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FIRST DIVISION

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. Nos. 250951 and 2 0958

Plaintif.f-Appellee,
Present:

GESMUNDO, CJ.,
Chairperson,
- versus - HERNANDO,
ZALAivfEDA,
ROSARIO, and
MARQUEZ, JJ.

Promulgated:
HENRY M. GELACIO,
Accused-Appellant. - - ~ , ~~;
AUG 1 0 2022
x-----------------------------, '
v--' ---x

DECISION

GESMUNDO, C.J.:

This is an Appeal 1 from the April 29, 2019 Decision2 and the June 26,
2019 Resolution3 of the Sandiganbayan, Sixth Division (Sandiganbayah) in I

SB-15-CRM-0101-0102, finding Henry M. Gelacio (accused-appefant)

guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as ametlded,
I
and of Sec. 7(d) ofR.A. No. 6713, otherwise known as the Code of Co duct
and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees.

1
Rollo, pp. 38-4 I.
2 Id. at 4-37; penned by Associate Justice Kevin Narce B. Vivero and concurred in by Associate J stices
Sarah Jane T. Fernandez and Karl B. Miranda.
3
Id. at 160-163.
Decision 2 G.R. Nos. 250951 and 250958

Antecedents

Accused-appellant was the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator of

the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) in Region
XII, Kidapawan City. On April 28, 2015, two Informations 4 for violation of
Sec. 3(e) ofR.A. No. 3019 and for violation of Sec. 7(d) ofR.A. No. 6713,
were filed before the Sandiganbayan, docketed as SB-15-CRM-0101 and
SB-15-CRM-0102, respectively. He was accused of allegedly soliciting and
accepting, on separate occasions, the aggregate amount of Pl20,000.00 and
a whole tuna fish in consideration for his issuance of a temporary restraining
order (TRO) and writ of preliminary injunction (WPI) relative to a case
docketed as DARAB Case No. XII-990-SC-2007 (DARAB case) pending
before him.

The accusatory portion of SB-15-CRM-0101 for violation of Sec. 3(e)

ofR.A. No. 3019 reads:

That on five separate occasions during the period of 14 August to

19 November 2007, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in
Kidapawan City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court; accused HENRY MAGAWAY GELACIO, Regional Agrarian
Reform Adjudicator (SG-28) of the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board - Region XII, Kidapawan City did then and there,
wilfully, unlawfully, criminally and with evident bad faith, demand and
extort from Eduardito Garbo and the group of Miguel Egagamao, Marisa
Egagamao, Bebiano Egagamao, Zenona Egagamao, Saturnina Egagamao,
Dominador Egagamao, Lucia Egagamao, Celso Palado, Sr., Aniceto
Mejala, Jonathan Villegas, Herminigilda Garbo, Shirley Glodove and
Norberto Malubay as complainants in DARAB Case NO. Xll-990-SC-
2007 (Miguel Egagamao, et al. vs. DARBACI and Alfonso, et al.), the
total amount of ONE HUNDRED TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS
(!'120,000.00) and a whole tuna fish in exchange for the issuance in said
DARAB case of a Temporary Restraining Order and Injunction Order in
complainants' favor; for which reason said complainants were forced to
sell their farm animals, tools and materials at extremely low prices,
resulting in more difficult farming conditions and their children's inability
to continue attending school; thus causing undue injury to said
complainants in the amount of no less than !'120,000.00, and in undue
injury even to said DARAB case respondents DARBACI and Alfonso, et
al. whose rights and interests were compromised; to the damage and
prejudice of said parties.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 5

4
Id. at 5-6.
5 Id.at5.
Decision 3 G.R. Nos. 250951 and 25 958

On the other hand, the accusatory potion of SB-15-CRM-010 for

violation of Sec. 7(d) ofR.A. No. 6713 reads:

That on five separate occasions during the period of 14 August to

19 November 2007, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in
Kidapawan City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court; accused Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (SG-28) of the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board - Region XII,
Kidapawan City did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully, criminally solicit
and accept from Eduardito Garbo and the group of Miguel Egagamao,
Marisa Egagamao, Bebiano Egagamao, Zenona Egagamao, Saturnina
Egagamao, Dominador Egagamao, Lucia Egagamao, Celso Palado, Sr.,
Aniceto Mejala, Jonathan Villegas, Henninigilda Garbo, Shirley Glodove
and Norberto Malubay as complainants in DARAB Case NO. Xll-990-
SC-2007 (Miguel Egagamao, et al. vs. DARBACI and Alfonso, et al.), the
total amount of ONE HUNDRED TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS
(Pl20,000.00) and a whole tuna fish in the course of and in exchange for
the issuance in said DARAB case of a Temporary Restraining Order and
Injunction Order in complainants' favor.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 6

During arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to both

charges. Upon pre-trial, the parties entered into the following rel .vant
stipulations:

1. Accused-appellant was the Regional Agrarian Reform

Adjudicator of the DARAB, Region XII and concurrent
Adjudicator for the other provinces in said region: Sultan
Kudarat, North and South Cotabato and Maguindanao;

2. In 2007, the DARAB case was assigned to accused-

appellant for adjudication; and

3. A TRO and a WPI were issued in DARAB XII-990-SC-

2007.7

After pre-trial was terminated, trial on the merits ensued.

