U.S.

-Philippine Relations in the Aquino Era

Author(s): Walden Bello
Source: World Policy Journal , Fall, 1988, Vol. 5, No. 4 (Fall, 1988), pp. 677-702
Published by: Duke University Press

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/40468591

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U.S.-PHILIPPINE RELATIONS
IN THE AQUINO ERA
Waiden Bello

Two and a half years after Corazón Aquino's ascent to the presidency, the
Philippines offers contradictory images. Elections have been held, but the
most powerful branch of government would appear to be the unelected
Philippine military. The press is the freest of any in Southeast Asia, but
dissent is checked by shadowy death squads operating with seeming impu-
nity. Democratic institutions have been restored, but they have produced
a landlord-dominated Congress that stymies agrarian reform - the key to
economic democracy.
The underlying crisis in the Philippines has not affected Washington's
strong support for Aquino, nor has the growing opposition to U.S. bases
among members of her government. By and large, Washington is satisfied
with the status quo and with its policy of "special relations" with Manila.
The Aquino government is viewed as a rare example of a successfully
managed transition from a U.S.-backed unstable dictatorship to a friendly
liberal regime - an outcome the Reagan administration has tried unsuc-
cessfully to achieve in other parts of the Third World. Moreover, the Reagan
administration has enjoyed bipartisan backing of its Philippine policy,
something that its Central America policy has lacked from the beginning.
Lulled by its own sense of achievement, however, the administration does
not recognize how its present policy actually contributes to the deepening
crisis affecting the Philippines.

Waiden Bello is a senior analyst specializing in Philippine and Pacific affairs

at the San Francisco-based Institute for Food and Development Policy
(Food First). He is the author o/U.S.-Sponsored Low- Intensity Conflict
in the Philippines (San Francisco: Institute for Food and Development
Policy y 1988) and coauthor of American Lake: Nuclear Peril in the Pacific
(New York: Penguin Books, 1987).

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678 World Policy Journal

"Democratization": The Lat

Washington's strong support
policy of liberalization or "d
1980s to stabilize a volatile p
dictatorship, a weak center,
the latest twist in the tradi
the relationship between the
the Philippines independenc
is filled with words like "warm
but in essence it has meant tha
vene in the affairs of what i
Marcos crisis, this doctrine w
by State Department operat
Liberalization gradually eme
assassination of Aquino's hus
adopted by pragmatic burea
met with some resistance initi
old policy of U.S. support fo
the White House and the Nat
to the Philippine dictator w
diplomat, sent a cable to Sec
1985 - fully a year before Marc
option. "If the opposition sh
didate, and that candidate sh
" . . . our judgment at this t
to act responsibly and that t
tionship would prosper."1
During the decisive years of t
was the key player of a team
Undersecretary of State for Po
three man at the State Depa
Washington's envoy to Manila.
tant Secretary of State Paul
ambassadorship to Indones
who was reassigned to Pan
Whether they were liberals
members of the team had o
Realpolitik ahead of ideology
In their efforts to change t

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U.S. -Philip pine Relations in the Aquino Era 679

found common cause with Democrats in Congress wh

critical of the administration's policy of full support
figure in this emerging alliance was Rep. Stephen Solarz,
Aquino and chairman of the House Asian and Pacific
mittee. Between 1983 and 1986, Solarz managed to per
to reduce the level of military aid to Marcos, restrict
to "nonlethal" items, and adopt a sense-of-the-House
for "genuine, free, and fair elections."
Pragmatic though they were, these individuals did n
when it served their ends. Against supporters of U.N
Kirkpatrick's efforts to legitimize continued backing for
like Marcos, the pragmatists invoked the notion of "sp
the Philippines to argue their case. Intervening for "dem
by Wolfowitz, for instance, on the grounds that "the
tions were nurtured under American leadership, and t
larger stake in their success or failure."2
Between the Aquino assassination and Marcos's flig
February 1986, the State Department's pragmatists g
upper hand from the ideologues at the White Hou
Security Council. They worked to replace what they
bankrupt policy with a campaign that would outmaneuve
pine left- composed principally of the National Dem
and the New People's Army (NPA) - by forcing Marco
tions as a prelude to easing him out of office. Coraz
tainly not handpicked by Washington to oppose Marc
tial elections of February 1986, but after she had be
upper-class opposition to be its candidate, the pragm
knew that the popular Aquino, with her image as a re
"democratic center," was the most potent weapon in thei
then set out to "encourage the constraints on Marcos
described it.3
Continuing intrabureaucratic conflicts produced som
President Reagan's stubborn refusal to abandon Marco
hour, when the Filipino strongman was on the verg
by a military-civilian uprising after his brazen attemp
dential elections of February 7, 1986. But the strategy
cost told a closed-door seminar for foreign service office
Aquino entered office on February 25, 1986: "Our
encourage the democratic forces of the center, then

