Public Diplomacy and The Implementation of Foreign Policy in The Us, Sweden and Turkey

PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF FOREIGN POLICY

IN THE US, SWEDEN AND TURKEY
Efe Sevin
Palgrave Macmillan Series in

GLOBAL PUBLIC
DIPLOMACY
Palgrave Macmillan Series in Global Public
Diplomacy
Series Editors
Philip Seib
University of Southern California
Pasadena, USA
Kathy Fitzpatrick
American University
Washington, DC, USA
Aim of the Series
At no time in history has public diplomacy played a more significant role in
world affairs and international relations. As a result, global interest in pub-
lic diplomacy has escalated, creating a substantial academic and professional
audience for new works in the field. The Global Public Diplomacy Series
examines theory and practice in public diplomacy from a global perspec-
tive, looking closely at public diplomacy concepts, policies, and practices in
various regions of the world. The purpose is to enhance understanding of
the importance of public diplomacy, to advance public diplomacy thinking,
and to contribute to improved public diplomacy practices.
More information about this series at

http://www.springer.com/series/14680
Efe Sevin
Public Diplomacy and

the Implementation of
Foreign Policy in the
US, Sweden and
Turkey
Efe Sevin
Faculty of Economic and Social Sciences
University of Fribourg
Fribourg, Switzerland
Palgrave Macmillan Series in Global Public Diplomacy

ISBN 978-3-319-49333-6 ISBN 978-3-319-49334-3 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-49334-3
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To Hamato Yoshi
Acknowledgments
This book would not have been possible without the support of many
people who have helped me over the last couple years in many ways.
First and foremost, I would like to thank my cosupervisors during my
time at American University, Dr. Craig Hayden and Dr. Rhonda Zaharna.
The opportunity to work with you was the main reason for me to choose
American University for my doctoral studies, and looking back at the last
four years, I am glad to say I made the right choice. Dr. Hayden, thank
you for your continuous support throughout my dissertation process and
my doctoral studies. Dr. Zaharna, thank you for all your advice on my
research and my academic career. I will forever be indebted to both of you
for your tremendous investment in my training to become a better scholar,
writer and public diplomacy advocate. Dr. Robert Kelley, thank you for
serving on my committee, for your feedback and for your help in develop-
ing a comparative framework for my study. I would like to extend my grati-
tude to Prof. Phil Seib and Prof. Kathy Fitzpatrick, the editors for Palgrave
MacMillan Series in Global Public Diplomacy, for their invaluable feedback
while I was trying to create a book manuscript from a dissertation study.
Several academics have played an important role in shaping this research.
Bruce Gregory of George Washington University, thank you for taking the
time to meet with me and discuss the nature of public diplomacy. James
Pamment of University of Lundt, thank you for your feedback on my
research design and for helping me understand Swedish public diplomacy.
Dr. Gregory Payne of Emerson College, thank you for introducing me to
the concept of public diplomacy back when I was a graduate student at
Emerson College.
vii
viii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
One last academic tack så mycket goes to the esteemed faculty and doc-
toral students at the Stockholm University. PO Berg, thank you for invit-
ing me as a visiting researcher to your department. Jacob Östberg, thank
you for hosting me once again at your department. And Anders Parment,
Ian Richardson, Andrea Lucarelli, Massimo Giovanardi, Danilo Brozović,
Christofer Pihl, Luigi Servadio, Alisa Minia, Anna Ehngage, Maíra Lopes,
Azadeh Kazeminia and Emma Björner, thank you for your hospitality.
And Mikael Andéhn, thank you for your hospitality and writing down the
names of these individuals in the acknowledgment of your dissertation.
If I missed anybody’s name—it is Micke’s fault, not mine.
I should add that this research would not have been possible with-
out the financial support of Stockholm University and the Office of the
Provost at American University. I highly appreciate the support I received
from both institutions.
I would like to extend my gratitude once again to the public diplomacy
practitioners and diplomats who took the time to answer my questions in
person, over the phone or via e-mail despite their busy schedules.
Last but not the least, I would like to thank my parents and my wife.
Thank you so much for your support and love during the last couple of
years.
Contents
1 The Need for Communication1

1.1 Why Diplomacy?3
1.2 Communicating Beyond Diplomacy4
1.3 New Topics for Public Diplomacy6
1.4 Public Diplomacy Works, But How?8
1.5 Outline of the Book13
Notes16
Bibliography16
2 Public Diplomacy: The New Foreign Policy “Tool”19

2.1 Defining Public Diplomacy20
2.2 A “New” Public Diplomacy?29
2.2.1 From the Early Days of USIA to 9/1130
2.2.2 Reviving Public Diplomacy:
The Relational Turn31
2.2.3 Globalizing Public Diplomacy34
2.3 Measuring the Impact of Public Diplomacy37
2.4 Studying the Practice of Public Diplomacy39
Notes41
Bibliography42
3 Six Pathways of Connection: A Theoretical Framework51

3.1 Areas of Impacts52
3.2 Public Opinion: Attraction and Benefit of the Doubt56
ix
x Contents
3.3 Relationship Dynamics: Direct Influence and Socialization59

3.4 Public Debates: Agenda-Setting and Framing61
3.5 Establishing an Analytical Framework63
Notes68
Bibliography69
4 The Pioneer of Public Diplomacy:

United States of America75
4.1 History of American Public Diplomacy77
4.1.1 Early Days of US Public Diplomacy77
4.1.2 Current Institutions and Mandate81
4.2 US–Russia Bilateral Presidential Commission84
4.2.1 ECSM in Motion: Sports Subgroup90
4.2.2 Analysis of ECSM94
4.3 Conclusion100
Notes101
Bibliography102
5 Collaboration and Public Diplomacy: Sweden109

5.1 History of Swedish Public Diplomacy110
5.1.1 From Cultural Exchange to Digitalization111
5.1.2 Swedish Foreign Policy and Public Diplomacy116
5.2 Facing the Climate119
5.2.1 Facing the Climate in Detail:
The Albanian Experience124
5.2.2 Analysis of Facing the Climate127
5.3 Conclusions134
Notes135
Bibliography137
6 History and Culture: Turkey143

6.1 History of Turkish Public Diplomacy144
6.1.1 Institutionalization of Turkish Public Diplomacy145
6.1.2 A Love Affair: Turkey in the Central Asia148
6.2 The Region’s UNESCO: TÜRKSOY153
6.2.1 TÜRKSOY in Detail: Eskişehir 2013159
6.2.2 Analysis of TÜRKSOY163
Contents xi
6.3 Conclusion170
Notes171
Bibliography173
7 Six Pathways of Connection: A Practical Roadmap179

7.1 Unpacking the Link180
7.2 A Comparative Look182
7.3 Reflection on the Practice190
Notes194
Bibliography194
8 Conclusion: Connecting Foreign Policy

and Communication197
8.1 Moving Away from Soft Power200
8.2 Public Diplomacy as a Foreign Policy Tool202
8.3 Final Remarks204
Note206
Bibliography206
Appendix: Testing Procedure209
Bibliography217
Index245
List of Abbreviations
AA Anadolu Ajansı. Anatolian (Anadolu) Agency

ACPD United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy
AKP Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi. Justice and Development Party
BBG Broadcasting Board of Governors
BPC U.S.–Russia Bilateral Presidential Commission
BYEGM Basın Yayın ve Enformasyon Genel Müdürlüğü. Directorate
General of Press and Information
DoD Department of Defense
DoS Department of State
ECA Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs
ECSM U.S.–Russia Bilateral Presidential Commission's Working
Group on Education, Culture, Sports, and Media Education,
Culture, Sports, and Media
ENGM Enformasyon Genel Müdürlüğü. Directorate General of
Information.
EU European Union
EUR Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, Department of
State
EURECA The Program for Enhancing University Research and
Entrepreneurial Capacity
ICBL International Campaign to Ban Landmines
ICT Information and communication technologies
IIE International Institute of Education
IIP Bureau of International Information Programs
IR International Relations
xiii
xiv List of Abbreviations
KDK Kamu Diplomasisi Koordinatörlüğü. Office of Public

Diplomacy
KHK Kanun Hükmünde Kararname. Executive Order
MFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MoU Memorandum of Understanding
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO Nongovernmental Organization
NSU Nämnden för Sverigefrämjande. The Council for the
Promotion of Sweden
OIG Office of Inspector General
PD-MAP Public Diplomacy Model for the Assessment of Performance
PL Public Law
PR Public Relations
QDDR Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review
R United States Department of State, Undersecretary for
Public Affairs and Public Diplomacy
SI Swedish Institute
Sida Styrelsen för Internationellt Utvecklingssamarbete. Swedish
International Development Cooperation Agency
SPF Swedish Promotion Forum
̇
TIKA Türk Iş̇ birliği ve Kalkınma Idaresi
̇ Başkanlığı. Turkish
International Cooperation and Development Agency
TKGM Yurtdışı Tanıtım ve Kültürel Iliş ̇ kiler Genel Müdürlüğü.
Directorate General for Overseas Promotion and Cultural
Affairs
TRT Türkiye Radyo ve Televizyon Kurumu. Turkish Radio and
Television Corporation
TÜRKKON Türk Dili Konuşan Ülkeler Iş̇ birliği Konseyi. Cooperation
Council of Turkic Speaking States
TÜRKPA Parliamentary Assembly of Turkic-Speaking Countries
TÜRKSOY Uluslararası Türk Kültür Teşkilatı. The International
Organization of Turkic Culture (2009–present).
TÜRKSOY Türk Kültür ve Sanatları Ortak Yönetimi. Joint
Administration of Turkic Culture and Art. (1993–2009)
UN United Nations
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization
USAID United States Agency for International Development
List of Abbreviations xv
USIA United States Information Agency

USIS United States Information Service
USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
VoA Voice of America
YTB Yurt Dışı Türkler ve Akraba Topluluklar Başkanlığı.
Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities
List of Figures
Fig. 1.1 Public diplomacy and foreign policy 8

Fig. 4.1 Summary of the link, American public diplomacy 99
Fig. 5.1 Summary of the link, Swedish public diplomacy 133
Fig. 6.1 Summary of the mechanism, Turkish 169
Fig. 7.1 Causal mechanism 180
Fig. 7.2 Pathway from practitioner country to foreign public 185
Fig. 7.3 Causal mechanism 190
xvii
List of Tables
Table 3.1 Summary of the pathways 64

Table 3.2 Pathways in detail 66
Table 4.1 Proposed explanations for ECSM 86
Table 4.2 Summary of the analysis, American public diplomacy 99
Table 5.1 Proposed explanations for Facing the Climate120
Table 5.2 Summary of the analysis, Swedish public diplomacy 132
Table 6.1 Turkish public diplomacy actors active in Central Asia 152
Table 6.2 Proposed explanations for TÜRKSOY 154
Table 6.3 Summary of the analysis, Turkish public diplomacy 168
Table 7.1 Combination of pathways in cases 187
Table 7.2 Empirical performances of pathways 188
Table A1 Tests for United States 211
Table A2 Tests for Sweden 212
Table A3 Tests for Turkey 213
xix
CHAPTER 1
The Need for Communication
Why do countries establish embassies in foreign lands? I start my public diplo-

macy classes with this deceivingly simple question, the very same question
that has paved the way to this research. Usually, I receive the response I
expect very quickly: because countries want to communicate with each
other. They want to have an insider view on the motives and interests of
other countries and represent theirs. This argument becomes the spring-
board for further discussion about “public” diplomacy or, in other words,
state-to-nonstate communication: why do states want to communicate with
foreign publics, with individuals? The communication between states is
indeed the basis of diplomacy (Nicolson 1964); yet, why do states feel
the need to communicate beyond the state level? Why does the United
States pay for broadcasting in languages other than English through Voice
of America and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty? Why is the United
Kingdom willing to compensate people’s graduate studies through the
Chevening Scholarships? Why has the European Union paid for at least two
million students’ study abroad or Erasmus experience?
I started thinking about this particular research project back in 2010
while I was living in Washington, DC, and walking through the famous
Embassy Row every day. I witnessed how embassies—besides their dip-
lomatic and consular functions—were standing as representatives of their
countries, as portals to their own countries. It was also in DC that I was
introduced to the concept of embassy open houses. On two different
© The Author(s) 2017 1

E. Sevin, Public Diplomacy and the Implementation of Foreign Policy
in the US, Sweden and Turkey, Palgrave Macmillan Series in Global
Public Diplomacy, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-49334-3_1
2 E. SEVIN
ccasions, the city’s World Embassy Tour and the European Union’s
o
Annual Embassy Open House events, Washingtonians were invited to step
onto the embassy grounds to interact with diplomats and to experience
different cultures. In this communication process between individuals and
states via their representatives, I always found it easier to explain why visi-
tors would like to participate. These were unique opportunities to watch
a dance troop, listen to a concert, or taste a local cuisine. Explaining the
motives of other side, in other words explaining why the embassies orga-
nized such open houses, required a multi-year research and resulted in
this book.
There is an increasing tendency among political actors to assume that it
is in their interest to communicate with foreign audiences (Hayden 2012).
High-level public diplomats see their job as helping to achieve the national
interests of their countries (Glassman 2008). In other words, there is a
national interest or a foreign policy component of these communication
projects. But how do we move from an embassy open house, an exchange
program, or any other public diplomacy project to achieving foreign pol-
icy goals and national interests?
Throughout the book, I give a variety of answers to explain the link
between public diplomacy and foreign policy. I use public diplomacy as a
specific case of international political communication. As the name sug-
gests, public diplomacy includes episodes of communication between
states and foreign publics. These episodes are expected to influence the
foreign policy outcomes. I present several plausible explanations to unpack
this expected influence by studying the American, Swedish and Turkish
public diplomacy projects. I present support to some of these explana-
tions, and disprove others. The main objective of this book is to move
forward in our explanations of public diplomacy as a foreign policy tool,
that is, as an instrument that can be used to advance national interests.
By the end of the book, you will have an explanation about why it is in
the interest of a country to communicate with foreign audiences and how
serving dinner during the embassy open house might help a country reach
its foreign policy objectives.
This chapter situates the research in the larger context of international
relations and communication. First, I focus on the inclusion of “diplomacy”
in public diplomacy. After introducing the role of diplomacy in world poli-
tics, I point out selected trends that show how states moved beyond the
borders of traditional diplomacy. Third, I combine these trends under
THE NEED FOR COMMUNICATION 3
the umbrella of public diplomacy. Subsequently, I introduce the leading

research question in this book by inquiring how public diplomacy works.
The chapter is concluded with an outline of the upcoming chapters.
1.1 Why Diplomacy?

Public diplomacy carries the label of “diplomacy”. In other words, by
name, the concept seems to be related to this particular communication
method in foreign policy and international relations. Not unlike public
diplomacy, diplomacy does not have a universally agreed upon or easily
expressed definition. A broad definition of diplomacy makes the concept
“a synonym for statecraft, foreign policy, and international relations in
general” (Sharp 1999, 54). Yet, more nuanced definitions position diplo-
macy as an international negotiation process. Harold Nicolson (1964), for
instance, uses diplomacy exclusively for negotiation processes and left poli-
cymaking out. Within this detailed view, diplomacy becomes a negotiation
process where “national governments seek to maximize their own abil-
ity to satisfy domestic pressures [or needs], while minimizing the adverse
consequences of foreign developments” (Putnam 1988, 434).
In its essence, diplomacy is the communication system of the inter-
national system (Alan 1980, 942). The bargaining and negotiation pro-
cesses happen when actors acknowledge the existence of each other and
engage in communication. In early 1980s, the concepts of Track One
and Track Two diplomacy were introduced to delineate different forms of
communication in world politics. Track One diplomacy referred—and still
refers—to what professional diplomatic corps do (Davidson and Montville
1981). The communication process takes place among governments
and government-authorized bodies. Track Two diplomacy, on the other
hand, is used to describe the activities of non-state actors (Davidson and
Montville 1981). Communication processes tend to take place in the form
of unofficial and unstructured interactions (Graham and Kelley 2009).
Diplomacy has been a necessity in the conduct of international rela-
tions. More specifically, countries and societies have always had a desire
to keep in touch with each other, and diplomacy presented a platform on
which such interactions can take place. The “diplomacy” label in pub-
lic diplomacy demonstrates its inherent tie with international relations.
“Public” label signals the move beyond traditional diplomacy.
4 E. SEVIN
1.2 Communicating Beyond Diplomacy

Communication is ubiquitous in today’s world. From the buzz of the
phone in our pockets to the traffic signs on the streets, we, as individuals,
are always exposed to messages and other forms of contact. The under-
lying assumption here is that a variety of actors believe that they have
something important to share with us. The call on your phone might be
an update on the project you have been working on, while a traffic sign
might give you information about construction works ahead. More and
more states are investing in different forms of public diplomacy, such as
establishing cultural centers abroad, broadcasting globally and organizing
student exchanges to connect directly with non-state actors—with us—in
other countries. States do not engage in these activities for the sake of
establishing relations or making new friends, but rather to “manage the
international environment through engagement with a foreign public”
(Cull 2009, 12).
Through communicating to, and more frequently engaging with, for-
eign audiences, states can advance their interests. As part of the diplomatic
engagement with other countries, public diplomacy projects attempt to
change the actions of people (Fisher and Bröckerhoff 2008, 6). Therefore,
a succinct definition of public diplomacy positions the practice as maintain-
ing direct relations with people in a country to advance national interests
(Sharp 2007, 106). Public diplomacy complements traditional diplomacy
by making it possible to interact with general audiences. The need to com-
municate is still based on similar assumptions with traditional diplomacy.
An illustrative example can be seen in American diplomacy during
World War II. Shortly after the attack in Pearl Harbor, the United States
started Voice of America (VoA) as its first international broadcasting proj-
ect. Initially limited solely to German-language broadcasts, VoA quickly
expanded to broadcast regular programing around a dozen languages,
reaching several countries (W. R. Roberts 2009). This public diplomacy
attempt supported the traditional diplomacy and warfare efforts by har-
nessing support for American ideals.
For the American practitioners, VoA also marked a move away from
propaganda—a tainted concept associated with German wartime efforts.
Public diplomacy was not the first time countries attempted to commu-
nicate with foreign publics. Propaganda studies present various exam-
ples, dating as early as Ancient Greece and the Peloponnesian War.1
Propaganda, defined as a deliberate attempt to persuade people to think
and then behave in a desired manner (P. M. Taylor 2007, 7), is another
tool used by countries to advance their national interests. Its employment
in warfare, as well as its deceitful techniques,2 steered the American practi-
tioners to find a new term to describe their activities: “public diplomacy”
(van Ham 2010). As a public diplomacy project, VoA was expected not to
use the same deceptive techniques as propaganda. Rather, VoA (2012) was
mandated to be a reliable and authoritative source of news and to present
accurate and balanced reports.
The year 1965 is usually pronounced as a turning point in the study
and practice of public diplomacy. Edmund Gullion, a former diplomat
and the dean of Fletcher School of Diplomacy, is credited with coining
the term for the first time in 1965 (Edward R. Murrow Center for Public
Diplomacy 2010). Even though there have been earlier references to the
term in the literature, these references do not necessarily define “pub-
lic diplomacy” as an international communication activity (Cull 2006).
Rather, the concept is used to describe an open diplomacy process, that
is, traditional diplomacy activities taking place in public (Such as in Hart
1907). Similarly, earlier practices—such as VoA—were not explicitly
labeled as public diplomacy.
The initial definition provided by Gullion also signals a move away
from propaganda activities. Public diplomacy is not solely about mobiliz-
ing forces or demoralizing enemy during wartimes, but rather “deals with
the influence of public attitudes on the formation and execution of foreign
policies” (Edward R. Murrow Center for Public Diplomacy 2010). The
practice stands as a nuanced international communication tool. Moving
beyond the wartime propaganda understanding, states employ this rel-
atively new communication approach to understand the role of publics
in their foreign policies. In more recent projects and studies, there is an
increasing emphasis on establishing and sustaining relations. Unlike propa-
ganda efforts or earlier public diplomacy projects, contemporary projects
are expected to help countries to “‘engage with’ rather than ‘communi-
cate to’ foreign publics” in their attempts to realize their foreign policy
goals (Fitzpatrick 2011, 9).
Such a move towards engagement changed the topics of communi-
cation. Propaganda and early public diplomacy projects relied on one-
way communication methods in which audiences tuning into mass media
outlets, such as radio in the case of VoA, were exposed to messages.
Contemporary projects, on the other, function with a different objective
in a different media environment. Their aim is to move beyond message
6 E. SEVIN
dissemination and to actually engage with audiences. Moreover, they need

to compete with other message resources for the attention of the audi-
ences. The next section provides an overview of new topics within public
diplomacy practice under the umbrella of hyphenated diplomacy.
1.3 New Topics for Public Diplomacy

Public diplomacy is a relatively new and developing field of study and
practice. Given the fact that public diplomats need to engage with foreign
audiences all across the world, there is a high level of creativity involved in
public diplomacy projects. This creativity is best captured by the concept
of “hyphenated diplomacy,” a term Craig Hayden (2011) introduced to
discuss instances in which the concept of diplomacy is used in conjunction
with other words such as salsa diplomacy, soccer diplomacy and music
diplomacy. Hayden sees the rise of these neologisms as a sign that more
groups share the responsibility of diplomatic engagement. A salsa dancer
might become a diplomat and contribute to the achievement of foreign
policy goals.
Hyphenated diplomacy is also reflective of the changing landscape
of public diplomacy projects. Nicholas Cull’s (2009) study of historical
trends produces five different forms of public diplomacy projects: listening
(aiming to learn more about the audience), advocacy (aiming to defend
a country’s position on given issues), cultural diplomacy (aiming to pro-
mote cultural assets of a country), international broadcasting (using mass
media outlets) and nation branding (aiming to change the perceptions of
a country). Even though it is possible to put most, if not all, hyphenated
diplomacy projects under one of these five types, scholars and practitioners
of public diplomacy saw the need to further delineate their attempts. John
Brown, a former diplomat and a public diplomacy researcher, compiles
a list of these new diplomacy subtypes on his blog and often introduces
these newly minted terms humorously.3 Thus far, he has caught more than
three dozen such terms, including “koala diplomacy,” “skate diplomacy”
and “soap opera diplomacy.”
These terms do not necessarily carry any analytical value. In other
words, these projects are still public diplomacy endeavors that engage with
foreign publics with the objective of advancing national interest. Rather,
their contribution to our understanding of international relations comes
from the topics they cover. These terms “carve out a niche for select
themes that are not normally associated with the course of diplomatic
affairs” (Kelley 2014, 74). Throughout this book, I introduce three such
themes: sports, cartoon and culture.
Using sports for political communication purposes is based on the
assumption that sports are seen as inherently apolitical and can be easily
enjoyed by people with diverse background (Peppard and Riordan 1993).
An earlier case of sports diplomacy took place when the American national
table tennis team was invited to China in 1971 for a friendly game. This
instance of “ping-pong diplomacy” is dubbed as an important contribu-
tion to the normalization of Sino-American relations during the Cold War
(Murray 2012). The football games between North and South Yemen in
1970s and 1980s are argued to be influential in the reunification of the
country (Stevenson and Alaug 2008). Within the American practice, sports
diplomacy projects are led by SportsUnited, a specialized unit operating
within the Department of State. The American case introduced in this book
is such a project led by SportsUnited to reach out to Russian foreign public.
Cartoons, not unlike sports, present a communication medium that
move beyond language barriers. Moreover, the humor element makes
it possible to attract the attention of a large number of people. China
used a short animated video to explain the role of Shanghai Cooperation
Organization to the public and to harness foreign support (Ramzy 2015).
Israel used a series of animations and cartoons to describe the importance
of President Barack Obama’s visit to the country (Mackey 2013). The
Swedish case, Facing the Climate, uses cartoons and cartoonists to push its
environmental protection agenda in the international arena.
Cultural diplomacy is undoubtedly the most prominent of hyphenated
diplomacy terms—one that is seen as essential to public diplomacy. As one
of the three assets of soft power, culture and cultural activities have always
been part of public outreach projects. The American foreign policy prac-
tice sees cultural activities best represent a country (Advisory Committee
on Cultural Diplomacy 2005). For decades, embassies hosted cultural
attachés that have been responsible for promoting the culture of their
countries (Embree 1949). In certain cases, such as the British Council,
cultural diplomacy even takes over public diplomacy (Pamment 2013).
The British Council defines its field of work as cultural management and
does not embrace the concept of public diplomacy (Pamment 2012).
The Turkish case, TÜRKSOY, presents an instance in which Turkey uses
Turkic culture to engage with Central Asian Republics.
It is possible to expand this list by introducing other themes—such
as gastrodiplomacy (Rockower 2012) and science diplomacy (Schlegel
8 E. SEVIN
et al. 2011)—or deepen it by further delineating existing themes—such

as ping-pong diplomacy under sports diplomacy (Murray 2012) or arts
diplomacy (J. Brown 2007) under cultural diplomacy. It is vital to reit-
erate that the different themes of public diplomacy are introduced as a
reflection of the practice. Hyphenated diplomacy terms are not theoreti-
cal or analytical frameworks. Rather, they are instrumental in demonstrat-
ing the breadth of public diplomacy practice. Regardless of their themes,
all public diplomacy projects are expected to help countries reach foreign
publics with the attempt to advance their national interests. Therefore, I
refrain from using hyphenated diplomacy concepts to avoid confusion,
and combine the different initiatives introduces in the cases under the
umbrella of public diplomacy throughout the book. All of these pub-
lic diplomacy projects (and hyphenated diplomacy projects) help engage
with the foreign publics. Yet, how do these interactions yield changes in
foreign policy?
1.4 Public Diplomacy Works, But How?

Public diplomacy works. The growing practice and adoption of the con-
cept by new countries show that there is at least an expectation that pub-
lic diplomacy projects produce significant outcomes. Given the fact that
countries carry out public diplomacy projects to manage the international
environment (Cull 2009), the expected outcome is in the field of interna-
tional politics, namely contribution to the achievement of foreign policy
goals and to advancement of national interests.
This research expands on the framework shown in Fig. 1.1. Practitioner
countries use public diplomacy projects to communicate with the foreign
public. This engagement with the target audiences, in return, makes it pos-
sible for the practitioner country to contribute to the foreign policy goals.
Moving beyond such a generic understanding requires the identification
of the details of the process through which public diplomacy projects
Public
Practitioner Foreign Policy
Diplomacy
Country Public Change
Project
Fig. 1.1 Public diplomacy and foreign policy

manifest their impacts on foreign policy. This research provides a more

nuanced explanation through a comparative study of American, Swedish
and Turkish public diplomacy practices.
The explanation shown in Fig. 1.1 needs further elaboration to contrib-
ute to our understanding of public diplomacy. This research undertakes
the responsibility of providing a comprehensive explanation of how public
diplomacy works by unearthing the link between public diplomacy and
foreign policy goals.4 The link is conceptualized as a causal mechanism in
social sciences. A causal mechanism is an “unobservable entity that—when
activated—generates an outcome of interest” (Mahoney 2001, 580), and
in this research refers to “the causal processes […] through which causal or
explanatory variables produce causal effects” (Bennett and George 1997).
Public diplomacy projects are the explanatory variables—the events that
explain the effect on foreign policy. What is detailed in this research is the
explanation of how organizing a cartoon exhibit in Brazil can contribute
to the achievement of Swedish foreign policy objective of ensuring inter-
national collaboration for climate issues. The explanation is carried out
through the six pathways of connection framework—the cornerstone and
main contribution of this research.
The focus in this research is on a specific subset of contemporary public
diplomacy activities—relational public diplomacy. These projects attempt
to build relations with individuals, civil society groups or other actors
in a foreign country. In the post-9/11 world, driven especially by the
American attempts to reach out to the Middle Eastern and other foreign
publics, there has been an observable change in the way public diplo-
macy is conceptualized and conducted. Practitioners started to focus on
establishing and sustaining relations with foreign audiences, instead of
solely exposing them to messages. Scholars also reflected on this change
in practice and conceptualized public diplomacy as operating within a new
relational paradigm (cf. Melissen 2011). In line with the move towards
relational projects in contemporary study and practice of public diplo-
macy, the “relational” nature of the projects is determined based on the
activity types and project descriptions.
Foreign policy goals are the statements of the objectives in the inter-
national arena of a nation. This research uses policy goals as declarations
of national interests, thus, conceptualizes advancement of national inter-
ests as achievement of a foreign policy goal. The representative projects
studied are explicitly connected to a foreign policy goal. These goals are
set forward in their project descriptions, their organizational structures,
10 E. SEVIN
foreign policy statements of the countries, budget documents of the

Department of State/Ministry of Foreign Affairs, or a combination of
these documents.
It is important to note that the research question is based on an
assumed connection between foreign policy and public diplomacy proj-
ects, expressed as a causal link. More specifically, it is assumed that public
diplomacy is influential in helping achieve foreign policy goals and thus
advancing national interests. Neither this research nor the practice of pub-
lic diplomacy argues that public diplomacy projects are the sole cause of
achieving a foreign policy goal. Even in a situation in which Brazil changes
its sustainability policies after hosting the cartoon exhibit, the study and
practice of public diplomacy will not declare that the public diplomacy
intervention is the direct reason for the policy change. It is only argued
that public diplomacy projects play a role in realizing foreign policy objec-
tives. In other words, the causal outcome of the interest generated by
public diplomacy intervention is the contribution to the achievement of a
foreign policy goal—not the actual achievement. Therefore, the objective
of this research is to show how these projects are designed to play a mean-
ingful role in the international arena by contributing to the achievement
of a foreign policy goal.
One last note is necessary about the nature of this research to adjust
the expectations of the reader. The “actual” impact of public diplomacy
projects is not studied. Rather, the analyses focus on the practice of public
diplomacy to unearth the assumptions made in the design and implemen-
tation of projects about their impact. For instance, if the cartoon exhibit
has elements to encourage debate on climate change issues in Brazil in
its design, the study acknowledges such elements and does not question
whether the exhibition successfully encourages discussion among the
Brazilian society or not.
This research is necessary to situate the newest addition to the interna-
tional communication toolkit—public diplomacy—as a viable foreign policy
tool. Such a demonstration is expected to increase the trust in the practice
and ensure the proper measurement and assessment of public diplomacy
projects based on their outcomes—foreign policy impact—rather than on
outputs—for example, number of people visiting a cartoon exhibition.
Public diplomacy is a tool with a mandate to manage the international envi-
ronment (Cull 2009) and to advance national interests (Glassman 2008),
and is expected to create “direct communication with foreign peoples, with
the aim of affecting their thinking and ultimately, that of their governments”
(Gilboa 2008, 291). However, the assessment of foreign policy outcomes

has attracted little attention (Banks 2011, 14). Rather, measurement stud-
ies and practices tend to focus on project output—such as number of par-
ticipants and engagement on digital platforms—or abstract goals—such
as increasing a country’s influence in the world and increasing the under-
standing of the policy and culture of a country.
Despite the assumption that public diplomacy works, existing research
does not help us understand how. The details of how states can move from
a public diplomacy project—such as organizing a cartoon exhibition—
to a foreign policy objective—such as encouraging Brazil to participate
in climate negotiations beyond the Kyoto Protocol—is not clear.5 This
underexplored link creates two grave problems. First, without knowing
the details of how projects can and have impacted foreign policy objec-
tives, it is almost impossible to design a proper public diplomacy project.
Let’s take the earlier example of serving dinner at an embassy open house
in Washington, DC If we assume public diplomacy might contribute to
advancing foreign policy through increasing the attractiveness of culture,
we should aim at serving the most delicious food to the highest number
of people possible. If we follow a more relational understanding, then one
might argue that the number of people is not necessarily the only impor-
tant variable. We also need to communicate with the right people—let it
be decision-makers or influential people in the society. Therefore, serving
a select group of people might be a better idea. Second, the lack of a clear
link between foreign policy and public diplomacy makes it more difficult
to advocate for its need in the larger picture of international affairs. Public
diplomacy, as used throughout this research, is a state function, meaning
that the projects are funded and/or executed by governmental institu-
tions. Our dinner service needs to compete with other tools of foreign
policy, including but not limited to other public diplomacy projects, tra-
ditional diplomacy tools, hard-power resources and other governmental
services for budgetary purposes. Unless we can explicitly state the impact
of a specific project on the larger picture, it is highly likely to experience
budget cuts in the consequent years.
The six pathways of connection framework explores how public diplo-
macy projects can yield impacts beyond being solely intercultural commu-
nication processes—beyond making friends—and towards contributing to
the advancement of the interests of a country in the international arena—
towards being a foreign policy instrument. Throughout the book, I intro-
duce six pathways of connection in three parts. First, I discuss the existing
12 E. SEVIN
works on communication, public diplomacy and foreign policy. Based on

these discussions, the six pathways of connection is situated as a theoretical
framework—meaning that it might be used to explain the practice. I sub-
sequently use it as an analytical framework to study the public diplomacy
practices of three diverse practitioner countries—the United States, Sweden
and Turkey. In all these analyses, I unfold the link between a selected pub-
lic diplomacy project and foreign policy starting with the observation that
public diplomacy is an increasingly salient aspect of diplomacy and inter-
national relations and further investigating its place in the larger picture
of foreign affairs. My main source of information about these cases is on
the accounts I gathered through elite interviews, site visits and archival
research. The third and final part of the introduction is the development
of the framework based on the findings of the research. Six pathways of
connection, thus, becomes a framework that can be both used to explain
the role of public diplomacy in the larger picture of international rela-
tions and also to design more effective and efficient project. Six pathways
of connection starts out with the history of communication in interna-
tional relations, emerges as a theoretical framework, is used as an analytical
framework and, finally, presented as a practical roadmap. Through a causal
mechanism understanding, the objective is to make it possible to argue for
the impact of public diplomacy projects without resorting to quantifying
the unquantifiable outcomes of public diplomacy (Seib 2013). Thus, the
portrayal of the link between public diplomacy projects and national inter-
ests expressed as foreign policy goals can help contribute to scholarship
and enhance measurement and evaluation practices.
Moreover, this book provides an analytical vocabulary that is academi-
cally sound and is easy for non-academics to use when discussing public
diplomacy. The six pathways of connection framework provides assump-
tions on how public diplomacy works that can be used in examining other
public diplomacy projects. Scholars and practitioners alike can engage in
more efficient dialogue by using the same analytical vocabulary.
Last but not the least, the book introduces two relatively understud-
ied cases—Sweden and Turkey. Current studies focus predominantly on
American practices, policy recommendations, single case narratives and
normative theories. This study expands our understanding of relational
public diplomacy by looking at the cases at Turkey and Sweden, following
the call for more systematic and comparative studies in the field.
It is my sincere hope that the book will influence the practice of public
diplomacy by presenting an alternative method to assess, explain, analyze
and measure the impact of public diplomacy. Six pathways of connection

framework can be also used to provide a roadmap for designing pub-
lic diplomacy projects that yield high impact. By clearly identifying the
impact of public diplomacy, it will be possible to advocate for the necessity
of public diplomacy in foreign affairs.
Succinctly stated, this book studies selected public diplomacy initia-
tives carried out by the United States, Sweden and Turkey. By examining
three episodes of public diplomacy where officials articulate a causal link
between public diplomacy projects and foreign policy goals, this book aims
to explore the process, or the causal mechanism, through which public
diplomacy advances national interests. Such an examination of the capacity
of public diplomacy activities to help realize foreign policy objectives and
national interest strengthens the role of public diplomacy as a feasible for-
eign policy tool, as opposed to the commonly shared misconception of a
“popularity contest” (Glassman 2008). The next section provides detailed
information about the rest of the book.
1.5 Outline of the Book

