless identified in its schedule.102 Conceptually
this is also similar to the principles of quantitative market access limitations
under GATT Art XI. Generally, GATS Art XVI:2 provides for rules that
prohibit members from imposing market access limitations. The existence of
any limitation in respect of these areas has to be indicated with respect to each
of the four modes of supply in scheduled sectors.103 The idea is that such market
access limitations are prohibited even if they are not discriminatory.104
However, GATS does not provide a comparable list in respect of national
treatment restrictions, and it is up to members to ensure that all potentially
"Ibid.
Bemnet Aschenaki (2004), Transport Costs in Ethiopia: An Impediment to
Exports?”, Background study for the World Bank FY04 Country Economic
Memorandum for Ethiopia, p 9.
101 GATS, World Trade Organization (1999), The Legal Texts, The Results of The
General Agreement On Trade In Services (GATS), Adopted by the Council for Trade
in Services.
104 N Icolas F. Di Ebold, (2010) Non Discrimination In International Trade In Services
relevant measures are listed in sectors where commitments are scheduled and, if
they wish, members can inscribe various types of national treatment limitation
(e.g., regarding taxation or regulations).105 “If a member no longer wishes to
conform to its specific commitments, it may modify its schedule by providing
compensation in the form of alternative market access (even across sectors).”106
“However, this undertaking may involve difficult negotiation and often creates
confusion regarding the member’s commitments.”107
With respect to the final part of the GATS framework, the GATS schedules
are key framework instruments providing the list of services with members’
commitments in terms of market access, national treatment and additional
commitments. The lists of services correspond to GATT secretariat
classification,108 which is a standardised harmonized framework also following
numerical references to the Central Product Classification system of the United
Nations.109
As explained above, the Ethiopian Shipping and Logistics Enterprise
(ESLSE) enjoys monopoly advantages. It is, in effect, a price setter as no
competitor can force it to lower its prices through competitive methods. This in
turn means that the importer is forced to accept the price set by the shipper. 110
This setting will become an issue for WTO members in Ethiopia’s accession
negotiation. It is the objective of this section to exemplify how the interplay
between liberalization of logistical services on the one hand, and trade
facilitation on the other hand, is equally complimentary and should be borne in
mind in the context of WTO negotiations on services and trade facilitation.
Thus, negotiators in both contexts should at least explicitly recognize the
105 Art XVII, In particular Art XVII lit 2 states; A Member may meet the requirement of
paragraph 1 by according to services and service suppliers of any other Member,
either formally identical treatment or formally different treatment to that it accords
to its own like services and service suppliers.
106 International Monetary Fund, (2010) Reference Note on Trade in Financial Services,
111 UNESCAP (2007), Trade Facilitation Beyond The Multilateral Trade Negotiations:
Regional Practices, Customs Valuation And Other Emerging Issues, A study by the
Asia-Pacific Research and Training Network on Trade, 276.
112 Ibid.
113 H.E. Haralambides (1994), GATT and its Effects on Shipping and Ports”,
unclear is whether Ethiopians are barred from utilizing the services of foreign
ships agents abroad. This is called consumption abroad or GATS Mode 2. In
terms of national treatment provisions under GATS, it is clear that no
investment license can be issued to a foreign company or national to invest in a
shipping agency enterprise in Ethiopia. These restrictions will have to be kept in
mind if Ethiopia decides to include these activities in its WTO accession
commitments. “Given the international nature of the shipping agency business,
Ethiopia should anticipate that other WTO members may seek market
liberalization measures in this area”.114
The implementation of National Treatment may also have its own
implication in terms of multimodal transport services. As indicated in the
sections above, Ethiopia has made some progress towards creating an enabling
framework for integrated logistics services through the adoption of legislation
on multimodal transport. However, restrictions on investment by foreigners in
key areas such as shipping and the apparently confusing regulations relating to
freight forwarding and shipping agency will effectively hinder foreign logistics
providers from investing in multimodal services. It thus would be wise that the
Ethiopian government reviews its investment policy with regard to all auxiliary
transport services with a view towards liberalizing market access in this area.