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 680 World Policy Journal

by the middle and also win

so good/'4
Full bipartisan support for Aquino has been the watchword in
Washington ever since. With the cooperation of Democratic members of
Congress, the bilateral aid pipeline was undogged following Marcos's ouster,
resulting in the inflow of more than $1 billion over the past two and a
half years. True, Washington has done nothing to stem the drain of over
$2 billion annually in interest payments to U.S. and other international
banks on the country's $29 billion external debt, but it has crusaded for
more foreign aid for Aquino from multinational sources. At the Group
of Seven summit in Toronto in July 1988, for example, President Reagan
managed to have the Philippines cited in the final communiqué as a country
of special concern to the top powers of the international economic order.
The gesture was part of a bipartisan drive led by two Democrats, Rep.
Stephen Solarz and Sen. Alan Cranston, and two Republicans, Rep. Jack
Kemp and Sen. Richard Lugar, to stitch together a multinational "mini-
Marshall Plan" for Aquino- a $10-billion aid package that skeptics have
described as an effort to recycle part of the huge Japanese surplus to serve
U.S. strategic goals in the Philippines.
Of all the forms of U.S. assistance, the most decisive has been the solid
and virtually unqualified support that the United States has given Aquino
in her showdowns with her enemies on the right. Embassy backing was
instrumental in saving Aquino from five coup attempts in less than two
years. In the most critical of these challenges, the August 28, 1987 putsch,
the U.S. Embassy warned the Philippine military that a successful attempt
to overthrow Aquino would result in a cutoff of military aid.5 Also, Philip
Kaplan, then chargé d'affaires at the embassy, actually telephoned former
defense minister Juan Ponce Enrile, Aquino's bitter rival, and asked him
to dissuade his former aide, Lt. Col. "Gringo" Honasan, from proceeding
with his plan to oust Aquino.6 When Enrile refused, the embassy sent
two defense attachés to the battlefield to get rebel and loyalist troops to
stop shooting one another.7 Throughout Aquino's first two years, then,
the U.S. Embassy constituted her main security detail against renegade
cliques within the military.
If the Philippines transition is a case where the Reagan administration
was saved "from its worst instincts," as one former U.S. envoy put it,8 it
also stands in contrast to U.S. policy elsewhere in the Third World, espe-
cially Central America. In Central America, the contra policy has been
run largely by "ideological maximalists" like Lt. Col. Oliver North at the
National Security Council and Assistant Secretary of State Elliot Abrams

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U.S. -Philip pine Relations in the Aquino Era 681

who, combining official and private right-wing netw

counterrevolutionary project that ultimately went out
logical excesses prevented realistic assessments and co
policy, on the other hand, career professionals like Ar
trol of policy-making and prevented mercurial ideolo
Abrams type from gaining significant influence. Because
d'état and flexibility ahead of ideology, these low-pro
effective professionals of the Asia- Pacific desk produced
sition in the Philippines but also a relatively stable p
tion in South Korea. It is no coincidence that in both i
States did not take a leading role but, rather, "cued in" to
from influential local elites. Nor is it any coincidence
ment operatives placed the weight of the United Stat
of liberalization and "democratization" as the best way
polarization, outmaneuver the left, and secure stabil

The Politics of Stabilization

Whatever the pragmatisti early expectations may have been, it is becoming

increasingly clear that what they have purchased in the Philippines can
hardly be described as lasting stability. For Corazón Aquino was ushered
into power by a broad but ultimately unwieldy multiclass coalition. As
a candidate and during her first months as president, Aquino was all things
to all people - a figure onto whom the United States, the anti-Marcos elite,
the middle class, labor, the peasantry, the anti-Marcos faction of the mili-
tary, and the progressive movement projected common and contradictory
expectations. Subject to multiple pressures, Aquino has, over the past two
years, shed her image of an upper-class populist and taken stands that
have more clearly defined her government as responsive mainly to the
interests of the elite, the military, and the United States. For the most
part, she has embraced conservative programs that may achieve a fragile
equilibrium in the short run but will actually exacerbate the underlying
structural crisis of Philippine society. This is evident from a close look at
five areas where she was expected to undertake major initiatives: democratic
government, civil-military relations, the insurgency, economic policy, and
U.S.-Philippine relations.
The Return of Elite Democracy. When Cory Aquino ran against Ferdi-
nand Marcos she promised democratic government, and it is on this score
that Aquino generally gets high grades. Free and fair elections, at the con-
gressional and local levels, were held following the approval of a new con-

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682 World Policy Journal

stitution in February 1987.

members of Congress reveal
of electoral democracy: 90 perc
of Representatives are big la
democratic government, Aquin
democracy that Marcos disman
of governance provided a rea
For a long time elite democ
system imposed on the Phi
source of social equilibrium i
marked by severe inequality in
democracy offered factions
tively peacefully, for political
majority the illusion of dem
among different elite candid
system was extremely comp
most part, mobilized along clas
client, kinship, and regional
Though it legitimized a syst
dominated democracy had it
elite candidate would come t
ever, patronage politics wou
faction and the next election
nity to "kick the rascals out
inevitably campaigned on an
hope, disillusionment, and d
No Philippine president had
Marcos. By having himself r
ical power in 1972 with his
fragile equilibrium of intra
agrarian reform and the oth
promised in an effort to win m
racy, the conditions were cre
class alliance that eventually
for the return of competitiv
The State Department's pra
favorite phrase- to the realit
mobilization of this electoral
counted on to fight and ma
they attributed not to the a

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U.S. -Philippine Relations in the Aquino Era 683