The rest of the book is structured around seven additional chapters. The
initial step of this research is to organize the existing knowledge on pub-
lic diplomacy. Despite all the interest in public diplomacy, there is no
universally agreed-upon definition. Moreover, the current scholarship is
separated according to the disciplines—mainly public relations, commu-
nications and international relations. By organizing the debates on public
diplomacy around the topics of debates and ideas, an analytical vocabulary
is provided. Chapter 2, thus, provides a comprehensive analysis of pub-
lic diplomacy as a foreign policy tool. The chapter first asks why public
diplomacy carries out the label diplomacy. The question is answered by
outlining the characteristics necessary for a process to be called “diplo-
matic”. The chapter continues by providing a working definition public
diplomacy. The key point in this section is the discussion between project
outputs and outcomes. In order to connect public diplomacy with foreign
policy, this study argues that the project-based success criteria—such as
number of visitors to an exhibition or positive participant testimonies after
an exchange project—should be used to reflect on how a given project
might help advance national interests. This chapter also provides details
about how the cases are analyzed. Each country’s practice is studied in
three steps: overall history, example project and detailed account of a spe-
cific event in the project.
14 E. SEVIN
Chapter 3 introduces six pathways of connection as an analytical frame-

work which constitutes the backbone of this book. Each pathway is built
on a theoretical foundation, and an explicit assumption about how public
diplomacy can manifest its impact on foreign policy and contribute to the
achievement of foreign policy goals. First, by reconstructing the concept of
public diplomacy through the help of international relations theories, the
chapter introduces the three areas of impact: public attitudes, relationship
dynamics and public debates. Subsequently, each area of impact is expanded
with the help of soft power as well as communication theories and practices.
All pathways are supported by selected public diplomacy episodes.
Chapters 4–6 introduce the case studies. Chapter 4 explores the link
between public diplomacy and foreign policy as practiced by the United
States—one of the most, if not the most, important practitioner of pub-
lic diplomacy. The chapter opens with a brief overview of the history of
American public diplomacy and current practitioner institutions. This his-
torical approach is important in order to understand the foundations of
the practice that remain unchanged throughout the years as well as to
highlight the recent changes made to better respond to the contemporary
political needs. The exemplary public diplomacy project is the Education,
Culture, Sports, and Media Working Group of the Russia–US Bilateral
Presidential Communication. This initiative of public diplomacy is chosen
due to its explicit connection to a foreign policy (Reset policy) and to the
fact that it can be used to represent general American relational public
diplomacy projects, given the fact that the working group executes differ-
ent types of public diplomacy activities, utilizing a variety of bureaucratic
structures.
Chapter 5 unfolds the link between public diplomacy and foreign pol-
icy as it is observed in the Swedish practice. The chapter opens with the
historical, bureaucratic and political context of Swedish public diplomacy.
The historical account portrays the role of the Swedish model, especially the
country’s reputation in working towards solutions for low politics issues, as
the basis of its public diplomacy projects. The bureaucratic account estab-
lishes the Swedish Institute as the most important organization working
on public diplomacy issues. The political account explains that the initial
idea for the public diplomacy projects is conceptualized in an environment
in which Sweden is threatened by the climate change issues and is keen on
supporting an international reaction to climate change and other environ-
mental issues. Next, Facing the Climate is presented in detail. The project
is chosen as it is closely connected to a foreign policy objective and is
based on the Swedish model. Facing the Climate is a multi-year travelling

cartoon exhibit and workshop series that focuses on artwork concerning
the implications of climate change. The relationship between the Swedish
Institute, foreign representations and the local partners also portray the
institutional dynamics at play in Swedish relational public diplomacy.
Chapter 6 unfolds the link between public diplomacy and foreign policy
as it is observed in the Turkish logic of practice. The chapter opens with
the history of Turkish practice. Then, the contemporary institutions that
are working in the political framework of Central Asia—the political work
in which the representative project operates—are introduced. The chap-
ter uses TÜRKSOY (International Organization of Turkic Culture) as the
exemplary project. TÜRKSOY acts as an international organization that
carries out a variety of events, from concerts to photo exhibits to song con-
tests, to promote the Turkic culture. The project is chosen as it is directly
connected to Turkey’s foreign policy, and as it is a prominent public diplo-
macy actor that designs and implements various different types of events.
Chapter 7 revisits the six pathways of connection framework based on
the lessons learned in the case studies. The chapter starts with highlighting
the lessons drawn from the individual cases about public diplomacy and its
link with foreign policy. Subsequently, based on these case studies, three
questions are asked: (1) Does one of the six pathways of connection have
a more prominent role than the rest? (2) Is there a “best” combination of
the six pathways of connection that can be used to explain all the cases? (3)
How can we create a road map that starts from a public diplomacy project
and ends in contribution to foreign policy?
Chapter 8 concludes the study by sharing three highlights revealed by
the pathways of connection. First, there is a need to contextualize the
understanding of soft power. The contextualization refers to two different
phenomena: the practice environment and the political environment. The
former argues that a country’s public diplomacy strategy or even a design
of project is highly influenced by the bureaucratic memory. The latter
underlines the fact that political environment is also crucial to evaluating
public diplomacy. If public diplomacy is a policy tool, we cannot exclude
other political variables from our analysis. Second, public diplomacy stud-
ies need to focus on developing new tools and methods to argue for the
“impact” of the practice. It is imperative for scholars and practitioners
to demonstrate their influence on foreign policy. Last, a move beyond
the disciplinary boundaries is argued to be necessary for the creation of
knowledge that has “practical” implications.
16 E. SEVIN
Notes
1. Philip M. Taylor’s Munitions of the Mind is a great resource for readers that
are interested in learning more about the history of propaganda. Taylor
presents 26 propaganda cases starting with Ancient Greece and taking the
reader all the way to 9/11 attacks.
2. The concept itself is not inherently unethical. Propaganda is solely a political
communication/mass persuasion tool—one that is not necessarily more
“evil” than advertising. However, the practice of propaganda throughout
the history decreased its legitimacy. For instance, hiding/lying about mes-
sage source have been commonly used tactics in propaganda projects.
Starting with the twentieth century, propaganda was almost exclusively used
to label “enemy” behavior. In World War I, the U.S. agency responsible for
“propaganda” was called Committee on Public Information. In World War
II, Office of War Information took over the same responsibility. Propaganda
was used to describe German communicate activities in both wars.
3. His blog can be accessed at http://publicdiplomacypressandblogreview.
blogspot.com/. The blog was active as of September 2016.
4. The original research question was worded differently throughout the

research project: “What are the mechanisms through which relational public
diplomacy projects help achieve foreign policy goals? The wording was based on
methodological concerns—specifically, it was worded according to the
ontological assumptions made in process-tracing studies. In order to make
the research more accessible, I intentionally left out certain methodological
language throughout the book.
5. All examples referring to Brazil and climate change are taken from Sweden’s
Facing the Climate project. Swedish foreign policy objective in environmen-
tal policy is to increase international cooperation. More information is given
about the project and its policy goals in Chap. 5.
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CHAPTER 2
Public Diplomacy: The New Foreign

Policy “Tool”
Since 1965, when Edmund Gullion coined the term “public diplomacy,”
there have been over 500 articles published in scholarly journals. Nearly
80% of these articles have been published since 2006.1 In other words,
despite the relatively longer life of the term, the majority of academic
discussions have been taking place in the last decade, making public diplo-
macy a vibrant and popular field of study. It is possible to find such aca-
demic works in journals coming from communication, public relations
(PR) and marketing, and international relations (IR) journals among
other disciplines. In addition to growing nearly fourfold in 10 years, the
field has also incorporated a variety of approaches to analyze the same
practice. Unsurprisingly, there is little to no agreement on the contours
of public diplomacy as a concept and as a field of study (Gregory 2008).
Within such a dynamic field, it is up to the scholars to explicitly state
what is meant by public diplomacy and how to study the concept. In this
chapter, I provide a working definition that I will use throughout the
studies of American, Swedish and Turkish practices. My aim in doing so
is not to reinvent the wheel. However, while working in a field that has
“no consensus on its analytical boundaries” (Gregory 2008, 274) and that
takes pride in being “one of the most multi-disciplinary areas in modern
scholarship” (Gilboa 2008, 57), it is vital to provide a working definition.
This research studies public diplomacy—more specifically relational
public diplomacy projects of the United States, Sweden and Turkey—and

20 E. SEVIN
the impacts of this practice on foreign policy. The chapter is devoted to

explain these four concepts. The first section starts out by presenting a
summary of contributions coming from a variety of disciplines includ-
ing communication, PR, marketing and IR to define public diplomacy.
The second section focuses on the contemporary understanding of public
diplomacy. There is virtually a universal agreement that the 9/11 terrorist
attacks constituted a breaking point in public diplomacy studies and prac-
tices. The pre-9/11 era has been dominated by the American experience
of sharing the country’s story with the world. The “old” public diplomacy
understanding considered message dissemination as its objective. Based
on the needs of the government, the American public diplomacy increased
or decreased its activity, keeping its focus on information sharing (Cull
2012). Yet, 9/11 demonstrated that there was a need for a “new” public
diplomacy, not necessarily more of the “old” (Zaharna 2010). Despite the
agreement on the fact that there is an “old” and a “new” public diplomacy,
the details of “new” public diplomacy era are debated. I use the concept
of relational diplomacy as a concept that defines a specific type of con-
temporary public diplomacy and provide a working definition that is used
throughout the book. The third section outlines the assumptions about
the impacts of public diplomacy. I answer what a successful public diplo-
macy project should accomplish. I differentiate between project outputs
and outcomes. In order to connect public diplomacy with foreign policy,
I argue that the project-based success criteria—such as number of visitors
to an exhibition or positive participant testimonies after an exchange proj-
ect—should be used to reflect on how a given project might help advance
national interests. I also explain how short- and long-term outcomes can
be examined. The fourth and last section presents the necessity of study-
ing the practice. In addition to the practice turn in social sciences (Adler
and Pouliot 2008), I explain the development of public diplomacy as a
practice-driven field of study.
2.1 Defining Public Diplomacy

It is neither necessary nor beneficial to devise a universal definition of or
approach to public diplomacy. Each and every discipline has its own weak-
nesses as well as strengths. Yet, disciplinary boundaries do not necessarily
provide an inclusive picture of the practice. For instance, from a commu-
nication studies’ perspective, diplomacy is the communication system of
the international society (Alan 1980, 942). In this system, r epresentatives
PUBLIC DIPLOMACY: THE NEW FOREIGN POLICY “TOOL” 21
of global actors (e.g. states, international organization) promote their

interests (Gilboa 2002, 731). Yet, this communication tends to be lim-
ited to professional diplomatic corps, governments and other governmen-
tal representatives, in other words, state actors (Dasgupta 2011, 72–73).
Public diplomacy expands communication processes to include non-
governmental entities.
Scholarly works in the field of communication debate the inclusion
and the role of state and non-state actors in public diplomacy. Traditional
diplomacy is defined very clearly as taking place between accredited rep-
resentatives of sovereigns (Sharp 2003). Public diplomacy, on the other
hand, might involve “state to non-state,” “non-state to non-state,” or
“state to state” process. Gifford Malone (1985, 199), for instance, argues
that public diplomacy is the “direct communication [of states] with for-
eign peoples.” Kristina Plavsak (2002, 113) defines public diplomacy as
the intensive information exchange between states and non-state actors.
On the other hand, Gregory Payne (2009, 579) presents support for
“non-state to non-state” communication by positing that a public diplo-
macy project should “be rooted in strategic people-to-people commu-
nication.” It is further argued that this audience configuration can take
place with or without a state involvement. “Grassroots public diplomacy”
concept dismisses the role of state or other governmental actors, argu-
ing that communication activities between individuals, corporations, civil
society or other non-governmental actors from different countries might
be considered as public diplomacy (Snow 2009). “People-to-people”
diplomacy refers to a situation in which individuals come together in a
state-sponsored and/or state-initiated project (Wang 2008). Therefore,
public diplomacy takes place under state leadership with the involvement
of non-state actors. Public diplomacy also includes projects between gov-
ernmental actors of two states. Jarol Manheim (1994) gives examples of
this process in his study of the lobbying attempts of foreign embassies
within the United Sates. These embassies communicate directly with poli-
ticians as well as other contacts in federal offices. James Pamment (2014)
unfolds the story of “Gripengate,” where the Swedish representation in
Switzerland worked together with local politicians in a PR campaign to
increase Swiss public support for Switzerland’s possible decision to pur-
chase Gripen aircrafts from Sweden.
Communication studies also provide information about the impacts
of different media platforms available for public diplomacy practice.
Essentially, foreign target audiences can be reached through two means:
22 E. SEVIN
mediated and non-mediated communication. In the former case, the focus

of the studies is on the impact of messages and platforms. The content
and delivery of the message is worth further studies, given the fact that
by choosing what to report (priming) and how to report it (framing),
media outlets have the potential to influence the outcomes of the events
(Jamieson and Waldman 2004). Thus, public diplomacy becomes the
process of “giving media-savvy public diplomats … adequate time and
… funds for assessing foreign mass opinion, seriously monitoring [for-
eign] news and interacting with foreign affairs journalists” (Frensley and
Michaud 2006, 218). In an attempt to explain how foreign target audi-
ences might be reached through media platforms, Robert Entman (2008)
proposes the use of his cascading activation model and employs it in
American public diplomacy. According to this model, public diplomacy is
“the organized attempts by a president and his foreign policy apparatus to
exert as much control as possible over the framing of … policy in foreign
media” (Entman 2008, 98).
Mediated communication necessitates further study of the character-
istics of the media platforms used in addition to the message delivery.
The new information and communication technologies (usually known as
ICTs) slightly modified the definition of public diplomacy as well as the
understanding of media as public diplomacy is “directly related to media
accessibility” (Seib 2012, 112). Online communication platforms provide
tools “for circulating … information, for engaging in dialogue and col-
laboration” (Arsenault 2009, 150). New technologies reduce the cost and
increase the speed of communication, thus extending the opportunity
to participate in public diplomacy conversations to a greater number of
actors (Riordan 2004, 13).
Public diplomacy studies especially focused on the role of Web 2.0
understanding and social media platforms.2 Content is “no longer created
and published by individuals, but instead are continuously modified by all
users in a participatory and collaborative fashion” (Kaplan and Haenlein
2010, 60–61). Social media platforms are Web 2.0-based platforms that
enable content creation and social interaction among its users simultane-
ously (Kaplan and Haenlein 2010, 60–63). The audience’s relation with
the content is, thus, completely changed as they are active participants in
content creation processes and they are interested in interacting with the
other members of the audience. Web 2.0-based communication is car-
ried with a “community that is based on common interest and ability”
(Fisher 2008, 24) mentality, rather than a communication mentality that
sees communicator and audience separately.
In addition to the multitude of studies on the impacts of media

platforms, studies also point to non-mediated, or face-to-face, commu-
nication instances in public diplomacy. This method of communication is
also known as the “last three feet,”3 a concept used by Edward R. Murrow
in an ABC TV’s “Issues and Answers” program (Betka 2006, 2). It is
argued that public diplomacy is most effective when face-to-face contact is
established with foreign audiences (Smyth 2001). Public diplomacy prac-
titioners need to cover the last remaining distance, the last three feet,4 to
reach target audiences. Thus, the essential component of communication
becomes the interaction between a practitioner country’s representatives
in a foreign country and the public.5
Succinctly stated, communication studies conceptualize public diplo-
macy as “practices of transnational communicative engagement” (Hayden
2012, 2). State and/or non-state actors use public diplomacy to proj-
ect their values and ideas to the international arena (Castells 2008). The
debates among scholars about the role of media and type of audiences
demonstrate that these are indeed crucial variables that have the potential
to change the answer to the “what is public diplomacy” question.
The fields of PR and marketing tend to import their respective theories
and intellectual frameworks to better understand public diplomacy. Even
though these two fields are distinct academic disciplines, their contribu-
tions to our understanding of public diplomacy converge at analyzing and
expanding the objectives of the practice. Public diplomacy enables the
states to implement the tools and techniques borrowed from corporate
world—let it be PR or marketing—in the realm of international relations.
Benno Signitzer and Timothy Coombs (1992, 146) propound that
public diplomacy and PR are “in a natural process of convergence.”
According to their work, professionals in these two fields “often pursue
the same objective—affect public opinion for the benefit of their client/
organization” (Signitzer and Coombs 1992, 139). Both groups “seek
their objective through the use of communication programs” (Signitzer
and Coombs 1992, 139) directed at their target audiences. Therefore,
they call the practitioners to learn more about each other’s area of exper-
tise and scholars to test which concepts are transferable. (Signitzer and
Coombs 1992, 145–146) Building on these claims, Jacquie L’Etang
(1996) identifies the shared functions and objectives such as represen-
tation, advising, intelligence gathering and creating dialogues. L’Etang
(2009, 610) defines public diplomacy as PR for countries, or an activ-
ity conducted by nations as well as other international organizations and
24 E. SEVIN
non-governmental organizations that entail media relations, promotional

and persuasive strategies. She also argues that integration of and schol-
arly exchange between PR and public diplomacy contribute to our under-
standing of both concepts, given the similarities of the tools and objectives
involved (L’Etang 2009).
The articulation of such similarities encourages scholars to PR models
and theories to study public diplomacy. Seong-Hun Yun (2006) tests the
applicability of the excellence study—frequently used framework for PR
practices. The framework consists of four dimensions: direction (dissemi-
nating information or an exchange of information), purpose (coloration/
cooperation or advocacy), channel (media platforms) and ethics (social
responsibility) (Yun 2006, 293–294). While the channel dimension has
been extensively covered by communication scholars, the other three cri-
teria are unique contributions due to the employment of a PR framework.
Public diplomacy, thus, is conceptualized as governmental communica-
tion attempts targeting publics (Yun 2006, 290–292). Aimei Yang et al.
(2012) incorporate the image cultivation theory as a prevalent topic. Public
diplomacy is seen as the attempts of governments “to cultivate a certain
image of their nation for international publics” (Yang et al. 2012, 653).
Antoneta Vanc (2010) utilizes relationship management understanding
and argues the concept refers to the activities of creating and maintain-
ing relations between members of different countries with the ultimate
aim of creating influential networks in target countries. Incorporating PR
approaches to public diplomacy demonstrates that communication activi-
ties might be undertaken with different objectives.
Marketing practitioners, not unlike their PR colleagues, have shown
interest in public diplomacy initially by arguing for the similarities in
between. An embodiment of this understanding was observed in the prac-
tice as well when advertising executive Charlotte Beers was appointed as
the Undersecretary for Public Affairs and Public Diplomacy (R) in 2001.
Colin Powell, the then Secretary of State, defended this appointment by
saying, “Well, guess what? She got me to buy Uncle Ben’s rice and so
there is nothing wrong with getting somebody who knows how to sell
something” (Carlson 2001). Such an understanding of marketing estab-
lishes connections between commercial branding and communication of
countries. During the last two decades, more and more countries started
to use marketing techniques to promote their unique characteristics (Olins
2000, 213). These practices paved the way to the inception of a new field
of study place/nation branding.
Michael Porter (1990) is one of the first scholars to identify that nations
differ in terms of characters and these differences are the main constitu-
ents of their competitive success. In 1998, Simon Anholt, an advertising
professional and a policy advisor, proposed a novel concept that drastically
altered the way national identity and reputation are understood: nation
brands. This concept proposes that governments can and should discover
how the characteristics of their nations are seen by the rest of the world
as these perceptions have political, social and economic impacts (Anholt
2007). Public diplomacy is subsequently defined as an important commu-
nication tool that gathers intelligence about a given country’s brand image
and attempts to share the brand-related improvements with the target
audiences. It should be noted that Anholt (2010) also posits that public
diplomacy, or any other communication activity, cannot change how a
nation is perceived by target audiences as such a change is only possible
through infrastructural, political, social and economic improvements. The
distinct tangible and intangible characteristics of a nation constitute the
core of a brand and public diplomacy projects contribute to the branding
projects by establishing relations with target audiences (Simonin 2008,
22–24).
Despite the marketing approach to see public diplomacy as a tool in
branding, the scholarly debate about the relationship is yet to be settled.
Gyorgy Szondi (2008), in his comprehensive work on the subject, pres-
ents four additional conceptualizations of linking two areas. He argues
that the concepts might be seen as synonymous, both referring to the
communication and PR activities of political actors. He presents concep-
tualizations from the other extreme, which define the two terms as com-
pletely different with no overlapping objectives, with public diplomacy
being solely focused on political gains and nation branding economic
gains. The remaining two explanations see public diplomacy and nation
branding as part of each other: by positioning public diplomacy as one of
the many tools available to create nation brand images or nation brand
as one of the many assets that public diplomacy can use to interact with
foreign audiences. Szondi does not necessarily present support for any one
of these explanations, but rather outlines all possible relations between
nation branding and public diplomacy.
PR and marketing-influenced studies use the similarities between
public diplomacy and corporate practices as their starting points. Public
diplomacy becomes attempts for public opinion management and promo-
tion for states. The fields continue to enrich the discussions on contours of
26 E. SEVIN
public diplomacy by demonstrating the compatibility of corporate objec-

tives in the case of countries.
Given the fact public diplomacy carries the label of diplomacy, it is quite
noteworthy that the contribution of diplomacy studies within the IR field is lim-
ited. Historically, diplomatic studies exclusively focus on interstate relations.
Diplomacy is seen as “the art of negotiating agreements between sovereign
states” (Nicolson 1964, vii). This understanding is supported by the works
of Hedley Bull (1977) and Martin Wight (1977), two of the leading figures
in the English School of International Relations. The assumption of the
English School is that there is a “society of states” at the international arena,
and states create norms and institutions to regulate interactions between
them. Diplomacy is one of these attempts to regulate interstate relations,
taking place among professional diplomatic corps representing sovereign
states. Diplomats are seen as loyal subjects of sovereigns that represent the
interests of these sovereigns in foreign countries, negotiate policies in their
names and make frequent reports of these negotiations and other relevant
aspects of politics in these countries (van Wicquefort 1715). As states are
aware of the fact their domestic policies are not immune to the changes in
other countries, they feel the urge to communicate with each other through
diplomatic institutions and establish rules of conduct for international affairs
(Watson 1991, 14–15). Diplomacy is seen as an essential and an inevitable
part of international politics because the international system is composed
of independent states that monitor the behavior of other states. Therefore,
there is a need for communication as these independent states take the
behaviors of others into consideration in their own policy-making processes
(Watson 1991, 213). Diplomacy is, thus, a state function. Diplomats are
tasked with representing their home states, gathering information about the
foreign states and negotiating policies (Nicolson 1964) to protect the rights
and interests of their home countries (de Callières 1716). In this “club
model” of diplomacy, diplomats only communicate with each other and
government officials (Heine 2006, 4). This is why public diplomacy, despite
its name, does not resemble diplomacy, at least at first glance.
Yet, the proliferation of non-state actors in the international arena dur-
ing the last decades encouraged diplomacy scholars to reconsider their
stance. Contemporary diplomatic practices do not exclusively focus on
traditional state-level communications and negotiations (Sending et al.
2011). Contemporary diplomats are expected to “actively engage the soci-
ety in which they reside” (Heine 2006, 19) in addition to the government
officials. In other words, diplomatic studies accept that diplomacy is being
decentralized and the authority to conduct relations across borders is

being shared with civil society organizations (Kelley 2010). Governments
are even enlisting the services of such organizations for public outreach,
such as the British Council of the United Kingdom and the Cervantes
Institute of Spain (Heine 2006, 14). In this “network model” of diplo-
macy, a higher number of players, including non-state actors, aim to “proj-
ect their own nation upon the nation they live in” (Heine 2006, 5–19).
Actors involved in diplomacy are expected to represent their home country
within their host countries. Within this framework, public diplomacy was
conceptualized solely as an extension of traditional diplomacy, enabling
non-state actors to participate in cross-border communication processes.
IR kept public diplomacy at arm’s length, if not completely dismissed
it as irrelevant, until Joseph Nye’s introduction of soft power in early
1990s. Soft power posits that it is possible to achieve behavioral change
through attraction and co-optation in addition to coercion (Nye 1990a).
Additionally, Nye (2011) argues that material power assets—such as mili-
tary and economy—are not the only resources available for countries in
this understanding. A country’s values, culture and foreign policy should
be seen as soft-power assets as they might be instrumental in inducing
behavioral change in the international arena (Nye 2011). The power-
related debates receive contributions predominantly from IR scholars.
A mainstream realist conception of power is predominantly interested
in the ability of states to use their material resources to achieve results
(Barnett and Duvall 2005), whereas Nye (1990a) defends the role of imma-
terial soft-power assets in foreign affairs. His initial studies on soft power
are not the only IR scholarship arguing for a move away from hard-power
understanding. Especially after the end of the Cold War era, it is believed
that military resources and capabilities cannot be seen as the sole require-
ment of power for a given country, as power lies in the ability to change
behavior, and not only in material resources (Nye 1990b, 154–155). It is
even argued that the great powers are moving towards shared economic
and political norms in their relations, making arm races and security alli-
ance formations of the Cold War era almost obsolete (J. M. Goldgeier
and McFaul 1992, 491). The traditional test of a great power was the
capacity to wage and win wars; yet, within the post–Cold War context, the
emphasis on military might is replaced by other factors such as technology,
education and economy (Nye 1990b, 154). Soft power is introduced as
the new way to obtain the outcomes a country wants—through cooption
and attraction, rather than military coercion (Nye 1990a).
28 E. SEVIN
In his subsequent writings, Nye further develops the concept of soft

power, influenced by the works of Steven Lukes. Lukes (1974, 2005)
divides soft power into three distinct categories, called the three dimen-
sions of power. One-dimensional power is based on Robert Dahl’s (1957,
202–203) understanding that “A has power over B to the extent that he
[sic] can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do.” The two-
dimensional power builds on the former concept and adds the capacity to
dictate the issues and topics of debate, in other words an agenda-setting
capacity. The three-dimensional power focuses on the ability to shape per-
ceptions, cognitions and preferences. Nye (2004, 4–5) similarly postu-
lates that power does not necessarily manifest itself in a command and/or
threat causing a behavioral change but also lies in the ability to shape the
preferences of others.
Soft-power studies generated a number of relevant concepts with smart
power, sticky power and social power being three of the most prominent
concepts. Smart power is based on Nye’s (2004, 10) argument that soft
power should not be seen as a universal solution to each and every foreign
policy issues. Nye (2011) underlines the need for the ability to combine
hard- and soft-power resources to reach desired outcomes, and labels this
combination as smart power. Sticky power refers to the shared economic and
political norms between countries. A country might be central enough in
a given economic or political institution making it difficult for other actors
to act against its own interests (Mead 2004). Social power, a concept recon-
figured for public diplomacy studies by Peter van Ham (2010, 8), expands
the concept of soft power to include “discursive power, drawing attention
to the impact of framing, norm advocacy, agenda setting, [and] the impact
of media and communications.” Within all these power understandings,
public diplomacy is the process of interacting with target audiences in other
countries. Public diplomacy might be seen as a tool to project a coun-
try’s immaterial power assets (Nye 2011) and increase its attractiveness in
the eyes of foreign publics (Goldsmith and Horiuchi 2009) or to generate
more power assets by “establishing standards, and create norms and values
that are deemed legitimate and desirable” (van Ham 2010, 8).
IR studies contribute to the field of public diplomacy by conceptual-
izing it as an expected aspect of state behavior in the international soci-
ety of states. States, which have traditionally attempted to communicate
with other sovereign states, are increasingly including non-state actors
in their diplomatic outreach. Public diplomacy is the “instrument that
governments use to mobilize these resources, culture, values, policy to
communicate with and attract the publics of other countries, rather than
merely their governments” (Nye 2008, 95). Public diplomacy also inher-
ently carries a power aspect as the practice of public diplomacy projects
or generates soft/sticky/social power for states, thus enabling them to use
further tools to reach their foreign policy objectives in addition to hard-
power resources.
Joseph Nye’s works are invaluable in situating public diplomacy within
the larger IR field. In his more recent works, Nye accentuates the impor-
tance of promoting and participating in cross-border networks that include
both governmental and non-governmental actors through communica-
tion and public diplomacy (Nye 2010). These communication processes
are composed of three circles: daily communications to explain the context
for domestic and foreign policy decisions; strategic communications which
communicate a set of simple themes similar to a political campaign; and
development of lasting relationships with target audiences including indi-
viduals and institutions (Nye 2011, 105–106).
These disciplines bring invaluable insights to different aspects of public
diplomacy—such as communication highlighting the role of media plat-
forms and PR demonstrating the similarities between practices. The next
section, building on the key strengths drawn from different definition,
provides information about more contemporary practices and studies of
public diplomacy under “new” public diplomacy heading.
2.2 A “New” Public Diplomacy?

Joseph Nye is not the only scholar to signal a change in the conceptual-
ization of public diplomacy. In a field rich of disagreements, virtually all
scholars agree on one subject: there has been a change in the practice of
public diplomacy in the post-9/11 world. Yet, is the change substantial
enough to require a complete overhaul of the field? Should we dismiss
what we have learned since 1965?
This section presents an answer in three parts. First, the “old” diplo-
macy understanding is introduced through the experience of United States
Information Agency (USIA). Second, the “new” public diplomacy under-
standing is analyzed through the changes in and the academic work on
the American practice that highlight a relational understanding of public
diplomacy. Both the “old” and the “new” understandings of public diplo-
macy are influenced predominantly by the American experience, with the
former being colored by the experience of the USIA (Cull 2008a) and the
30 E. SEVIN
latter with the American attempts to reach out to the Middle Eastern and
other foreign publics in the post-9/11 world (Zaharna 2010). Therefore,
a history of American public diplomacy is vital, yet not enough, to our
understanding of old and new public diplomacy. Especially within the
last two decades, more and more states have been establishing their own
public diplomacy practices, thus influencing the way public diplomacy is
understood This is why the third section introduces non-American con-
ceptualizations of public diplomacy to complete the answer.
2.2.1 From the Early Days of USIA to 9/11

Public diplomacy was first coined to cater to the needs of the American
international communication practices. The country needed “a more
benign alternative to terms like propaganda and psychological warfare,
mainly to stress the contrast with the manipulative practices and totalitar-
ian nature of the USSR” (van Ham 2010, 115). An earlier brochure by
the Edward R. Murrow Center for Public Diplomacy (2010) provides the
first definition provided by Edmund Gullion as the following:
Public diplomacy … deals with the influence of public attitudes on the

formation and execution of foreign policies. It encompasses dimensions
of international relations beyond traditional diplomacy; the cultivation by
governments of public opinion in other countries; the interaction of private
groups and interests in one country with those of another; the reporting
of foreign affairs and its impact on policy; communication between those
whose job is communication, as between diplomats and foreign correspon-
dents; and the processes of inter-cultural communications.
This definition conclusively situated public diplomacy as a concept

related to communication and foreign affairs for American practitioners
and policy-makers. The USIA subsequently adopted the concept as an
umbrella term covering most of its activities from international broadcast-
ing to exchange programs. In academia, the field of study similarly grew
bigger to cover various governmental activities aimed at communicating
with foreign audiences—including but not limited to cultural diplomacy,
sports diplomacy and arts diplomacy.
The USIA has revolved around combating misinformation during
the Cold War. Public diplomacy was seen as part of the fight between
the United States and the communist world. With the end of the Cold
War, the raison d’être for the Agency was abolished, and it lost most of
its budget and staff before its eventual move into the Department of State
(DoS) in 1999. A new position, Undersecretary for Public Diplomacy and
Public Affairs (R), was created and tasked with leading the country’s com-
munication efforts.
Shortly after this merger, another American experience challenged the
way public diplomacy is understood and practiced across the world. The
terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, in New York City initially made
the American policy-makers realize that foreign perceptions of the coun-
try might have consequences even within the country’s borders (Zaharna
2010). Moreover, it was observed that especially in the Middle East, there
was a love-hate relationship with the American culture: people were con-
suming American cultural products and harboring anti-American senti-
ments at the same time (Hoffman 2002). American public diplomacy was
once again called to action to communicate with foreign audiences.
2.2.2 Reviving Public Diplomacy: The Relational Turn

The initial public diplomacy response after 9/11 was to disseminate
information via mass media by establishing radio and TV stations, as well
as publications (Zaharna 2007). Charlotte Beers was appointed to lead
R, thus to coordinate all American public diplomacy attempts in 2002.
Her Shared Values Initiative aimed to present how Muslims were treated
within the United States, targeting Muslim countries through television
commercials (Fullerton and Kendrick 2006). Most of these attempts were
unsuccessful in reaching the target audiences, as they were dismissed
as being propaganda messages (Zaharna 2007). In this particular case,
broadcasting pieces of information proved to be an inefficient method, as
the American media outlets and messages were not perceived as credible
sources in the region. There was a need for a new type of public diplomacy
that acknowledged the demands of the audience and moved beyond solely
sending out messages.
Scholars introduced various concepts to define the next stage in public
diplomacy. Jan Melissen (2007b, 13–14) simply calls it “the new public
diplomacy” and argues that governments can see “more and more that
they have to engage in dialogue with foreign audiences as a condition of
success in foreign policy.” Paul Sharp (2007, 106) also uses “new public
diplomacy” as the term and defines it as “the process by which direct
relations are pursued with a country’s people to advance the interests.”
The main criticism towards pre-9/11 practices is based on the fact that
32 E. SEVIN
public diplomacy is seen as a one-way information transfer mechanism.