Version ofthe prosecution

The prosecution presented four witnesses: (1) Loi:na Nietes Gart i' the
Supervising Agrarian Reform Program Officer and designated Clerk o the

6
Id. at 6.
7
Id.
Decision 4 G.R. Nos. 250951 and 250958

DARAB, Office of the Provincial Adjudicator, who proved the existence of

the Complaint in the DARAB case and the issuance of the TRO and WPI in
the said case; (2) Atty. Johnny Landero (Atty. Landero), the counsel of
complainants in the DARAB case; (3) Herminigilda Garbo (Herminigilda),
the wife of private complainant and a co-complainant in the DARAB case;
and (4) Dominador Egagamao, a co-complainant in the DARAB case, who
testified that he contributed his money to come up with the amounts
demanded by accused-appellant in exchange for the issuance of the TRO and
WPI in the DARAB case. 8

Eduardito Garbo (private complainant) was unable to testify because

he died a few years after the filing of the criminal complaint against
accused-appellant. 9

From the collective testimonies of the witnesses, the prosecution

evidence tends to establish that a Complaint dated August 1, 2007 was filed
by several farmers, including Herminigilda, before the DARAB, docketed as
DARAB Case No. XII-990-SC-2007, entitled "Miguel Egagamao, et al. v.
DARBC, et al." and the case was assigned to accused-appellant. 10 According
to Atty. Landero, the farmers appointed private complainant to represent
them in the DARAB case although no Special Power of Attorney was
executed. 11

Atty. Landero testified that he was the counsel of the farmers in said
DARAB case. Upon filing of the complaint, Atty. Landero was advised by
the DARAB's receiving officer to meet with accused-appellant regarding the
issuance of provisional remedies prayed for in the complaint. According to
Atty. Landero, he and private complainant met with accused-appellant and,
after a short briefing of the case, private complainant informed Atty. Landero
of his intention to talk privately with accused-appellant. Thus, Atty. Landero
went out of accused-appellant's office and waited for his client. Afterwards,
private complainant narrated to Atty. Landero that accused-appellant asked
for cash amounting to P20,000.00 and that private complainant gave said
sum to accused-appellant. 12

Atty. Landero added that on September 13, 2007, private complainant

and his wife gave another !"20,000.00 to accused-appellant for the
immediate issuance of the TRO. On September 24, 2007, Atty. Landero
received a call from accused-appellant asking for private complainant to

8
Id. at 7-14.
9
Id. at 11.
10
Id. at 8.
11 Id. at II.
I
12
Id. at 8.
 Decision 5 G.R. Nos. 250951 and 25 958

meet him at a certain hotel. Atty. Landero agreed and drove his car to eet
private complainant outside the hotel. Atty. Landero, however, stayed ih the
car while private complainant went inside the hotel. When he came Tuack,
private co~plainant showed to Atty. Landero the draft TRO, informed! him
that he paid accused-appellant an additional 1'20,000.00, and that the atter
also requested for a tuna fish. 13

Later, Atty. Landero and private complainant went to the farmer's

house to obtain an ice box, and from there, proceeded to General Santo~ fish
port where private complainant bought a tuna fish. Thereafter, Atty. Landero
called accused-appellant to ask him where to deliver the fish. They deli✓ered
the fish to accused-appellant and the latter's driver assisted them in lo::Jding
the fish onto their pick-up truck. Subsequently, private complainant
informed Atty. Landero that accused-appellant had called to advise himl that
the TRO could be picked up in Kidapawan City. He also informed Atty.
I
Landero that he gave accused-appellant another f>20,000.00. Private
complainant obtained the injunction and told Atty. Landero "Mahal maJ hid
ka injunction oy [P]40,000 man" which meant "the price of the injunctir! n is
very high, it is worth [f>]40,000." 14

Atty. Landero further testified that every time there would !be a
meeting between private complainant and accused-appellant, the farmets in
the DARAB case would also hold a meeting to contribute money tb be
brought to accused-appellant. He apprised the Sandiganbayan that private
I
complainant died after two or three years from the filing of the case ag inst
accused-appellant. 15

Private complainant's wife, Herminigilda, recalled that she

accompanied her husband twice to Kidapawan City to give mone to
accused-appellant. On one incident, they gave f>20,000.00 to accJsed-
appellant's "body body" (assistant) as the latter was not in his office Jhen
they arrived. On the second incident, accused-appellant once again aske~ for
money, and Herminigilda took out an envelope containing f>20,0000.00 from
her brassiere and gave it to her husband who, in turn, handed it to accJsed-
appellant. Upon inquiry, accused-appellant confirmed that he received the
previous f>20,000.00 that the spouses handed to his assistant. 16

According to Herminigilda, the giving of money to accused-appellant

adversely affected the livelihood of the farmers in the DARAB case bec~use
they had to sell their cows, hogs, and sprayers. She even claimed tha she
13
Id. at 9.
14 Id. at 10-11.
15
Id. at 11.
16 Id. at 12.
Decision 6 G.R. Nos. 250951 and 250958

could no longer give money to her youngest son who was attending school.
While accompanying her husband, Herminigilda saw accused-appellant
many times but it was only private complainant who was able to talk to
him. 17