program but to their being able to present themselve

opposition to Marcos's arbitrary, repressive rule. Their
rect. The electorate ignored the NDF's call to boycott
presidential elections- or the "circus of reactionaries"
the event- and voted massively for Aquino. A year l
endorsed constitution was approved by over 75 percen
despite the left's call for a "no vote."
By the time the New People's Army resumed the ar
the breakdown in cease-fire talks with the governmen
political environment had changed radically. In t
atmosphere, where the government enjoyed widespr
guerrillas not only were on the political defensive, but th
nerable to being marginalized by the government's c
democratic center against the extremes of right and
The congressional elections in May 1987 demonstra
hegemony of the "old politics" over most of the mas
tido na Bayan, or People's Party, ran candidates for bo
came up against elite candidates who were engaged i
tion for the votes of the masses, employing not only
and massive advertising but also billions of pesos in
the progressive movement was handicapped, in part,
lence toward participation in the electoral process. T
the weak campaign machine it built and in its halfhearte
while some progressive candidates campaigned to win,
tion simply as an opportunity to communicate the le
masses. In the end, the combination of money, high med
ambivalence, and the continuing strong influence of
tionships won the day. Leftist candidates were defeated n
and elite politicians won the vast majority of seats in
the Senate. The local elections of January 1988 compl
of elite democracy. In that contest most candidates favor
even in rural areas where the guerrillas were strong.
Civilian Rule, Military Veto. The Aquino regime, howev
restoration of the old pre-Marcos elite democracy
difference: the elected civilian officials must now sh
unelected, bloated Armed Forces of the Philippines
bequeathed his successor. Needless to say, this develop
appointment to the human rights movement that su
Once Aquino came to power, many of her liberal a
to move decisively to depoliticize the military. Both

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684 World Policy Journal

ment and the Pentagon favo

As the Pentagon viewed it,
of the armed forces becomin
"restoration of professional
became a priority of the U.
Reform the Armed Forces M
by Lt. Col. "Gringo" Honasan
Academy's class of 1971, RAM
directing elite. The American
alism, but they were distres
RAM's goal was somewhat d
tioned itself behind Defense
dinand Marcos. But the coup
led, could no longer be regar
It was the inevitable conclus
earlier, when Marcos started
an instrument of personal p
rying the process to its logical
ical guardian of the nation.
In retrospect, despite their
other coup attempts of 1986
ical compromise that was to
for Aquino and U.S. oppositi
mended by RAM. But it did
alty either. Rather, the milita
modated itself to the existen
Aquino give it free rein in cond
agree to treat it like a state w
of national policy. This "Faus
nist describes it, has given Aqu
fringe of the armed forces.1
In a society marked by sev
military or military- backed
the stability of elite-domin
racy functions best in an envi
which anti-elite candidates wit
from the t electoral arena by
toral competition will not b
the local elections of January
for votes among candidates

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U.S. -Philip pine Relations in the Aquino Era 685

the People's Party, fearing for their lives, did not dare
nated by military- backed vigilantes.
The Counterinsurgency: New Rhetoric, Old Tactics. In
in office, Corazón Aquino declared that she was giving pri
a peaceful settlement with the insurgent National Dem
and New People's Army (NPA). "We must seek to brin
down from the hills," Aquino declared, "and by econ
justice, show them that for which the best intentioned
The NDF, in turn, expressed a similar desire for a neg
"We hope that ... we can achieve a common point of v
the problems that confront the Filipino people, an
approach towards their solution."14
The peace talks between the NDF and the government
more than a 60-day cease-fire. Their collapse was precipita
mination of the Philippines armed forces to wreck th
from the United States.15 Even before the talks began
1986, the Pentagon was emphasizing the impossibility
senior defense official told the Senate that there was
at the end of the day, military action will be required
gency."16 Then, just as preliminary talks were launched w
the Reagan administration moved to scuttle them. One
concealing his impatience with Aquino, explained c
[Aquino] had to make this [peace] effort and she has m
to move on."17 Even after the negotiations broke down
Pentagon continued to criticize any latent interest in
liberals in Aquino's cabinet. As Assistant Secretary of
Armitage explained in testimony before Congress:

Some members of the Aquino administration believe that

exclusively on symbolic political acts to cure the insurgen
cling to the forlorn hope that the insurgents will fade fro
coordinated civil and military action will not be necessary

The AFP-Pentagon pressure successfully derailed the

March 1987, Aquino was telling the army that the "answe
of the left and the right is not social and economic re
military action." She then asked the troops for "a str
victories."19
In pushing Aquino to spurn peace with the insurgents and maintain
military pressure on them instead, the Pentagon was not pursuing a course

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686 World Policy Journal

that contradicted the State D

through political means. The
importance of political stabi
secretary of defense, explain

Nations which have contended s

the role of force is secondary to
reform. . . . [Ajgrarian reform
credible system of local justice
insurgency campaign will be pe
with the next generation.20

From this perspective, then,

necessary for elements of th
in the countryside. This req
missions- to move, shoot, an
Thus, a major concern of th
so that its use of repression
random and indiscriminate,
led to the development of a co
cated intelligence work, the
to win hearts and minds throu
and military operations that
tive communities. Of course
imagined that the AFP could
a half years after then Chief
the "New Armed Forces of t
tinues to be dismal from the s
the political and military di
Periodically, the AFP has be
covert operations against th
penetration agents have bee
sion and bloodletting in the
of Mindanao, and in a four-m
atives bagged more than 20 k
members of the Communist
ments," however, must be p
tions involving indiscrimina
According to Amnesty Inter
it was able to document durin
ment were committed by regu