The “new” public diplomacy engages in a dialogue and establishes rela-
tionships with target audiences.
Ali Fisher (2008) builds an analogy with the software development and
creates the concept of open source public diplomacy. An open source under-
standing requires transparency and inclusiveness. All the participants are
aware of the software development process and actively contribute. Thus,
this approach to public diplomacy encourages engagement in collective
efforts among people in an open and transparent manner. Through public
diplomacy projects, governments seek to build and belong to certain com-
munities that share similar goals and objectives (Hayden 2009).
Geoffrey Cowan and Amelia Arsenault (2008) introduce the concept
of collaborative diplomacy. They argue that projects can take the form of
cross-national collaborations referring to the “initiatives in which partici-
pants from different nations participate in a project together” (Cowan
and Arsenault 2008, 21). Instead of a monologue (i.e. one-way message
transfer) or a dialogue (i.e. two-way communication), public diplomacy
might be based on creating a joint project between interested parties from
different countries so that audiences convene around shared objectives,
rather than messages.
R.S. Zaharna (2005) calls for a network paradigm of public diplomacy
in which actors try to persuade each other through establishing relations
and networks. Her research looks at the network structures, network syn-
ergy and network strategy referring to understanding the relationships,
diversity and information use/exchange processes within a network,
respectively (Zaharna 2007, 219–220). Public diplomacy is therefore
about designing and managing networks (Zaharna 2014, 20).
Another concept, public diplomacy 2.0 accentuates the role and capa-
bilities of new digital communication platforms in this new era of pub-
lic diplomacy. Apart from the changes in the needs of the audience,
the twenty-first century also started with a drastic rise in the number of
personal computers and internet penetration. Currently, any individual
with internet access can generate content online and start sharing his or
her views with the other users.6 Based on this understanding of online
communications, several social media platforms, such as Facebook, Twitter,
Instagram and Vine, were launched in which users are encouraged to
create content and social connections and share these content and con-
nections with other users. Social media does not follow the one-way and
one-to-many communication understandings of traditional media but is
based on a two-way and one-to-one communication understanding. The

audience no longer passively accepts the messages coming from media
platforms but is an active part of message creation. The audience is no
longer solely interested in messages but is also concerned with establishing
relations. Public diplomacy 2.0 argues that projects can take place through
social media platforms in which users can actively form and exchange opin-
ions (Arsenault 2009). These approaches position new technologies—in
this case internet-based communication platforms—not only as means or
tools (Ross 2011). The possibility of engagement and two-way communi-
cation facilitated through these technologies also influence the way public
diplomacy is understood.
The attempts to describe the differences between the “new” and “old”
public diplomacy enjoy a plethora of new concepts and names. Despite
the differences among the aforementioned concepts, it is possible to argue
for certain common traits (Fitzpatrick 2011). First, one-way communi-
cation is left behind. During the last couple of decades, we observed a
proliferation of actors in the international arena with civil society, cor-
porations and even individuals becoming more influential. New public
diplomacy understanding accentuates the importance of non-state actors
and argues that states need to listen to these audiences as well as opposed
to the old public diplomacy approach of solely sending messages to these
actors (Cull 2008b). States now are expected to engage in a dialogue with
the target populations. For instance, the Cold War era American public
diplomacy invested in one-way message dissemination projects and did
not necessarily take the views and ideas of the audiences into consider-
ation in designing and executing projects (Gregory 2008). New public
diplomacy values interaction with the audiences, let it be in the form of a
dialogue or in the form of collaboration in projects that are relevant to all
parties involved (Cowan and Arsenault 2008). Second, the focus of pub-
lic diplomacy projects has shifted away from message exposure towards
relationship building (Melissen 2007b). The content of the message is
still considered important; however, new public diplomacy projects value
building relations and networks more than message dissemination in the
attempts to advance policy objectives (van Doeveren 2011). Practitioners
started to focus on establishing and sustaining relations with foreign audi-
ences, instead of solely exposing them to messages. Scholars have reflected
on this change in practice, and conceptualized public diplomacy as oper-
ating within a new relational paradigm. Scholars propose the concept of
relational public diplomacy to describe the new public diplomacy practice.
34 E. SEVIN
Relational public diplomacy does not necessarily replace the other con-
cepts but is rather an umbrella concept. In other words, public diplomacy
2.0 or open source public diplomacy projects are also relational public
diplomacy projects by definition as they acknowledge the role of two-way
communication with non-state actors.
2.2.3 Globalizing Public Diplomacy

Apart from the relational turn in practice, contemporary public diplomacy
presents another important change. Even though the American practice has
been influential in creating and spreading the idea of public diplomacy, it is
no longer the sole practitioners. Moreover, most countries that have been
engaging in activities similar to public diplomacy have started explicitly
embracing the term.7 Thus, the American monopoly on public diplomacy
is left behind with these countries crafting their own conceptualizations
of public diplomacy and establishing their practices. An inclusive under-
standing of public diplomacy can no longer be reached solely through
analyzing the American experience as the other countries’ practices are not
necessarily perfect replicas of the American practice. Jan Melissen (2007a),
for instance, argues that other states conduct public diplomacy for very
different reasons and points to the importance of studying their practices.
China, as an upcoming player in the public diplomacy scene, is actively
trying to rebrand itself in conjunction with its objective of increasing its
economic interactions with the rest of the world (Björner 2013). The
country is working to alter “its image across the globe, from threat to
opportunity, from danger to benefactor” (Kurlantzick 2007, 5). China
has various historical and cultural assets to be used in its public diplomacy
outreach, as well as liabilities due to its social and political life that is not
consistent with the Western expectations (d’Hooge 2007). Besides the
informational activities, China also conducts relational public diplomacy
through its Confucius Institutes (Hartif 2012) and foreign aid projects
(Zhang 2006). In other words, China uses public diplomacy to rebrand
the country through informational and relational activities.
British public diplomacy was historically based on the educational and
cultural works of the British Council (Pamment 2013). The entire strat-
egy was solely “a loose emphasis on promoting the national brand” (Cull
2009, 5). In the recent years, there has been a rapid change in the way
public diplomacy is conceptualized and practiced in the country (Pamment
2012). Currently, it is seen as a tool that focuses on strategic objectives
relevant to British foreign policy (Cull 2009, 5). The country accepts “the
principle of ‘the need for dialogue’” and uses public diplomacy to establish
“broader reciprocal understanding” between the United Kingdom and
other countries, led primarily by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office
(Leonard 2005, 52). The projects help the country to communicate and
build relations with foreign publics.
Jozef Bátora (2005) postulates that the public diplomacy conduct of
small and medium powers is different from “big power” countries, such as
the United States. In his study of Norway and Canada, Bátora concludes
that the former positions public diplomacy as a function of the Foreign
Ministry to represent the country abroad to non-state actors, while the
latter uses an array of institutions and agencies to share Canadian values.
Norwegian public diplomacy strategy is to portray the country as one that
is actively concerned with and works on human rights issues through infor-
mation programs (Leonard 2002). Canadian public diplomacy is designed
to promote Canadian values and economic development, more often than
not to domestic audiences. Both rely on information campaigns, with a
relatively lower interest in relationships (Vickers 2004).
This particular research studies two countries in addition to the American
experience: Sweden and Turkey. The Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs
sees and uses Swedish public diplomacy as a tool for establishing state-to-
civil society and state-to-people relationships.8 The main objective is to
promote the Swedish contributions to the world.9 The majority of projects
are coordinated by the Swedish Institute (SI) and executed by Swedish
embassies and consulates. More often than not, these projects aim to build
up long-lasting relationships and partnerships between Sweden and for-
eign publics.10
Turkish public diplomacy is seen as a tool to increase Turkish politi-
cal influence through perception and information management.11 Public
diplomacy projects are designed and coordinated by various government
agencies, including but not limited to, broadcasting and development
agencies.12 The “Office of Public Diplomacy” was recently established to
coordinate public diplomacy efforts (Başbakanlık 2010). Turkey considers
public diplomacy as a unique tool to connect with foreign audiences as
it relies on informational campaigns for other outreach activities such as
nation branding and cultural promotions.13
Succinctly stated, in the current global practice, there is a need for a work-
ing definition that acknowledges three changes: the move beyond disciplin-
ary borders, the “new” public diplomacy understanding and the diversity
36 E. SEVIN
of practitioner countries. There is already a substantive push in academia

to move beyond boundaries in public diplomacy. Eytan Gilboa (2008) and
Craig Hayden (2009), for instance, suggested a multi-disciplinary perspec-
tive for future studies, inviting contributions from different disciplines.
Henry Sun (2008) argued that public diplomacy is inter-disciplinary as it
is related to marketing, communication and IR fields. Liam Kennedy and
Scott Lucas (2005) labeled their work on American public diplomacy and
foreign policy as cross-disciplinary as they try to present different disciplin-
ary perspectives to concepts such as nation, state and identity. Similarly,
during the annual convention of the International Studies Association, a
working group on public diplomacy brought scholar together to discuss
inter-disciplinary and multi-disciplinary approaches to public diplomacy.14
These meetings and scholarly works demonstrate that there is an awareness
within academic circles that an array of disciplines is required to advance
the studies, yet the expected nature of cooperation between disciplines
is—such as inter-disciplinary or multi-disciplinary—unclear.
Multi-, inter- and cross-disciplinary approaches provide different
frameworks to move beyond disciplinary boundaries. Multi-disciplinary
approaches tend to bring scholars from various fields together and expect
them to use their disciplinary knowledge to tackle their research ques-
tions (Stember 1991). Public diplomacy literature, thus far, has been a
multi-disciplinary effort. Inter-disciplinary approaches, on the other hand,
involve “familiarity with components of two or more disciplines … [and
combine] components of two or more disciplines in the search or creation
of new knowledge, operations, or artistic expressions” (Nissani 1997, 203).
Public diplomacy scholars have already produced several inter-disciplinary
works, including Sun’s aforementioned 2008 work combining power and
marketing theories. Cross-disciplinary work proposes using one discipline
to look at other disciplines, such as the work of Kennedy and Lucas using
IR theories to look at relationship management issues (Love 2002).
In order to adequately analyze a concept that expands over a variety of
disciplines, a transdisciplinary approach is necessary—one that integrates
and synthesizes content across disciplines based on the research questions
(Gray 2008, 124). Based on the key strengths drawn from different defini-
tions, it is argued that in order to study the relationship between foreign
policy and an episode of public diplomacy, there is a need for a transdis-
ciplinary approach that encourages a research design led by the research
questions and the state of the practice, rather than the availability of theo-
ries and research methods within a specific discipline.
In addition to moving beyond disciplinary borders, there is a need to

acknowledge the new public diplomacy practice. This research uses the rela-
tional public diplomacy concept. The reason for choosing relational public
diplomacy over the other available concepts in the literature is threefold.
First, the term has familiarity to audiences within the public diplomacy field.
The concept is already being used to underline the aforementioned changes
from old public diplomacy. Second, its position as an umbrella concept
makes it a better analytical tool for a comparative study in the era of new
public diplomacy. Relational public diplomacy makes it possible to make
comparisons between collaborative diplomacy and networked diplomacy
projects or any other new public diplomacy practice by highlighting their
shared characteristics. Third, the concept is parsimonious because “rela-
tional” as a word explicitly refers to the nature of the practice as opposed to
other less direct terms such as “new” public diplomacy.
Last but not the least, the definition must be applicable to multiple
countries. Based on the summary of existing definitions and approaches, I
argue that public diplomacy is fundamentally a communication tool used
by states to create impact in the international political arena. Yet, a more
detailed definition requires the acknowledgment of the role of commu-
nication, actors involved in the communication activities, state functions
and, lastly, the expected outcomes of such activities. The working defini-
tion I employ uses public diplomacy to refer to the communication-based
activities of states and state-sanctioned actors aimed at non-state groups in
other countries with the expectation of helping to achieve foreign policy goals
and objectives. Within this definition, public diplomacy is an extension of
traditional diplomacy in terms of the actors and objectives and is linked
with foreign policy goals. The next section explains this particular link by
explaining what success means in public diplomacy.
2.3 Measuring the Impact of Public Diplomacy

The debates on how to measure the impacts of public diplomacy are at
least as rich as the definition discussions. There is virtually no agreement
on even what to measure—let alone how to measure. What shows—for
instance—the success of the Fulbright program, the flagship educational
exchange program of the United States? Should we look at the actual
program outputs (i.e. is the program instrumental in exchanging stu-
dents?) or project outcomes (i.e. can the program increase inter-cultural
understanding?) or political outcomes (i.e. does the United States have
38 E. SEVIN
better relations with foreign countries?)? If we decide on measure political

outcomes, should we focus on economic relations or political relations?
Even if we decide on what and how to measure, how can we attribute the
changes specifically to the public diplomacy program, given the fact that
there are various other variables?
Unsurprisingly, there is no one single recipe for analyzing the impact
of public diplomacy, as different approaches require different evaluation
models (Banks 2011). For the purposes of this research, the impact of pub-
lic diplomacy is based on the working definition provided above. Public
diplomacy projects have a specific objective—regardless of their nature
and tools: helping to achieve foreign policy goals. Therefore, a project
can be deemed successful only if its contribution to foreign policy can be
demonstrated. In other words, project outcomes are not by themselves
sufficient to deem a project successful. Rather, these project-based success
criteria—such as number of visitors to an exhibition or positive participant
testimonies after an exchange project—should be used to reflect on how a
given project might help advance national interests.
Throughout the American, Swedish and Turkish case studies, I employ
process-tracing to connect the project outputs with the foreign policy out-
comes. Each and every public diplomacy project included in this study
is explicitly linked with a foreign policy objective by the practitioners.
While going through archival documents and interviewing practitioners,
I looked for three types of evidence to argue for the contribution of pub-
lic diplomacy to foreign policy: trace, account and sequence (Beach and
Pedersen 2013, 99–105). Trace evidence is the first step. For instance, if
we are to argue that an international broadcasting project is expected to
help achieve a foreign policy by changing the public opinion, first, we
need to establish the fact that the project is designed to reach the public.
An example of trace evidence would be the existence of a media rating
report. Account evidence is about the content of the material. If the media
rating report shows that the foreign public is following the project, our
argument gets stronger. Last piece of evidence, sequence, deals with the
chronology of the event. In order for an argument to be accepted as true,
the stages should follow each other such as the acknowledgment of an ini-
tially unfavorable (or less favorable) public opinion, followed by a public
diplomacy project, followed by an expected change towards favorable as
a result. If this sequence of events is not observed, the initial argument
might not be a plausible explanation.
These pieces of evidence are used to test the arguments throughout

the cases. David Collier (2011) introduces several tests for process-tracing
studies, three of which are used in this research: hoop, smoking-gun and
doubly decisive.15 Hoop tests are necessary for confirming the hypotheses.
If a given explanation fails the hoop test in a given case, it is disregarded.
Smoking-gun tests are similar to a literal smoking-gun in a murder case.
If a suspect is caught with a smoking-gun, it is highly likely that he or
she is the culprit. However, lack of a smoking-gun does not necessarily
prove innocence as the gun might be somewhere else. Passing a smok-
ing-gun test increases the confidence, while a failure slightly weakens it.
Doubly decisive tests, as the name suggests, present important contribu-
tions both when they are passed and failed. Failing such a test eliminates
an argument, whereas passing increases our confidence in it and decreases
our confidence in rival or contradicting arguments. I use systematic hoop,
smoking-gun and doubly decisive tests with the help of respectively trace,
account and sequence evidence to evaluate the empirical performance of
proposed links between project outputs and outcomes.16
Fundamentally, I propose theoretical arguments that can be used to
link project outputs and outcomes in Chap. 3 and test these arguments
through the subsequent chapters to present an inclusive explanation of
how public diplomacy projects might help achieve foreign policy goals. In
order to find the pieces of necessary pieces of evidence to employ Collier’s
tests, I focus on the practice of public diplomacy. The next part explains
how—as well as why—I chose to study the practice specifically.
2.4 Studying the Practice of Public Diplomacy

The driving force of this research is a practice-based research question.
Therefore, a transdisciplinary approach in defining the boundaries of pub-
lic diplomacy ensures that the research design incorporates the leading
role of the research question and practice. Following the practice turn in
IR (Adler and Pouliot 2008), the focus is on the action of public diplo-
macy as it is carried out by the practitioners throughout the case studies
(Neumann 2002, 628). This means the analytical attention is directed at
what practitioners actually do in the field (Adler and Pouliot 2011, 5).
The inquiry aims to get objective conclusions from how the practitioners
see the role of their projects in the larger framework of foreign policy.
Public diplomacy research cannot be complete if the focus is solely
on testing theories by using enacted practices or by documenting the
40 E. SEVIN
experiences of the practitioners. The former faces the danger of mistaking

the enacted disciplines as the entire practice process (Pouliot 2008). A
post-hoc theoretical explanation of a practice solely projects its assump-
tions to the practice and cannot see the whole picture (Pouliot 2008).
The latter presents the accounts of the practitioners, yet, practitioners tend
to take their situation for granted and do not necessarily reflect on their
work or try to understand the reasons for their actions (Neumann 2012,
19). There is a need to go beyond objective and subjective approaches to
knowledge and explain the logic of practice—which is not that of the logi-
cian (Bourdieu 1990, 86). Thus, the accounts of the practitioners cannot
be taken as the answer to the research question posed. Rather, there is a
need to consolidate the objective theoretical framework with the subjec-
tive information gathered about the practice.
Based on the need to objectively analyze the subjective data, three
components are introduced to each case chapter in this research: context,
practice and theory.17 The public diplomacy practice is positioned within
appropriate political and historical context. Practices evolve over time, and
such historical changes might influence contemporary practices (Adler and
Pouliot 2008). The analysis of public diplomacy practice in this research,
situated within the history of public diplomacy and foreign policy. For prac-
tice, the logic of practice is studied in each case to understand how public
diplomacy can contribute to the achievement of foreign policy goals. The
term logic of practice is used to refer to how the practitioners see their own
work—including their definition of public diplomacy and understanding
of their responsibilities. Their explanations of their own work are taken as
a starting point. For theory, Chap. 3 identifies six pathways of connection
through an analysis of the public diplomacy literature. These pathways are
used to ground the practices in theory following the three areas of connec-
tion between foreign policy goals and public diplomacy goals: public opin-
ion, relationship dynamics and public debate. Pathways are propositions
that explain how public diplomacy projects contribute to the achievement
of foreign policy goals.
Despite being a relatively new field of study predominantly composed
of descriptive single-cases, it is not impossible to study public diplomacy
from an analytical and a comparative point of view. In this chapter, I
focused on explaining what I mean by relational public diplomacy and
why I prefer to use this particular concept to describe contemporary prac-
tices. I then described how I conceptualize the impact of public diplo-
macy and what I see as public diplomacy practice. Next chapter completes
the analytical framework by providing definitions for the six pathways of

connection—the arguments that connect outputs and outcomes in public
diplomacy.
Notes
1. The figure is taken from a separate meta-literature review study carried out
by a team including the author.
2. Web 2.0 is used to describe the new second generation of information
creation on the World Wide Web. First-generation websites, Web 1.0,
share published content with the users. Second-generation websites, Web
2.0, asks for the input of users to create content through comments, blog
posts, social media or other available tools.
3. A 2011 forum, jointly organized by George Washington University
Institute for Public Diplomacy and Global Communication, The Public
Diplomacy Council and the Walter Roberts Endowment, was entitled
“The Last Three Feet: New Media, New Approaches and New Challenges
for American Public Diplomacy.” The forum shows the relevance of face-
to-face communication in the study of public diplomacy, despite the
advancements in communication technologies. Further information about
the conference and a link to the schedule can be found here: http://
publicdiplomacycouncil.org/2011-fall-forum-last-three-feet. Last accessed
27 June 2016.
4. Three feet equals 91.44 cm.
5. For various case examples, the readers can refer to William P. Kiehl’s edited
volume published in 2012, entitled The Last Three Feet: Case Studies in
Public Diplomacy.
6. Graham Cormode and Balanchander Krishnamurthy explain the character-
istics of Web 2.0 as well as its differences from Web 1.0 in their 2008
article. Cormode, Graham, and Balachander Krishnamurthy. 2008. “Key
Differences between Web 1.0 and Web 2.0.” First Monday 13 (6). http://
firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/2125
7. Countries have engaged in projects that were actually public diplomacy in
nature. For instance, Turkey started student exchanges with Central Asian
countries as early as 1990s (Akdiş 1999). Sweden started engaging foreign
populations through communication campaigns in 1945 (SI 2013). The
British Council started working on educational and cultural projects in
1930s (Pamment 2013) However, none of these three countries used the
public diplomacy concept to describe their communication activities until
early twenty-first century.
8. Håkan Hjort (Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs), phone interview with
the author, 7 November 2013.
42 E. SEVIN
9. Sergio Guimaraes (Swedish Institute), personal interview with the author,

6 February 2013.
10. Sofia Bard (Swedish Institute), personal interview with the author, 10
October 2013.
11. Mesut Özcan (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs), personal interview
with the author, 25 September 2013.
12. Cemalettin Haşimi (Office of Public Diplomacy, Turkey), personal inter-
view with the author, 15 March 2013.
13. Ayda Ünlü (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs), personal interview with
the author, 25 September 2013.
14. The full program of the preconference working group can be found here
http://www.isanet.org/Portals/0/Media/Conferences/Montreal2011/
DPLST%20WG%20Summary.pdf. Last accessed 30 June 2016.
15. David Collier (2001) introduces four tests in his work. Straw-in-the-wind
tests can also be applied in process tracing. If an argument passes this test,
its relevance is affirmed; if it fails, its relevance is weakened. As this type of
test is neither sufficient nor necessary for affirming causal links, it is not
included in this research.
16. A more detailed explanation of these tests can be found in Appendix A. I
advise the readers to go through Chap. 3 before going into the Appendix.
17. Here, I should note that Bourdieu’s (1990) “logic of practice” and

Pouliot’s (2007) sobjectivism concepts were influential in this approach to
the research. The latter concept encouraged me to rely predominantly on
the views of practitioners that I gathered through interviews and archival
research. Bourdieu’s explanation of practice through the concepts of habi-
tus and doxa helped me to structure the case chapters and presented the
need to contextualize my cases in the history.
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CHAPTER 3
Six Pathways of Connection:

A Theoretical Framework
As argued by the former American Undersecretary for Public Affairs and

Public Diplomacy (R) James Glassman (2008) explicitly introduced in a
speech delivered at the New America Foundation, the objective of pub-
lic diplomacy is “to engage foreign publics to make it easier to achieve
U.S. foreign policy goals, both short and long term.” Public diplomacy is
indeed by definition an item in the foreign policy toolkit. Together with
other instruments, such as traditional diplomacy, trade and military, public
diplomacy is expected to help a country achieve its foreign policy goals.
Yet, questions remain about “how” such a move from public diplomacy to
foreign policy can be drawn. This section employs a framework to orga-
nize the existing studies and practices on the impacts of public diplomacy
to present an exclusive description of different areas on which public
diplomacy can manifest an impact on foreign policy. Given the fact that
the link between foreign policy and public diplomacy is understudied and
underexplained among the scholars of public diplomacy, this framework
also uses mainstream international relations (IR) theories to explore how
communication might be influential in the conduct of global politics.
One of the main objectives of this book is to position public diplomacy
in the larger practice of foreign affairs by answering a question posed at the
nature of the relationship between these two concepts: “Public diplomacy
works, but how?”1 In this chapter, six pathways of connection framework
is introduced in five steps. First, the plausible areas of impact for public

52 E. SEVIN
diplomacy are introduced. Using three prominent IR theories—realism,

liberalism and constructivism—three main areas are identified—public
opinion, relationship dynamics and public debates. The subsequent three
sections introduce two pathways per impact area, one of which has a wider
scope and the other being more focused. Each pathway includes a theoreti-
cal foundation, based on the prior scholarship in the field and an explicit
assumption about how public diplomacy can manifest its impact on foreign
policy and contribute to the achievement of foreign policy goals. These
assumptions are worded as expectations and are used to assess whether a
given pathway can explain the outcomes of the public diplomacy project
studied. In other words, in each case, it is discussed whether a given path-
way can present a partial or complete explanation of how public diplo-
macy works. The last section brings all six pathways together and provides
details about how I use the framework to analyze the three cases described
in this book.
3.1 Areas of Impacts

An inquiry into how public diplomacy works inherently includes assump-
tions about the workings of global politics. If a practitioner decides to
employ a communication project to influence foreign policy outcomes,
the underlying assumption here is that communication is a significant vari-
able in global politics. Therefore, the areas of impact can be explored by
linking communication to arguments and assumptions in IR theories (for a
similar study on public diplomacy following realism and liberalism, cf. Yun
and Toth 2009). Here, the objective is not to introduce a debate over the
validity of these theories. Rather, all three mainstream theories—realism,
liberalism and constructivism—are introduced as equally acceptable and
reliable sets of arguments about how international system works. Public
diplomacy is amended to the extracts of the assumptions and expectations
of these theories regarding global politics.
Realism, one of the most prominent schools of thought in IR, sees
the international arena as composed of state actors, all of which have
power-relevant conflicts operating under an anarchic structure (cf. Waltz
1959). Despite the variance among different camps within the realism
school, the common themes are that (1) states are the only important
actors in the global scene, (2) states seek to maximize their power and
(3) states have conflicting interests. Within this perspective, public diplo-
macy projects should not consider foreign publics as their ultimate target
SIX PATHWAYS OF CONNECTION: A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 53
audiences. Within the grand scheme of power plays and conflicts among
states, publics are not considered as important actors. The rise and fall of
the Almond-Lippmann consensus explains the procedure through which a
realist approach might explain the link between foreign policy and public
diplomacy.
Almond-Lippmann consensus is a prominent framework based on the
combination of Gabriel Almond’s and Walter Lippmann’s works and ideas
and argues that public opinion cannot be seen as a factor in policy-making.
Almond in his influential book The American People and Foreign Policy
argues that at least half of the American population is not informed about
world affairs and portrays apathy to the issues (Almond 1960). Similarly,
Lippmann argues that the common man spends more time thinking about
his daily life than world politics and is too uninterested in these events to
make an informed opinion (Lippmann 1922). The consensus view, con-
sequently, presents that the public attitudes on world affairs are highly
volatile and lack a structure, thus public opinion does not have a consider-
able impact on foreign policy. These arguments are supported by research
conducted shortly after the World War II about the role of the United
States in the international arena (cf. Holsti 1992). However, the Vietnam
War and post-war developments posed important challenges to the con-
sensus and led to its collapse. The Cold War era polling studies of pub-
lic attitudes presented “correlational evidence that policy changes are in
fact predominantly in the direction favored by the public” (Holsti 1992,
459). Even though publics are not actors themselves in foreign policy,
they have proven their capacity to influence the behavior of the states.
Public diplomacy projects are expected to change the attitudes of the pub-
lic to influence the state behavior. The main assumption is that the public
is important in foreign policy only due to the capacity of public opinion
to change the state behavior. The first area of impact is, thus, the public
opinion within the host countries.
Influencing public attitudes in a foreign country, thus, might be pre-
sented as a viable method to change policy directions in a country. The
writings of Simon Anholt on national reputation and branding also point
to the importance of public opinion and perception in the realm of for-
eign affairs. The “nation-brand” concept proposes that international con-
sumer brands are affected by how their home country is conceived by
the consumers (Anholt 1998). For instance, a consumer is likely to pay a
higher price for a Japanese electronic device than a Chinese brand or for
an Italian suit than a German one. Subsequent works in the field have also
54 E. SEVIN
demonstrated that nation brands are not only limited to country of origin
effect, rather, the perception of these nations were affecting their capacity
to compete with each other for limited resources—such as foreign direct
investment, qualified workforce and tourism (Anholt 2007). Nations are
becoming “brands” in the sense that their reputations have significant
impact on their social, political and economic interactions (Olins 2000).
Public diplomacy becomes an important tool in establishing, protecting
and sharing nations’ brand images in the eyes of foreign publics. The
majority of the American annual budget to measure the impact of public
diplomacy (around $3 million annually) goes towards public opinion poll-
ing (Center on Public Diplomacy 2006). The famous Public Diplomacy
Model for the Assessment of Performance (PD-MAP), presented by the
Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy (ACPD), also argues for the
need to measure public opinion, as the objective of public diplomacy is to
increase the favorability of the United States in the world (ACPD 2010).
The favorability, in return, makes it easier for the United States—or any
other practitioner country—to achieve its foreign policy goals.
Liberalism argues that interstate relations “do not take place in a vac-
uum” (Nye and Keohane 1971, 329). In other words, IRs compass a
larger scope of events than state-to-state relations. Robert O. Keohane and
Joseph Nye (1972) introduced the idea that foreign affairs and politics are
not only influenced by states but also by the interactions of non-state actors
that they call transnational actors. They categorize global interactions
under four headings: communication (movement of information), trans-
portation (movement of physical objects, including military equipment),
finance (movement of money) and travel (movement of people) (Nye and
Keohane 1971, 332). They further argue that most parts of communi-
cation, transportation and finance are carried out by nation-states, parts
seen as conventional diplomatic activity. However, non- governmental
actors might still play a significant role in the aforementioned transactions
by interacting with governments or with other non-governmental actors,
such as corporations, unions, religious organizations and foundations.
More contemporary foreign policy experiences demonstrate that non-state
actors have developed a capacity to highly influence international agendas
and transform policies in the decades since Keohane and Nye’s work (e.g.
Keck and Sikkink 1999; Ruggie 2004). This does not necessarily mean
that states are not important. On the contrary, states are still dominant and
powerful—probably the most powerful—actors in the international arena.
State-level interactions are still important. However, there is a need to
increase interactions with transnational actors. The second area of impact

is the relationship dynamics between the host and practitioner countries.
Public diplomacy, within this perspective, is a method to communi-
cate with these new actors. Moving away from a mass communication
approach, the states are required to build relations and networks through
mutual message exchanges and collaborations (Zaharna 2007). Through
educational exchanges, states reach out to universities and students, as
well as creating a network in which these individuals and institutions can
work together. Erasmus+ program of the European Union (EU)2 facili-
tates cooperation among more than 100,000 education and training insti-
tutes and is planning to reach out to two million students between 2014
and 2020 (European Commission 2014). As a consequence, public diplo-
macy measurement practices have started to use social network analysis
to analyze the quantity and quality of relations between actors in a given
society (cf. Fisher and Montez 2011). In order to explain the impacts of
Chinese public diplomacy, Aime Yang and Maureen Taylor (2014) analyze
the nature and frequency of communication between the Chinese gov-
ernment and international non-governmental organizations and provide
a map of the network created as a result. Briefly stated, public diplomacy
enables the states to connect with the new actors. Foreign policy out-
comes are achieved with the help of new relations and networks.
Constructivism argues that the structures and identities that IRs oper-
ate on are socially constructed. Alexander Wendt’s (1992) oft-quoted
phrase, anarchy is what states make of it, summarizes the assumptions in
this school of thought. Anarchy, as a phenomenon, does not necessarily
dictate a given set of behaviors. Rather, actors in the international arena
decide on their meanings. Therefore, international actors can be deemed
powerful to the extent that they can influence the meanings of structures
and norm (van Ham 2010). A constructivist public diplomacy, thus, is
based on an assumption that norms, values and identities in IRs are not
defined by material power sources—such as military power or economic
infrastructure—but are social constructs (van Ham 2002). Public diplo-
macy can be seen as a communicative tool which has the potential to
assign new meanings to social constructs. This tool can manipulate these
meanings by encouraging and influencing public discussions in foreign
countries (Gilboa 2008). The third area of impact is the public debates
within the host countries.
Public diplomacy has the capacity to change the discourse about a sub-
ject in a given country. Robert Entman (2008) defines public diplomacy as
56 E. SEVIN
an organized attempt to control the media framing, and indirectly influence

the discussions among people within the society. For instance, French public
diplomacy projects aim to encourage intellectual debates on democracy, and
good governance (Institut Français 2014). German public diplomacy pro-
motes conversations on issues of global concern (Goethe Institute 2015).
The measurement practices incorporate the role of new issues and debates
sparked by the public diplomacy projects. State-led public diplomacy efforts
have long been used to encourage debates on certain issues (Banks 2011).
The evaluation model used by the British Council lists issues awareness and
agenda-setting as two of the expected program outcomes, showing their
relative importance in the eyes of the practitioners (West 2012). The EU
includes messages in its assessment of the outreach campaigns of delega-
tions in other countries (D. Lynch 2005a). In other words, the EU also
monitors the issues and topics that are promoted by its representations in
other countries in their public diplomacy projects. Public diplomacy proj-
ects can help shape the social norms among target audiences.
Public diplomacy is indeed a foreign policy tool. The classification of
realist, liberal and constructivist approach to public diplomacy positions
public diplomacy within IR paradigms and clarifies the areas in which pub-
lic diplomacy projects might yield impact in international affairs. These
categories also facilitate the classification of the outcomes from public
diplomacy projects. In other words, public diplomacy projects might
change the public opinion in a given country, relationship dynamics
between countries and audiences, and the issues discussed in the public.
3.2 Public Opinion: Attraction and Benefit

of the Doubt
Following the realist understanding of how IRs work, it is possible to argue

that publics cannot be the ultimate audience in public diplomacy. Publics
are not actors. But public opinion is an influential variable. A favorable
opinion might create a better foreign policy environment. The key con-
cept in this argument is favorable opinion. What does a favorable public
opinion entail? Within the six pathways of connection framework, favor-
able public opinion might refer to two relevant, yet distinct, situations.
First, a given public might be in awe of a given country’s culture, domes-
tic values and policies, and foreign policy (Nye 1990). Labeled as the soft-
power assets by Joseph Nye, the achievements and practices of a country
in these three areas have the potential to gain the admiration and respect
of foreign publics. A policy outcome might be consequently changed