One thus could also anticipate that WTO members will seek express
commitments from Ethiopia in this area.115 Commitment of such nature thus
may generally mean the entitlement of foreign shipping service providers to
access Ethiopia’s economy, customs clearance, maritime agency, freight
forwarding and so on. With respect to all these facilities or services, foreign
ships would then be treated in the same way as domestic ones.
Another important implication of commitment in national treatment would
relate to the ability of foreign companies to own and operate a dry port
infrastructure and facilities. Perhaps national treatment commitment in this area
would carry a key tool to liberalize multimodal transport. If commitment is
undertaken, the investment could be facilitated for instance through leasing and
rental arrangement with the government. This option also seems economically
compelling from experience.
other Members no less favorable than that provided for under the terms of their
Schedule.116
Upon Ethiopia’s accession, two issues immediately arise with regard to
market access: the establishment/commercial presence by foreign companies
and the right to provide services. Regarding the establishment of commercial
presence, the effect could differ considerably among different market strategies
by foreign companies. Commercial presence could take various forms and could
be in charge of different activities. These activities may be the marketing and
sale of maritime transport services; the purchase and use of any transport and
related services; transport documentation; customs and other activities;
provision of business information and freight forwarding and agency services
and related activities.
The other issue which can be of fierce debate between Ethiopian negotiators
and WTO members will be on the issue of freight forwarding and shipping
agency services. Experience now shows that there is a considerable level of
commitment undertaken by other acceded countries. Policy wise, one can find
some shallow rationale and standing by the government. For instance, if one
investigates the rationales behind current level of investment restrictions in
shipping agency services, it seems that it is a genuine concern of the Ethiopian
government to encourage the growth of the domestic shipping agency industry.
However, this provision would prevent, in the long run, a foreign multimodal
transport operator (MTO) which includes shipping agencies within its service
offering, from setting up an agency office in Ethiopia. In effect, the restriction
would force the MTO to locate itself outside Ethiopia. Such development will
represent an investment loss for Ethiopia.117 It thus seems logical for the
Ethiopian government to amend the investment regulation to permit foreign
investors to provide ship agency services in Ethiopia.
Inland transport can also be an objective of further liberalization. As
international transport becomes more integrated, and considering the advantages
of multimodal transport, many shipping companies, or their subsidiaries, are
trying to start their business in inland transport, particularly in trucking. As a
first step, the possibility of freely contracting with any local transport service
providers might be granted to foreign shipping companies, especially those in
liner shipping. This free choice of local transport suppliers will surely increase
the competitiveness of the local transport market.
As indicated above, the provisions of National Treatment and Market Access
are binding only in so far as Member’s Schedules specify. If they are negotiated
6 Haralambides, H. E., et al (1994), GATT and its Effects on Shipping and Ports,
<http://www.maritimeeconomics.com/downloads/papers/HH_GATT%20Seoul.pdf >
117 Nathan Associates, supra note 98, p IX.
Trade Facilitation in Ethiopia: The Role of WTO Accession in Domestic Reform 177
118 Addis Fortune, Logistics Malaise Regulate, Monopolize Not!, Addis Fortune,
(March 04, 2012).