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U.S. -Philippine Relations in the Aquino Era 687

uted to AFP-backed civilian "vigilante" groups that prolif

the country in 1987.
Now numbering over 200, the vigilante groups recr
from a variety of sectors of the population, including
religious fanatics, and former NPA guerrillas. While the
its vigilante protégés target "only communists," the
be very elastic, covering peasants demanding land ref
activists, and priests and lay workers who preach soc
oric of officers like Lt. Col. Franco Calida, organizer o
Masa (Masses, Arise) gang in Davao City, encourages t
broad criteria in determining who is a communist: "I
democracy and communism," Calida has said, "there is
body who would not join Alsa Masa is a communist."
While American right-wing organizations and indi
(Ret.) John Singlaub have been enthusiastic about
officials have become increasingly aware of the proble
pose for Aquino's politics of stabilization.25 Thus Gen
well, until recently a senior Pentagon official, warned th
were a "mixed blessing: in the short term, a welcom
in the longer term, a potential source of problems as
not responsive to duly constituted authority."26 And
George Shultz, who endorsed Aquino's support of vigi
1987 visit to Manila, recently stated in testimony be
vigilantes constitute a "dangerous trend" because th
law into their own hands."27
Stilwell's and Shultz's concerns are well founded if
Philippine experience in light of the U.S. experience i
the massive killings by death squads in the period be
expanded rather than contained the leftist insurgency
States was forced to rein in the right-wing pistolero
up" the counterinsurgency.28
The Economics of Stabilization. Another element of
has been her economic program. Like her political t
nomic direction was initially ambiguous. In some ar
ments of continuity with the old regime. This was
her economic recovery and development policy. Aquin
to develop local industry by exposing it to internatio
out to dismantle economic protectionism - a World Ba
prise that Marcos's technocrats had begun but failed
of opposition from Filipino capitalists and Marcos cr

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688 World Policy Journal

Like Marcos's technocrats,

substantial economic aid and
opment. Thus aid missions
and a great deal of effort wa
stable labor-management r
scared off by the image of a
is evident in the fact that th
Jose Fernandez, continue
has outlasted many of Aq
Aquino's conservative econ
sible for the slightly more
tered in 1986 and 1987. Th
lost in 1984 and 1985, wh
Moreover, it barely made a
of the population that lives b
including some members of
and inequality could only b
the external debt and land
to be very disappointing t
Unlike her counterparts i
tional promise early on in he
debt of more than $29 bill
straint on economic develop
ments came to a staggerin
national product.
Few Filipinos understand
this massive burden, since
the debt without regard f
stantial part of it into their
What many find particula
half of it guaranteed by th
to pay for the Bataan Nucle
and several earthquake faul
relative at least $80 million in
upon her assumption of of
a million dollars a day just
New "fork banks, which a
external debt, have yielded
ment that they imposed o
conditional commitment t

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U.S. -Philippine Relations in the Aquino Era 689

Philippines less attractive terms than they have given

tina in recent negotiations to reschedule debt payme
the commercial banks have agreed to reschedule Ph
this will not really reduce the debt load but mainly
ments on principal. It does not eliminate the enorm
payments that the banks require to reflect a profit on t
According to one estimate, debt service from 1987
a total capital outflow of $19.6 billion, while capital
to total only $5.3 billion- making the Philippines a
to the tune of $14.3 billion.32 Obviously, such a hemo
ital is incompatible with the achievement of even a m
development and political stability since it ties up r
otherwise be used for productive investment and to alle
needs.
As disappointing as Aquino's performance on the e
tion is her record on agrarian reform, the most vital
cent of the Philippine population that lives in the cou
paigning for president, Aquino, who comes from o
leading landed families, pledged that her highest pr
would be "an equitable sharing of the ownership of
the first 17 months of her presidency, when she en
to legislate and execute, she took no action to fulfill
just before the new Congress assembled in late July
an executive order that decreed land reform but lef
like land-retention limits to be decided by the Con
With the House of Representatives dominated by la
surprising that the land reform legislation ultimate
1988 favored landowners rather than tillers of the soil.
the law established generous land retention limits,
to keep 12.5 acres for themselves and transfer owne
each child 15 years or older who is "tilling the land or m
The retention limit is very sizable in a country wher
is 2 to 5 acres. It is certainly generous in comparison
successful land reform programs that have been intr
South Korea, where each landlord family was allowe
than 7.5 acres. It has been estimated that the reten
in fact, exempt about 75 percent of the country's to
from being transferred to tenants and workers.33
The new law also gives landlords an opportunity to
bution by incorporating their land and then selling s

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 690 World Policy Journal

and workers. Moreover, it a

control of key areas of agricu
leases from the government
its land-compensation provi
pensation packages that cou
Rep. Bonifacio Gillego, one of
up voting against it in its fi
law when he described it as
It is unlikely, however, that
that whatever cosmetic arra
measure will be able to cont
with the most inequitable di
than Aquino's key supporte
has warned, "The Philippines w
revolution."36
The Bases Question. The iss
ence in the Philippines pres
for the obvious reason that it
Indeed, one of Washington's
alization has been to create
operation of Subie Naval Base a
bases. But if Washington exp
taining the bases, it may be
tion of the bases has grown
developments: rising mass op
increased support for a neu
U.S. officials were taken ab
bases agreement elicited a s
with most opinion makers ca
or for fundamental changes
ments, governing their stay
the Philippine panel, Foreig
Freudian imagery, talked abo
the United States.38
Confusion turned to alarm when, by a vote of 19 to 3, the Philippine
Senate voted on June 6, 1988 to ban the entry and storage of nuclear
weapons and to strengthen the provision in the constitution that stipu-
lates a "nuclear-free" policy. Since 80 percent of the Seventh Fleet is nuclear-
armed, this would mean that most U.S. warships entering Subie Bay would
be in violation of Philippine law should the House of Representatives back