through attraction and co-option, rather than through using coercive
hard-power capabilities (Nye 1990). Nye uses the role of American popu-
lar culture during the Cold War as an example. He quotes the arguments
of Reinhold Wagnleitner, saying, “The fast adaptation of American popu-
lar culture by many Europeans after the Second World War certainly con-
tributed positively to the democratization of these societies” (As quoted
in Nye 1990, 48). The appreciation towards American culture brought a
more open stance towards free market economy and democratic ideals.
The recent interest in South Korea also supports this argument. Starting
with the countries in the region in 1990s, South Korean soap operas and
singers started to gain wider exposure and recognition outside their home
country. The rise of the country’s export of cultural products—Hallyu
or K-wave—has positively transformed the image of South Korea. For
instance, Hallyu “has led many Taiwanese to remark on the influence of
Korean dramas and pop music in renewing their relationship with South
Korea” (Sung 2010, 43). Similarly, the introduction of Hallyu to Malaysia
led to increased economic and social relations, with the expectation of
stronger bilateral relations in the near future (Cho 2010). The second
source of attraction, domestic values and policies, can be better explained
through the example of the EU. EU’s soft power is not necessarily based
on its culture, given the fact that the Union itself does not have a strong
cultural identity and the cultural assets of member countries are only indi-
rect contributions to soft power (Nielsen 2013). Rather, its soft power is
based on its success “of peaceful integration between previously warring
states” (Nielsen 2013, 729) as well as its support for national economies,
democratic processes and rule-of-law (Tuomioja 2009). Last, a country’s
foreign policy decisions are influential in creating attraction. Nye argues
that the multilateralist understanding of US foreign policy increases its
attractiveness as a legitimate partner; therefore, this can be shown as a
reason for how several American alliances built during the Cold War still
exist decades after the fall of Soviet Union (Nye 2004, 63–66). Briefly
stated, attraction pathway is the operationalization of soft-power con-
cept. Public diplomacy is used to disseminate soft-power assets and to
increase their exposure to wider audiences. Foreign publics, in return, are
expected to have a more favorable stance vis-à-vis the practitioner coun-
try. In other words, public diplomacy’s contribution to foreign policy
happens via views among the target publics (Goldsmith and Horiuchi
2009, 560).
58 E. SEVIN
Second, publics might have a more specific opinion towards the prac-
titioner countries. Benefit of the doubt pathway assumes that public diplo-
macy projects might help achieve foreign policy goals by highlighting the
benevolence of the countries. In other words, public diplomacy becomes
a trust-building exercise in which practitioner countries are portrayed as
actors that have shared or comparable interests with the host countries.
Audiences become more likely to give benefit of the doubt to practitioner
countries, and policies that might look self-serving at a glance might be
reconsidered by target audiences in a more positive manner (Nye 2008,
103). Moreover, in the lack of correct or imperfect information, audi-
ences might side with the practitioner countries based on prior rapport
and mutual trust (Wallin 2015). The concept is often invoked with regard
to American foreign policy and public diplomacy (cf. Advisory Committee
on Cultural Diplomacy 2005). Robert Entman (2008) argues the US
foreign policy as an example that has a domestic benefit of the doubt
but lacks a foreign one. When the United States intervenes in a foreign
land, the American public might see the purpose as altruistic, but for-
eign publics “give the U.S. no such benefit of the doubt” (Entman 2008,
95). Regardless, American policy-makers rely on the concept in their for-
eign policy practices. Recently, President Barack Obama appealed to the
German people and asked them “to give us [the American government]
the benefit of the doubt, given our [German and American] history, as
opposed to assuming the worst” upon the leaked documents showing
that the US agencies tapped German chancellor Angela Merkel’s phone
(Robertson 2015, para. 3). The shared German-American history argu-
ment portrays the two countries as allies who share compatible interests.
Therefore, the German public is asked to consider the tapping incident by
taking this friendly past into consideration. In short, benefit of the doubt
pathway posits that practitioner country can influence foreign policy out-
come by changing the audience perception of its interests and motives in
the international arena.
Attraction and benefit of the doubt pathways conceptualize public opin-
ion as an indirect variable that has the potential to influence the state
behavior. Yet, they do not present the same explanation of what favorable
public opinion means in conjunction with foreign policy outcomes. The
former argues that target audiences might have an overall positive idea
about a country’s culture and policies. The latter postulates a narrower
definition in which favorable public opinion is equated to a more lenient
public reaction.
3.3 Relationship Dynamics: Direct Influence

and Socialization
Traditional diplomacy has a limited perspective on the actors of IRs. The

privilege of international political activity is reserved exclusively to profes-
sional diplomatic corps representing states and intergovernmental organi-
zations. Public diplomacy expands the functions of diplomatic activities by
proving platforms to engage with actors that do not have such a privilege,
including individuals, civil society groups and corporations. The following
two pathways explain how building new relationships might contribute to
the advancement of national interests.
First, new relationships might change the nature of interaction between
two countries. Socialization pathway argues that a public diplomacy proj-
ect can create new roles and responsibilities for the practitioner country
in other society. By its nature, the functions of an embassy are limited to
diplomatic representation and consular activities. Through public diplo-
macy projects, the same embassies might become meeting grounds for
musicians or a funding resource for civil society activities. This pathway
is influenced by social network analysis understanding that examines the
structure of relations through the quantity and nature of interactions
between actors (Wasserman and Faust 1998). Public diplomacy practice
can both increase the quantity and change the nature of relations between
host and practitioner countries. Examples of new or relational public
diplomacy better portray the assumptions of socialization pathway. As
the relationship building is seen as an essential objective of public diplo-
macy (Melissen 2007b; Zaharna 2010), practitioners interact with target
audiences in the form of collaborative projects that bring different actors
together to work for the same project, such as joint concerts or joint devel-
opment efforts (Cowan and Arsenault 2008, 21). For instance, during
the Saudi-American Exchange project, American and Saudi students were
brought together to work on assigned marketing projects during their
exchange visits (Payne 2009). The participants in this exchange project
worked together on a Formula 1 Boating marketing plan for Saudi Arabia.
American students provided academic help to Saudi students in crafting a
marketing plan, thus giving the United States a new function in which to
interact with the Saudi society (Hayden 2009). Another example portray-
ing new roles undertaken by a practitioner country is Schools Online of
the British Council. This project enables schools all around the world to
work together and introduce an international aspect to their curriculum
60 E. SEVIN
(British Council 2015). Therefore, the country becomes a resource for

educators and students in the host country. These new relationships and
functions, as well as the increased level of interaction, might help countries
to achieve their foreign policy goals.
The second pathway follows a narrower understanding of relationships.
Public diplomacy projects can also build communication bridges with
elites in the host countries. Direct influence pathway is based on the direct
lobbying understanding in which parties attempt to persuade key people
who have political decision-making capabilities (Graham and Kelley 2009).
Unlike other pathways discussed in this section, direct influence does not
consider society or certain segments of the society as public diplomacy
audiences. Rather, certain individuals are targeted due to their social and
political connections. This approach to “public diplomacy” might be seen
as contradicting the definition of the term, given the fact that public and
ordinary individuals are ignored. Indeed, there are scholarly works that do
not necessarily consider lobbying as part of public diplomacy as lobbying
focuses on individuals who are within the policymaking circles (Melissen
2007a, 15). Yet, lobbying activities are observed as parts of overall pub-
lic diplomacy practice. Kishan Rana, a former ambassador from India,
argues that public diplomacy has become a lobbying practice (as cited
in Pigman 2010, 121–122). Lobbying-based public diplomacy activities
constituted an important part of Turkey’s unsuccessful bid to host EXPO
̇
2020 in Izmir, Turkey.3 Mexico is known to have spent over $30 million in
Washington, DC-based public diplomacy and lobbying attempts between
1989 and 1993 to get a favorable decision on North Atlantic Free Trade
Agreement discussions from the United States (Manheim 1994, 34) In
short, the contribution to the achievement of foreign policy goals might
happen by communicating directly with decision-makers through public
diplomacy projects.
Socialization and benefit of the doubt pathways see public diplomacy
as the expansion of traditional diplomacy projects. Global politics is no
longer closed to non-state actors ranging from individuals to civil soci-
ety groups to corporations. The first pathway explains the impact on
foreign policy through the new roles and responsibilities undertaken by
practitioner countries as a result of collaboration with local actors. The
second pathway argues for the possibility of communicating directly with
local elites and policy-makers and achieving foreign policy gains by chang-
ing their attitudes.
3.4 Public Debates: Agenda-Setting and Framing
In line with the views of constructivist school of thought, public diplo-

macy projects can also have the objective of influencing the construction
of structures and identities. The basic assumption in the public debates is
that it is possible to influence the topics and coverage of certain issues. In
other words, public diplomacy projects can change the social construc-
tions of norms by prioritizing certain subjects and viewpoints over others.
The next two pathways explain the prioritization of subjects and view-
points, respectively.
Agenda-setting pathway presumes a larger impact on public debates
through introducing new subjects and topics to the public agenda. In
their attempts to explain the effects of media on publics, Max McCombs
and Donald Shaw (1972) demonstrated that there was a high correla-
tion between the issues discussed among undecided voters and the issues
presented in the media. Media outlets, thus, can influence the salience of
topics and lead publics to think about certain topics. Within the agenda-
setting pathway, it is assumed that “issues receiving the most attention in
the media will be perceived by the public as the most important” (Gilboa
2008, 63–64). Public diplomacy projects can directly or indirectly influence
the issues covered in media. States can invest in international broadcast-
ing projects, defined as “an actor’s attempts to manage the international
environment by using the technologies of radio, television, and Internet
to engage with foreign publics” (Cull 2009, 21). Russia’s RT, Britain’s
BBC World Service, France’s France 24 and Germany’s Deutsche Welle are
examples of broadcasting outlets that are partially or wholly owned by
states. All the organizations have the responsibility of promoting their
own countries’ views and interests through media platforms.
States can also use non-broadcasting projects to get the attention
of other media outlets. The United States recently started the “Art in
Embassies” project, during which exhibitions are held on embassy grounds
and ambassadorial residences. The exhibitions are covered by local media
outlets, thus enabling the actors to reach foreign publics. It should be
noted that media agenda is not the only way to increase the salience of a
topic. States can also introduce and/or prioritize certain topics among a
selected group of people without resorting to mediated communication.
For instance, Sweden is trying to push the rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual
and transgender people into the agendas of Eastern and Central European
countries as part of its public diplomacy projects.4 The country does not
62 E. SEVIN
necessarily aim a high volume of media coverage. Rather, the modest aim
is to introduce these topics to the discussions among the participants of
these projects. In agenda-setting pathway, public diplomacy projects con-
tribute to the achievement of foreign policy goals through manipulating
the salience of certain topics via mediated and non-mediated means.
The second pathway, framing, is used to explain the cases in which issues
are already discussed among public, yet the coverage is not friendly to the
interests of the practitioner country. Basically, the pathway argues for the
importance of analyzing which elements of a given issue are included and
excluded in discussions (Entman 1993). The point of view is influential in
the conclusions drawn. As the oft-quoted “one person’s terrorist is another
person’s freedom fighter” summarize, it is possible to frame an issue in
different ways by selectively presenting facts and influence the outcomes.
In their study of strategic international frame-building attempts by Israel
and Palestine, Tamir Sheafer and Itay Gabay (2009, 463) find evidence
supporting the existence of a “highly dynamic and complex media arena
that includes the antagonist actors, foreign governments, and the media
as additional actors, each trying to promote its own framing.” They ana-
lyze the portrayal of two separate events—the Israeli disengagement from
Gaza in 2005 and the Palestinian general elections in 2006—in American
and British media. In the former event, Israel attempts to portray itself as
a non-aggressive actor and in the latter Palestinian frame is based on dem-
onstrating the country as a functioning democracy.
As the findings suggest, these frames were not necessarily picked up by
foreign media and additional frames by other actors were introduced in
media portrayals. The US-led military campaigns following 9/11 attacks
are another instance of framing through public diplomacy. “War on Terror”
frame was widely used by American policy-makers to characterize the oper-
ations as a legitimate attempt against illegitimate, that is, terrorist, organi-
zations and states sponsoring terrorism. Accompanying public diplomacy
and other communication strategies also followed the same frame (Azpiroz
2013). Consequently, public diplomacy project help advance national
interests by favoring certain viewpoints over others on given issues.
Throughout this book, agenda-setting and framing are treated as inde-
pendent processes. In other words, even in the cases where one of the two
explains the outcomes of a public diplomacy project, the second one is not
automatically included. Agenda-setting refers to the binary option of the
existence of coverage. If the host country is not interested in an issue prior
to the public diplomacy intervention, agenda-setting pathway can be used
to explain the outcome. Framing, on the other hand, refers to the tone
of coverage or the way an issue is covered. The host country is expected
to be aware of the issue and to have an ongoing debate. Public diplomacy
intervention provides additional viewpoint. Public diplomacy, within this
aspect, might consist of “targeted messages directed at attitudinal drivers
of policy support or opposition” and work through changing the coverage
of an issue and by highlighting more favorable aspects (Egner 2010, 99).
3.5 Establishing an Analytical Framework

I started the book with one seemingly persona question—why would an
embassy invite an individual to its grounds? The question grew larger
and took its final form when I inquired the link between foreign policy
and public diplomacy—public diplomacy works, but how? Three areas of
impact and six pathways of connection later, an abstract framework that
can be used—and will be used—to examine public diplomacy projects
is presented. The analytical framework is basically a combination of all
six pathways and includes details about how the American, Swedish and
Turkish experiences are discussed in this book.
Such a framework is necessary to balance theory and practice. A discus-
sion on public diplomacy cannot be complete if the focus is solely on test-
ing theories by using enacted practices or by documenting the experiences
of the practitioners. The former faces the danger of mistaking the actions
as the entire practice process and overlooks the thinking that goes into the
enactment (Pouliot 2008). The latter might be incomplete as practitioners
tend to take their situation for granted and do not necessarily reflect on
their work or try to understand the reasons for their actions (Neumann
2012). Thus, the accounts of the practitioners cannot be taken as the
answer to the research question posed. Rather, there is a need to con-
solidate the objective analytical framework with the subjective information
gathered about the practice. Following the practice turn in IRs, the analyt-
ical attention is directed at what practitioners actually do in the field (Adler
and Pouliot 2008, 5). The inquiry aims to get objective conclusions from
how the practitioners see the role of their projects in the larger framework
of foreign policy.
Based on the need to objectively analyze the subjective data, three
components are introduced to each case chapter in this research: context,
practice and theory.5 The public diplomacy practice is positioned within
appropriate political and historical context. Practices evolve over time, and
64 E. SEVIN
Table 3.1 Summary of the pathways

Larger impact Narrower impact
Public opinion Attraction Benefit of the doubt

Relationship dynamics Socialization Direct influence
Public debates Agenda-setting Framing
such historical changes might influence contemporary practices (Adler and

Pouliot 2008). The analysis of public diplomacy practice in this research is
situated within the history of public diplomacy and foreign policy. Practice
is studied in each case to understand how public diplomacy practitioners
see themselves and their contributions to the achievement of foreign pol-
icy goals. Their explanations of their own work are taken as a starting
point. For theory, six pathways of connection (cf. Table 3.1),6 which are
identified through an analysis of the public diplomacy literature, are used.
Each country’s practice is introduced through one representative proj-
ect. The project chosen for each country was expected to include types of
activities—such as student exchanges and cultural diplomacy projects—
that represent a variety of types of activities and/or a type of activity that
is widely used by the country. The projects also included major public
diplomacy institutions in the country.
The American representative project is the “U.S.-Russia Bilateral
Presidential Commission’s Working Group on Education, Culture, Sports,
and Media” (BPC, ECSM). BPC’s main objective is to identify “identifying
areas of cooperation and pursuing joint projects and actions that strengthen
strategic stability, international security, economic well-being, and the devel-
opment of ties between the Russian and American people” (EUR 2009).
ECSM is an initiative to develop connections and innovative collaborations
between two countries through sports diplomacy, cultural exchanges and
media projects. Established in 2009 by President Barack Obama and then
President Dmitry Medvedev, BPC and various working groups under it were
established to support this new policy objective of strengthening relations
between Russia and the United States (Kaufman 2010). ECSM is a repre-
sentative episode of American relational public diplomacy as it organizes a
variety of activities—such as sports diplomacy, student exchanges and cul-
tural visits—and includes the involvement of the bureaus of International
Information Programs and of Education and Cultural Affairs, as well as
public diplomacy and other foreign service o fficers in the Bureau of Europe
and Eurasian Affairs and American representations overseas.
The Swedish example is the Facing the Climate project. Facing the
Climate is a travelling cartoon exhibition that exclusively includes works on
climate issues and climate change (SI 2012). The project brings together
Swedish artists with their colleagues in the host countries in workshops
before the exhibitions. The cartoon collection can expand with the con-
tributions coming from the host country’s artists. The project is linked to
Sweden’s commitment to raise awareness about climate change within the
EU (Ministry of the Environment 2004). Facing the Climate is deemed
representative of the larger Swedish practice as it exemplifies the Swedish
Institute practice of organizing multi-year multi-country public diplomacy
projects. Institutionally, the project includes the Swedish Institute, the
Council for the Promotion of Sweden, the Swedish Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, and Swedish foreign representations.
The last project is TÜRKSOY (The International Organization of
Turkic Culture) from Turkey. Established under the name of Joint
Administration of Turkic Culture and Arts (Türk Kültür ve Sanatları
Ortak Yönetimi), TÜRKSOY is a joint venture of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Turkey. From a Turkish per-
spective, TÜRKSOY is a relational public diplomacy project that brings
Turkic republics closer to Turkey and facilitates the bilateral and multilat-
eral relations (Yağmurlu 2012). This project is linked to Turkey’s foreign
policy of increasing regional cooperation with the Central Asian countries
(Dışişleri Bakanlığı 2011). TÜRKSOY is a representative of the Turkish
relational public diplomacy understanding as it is an umbrella project
that includes various activities. The project is supported by the Turkish
Ministries of Foreign Affairs and of Culture and Tourism, the Office of the
Prime Minister, and the Turkish representations in the region.
The analysis sections for all American, Swedish and Turkish public
diplomacy include an assessment narrative of all six pathways’ explanatory
performance. The question posed is straightforward: can I use a pathway
to explain the link between the particular case or not? I look for clues
in project designs and executions that resonate the arguments presented
by the pathways. If a clue is seen, I look for further evidence suggesting
that a pathway might be used to explain all or parts of the link between
the public diplomacy project described and attached foreign policy goal.
Succinctly stated, the pathways that pass this initial test are subjected to
further scrutiny before being included in the final description of how public
diplomacy helps countries achieve their foreign policy goals, based on the
views of practitioners gathered through interviews and official reports.
The overall investigation procedure is summarized in Table 3.2.
66 E. SEVIN
Table 3.2 Pathways in detail

Pathways Assumption Further evidence is Further evidence is
Contribution to looked for if Public not considered if
foreign policy diplomacy Public diplomacy
change is practitioners practitioners
achieved by prefer to prefer to
changing
Attraction Public Changing Reach large parts Work in the last three
diplomacy projects domestic public of the population feet over mass media
increase the favorable opinion
public opinion towards
the practitioner country
in the host country
Benefit of the Doubt Changing the Focus on mutual Engage in advocacy,
Public diplomacy perception of interest promotion, or other
projects change the way practitioner self-serving purposes
the practitioner country’s country’s
foreign policy goals and interests
objectives are received in
the host country
Socialization Public Creating Bring new Continue existing
diplomacy projects relations and objectives, types functions, which do
redefine the roles of the tasks carried out of events, and not create a new
practitioner country by the host tasks to the portfolio
and/or the practitioners country country
Direct Influence Public Creating access Establish relations Reach ordinary people
diplomacy projects to with
communicate with policy decision-makers policy-makers
elites directly and
influence their thinking
Agenda-Setting Public Influencing issue Introduce new Work with existing
diplomacy projects salience subjects issues/nonissues
change the issues
covered in media and/or
discussed in the host
country
Framing Public Influencing issue Introduce new Work with new
diplomacy projects discussions ways to look at issues/non-issues
change the media existing issues
coverage of the
practitioner country’s
foreign policy in the host
country
Data for this research were collected about the views of the practitioners through
elite interviews and online and offline archival research. I was based in Washington,
DC, during that time and made four field trips to Stockholm, Sweden and Ankara,
Turkey to access archival documents and to conduct interviews. In the United
States, the Department of State—Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, Bureau
of International Information Programs, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs
and the Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy—were visited. In Sweden, the
Swedish Institute (Svenska institutet) and the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(Utrikesdepartementet) were parts of the research. In Turkey, visits were made to
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Dışişleri Bakanlığı), Office of Public Diplomacy (Kamu
Diplomasisi Koordinatörlüğü) and the International Organization of Turkic Culture
(Uluslararası Türk Kültürü Teşkilatı, TÜRKSOY). A total of 25 in-person and one-
phone interviews have been conducted. These interviews were all semi-structured.
Moreover, 12 embassies that hosted Sweden’s Facing the Climate project were con-
tacted via e-mail. Nine embassies responded back and provided their answers to two
interview questions about why they decided to invite Facing the Climate to their
posts and what they saw as the biggest success of the project. Archival research gath-
ered five types of documents. First, documents about the projects included in the
study—such as promotional documents, invitations, historical accounts, handouts,
posters, newsletters and so on—are collected to understand how the projects are
officially constructed, described and promoted. Second, documents about public
diplomacy institutions and other public diplomacy projects are included to explain
how public diplomacy is defined and practiced by a country. Third, evaluation and
measurement reports are analyzed to see what aspects of public diplomacy projects
are deemed important and measured. Fourth, background documents about a
country’s public diplomacy and foreign policy institutions, including but not limited
to laws, mandates, op-ed written by high-ranking officials, are gathered to concep-
tualize the relation between foreign policy and public diplomacy. Fifth, foreign
policy statements and budget reports are analyzed to point the relative importance
of public diplomacy projects and expenditure. The initial archival research yielded
517 documents. A total of 444 documents were used in the reconstruction of the
cases. Secondary data were collected through various resources—namely, news arti-
cles and social media—when deemed necessary in cases. LexisNexis Academic data-
base was used for news articles. As observed in the interviews, projects’ use of social
media was limited to Facebook, YouTube and Twitter, with the exception of weak
Tumblr presence in the American case. Allmytweets7 and ScraperWiki8 were used to
gather tweets, respectively, based on usernames and search keywords. Data from
Facebook, Youtube and Tumblr activities were collected by visiting the official pages
used by the projects. News articles and social media data were included as additional
reference points in case narratives.
In short, this chapter presented a discussion on the connection between
foreign policy and public diplomacy. Influenced by IR theories and the
68 E. SEVIN
measurement practice, the literature is organized under three distinct

approaches: realist, liberal and constructivist public diplomacy. These dif-
ferent approaches, respectively, argue that the connection between foreign
policy and public diplomacy can be created in three different areas: pub-
lic opinion, relationship dynamics and public debate. Additionally, two
pathways of connection for each area of impact were introduced to better
explain the connection. The chapter concluded by describing the crucial
decisions made in the design of this research. This design is based on four
assumptions. First, the logic of practice or how public diplomacy practitio-
ners see their own work—including their definition of public diplomacy
and understanding of their responsibilities—is a crucial topic of study to
understand the expected outcome and impact of projects. Second, a causal
mechanism linking public diplomacy intervention to the contributions of
the said intervention to achieving foreign policy goals can be identified as a
result of studying the practice. Third, this causal mechanism can be objec-
tively explained by using one or a combination of the six pathways drawn
from the literature. These pathways are expressed as distinct arguments
on how public diplomacy works and how the impacts of public diplomacy
projects might be manifested on foreign policy. Fourth, the historical and
political context in which public diplomacy is practiced is relevant to the
analysis as the structure and outcome of the public diplomacy projects
are influenced by prior practice as well as external political variables. The
next chapter presents the application of the research methodology on the
American relational public diplomacy practice through the case of ECSM.
Notes
1. The original research question was: “What are the mechanisms through which
relational public diplomacy projects help achieve foreign policy goals?
2. Erasmus+ program is an academic mobility program that is geared primarily
toward domestic EU audiences. However, I still consider the program to be
a public diplomacy program between the EU and member countries.
Therefore, I consider the EU to be the practitioner “country” that attempts
to communicate with publics in other countries. The British decision to
leave, more commonly known as Brexit, shows that the EU and member
countries do not always enjoy compatible policy goals. It should also be
noted that there are five non-EU program countries (Macedonia, Iceland,
Norway, Liechtenstein and Turkey) as well as nearly 20 partner countries all
across the world (such as Armenia, Jordan, Russia and Tunisia) included in
the Erasmus+ program.

4. Sergio Guimaraes (Swedish Institute), personal interview with the author, 6
February 2013.
5. Hereby, I should note that Bourdieu’s “logic of practice” and Pouliot’s sob-
jectivism concepts were influential in this approach to the research. The
latter concept encouraged me to rely predominantly on the views of practi-
tioners that I gathered through interviews and archival research. Bourdieu’s
explanation of practice through the concepts of habitus and doxa helped me
to structure the case chapters and presented the need to contextualize my
cases in the history.
6. As argued in Chap. 2, there are no established theoretical frameworks in the
field of public diplomacy. However, it is possible to extract various assump-
tions about the link between public diplomacy and foreign policy. I use
“pathway” and “pathway of connection” as generics word to refer to these
assumptions in the field.
7. http://www.allmytweets.net/connect.php. Last accessed 25 February 2016.
8. https://scraperwiki.com. Last accessed 25 February 2016.
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CHAPTER 4
The Pioneer of Public Diplomacy: United

States of America
The United States of America is undeniably one of the most, if not the
most, prominent practitioner country in terms of public diplomacy, with
a long history. Even one of the founding documents of the country, the
Declaration of Independence, is called as an “exercise in public diplo-
macy” sharing the American way of politics and harnessing the support of
other countries (Isaacson 2004). Moreover, the field of public diplomacy is
established and developed predominantly through studying the American
projects. Therefore, the American experience stands out as a crucial case to
test new arguments—in this case, the six-pathway framework.
In this chapter, the link between American public diplomacy practice
and foreign policy is analyzed. As expressed by the former Under Secretary
for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs (R) James Glassman (2008), the
United States does not see public diplomacy as a popularity contest but
rather as a foreign policy tool. Indeed, the aim of the American public
diplomacy is to “support the achievement of U.S. foreign policy goals and
objectives, advance national interests, and enhance national security by
informing and influencing foreign publics and by expanding and strength-
ening the relationship” between the United States and the world (DoS/R
2009). This definition highlights the active role of the publics and the
relative importance of relationships in public diplomacy but does not nec-
essarily shed light on how public diplomacy projects might help achieve
foreign policy goals.

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A representative project, the US–Russia Bilateral Presidential Com-

mission’s (BPC) Working Group on Education, Culture, Sports, and
Media Working Group (ECSM), is presented in the context of US–Russian
relations. ECSM is deemed representative of the American relational pub-
lic diplomacy practice with its breadth of activities, and its explicit connec-
tion with foreign policy. ECSM was a collection of various events such as
sports diplomacy, student exchanges, journalist trips and cultural exhibi-
tions that took place from 2010 to 2014. These activities were organized
by both bureaus responsible for public diplomacy in the Department of
State (DoS)—Bureau of International Information Programs (IIP) and
Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (ECA)—as well as the Bureau
of European and Eurasian Affairs (EUR) public diplomacy personnel and
encouraged the participation of embassies and consulates in Russia and
other non-governmental actors. Thus, ECSM included examples of dif-
ferent types of activities and practitioners and is a representative case of
public diplomacy definition of the current administration as “global pub-
lic engagement and strategic communication [and] a multi-stakeholder
engagement” (Gregory 2011, 353). Second, BPC was created as part of
American and Russian attempts to start a new chapter in their bilateral
relations after 2009, also known as the “Reset” policy.1 ECSM had an
explicit policy objective: improving and deepening the bilateral relations
(EUR 2009). The case narrative presented for ECSM is based on the elite
interviews2 carried out at the DoS as well as BPC’s and DoS’s official pub-
lications such as budget requests, annual reports, newsletters and memo-
randa of understanding. The narrative is guided by the six pathways that
explain how public diplomacy might be influential in foreign policy.
ECSM is also an intriguing case that displays not only the capabilities
but also the limitations of public diplomacy. The Reset era created quite
an excitement at all levels of bilateral diplomatic relations. Public diplo-
macy was seen as an invaluable tool to further deepen the relationships.
Yet, in February–March 2014, Russia annexed Crimea from Ukraine.
Subsequently, the United States imposed various sanctions to Russia, rang-
ing from travel bans to freezing financial assets (“Executive Order 13660,
Blocking Property of Certain Persons Contributing to the Situation in
Ukraine” 2014). As a response, Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev
declared that it was impossible to talk about a reset period between the
countries (Cassandra 2014). BPC, overall, failed to reach its objectives.
DoS (2014) shut down the program and diverted its funding to be used
in US assistance to Ukraine.
THE PIONEER OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 77
The chapter opens with a short history of American public diplomacy.

Then, the BPC and ECSM are introduced in the context of the “Reset”
era in US–Russian relations. The projects of Sports Sub-Working Group
are analyzed in further detail to exemplify the logic behind ECSM and
American public diplomacy. Subsequently, the analysis of ECSM is pre-
sented by assessing the empirical performance of the six pathways. The
explanations of the pathways are tested to assess their explanatory perfor-
mance in the practice of public diplomacy (Mearsheimer and Walt 2013).
Last, the causal mechanism that is presented in the practice is introduced.
4.1 History of American Public Diplomacy

It is not possible to overemphasize the role of American practice in the
invent and spread of public diplomacy. Walter R. Roberts (2009), a former
Voice of America (VoA) official, famously said that public diplomacy “was
born on February 1st, 1942 at 270 Madison Avenue in New York City,”
referring to the time and place VoA started. The term itself was coined as
a response to the American foreign policy needs and practices (van Ham
2010). As discussed in Chap. 2, the understanding of public diplomacy
has changed throughout the years. This particular section explains the
reflection of these theoretical changes on the American practice by focus-
ing on key organizations. The focus is exclusively on the bureaucratic and
institutional structure through which American public diplomacy oper-
ated and is operating. First, I outline the earlier days of the practice start-
ing with World War II. I subsequently introduce the current institutions
and organizations involved, specifically those pertaining to the framework
of American–Russian bilateral relations.
4.1.1 Early Days of US Public Diplomacy

The United States has never been a stranger to strategic communication
efforts. Even during the early days of the American Revolution, Benjamin
Franklin was known to circulate print material in Britain to influence
public opinion and increase support for the American cause (Cull 2008,
1–2). The World War II era, however, is usually pointed out by scholars
as the first time when the country felt the increased need to strategically
influence the decisions of other countries (Cull 2008). Thus, the war era,
despite not being the first instance of American communications attempts,
is the time when the country started establishing various organizations for
a more strategic approach to public diplomacy.
78 E. SEVIN
Besides the demands of the wartime politics, then President Franklin

Delano Roosevelt’s proposed changes in domestic politics were influential
in his administration’s establishment of various communication organiza-
tions to publicize the new policies and gain the support of both domestic
and foreign publics (Cull 2008, 13–15). During his term in the office,
two of the biggest legacy institutions in American public diplomacy were
founded: Voice of America (VoA)—which still continues its existence
under the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG)—and United States
Information Service (USIS)—which continued its existence as the name
given to the overseas representation of USIA services before being incor-
porated to DoS. The history of these institutions, to an extent, represents
the conceptualization of public diplomacy in contemporary American
practice (Gregory 2011). The broadcasting activities of VoA date back
to 1942, with its 24-hour multiple-language service starting in May of
that year (Cull 2008, 15). Currently, VoA broadcasts in 45 languages on
radio, television, mobile and internet platforms, reaching over 100 million
people weekly (BBG 2013c).
All of VoA operations are regulated by three main pieces of written leg-
islation (BBG 2013a). The United States Information and Educational Act
of 1948—also known as the Smith-Mundt Act—is the first of these three
legislations and aims to codify the responsibilities of VoA. The act pres-
ents the objectives as to “enable the Government of the United States to
promote a better understanding of the United States in other countries,
and to increase mutual understanding between the people of the United
States and the people of other countries” (United States Information and
Educational Exchange Act of 1948 1948, Sec. 2). Initially, the necessity
for international broadcasting is presented within the context of the Cold
War. The policy-makers argue for a need to combat communism at a com-
munication level as well and fight off the misinformation and false propa-
ganda disseminated by the communist world targeting the perception of
the United States (Armstrong 2008). VoA takes part in this combat by pro-
viding objective information to the foreign publics (Armstrong 2008). The
Smith-Mundt Modernization Act of 2012 updates the legislation, making
VoA and other public diplomacy material available for domestic audiences
(112th Congress 2012). This change does not authorize BBG to work on
influencing domestic public opinion, but rather solely makes the program-
ming prepared for foreign audiences available within the country (112th
Congress 2012). VoA and BBG are still tasked primarily tasked with reach-
ing out and informing the overseas audiences (BBG 2013b). The second
written legislation is the VoA charter of 1960. The charter requires VoA to
“present a balanced and comprehensive projection of significant American
thought and institutions” (VoA 2012, Art. 2). VoA is seen as an institution
responsible for representing America in the world. Thus, VoA is tasked to
present an all-inclusive view of American politics and society, rather than
led by the political majority of its time. The last piece of legislation oversee-
ing the activities of VoA is the United States International Broadcasting Act
of 1994. The act both ensures that VoA upholds high journalistic standards
and that its broadcast is “consistent with the broad foreign policy objectives
of the United States”(United States International Broadcasting Act of 1994
1994, Secs. 303 (a) & (b)). The act positions VoA as a tool in the American
foreign policy kit, but prohibits its use a source of misinformation.
In contemporary practice, international broadcasting activities are
supported by other stations, namely Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty,
Radio Marti, Radio Free Asia and Middle East Broadcasting Networks. All
these entities are governed by BBG and regulated by the aforementioned
three pieces of legislation. Thus, VoA and other BBG-governed outlets are
tasked with supporting American foreign policy goals and reporting news
and information about the country overseas (BBG 2013b).
The other legacy institution coming from President Roosevelt’s term—
and one that still casts its shadow on the American public diplomacy prac-
tice despite being defunct—is the USIS. The organization was established
in 1934 to respond to the public requests for information about the admin-
istration’s new policies (Lee 2007, 214). Logistically, USIS was composed
of repositories and libraries hosting governmental and policy documents.
Up until 1942, the functions of USIS targeted primarily domestic audi-
ences through these collections. During the wartime, the service became
a part of the Office of War Information and started to communicate with
foreign audiences as well (Lee 2007). The office established its first over-
seas library in 1942 in London, to share information about the role of the
United States in the war (Sussman 1973). With the end of the war, USIS
and its collections were transferred to DoS, and eventually became the
name given to the foreign representations of the USIA, an autonomous
agency responsible for American public diplomacy, in 1953 (Cull 2008;
Sussman 1973). The agency took over existing public diplomacy projects,
such as the aforementioned libraries and staff of USIS and the broadcast-
ing activities of VoA (USIA 1999a, 15).
USIA single-handedly worked on American public diplomacy for
nearly half a century until its integration back into the DoS in 1999. The
80 E. SEVIN
agency was responsible for exchanges, information activities and broad-

casting (USIA 1999b). Being the main agency responsible for the cultural
exchanges and other state-to-non-state communication activities of the
State Department (“Reorganization Plan No. 8” 1953), the mandate of
USIA was drawn from the Smith-Mundt Act of 1948. USIA was tasked
with providing information services to disseminate information about
the United States and establishing exchange programs (United States
Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948 1948). As summa-
rized by its motto, during the Cold War era, USIA focused on “telling
America’s story” and provided information about American policies over-
seas (USIA 1999b). USIS and its libraries were asked “to support the
American foreign policy” (Richards 2001, 183). USIS projects and librar-
ies were used to protect American citizens and foreign audiences from
the Soviet influence (Richards 2001, 201). The public diplomacy work
was carried out by Foreign Service Officers with three post titles: Public
Affairs Officer, Information Officer and Cultural Affairs Officer (USIA
1998). Public Affairs Officers were tasked with embassies’ and consul-
ates’ communication and information activities, Information Officers with
media relations and Cultural Affairs Officers with educational and cultural
exchange programs (USIA 1998).
With the end of Cold War, policy-makers raised questions about the
necessity of USIA (Cull 2012). The raison d’être of American public
diplomacy was to combat the Cold War era misinformation campaigns.
When the Cold War was over, USIA was seen as a successful yet no lon-
ger needed institution (Cull 2012). After a decade of restructuring and
repositioning efforts, USIA was abolished. The public diplomacy activities
were brought back into the State Department with an argument that the
nature of these activities was central to foreign affairs and they belonged
to DoS. A new Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy was established
within DoS with the same responsibilities (The Foreign Affairs Reform and
Restructuring Act 1998).
The twentieth-century American public diplomacy experience closely
followed the American engagement in wars and conflicts, pushing public
diplomacy closer to the national security framework (Gregory 2011, 362).
Public diplomacy constituted the communication arm of the attempts
to protect the country from the threat of communism during the Cold
War era. Institutionally broadcasting was situated as a practice close to
yet separate from public diplomacy activities. Even though VoA and
USIS/USIA received their mandates from similar pieces of legislation,
their bureaucratic structures were distinct. The tools utilized in achieving

this objective were based on a one-way communication understanding,
in which the United States shared its views and promoted its policies to
foreign publics. During its later days, USIA (1999b) signaled the increas-
ing importance of relationships, yet the relational turn in the American
public diplomacy practice was not fully embraced by the practitioners in
the new institutional landscape until another conflict: 9/11 and the War
on Terror. The next section presents an overall view of current American
public diplomacy actors and the changes brought in by the relational turn.
4.1.2 Current Institutions and Mandate