<http://addisfortune.com/Vol_12_No_618_Archive/Logistics%20Malaise%20Regul
ate%20Monopolise%20Not.htm >
178 Mizan Law Review, Vol. 8, No.1 September 2014
value added to Ethiopian goods.119 While it costs 0.07 dollar cents to transport a
shirt from Bangkok, Thailand, to New York, the cost of transporting the same
shirt from Addis Ababa to New York is 0.11 dollar cents. While it takes 27 days
for a Thai exporter to send its goods to New York, studies show, it takes five
more days for the Ethiopian exporter.120
The monopoly also has its own time constraints especially in areas where the
ESLSE does not have routes and has yet to subcontract them. Under the current
situation, all LC shipments must be handled by ESLSE. If that port is called by
the ESLSE, then, it will be about ESLSE’s capacity to pick it up. If ESLSE does
not call that port, it has the slot system, agreements with other shipping lines to
pick cargo up on its behalf at a premium price.121 * This venture is entirely
dependent on the contractual arrangement to be reached by ESLSE and its
client. This often takes considerable time and causes delays. The evidence could
even be staggering if one looks into what is going on in the ground. Local
experts and stakeholders state that it often takes ESLSE from 15 days - upto two
months, at least, to collect goods from various import destinations by its slot
partners. 122
Yet, even when the port is called by ESLSE, the number of vessels it has and
the volume of cargo that needs to be transported are often incompatible. Local
experts state that ESLSE’s ships cannot efficiently serve the import of the
country, be it on a slot basis or on their own.123 According to them, the problem
starts at origin ports, where goods stay at the ports more than they have to; even
if ESLSE picks them up, it may not pick them up on a timely basis. ESLSE
could or should have outsourced the said services but rather chooses to handle
the fright by its own ships while its ships are not available. In many cases its
takes ESLSE ships to have round trips to the same port more than once to clear
the goods waiting for shipment to Ethiopia. This entails costs not only for
storage but for all programmes in Ethiopia waiting for the goods that face the
delay.124
119
Ibid.
120
Ibid.
121
Ibid.
122
Commander Tilahun, President of Ethiopian Freight forwarders and Shipping Agents
Association, Interview with the author, July 2012 . This has high impact for trade
and it is not difficult to calculate the economic implication of this delay. See Gael
Raballand et al., (2012) Why Cargo Dwell Time Matters in Trade, World Bank
Economic Premise, Number 81.
123
Addis Fortune, supra note 118.
124Ibid,
Trade Facilitation in Ethiopia: The Role of WTO Accession in Domestic Reform 179
at least in the long run, will be able to create its own businesses at least in sub
sectors with low costs of entry.128
Generally, experience over the last decade has shown that state-owned
transport monopolies may not be the most efficient way to assist the trade of a
country. Consequently, developing countries like Ethiopia should be encouraged
to promote private transport companies, be they shipping companies, trucking
companies or railways. it is argued that maritime and (road transport)
monopolies often seal off developing economies from the natural growth of
domestically based transport enterprises.129 In Ethiopia, while there are not
sufficient level studies evidencing the this conclusion, there are reports from
various industry groups which show that industries in Ethiopia suffer from the
current state of maritime transport performance in the country. industries report
a very serious disadvantage for Ethiopian industries vis-a-vis those that reside in
Asian economies with respect to inventories and input costs. On average, the
reports indicate that Ethiopian industries hold twice as much raw material and
finished products compared to their Asian counterparts.130 According to the
reports, higher transaction costs explain a relevant part of the discrepancies in
these inventories: Ethiopian industries faced with higher prices, uncertain
demand and longer delays for small frequent shipments choose to maintain
larger reserves.131 As business people comment with frustration,
there are certain ports wherein the [ESLSE] may not accept bulk cargo (i.e.,
un-containerized cargo). In order to containerize a cargo, the consignment
needs to be at least 10,000 to 12,000 kilograms. For different reasons, bulk
purchasing is not widely practiced in Ethiopia, and the origins of imports are
diverse. If a waiver is obtained from the [ESLSE], it is possible to nominate
a foreign vessel for transporting such imports. But the mode of payment
becomes C&F, instead of FOB. Arranging for such a change in bills of
lading takes a lot of time and becomes a source of delay.132
Considering that the cost of capital is excessively high in Ethiopia than in Asia,
the rest of Africa and Latin America, the commentators point out that these high
inventory levels translate into considerable costs, and ultimately in lower
133Ibid.