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U.S. -Philippine Relations in the Aquino Era 691

the Senate bill. An even more ominous message lay

any renewal of the U.S.-Philippine Military Bases Treaty
struggle, since eight or nine senators would be sufficien
of a treaty.
This defiance on the part of a traditionally pro-American elite reflects,
in part, the continuing resentment pro-Aquino senators harbor for a country
that supported Marcos for 14 years. On the other hand, former pro-Marcos
stalwarts like Sen. Joseph Estrada are probably motivated in their opposi-
tion to the bases by resentment over the U.S. role in ousting their patron.
But the most important factor explaining the elite's increasingly critical
views of the bases is the rising antibases sentiment among the people.
Compared with about 42 percent in March 1987, a poll conducted in March
1988 revealed that only 30 percent of those surveyed in metropolitan Manila
want to retain the bases under the current arrangements beyond the treaty's
1991 expiration date. Most of the people polled either want the bases out
unconditionally after 1991 or would like retention contingent on increased
monetary benefits for the country.39 This sense that the spread of anti-
bases sentiment will soon capture a majority of Filipinos has led other-
wise moderate politicians, like Sen. Jose Lina, to counsel the United States
to read "the handwriting ... on the wall."40
The growth of antinuclear and antibases sentiment in the Philippines
has been influenced in part by rising demands for neutralization, if not
demilitarization, of the Asia- Pacific region. Sparked by developments in
the tiny Republic of Palau, which attached a nuclear-free clause to its con-
stitution in 1979, the antimilitarist wave spread to New Zealand, which
banned nuclear warship visits in 1984, and the South Pacific, where 11
countries constituted themselves into the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone
in 1985.
The strength of antimilitarism and nonalignment is also evident in the
1987 adoption "in principle" by the otherwise conservative Association
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) of a proposal to create a Southeast
Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in keeping with an earlier declaration
of the area as a Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality. While the United
States claims that the other ASEAN countries favor the bases, the truth
is that these countries have resisted pressure from the Philippine govern-
ment for an ASEAN declaration of support for the bases, fearful that such
a declaration would compromise their status in the Non-Aligned Movement.
The United States has attempted to rally support for its bases by raising
the specter of a Soviet threat to the region, but these efforts have largely
backfired. Ambassador Nicholas Platt's warning about a "Soviet buildup "

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692 World Policy Journal

issued at the start of the Phili

dissent from Australia, nor
U.S. intelligence findings, Au
that Soviet naval deploymen
reduced by half.41 In other
own arguments. For instanc
Soviet base at Vietnam's Cam
buildup in the area. But af
Vladivostok speech, hinted a
Subie Bay and Cam Ranh Bay
selves, claiming, as one U.S. m
require the U.S. to yield a pi
tion of what is, despite its
Amid this growing controver
dent Aquino periodically aff
open." Given her dependenc
she favors renewing the ba
controversial opinion that he
that Aquino can legally side
tion and conclude a new tre
beyond 1991, despite Senate
and whatever legal justificati
would risk the wrath of ris
1991 agreement that does no
bases, specify a short durati
lion a year in rent. Indeed, a
Sen. Leticia Shahani, chair o
has already floated a proposal
drawal of the bases over a 1

Ending the "Special Relati

Aquino may have brought st
but clearly she is failing to re
lems her country faces. Wh
rized as it was in Marcos's l
gave rise to polarization the
military arrogance, econom
tremendous rural misery. So
ious issues have not coalesce

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U.S. -Philip pine Relations in the Aquino Era 693

Marcos to precipitate his fall. And so far the powerfu

still feeling its way. But time is not on Aquino's side
Elite democracy contains the seeds of future instab
system of governance generates the illusion of democr
political level, thus obscuring the reality of social and
and stabilizing society for a time, the combination of
ness, weak economic growth, and the absence of redi
will sooner or later undercut it. Elite democracy may
regarded by the masses as a state of political paralysis
acceptable system of democratic representation. In 1972
facilitated Marcos's consolidation of power. At that tim
to exploit the country's extreme poverty and inequalit
"democratic deadlock" of the pre-martial-law elite dem
without too much opposition from a population grown
rule, a dictatorship promising "social and economic ref
is a major change in the distribution of wealth and power
a new round of disaffection with sterile upper-class
is likely to ensue - though its beneficiaries this time
credited authoritarian right but the left, which, thou
the political defensive, remains resourceful and resil
The continuing crisis of the Philippines cannot be se
policy of "special relations" that has long governed the re
Manila and Washington. The influence that the United
Philippine national policy-making contributes signific
Forty-two years after the Philippines achieved formal
the United States, a new policy is needed- one that b
status of the the Philippines as a mature, sovereign cou
it breathing room to solve its own problems without h
front the United States or depend on it at every turn
have to address four critical areas: the insurgency, mil
relations, and the issue of U.S. bases.
A Filipino Solution to the Philippine Crisis. One o
tives of U.S. policy in the Philippines has been to destr
Since the National Democratic Front (NDF) and the N
(NPA), more than any other political force in the Ph
mitted to dismantling the whole structure of special relat
determination to defeat the insurgency is hardly surp
of destroying the left is not very likely to succeed. The l
to power but it cannot easily be eliminated either. The
30,000 and operates in 67 of the Philippines's 73 prov

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694 World Policy Journal

today's generation of insur

of guerrilla warfare than the
They have patiently cultiv
populations and have care
country, largely as a result
influence.
On the other hand, it is i
of the organized left. Recent
pine armed forces (AFP) de
country's second largest islan
rilla force that has very limi
is necessary to decisively al
the NPA's fighters are regu
panies and "oversized" plato
no backing from any sociali
Union all taking a hands-
significant quantities of the
Certainly, with its 250,000 t
and armor, the AFP dwarfs
Still, it is difficult to see how
and unreformable as it is -
sional army would find dif
sions, U.S. officials would d
he was defense minister: "
about a year or two to refo
out the bad ones. Now I'm c
The most effective weapon
its political message. The ap
gram of thoroughgoing lan
dominant U.S. military and
dent that the Aquino revol
the organized left is bound
attractive, well-organized b
unprofessional and unpopular
racy is a prescription for a
decade or longer- a war in
It is a conflict that can dra
commitment unless there i