Version of the defense

On the other hand, the defense presented three witnesses: (1) accused-
appellant; (2) Bebiano Egagamao (Bebiano), one of the complainants in the
DARAB case and the brother of prosecution witness Dominador Egagamao;
and (3) Atty. Noli Lechonsito (Atty. Lechonsito), the Chief of the Legal
Division of the Department of Agrarian Reform in Cotabato City. The
defense testimonies were summarized as follows:

Accused-appellant denied all the charges against him, stating that

private complainant had filed a disbarment case against him before this
Court, which was dismissed for being inconclusive and unreliable. Bebiano
also testified that it was true that their group held meetings and contributed
money, but he claimed that it was given to Atty. Landero, their lawyer in the
DARAB case. Lastly, Atty. Lechonsito testified that he assisted private
complainant in drafting an affidavit of retraction of his accusations against
accused-appellant, which he filed with the Office of the Ombudsman
( Ombudsman ). 18

After the parties submitted their respective memoranda, the case was
submitted for resolution by the Sandiganbayan.

Sandiganbayan Ruling

In its Decision dated April 29, 2019, the Sandiganbayan found

accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged, the
dispositive portion of which, reads:

WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, [judgment] is hereby

rendered as follows:

(1) In Criminal Case No. SB-15-CRM-0101, the Court finds

Henry Magaway Gelacio GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, and is hereby
sentenced to suffer the following penalties: (a) imprisonment

17
18
Id. at 12-13.
Id. at 14-17.
I

i
 Decision 7 G.R. Nos. 250951 and 250, 58

for six (6) years and one (1) month, as minimum, to eight (8)
years, as maximum; and (b) perpetual disqualification from
public office.

(2) In Criminal Case No. SB-15-CRM-0102, the Court finds

Henry Magaway Gelacio GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
violation of Section 7(d) of R.A. No. 6713 and is hereby
sentenced to suffer the following penalties: (a) imprisonment
from one (1) year and one (1) day, as minimum, to five (5)
years, as maximum; (b) fine of Five Thousand Pesos
(PhP5,000.00); and disqualification to hold public office.

SO ORDERED. 19

The Sandiganbayan held that all the elements of the crimes ch ged
were satisfactorily established and that accused-appellant's defense of d6nial
was sweeping and self-serving, which cannot prevail over the direct and I

positive testimonies of the prosecution's witnesses. The Sandiganbayan

focused and lent evidentiary weight on the testimonies of Atty. Landero! and
Herminigilda. According to the Sandiganbayan, Atty. Landero positifely
testified on the delivery of the tuna fish that was requested by acc1':ed-
appellant as he had personal knowledge of the incident, and that he caneµ up
accused-appellant directly on where to deliver the fish. Meanwhile,
Herminigilda was a direct witness to the giving by private complainarit of
the money to accused-appellant in his office. The Sandiganbayan didl not
give credence to the alleged affidavit of retraction executed by prirate
complainant because the same was not offered in evidence; and also, that
affidavits of desistance are looked upon with disfavor. The Sandiganbfyan
concluded that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are sufficier to
convict accused-appellant even without the testimony of pri ate
complainant. 20

Accused-appellant filed a motion for reconsideration but it was de ied

in the June 26, 2019 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan.

Later, accused-appellant filed a Notice of Appeal21 with the

Sandiganbayan, which was, however, dismissed in a Minute Resol tion
dated September 4, 2019 for lack of proof of payment of the nece8fary
appellate docket and other lawful fees. Accused-appellant filef a
manifestation and motion for reconsideration of the September 4, 4019
Minute Resolution. The Sandiganbayan granted accused-appelljnt'.s
manifestation and motion for reconsideration and gave due course t his

19
Id. at 36.
20 Id. at 20-36. I
,
21 Id. at 38-41.
Decision 8 G.R. Nos. 250951 and 250958

notice of appeal via its January 10, 2020 Resolution. 22 The dispositive
portion of said resolution states:

WHEREFORE, the Court resolves as follows:

a. Accused Gelacio's Motion for Leave ofCourt is NOTED[;]

b. Accused Gelacio's Motion for Reconsideration is GRANTED.
The Resolution dated September 4, 2019 is reversed and set
aside;
c. The Division Clerk of Court is directed to accept the belated
payment of the appellate and legal fees; and,
d. Accused Gelacio' s appeal is given due course. The Division
Clerk of Court is directed to elevate the records of this case to
the Supreme Court.

SO ORDERED. 23

Hence, this appeal.

Issues

Accused-appellant raises the following assignment of errors:

I. WHETHER THE SANDIGANBAYAN COMMITTED

ERROR WHEN IT RELIED ON HEARSAY EVIDENCE
IN ASCERTAINING THE EXISTENCE OF THE
ELEMENTS OF THE CRIMES; AND WHEN IT FOLTND
ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE CRIMES
DESPITE GRAVE DOUBT ON THE IDENTITY OF THE
PERSON, WHO SUPPOSEDLY SOLICITED/ACCEPTED
GIFTS FROM PLAINTIFFS IN DARAB CASE NO. XII-
990-SC-2007; AND THE COMMISSION OF THE
CRIMINAL OFFENSES CHARGED.