With the demise of the USIA, DoS became the foremost institution of
public diplomacy. The Under Secretary of Public Diplomacy and Public
Affairs—also known by its abbreviation “R”—is tasked with helping the
Secretary of State in the “formation and implementation of United States
public diplomacy policies and activities, including international educa-
tional and cultural exchange programs, information, and international
broadcasting” (The Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act 1998,
Chap. 2, Sec. 313). The first two of these three different types of public
diplomacy activities are carried out by the bureaus within R, respectively,
by ECA and IIP. The latter activities are coordinated by BBG, an auton-
omous agency. Outside the three players taking over USIA’s activities,
there are other active public diplomacy actors, such as the United States
Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Department of
Defense (DoD). In this relatively crowded area, the Advisory Commission
on Public Diplomacy (ACPD) is the sole institution tasked with apprais-
ing all aspects of American public diplomacy. In short, DoS is the main
public diplomacy actor, yet shares this role with other federal organiza-
tions. ACPD is the sole body that has the mandate to assess and evaluate
American public diplomacy practice across the institutions.
The majority of the changes taking place shortly after the end of the
Cold War was bureaucratic in nature and did not necessarily influence
the way public diplomacy was practiced. ECA, IIP and BBG continued
USIA’s objective of telling America’s story. The overwhelming assumption
saw the main function of public diplomacy as combatting misinformation
campaigns. Therefore, the practice reflected a one-way communication
understanding. This long-held assumption was challenged by the terrorist
attacks on September 11, 2001. The tragedy made it apparent that the
82 E. SEVIN
American image abroad was not popular, and foreign perceptions of this
image had domestic consequences (Zaharna 2010, 1). American foreign
policy-makers, once again, argued that news resources in the Middle East
were spreading negative stereotypes about the country (Zaharna 2010,
21). Additionally, the post-9/11 assessments of American diplomacy con-
cluded that public diplomacy projects were to a large extent ineffective in
combating these misinformation campaigns (Fitzpatrick 2011, 2–4). The
initial reaction from practitioners was to argue for the necessity of “more
public diplomacy” (Zaharna 2010, 83). This policy choice, albeit rational,
was not the best course of action. The developments in 1990s changed the
“underlying political and communication dynamics in the international
arena” (Zaharna 2010, 83). The twenty-first century included more polit-
ical actors who were able to organize themselves and their messages with
the help of communication technologies to achieve their political objec-
tives. This is why “combating misinformation by providing more informa-
tion” proved to be an ineffective public diplomacy practice. The United
States needed a “new” public diplomacy, rather than “more” public diplo-
macy (Zaharna 2010, 83).
The new, or “relational” as it is used in this book, understanding of
public diplomacy signals a move away from media relations and informa-
tion campaigns to engaging with foreign audiences (Melissen 2007, 13).
Therefore, the promotional and one-way perspective of public diplomacy,
which encouraged the USIA to tell America’s story, is left behind in the
current practice. Rather, public diplomacy is seen a “form of diplomatic
engagement” (Melissen 2011, 23) and as a “standard component of over-
all diplomatic practice and is more than a form of propaganda conducted
by diplomats” (Melissen 2007, 11). Projects deem building relations more
important than those disseminating information (Zaharna 2010, 179).
The new era of American practice is clearly observed in the policy circles
in addition to academia. 21st Century Statecraft, the name given to the
general framework of American foreign policy introduced during the term
of former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, proposes that diplomatic
practices need to expand their scopes, incorporating state-to-people, peo-
ple-to-state and people-to-people communication activities (DoS 2011).
DoS is actively working to build relations with partners beyond the state
(DoS and USAID 2010, 59). Even at the presidential level, it was argued
that ensuring stronger connections with people in other parts of the world
must be seen as part of the national security strategy (Obama 2010).
Subsequently, DoS under the Secretary of State John Kerry reaffirmed its
commitment to reaching out to “like-mindedd community leaders who

can help counter the networks that extremists groups use to their advan-
tage” (DoS and USAID 2015, 26) Public diplomacy activities, within this
framework, both help to establish these relationships and to change per-
ceptions of foreign publics to ensure the durability of such relations (DoS
and USAID 2010, 60; 2015, 56).
The sustained engagement with foreign publics, rather than an attempt
to fight misinformation through information dissemination, is expected to
help achieve American foreign policy goals. As argued by both scholars and
practitioners, the lessons learned in the post-9/11 world pushed American
public diplomacy to a more relational axis and made it an invaluable part
of foreign policy. The academic studies on the nature of American practice
(such as Fitzpatrick 2011; M. Lynch 2005; Zaharna 2010) as well as offi-
cial reports (such as Advisory Committee on Cultural Diplomacy 2005)
demonstrate the American attempts to utilize relational public diplomacy
to achieve foreign policy objectives.
ECSM is an example of how relational public diplomacy projects are
used to help achieve foreign policy goals. The working group was a part
of BPC, a high-level platform composed of various working groups and
subgroups. The most recent annual report before the commission sus-
pended its activities listed 21 such working groups focusing on a vari-
ety of issues ranging from military to space cooperation, from agriculture
to cybersecurity and from energy to health (BPC 2013a). Furthermore,
ECSM is an illustrative example for demonstrating the limitations of public
diplomacy. To my knowledge, none of the scholars or the practitioners of
public diplomacy argue that these projects, by themselves, can solve the
problems. In line with this widespread belief, throughout the research, I
present “the contributions” of public diplomacy projects to the achieve-
ment of foreign policy goals, rather than claiming that public diplomacy
was the only variable.
BPC is a high-level commission concept. In the case of U.S.–Russia
relations, it was co-chaired by the two Presidents and coordinated by the
Minister of Foreign Affairs from Russia and the Secretary of State from
the United States. The coordinators were tasked to meet at least once a
year and to present an overall strategic framework. Issue-specific initiatives
and policies were decided and executed by one of the working groups or
their subgroups that were co-chaired by relevant Russian and American
bureaucrats.
84 E. SEVIN
Reset policy sought to improve bilateral relations by encouraging coop-

eration on issues that were deemed important by both parties through
these groups. ECSM constituted the state-to-people communication ele-
ment of the project. ECSM also helped coordinate the different aspects
of American public diplomacy in the country as its topic-mandate spread
through ECA and IIP. The Reset policy did not yield successful outcomes
(Nexon 2014). Following the Russian intervention in Ukraine, it was even
argued that Russian–American relations became even worse than they
were when the Reset policy was introduced (J. Goldgeier 2014; Rubin
2014). Consequently, BPC suspended all of its activities in 2014—after
only a mere four-year period of existence (DoS 2014).
The following section introduces and analyzes BPC’s public diplomacy
component within the frameworks of BPC and US–Russian relations dur-
ing the Reset policy era. This should not be seen as an expectation that
the Reset policy is going to be revived. Rather, as all the activities were
carried out in compliance with the ideas introduced by the Reset policy
understanding, the proper political context is the Reset era—despite its
currently defunct status.
4.2 US–Russia Bilateral Presidential Commission

When President Barack Obama called for a “reset” in US–Russia relations,
the bilateral relations between countries were “as sour as they had been in
more than twenty years” (Burns 2010, para. 3) and suffering from various
issues such as human rights issues, nuclear negotiations with Iran and the
Russia–Georgia war. In April 2009, President Obama and then President
Dmitry Medvedev jointly declared that the countries were “ready to move
beyond Cold War mentalities and chart a fresh start in relations between
[the] two countries” (The White House 2009a, para. 9). In July 2009, the
two presidents organized a three-day working meeting in Moscow in July
2009 and agreed on a US–Russia Action Plan that identified key objectives
for the future of bilateral relations (The White House 2009b). The meet-
ing introduced BPC as a platform to “provid[e] [a] better structure to the
bilateral relationship” (The White House 2009b, para. 1).
Within the Reset policy framework, BPC had the following mission
(EUR 2009, para. 1):
U.S.–Russia Bilateral Presidential Commission is dedicated to identifying

areas of cooperation and pursuing joint projects and actions […] Through
the commission’s working groups and sub-committees, we will strive to
deepen our cooperation in concrete ways […] The foundation for the work
of the commission is based on the core principles of friendship, cooperation,
openness, and predictability, and we are resolved to address disagreements
openly and honestly in a spirit of mutual respect and acknowledgement of
each other’s perspective.
The Annual Reports and Joint Statements of the BPC summarize the activ-
ities of all working groups under four headings: security, economy, science
and technology, and people-to-people. People-to-people communication
processes predominantly consist of the projects carried out by ECSM.
ECSM was one of the original 16 working groups established together
with the BPC (DoS 2009). The working groups were tasked with “devel-
oping connections and innovative collaborations to promote new dia-
logue and understanding between the people of the U.S. and Russia”
(DoS 2010). Given the fact that the BPC itself was tasked “to improve
coordination and to explore new opportunities for partnership” (DoS
2009), both the working group and the Commission had the mandate to
expand and deepen the relations between the countries through a multi-
tude of means, tools and subjects. The relational public diplomacy practice
within the “Reset” era could be designed to influence the public opinion,
relationship dynamics and/or public debates to contribute to achieving
foreign policy objective: improving and deepening the bilateral relations.
Table 4.1 shows the explanations and assumptions for the six pathways of
connection, updated from their generic versions discussed in Chap. 3 by
incorporating American foreign policy goals and the activities of ECSM.
Attraction pathway posits that public diplomacy projects should project
American soft power. Contribution to the foreign policy takes place by
encouraging the Russian public to demand a new era of relations from
their government. Benefit of the doubt pathway argues that public diplo-
macy projects will demonstrate that the United States and Russia share
similar interests, and Russian public will be more amenable to American
interests believing that their country has similar objectives. Socialization
pathway foresees that the public diplomacy projects will bestow new func-
tions to the US representations in Russia and consequently to the United
States and that these new roles will help the country achieve its foreign
policy objective. Direct influence pathway sees projects as tools to contact
decision-makers and influence their decisions. Agenda-setting and fram-
ing respectively argues that public diplomacy projects will bring new issues
or change the coverage of existing issues. After assessing the viability of
86 E. SEVIN
Table 4.1 Proposed explanations for ECSM

Pathway Proposed explanation
Public opinion Attraction Improved and deepened relations are demanded

by Russian public
Benefit of the Improved and deepened relations are supported
doubt by Russian assumption that the United States is
acting in good faith
Relationship Socialization Improved and deepened relations are result of
dynamics new roles of US embassies and other
representations introduced by the projects
Direct influence Improved and deepened relations are facilitated
by influential people/decision-makers engaged
through the projects
Public debates Agenda-setting Improved and deepened relations are supported
by Russian media’s/public’s coverage of new
issues introduced by projects
Framing Improved and deepened relations are supported
by Russian media’s/public’s new tone of
coverage
each pathway, the following narrative of ECSM projects is constructed. In

other words, the explanatory capacity of each pathway was tested prior to
being included in this chapter.
ECSM was co-chaired by the Under Secretary of R, Richard Stengel, and
Special Presidential Representative for International Cultural Cooperation,
Mikhail E. Shvydkoy. ECSM did not have a physical bureaucratic presence
within the DoS, such as an office or specifically designated employees.
ECSM’s functions were coordinated by mainly R personnel with the help
of EUR—including public diplomacy desk officers. This combination of
subject and country expertise, together with the existing logistical capabili-
ties, enabled ECSM to design tailored projects for the Russian audiences.
As the name suggests, the working group included four subgroups:
education, culture, sport and media. The reason for bringing these four
subjects together was partially based on DoS’s bureaucratic structure. R
already had the operational experience and capability to execute projects
on these topics through IIP and ECA. Moreover, using all these subjects
ensured a more inclusive engagement process with the Russian public. For
instance, even though media might not be able to reach non-journalists,
cultural events might attract their attention. Education might limit the
audience to people with language and academic skills, whereas sports

might include athletes who do not necessarily possess such academic
credentials.
All four subgroup co-chairs were from R, yet project personnel included
other bureaus and other agencies within the federal government, as well
as organizations from the private sector. The subgroups followed simi-
lar practices with BPC. They were launched with the rest of the work-
ing groups in December 2009. Their founding documents were the joint
plans signed by the working group co-chairs. These plans were sometimes
further detailed by memorandum of understanding (MoU). The sub-
groups were led by subgroup chairs and included a core team, composed
of co-chairs and usually high-level bureaucrats in the divisions of the co-
chairs. The core teams met at least once a year to discuss the projects and
strategies for the upcoming year.
Education subgroup operated within ECA and was co-chaired by the
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Academic Programs. The subgroup used
the Bureau’s experience with educational exchanges and projects, and
worked on issues relevant to all levels of education. The joint plan of the
subgroup declared its objectives as “developing educational and research
initiatives, including science, language acquisition and proficiency, teacher
education and professional development” and “expanding cooperation
and sharing best practices” (ECSM 2009b, para. 2). The MoU, signed by
the United States and Russia in 2012, further identifies the fields of action
as “education, science, and innovation” and the objective as supporting
“educational, economic, and social development of, and mutual under-
standing between, the people of the U.S. and the Russian Federation”
(BPC 2012d, Sect. 1, Art. 1).
The education subgroup organized new projects, supported exist-
ing frameworks and established partnerships with other relevant actors
to reach its objectives laid out in the MoU. The majority of the new
projects were short-term exchange programs bringing students from
both countries together. For instance, theater students in Moscow and
Los Angeles worked together on joint productions (BPC 2011a). The
Young Entrepreneurships Study Program brought Russian students for
short-term study trips in the United States (BPC 2012a). The support
provided for the existing framework focused on expanding the outreach
of well-established projects, such as the Fulbright program. The subgroup
launched the Fulbright Community College Administrator Seminars and
brought Russian and American higher education professionals together to
88 E. SEVIN
“share best practices and models for workforce development and access to
higher education” (BPC 2013d, 5). Additionally, partnerships were built
with actors that have already been active in the region. The US–Russia
Foundation and American Councils was approached to support the foun-
dation’s Enhancing University Research and Entrepreneurial Capacity
Program (EURECA) to build relations between American and Russian
universities to encourage entrepreneurial understanding in Russian institu-
tions (EURECA 2013). The American representations in Russia were also
actively involved in the projects of the subgroup. The Consulate General
in Yekaterinburg organized a competition for students to win a trip to the
United States. The entrants were asked to upload a video of themselves
that detail a proposed project plan relevant to one of the elements of
the BPC.3 The projects that built partnerships and expanded on existing
programs were mutually beneficial. In other words, the subgroup pre-
sented the existing projects/actors to increase their visibility and outreach
by including them in the BPC framework. The existing projects/actors
provided the subgroup an infrastructure through which it could easily
reach the Russian target audiences. The new projects helped the subgroup
address the part of the Russian audience that was not already contacted.
Since 2009, the education subgroup “nearly doubled the number of part-
nerships between American and Russian universities” (BPC 2010a, 3). It
encouraged the dissemination of new concepts, such as innovation and
entrepreneurship, among Russian students (BPC 2012a, 17). It helped
the United States as well as its representations in Russia to engage with the
students, educators and education professionals.
The culture subgroup was chaired by the Managing Director of
Professional and Cultural Programs at ECA and was tasked with foster-
ing “a new understanding and respect for the culture of the two nations”
(ECSM 2009a, para. 1). Both countries have been actively exporting
their cultural products to the global society; therefore, the subgroup
aims to specifically target parts of population and geography that do not
have such prior cultural exposure (ECSM 2009a). The initial joint plan
outlines the general strategy for the subgroup and proposes the idea of
“Culture Year” events in both countries where parties can celebrate dif-
ferent aspects of each other’s culture through the year (ECSM 2009a).
“American Seasons”—named as a homage to Sergei Diaghilev who orga-
nized “Russian Seasons” in Paris in the early twentieth century to show-
case Russian culture to Europe—took place in 2012 during which a series
of events showed American culture to the Russian public (BPC 2012c).
The highlight of the event was the visit of Chicago Symphony Orchestra
to Moscow and St. Petersburg in 2012 (BPC 2012c). The orchestra held
performances in both cities and conducted master classes with music stu-
dents (BPC 2012c).
The subgroup also organized various exhibitions and concerts using
topics that are of interest to both parties. For instance, through the
Consulate General in St. Petersburg, the subgroup ran cultural events—
such as art exhibits—and a speaker series (OIG 2013). Moreover, the con-
sulate also supported a local Bluegrass band (BPC 2010c). Someone Still
Loves You Boris Yeltsin, a Missouri-based indie-pop band, was named as a
cultural ambassador while headlining a Russian rock festival organized by
the Boris Yeltsin Foundation (Fitzmaureice 2012). The year 2012 marked
the 200th anniversary of Fort Ross, a former Russian establishment in
California (Crawford 2012). The subgroup made use of this opportunity
to celebrate the long history of cultural interactions between the United
States and Russia. On the whole, the culture subgroup used cultural assets,
from rock bands to landmarks to art shows, to interact with the Russian
population. Its activities attempted to increase the exposure to American
culture and to connect American and Russian artists, writers and musicians
with each other.
The media subgroup is the only subgroup not chaired by ECA or one
of its divisions within ECSM. The chair was the coordinator for IIP under
R. Unlike the other subgroups and working groups, the media subgroup
did not meet in December 2009 and did not have a publicly available
joint plan.4 In earlier documents coming from BPC, the media subgroup
or its representatives were not even acknowledged. The first reference to
its activities was seen in a BPC newsletter published in February 2011
newsletter. The inaugural meeting of the subgroup took place in March
2011, in Boston, Massachusetts. During her opening remarks, former
Under Secretary Judith McHale (2011) posed three questions that sum-
marized the subgroups’ agenda: “How can the Russian-U.S. dialogue
encourage the media to become more professional, more accurate, and
more accessible? How can the media better educate our citizens? How
can we better inform Americans about Russia and, vice versa, Russians
about America?” The annual subgroup coordination meetings were
the major events organized by the media subgroup. Unlike the other
three subgroups that solely invited the core project team and focused on
crafting strategies during these meetings, the media subgroup meetings
brought representatives from media industry, academia and civil society
90 E. SEVIN
together. These meetings encouraged participants to express their views

and learn from each other on a variety of media-relevant topics, such
as new media and innovation in contemporary journalism, business of
media and citizen journalism (EUR 2011; BPC 2013d). The subgroup
also organized speaker programs (BPC 2011b) and exchange projects
(Office of the Spokesperson 2011b) to bring parties interested in media-
relevant subjects, including media owners, editors, educators and NGO
representatives together for further discussion and encourage them to
learn journalistic skills from each other (BPC 2012a).
The media subgroup shared the American experience with the represen-
tatives from the Russian media sector. The unique nature of the subgroup
meetings made it possible to bring representative from the media and pub-
lic sector together. Speaker programs and exchange projects increased the
level of interaction between the two countries.
Overall, all four subgroups worked as parts of the ECSM with specific
topical aims, which in return functions as the public diplomacy compo-
nent of BPC. Supported by the introduction of the Reset policy in 2009,
both Russia and the United States have embarked on a journey to improve
and deepen the bilateral relations. The next section further details the
activities of a representative component of ECSM, the Sports sub-group, to
demonstrate the practice of American public diplomacy.
4.2.1 ECSM in Motion: Sports Subgroup

The sports subgroup was led by ECA’s SportsUnited Program, located
under the Office of Citizen Exchanges. SportsUnited was established in
2002 to restart sports-related public diplomacy programs after USIA’s
integration into DoS (ECA 2013b). SportsUnited defines the work they
do as “sports diplomacy” in its work to highlight the role of the tool they
use in increasing dialogue and cultural understanding between people
(ECA 2013b). Its main objective is to send the “message of international
understanding, cultural tolerance, and mutual respect” (Martinmilinski
2010, para. 2). SportsUnited engages with foreign publics through
three different types of projects—sports envoys, sports visitors and grant
competitions (ECA 2013b). Sports envoys project sends American ath-
letes and coaches overseas to lead training programs for foreign youth
athletes with the support of American embassies and consulates (ECA
2013c). SportsUnited partners with professional associations, such as the
National Basketball Association, as well as individuals to name its envoys
(ECA 2013a). Sports visitors are foreign non-elites athletes and coaches,
chosen by American embassies and consulates to visit the United States
for training as well as sports-themed workshops and seminar such as gen-
der equity in sport, disability and team building (ECA 2013c). Grant
competitions enable American civil society organizations to engage in
sports diplomacy projects they organize, around ECA’s priority themes
(ECA 2014). The program argues that sports are “a shared cultural pas-
sion that can bring people together across the divisions of region, race
and religion” (Martinmilinski 2010, para. 3).
Sports diplomacy should be seen as a part of the former Secretary
Clinton’s understanding of smart power diplomacy (Office of the
Spokesperson 2011a). This particular approach values a balance of civil-
ian power and military power to solve global problems (DoS and USAID
2010, ii). Through sports diplomacy, the civilian power is strengthened as
the United States becomes able to engage with foreign publics directly. As
a part of the “Reset” era, the sports subgroup was tasked with “ expand[ing]
the range of sports exchanges to create opportunities and programs for
Russian and American youth” (ECSM 2009c, para. 2). Thus, the sub-
group constituted a tool that was used to reach younger audiences utiliz-
ing shared interest in athletic activities, and it brings two communities
together.
Within the framework of ECSM, SportsUnited predominantly used
envoy and visitor programs. The United States sent young and elite ath-
letes to Russia and hosts Russian in the country. The countries jointly
decided on which sports to use for these exchange activities. These deci-
sions were based on mutual interests coming from both countries (ECSM
2009c) and SportsUnited’s existing capabilities, including its partnerships
with professional leagues and sports organizations (BPC 2010b). Sports
subgroup organized projects mainly on basketball, ice hockey, beach
volleyball and swimming (ECSM 2009c). The projects of the subgroup
were not necessarily limited to these sports, as additional activities were
included provided that there was mutual interest and institutional capabil-
ity to carry them out.
The inaugural event for the Sports sub-group was a basketball exchange
that took place in May 2010 (ECSM 2009c). This exchange welcomed 22
players aged 13 to 15 who participated in several skill clinics including one
hosted by the Women’s National Basketball Association and the National
Basketball Association (Richardson 2010). The event caught media atten-
tion when the Russian players had the opportunity to play basketball with
92 E. SEVIN
President Obama on the White House basketball court (Office of the

Spokesperson 2011a). After the game, President Obama acknowledged
the importance of these activities by saying that sports diplomacy shows
that the relations between Russia and the United States take place not
only at a governmental level but also at an interpersonal level (Richardson
2010). In July 2011, an American delegation, composed of young athlete,
ages 14 to 17, and their coaches, was sent to Moscow and St. Petersburg
as a follow-on exchange program (Richardson 2010).
SportsUnited partnered with the US Olympic Committee in July 2010
to organize a swimming camp (ECA 2010). The United States hosted
19 Russian swimmers, ages 13 to 16, and their coaches during this camp
(ECA 2010). In August 2012, the Russian Swimming Federation, in
cooperation with SportsUnited and US Swimming Federation, hosted
American athletes in Moscow for a two-week program (BPC 2012b). This
trip to Moscow included swimming practices and cross-cultural programs.
The American Embassy in Moscow (2012) argued that the main benefit
of this exchange was to interact with each other on a personal level and
make the participants realize that Russia and United States did not have
great differences.
Both countries’ interest and experience in ice hockey, as well as the
Sochi Winter Olympics, made the sport quite prominent in the activities
of the subgroup. In March 2011, the United States hosted a delegation
of 18 Russian youth and 3 coaches, for a project organized in partnership
with the National Hockey League (BPC 2011c). The delegation visited
Washington, DC, and New York (BPC 2011c). The athletes participated
in ice hockey clinics with American players, attended programs on team
building, sports and disability, and visited National Hockey League head-
quarters (BPC 2011c). In 2012, American players and coaches recipro-
cated the visit. American hockey players, ages 14 to 18, visited Moscow
for ten days, to participate in joint trainings with their Russian counter-
parts (McDonald 2012). Young athletes were not the only ones participat-
ing in hockey games. In 2010, the Carolina Hurricanes of the National
Hockey League visited St. Petersburg for an exhibition game with a local
team (ECA and DoS 2013). A friendship hockey tournament brought
American and Russian first responders together in Moscow (BPC 2012c).
The event was organized with the help of Russian–American Foundation,
Russian Ministry of Emergency Situations and Moscow’s Hockey Club
Legends. The subgroup’s “hockey diplomacy” was repeated even by other
working groups within BPC. The Business Development Working Group
organized a friendly hockey match between the Moscow embassy person-

nel and the Russian Ministry of Economic Development in March 2013
(BPC 2013a). In these exchanges and the games, the main objective was
to encourage individuals to work together.
The sports subgroup moved beyond the initial four sports based on
relevant sport events, schedules of athletes and interest from the parties.
During a time when the International Olympic Committee was debating
whether to keep wrestling as a competition in 2020 Summer Olympics,
SportsUnited hosted wrestlers from Iran, Russia and the United States
for an exhibition game in New York’s Grand Central Station called “The
Rumble on the Rails” (BPC 2013b). The three countries showed their
support to keep wrestling in the Olympics. The event gathered hundreds
of people in the Grand Central Station and caught the attention of media
(Zaccardi 2013). Ibtihaj Muhammad, the first Muslim woman to compete
for the United States in international arena and the first American woman
in hijab to compete in Olympic Games by her appearance in the 2016 Rio
Games, visited Russia in late March to participate in the Moscow Grand
Prix. During her tour, she was declared as a sports envoy to Russia, where
she trained with Russian Paralympic fencing team and attended a confer-
ence to advocate for women’s empowerment and social tolerance (BPC
2013c, 2). The Winter Olympics in Sochi encouraged parties to work on
winter sports. Similarly, there were discussions on organizing events sur-
rounding the Winter Paralympics held in Sochi, Russia, in March 2014.
Yet, the Russian incursion into Ukraine halted the BPC events before
the Paralympics. The Baseball Federation of St. Petersburg (2009) was
supported by the subgroup to increase the popularity of baseball within
the country. The “Helping Baseball Take Root in Russia” program was
launched during which participants from the baseball federation travelled
to Washington, DC, to meet with the DoS officials and discuss possible
sports exchanges (BPC 2011c, 28). They also visited various facilities in
Maryland to explore baseball training techniques. They discussed the role
of local government in youth baseball with New York City Officials. The
US Consulate General in St. Petersburg (2011) also supported the fed-
eration at the local level by sharing the American practices and even by
serving hot dogs and soft drinks during the games to “help create an
authentic baseball atmosphere.”
The activities of the sports subgroup exemplify the work of the ECSM
as the subgroup both had a high level of activity and organized projects
of different types, including exchange projects, speakers programs and
94 E. SEVIN
exhibition games. Given the fact that neither the working group nor the
subgroups had any bureaucratic structures, the sports subgroup operated
within the existing R structure and was coordinated by the SportsUnited.
This organizational structure influenced the types of projects carried out
by the subgroup as these projects also relied on the existing capabilities of
the SportsUnited. The relational public diplomacy projects took the shape
of “sports diplomacy,” in other words promoted the role of the tool that
is used to establish relations—sports. The practitioners argue that sports
is a tool to bring the leaders of tomorrow together (US Embassy Moscow
2012), given the fact that sports makes it possible to reach young people,
who do not necessarily have the linguistic or academic skills to partici-
pate in other types of exchange projects (Martinmilinski 2010). The next
section assesses the empirical performance of the six pathways based on
the case narratives presented throughout the chapter and introduces the
causal mechanism between public diplomacy and foreign policy as por-
trayed in the American logic of practice.
4.2.2 Analysis of ECSM
ECSM, as well as the sports subgroup, is a representative case of American
public diplomacy practice designed to work towards helping to achieve a
foreign policy objective, given its high level of activities and partnerships
with other actors. The working group showcased various types of activi-
ties in the American relational public diplomacy portfolio and included
the involvement of major public diplomacy institutions. As the BPC and
the Reset policy also demonstrate, public diplomacy is not the only tool
of engagement used by the United States towards Russia. The analysis in
this chapter solely focuses on unfolding the causal mechanism between
American public diplomacy and foreign policy as it is represented in the
American logic of practice—in other words, as it is represented in the
design and implementation of the projects by the practitioners.
The case narratives included in this chapter are reconstructed after a
process-tracing testing of the six available pathways as summarized in the
preceding section. Yet, the presentation of the analysis is not complete
without highlighting how these six pathways can be used to build up the
causal mechanism. This section examines each pathway in turn, beginning
with the pathways relevant to public opinion, followed by relationship
dynamics and public debates.
Attraction pathway explains the contributions of public diplomacy

through a soft power understanding. In order to argue that this pathway
shows a high level of empirical performance in explaining American pub-
lic diplomacy, the projects should make use of the soft-power assets and
increase the attractiveness of the United States in the eyes of a foreign pub-
lic (Nye 2008)—in the case of ECSM—of the Russian public. For instance,
the existence of opinion polls, utilizing well-known American cultural
products and references to active mass publics in project designs or in the
elite interviews carried out for this research make attraction pathway a fea-
sible explanation. In this specific case, sports diplomacy projects attracted
the attention of the Russian public due to the prominent place of American
athletes in the world (Martinmilinski 2010). Other soft-power assets, from
the English language to civil society and democracy, made it possible for
the United States to engage with Russian public (BPC 2010a, 2011c,
2012a, 2013a). Yet, the rest of the project design does not necessarily fol-
low the operating assumptions of the attraction pathway. In other words,
the projects are built on soft-power assets but do not attempt to project
American soft power to Russian publics. Rather, these assets solely facilitate
American entry and further communication with target audiences. The
strongest argument against the attraction pathway can be made through
the lack of public opinion polling. Attraction pathway argues that foreign
policy influence happens via mass public; thus, the fact that project design
does not refer to mass public opinion measurement shows the lack of rela-
tive importance of public opinion. Together with the fact that the projects
focus on establishing relations (McDonald 2012) and reaching out to indi-
viduals (ECSM 2009c), the design does not aim for a large-scale change
in mass public opinion. Therefore, American public diplomacy wields
American soft power only as a project input. By promoting American soft-
power assets, the projects inherently increase the attractiveness of American
culture and values. For instance, in the case of sports diplomacy, partici-
pants tend to appreciate certain aspects of American training techniques
(ECA 2011). These projects are designed to generate soft power.
Benefit of the doubt pathway argues that public diplomacy can help
achieve foreign policy goals by establishing a more amicable environment
towards the practitioner state. The friendly approach to the practitioner
country is created by emphasizing the similarities between its interests and
the host country’s interest and by arguing for shared values. Therefore,
the public diplomacy project will contribute to fostering an assumption
in Russia that the United States is acting in good (or better) faith. Given
96 E. SEVIN
the fact that the countries belonged to different camps during the Cold
War, “good faith” has not been a part of bilateral relations for decades.
Yet, if public diplomacy projects and practitioners refer to mutual interests
and establishing shared values, it can be argued that they are seeking to
generate a benefit of the doubt impact. The observations in both ECSM
and the sports subgroup suggest that the project designs aim to increase the
benefit of the doubt in project participants. The exchange projects have
been opportunities to get to know the other side without the Cold War
mentality and to recognize shared values (McDonald 2012). The list of
events and projects organized by the culture subgroup hints that a shared
interest is a paramount criterion for selection from the events surrounding
the 200th anniversary of Fort Ross settlement to the partnership between
the Boris Yeltsin Foundation and the band Someone Still Loves You Boris
Yeltsin.5 The “Rumble on Rails” project brought the United States, Russia
and another unexpected ally, Iran, to collaborate on a project of mutual
interest. Benefit of the doubt effect is intended, albeit solely for the people
participating in the project and not necessarily in the larger public. In
other words, as argued in the attraction pathway as well as throughout the
chapter, American relational public diplomacy focuses on in-person inter-
actions at the expense of mass public opinion. Therefore, the benefit of
the doubt is limited to the individuals directly or indirectly involved in the
projects. The projects are not designed to create a country-wide benefit
of the doubt impact.
Socialization pathway argues that public diplomacy can contribute
to the foreign policy of a country by influencing the way the practitio-
ner country interacts with people and institutions in the host country.
The operating assumption argues that the public diplomacy projects are
designed to give the country as well as its foreign representations new
tasks and to increase the level of activities within the host country. Thus,
if a public diplomacy project can increase the activities of the practitioner
country or its representations in the host country or give them new duties
and responsibilities, this pathway can be used to link foreign policy and
public diplomacy. Eventually, the foreign policy influence is expected to
happen via these new relationship dynamics. In looking at the specific of
this case, we can see that BPC and ECSM help to increase the level of
activity between Russia and the United States. The working group argues
to have organized more than 400 activities in less than four years, which
are designed to develop connection and find new areas of cooperation
(BPC 2010a, 2011a, 2012a, 2013a). The projects of sports subgroup reach
audiences who might not even be able to speak English, making it possible
for Russians to interact with the United States and its representations. The
evidence suggests that the projects change the way these representations
are seen in the public. For instance, the Embassy in Moscow financially
supported the renovation of the Semenkovo Open Air Heritage Museum
(ECA and DoS 2013). Thus, the projects under the ECSM framework
portrayed the embassy as an organization interested in preserving the local
culture. Other projects built up partnerships between the representations
and local institutions such as EURECA, St. Petersburg Baseball League
and the alumnus of these exchange programs. It appears that the projects
were designed to encourage and increase the quantity of the interaction
with the host country on a variety of issues.
Direct influence pathway argues that public diplomacy projects can
establish contact with high-level political and bureaucratic figures. The
operating assumption is that the foreign policy change can be achieved by
influencing the thinking of policy-makers. If the projects give the practi-
tioner country an opportunity to connect with the key figures in the host
society, this pathway can be used to explain the impacts of public diplo-
macy. In the framework of ECSM, there has been no evidence arguing for
direct influence. The only recorded interaction with policy-makers took
place in May 2010, when the participants of an exchange project had the
opportunity to play basketball with President Obama. Yet, the Russian
envoy’s visit to the White House basketball court was not an attempt
to influence President Obama—but was a publicity stunt—and did not
contribute to the achievement of American foreign policy goals. The evi-
dence does not suggest the involvement of direct influence in the project
designs. On the contrary, the projects see the general public as their target
audiences.
Agenda-setting pathway argues that public diplomacy projects can
introduce new items to public or media agenda in a given society, and
thus influence the topics of debate. The operating assumption is that a
public diplomacy project can help achieve a foreign policy objective by
encouraging a society to have debates on certain issues. For instance,
project can make references to relative importance of topics and contacts
with media. In the case of ECSM, the projects have the design elements
to attract media attention. Especially the Sports Envoy projects of the
sports subgroup included prominent figures such as professional athletes
and coaches. The involvement of elite athletes and coaches can create a
celebrity diplomacy aspect and intensify media attention (Cooper 2008).
98 E. SEVIN
Besides the media attention, the evidence suggests that the United States
presented new topics of debate to Russian public. For instance, the edu-
cation subgroup work on entrepreneurship issues and aim to “share best
practices and models for workforce development and access to higher edu-
cation” (BPC 2013d, 5). The visit of Ibtihaj Muhammad went beyond
being a fencing exhibition and included discussions on stereotypes, social
exclusion and tolerance with the Russian audiences. The main working
areas of the media subgroup included topics such as media independence
or objectivity that are not necessarily known topics in Russia where jour-
nalists tend to be limited by the political interests of the government and
the commercial interest of the owners (Nygren and Degtereva 2012). This
is to say that some of the agenda items introduced by projects would not
necessarily have attracted public attention without the American interven-
tion. Therefore, these projects are designed to invoke public discussion,
either through in-person involvement or through media, on topics that
are deemed important for the United States.
Framing pathway argues that public diplomacy projects can influence
the way public or media discuss a given issue, thus change the tone of a
given debate. The operating assumption is that a public diplomacy project
can influence a policy outcome by changing the media coverage or public
discussion of an issue. Thus, project designs and relevant documentation
should make references to narratives and competition of narratives. In the
case of ECSM and BPC, the projects do not refer to the existing narratives.
Especially with the Reset policy, the United States aims to leave the past in
the past. As the benefit of the doubt pathway argues, there is a tendency to
move away from Cold War narratives. However, the projects support this
tendency by increased levels of activity and new subjects of debate, rather
than actively combating an old narrative. There is no evidence support-
ing the explanatory capacity of the framing pathway. Additionally, fight-
ing misinformation with information seems to belong the pre-relational
understanding of American public diplomacy. Within the framework of
ECSM, evidence suggests that introduction of new issues is a higher prior-
ity than changing the discussions and debates on existing issues.
Table 4.2 presents the findings of the analysis by summarizing the per-
formance of the pathways in explaining the causal mechanism between
foreign policy and public diplomacy as manifested in the case of American
relational public diplomacy. Four out of the six pathways explain parts of
the link between public diplomacy and foreign diplomacy. Therefore, the
combination of these four pathways is proposed to better understand the
American public diplomacy project.
Table 4.2 Summary of the analysis, American public diplomacy