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U.S. -Philippine Relations in the Aquino Era 693

policy. More than ever, there is a need for domestic

a domestic solution to the Philippine crisis.
The first peace talks in 1986 foundered partly because
cations and Aquino's refusal to discuss issues beyond
surrender and rehabilitation. But the main obstacle t
ical settlement was Washington's desire to crush the
the effect of strengthening the hand of those in the
tical about what the talks could achieve. The possibili
for national reconciliation still exists, however. Indeed
reopen peace talks by the Aquino government is likely
response from the NDF. But if new talks are to succe
Washington's disengagement from its dominant rol
political process.
Without U.S. advice and assistance, the AFP perhap
futility of seeking a military solution to a political pr
guarantee of U.S. backing for whatever it does, the
have to face the fact that social peace can only come
land reform and a fundamental redistribution of
Without the fallback offered by the U.S.-Philippine "
the Aquino administration will be forced to go back to t
tainhead of its legitimacy: the promise, not of elite dem
uine, substantive democracy.
Military Aid and Human Rights. With the end of
tions on aid to the Philippines, the flow of military
has grown from a trickle to a flood. From 1986 to 1
million worth of aid will have reached the Philippine
the United States funds over 80 percent of the AFP's
ment, operations, and maintenance.48 The bulk of t
of what one senior Pentagon official calls "move, sho
items," that is, lethal and support equipment intend
or counterinsurgency.49
Thus U.S. military assistance serves as a vital lifelin
that, as both Amnesty International and the Lawyers Co
Rights have claimed, is responsible for scores of ex
"salvagings." Though Aquino has denied that her go
ately violates human rights, she cannot escape respon
to create an atmosphere that encourages or condone
early 1987, she has repeatedly given militant backing
insurgency effort. Her support, in fact, reminds observe
blanket defense of his soldiers. In January 1988, for

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696 World Policy Journal

asserted that "all accusation

the military] have been sh
These circumstances make
Act relevant to the Philippi
gress in 1976, calls for the te
ment that "engages in a co
nationally recognized hum
applying this human right
Marcos in mind - to Aquino
massive violations of human
to prevent U.S. arms and ad
that, according to the Lawy
lated, beheaded, shot, and
Such strong action would n
presidency, Pentagon spok
Congress that reform and p
the corner. Instead of depo
tary assistance has had the
most powerful factions with
anteed income" from the U
from violating human righ
person Col. Honesto Isleta
year: "To heck with human
Cutting off U.S. aid would
tary within the ruling coali
opinion and pressure group
respect for human rights
for scarce funds would for
public for its behavior.
A New Deal on the Debt. I
a Marshall Plan, as bipartis
an end to the scandalous sp
opment are held hostage b
to pump $10 billion of aid
if nearly $20 billion is goin
vice payments- unless, of cou
see aid as part of the cash
Calls for substantial debt re
tries like the Philippines, but
chancellor Willy Brandt and

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U.S. -Philippine Relations in the Aquino Era 697

offers is more of the same: debt rescheduling in exch

tation of the structural reforms prescribed by the In
Fund (IMF). These austerity measures have already r
erosion of Philippine living standards. The U.S. Treasu
tinue to maintain an uncompromising position- beha
lection agencies - even as the banks themselves have b
Third World debt, selling it to corporate buyers for
to 85 cents to the dollar.
A Philippine debt relief program might take its cues
cial banks' devaluation of their Third World claims
Mexican debt repayment agreement, both of which
edge the debtor's capacity to pay. Congress can take t
the banks to reduce the debt to its current market v
half its nominal value.53 This would reduce the $15
U.S. and other foreign commercial banks to $7.5 bill
then urge the banks and the Philippine government
flexible scheme for repayment of the remaining $7
fixed, concessional interest rates, a protracted principal
and a ceiling on debt servicing established at, perhap
percent of the country's foreign exchange earnings.
of trust and confidence among the parties involved
sorely missing now- Congress might urge the banks
controversial $2.2 billion nuclear reactor loan, for if a
deserves repudiation it is this.
Undoubtedly, any genuine debt relief will involve some
mercial banks. But it is not unreasonable to expect th
responsibility for the poor judgment they exhibited
traditional financial criteria for creditworthiness were t
and replaced by naive trust in the superficial stability of
dictatorship.54 Furthermore, taking losses instead of dis
can lead to renewed business confidence in a bank, a
move to build up its loan-loss reserves demonstrates
As for the roughly $14 billion that the Philippines owe
IMF, and other official donors, Congress might also take
ing participants in the Paris Club, the principal offic
to write offa substantial portion- perhaps half- of the P
debt and work out a repayment package for the rem
one proposed for the private banks. Since multilater
agencies do not have to worry about reporting paper pro
this would encounter fewer obstacles. It would redu

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698 World Policy Journal

total foreign debt load to $

that the country is more c
Debt relief may be necessa
is not sufficient. Funds di
development if national in
that can absorb aid and eff
the moment, the Philippines
has prevented utilization of
already appropriated, accord
without socioeconomic ref
nomic aid to the Philippine
is precisely what happened
billion in bilateral and mult
year period while the numbe
less than 50 percent to som
Military Disengagement an
States is prepared to maintain
the wishes of its host - as it
regarded as an internationa
drawing its bases. Sooner r
the Philippine government
The bases treaty expires in
now of the decision not to
tage of defusing pressures
payments in the last 2 yea
is reportedly asking $1.2 billi
will fund the military.)
The Pentagon, in fact, has
redeployment of its forces
the Philippines.57 "There i
Bowen, "that the military fu
ities could be continued fro
Philippines and elsewhere h
a system of mobile bases, "
territorial waters but still
tainer ships to support specia
mission on Integrated Long
The problem with such sol
of bearing U.S military uni
the region and do little to re