II. WHETHER THE SANDIGANBAYAN COMMITTED

ERROR WHEN IT FAILED TO APPRECIATE THAT THE
PROSECUTION HAD COME TO COURT WITH
UNCLEAN HANDS, HAVING PROSECUTED
ACCUSED-APPELLANT TO THE EXCLUSION OF
PRIVATE COMPLAINANT AND HIS WITNESSES IN

22 Id. at 42-58.
23
Id. at 58.
Decision 9 G.R. Nos. 250951 and 25 958

VIOLATION OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT'S RIGHT TO

EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS. 24

In his Brief,25 accused-appellant argues that his conviction was erely

anchored on hearsay evidence because private complainant failed to testify,
and that the prosecution witnesses' testimonies were based only of the
representations made by other parties and were laced with inconsistencies.
Further, accused-appellant contends that positive identification waJ not
proven as private complainant, who passed away, was the "fixer. j• He
maintains that none of the other witnesses actually saw accused-appellant
accepting the corruption money. He theorizes that private complainant Jould
have pocketed the money himself, casting grave doubt as to wheth!r he
indeed committed the crimes charged. Accused-appellant also points ouf that
private complainant had previously filed multiple cases against him and that
he had been cleared of professional misconduct by this Court. Fifally,
accused-appellant submits that the prosecution had come to the court with I

unclean hands as private complainant and his witnesses expressly a itted

corrupting or attempting to corrupt accused-appellant. 26

The People of the Philippines, represented by the Ombud, man

I
through the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), also filed its Brief. 2 The
OSP counters that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were not
hearsay evidence as said witnesses have personal knowledge of the fabltual
circumstances they narrated before the Sandiganbayan. Further, the
statements were consistent with private complainant's written manifestation,
the due execution and preparation thereof being affirmed by Atty. LanB.ero,
who assisted him in its preparation. The OSP also argues that the evidence
adduced by the prosecution clearly and succinctly established al~ ~he
elements of both crimes. Finally, the OSP underscores that the max.rm
"coming to court with unclean hands" applies only to justice and equi6, in
settling civil rights and obligations between two litigants. 28

In his Reply Brief,29 accused-appellant highlights that the OSP's rief

was belatedly filed or filed 58 days late, and hence, should be treated as a
mere scrap ofpaper. 30

24
Id. at 87-88.
25
Id. at 74-125.
26 Id. at 88-121.
27 Id. at 188-209.
28 Id. at 200-202.
29
Id. at 215-221.
30
Id. at 216.
Decision 10 G.R. Nos. 250951 and 250958

The Court's Ruling

The appeal is partly meritorious.

Violation of Sec. 3 (e) of R.A.

No. 3019

Accused-appellant was charged with violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A.

No. 3019, which reads:

Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts

or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the
following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are
hereby declared to be unlawful:

xxxx

(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the

Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative or
judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and
employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of
licenses or permits or other concessions.

To sustain a conviction under the said provision, the prosecution must

sufficiently establish the following elements:

(1) the offender is a public officer;

(2) the act was done in the discharge of the public officer's official,
administrative or judicial functions;

(3) the act was done through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or
gross inexcusable negligence; and

(4) the public officer caused any undue injury to any party, including the
Government, or gave any unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference. 31

On the first and second elements, there is no doubt that accused-

appellant is a public officer as he himself admitted and as established in the
pre-trial stipulations. It is also clear that the complained acts of accused-
31 People v. Pallasigue, G.R. Nos. 248653-54, July 14, 2021.
Decision 11 G.R. Nos. 250951 and 2 0958

,ppell~t w~e disch,,.ed ID oomo=ee with his official ~d Ji,i,I

functions as the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator of the DARAB.
Hence, he had the authority to issue the TRO and the WPI that were n1 eded
1

by the complainants.

Anent the third element, jurisprudence has established that the offense
under Sec. 3(e) may be committed in three ways. There is mailiifest
partiality when there is a clear, notorious, or plain inclination or predildction
to favor one side or person rather than another. "Partiality" is synonyinous
with "bias" which "excites a disposition to see and report matters as tho/ are
wished for rather than as they are." In Martel v. People32 (Martel), the <Court
explained that under Sec. 3(e) ofR.A. No. 3019, manifest partiality is if the
nature of dolo. Hence, it must be proven that the offender had maliciou and
deliberate intent to bestow unwarranted partiality in favor of another.

Evident bad faith, on the other hand, pertains to bad judgment as well
as palpably and patently fraudulent and dishonest purpose to do oral
obliquity or conscious wrongdoing for some perverse or ill will. In Mhrtel,
the Court expounds that evident bad faith "does not simply connot9 bad
judgment or negligence" but of having a "palpably and patently fraudflent
and dishonest purpose to do moral obliquity or conscious wrongdoing for
some perverse motive or ill will. It contemplates a state of tnind
affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive or self- I

interest or ill will or for ulterior purposes." 33 In Martel, it was emphasized

that the presence of evident bad faith requires that the accused acted th a
malicious motive or intent, or ill will. It is not enough that the ac1used
'f
violated a provision of law or that the provision of law violated is dear,
unmistakable, and elementary. To constitute evident bad faith, it
34
t be mur
1

proven that the accused acted with fraudulent intent.