134 Initial steps started at the WTO Ministerial Conference in 1996 for examining how
multilateral action by WTO Member governments might help to reduce these costs
without interfering with legitimate border management objectives such as revenue
collection and security. After some years of analysis and debate in the WTO, it was
agreed in mid-2004 to address these obstacles by adding Trade Facilitation to the list
of subjects that was being negotiated in the Doha Round. WTO Singapore
Ministerial 1996: Ministerial Declaration WT/MIN(96)/DEC (1996); The Doha
Work Programme Decision Adopted by the General Council on 1 August 2004
stated that - (Trade Facilitation) taking note of the work done on trade facilitation by
the Council for Trade in Goods under the mandate in paragraph 27 of the Doha
Ministerial Declaration and the work carried out under the auspices of the General
Council both prior to the Fifth Ministerial Conference and after its conclusion, the
General Council decides by explicit consensus to commence negotiations on the
basis of the modalities set out in Annex D to this document. See World Trade
Organization WT/L/579, 2 (August 2004).
135 Bali Ministerial Declaration - WT/MIN(13)/DEC, Ministerial Conference Ninth
136 Richard Eglin, “The Doha Round Negotiations on Trade Facilitation”, (in) World
Economic Forum (eds.) The Global Enabling Trade Report- 2008 (2008), p 35.
137 Agreement On Trade Facilitation, WT/L/931, Article 1.
138 It is to be noted here that the newly enacted Mass Media and Access to Information
law requires each state body to publish —its directives, regulations, guidelines.
Federal Negarit Gazeta, 14th Year No 64, Freedom of the Mass Media and Access to
Information Proclamation No 590/2008, Addis Ababa, 4th December, 2008. Article
13(1)(g).
9 Generally see Mulugeta Getu, “Law Schools’ Access to Legislation and Decisions:
Current Trends and Suggested Outlets”, Ethiopian Journal of Legal Education, Vol.
3, No.2 (December 2010).
Trade Facilitation in Ethiopia: The Role of WTO Accession in Domestic Reform 183
the relevant agency maintains websites. Other than these circulars and
guidelines issued by government agencies on administrative, procedures are
printed as hard copies by the relevant institutions or departments. In terms of
customs laws, the ERCA publishes a general tariff book with preferential tariff
rates and taxes, relevant laws, regulations, and procedures on its websites, in
addition to publishing such information through the Gazette.
b) Enquiry points/single national focal information centre:
On general customs issues, the ERCA has a consultation department that
provides information on customs issues relating to importation and exportation
in Addis Ababa. The other border agencies do not seem to have similar
structures or designated information desks like Customs. Generally, Ethiopia’s
border agencies would therefore need to establish inquiry points/desks or
collectively establish a central enquiry point to meet the specific proposals for
WTO Members.
c) Notification of trade regulations:
While Ethiopia has a mechanism for notifying the general public when
amending and introducing new measures, the Trade Facilitation Agreement
demands that such amendments - especially the ones that relate to core measures
that may have significant effects on trade with other Members, interested
parties, and the WTO Secretariat - should be notified to enable such parties to
submit comments before the amendment is finalized. This notification might
have to be similar to what is provided for under Technical Barriers to Trade
(TBT) and Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Agreements.
As far as the notification provisions of the TBT and the SPS agreements are
concerned, to date, Ethiopia has only made preparations to establish national
inquiry point under the TBT agreement.140 Much work remains for Ethiopia to
meet the rest of the notification requirements under the SPS agreement and the
national notification authority. Notification obligations on the lines of the SPS
Agreement and the TBT agreements will create additional pressure, even though
this would be beneficial in adding transparency to the trading system. In some
cases, the Ethiopian government has been given contributions from relevant
stakeholders when establishing the inquiry point.
One of the challenges for Ethiopia will be the ability to make information
available electronically and in a sustainable manner given limited connectivity,
electric power interruptions and the limited availability of skilled manpower in
information technology, at least in relevant government agencies. Most
governmental agencies do not have official websites on which to publish
information, and those that do only publish partial information which, in many
cases, is outdated.