Pathway Empirical performance
Public opinion Attraction US relational public diplomacy uses prominent

soft-power assets to facilitate engagement with
target audiences
Benefit of the Relational public diplomacy projects make
doubt references to mutual and shared interests
Relationship Socialization Projects are designed to increase the level and
dynamics breadth of activities of the United States and its
overseas representations
Direct influence No project is carried out with the attempt to
communicate with decision-makers
Public debates Agenda-setting Projects are based on new issues, and encourage
public debates on these new issues
Framing Projects do not focus on changing the discussion
on existing issues
Public opinion:
shared
interests
Benefit of the doubt
Relational Relationship Contribution

Prominent
public Foreign dynamics: to foreign
U.S. soft power
diplomacy Public New/increased policy
assets
projects activities objective
Socialization
Public
Technical debates: New
expertise issues and
concepts
Agenda-setting
Fig. 4.1 Summary of the link, American public diplomacy
Figure 4.1 summarizes the process through which American relational

public diplomacy projects help the country to realize its foreign policy
goals. The attraction pathway is used to understand the project input. A
country’s culture, policies and values might enable or hinder its engage-
ment with a foreign public. In this specific case, the American achieve-
ments in education, culture, sports and media enabled the country to
engage with Russian public on these issues. The initial project outputs are
100 E. SEVIN
designed to be technical expertise—let it be in learning new swimming

styles or higher education management techniques—as well as increased
admiration of American soft-power assets. The project outcomes include
elements that can be explained by a combination of three distinct path-
ways. First, public diplomacy projects change the relationship dynamics
between the Russian public and the United States. Given the fact that
relational public diplomacy projects—by definition—see establishing rela-
tionships as a main objective, it is not surprising to see new dynamics of
relationships as part of the project designs. The public diplomacy practice
also introduces a variety of topics of public debate in the host country and
creates an environment in which the United States and Russia are seen as
having shared interests. Using all these together makes it possible to better
evaluate a public diplomacy project and to explicitly connect this commu-
nication tool to foreign policy and international relations.
4.3 Conclusion
This chapter demonstrated the link between relational public diplomacy
and foreign policy in the case of one of the most prominent practitioner
countries—the United States. Fundamentally, the findings suggest that
American projects are designed to invoke changes in all three areas—public
opinion, relationship dynamics and public debates. Using ECSM as a repre-
sentative case study made it possible to link specific public diplomacy proj-
ects with publically articulated foreign policy goals within the Reset era.
The analysis of American relational public diplomacy practice presents
four important insights. These insights advance our understanding of how
public diplomacy works and the process through which public diplomacy
projects help achieve foreign policy goals. First, ECSM shows that public
diplomacy is one of many variables that are relevant to the achievement of
a foreign policy objective. Despite the fact that the activities of the work-
ing group were deemed successful by the practitioners and were designed
to create an impact, at the time of this writing the “Reset” policy failed
due to non-public diplomacy variables. Thus, an assessment of a public
diplomacy project should incorporate the relevant political context and
external variables.
Second, the institutional history and capabilities of a practitioner coun-
try are influential in determining what topics of public diplomacy activities
are used. As argued throughout the chapter, the four topics in ECSM—
education, culture, sports and media—are brought together because of
ECA and IIP capabilities. Therefore, the context in which public diplo-
macy is practiced should take the prior experience in the country into
consideration.
Third, despite its popularity among American policy circles and schol-
ars, soft power does not present a comprehensive framework to under-
stand the impact of public diplomacy. The attraction pathway is helpful
solely for explaining the input of public diplomacy projects. Moreover,
public diplomacy projects tend to generate soft power by increasing the
admiration of foreign audiences of particular soft-power assets, rather than
being a tool for soft-power projection and utilizing the assets.
Fourth, the link between the public diplomacy intervention and the
expected outcome, namely contribution to achieving given foreign policy
goals, is best explained by a combination of four pathways: attraction,
socialization, benefit of the doubt and agenda-setting. Public diplomacy
projects are designed and implemented to create impact in all three dif-
ferent areas: public opinion, relationship dynamics and public debate.
A comprehensive analysis and assessment of a project should be able to
detect the changes in these areas.
The next chapter studies the Swedish relational public diplomacy prac-
tice. The inclusion of the Swedish relational public diplomacy practice
through the case of Facing the Climate is a further test on the feasibility
of the six pathways as an analytical framework to study public diplomacy
projects. Moreover, incorporation of the Swedish practice into the study
makes it possible to identify possible common patterns among diverse
practitioners of public diplomacy.
Notes
1. In March 2009, then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton pressed a meta-
phorical reset button with the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei
Lavrov to open a new chapter in bilateral relations. This is why the U.S.–
Russian relations after 2009 is known as the Reset era. The American for-
eign policy towards Russia is similarly labeled as the Reset policy.
2. All DoS interviewees were agreed to be “off the record.” Therefore, the
chapter does not include any direct quotes from the interviewees. The infor-
mation obtained during the interviews was used to assess the relative impor-
tance of official and unofficial documents.
3. Most of these videos are available on the Yekaterinburg Consulate General’s
YouTube channel at http://www.youtube.com/user/yekatconsulate. The
Consulate General has a specific playlist, Contest “American Holidays”
(Конкурс ‘Американские каникулы’) available at https://www.youtube.
102 E. SEVIN
com/playlist?list=PLHMfHaB27L1NsJNg46eGEVXq1QZMDYy6W. Last
accessed July 25, 2016.
4. It is important to acknowledge the fact that the time period studied in this
research was troublesome for IIP. As a recent Office of Inspector General
(OIG) report about the bureau argues, IIP lacked an explicit public diplo-
macy strategy and had problems between the bureau staff and senior leader-
ship for years. Moreover, the recommendations from the 2004 OIG
inspection report were not fully implemented causing some of the chal-
lenges cited by the previous report to remain problematic. It is possible to
argue that such challenges required time and resources and, therefore, hin-
dered the progress of the Media sub-group. For further information, please
refer to OIG, Inspection of the Bureau of International Information
Programs.
5. The inclusion of Boris Yeltsin in the band’s name is not political. The band
members have been quite vocal about the fact that they do not endorse any
of Yeltsin’s policies. Neither the band nor its music is based on American–
Russian relations. However, this coincidental shared cultural reference got
the band an invitation to headline in a Russian music festival and be named
as a cultural ambassador.
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CHAPTER 5
Collaboration and Public Diplomacy:

Sweden
Sweden is arguably a country that enjoys a prominent place in the eyes

of the foreign publics despite its relatively small population and remote
location. The nation-branding measurement studies rank Sweden among
the ten countries with the strongest brand perception (Feinberg and Zhao
2011). Its diverse production portfolio ranging from Volvo cars to the
music-streaming software Spotify is used all across the world. Swedish
musicians, from Abba to Tove Lo and Robyn, have attracted global atten-
tion. The overall sentiment towards Sweden is positive to such a degree
that Sweden’s media monitoring does not bother to assess the content
of the pieces published about the country.1 Indeed, it is quite difficult to
find negative portrayals of Sweden or negative news about the country in
international media, probably with the exception of customer reviews on
IKEA furniture.
The Swedish experience expands our understanding of how new, or
relational, public diplomacy works in the realm of foreign affairs. As the
practice of public diplomacy moves away from the informational projects
and is no longer exclusively American, the study needs to incorporate
projects from other countries. Sweden presents a viable case study with
its long experience with public outreach campaigns and employment of
the concept of public diplomacy in these campaigns for nearly the last
two decades. Moreover, Swedish foreign policy—compared to American
foreign policy—has different priorities and a different approach. With its

110 E. SEVIN
long-established position as a neutral country, Sweden follows an agenda

involving predominantly “low politics” topics in the international arena.2
Indeed, the country has been listing these topics—such as climate change
and gender equality—as important items in its foreign policy agenda (Bildt
2014; Wallström et al. 2015). Additionally, the country underlines the
importance of collaboration and achieving consensus in its international
relations (Wallström 2015). Public diplomacy projects likewise follow a
collaborative approach and focus on low politics issues as their end goals.
This chapter unfolds the link between public diplomacy and foreign
policy as it is observed in the Swedish practice through Facing the Climate
project—a traveling cartoon exhibition designed to illustrate Swedish
commitment to climate and environment issues. The project is represen-
tative of the Swedish practice, given the fact that it portrays the Swedish
public diplomacy project structure—it is a collaborative project and is con-
nected to a low politics foreign policy objective that Sweden actively pro-
motes in the international arena.
The chapter opens with the historical, bureaucratic and political context
of Swedish public diplomacy. The historical account portrays the role of
the Swedish model, especially the country’s reputation in working towards
solutions for low politics issues, as the basis of its public diplomacy proj-
ects. The bureaucratic account establishes the Swedish Institute (Svenska
Institutet, SI) as the most important organization working on public
diplomacy issues. The political account explains that the initial idea for the
public diplomacy projects is conceptualized in an environment in which
Sweden is threatened by the climate change issues and is keen on support-
ing an international reaction to climate change and other environmental
issues. Next, Facing the Climate—a multi-year travelling cartoon exhibit
and workshop series that focuses on artwork concerning the implications
of climate change—is presented. A detailed explanation of how Facing the
Climate is planned and executed in a representative country, Albania, is
given. The chapter concludes with the assessment of the empirical perfor-
mance of the six pathways. The tests focus on understanding whether the
explanations of the pathways are reflected in the Swedish practice.
5.1 History of Swedish Public Diplomacy

Sweden has been actively working on crafting public diplomacy strate-
gies and creating institutions to meet the needs and challenges of inter-
national affairs since the establishment of the SI in 1945 as an institution
COLLABORATION AND PUBLIC DIPLOMACY: SWEDEN 111
responsible for the country’s reputation (SI 2013g). The establishment

of SI was directly related to Sweden’s involvement, or lack thereof, in
World War II. Sweden remained neutral throughout the War and con-
sequently found itself in a position of having to explain its neutrality and
policies to the rest of the world. In 1943, the Swedish government estab-
lished a committee—named the America Inquiry—to focus on Sweden’s
future relation with the United States (Glover 2009). Sweden believed
the United States was about to win the war and “would clearly dictate the
international trade after War, and would dominate the international politi-
cal arena” (Glover 2011, 32). Given the fact that it did not take part in
the American wartime efforts, Sweden was not sure about how it would be
perceived by American and other foreign audiences. The America Inquiry
argued that a negative perception caused by the neutrality could generate
serious economic and political problems for Sweden (Glover 2011). The
reports of the America Inquiry committee encouraged the establishment
of an institute to communicate with foreign publics: the Swedish Institute
for Cultural Exchange with Foreign Countries—which later adopted the
shortened version of its name, the Swedish Institute. The initial neces-
sity for public diplomacy was based on an assumption that an unfavorable
public opinion would be detrimental to Swedish foreign policy goals. A
coordinated Swedish public diplomacy was expected to explain why the
country decided to stay neutral to the participants of the World War II to
ensure the continuation of political, social and economic relations. The
main objective of SI was declared as promoting such relations through
informational activities and cultural exchanges (Glover 2011).
5.1.1
From Cultural Exchange to Digitalization
SI’s initial target audience was its immediate neighboring countries, as well
as the United States and the United Kingdom (SI 2013g). Throughout the
Cold War years, SI expanded its geographic outreach and became more of
a global organization, engaging with foreign publics across the world. The
end of the Cold War caused a noteworthy change in SI’s target audiences.
Countries in the Baltics and in Eastern Europe left the Soviet Union and
declared their intentions to have closer relations with the Western world.
Sweden attempted to play “an important role in the process of integrat-
ing the new neighbo[.]rs into a European collaboration” by reaching the
public in these countries (SI 2013g). These newly independent countries
gained a prominent place in the Swedish public diplomacy agenda. As the
112 E. SEVIN
original name of SI—the Swedish Institute for Cultural Exchange with

Foreign Countries—suggests, the early days of Swedish public diplomacy
predominantly focused on cultural and student exchange projects. These
programs were usually one-time exchanges between Sweden and target
audiences.
From 1950s onward, the country added aid and development pro-
grams to its public diplomacy portfolio, fueled by the rising standards
of Swedish living. In 1962, the Council for International Development
was established to coordinate Swedish development aid to underde-
veloped countries (Sida 2009). In 1965, the Council was replaced by
Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Styrelsen för
Internationellt Utvecklingssamarbete, Sida). By the 2000s, Sida had exe-
cuted projects in more than 110 countries (Sida 2009). Sweden made use
of aid and development programs to increase its public outreach. In 2007,
the Swedish government decided to move towards a new development aid
strategy by decreasing the number of countries with which Sweden cooper-
ates to lower than 33 (Sida 2009). The main idea behind this decision was
to de-clutter the crowded landscape of international development actors
due to two reasons. In developing countries, it was possible to see several
foreign and international development agencies working simultaneously,
which caused both logistical and communication problems. Logistically,
it was difficult to coordinate the activities of different agencies that made
reaching the overall development objectives challenging. By taking more
responsibility in one country, Sida aimed to increase the efficiency of inter-
national development campaigns in the long run (Utrikesdepartementet
2012). From a communication perspective, the local populations found it
difficult to identify the source of the development aid. Sida (2009) also
aimed to provide better visibility for Sweden in its development projects by
being one of the few—if not only—agencies working in a given country.
This change in Swedish development aid is in line with Sweden’s overall
move towards a “nation-branding” approach in its public diplomacy and
other outreach activities. Sweden wants to generate interest in the country
and influence public opinion by promoting the country, and its contribu-
tions in the international arena (Pamment 2014). Swedish development
projects with their objective of making Sweden more visible have a direct
public diplomacy component. Therefore, the country wants to increase its
visibility through various means, including its development aid projects,
its international trade and its global businesses.
The multitude of these public outreach means necessitated a coordi-

nating agency for the Swedish brand. In 1995, Sweden established the
Council for the Promotion of Sweden (NSU) as a coordination agency
for promoting the country. NSU includes representatives from Ministry
of Foreign Affairs (MFA), Ministry of Culture, Ministry of Enterprise,
Energy and Communications, VisitSweden, Business Sweden, and SI.3
The secretariat of NSU is housed by the Press and Communication
department within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.4 The mandate of the
Ministry of Culture’s mandate covers topics related to culture and media.
The Ministry of Enterprise, Energy and Communications is partly respon-
sible for international development partnerships. The ministerial part
of NSU thus covers all relevant public diplomacy and diplomacy actors.
VisitSweden is country’s official tourism and travel promotion agency.
Business Sweden promotes Swedish companies working abroad. Lastly, SI
is included as the main agency responsible for organizing and executing
public diplomacy campaigns.
The branding-based outreach understanding, “Brand Sweden,”
strengthened the position of SI in the institutional landscape of Swedish
foreign policy. Since the 2000s, Sweden started to explicitly embrace
the concepts of public diplomacy and nation branding (SI 2013g). The
nation-branding understanding in Sweden is based on a country of origin
effect (Andehn 2013). Thus, the Swedish brand image is expected to pro-
vide an added value to the goods and services produced in the county. The
source of Brand Sweden is seen as everything associated with the coun-
try, from individuals to companies. The country closely monitors how its
brand is perceived through the famous Anholt-GfK Nation Brands Index5
since 2005 (SI 2009). Within this branding understanding, SI under-
takes the responsibility of managing the country’s brand—from providing
visual identity tools, such as logos and avatars, to communicating its brand
promises to target audiences. Essentially, the nation-branding understand-
ing sets the tone for a more proactive public diplomacy understanding
that aims to communicate Swedish actions and values to the rest of the
world. In its early days, SI strived to be perceived as an educational insti-
tute, yet, its current form resembles more to a marketing agency that has
one single account—Sweden. Indeed, from its glossy publications to office
design, SI carries the vibe of a marketing agency, rather than a government
institution.
Starting with late 2011, Sweden began working on a new wave of
digital engagement. Following the initiative of then Minister of Foreign
114 E. SEVIN
Affairs Carl Bildt, embassies and consulates were encouraged to estab-

lish their presence on Twitter and Facebook. Additionally, the country
also started the now-famous official Twitter account, @sweden. Unlike
other examples of official accounts, @sweden is not controlled by a profes-
sional staff. Instead, through a project called “Curators of Sweden” each
week a different Swedish individual is given the ownership of the account
(Christensen 2013). The country is promoted through the eyes, experi-
ences and keyboards of ordinary Swedish citizens. This is why @sweden is
dubbed as the “most democratic Twitter account” (Swedish Institute and
VisitSweden 2013). The project was the first of its kind, and its success
caught the attention of other cities and countries to present a different
image than the images distributed through traditional media. Within the
post-2011 wave of digital engagement, most of the organizations within
NSU, including SI, updated their websites to become more user-friendly.6
NSU also launched a new main website, sweden.se. An important aspect of
the new website is the fact that all Swedish promotional and public diplo-
macy material were made available to general public. Until 2013, NSU
maintained a Swedish Promotion Forum (SPF) extranet. Swedish embas-
sies, consulates and other NSU participants had access to a password-
protected area of SPF that included SI-provided public diplomacy content
and promotional materials. Currently, these documents are hosted on the
new website and are open for public consumption.
The digitalization wave in Swedish foreign policy should not only be
seen as a technology move. Digitalization of its international communica-
tion was actually a demonstration of the Swedish model—a concept that is
often credited for the successes of Swedish public diplomacy (SI and United
Minds 2012). The Swedish model was first coined to describe Sweden’s
social welfare-based development strategies in the 1930s (Lundberg 1985).
Political scientists still tend to use the concept to a country with a strong state
bureaucracy that actively carries out a wide scope of functions (Fukuyama
2004). Yet, the contemporary meaning of the Swedish model carries more
substance than a development policy or administration approach. The
Swedish model embraces the country’s achievements in and contributions to
the international arena in a variety of issues ranging from the Swedish way
of fighting prostitution to drinking coffee. The country defined prostitution
as a male violence against women and children, therefore criminalized men
who pay for sex (Ekberg 2004; D. Taylor 2014). The Swedish way of coffee
drinking is not only grabbing a cup to go. Rather, Swedish coffee tradi-
tion—also known as fika in Swedish—refers to the combination of coffee
and sweet snacks, and for an opportunity to socialize (Averbuch 2013). The
country’s move to social media was similarly in line with “Swedish model”
of politics and diplomacy. By strategically using a citizen-controlled Twitter
account and a web platform that included public diplomacy project mate-
rials, Sweden demonstrated the openness and transparency aspect of the
Swedish model (Christensen 2013).
It is possible to argue that the “Swedish model” is the brand identity
for the country, in other words how Sweden sees itself and its contribu-
tion to the world. “Brand Sweden” is the country’s branding attempt or
the platform it uses to promote the Swedish model. Knowing its impor-
tance, Sweden actively monitors how foreign audiences perceive its model.
According to the country’s own research, the Swedish model predominantly
resonates with the audiences on topics that the country has been actively
working for domestically and internationally. For instance, Sweden’s gov-
ernance model, low level of corruption and equality among citizens are
widely appreciated by target audiences (SI and United Minds 2012). Apart
from its domestic political practices, Sweden’s role in taking initiative in
certain issues in the world is well received: such as gender equality and
environmental sustainability (Krutmeijer 2008; Wallström et al. 2015).
In summary, the “Swedish model” constitutes the basis of Swedish out-
reach and branding attempts that are coordinated by four main actors—
NSU, MFA, Sida and SI—and are supported by the other participants
within the NSU framework. The overall strategies are decided by the NSU
and MFA. MFA furthermore carries out the secretariat functions for the
Council and issues the governmental directives for the priority countries.
Sida is responsible for promotion activities through development proj-
ects. MFA, controlling a part of Sweden’s international aid, also supports
Sida’s activities abroad. SI is the main organization responsible for the
public diplomacy activities. It operates as a public agency connected to
MFA. The main responsibility of SI is to work on raising the country’s
reputation in the world.
This chapter uses an example public diplomacy project—Facing the
Climate—to explain how Sweden uses public diplomacy to achieve for-
eign policy goals. The next section introduces two aspects of the Swedish
model to provide a complete background information for the project.
First, the relevant aspects of the Swedish model, namely the role of envi-
ronmental politics in Swedish foreign policy, are introduced. Second, a
general overview of Swedish public diplomacy projects relevant to envi-
ronmental issues is presented.
116 E. SEVIN
5.1.2
Swedish Foreign Policy and Public Diplomacy
Sweden follows an active domestic and foreign policy agenda on climate
and environmental issues. Domestically, the country adopted an ecologi-
cally sustainable development strategy back in 1998 (Lindh 1998). The
Environmental Code was sanctioned in 1999, outlining Sweden’s rela-
tionship with the environment (Ministry of the Environment 2004). In
2002, the government formed the Environmental Objectives Council to
ensure that Sweden reaches its environmental quality objectives by 2020
(sweden.se 2013). These objectives ranged from sustainable forests to
reduced climate impact, from protecting the ozone layer to biodiversity.
In 2005, a new commission was formed to assess the threats of climate
change. The Swedish Commission on Climate and Vulnerability (2007)
presented a bleak picture of the years ahead, forecasting increased risks of
floods, landslides and erosions, decreased water quality, and accelerated
spread of infectious diseases throughout the country. The commission
advocated that it was necessary to promote legislative changes not only
domestically but also internationally.
Sweden’s work on climate change in the international arena attracted
the world’s attention when the United Nations (UN) Conference on the
Human Environment, also known as the Stockholm Conference of 1972,
was organized at the initiative of the Swedish government and hosted by
the country. The conference was the first international platform to discuss
the human impact on the environment. Following the country’s acces-
sion to the European Union (EU) in 1995, Sweden further engaged in
regional and international cooperation projects. The country continuously
works within the EU framework to strengthen environmental policies of
member countries and the Union as a whole.
Sweden’s presidency of the EU in 2009 was an invaluable opportu-
nity for the country to promote its environmental agenda. Shortly after
the Global Financial Crisis, Europe had economic and financial recovery
as a priority in its policy agenda (Regeringskansliet 2009). Sweden put
forward the climate challenge as the second overriding presidential issue,
arguing that environmental sustainability was a necessary part of all eco-
nomic policies (Langdal and von Sydow 2009). The presidency encour-
aged member countries to decrease their dependence on fossil fuels and
emission of greenhouse gases (Regeringskansliet 2009). Leading by exam-
ple, as part of this endeavor, Sweden voiced its goal to achieve a fossil-fuel
transport sector by 2030 and zero-net emissions of greenhouse gases by
2050 (sweden.se 2013).
A critical moment for the Swedish presidency was the 2009 UN Climate
Change Conference in Copenhagen, Denmark. At the conference, coun-
tries met to discuss new measurements to take effect beyond 2012, the
expiration date for previous agreements made during the conference in
Kyoto, Japan in 1997. The member countries left the conference promis-
ing to cut their greenhouse gas emissions by 30% to 40%. Sweden argued
that “[w]here other[s] reneged, the EU demonstrated its capacity to take
responsibility by putting concrete and ambitious bids on the table” (Bildt
2010, 3).
Sweden continuously recites its aim to increase the level of ambition to
meet the climate objectives and promises to keep climate change “high on
[its] agenda and one of the Government’s top environmental priorities”
(Bildt 2013, 10). Sweden follows a busy agenda in the international arena
as well. Most recently, the country initiated a coalition against short-lived
climate pollutants and hosted the UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change to present its assessment report (Bildt 2013). In the wake of the
climate conference in Paris in 2015, the country announced its readiness
to contribute over US$2 million to support the climate change adaptation
of the poorest and most vulnerable countries (Regeringskansliet 2015).
The political commitment is supported by public diplomacy projects.
Sida supports various countries around the world in their attempt to miti-
gate the impact of the climate change. For instance, Sweden has a partner-
ship with India to help the country overcome the challenges of handling
the impacts of a rapidly developing economy on the environment (Sida
2013a). Similarly, Sweden is working with Vietnam to identify and dis-
seminate projects and programs that help people living in coastal regions
to cope with the effects of the climate change (Sida 2013b).
SI (2013b) also has environment as one of the four thematic headings
for its projects7: innovation, creativity and culture, society and environ-
ment. All these thematic priorities, including environment, are based on
subjects in which Sweden has a comparative advantage or has experience
to share with foreign audiences. Moreover, as also seen in the case of
the environment and foreign policy, these issues are part of the “Swedish
model.” Indeed, SI argues that Sweden has a unique experience with
using innovative power for development, its creativity and culture con-
tributes to the prosperity and quality of life, its society attracts general
attention due to its welfare system and its work on equality and justice,
and sustainable development is one of the country’s niche expertise.
The project under study in this chapter, Facing the Climate, is situated
118 E. SEVIN
under the environment heading as a part of a larger “Facing the Future—

Sustainability the Swedish Way” theme to share the Swedish experience
with the world. The Swedish involvement in environmental issues has long
been a part of the Swedish model. By officially pledging to “hand over
to the next generation a dynamic but sustainable society in which the
major environmental problems have been solved,” the country has almost
a unique commitment to environment and sustainability (Committee on
Environmental Objectives 2000, 6).
The environment-themed public diplomacy projects operate in such a
framework in which Sweden aspires to lead the world and has the experi-
ence to be a leader. SI organizes three types of projects: (1) continuous
projects, (2) various one-time events such as workshops, seminars and
exhibitions, and (3) outside partnerships. Until late 2013, there were two
continuous projects. Eco Chic was a travelling fashion exhibition highlight-
ing the works of Swedish designers who took an environmentally friendly
approach to their work (Grady 2010). Eco Chic concluded its activities by
2013, leaving Facing the Climate as the major project under the environ-
ment heading. In 2014, SI (2014c, d) launched another continuous proj-
ect: an innovation contest entitled Smart Living Challenge. The contest
is looking for ideas on smarter transportation, smarter homes and smarter
food to make daily life more sustainable. The one-time events are usually
organized by the Swedish foreign representations inviting Swedish schol-
ars and practitioners to share their experience on environmental issues
and to cooperate with their local counterparts. For instance, the Swedish
Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya, invited Swedish public and private sector
employees of urban planning and development to facilitate information
exchange between countries (SwedenAbroad 2012). The Embassy in
New Delhi hosted Swedish Ambassador for Climate Change for a one-day
seminar on the international climate change negotiations (SwedenAbroad
2014). In terms of outside partnerships, SI (2013a) predominantly works
within the EU such as “InnoHeat” that works towards developing sus-
tainable heating systems in districts. Through three different kinds of pub-
lic diplomacy activities—continuous projects, one-time events and outside
partnerships—Sweden both demonstrates its commitment to the environ-
mental issues and contributes to creating solutions across the world.
Succinctly stated, environment is an important priority in Swedish for-
eign policy and public diplomacy. Sustainability and respect for nature
are situated as parts of the Swedish way of living, or the Swedish model.
Sweden makes use of various tools available in its foreign policy toolkit to
create an impact. The country is active in traditional diplomacy arenas,

working towards changing environmental policies through state-to-state
relations and through international organizations, such as the UN and the
EU. Sida provides aid for sustainable development projects in the devel-
oping world. On the public diplomacy front, SI executes a number of
projects with the help of MFA and foreign representations.
The next section introduces Facing the Climate within the political and
institutional framework explained in this section. The project is representa-
tive of SI’s work in specific and Swedish relational public diplomacy due to
two reasons. First, Facing the Climate aims to both promote the Swedish
model—the Swedish way of solving problems. Second, it is connected to
an issue area in which Sweden aspires to be a world leader—environmental
politics. The project encourages collaboration among Sweden, Swedish
foreign representations and local actors to work together to understand
and implement the Swedish way of sustainable development.
5.2 Facing the Climate

Facing the Climate is a travelling cartoon exhibit and workshop project
organized by the SI in collaboration with Swedish foreign representations
and local partners across the world to stimulate conversation about cli-
mate change and environmental sustainability (SI 2013c). The exhibition
presents a “genuine appeal for a better response to the environmental
threats we face” blended with humor and satire as an attempt to simulta-
neously entertain and educate publics (SI 2013d, 5). Since its inaugura-
tion in Belgrade, Serbia in 2010, the project has visited 20 countries and
reached over 190,000 people.8 Given the fact that Facing the Climate was
not necessarily conceptualized as a multi-year project in the beginning, its
continuation is indeed an indicator of its success as there is demand com-
ing from the Swedish embassies to host the exhibition.9 As of this writing,
the project is still active and has been touring the world for five years.
The project is closely associated with the Swedish foreign policy com-
mitment to environmental issues and its goal of establishing international
cooperation. Facing the Climate aims to influence the environmental pol-
icy decisions of the countries that host that exhibit and encourage them
to join the international community to work on environmental issues
through engagement with the public. Table 5.1 shows the explanations
for six pathways, updated from their generic versions laid out in Chap.
3, to reflect the policy goals of this project. The exhibition attempts to
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Table 5.1 Proposed explanations for Facing the Climate

Public opinion Attraction Host country’s stance on climate issues is

changed by popular demand
Benefit of the Host country’s stance on climate issues is
doubt changed by the belief that Sweden is acting in
good faith
Relationship Socialization Host country’s stance on climate issues is the
dynamics result of new roles of Swedish embassies and
other representations introduced by the projects
Direct influence Host country’s stance on climate issues is
changed by influential people/decision-makers
engaged through the project
Public debates Agenda-setting Host country’s stance on climate issues is
changed by local media’s/public’s coverage of
new issues introduced by projects
Framing Host country’s stance on climate change is
changed due to local media’s/public’s new tone
of coverage
change the stance of the host country on climate change and other envi-
ronmental issues.10 This change can be achieved through influencing pub-
lic opinion, relationship dynamics and/or public debates.
Attraction pathway posits that public diplomacy projects should project
the Swedish model to the foreign publics as attractive, thus encouraging
the foreign publics to demand a change in environmental policies. Benefit
of the doubt pathway argues that public diplomacy projects will demonstrate
that Sweden and the country hosting the exhibition share similar interests
and foreign public will be more amenable to Swedish interests believing
that their country has similar objectives. Socialization pathway foresees
the public diplomacy projects bestowing new functions to Swedish rep-
resentations in the host countries and consequently to Sweden, and these
new roles will help the Sweden achieve its foreign policy objectives. Direct
influence pathway sees Facing the Climate as a tool to contacting decision-
makers and to influencing their decisions. Agenda-setting and framing
respectively argues that the exhibitions will bring new issues or change the
coverage of existing issues in the country. Contribution to the achieve-
ment of a foreign policy goal will thus be affected by the change in public
debates. The following narrative of the project is constructed after assess-
ing whether the explanations and assumptions proposed by the pathways
are observed within the design, implementations and expected outcomes

of the Facing the Climate project.
The initial idea for Facing the Climate was conceptualized during a
meeting between Birgitta Tennander, the project manager at SI for Facing
the Climate, and Magnus Bard, a Swedish illustrator to discuss a possible
partnership on environmental issues. During this meeting, they decided
to create an exhibition to showcase the works of Swedish cartoonists on
climate-related issues to raise awareness as well as to emphasize Swedish
involvement in environmental politics.11 The collection for the exhibi-
tion started with the works of Magnus Bard, Helena Lindholm and Riber
Hansson. Two prominent Swedish cartoonists—Love Antell and Karin
Sunvisson—also joined the exhibition before its premier (SI 2014b). Each
cartoonist contributed five works, summing up to a total of 25 cartoons.12
The actual implementation of the Facing the Climate exhibition is orga-
nized with the help of Swedish foreign representations—who are expected
to initiate the project by declaring their intention to host the exhibition.13
In other words, SI or other institutions involved in NSU do not decide on
the route. Despite the thematic and geographic priorities of SI, Swedish
foreign representations are the actors that are expected to assess the needs
and demands of the host society and choose the projects most appro-
priate for their target audience. SI solely presents a pool of projects and
provides implementation support. After initial request to host the exhibit
by the embassies and consulates, SI works together with the foreign rep-
resentation to produce necessary documents and materials. SI provides an
“Exhibition Brief” and a “Toolkit” that includes information about the
exhibition’s production process and components, as well as social media
and other promotion strategies. The artwork and promotion materials are
digitally produced and reproduced. The exhibition material is sent as a
soft copy by SI and printed locally. Promotional material, such as invita-
tions in local languages or local artists’ works, are prepared by the for-
eign representations, sent to SI for layout purposes, and returned back to
the embassy for hardcopy production. The reason for preferring a digital
reproduction is quite noteworthy as it is also based on environmental rea-
sons. SI decreases the impact of the exhibition on the environment by
cutting down unnecessary shipment of the artwork.14 When requested by
the embassies, SI also provides an opportunity for small budget support15
to partially cover the expense of hosting the project.16 The embassies are
responsible for all logistical and promotional activities, and SI encour-
ages them to find local partners to share the responsibility of hosting
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the exhibition. Afterwards, the embassies are asked to submit a “Project