Meanwhile, gross inexcusable negligence is that negligence

characterized by the want of even the slightest care, acting or omitting ~o act
in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but wilfulli and
intentionally, with conscious indifference to consequences insofar as 'bther
persons may be affected. 35

From here, it must be pointed out that finding~ of fact of the

Sandiganbayan, as a trial court, are accorded great weight and respect,
especially on the assessment or appreciation of the testimonies of

32 G.R. Nos. 224720-23 & 224765-68, February 2, 2021.

33 Id.
'• Jct.
35 Sabaldan, Jr. v. Office of the Ombudsman/or Mindanao, G.R. No. 238014, June 15, 2020.
I
Decision 12 G.R. Nos. 250951 and 250958

witnesses. 36 This is more so when there is nothing to show that the ruling of
the court was tainted with malice or bad faith. Hence, the findings of fact are
binding and conclusive on this Court in the absence of a showing that they
come under the established exceptions. 37

In light of this, the Court's review of the records of the case shows
that accused-appellant committed manifest partiality and evident bad faith,
which resulted in causing undue injury to private complainant and the
farmers in the DARAB case, by draining their resources to secure the TRO.

There was manifest partiality when accused-appellant, instead of

issuing the provisional remedies based on the merits of the case, expedited
the issuance of the TRO prayed for in private complainant's DARAB case in
consideration of monetary and non-monetary gifts. As mentioned, manifest
partiality occurs "when there is a clear, notorious or plain inclination or
predilection to favor one side or person rather than another." 38 The Court is
convinced that accused-appellant had malicious and deliberate intent to
cause undue injury, through manifest partiality, to private complainant in the
issuance of the TRO.

In this case, accused-appellant inappropriately met with private

complainant several times for purposes of discussing the latter's case,
facilitated the immediate release of the TRO for several considerations, and
released a copy of the TRO to a private person instead of issuing the same in
due course of a proper proceeding. These acts show a clear malicious
inclination on the part of accused-appellant to violate the law by giving
undue preference to private complainant in exchange for monetary and non-
monetary considerations.

Further, there was evident bad faith on accused-appellant's acts of

soliciting and accepting money and a tuna fish from private complainant.
Accused-appellant, as a public official, knew all too well that he was
violating the laws against solicitation and acceptance of gifts of public
officials and employees. The acts of privately meeting private complainant,
soliciting money and a tuna fish, and issuing a provisional remedy for
consideration are clear acts done for a dishonest purpose, self-interest, and ill
will. There is nothing that will justify the acts of accused-appellant in
accepting monetary and non-monetary considerations in exchange of a
favorable action in the administrative case he was officially presiding.

36 Office ofthe Court Administrator v. Amor, A.M. No. RTJ-00-1535, November 10, 2020.
37
38
Balderama v. People, 566 Phil. 412, 420 (2008).
Martel v. People, supra note 32. I
~
J
 Decision 13 G.R. Nos. 250951 and 2 0958

While private complainant had died before he was able to testify

before the Sandiganbayan, the prosecution was still able to present bther
witnesses who had direct knowledge of the acts committed by acciksed-
appellant, particularly, the acceptance of the money and the tuna fiJh in
exchange for a favorable action in the administrative case beford the
DARAB. Herminigilda testified that she accompanied her husband, private
complainant, twice to Kidapawan City to give money to accused-appellant.
On the first incident, they gave i"20,000.00 to accused-appellant's assiJtant.
On the second incident, accused-appellant once again asked for moneyJ and
Herminigilda handed an envelope containing P20,0000.00 to her hus!:land,
who in tum, gave it to accused-appellant. 39 On the other hand, Atty. Laridero
had personal knowledge that he and private complainant proceede~ to
General Santos fish port to buy tuna fish and he witnessed the fish 1:leing
delivered to accused-appellant. 40 These established facts clearly demonsb-ate
the manifest partiality and evident bad faith committed by ace sed- 1

appellant.

Finally, on the fourth element, there are two ways by which Sec. 3(e)
ofR.A. No. 3019 may be violated, to wit: (1) by causing undue injury ta any
party, including the government; or (2) by giving any private party any
unwarranted benefit, advantage, or preference. 41

In Giangan v. People, 42 the Court defined "causing undue inju "as

causing actual injury or damage. The word "undue" means "more ~han
necessary, not proper, or illegal" while "injury" means "any wrong or
damage done to another, either in his person, rights, reputation or propfrty;
the invasion of any legally protected interest of another." Hence, aq:tual
damage in the context of these definitions is akin to that in civil law. 4i On
the other hand, giving any party unwarranted benefit, advantagci or
preference in the discharge of his or her functions means giving a gai of
any kind without justification or adequate reasons. 44

In this case, the undue injury was brought about when accused-
appellant solicited and accepted money and a tuna fish from private
complainant in exchange for the issuance of a TRO. T?is, in tun:-, force1 the
latter and the farmers in the DARAB case to sell therr farm animals, tIDols,
and materials to raise the funds demanded by accused-appellant, whic1 led
to more difficult farming conditions. 45 Atty. Landero even stated that e ery