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U.S. -Philippine Relations in the Aquino Era 699

aggressive "maritime strategy" which is regional in

quences. Besides, whether the navy is based at Subie
on Palau, the Philippines would still be well within
of U.S. interventionary forces. The resolution of the Ph
in other words, must take place within the framewo
U.S. strategy for the whole Western Pacific.
"The original justification for the maintenance of t
been extensively undermined," wrote George Kennan,
tainment, a decade ago. "The American response t
now exists should be, surely, the immediate, complete, r
less withdrawal of the facilities and equipment they
the Philippine government the real estate and only
prescription is even more relevant today than it was
ties on firm ground, Vietnam withdrawing from Ca
on economic reconstruction, and the Soviet Union sc
tary presence in the Pacific, the time is ripe for an a
ment and the military posture of aggressive forwa
An alternative posture would require a shift in per
of fearing and resisting the spread of neutralization
of the Pacific to viewing and supporting these aspir
that can undergird a new, harmonious political and
the area. Peace, relations of equality, and reliance on
to conflicts are the political preconditions for the fu
dynamic regional economic exchanges that have char
over the past two decades - and that continue to de
aggressive military policy and retaliatory economics foll
administration.
Withdrawing from the bases in the Philippines cou
first step in a process of regional military disengage
only promote regional peace but would also have a sa
troubled U.S. economy by reducing defense spending.
Asia-Pacific commitment accounts for about half the
Navy, two-thirds of the combat strength of the U.S
divisions, and several fighter wings of the U.S. Air Fo
nonproductive force of 330,000 soldiers costs US. taxpay
every year. It is estimated that the cost of maintain
umbrella over South Korea and Japan alone comes t
annually. Undoubtedly, the Asia-Pacific military com
greatly to what Paul Kennedy calls "imperial overstre
gap between infinite overseas commitments and finite d

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 700 World Policy Journal

The United States ought to

has decreased its military fo
matic engagement. The Sovi
with their offer to withdraw
withdraw from the Philippine
point Pacific peace plan ann
belied their old Cold War im
exchanges with the South Pa
established the South Pacific
gagement from military comp
deployment" of nuclear forc
sion in the Pacific.
The United States can either continue this course of unilateral milita-
rism and eventually alienate even its close allies, or it can accommodate
itself to the region's determination to eliminate superpower competition
and denuclearize the area. U.S. military disengagement from Subie and
Clark, coupled with stepped-up diplomatic engagement- for instance,
signing the Raratonga Treaty and formally pledging to respect nuclear-
ship bans in the Philippines, New Zealand, and Palau- would go a long
way toward building a more benign and mature order in the Pacific.

Notes

1 Ambassador Stephen Bosworth, "The Opposition: Uniting or Fragmenting ," cable to

Secretary of State George Shultz, February 1985.
2 Paul Wolfowitz, "Developments in the Philippines," statement to U.S. Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, October 30, 1985.
3 Michael Armacost, speech at Foreign Service Institute, Rosslyn, VA, April 23, 1986.
4 Ibid.
5 "Aquino Regime Nearly Toppled, U.S. Aides Say," New York Times, September 7, 1987.
6 Ibid.
7 See "Allegations of Coup Tie Irk Manila," a Washington Post report reproduced in the
San Jose Mercury News, October 27, 1987.
8 William Sullivan, remarks at conference on the Philippines sponsored by the
Washington Institute for Values in Public Policy, Washington, DC, April 30-May 1, 1986.
9 The term is borrowed from Richard Feinberg, The Intemperate Zone: The Third World
Challenge to U.S. Foreign Policy (New York: Norton, 1983).
10 Joseph Collins, "Cory's Broken Promise," Nation, November 14, 1987.
11 U.S. Department of State, "U.S. Policy Toward the Philippines," National Security
Study Directive, November 2, 1984. This document was leaked to the author by U.S. State
Department sources and later released to the press.
12 Smela Coronel, Aquino s Faustian Bargain, San Francisco Chronicle, July 27, 1988.

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U.S. -Philippine Relations in the Aquino Era 701