141 ARTICLE 2: Opportunity To Comment, Information Before Entry Into Force, And
Consultations, 1 Opportunity to Comment and Information before Entry into Force
1.1 Each Member shall, to the extent practicable and in a manner consistent with its
domestic law and legal system, provide opportunities and an appropriate time period
to traders and other interested parties to comment on the proposed introduction or
amendment of laws and regulations of general application related to the movement,
release, and clearance of goods, including goods in transit.
142 See EPPCF website, <http://www.eppcf.com/?view=featured >
Trade Facilitation in Ethiopia: The Role of WTO Accession in Domestic Reform 185
provide for consultations with the private sector when there is a need to change
procedures.
Another issue of contention with some stakeholders is that these
consultations are not encompassing enough and that in some cases the
stakeholders lack technical capacity and information to engage effectively with
the government on the issues under consultation. Generally, most of the
institutions stated that there are no consultative mechanisms to provide an
opportunity for stakeholders to comment before any new laws or regulations are
introduced or before changes are made.
143 See provisions of standard 9.9 of the Revised Kyoto Convention that define the term.
144 See TFA Article 3.
186 Mizan Law Review, Vol. 8, No.1 September 2014
industrial goods. The Draft has also considered providing for submission of a
request for advance ruling through clearing agents. This provision would entail
training clearing agents on how to determine value using transaction value,
manage Advance Rulings, and maintain a database on Advance Rulings linked
to the Customs database for Advance Rulings.
Generally, while its progress is notable, Ethiopia nonetheless has much work
ahead to bring its overall trade facilitation standards in line with the proposals
that are under discussion in the wTO. And, it is only partially prepared to abide
by the new set of rules under draft by the WTO Negotiating Group. The
observations in the preceding paragraphs have shown both achievements and
deficiencies and have noted where high level of early preparation may be
advisable for bringing about the changes envisioned.
Conclusion
As the preceding section indicate the need for trade policy and other endogenous
reform needs, in the area of trade facilitation. i generally argue that efforts
toward streamlining economic development, trade and investment policy in
Ethiopia with domestic legal and institutional reforms to facilitate trade are the
very factors that render the country’s pursuit of WTO accession and trade
liberalization fruitful. In today’s international business environment of global
production network and just in time delivery, businesses seek cost-effective,
efficient, and predictable facilitation in international trade.
As highlighted in this article, Ethiopia’s customs administration is the
foremost agency at the border and plays a prominent role in the release of
goods. The implications of WTO membership include the development of trade-
related institutions such as the laws and regulatory frameworks that govern trade
as well as the administrative mechanisms and processes for designing,
implementing and evaluating trade and trade-facilitation related policies.148 One
instance in this regard relates to the discussion made with respect to the legal
regime on customs valuation of goods in Ethiopia. The current practice of
customs valuation in Ethiopia demonstrates that the WTO valuation methods are
not fully incorporated in legislative guideline. As they cannot be applied
effectively until necessary legislation is prepared and passed, the first key
reform measure should involve legislative upkeep. Thus, legal inadequacy in
Ethiopia still remains. What is needed is a comprehensive customs regulation
with detailed definition of valuation terms, transparent provision of price
adjustment, clear guidance to valuation and other similar measures. We can
thus expect that customs reform and trade facilitation in Ethiopia will be driven
by the Ethiopian government’s decision to accelerate its WTO accession
application.
148 Lesser, C. and E. Moise-Leeman, (2009) “Informal Cross- Border Trade and Trade
Facilitation Reform in Sub- Saharan Africa”, OECD Trade Policy Working Papers,
No 86, OECD Publishing
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/225770164564> (Last accessed April 2014)
Trade Facilitation in Ethiopia: The Role of WTO Accession in Domestic Reform 189
149 Institute for International Trade, University of Adelaide, supra note 69.
150 Ibid.
This work is licensed under a
Creative Commons
Attribution - Noncommercial - NoDerivs 4.0 License.
Institute of
Development Studies