Evaluation” to SI and report information about project promotion, target
groups, number of visitors, media coverage and costs.17
In its bare form, Facing the Climate is a two-week exhibition. The
Swedish representations have the flexibility to prolong the duration of the
exhibit, to include the works of local artists and to combine the exhibi-
tion with other relevant events, workshops and symposia (SI 2011a). SI
proposed two kinds of workshops designs to be incorporated into the
project. The first workshop invites local artists to work together with their
Swedish counterparts (SI 2014b). The works of local artists are subse-
quently included in the exhibition portfolio. The second workshop, called
“What are you doing for the climate?” is for the general public where par-
ticipants are asked to propose sustainable solutions to the problems faced
in their society (SI 2014b). In this way, non-artists are presented with a
collaboration opportunity. Moreover, individuals are encouraged to think
about climate issues through an interactive workshop.
From 2010 to 2016, Facing the Climate has visited 33 countries,
including Sweden, Albania, Angola, Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium,
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Canada, Czech Republic, Croatia,
Egypt, Georgia, Greece, Iceland, India, Israel, Kosovo, Latvia, Lithuania,
Macedonia, Malaysia, Moldova, Montenegro, Russia, Serbia, Slovakia,
South Africa, Syria, Ukraine, the United States and Vietnam. Some coun-
tries, such as South Africa, hosted the exhibition multiple times over
the years and others, such as Russia, organized events in multiple cities.
Depending on the reaction of the audiences, sometimes the exhibition has
done both—has visited multiple cities over the years in the same country.
In Albania, after an initial visit to Tirana, the exhibit was invited back to
Korça and Shkodra.
In its first year, Facing the Climate was shown in Reykjavik, Riga
and Kuala Lumpur, in addition to the inaugural show in Belgrade (SI
2011b). The exhibition was well received by all the host countries. In
Kuala Lumpur, the local interest was quite high with over 30,000 visitors
(Swedish Embassy Kuala Lumpur 2010). In Riga and Reykjavik, around
5000 visitors were recorded (SI 2010). In 2011, the project visited sev-
eral countries including Bosnia and Herzegovina, Latvia, Lithuania and
Russia. In 2012, Facing the Climate continued its tour near and far. It was
shown in Brazil, South Africa, Israel and Albania and reached over 60,000
visitors (Shary 2012; SI 2013f).
The exhibition gathered considerable interest from the media and con-
sequently SI argued for an estimated range of 4.4 million people outreach
(SI 2013f). SI cited the role of their local partners for this increase in the
number of visitors and media outreach. For instance, in the case of Greece,
a well-connected local partner, Eugenides Foundation,18 managed to get
over 100 articles published about the exhibition due to its established
media relations and prominent place in Greek society (SI 2012). The
Swedish embassies also partnered with governmental institutions—with
the Ministry of Environment, Forests, and Water Management in Albania
and with the Netanya Ministry of Environment in Israel to harness media
attention (Shary 2012). Local partners also increased the interest in the
exhibition by combining Facing the Climate with other projects of interest
to the local public. In South Africa, the Swedish Embassy partnered with
local organizations and incorporated Facing the Climate to an event enti-
tled “Towards a Grass Roots [sic] Women’s Movement around Climate
Justice and Sustainable Development” (Tully 2012). The agenda was cre-
ated with the help of one of the local partners, GenderCC: Women for
Climate Justice, which aims to “integrate gender justice in climate change
policy at local, national, and international levels” (GenderCC 2010).
Therefore, Facing the Climate offered a platform to promote Swedish
involvement in both gender and climate issues.
The 2013 tour included six countries that wanted to host Facing the
Climate once again: Albania, Latvia, Lithuania, Ukraine, South Africa and
Russia.19 These encore tours are again initiated by the embassies and con-
sulates based on their positive experience with the previous exhibitions. For
instance, following the Tirana, Albania exhibit in 2012, Facing the Climate
visited Shkodra in 2013. The 2013 exhibits managed to attract more than
33,000 visitors worldwide.20 The 2014 activities included the first North
American stop in Washington, DC. This latest addition to the Facing the
Climate stops not only featured the cartoon exhibit but also hosted sus-
tainable fashion exhibit and showcased other Swedish contributions to sus-
tainability such as portable safe water and sanitation system (Sevin 2014;
SI 2014a, 2015). The exhibit was unveiled in February and ran through
December 2014, as part of Sweden’s year-long public diplomacy project in
Washington, DC, Going Glocal.21 In 2015, the exhibit was positioned as
part of country’s promotion activities, giving embassies an opportunity to
engage with local publics (SI 2016b). In 2016, Facing the Climate helped
Sweden engage with foreign publics in Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech
124 E. SEVIN
Republic, Georgia, Latvia, Moldova, Slovakia and the United States (SI
2016a). As of September 2016, the project exhibited the works of 115
cartoonists across five continents including the Swedish artists (SI 2016a).
Over the years, Facing the Climate grew to be a flexible framework that
allowed the Swedish foreign representations to modify the project based
on the audience demands, rather than presenting an unchanging cartoon
collection to local public. The artwork is kept fresh and interesting to
the audiences by including new and local works—including non-cartoon
works, such as sculptures (Tully 2013). The project seeks both to attract
visitors and to encourage cooperation between Swedish people and local
populations. The former objective is geared towards sharing the Swedish
experience in climate issues with the world. In the field of climate change,
Sweden aims to promote the Swedish model—such as the Swedish experi-
ence in green technology and renewable energy (Lryvall 2014). The latter
provides a platform for collaborative public diplomacy project by encour-
aging Swedish and local participants to work on issues of mutual interest.
In summary, Facing the Climate constitutes part of the public diplo-
macy component of Swedish environmental policies by “encouraging the
discussion of sustainable development around the world” (SI 2013d).
The exhibition provides Swedish foreign representations an opportunity
to interact with the local target audiences through a cartoon exhibit and
a series of workshops, as well as by establishing partnerships with local
actors to host the project. The project gives the representations the flex-
ibility to adapt its content in order to better suit the needs and demands
of the population. In conjunction with Sweden’s overall environmental
policy objectives, this project is devised to contribute to ensuring global
cooperation on climate change and other relevant issues. The next sec-
tion introduces the Albanian Experience with Facing the Climate in 2012
(Tirana) and 2013 (Korça and Shkodra) to shed light on how Facing the
Climate takes place in the field.
5.2.1 Facing the Climate in Detail: The Albanian Experience

This section supports the unfolding of causal mechanisms between
Swedish public diplomacy and foreign policy by further detailing a rep-
resentative experience selected from the 26 countries hosting Facing the
Climate: Albania. The country is chosen due to two reasons. First, the
country hosted the project across two years and in three cities. Therefore,
it is representative of different experiences of initial and “encore” visits.
Second, the three exhibits are well documented through digital media,
evaluation reports coming from the Swedish embassy in Tirana, and SI’s
annual reports. Facing the Climate project does not have strict reporting
requirements. Even though the representations are asked to submit an
evaluation report afterwards, they might fail to respond to this request.
Thus, the Albanian experience provides an illustrative example through
which different aspects of Facing the Climate’s project design can be
unearthed and linked to Swedish foreign policy.
The Swedish engagement in Albania is relatively new. Sida has been
working in the country for nearly 15 years (Sida 2013c). The agency
works on issues related to natural resources and environmental care. Sida’s
development projects support Albania’s attempt to establish sustainable
development practices (Drakenberg 2011). Sida also carries out informa-
tive activities for the Albania’s issues in adjusting to European standards in
the fields of environment and climate change (Sida 2014).
The official representation in the country first started with an honorary
consulate general in 1997 (Swedish Embassy Tirana 2014). The first pro-
fessional Swedish representation was established as “the Office in Tirana”
belonging to the Swedish embassy in Macedonia. The office was turned
into an embassy in December 2010. Facing the Climate presented an
opportunity to engage with the Albanian society for this young embassy.
The first stop for Facing the Climate in Albania was Tirana—the capital
city—in June 2012. The exhibit took place between June 5 and 13. The
day of June 5, the unveiling day, coincided with the World Environment
Day. This date is celebrated as the World Environment Day to com-
memorate one of the earlier Swedish contributions to the environmental
politics in the international arena, as the famous Stockholm Conference,
or the UN Conference on the Human Environment, started on June 5,
1972. Moreover, Facing the Climate exhibition was incorporated into the
Swedish national day celebrations the following day, June 6. The national
day reception was held at the exhibition hall; thus, the regular audience for
the reception—such as members of diplomatic corps, government repre-
sentatives and civil society people—had the opportunity to see the artwork.
Last, June 6 was also the day when Sida launched its civil society training
project, called the “Environmental Civil Society Programme” (Swedish
Embassy Tirana 2012). The launch event was also held in the exhibition
hall, exposing the civil society leaders to Facing the Climate project. One
of the five cartoonists from Sweden and one representative from Albanian
artists were present at the opening ceremony. The embassy’s main local
126 E. SEVIN
partner was the Albanian Ministry of Environment, Forests, and Water

Management. The Swedish foreign representation in Tirana established
partnerships with other organizations as well, through organizing tours for
specific target audiences that included students, civil society organizations
and other bureaucrats. For instance, students from both the Agriculture
University and Fine Arts University were invited to see the project (Swedish
Embassy Tirana 2012). A European Union delegation held a seminar on
climate change and European policy. Overall, the estimated number of visi-
tors to the exhibit was around 600.
The following year, Facing the Climate had two stops in Albania—to
Korça in May 2013 and Shkodra in October 2013. The Korça event took
place from May 10 to 18. The opening ceremony was attended by gov-
ernment officials from Korça, general public, and Swedish representatives
(Swedish Embassy Tirana 2013a). During their welcoming remarks, both
the Swedish representation and Korça government gave similar messages
and argued for the necessity to take concrete action to protect the envi-
ronment (Svensson 2012). The project was once again promoted under
the heading “Facing the Future—Sustainability the Swedish Way.”
The local partner for the exhibition was the Korça municipality. The
embassy reported that the cooperation with the municipality was a posi-
tive experience for both parties and might lead to further cooperation
(Swedish Embassy Tirana 2013a). The exhibition gave an opportunity for
the embassy in Tirana to interact with the local audience in the city. Sweden
does not have a representation in Korça, and in 2013 Facing the Climate
was the only reported embassy event in the city (Swedish Embassy Tirana
2013b). In other words, the exhibition was the only platform for com-
municating with Korçans. The embassy estimated a total of 400 visitors
(Swedish Embassy Tirana 2013a). The short exhibit also received limited
local and national media attention.
In addition to the exhibition, two workshops were organized. The work-
shops were both designed for high school students and facilitated Karin
Sunvisson, one of the five Swedish cartoonists involved in the project.
Following a modified version of the “What are you doing for the climate?”
format, the participants were asked to play the role of an editor-in-chief of
the fictional “Bad Times Ahead” newspaper (SI 2013e). They were tasked
with deciding on headlines for paper, highlighting the imminent threats
and outcomes of climate change. The participants expressed their views on
environmental issues under the guidance of a Swedish expert. The second
workshop helped high school students to create artworks on themes rel-
evant to environmental issues.
The project’s last stop in Albania was in Shkodra, from October 1 to

October 10, 2013. The opening ceremony brought Swedish representa-
tion, local officials and the general public together. The environmental
sustainability aspect of the Swedish model was shared with the audiences
through welcoming remarks and the artwork. Facing the Climate, once
again, was the only reported embassy event in the region, thus helping
the presence of the Swedish representation increase outside the capital
city (Swedish Embassy Tirana 2013b). The local partner for the event was
Shkodra’s Municipality Council. The structure of the project was similar
to Korça, with one minor difference. Shkodra hosted only one workshop
that included students from Preng Jakova School of Music, a fine arts high
school in the region (Swedish Embassy Tirana 2013b). The workshop
with the students was a repetition of the second workshop in Korça. Art
students were asked to use their skills to share their views on the future of
environmental issues.
The Swedish experience with Facing the Climate in Albania best exem-
plifies the structure, potential and capabilities of the project. All three exhi-
bitions across a two-year period have the objective of sharing the Swedish
environmental policy objectives in the country, and play their part in the
larger Swedish engagement and cooperation with Albania.22 The next sec-
tion analyzes the logic of practice based on the case narratives presented
and introduces a summary of how Swedish public diplomacy can manifest
its impact on the larger picture of international affairs.
5.2.2 Analysis of Facing the Climate

Organized in cooperation with the Swedish foreign representations, SI,
and local partners in host countries, Facing the Climate exemplifies the
institutional partnership of Swedish relations public diplomacy projects.
The project also represents the relationship between Swedish foreign policy
and public diplomacy, given its prominent place in promoting the Swedish
model and helping Sweden achieve its environmental policy objectives.
As argued throughout the chapter, SI and Facing the Climate are not
the only tools Sweden uses to promote its environmental agenda in the
international arena. Public diplomacy is solely one part of a larger political
strategy that includes other tools such as traditional diplomacy, and devel-
opment aid. The analysis in this chapter solely focuses on explaining the
relationship between Swedish public diplomacy and foreign policy as it is
represented in the design and implementation of Facing the Climate. The
128 E. SEVIN
arguments suggest that the link between public diplomacy and foreign
policy in Swedish relational diplomacy is similar to the American case and
requires the same four out of the six pathways to be explained.
The first of the six pathways, attraction, explains the contributions of
public diplomacy through a soft-power understanding and change in mass
public opinion (Goldsmith and Horiuchi 2009; Nye 2008). The pathway
can better explain cases where the projects are designed to make use of
the soft-power assets and increase the attractiveness of Sweden in the eyes
of a foreign public. In the specific case of Facing the Climate, the general
public in the host country must be expected to appreciate Swedish values,
policies and culture. Such an argument can be supported by demonstrat-
ing references to mass publics, public opinion polls and attractiveness of
the Swedish assets in the project design.
The attraction pathway cannot be used to explain the link between the
project and the foreign policy. The strongest design aspect that decreases
the confidence in the pathway is the lack of public opinion polling. Facing
the Climate reporting and measurement processes do not include mass
public opinion indicators. Facing the Climate does not refer to changes
in public opinion in general. Given the fact that the exhibition tends to
reach an audience of a small size and to emphasize relationship building,
the design does not aim for a public opinion change.
Yet, the Swedish soft-power assets—namely, the Swedish brand and
model—constitute the basis of the public diplomacy projects. Sweden
argues that its engagement with foreign countries is based on country’s
long experience with green development and its well-known commitment
to environmental issues.23 Facing the Climate’s entry into societies is facili-
tated by Sweden’s positive image24 and by Sweden’s identity as a forerun-
ner in climate issues (Svensson 2012). Thus, the essence of the Swedish
soft power—the Swedish model—facilitates the Swedish engagement with
foreign public opinion. Yet, public opinion factors exclusively as a project
input. Moreover, by providing a wider exposure to the Swedish model,
the projects generate soft power for Sweden (Zaharna 2007). Facing the
Climate lists “illustrate[ing] Sweden’s strong commitment to climate and
environmental issues” as a project objective (SI 2013c). For instance,
Facing the Climate was invited to Brasilia, Brazil to “create interest
for Sweden by illustrating [the country] as an open and sustainability-
conscious nation.”25 Similarly, the Greek exhibitions were organized “to
illustrate Sweden’s strong commitment to climate and environmental
issues.”26 Therefore, soft power is also generated as a project output.
Benefit of the doubt pathway argues that public diplomacy projects show
their impacts on public opinion—specifically by changing the perception
of the interests of the practitioner as mutual and shared interests within
the host country. Therefore, public diplomacy intervention will encour-
age the target audiences to see Swedish interests as mutual interests or see
Sweden as an actor that shares several interests with their own country and
thus acts in good faith. If the project design includes references to mutual
interests and establishing partnerships to work for issues that are deemed
important by both countries, benefit of the doubt might be used to explain
the link between public diplomacy and foreign policy.
Overall, Facing the Climate indeed is designed to create an environ-
ment in which Sweden and the host country share similar interests and are
working together. The attempt to create such an environment increases
the confidence in the benefit of the doubt pathway. For instance, embas-
sies are required to take the decision to host the exhibition based on
demands coming from the host countries and publics.27 The exhibit in Rio
de Janeiro was held in 2012, together with the Rio+20 UN Conference
on Sustainable Development, during a time when the entire society was
interested in climate issues.28 The exhibit in Tirana was held on June 5
during the World Environment Day celebrations. The focus on exhibit
was relevant to Albania’s expected adaption to the European regulations.
Overall, SI encourages the embassies to build up collaborations on issues
of mutual interest through Facing the Climate by co-organizing the event
with local institutions. In Albania, Sweden cooperated with a ministry
and two municipalities. Tirana embassy was positive about the possibility
of future partnerships with the municipalities (Swedish Embassy Tirana
2012). The South African tour was arranged because it gave the local
organizers “the opportunity to foreground environmental themes in the
African context.”29 Even the SI annual reports list Facing the Climate
under the “International Cooperation to secure Sweden’s interests in its
relations with other countries” heading (SI 2010, 2011b). Thus, public
diplomacy helps Sweden to create an environment in which it is perceived
as organizing these events because of mutual interests, rather than solely
propagating its own policies.
Socialization pathway focuses on the nature of interaction between the
foreign public and the practitioner country, arguing that public diplomacy
can help achieve policy goals by giving new roles to as well as increas-
ing the activities of Sweden and Swedish representations in host coun-
tries. Projects that can be explained by the pathway include references
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to increased volume, or level, and breadth, or topics, of activities. The

projects should be designed to increase the level of activity of Swedish rep-
resentations on environment-related issues—or give them an opportunity
to undertake such roles if they have not already been active.
In Tirana, Albania, Facing the Climate was one of three events pro-
moted on the Embassy’s calendar of events in 2012 (Swedish Embassy
Tirana 2013b). The public in Korça and Shkodra had their first interac-
tion with the Swedish embassy in Tirana through the exhibit. The project
increased the presence of the relatively young embassy among Albanian
public by presenting an opportunity to organize events outside its embassy
compounds and even outside the capital city and to engage with general
public. The project made it possible to engage foreign audiences through
new exhibitions, seminars and workshops. The public diplomacy projects
presented platforms to “unite local people [regardless] of age, education,
or political views [and to] discuss and learn from each other,”30 giving
the embassy the role of bringing people together. These new activities
influenced the way Sweden interacted with the host country. Facing the
Climate is thus designed to have an impact on the dynamics of relation-
ship between host countries and Sweden.
Direct influence pathway posits that public diplomacy projects can help
the practitioner country to connect with decision-makers. This new access
to host country’s bureaucracy can help change policies. Thus, a project
is expected to include opportunities to connect and persuade—or to
lobby—key bureaucrats, politicians and other decision-makers.
Facing the Climate presented Sweden certain opportunities to inter-
act with decision-makers. Especially, the opening ceremonies attracted
the attention of local governments as well as other embassies in the host
countries. In Tirana, Dr. Taulant Bino, Deputy Minister of Environment,
Forests, and Water Administration, attended the opening of the exhibi-
tion in Tirana.31 As the opening day in Tirana coincided with the Swedish
national day, other political dignitaries were also present at the event. In
Korça and Shkodra, high-ranking city officials attended the exhibit.
However, the confidence in this pathway is challenged due to two rea-
sons. First, apart from the opening ceremonies, Facing the Climate does
not provide opportunities for contact with decision-makers. The atten-
dance in opening ceremonies seems to be inconsequential and part of
diplomatic protocol. This impression is supported by the fact that the
embassies evaluation reports never list decision-makers as target groups
for the projects. Second, even in the cases where there is direct contact
with decision-makers, there is no evidence suggesting that the participants

are trying to be persuaded. Facing the Climate tends to value engagement
with students, youth groups and civil society organizations, rather than
policy-makers, presenting evidence for a case where direct influence path-
way shows low empirical performance.
introduce new items to the public or media agenda, encouraging discus-
sions on certain issues among the public. The operating assumption is
that a public diplomacy project can help achieve a foreign policy objective
by these new debates. If a project is expected to influence foreign policy
through agenda-setting, its design should have references to changes in
topics of debate and to importance of media and media contact.
One of the fundamental objectives of Facing the Climate is “to stim-
ulate conversations about sustainability” (SI 2013c). This objective was
well understood by all the organizers of Facing the Climate and reported
back in their evaluations. As clearly seen in the case of Albania, host coun-
tries did not necessarily see climate change and environmental issues as
a priority item in their public agenda. Even though the threat of climate
change was imminent and the political risk of not adapting to European
regulations was high in Albania, there was not necessarily a widespread
public discussion on the issue. Facing the Climate was a pioneer public
diplomacy project in introducing these topics to the public agenda. In the
majority of the exhibitions, the local artists invited were not necessarily
known for their existing work on environmental issues, but rather for their
political and socially conscious work. During the workshops, these local
artists were encouraged to think about environmental issues and produce
relevant artwork.32 The individuals taking part in the workshops or visit-
ing the exhibitions also became more aware of the issues. Therefore, for
a certain segment of the population, environmental advocacy became an
important item in their agenda. Environmental issues are introduced into
the public debate. The project is designed to yield media-level agenda-
setting impact as well. For instance, the Russian exhibits underlined the
importance of creating a “big interest of mass media result[ing] [in] rais-
ing awareness in the society.”33 SI annual reports included the number
of articles published about the project (SI 2013f). The embassies used
their own webpage and other media outlets to make its message heard.
Each embassy was required to report back the media interest in the event.
Therefore, inherently, the project had the potential to increase the media
coverage of climate change issues.
132 E. SEVIN
Framing pathway presents the capacity of public diplomacy projects to

change the way public or media discuss a given issue. Policy change can be
achieved based on the new tone of coverage. If the projects are designed
to combat existing narratives or refer to competitive narratives and/or
attempts to change the way a certain topic is understood in the country,
the projects can be said to incur a framing effect.
The case narrative for Facing the Climate did not provide any evidence
of Sweden actively changing the narratives. Rather, the public debate is
influenced through introducing new issues and raising awareness. The most
important evidence decreasing the confidence in the pathway is the fact that
Facing the Climate does not target existing debates in the societies but rather
brings in new issues to be discussed. Framing cannot be necessarily used to
explain how the project helps Sweden achieve its foreign policy goals.
Table 5.2 presents the findings of the analysis by summarizing the per-
formance of the pathways in explaining the link between foreign policy
and public diplomacy as represented in the case of Sweden. The analysis
of Swedish practice demonstrates that no single pathway can explain this
link satisfactorily. Rather, there is a need for a combination of four path-
ways to describe how public diplomacy projects might help achieve for-
eign policy goals. The combination of four pathways—namely attraction,
Table 5.2 Summary of the analysis, Swedish public diplomacy

Public opinion Attraction Swedish relational public diplomacy is based on

the attractiveness of the “Swedish model”
Benefit of the Projects make references to mutual interests and
doubt are designed as collaborations. Sweden works
together with the host country for mutual gains
Relationship Socialization Projects are designed to give new roles to Sweden
dynamics and its representations
Direct influence Interactions with policy-makers are limited to
opening ceremonies and are inconsequential
Public debates Agenda-setting Environmental issues not necessarily popular
prior to the project. Objective is to stimulate
conversation
Framing Projects do not focus on changing the discussion
on existing issues. Environmental discussions are
introduced as “new items” to the public agenda
socialization, agenda-setting and benefit of the doubt—better explains the

logic of practice. The socialization pathway accentuates the importance
of the new roles and increased activity of Sweden in the host country.
Agenda-setting draws attention to the introduction of new topics and the
stimulation of dialogue between Sweden and the country, as well as of
debate on environmental issues within the society. Last, benefit of the
doubt pathway explains the result of proposed collaboration between local
institutions and Swedish representations—perception of shared interests.
Figure 5.1 summarizes the process through which Swedish relational
public diplomacy projects help to achieve foreign policy objectives. Similar
to the American case, the projects are based on the attractiveness of
Swedish soft-power assets—the Swedish model. The Swedish soft power
facilitates the Swedish engagement with foreign publics. The project out-
put is the raised awareness about the policy issue—in the case of Facing
the Climate, environmental politics. Sweden is known in the world for its
important role in the international environmental politics arena, and this
role is supported by its active public diplomacy projects about environ-
ment. As the projects create an opportunity to expose foreign publics to
the Swedish pathway, they generate soft power for the country. The proj-
ects are designed to change the dynamics of relations, making the Swedish
representations a more active actor. The collaborative aspect of the rela-
tional public diplomacy projects increases the perception of Sweden as an
actor acting in good faith and working together with the host countries for
mutual gains. The projects also introduce new topics to the public debates
and are designed to influence both the public and the media agenda.
Public opinion:
shared
interests
Soft power: Relational Relationship

public Foreign dynamics: Contribution to
Sweden Swedish foreign policy
diplomacy Public New/increased
model objective
projects activities
Socialization
Public
Promoting debates: New
the Swedish issues and
model concepts
Agenda-setting
Fig. 5.1 Summary of the link, Swedish public diplomacy

134 E. SEVIN
5.3 Conclusions
This chapter presented the link between public diplomacy and foreign
policy as observed in the Swedish practice. Succinctly stated, from the
practitioner’s point of view, this research proposes a framework to assess
Swedish relational public diplomacy projects. As the projects are designed
to invoke changes in three different areas—public opinion, relationship
dynamics and public debates—assessments should also focus on all three
areas. From a theoretical perspective, this chapter further exemplifies the
implementation of a new vocabulary—six pathways—to structurally dis-
cuss the impacts of public diplomacy projects.
This case study provides four important insights. First, the analysis of
Swedish public diplomacy practice presents an opportunity to test whether
the six pathways can be used outside the American case. This point is
important, given the fact that six pathways of connection are derived from
studies predominantly focusing on the American experience. In other
words, the Swedish experience makes it possible to assess the feasibility of
these pathways as an analytical framework outside the realm in which they
were created.
Second, the similarities between the American and Swedish causal
mechanisms hint the possibility of common patterns in the practice of rela-
tional public diplomacy. American and Swedish practices operate in differ-
ent institutional, political, social and historical contexts. Yet, both causal
mechanisms are composed of the same four pathways, working across
three areas of connection between foreign policy and public diplomacy.
Third, the “Swedish model” portrays a distinct understanding of soft
power. While the American soft power is based on the attractiveness of
its cultural products, organizations and technical expertise, Swedish soft
power is based on Swedish policies. In other words, soft-power assets are
not necessarily universal.
Fourth, Facing the Climate also supports the complexity of the con-
tribution to the foreign policy goal understanding. The achievement
of a foreign policy goal depends on a number of non-public diplomacy
variables. The Swedish case further shows the difficulty of capturing
the impact of public diplomacy interventions. An impact assessment for
Facing the Climate, for instance, requires a thorough understanding of the
environmental policies of 20 countries, including their histories and other
determinants of their foreign policy decisions.
The next chapter introduces a new case and applies the research meth-
odology on Turkish relational public diplomacy projects. The incorpora-
tion of Turkish practice is another data point to examine the relational
public diplomacy practice.
Notes
6 February 2013.
2. Low politics is used in reference to the topics that are not directly related
to a state’s survival such as social and economic issues.
4. Sara Modin (Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs), personal interview with
the author, 17 October 2013.
5. Anholt-GfK Nation Brands Index is the oldest and most prominent nation
branding measurement index. It is coordinated by Simon Anholt, an
advertising professional, who is often credited with coining “nation-brand”
concept.
7. SI launched its new website in February 2013 as part of NSU’s new visual
identity. Prior to February 2013, these four thematic headings were known
by different names: environment and sustainability, innovation, gover-
nance and society, and culture and creative industries. The idea behind the
categories stayed the same despite the change in wording during the
update.
8. Birgitta Tennander (Swedish Institute), e-mail interview with the author,
10 February 2014.
9. Birgitta Tennander (Swedish Institute), personal interview with the author,
1 February 2013.
10. “Change” denotes a policy decision that is different from country’s origi-
nal stance. In certain cases, change might refer to a country’s decision to
join an international effort to support sustainable development—such as
the Kyoto Protocol—while in others change might denote a country’s
decision not to leave such an international effort. In other words, provided
that the country protects and/or increases its commitment to environmen-
tal issues, the public diplomacy project contributes to the achievement of
Swedish foreign policy objective.
1 February 2013.
136 E. SEVIN
12. This number increases after each exhibition as the project invites local art-
ists to work with their Swedish colleagues and incorporates their works to
the exhibition.
6 February 2013.
1 February 2013.
15. This budget support is around $3000.
1 February 2013.
1 February 2013.
18. Eugenides Foundation, established in 1956, is a private non-profit entity
that works towards providing better science and technology education to
Greek youth. Further information about the Foundation can be found
here: http://www.eugenfound.edu.gr/. Last accessed, 29 September
2016.
10 February 2014.
24 February 2014.
21. Going Glocal is used in reference to local partnership and collaboration
opportunities for the United States and Sweden emerging from globaliza-
tion. For further information, refer to the website of the Swedish Embassy
in Washington, DC, http://www.swedenabroad.com/en-GB/Embassies/
Washington/Current-affairs/News/Going-Glocal-sys/. Last accessed 26
September 2016.
22. Merita Pira (The Embassy of Sweden in Tirana), e-mail interview with the
author, 20 February 2013.
6 February 2013.
25. Pierre Liljefeldt (The Embassy of Sweden in Brasilia), e-mail interview with
the author, 27 February 2013.
26. Sofia Keramida, (The Embassy of Sweden in Athens), e-mail interview with
the author, 3 March 2013.
6 February 2013.
28. Lena Lundgren, (The Consulate-General of Sweden in Rio de Janeiro),
e-mail interview with the author, 28 February 2013.
29. Ann Tully, (Curator, Johannesburg), e-mail interview with the author, 5
March 2013.
30. Elena Emilianova, (The Kaliningrad Office of the Consulate General of
Sweden in Saint Petersburg), e-mail interview with the author, 5 March
2013.
32. Lena Lundgren, (The Consulate-General of Sweden in Rio de Janeiro),
e-mail interview with the author, 28 February 2013.
33. Elena Emilianova, (The Kaliningrad Office of the Consulate General of
Sweden in Saint Petersburg), e-mail interview with the author, 5 March
2013.
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CHAPTER 6
History and Culture: Turkey
Turkey is quite an “intriguing” case for those of us who study anything

related to politics and international relations. It is virtually impossible to
categorize the country in world politics. Known as a bridge between the
East and the West, Turkey enjoys a democratic and constitutional republic
and a predominantly Muslim population. The country applied to be a part
of the European Economic Community in 1987 and has been negotiat-
ing with the European Union—the successor organization—since 2005.
Yet, as the failed coup d’état in July 2016 once again demonstrated, the
country presents an intriguing case for social scientists. Leaving arguments
for “Turkish exceptionalism” aside, it should be noted that the political
practice of the country is different from its Western and Eastern counter-
parts—if not unique. This chapter expands our understanding of “new”
public diplomacy by introducing the analysis of Turkish relational public
diplomacy.
The Turkish conceptualization of public diplomacy, expectedly, differs
from both the American and Swedish practices in terms of overall objec-
tives and outreach strategies. The country mainly uses communication
campaign to rebrand itself in the international political arena and pre-
dominantly engages with foreign audiences in its nearby regions, namely
the Middle East and Central Asia. Turkey sees itself as a rising power in the
international arena and attempts to demonstrate its capacity to affect inter-
national politics (Bank and Karadağ 2013). This aspiration to conduct an

144 E. SEVIN
active foreign policy agenda is especially visible after the rise of Justice and
Development Party (AKP) to power in 2002.1 The contemporary Turkish
foreign policy is based on establishing and pursuing independent foreign
policy objectives without being influenced by the choices of Turkey’s
long-time Western allies, such as the European countries and the United
States (Davutoğlu 2013a).
Public diplomacy is one of the numerous tools that Turkey uses in its
new foreign policy era. The AKP era is not the first time the country
engages in communication activities. Despite not officially using the con-
cept of “public diplomacy” until the beginning of the twenty-first cen-
tury, Turkey rather has a long history of reaching out to foreign audiences
through a variety of tools and media since the very early days of its inde-
pendence movement following World War I. In this chapter, I focus on
a project that started before the official introduction of public diplomacy
to Turkish foreign policy lexicon and that still continues its activities: the
International Organization of Turkic Culture (Uluslararası Türk Kültürü
Teşkilatı—TÜRKSOY).
The chapter starts with the presentation of the historical and institu-
tional backgrounds of Turkish public diplomacy practice, with a specific
focus on the political framework that TÜRKSOY operates in—Turkish
foreign policy towards Central Asia. This contextual summary is followed
by a descriptive account of TÜRKSOY and its activities as a representative
project. TÜRKSOY is argued to be a representative case, given the fact
that it has been a part of Turkish bilateral and multilateral relations with
the Turkic Republics in Central Asia since the very early days of their inde-
pendence. Moreover, TÜRKSOY includes a variety of activities—from
cultural exchanges to concerts to publications. Third, a detailed account
of a TÜRKSOY project—Eskişehir 2013 Culture and Arts Capital in the
Turkic World2—is given. Subsequently, the analysis of TÜRKSOY by
assessing the empirical performance of the six pathways is given. The chap-
ter is concluded by introducing the causal mechanism that is presented in
the Turkish practice.
6.1 History of Turkish Public Diplomacy