13 "Address of Her Excellency Corazón Aquino, President of t

pines, to the Joint Meeting of the United States Congress,"
of the Philippines Embassy, September 18, 1986).
14 National Democratic Front, "NDF Presents Proposal for 1
November 1, 1986.
15 Reports of continuing military conflict appeared in the
period. According to the February 1987 issue of the leftist
90 members of the NDF were killed and over 320 barrios were
tion and food blockades.
16 Richard Armitage, statement to U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, June 3,
1986.
17 "U.S. Wants Aquino to Toughen Stand on Insurgents, New York Times, Septem-
ber 1, 1986.
18 Richard Armitage, statement before U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee on
Asian and Pacific Affairs, March 17, 1987.
19 San Francisco Chronicle, March 23, 1987.
20 Karl Jackson, "Domestic and International Dynamics of the Philippines," unpublished
paper, pp. 55-56.
21 Ibid.
22 Claim made by Fidel Ramos, secretary of national defense, in "People's War for
Democracy," speech at Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC,
May 18, 1988.
23 John Healey, "Security Overkill in the Philippines," Los Angeles Times, May 3, 1988.
24 Seth Mydans, "Right-Wing Vigilantes Spread in the Philippines," New York Times,
April 4, 1987.
25 On the "private right's" support for the vigilantes, see New York Times, April 4, 1987,
and Douglas Cunningham, "Singlaub Recruits His Own Army in the Philippines,"
National Reporter, Vol. 10, No. 3 (Spring 1987).
26 R. G. Stilwell, statement to U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington,
DC, October 8, 1987.
27 Response to question posed by ben. Daniel Inouye at hearings ot the senate roreign
Operations Subcommittee, June 16, 1988.
28 See Sara Miles, The Real War: Low-Intensity Conflict in Central America," MALLA
Report 20, No. 2 (April-May 1986), p. 36.
29 For more on this subject, see Waiden Bello, David Kinley, and Elaine Elinson, Devel-
opment Debacle: The World Bank in the Philippines (San Francisco: Institute for Food
and Development Policy, 1987).
30 According to a U.S. Department of Justice suit. See Wall Street Journal, December
15, 1987. For a study of different aspects of the nuclear power project, see Waiden Bello,
Peter Hayes, and Lyuba Zarsky, 500-Mile Island: The Philippine Nuclear Reactor Deal
(Mountain View, CA: Pacific Studies Center, 1979).
31 Robin Broad and John Cavanagh, "Our Wrong-Way Foreign Aid," Los Angeles Times,
January 6, 1988.
32 Freedom from Debt Coalition, Questions and Answers on the Philippine Foreign Debt
(Quezon City: National Economic Protectionism Association, 1987), p. 7.
33 Jimmy Tadeo, head of the Philippine Peasant Movement, quoted in Philippine Land
Reform Measure Called a Hoax," San Francisco Chronicle, June 17, 1988.
34 For a longer analysis of the weaknesses of the agrarian reform law, see Waiden Bello,
"New Law Fosters Grand Illusion of Reform," Malaya (Manila), July 7 and 8, 1988. The
program could in fact bankrupt the government while benefiting the landlords: it is now
expected to cost $11.8 billion, a substantial part of which will go toward compensating
landlords. See "Land Reform Plan Will Cost Over $11 Billion," in Sing Tao International
(San Francisco), July 8, 1988.

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 702 World Policy Journal

35 Quoted in "Cory's Approval of L

June 8, 1988.
36 Quoted in "U.S. Is Optimistic o
37 See "Talks on Rases Snnr Defianre TnwarH U.S. " New Ynrk Times Tune 2V 1Q88
38 Ihid

39 "Paper Reports Survey About U.S. Bases," Manila Chronicle, July 11, 1988, reported
in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), Daily Report: East Asia, July 11, 1988.
40 "U.S. Facing Rising Tide of Nationalism, Philippine Daily Globe, June 2, 1988,
reported in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), Daily Report: East Asia,
June 3, 1988.
41 "Soviet Activity in Asia-Pacific Declining, Says Hayden," Singapore Straits Times,
April 13, 1988.
42 Fred Greene, ed., The Philippine Bases: Negotiating for the Future (New 'brk:
Council on Foreign Relations, 1988), p. 33.
43 "Aquino Can Let Bases Stay," Sing Tao International, July 21, 1988.
44 Proposal stated on the television program, Velez This Week, Channel 7, Manila, April
28, 1988.
45 See Carolyn Arguillas, "'Bad News' on 'Deep Penetration' Against NPA," Veritas,
April 3, 1986; also Romy Marinas, "Mindanao NPA Commander Discusses Anti-Penetra-
tion Efforts," We Forum, May 27-June 2, 1986.
46 Always eager to uncover Soviet- bloc aid to the NPA, the Pentagon can claim, at most,
that "there are unconfirmed foreign sources, possibly from North Korea or Vietnam."
Richard Armitage, "Situation in the Philippines," statement before U.S. House of
Representatives Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, March 17, 1987.
47 Quoted in Pam Belluck, "The Hamstrung Philippine Army," San Francisco Chronicle,
February 14, 1987.
48 Gaston Sigur, Jr., assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, statement
before U.S. House of Representatives Foreign Operations Subcommittee, March 30, 1988.
49 Recent shipments include refurbished Bell UH-1 helicopters; V-150 armed personnel
carriers; hundreds of trucks, grenade launchers, light machine guns; and spare parts for
aircraft and helicopters.
50 Quoted in Keith Richburg, Even Under Aquino, Washington Post National Weekly
Edition, June 20-26, 1988.
» Ibid.
52 Quoted in Healey (fn. 23).
53 See Broad and Cavanagh (fn. 31).
54 In an interview with the author on June 26, 1987, Lewis Coleman, Bank of America's
vice president for international lending, told me: "Authoritarian government structures
appealed to bank managers who, after all, came from an institution with basically
authoritarian structures. It was like dealing with somebody like a CEO at the other end
of the table. It was so attractive. People like Delfim Netto [of Brazil] came across as
standing for unifying the country, no politics, and stability. They were good CEOs."
55 Within 48 hours of Citicorp's decision to take a loss of $1 billion by setting up a $3
billion loan-loss reserve for its Third World loans, the bank's stock shot up by 10 percent.
"How to Take a $1 Billion Loss and Look Good," U.S. News and World Report, June 1,
1987, P. 46.
56 "Philippines Delay Is Causing $1 Billion in Aid to Languish," New York Times,
January 11, 1988.
57 Alva M. Bowen, Jr., "U.S. Facilities in the Philippines," in Greene (fn. 42).
58 Ibid.
59 Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy, Discriminate Deterrence
(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1988), p. 23.
60 George Kennan, Cloud of Danger (Boston: Little Brown, 1977), pp. 97-98.
61 Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (New York: Random House,
1987), pp. 514-535.

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