39
Rollo, pp. 8-13.
40
Id. at 9- l 0.
41 Montejo v. People, G.R. Nos. 248086-93 & 248702-09, June 28, 2021.
42 767 Phil. 738 (2015).
43 Id. at 746, citing Pecha" Sandiganbayan, 308 Phil. 120, 140 (I 994).
44 Bacasmas v. Sandiganbayan, 713 Phil. 639,663 (2013). I
45 Rollo, pp. 12-14, 27, and 30.
Decision 14 G.R. Nos. 250951 and 250958

time there would be a meeting between private complainant and accused-

appellant, the farmers in the DARAB case would also conduct a meeting to
contribute money to be brought to accused-appellant. 46 As attested by
Herminigilda, the giving of money to accused-appellant caused a big effect
on the livelihood of the farmers in the DARAB case. 47

Private complainant should have received a fair trial in the DARAB

case without resorting to giving accused-appellant monetary and' non-
monetary gifts. However, due to the nefarious solicitations of accused-
appellant, private complainant had to expend additional and unnecessary
personal funds to secure a TRO from the DARAB. Indubitably, the acts of
accused-appellant, through manifest partiality and evident bad faith, caused
undue injury to private complainant.

Public officials and employees are expected to perform their duties

without expecting or demanding anything in return. In the same vein,
accused-appellant, in his capacity as the Regional Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator of the DARAB, is expected to have the cold neutrality of an
impartial judge and to serve the public with utmost responsibility, integrity,
loyalty, and efficiency. 48

Violation of Sec. 7(d) of R.A.

No. 6713

Accused-appellant was also charged with violation of Sec. 7(d) of

R.A. No. 6713, which reads:

Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. - In addition to acts

and omissions of public officials and employees now prescribed in the
Constitution and existing laws, the following shall constitute prohibited
acts and transactions of any public official and employee and are hereby
declared to be unlawful:

xxxx

(d) Solicitation or acceptance of gifts. - Public officials and

employees shall not solicit or accept, directly or indirectly, any gift,
gratuity, favor, entertainment, loan or anything of monetary value from
any person in the course of their official duties or in connection with any
operation being regulated by, or any transaction which may be affected by
the functions of their office .

46
Id. at 11.
47
Id. at 12-13.
48 CONSTITUTION, Article XI, Sec. I.
 Decision 15 G.R. Nos. 250951 and 2 . 0958

To sustain a conviction under the said provision, the prosecution must

sufficiently establish the following elements:

(a) that the accused is a public official or employee;

(b) that the accused solicited or accepted any loan or anything

of monetary value from any person; and

(c) that the said act was done in the course of the accused's
official duties or in connection with any operation being
regulated by, or any transaction which may be affected by
the functions of his office. 49

However, it must be pointed out that Sec. ll(a) of R.A. No. 6713
provides that if the violation under R.A. No. 6713 is punishable by a hekvier
penalty under another law, then the offender shall be prosecuted undei the
said statute. The provision states:

SECTION 11. Penalties. - (a) Any public official or employee,

regardless of whe1her or not he holds office or employment in a casual,
temporary, holdover, permanent or regular capacity, committing any
violation of thls Act shall be punished wi1h a fine not exceeding 1he
equivalent of six ( 6) months' salary or suspension not exceeding one (I)
year, or removal depending on the gravity of the offense after due notice
and hearing by the appropriate body or agency. If the violation is
punishable by a heavier penalty under another law, he shall be
prosecuted under the latter statute. Violations of Sections 7, 8 or 9 of
this Act shall be punishable with imprisonment not exceeding five (5)
years, or a fine not exceeding five thousand pesos (P5,000), or both, and,
in 1he discretion of 1he court of competent jurisdiction, disqualification to
hold public office. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Verily, the statutory provision clearly states that if the violati n of

1
R.A. No. 6713 is punishable by a heavier penalty under another law, the
offender shall be prosecuted under the latter statute. The use of the iord
"shall" in a statute or rule expresses what is mandatory and compul~ory,
hence, the obligatory language of Sec. ll(a) of R.A. No. 6713 should ave
been observed and followed by the Sandiganbayan.50

The Senate deliberations on Senate Bill No. 139, which eventttally

became R.A. No. 6713, show that the lawmakers intended to proscribe two

49
Malicse-Hilaria v. Reyes, G.R. No. 251680, November 17, 2021.
50 See People v. Pa/aria, G.R. Nos. 243547-48, June 16, 2021.
Decision 16 G.R. Nos. 250951 and 250958

or more prosecutions for violations ofR.A. No. 6713 and of the other laws
with similar provisions, to wit:

SENATOR GONZALES - Mr. President, some of the acts or

omissions which are punishable under this bill are somehow covered
already by the provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and
also the Revised Penal Code.

Is it my understanding then that a conviction or acquittal, and

in a prosecution for violation of any of this provision would constitute
a bar to another prosecution for the same offense punishable under
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices or the Revised Penal Code?

SENATOR SAGUISAG. I believe that this is a fair statement

of my own personal opinion. 51 (Emphases supplied)

Thus, it is clear from the Senate deliberations that the lawmakers

agreed that an accused may not be prosecuted twice for violation of
R.A. No. 6713 and other laws, especially if the violation of other laws
imposes a higher penalty, as in this case. 52 Consequently, Sec. ll(a) ofR.A.
No. 6713 reflects that if the violation under R.A. No. 6713 is punishable by
a heavier penalty under another law, the offender shall be prosecuted under
the latter statute.

In this case, the Sandiganbayan should not have allowed accused-

appellant to be prosecuted for both Sec. 3(e) ofR.A. No. 3019 and Sec. 7(d)
ofR.A. No. 6713 in view of the mandatory import of Sec. ll(a) ofR.A. No.
6713. The Court notes that accused-appellant was charged under two
separate Informations - one for Sec. 3(e) ofR.A. No. 3019 and one for Sec.
7(d) of R.A. No. 6713 - which allege substantially the same facts and are
identical to the other.

In summary, the Information for violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No.

3019 reads in part:

That on five separate occasions x x x accused x x x wilfully,

unlawfully, criminally and with evident bad faith, demand and extort
from Eduardito Garbo and the group xx x in DARAB Case NO. XII-
990-SC-2007 x x x the total a.mount of ONE HUNDRED TWENTY
THOUSAND PESOS ("1'120,000.00) and a whole tuna fish in exchange
for the issuance in said DARt\B case of a Temporary Restraining

Senate Deliberations in Senate Bill No. 139 (Second Reading); see People v. Perez, G.R. No. 198303,

/
51

May 3, 2021.
52 id.

IP
 Decision 17 G.R. Nos. 250951 and 50958

Order and Injunction Order in complainants' favor xx x. 53 (Emphase

supplied)

On the other hand, the Information for violation of Sec. 7(d) ofR.A.
No. 6713, states:

That on five separate occasions x x x accused x x x wilfully,

unlawfully, criminally solicit and accept from Eduardito Garbo and th
group x x x in DARAB Case NO. XII-990-SC-2007 x x x the total
amount of ONE HUNDRED TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS
(1"120,000.00) and a whole tuna fish in the course of and in exchange
for the issuance in said DARAB case of a Temporary Restraining
Order and Injunction Order in complainants' favor. 54 (Emphases
supplied)

A comparison of the two readily shows that both violations con ist of
the same acts, i.e., the extortion or solicitation from private complaiJant of
the total amount of Pl20,000.00 and a whole tuna fish in exchan e for 1

provisional remedies in private complainant's favor.

Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 penalizes a public officer who ,auses
undue injury to any party by giving unwarranted benefits or advankages,
while Sec. 7(d) of R.A. No. 6713 penalizes a public official solicitfug or
I
accepting any gifts or anything of monetary value in connection with any
I
operation or transaction which may be affected by the functions o~ their
office. In this case, accused-appellant was found guilty of comrriitting
manifest partiality and evident bad faith which resulted in undue injk to
the private complainant. As already discussed, manifest partialit;t and
evident bad faith were proven when accused-appellant extorted./sol~cited
monetary and non-monetary gifts to issue the provisional reliefs in private
complainant's favor. These same acts of the offender are used as ba~is to
prosecute accused-appellant for the identical violation of Sec. 7(d) o~ R.A.
No. 6713. Evidently, both laws essentially penalize the same violatilbn of
accused-appellant. -

Again, if the violation under R.A. No. 6713 is punishable by ah avier 1

penalty under another law, such as Sec. 3(e) ofR.A. No. 3019, the ofljender
shall be prosecuted under the latter statute. The prescribed penaley for
violation of Sec. 3(e) in R.A. No. 3019 is imprisonment of not less thln six
1
(6) years and one (1) month nor more than 15 years; 55 while violation o Sec.

53
Rollo, p. 5.
54 Id. at 6.
55
Sec. 2, Batas Pambansa Big. 195, entitled "AN ACT AMENDING SECTIONS EIGHT, NINE, TEN, EVEN,
AND THIRTEEN OF REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED THIRTY HUNDRED AND NINETEEN, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE
ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT." Approved: March 16, 1982.
Decision 18 G.R. Nos. 250951 and 250958

7(d) in R.A. No. 6713 prescribes the penalty of imprisonment not exceeding
five (5) years or a fine not exceeding P5,000.00, or both. 56 As Sec. 3(e) of
R.A. No. 3019 prescribes a heavier penalty, accused-appellant may only be
prosecuted under the said law. The criminal charge against accused-appellant
for violation of Sec. 7(d) in R.A. No. 6713 should be dismissed. He must be
acquitted of that particular charge.

It a well-entrenched rule that penal laws are to be construed strictly

against the State and liberally in favor of the accused. 57 Hence, as mandated
by Sec. ll(a) of R.A. No. 6713, accused-appellant shall only be prosecuted
for violation of Sec. 3(e) ofR.A. No. 3019, the offense with the heavier
prescribed penalty.

Hearsay evidence

The Court delves into the issue of alleged hearsay evidence in

ascertaining the existence of the elements of the crimes. It is a basic rule
in evidence that a witness can testify only on the facts that are of his own
personal knowledge, i.e., those which are derived from his own perception.
Hence, a witness may not testify on what he merely learned, read or heard
from others because such testimony is considered hearsay and may not be
received as proof of the truth of what he has learned, read or heard. 58 Thus,
the general rule is that hearsay evidence is not admissible.

In the present case, the Sandiganbayan, in its decision, outlined the

testimonies which it did not consider being hearsay evidence. Nevertheless,
even if these hearsay testimonies were set aside, the remaining pieces of
evidence would still be sufficient to establish the guilt of accused-appellant
for the crimes charged beyond reasonable doubt.

Notably, most of the testimonies of Atty. Landero and Herminigilda

were all drawn from their own personal knowledge. Atty. Landero was the
one who called accused-appellant directly and delivered the fish to him
personally. 59 Meanwhile, Herminigilda had accompanied her husband to see
accused-appellant and was the one who carried the money for safekeeping
before handing it over to accused-appellant's assistant. She also witnessed
60
private complainant handing another sum of money to accused-appellant.
These testimonies were all taken from their own perception, the parties

56 Sec. JI, R.A. No. 6713.

57 People v. Sul/ano, 827 Phil. 613,625 (2018).
58 People v. Carino, G.R. No. 234155, March 25, 2019, 898 SCRA 326, 345.
59
Rollo, pp. 7-14.
60 Id.
(
ti
Decision 19 G.R. Nos. 250951 and 350958

being present during those incidents. Accordingly, even thougl the

Sandiganbayan completely disregarded private complainant's affidavit! as he
was not presented as a witness, there was still sufficient, competenl and
convincing evidence to convict accused-appellant of the crimes charged.
I

Finally, accused-appellant's assertion that the prosecution had c+e to

court with unclean hands deserves scant consideration. It is understood that
the legal doctrine is a maxim of equity upon which: (1) he who seeks 6quity
must do equity, and (2) he who comes into equity must come with clean
hands. 61 The general principle is that he who comes into equity must come
with clean hands applies only to plaintiff's conduct in relation to the very
matter in litigation. The judicial process is sacred and is meant to ptotect
only those who are innocent. 62 It would certainly be unwarranted to ~llow
accused-appellant, who solicited money for the release of the proviJional
reliefs, to escape criminal liability simply because of this legal mhxim.
Equity does not apply to a situation when fraud and dilatory schemes e~st. 63
II

Proper penalty !

As stated earlier, accused-appellant was charged under two seJarate

Informations. Notably, the Informations charging accused-appell341t of
violations under Sec. 3(e) ofR.A. No. 3019 and Sec. 7(d) ofR.A. No. 16713
allege substantially the same facts and are identical to each other. Pursuant to
Sec. ll(a) of R.A. No. 6713, accused-appellant should only be prosebuted
under Sec. 3(e) ofR.A. No. 3019. I

The prescribed penalty for violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3 119 is
found in Sec. 9 thereof, which states:

Section 9. Penalties for violations. (a) Any public officer or private

person committing any of the unlawful acts or omissions enumerated in
Sections 3, 4, S and 6 of this Act shall be punished with imprisonment for
not less than six years and one month nor more than fifteen years,
perpetual disq'!alification from public office, and confiscation or forfeiture
in favor of the Government of any prohibited interest and unexplained
wealth manifestly out of proportion to his salary and other lawful income.

Vitugv. Abuda, 776 Phil. 540,571 (2016).

I
61

62 ANGKLA: Ang Partido ng mga Pilipinong Marino, Inc. v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 24 6316,
September 15, 2020.
63Ramnani v. Court ofAppeals, 413 Phil. 194, 208 (200 I). 1
Decision 20 G.R. Nos. 250951 and 250958

Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, 64 the penalty shall not be

less than the minimum term nor exceed the maximum term fixed by the
law. 65 Accordingly, the penalties imposed by the Sandiganbayan, which are
imprisonment for six (6) years and one (1) month, as minimum, to eight (8)
years, as maximum, and perpetual disqualification from holding public
office, 66 are within range of the penalty prescribed by law.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The April

29, 2019 Decision and the June 26, 2019 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan
are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS as follows:

1. In SB-15-CRM-0 101, accused-appellant Henry M. Gelacio is

found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section
3{e) of Republic Act No. 3019, and is hereby SENTENCED to
suffer the penalty of imprisonment for six (6) years and one (1)
month, as minimum, to eight (8) years, as maximum. He is also
perpetually disqualified to hold public office.

2. In SB-15-CRM-0102, accused-appellant Henry M. Gelacio ts

ACQUITTED of the charge of violation of Section 7(d) of
Republic Act No. 6713.

SO ORDERED.

64 Act No. 4103 (As Amended by Act No. 4225 and Republic Act No. 4203 [June 19, 1965]), entitled "AN
ACT TO PROVIDE FOR AN INDETERMINATE SENTENCE ANO PAROLE FOR ALL PERSONS CONVICTED OF
CERTAIN CRIMES BY THE COURTS OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS; TO CREATE A BOARD OF INDETERMINATE
SENTENCE AND TO PROVIDE FUNDS THEREFOR; AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES." Approved: December 5, 1933.
65 Sarion v. People, G.R. Nos. 243029-30, March I 8, 2021.
66 Umpa v. People, G.R. Nos. 246265-66, March 15, 2021.
. .

Decision 21 G.R Nos. 250951 and 250958

WE CONCUR:

Associate Justice

RICA.-rY
A sociate Justice

J
@ ~~- IDAS P. MARQUEZ
ociate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certifY that

the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consu~tation
before the cases were assigned to the writer of the opinion of the ourt's
I

Division.

AL~~-GE
/ r~;Justice