Turkey is a latecomer to the practice of “public diplomacy”. One of the ear-
liest references to the concept in Turkey was made by Jan Melissen (2006),
a Dutch professor of diplomacy, when he was invited to address Turkish
diplomats in 2006. The first institution to explicitly bear the name “public
HISTORY AND CULTURE: TURKEY 145
diplomacy”, the Office of Public Diplomacy (KDK), was established in 2010

(Başbakanlık 2010). Yet, as argued above, this does not necessarily mean
that the country is a stranger to communicating with foreign publics.
6.1.1 Institutionalization of Turkish Public Diplomacy

It is possible to argue that Turkish public diplomacy experience started
with international broadcasting. During the Turkish War of Independence
(1919–1923), the country found it necessary to talk to the foreign audi-
ences and to advocate for an independent Turkey (Anadolu Ajansı 2014).
In 1920, the Anatolian Agency (Anadolu Ajansı, AA) was established as
the official international news agency. AA currently works as a news agency
with the objective of introducing Turkish points of views into the inter-
national media agenda. With the increasing adoption of radios and televi-
sions in households, Turkey ventured into broadcasting in these media
platforms. Turkish Radio and Television (Türkiye Radyo ve Televizyon
Kurumu, TRT), established in 1964, is the national public broadcaster in
the country and has engaged in international broadcasting activities start-
ing in 1990s. Now-defunct channels TRT int and TRT Avrasya broad-
casted Turkish-language programming to neighboring countries and the
Central Asia (Çankaya 2015). Currently, TRT controls five international
radio stations in Turkish language, all broadcasting in Turkish, and five
television stations, broadcasting in Turkish and other languages: TRT
Belgesel (TRT Documentary) broadcasts Turkish-language documentaries
abroad; TRT Türk presents regular TRT programming in Turkish lan-
guage worldwide; and TRT-6, TRT Et-Türkiyye and TRT Avaz broadcast
respectively in Kurdish, Arabic and Turkic languages (TRT 2016).
One of the earlier Turkish attempts to move beyond broadcasting in
public diplomacy took place through the creation of the Directorate for
Economic, Cultural, Educational, and Technical Cooperation in the early
1990s. The Directorate was established to develop and execute coop-
eration projects in economic, trade, technical, social and cultural areas
with developing countries starting with the Turkic-speaking republics
and neighboring countries (KHK/480 1992). During its initial years,
the Directorate had two units. The first unit, named Economic, Trade,
and Technical Cooperation Bureau, was tasked with helping the transition
of especially the Turkic-speaking countries into free market economies
through development aid and projects after the fall of the Soviet Union
(KHK/480 1992, Article 8). The second unit, Educational, Cultural,
146 E. SEVIN
and Social Cooperation Bureau, was an early prototype for Turkish public
diplomacy institutions. This unit was tasked with organizing cultural pro-
motion events and exchanges, as well as with establishing Turkish Cultural
Centers in foreign countries to promote Turkish culture (KHK/480 1992,
Article 9). The Cultural Centers were expected to be used for promoting
Turkish culture, language and art abroad and contribute to the relations
between Turkey and other countries (Dışişleri Bakanlığı 2012b). After a
decade, the directorate was transferred to the Office of the Prime Minister
and took the name of “Turkish Cooperation and Development Agency”
(Türk Iş̇ birliği ve Koordinasyon Ajansı Başkanlığı, TIKA)̇ while keeping its
original mandate (PL 4668 2001).
In 2011, the AKP government restructured TIKA, ̇ increasing its geo-
graphical outreach and its responsibilities. Its original organizational
structure—composed of Economic, Trade, and Technical Cooperation
and Educational, Cultural, and Social Cooperation units—was replaced
by primarily regional units: such as the Middle East and the Caucasus,
Balkans and Eastern Europe, Middle East and Africa, and South and East
Asia, Pacific, and South America (KHK/656 2011). The majority of con-
temporary TIKA ̇ projects are based on infrastructure development and
construction (Denizhan 2010). In other words, TIKA ̇ is using develop-
ment and foreign aid as tools of diplomacy, leaving the practice of social,
cultural, and educational cooperation to other public diplomacy organi-
zations. For instance, in 2009, an autonomous government institution
called the Yunus Emre Institute was created to take over TIKA’s ̇ former
responsibility of operating the Turkish Cultural Centers abroad (Dışişleri
Bakanlığı 2012b). The institute’s main objective is declared as organizing
activities of similar nature in order to promote Turkish culture and Turkey
abroad (PL 5653 2007). These activities are organized through over 30
cultural centers across the world, including the ones transferred from
̇
TIKA (Yunus Emre Institute 2013). The institute also teaches Turkish
language and different aspects of culture—such as folk dances—to inter-
ested audiences.
Turkish MFA continues to contribute to the public outreach attempts
through two designated units after the departure of TIKA: ̇ the Directorate
General of Information (Enformasyon Genel Müdürlüğü, ENGM) and
the Directorate General for Overseas Promotion and Cultural Affairs
(Yurtdışı Tanıtım ve Kültürel Iliş ̇ kiler Genel Müdürlüğü, TKGM). The
former is tasked with general press outreach events, targeting journalists
based in the country.3 ENGM, thus, has a public affairs function engaging
media about Turkish foreign policy and MFA functions. TKGM is the old-
est institution in the country specifically tasked with “cultural diplomacy”
activities. The unit carries out advertising and promotional projects, as
well as activities that aim to promote Turkish culture abroad such as fes-
tivals.4 The two units combined engage with target audiences through
media platforms and cultural programs.
The Office of the Prime Minister is also an active public diplomacy
actor, working through two appendant bodies: the Directorate General of
Press and Information (Basın—Yayın ve Enformasyon Genel Müdürlüğü,
BYEGM) and the Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities
(Yurtdışı Türkler ve Akraba Topluluklar Başkanlığı, YTB). BYEGM is
responsible for actively engaging with foreign media outlets in the coun-
try through journalists visits and meetings to share Turkish view on pol-
̇
icy issues (Iletiş im ve Diplomasi 2013). YTB is a relatively new agency
established in 2010 (Yurtnaç 2012). It is tasked with organizing activities
aimed at Turkic societies to develop social, cultural and economic relations
(PL 5978 2010 Article 1(c)). In other words, BYEGM focuses on medi-
ated communication, whereas Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related
Communities works with face-to-face communication projects.
In 2010, MFA and the Office of the Prime Minister, through BGEYM,
worked together to establish a coordinating agency for Turkish pub-
lic diplomacy, KDK (Başbakanlık 2010). KDK’s main objectives are to
(1) ensure better coordination and cooperation between various public
diplomacy actors in the country; (2) improve Turkey’s reputation; and
(3) increase Turkey’s visibility and activity in international public opinion
(Başbakanlık 2010). In other words, KDK is tasked with organizing and
improving the country’s existing public diplomacy capabilities to create a
more favorable public opinion of Turkey in foreign nations.
Coordination is indeed a necessary task for Turkish public diplomacy,
given the plethora of actors and institutions. The next section presents
such a policy area that includes various public diplomacy actors, namely
the Turkish outreach to Central Asia. The outreach is outlined through
two important figures: Turgut Özal, former prime minister and president
of Turkey, and Ahmet Davutoğlu, a professor of international relations,
foreign policy advisor to AKP governments, the minister of foreign affairs
from 2009 to 2014 and the prime minister from 2014 to 2016. The impor-
tance of Özal stems from the fact that he is the first policy-maker who ini-
tiated the contact with the Turkic republics following their independence
after the fall of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). Davutoğlu
148 E. SEVIN
and his ideas are noteworthy, as his geopolitics-influenced foreign policy

approach constitutes the backbone of the AKP foreign policy towards the
region, and he held several executive positions during the implementation
of said policies.
6.1.2
A Love Affair: Turkey in the Central Asia
Turkey’s first interaction with Central Asia dates back to Turgut Özal’s
term as the prime minister and subsequently the president of Turkey in
late 1980s and early 1990s (Ataman 2008, 122). Özal is known to be the
first politician in the twentieth century to diversify Turkish foreign policy
by including non-Western audiences (Aykan 2009). Since the early days
of the republican era, Turkey preferred partnerships and alliances almost
exclusively with Western countries. Özal argued for the necessity of reach-
ing out to countries in other parts of the world. Moreover, his time in
office also coincided with the end of the Cold War and the fall of the Soviet
Union during which various states in close proximity to Turkey declared
independence. In other words, both the foreign policy of Özal and the
changes in the international system created new audiences in Central Asia.
Özal’s foreign policy strategy foresaw Turkey as “a major regional power
in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Persian Gulf” (Abramowitz 1993,
164). He furthermore advocated closer relations with the Central Asian
republics arguing that the twenty-first century was going to be “the cen-
tury of the Turk” (Makovsky 1999, para. 6). Following the independence
of the Turkic republics, Turkey initiated a series of high-level summits of
“Turkic Speaking Countries” (Kut 1996). These summits brought min-
isters of specific topics, and/or heads of states together. Various public
diplomacy organizations, such as TIKA ̇ and TÜRKSOY, were established
to facilitate interaction with the Turkic countries while Özal was in office.
The early days of Turkey–Turkic republics relations were seen as a
“reunion.” Despite the shared ethnicity and culture, the Cold War era
relations were overpowered by political ideologies during which Turkey
and the Turkic republics belonged to different alliances, virtually freezing
all relations between the countries. Therefore, there was an initial excite-
ment about the renewing of relations among these six Turkic countries
during the late 1980s and 1990s (Akdiş 1999). The relations between
Turkey and the Turkic republics in Central Asia were supported by a
mutual “emotional proximity” and quickly took off in their earlier days
(Dikkaya 2009; Ibrahimov 2011). However, after the initial sentimental
phase, the relations stagnated. This change of hearts was partly caused by
the fact that Turkish foreign policy returned back to its Western focus after
Özal’s death in 1993, where relations with the European countries and
the United States were deemed more important than relations with the
neighboring countries and regions (Davutoğlu 2013a).
The relations regained their importance with the AKP governments
and the new foreign policy understanding brought in by Minister Ahmet
Davutoğlu, who outlined the theoretical underpinnings of the changes
in foreign policy in his book Stratejik Derinlik (“Strategic Depth”). The
book argues that the Turkish foreign policy was not based on a strategic
understanding because it was led by faceless elites who did not want to
be seen in the international arena during the times of crisis and the coali-
tion governments of 1990s who followed short-term risk-aversive policies
(Davutoğlu 2013a, 33–45, emphasis added). According to Davutoğlu’s
new geopolitical understanding, the Central Asian region is important for
Turkey due to its natural resources and to the fact that it constitutes a
new market for Turkish companies (Davutoğlu 2013a; Demirtepe and
Özkan 2011). For the Turkic republics, Turkey provides new possible
trade routes, including naval access to North America and beyond, for
the landlocked region (Davutoğlu 2013a, 458). In terms of geopolitics,
Turkey–Turkic republics relations are a “win-win” scenario for all parties
involved.
AKP has supported the idea of closer relations with the Turkic repub-
lics and encouraged the establishment of various platforms to facilitate
communication outside traditional diplomatic channels since it came
to power. For instance, in 2006, Turkey developed the idea of an inter-
parliamentary group among these countries, which was initially introduced
by Kazakhstan, by hosting the meetings to finalize and sign the treaty that
created the Parliamentary Assembly of Turkic-Speaking Countries between
Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkey (TURKPA) (TURKPA
2012a). In addition to its support in developing the idea, Turkey currently
provides more than half of the budget for TURKPA (TURKPA 2010 Art.
7.2). The main objective of this assembly is to achieve “harmonization of
the legislations and strengthening mutual activities with regard to other
issues relating to the parliamentary cooperation on the basis of historical,
cultural, and language unity” (TURKPA 2012a, para. 2). The Assembly
predominantly carries out traditional diplomatic functions by facilitating
conversation among the policy-makers and parliamentarians of the Turkic
world. Moreover, TURKPA houses permanent commissions of bureaucrats
150 E. SEVIN
that are tasked with publishing reports on the developments in the Turkic
world and propose cooperation possibilities in the areas of international
relations, humanitarian issues and trade (TURKPA 2012b).
In addition to bringing politicians together and exploring cooperation
opportunities, TURKPA has declared its commitment to public diplomacy
in its fourth plenary session held in Ankara, Turkey. First, it was declared
that TURKPA is expected to support “any initiatives aimed at promot-
ing the unity of history, culture, and language” (TURKPA 2013, Art. 2).
Therefore, it took over a purpose to cultivate soft-power assets for Turkey
by underlining the shared backgrounds. Second, the Assembly encour-
aged the participation of certain non-state groups—such as the business
communities—in their plenary sessions. (TURKPA 2013, Art. 5) These
plenary sessions that were solely open to parliamentary bodies until 2013
became a public diplomacy platform in which issues of shared interest are
discussed by the representatives of state and non-state groups.
TURKPA is not the only platform for cooperation in the region. The
same countries—Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkey—also
came together to build a specialized scientific cooperation organization
called the Turkish Academy in 2009 (Türk Akademisi 2012). Supported
predominantly by the financial contributions coming from Turkey,
the academy works towards facilitating the union of Turkic societies
through supporting academic research and educational support (“Türk
Akademisinin Kuruluşuna Dair Anlaşma” 2012). The academy works
on the subjects of linguistic, folk arts, literature, philosophy and history
within the Turkic context (Türk Akademisi 2012). The projects range
from symposia to publications on the aforementioned topics.
In 2009, these four Turkic countries established the Cooperation
Council of Turkic Speaking States (TÜRKKON) as an umbrella organi-
zation for bilateral and multilateral organizations such as the TURKPA,
Turkish Academy and TÜRKSOY. TÜRKKON’s main objective is to
deepen the cooperation on a variety of issues including but not limited to
politics, trade and economy, law enforcement, environment, culture, science
and technology, military, education, energy, trade and finance (“Türk Dili
Konuşan Ülkeler Iş̇ birliği Konseyi Kurulmasına Dair Nahçıvan Anlaşması”
2009). Currently, most of the employees in the international secretariat
are diplomats from Turkish MFA (TÜRKKON 2016b). The headquar-
ters is also located in Istanbul, Turkey. As TÜRKKON is a coordination
agency, the council either establishes working groups to facilitate coopera-
tion or builds partnerships with other organizations to organize projects.
TÜRKKON lists all the existing organizations—including TURKPA,

Turkish Academy and TÜRKSOY—as its partners (TÜRKKON 2016a).
In terms of public diplomacy, TÜRKKON is expected to cooperate with
TÜRKSOY and use TÜRKSOY mechanisms for its cultural activities.5
There is an overarching theme across TÜRKKON, TURKPA and
the Turkish Academy. Reflecting the nature of relations between Turkic
republics, the shared cultural background is invoked in each organization
as the basis of cooperation. These organizations are established because of
cultural affinity and also further reproduce and promote the idea of one
nation across Turkic states.
Apart from these international partnerships and organizations, Turkish
domestic public diplomacy actors also engage with the foreign publics in
the region. YTB under the office of the Turkish Prime Minister works
with Turkic communities in Central Asia by organizing joint workshops
and exchange projects about Turkic culture (PL 5978 2010). BYEGM
engages with journalists from the Turkic world (BYE 2010). TIKA ̇ has
branch offices and active development projects in all Turkic countries.
MFA maintains traditional diplomatic representations in the region, and
ENGM and TKGM support Turkish embassies and consulates by provid-
ing public diplomacy strategies.6 TRT Avaz broadcasts in Azeri, Kazakh,
Kyrgyz and Uzbek (TRT 2014). Yunus Emre operates two cultural cen-
ters—Baku, Azerbaijan, and Astana, Kazakhstan—in the region (Yunus
Emre Institute 2013).
The landscape of governmental actors conducting public diplomacy in
the Central Asia region is quite crowded. Turkey’s public diplomacy out-
reach operates through two different institutional structures: international
bodies initiated and/or supported by Turkey,7 and Turkish bureaucratic
organizations. Across the board, domestic Turkish institutions and inter-
national organizations supported by the country are built on a shared
ethnicity understanding, which presents the argument that there is one
nation, spread across different states. Table 6.1 lists all the active pub-
lic diplomacy actors in Central Asia region that attempt to invest on the
shared cultural heritage and cultivate social, political, cultural and eco-
nomic gains. In this political arena, TÜRKSOY is one of the most impor-
tant actors, if not the most, in this list due to three reasons. First of all,
continuing its activities uninterrupted since 1992, it is indeed the lon-
gest running Turkish project in the region. The organization also has a
clear and straightforward mandate that has not been changed. The other
organizations listed in Table 6.1 cannot trace their current mandates
152
E. SEVIN
Table 6.1 Turkish public diplomacy actors active in Central Asia
Turkish International
Organizations Organizations
Office of the Yunus Emre Turkish

MFA TRT TÜRKKON TURPA TÜRKSOY
Prime Minister Institute Academy
KDK TKGM
YTB ENGM
BYEGM
TİKA
before 2007. Second, it has an exclusive focus on Turkic countries and

has largest outreach as it includes all five Central Asian republics, whereas,
for instance, TÜRKKON has only three out of the five Turkic republics
as members and TİKA has projects going on outside the regions. Third,
it has followed and is still following a very active agenda. As the former
Secretary-General Polad Bülbüloğlu (2006) argues, it is not possible to
find an international event in any one of these countries that do not have
TÜRKSOY involvement. All three things considered, TÜRKSOY is a
proven and viable public diplomacy actor that helps to expand and deepen
the relations within the Turkic world.
6.2 The Region’s UNESCO: TÜRKSOY

This section introduces TÜRKSOY and its projects to provide the insti-
tutional setting in which Turkish public diplomacy operates. Instead of
solely listing the activities, the case narrative highlights TÜRKSOY’s role
in Turkish foreign policy and cultural relations among Turkic nations. The
idea for an organization dedicated to Turkic arts and culture was initially
introduced in 1992 during the High-Level Summit of Ministers of Culture
of the Turkic Speaking Countries (TÜRKSOY 2014). In 1993, Turkey
and the five Central Asian Turkic Republics—Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan—signed the founding agree-
ment for the Joint Administration of Turkic Culture and Art (Türk Kültür
ve Sanatları Ortak Yönetimi) with the objective of establishing friendly
relations with the newly independent Turkic countries through preserving
̇
and promoting Turkic culture (Türksoy’un Kuruluşu ve Faaliyet Ilkeleri
Hakkında Anlaşmanın Onaylanmasının Uygun Bulunduğuna Dair
Kanun 1994). The abbreviation ‘TÜRKSOY’ is both composed of the
first letters of the organization’s full-form name in Turkish and is also a
backronym that is a composed of Turkic (Türk) and ancestry (soy), high-
lighting the shared heritage among members. In 2009, keeping the abbre-
viation as it is, TÜRKSOY changed its name to International Organization
of Turkic Culture (Uluslararası Türk Kültür Teşkilatı).8
When Turkey was contemplating the idea of TÜRKSOY, the coun-
try’s main policy objective in the region was to ensure the peaceful tran-
sitioning of these states from communism to democracy (Ibrahimov
2011). This objective has not drastically changed in the last two decades
but has been further developed. Turkey still aims to ensure the politi-
cal and economic stability of the countries, and to help them integrate
with the international community, as well as to embrace democratic values
154 E. SEVIN
Table 6.2 Proposed explanations for TÜRKSOY

Public opinion Attraction Increased political and economic cooperation is

demanded by local public
Benefit of the Increased political and economic cooperation is
doubt supported by local assumption that Turkey is
acting in good faith
Relationship Socialization Increased political and economic cooperation is
dynamics the result of new roles of Turkish embassies and
other representations introduced by the projects
Direct influence Increased political and economic cooperation is
facilitated by influential people/decision-makers
engaged through the projects
Public debates Agenda-setting Increased political and economic cooperation is
supported by local media’s/public’s coverage of
new issues introduced by projects
Framing Increased political and economic cooperation is
supported by local media’s/public’s new tone of
coverage
(Dışişleri Bakanlığı 2011a). Then Minister of Foreign Affairs Davutoğlu

(2013b) lists the following concretes areas of cooperation in his address to
the Turkish parliament: exploiting economic resources, specifically energy
resources, strengthening the trade and political relations between coun-
tries. Therefore, TÜRKSOY operates in conjunction with the Turkish
foreign policy objective of increasing political and economic cooperation
with the countries in the region.
Turkish relational public diplomacy practice towards the Turkic repub-
lics can influence the public opinion, relationship dynamics and/or public
debates in Central Asia to reach its foreign policy objective: increasing
political and economic cooperation between Turkey and the countries in
the region. Table 6.2 reflects the versions of generic hypotheses described
in Chap. 3 adjusted for TÜRKSOY. Attraction pathway argues that public
diplomacy projects should project Turkish soft power, thus encouraging
the local audiences to demand increased cooperation with Turkey. Benefit
of the doubt pathway posits that the activities of TÜRKSOY should pro-
mote the idea that Turkey and Turkic republics share similar interests.
Socialization pathway sees increasing the presence and expanding the
role of Turkey within the societies in Turkic republics as the main goal of
public diplomacy activities. Direct influence pathway conceptualizes public
diplomacy activities as a tool to connect with and influence the decisions

of policy-makers. Agenda-setting pathway assumes that public diplomacy
intervention introduces new issues for public debate. Framing pathway
argues that public diplomacy influences the public debate by changing the
coverage of existing issues. This chapter tests the empirical performance
of these pathways by assessing whether their explanations and assumptions
are observed within the design, implementations and expected outcomes
of the activities of TÜRKSOY.
TÜRKSOY is an international organization with a permanent sec-
retariat located in Ankara, Turkey. Since 1993, the membership in the
organization has grown to include eight observer members, in addition
to Turkey and the Turkic republics: six autonomous Turkic regions from
Russian Federation (Altai Republic, Republic of Bashkortostan, Khakas
Republic, Republic of Sakha, Republic of Tatarstan, Tyva Republic), one
autonomous region from Moldova (Gagauzia) and Turkish Republic of
Northern Cyprus (Dışişleri Bakanlığı 2011c). TÜRKSOY is coordinated
by “the Permanent Council of Culture Ministers of Turkic Speaking
Countries,” and is scheduled to meet annually.9 The meeting is orga-
nized by the “Term Coordinator” country, a position that rotates among
member countries (TÜRKSOY 2014). The day-to-day activities of the
organization are executed by an international secretariat, led by a Secretary-
General. The Secretary-General is elected by the Permanent Council and
is responsible for all the activities of the organization, and working as
a liaison between the Permanent Council and international secretariat.
Since 2008, the position is held by Duisen Kaseinov, the former Minister
of Culture of Kazakhstan. The headquarters staff also includes a deputy
Secretary-General appointed by Turkey, project staff, administrative staff
and representatives of member countries, as well as observer countries.
The organization’s budget is composed of the mandatory contributions
collected from members.
As an international organization, each and every member state of
TÜRKSOY is declared as equal in the founding agreement. Yet, as in the
case of other international public diplomacy actors (cf. Table 6.1) in the
region, Turkey is the leading force behind TÜRKSOY since its inception
(TÜRKSOY 2006). The country enjoys an exclusively influential position
within the organization since its inception. The founding agreement of
TÜRKSOY was drafted by Turkey’s initiative and efforts (Dışişleri Bakanlığı
2011c). TÜRKSOY’s headquarters are located in Ankara, Turkey, built
on a land given by the Turkish state (Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümeti Ile
156 E. SEVIN
Uluslararası Türk Kültürü Teşkilatı (TÜRKSOY) Arasında Evsahibi Ülke

Anlaşması Onaylanmasının Uygun Bulunduğuna Dair Kanun 2011;
Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Ile Türk Kültür ve Sanatları Ortak Yönetimi Genel
Müdürlüğü Arasında Arsa Tahsisi Hakkında Protokolün Onaylanmasının
Uygun Bulunduğuna Dair Kanun Tasarısı 1999). Most of its employees
at the headquarters are Turkish citizens. The majority of the organization’s
budget is contributed by Turkey (Dışişleri Bakanlığı 2011c). For instance, in
2013, the required contribution for member countries was set at $25,000,
while Turkey’s voluntary contribution was $300,000, making the country
the largest contributor.10 Moreover, within the international secretariat,
Turkey has the right to always appoint a Deputy Secretary-General, sec-
ond-in-charge after the elected Secretary-General. In other words, Turkey
has logistical, financial and bureaucratic influence on TÜRKSOY.
TÜRKSOY’s main objectives are listed as the following (Türksoy’un
̇
Kuruluşu ve Faaliyet Ilkeleri Hakkında Anlaşmanın Onaylanmasının
Uygun Bulunduğuna Dair Kanun 1994):
• To increase mutual understanding between the Turkic and Turkish-

speaking people and societies
• To demonstrate the important contributions of Turkish culture to
civilization and to protect, revive and develop the arts and traditions
of Turkic societies
• To teach the national cultures of countries to the next generations,
and thusly creating amicable relations between them
This is to say, the organization is tasked to preserve and promote Turkic

culture and to serve as an official platform to facilitate the relations between
Turkey and the Turkic states. TÜRKSOY works towards these objectives
by organizing a variety of events. The organization’s first and only activity
report covers the 2008–2011 time period and includes over 250 events,
meetings and publications (TÜRKSOY 2011a). This busy schedule includes
a variety of events ranging from high-profile ministerial level meetings to
art exhibitions, from scientific congresses to commemoration events. The
majority of these events take place within the member and observer coun-
tries.11 Outside these countries, TÜRKSOY also organizes events in Europe
and North America to promote Turkic culture in these regions.
The main public diplomacy activities of the organization can be sum-
marized in eight different event types. First, TÜRKSOY is charged with
organizing the Permanent Council meetings—two-day events that bring
the ministers of culture and/or heads of state of member countries
to formulate the overall strategies, define the budget for other public
diplomacy activities and enable direct communication between the organi-
zation and member states (Salihov 2012). Thus far, the Permanent Council
has met 33 times (TÜRKSOY 2015a). Up until 2014, Turkey has hosted
most of these meetings with the last one taking place in Ankara in October
2013. Currently, the Permanent Council meetings tend to coincide with
the closing events of the Culture and Arts Capital of the Turkic World—a
title that was held by the host of the meeting in 2015, Mary, Turkmenistan.
Culture and Arts Capital of the Turkic World does not only mean host-
ing the Permanent Council meeting but is the second type of event carried
out by TÜRKSOY. Since 2012, the Permanent Council names one city as
the culture capital of the Turkic world. During the year, TÜRKSOY orga-
nizes various public diplomacy activities highlighting the contributions of
the particular city to the Turkic culture and also increases its level of activity
in the capital. Therefore, the local population is exposed to more compo-
nents of Turkic culture and other societies learn more about the Capital of
Culture. Astana, Kazakhstan, was named as the inaugural capital, followed
by Eskişehir, Turkey, in 2013, Kazan, Tatarstan (Russia), in 2014, Mary,
Turkmenistan, in 2015, and Sheki, Azerbaijan, in 2016 (TÜRKSOY 2016a).
The third type of events is commemoration events dedicated to people
who have contributed to the Turkic culture. The Permanent Council has
the authority to name yearlong commemoration events. For instance,
2014 is named as the year of Toktogul Satilganov, a Krygyz poet, and of
Mahtumkulu Firagi, a Turkmen poet, to commemorate the 150th and
290th anniversary of their births, respectively (TÜRKSOY 2013b). These
events share the works of the commemorated artists with the domestic
and foreign audiences. The aim is to both preserve the works of Turkic
artists and promote Turkic culture to the general public. Moreover, the
events also demonstrate the interactions between countries. In 2015, a
commemoration event was held for the Kyrgyz artist Tölömüş Okeyev
(TÜRKSOY 2015b). Okeyev, in addition to his artistic career, was also the
first Kyrgyz ambassador to Turkey. In his commemoration, he was called a
bridge in between two countries (Gazi University 2015).
The fourth type of events is scientific meetings that bring together the
scholars of Turkic culture. In 2008, Turkic scholars of architecture and
city planning were invited to Ankara, Turkey, to discuss the problems
faced by the modern Turkic cities as well as share their experiences on
preserving the cultural heritage sites (TÜRKSOY 2011a). These events
enable TÜRKSOY and Turkey to build up relations directly with the edu-
cated populations in Central Asian countries.
158 E. SEVIN
The fifth type of events is the artist meetings. TÜRKSOY organizes

short-term events that encourage Turkic artists to work together and pro-
duce works of art. Thus far, sculptors, painters, poets and musicians have been
invited, mostly to Turkey (TÜRKSOY 2011a). The first year in which these
meetings took place outside of Turkey was 2011. Photographer meetings
were organized in Bashkortostan and Tatarstan regions in Russia. The art-
works produced during these meetings are usually published by TÜRKSOY
and used as promotion materials. Thus far, TÜRKSOY has published sev-
eral compiled volumes of painters’ and photographers’ meetings.
Publications are the next type of projects. Apart from the artists meet-
ings publication, the organization also published a magazine highlighting
its own work as well as the latest developments in the Turkic world.12
The magazine, simply titled TÜRKSOY Dergisi (TÜRKSOY Magazine),
is shared with the partners in member and observer countries.13 The sto-
ries are published in Turkish and Russian, with intermittent English sec-
tions and summaries. Moreover, TÜRKSOY is involved in reprinting and
translating the classic works of Turkic artists.14 These publications seek to
communicate with state officials as well as general public.
The seventh type of events is festivals and stage performances. TÜRKSOY
organizes two kinds of festivals: modern and traditional. The modern festi-
vals include theater, opera and movie festivals where individuals are presented
with member countries’ works (TÜRKSOY 2011a). The traditional festivals
aim to revive old Turkic traditions. TÜRKSOY has recently started to orga-
nize Nawruz (New Year) and Hidrellez (Spring celebration) festivals inside
and outside the Turkic world. Moreover, there have been substantive efforts
to revive the Ashik tradition, the Turkic equivalent of bards. TÜRKSOY
also helps artists to stage concerts, operas and theater plays. Recently, the
organization started a new long-term concert series called TÜRKSOY
Youth Chamber Orchestra. The orchestra is composed of young musicians
coming from member countries (TÜRKSOY 2011a). The troupe performs
Turkish classical music in member countries, Europe and North America
and is currently getting ready for a series of concerts dedicated to the 25th
anniversary of the independence of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan (TÜRKSOY 2016b). This orchestra project
seeks to both inspire collaboration among the musicians of the Turkic world
and promote Turkish culture through performances.
Last, TÜRKSOY acts as a traditional diplomacy actor. TÜRKSOY claims
to carry the same functions and work in the same areas as the United Nations
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in the Turkic
world. Therefore, it follows an active political agenda that enables it to connect
directly with key influencers and decision-makers in various organizations.

The organization also signed an agreement with UNESCO to establish offi-
cial consultation meetings and ensure information and document exchange
between parties (UNESCO 1996). TÜRKSOY has established partnerships
with other international organizations, such as the Council of Europe and
Islamic Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization and local actors
such as universities and civil society organizations (TÜRKSOY 2011a). This
diplomatic identity enables TÜRKSOY to have access to decision-makers in
international organizations and other countries.
TÜRKSOY projects have three characteristics in common. First, the
shared cultural and ethnic identity is the main input and predominantly the
main output of the projects. Projects used different aspects of this shared
identity—ranging from history to literature to traditions and contributed
to the reproduction of the shared “Turkic” identity understanding. In
certain instances, this identity-based conversation meant introducing new
subjects, artists and performances as in the case of the almost-forgotten
Ashik tradition. Second, the projects increase the level of activity and raises
TÜRKSOY’s public profile. Through concerts, face-to-face activities or
high-level meetings, TÜRKSOY has become a viable actor for issues rel-
evant to Turkic culture. For instance, TÜRKSOY translates and publishes
the highest number of Turkic authors into other Turkic languages, thus,
acts as an intermediary actor in supporting Turkic literature. Third, the
public is the main audience. Even in the cases of Permanent Council meet-
ings and diplomatic actions, TÜRKSOY ensures that its activities reach
people: individuals, artists, scholars and culture enthusiasts.
In summary, TÜRKSOY hosts small- to large-scale events tailored
towards specific groups as well as general audiences. The organization uses
publications to communicate with larger publics and has the mechanisms
to communicate with decision-makers in member countries. Basically, the
organization preserves the Turkic culture, and promote it, both to Turkic
and non-Turkic societies. The next section introduces Eskişehir 2013 in
detail as a representative project of TÜRKSOY activities.
6.2.1 TÜRKSOY in Detail: Eskişehir 2013

This section supports further details a representative project selected from
TÜRKSOY’s portfolio: the 2013 Culture and Arts Capital of the Turkic
World—Eskişehir. The project is chosen because it shows variation in all
three common characteristics of TÜRKSOY projects by using various
aspects of the shared identity, raising TÜRKSOY and Turkey’s profile in
160 E. SEVIN
the region through a number of types of activities, and reaching out to

different audience groups. Therefore, a descriptive analysis of the project
is representative of the organization’s logic of practice, and is beneficial in
linking Turkish public diplomacy with its foreign policy goals.
The initial idea for the “Culture and Arts Capital of the Turkic World” was
presented in 2010 by TÜRKSOY during a meeting of the Turkic Speaking
Countries Summit (TÜRKSOY 2011b). The proposal was unanimously
accepted, and TÜRKSOY was given the responsibility of selecting a capital
every year during its Permanent Council meetings. As introduced in the
previous section, there have been five capitals thus far: Astana (Kazakhstan)
2012, Eskişehir (Turkey) 2013, Kazan (Tatarstan, Russia) 2014, Mary
(Turkmenistan) 2015 and Sheki (Azerbaijan) 2016. The capital for 2017
will be announced during the upcoming council meeting, scheduled to
take place in late 2016. The selection decision shows the characteristics
of a competitive process. There are no official candidacy declarations or
bids. The countries argue for the relative cultural importance of their cit-
ies during the Permanent Council meetings. For instance, then Turkish
Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (2012) mentioned that the minis-
ters from his cabinet, members of the parliament and the local government
in Eskişehir worked towards bringing the title to the city.
Through this public diplomacy project, the aim is to establish friendly
relations between Turkic-speaking communities and countries and to pre-
serve and promote Turkic culture (TÜRKSOY 2011b). This understand-
ing is similar to the organization’s overall objective of demonstrating,
protecting, developing and reviving the elements of Turkic culture. The
project is launched in to further improve the relations between people
who share the same history, same civilization, same past and same future
(Erdoğan 2013). In the case of Eskişehir 2013, Turkey saw the project
as an opportunity to promote itself to the Turkic world (Erdoğan 2012).
Turkey established a temporary agency in the city called “Eskişehir
2013 Culture Capital of the Turkic World” with the specific mandate
to organize the events in the city (PL 6303 2012). The agency’s bud-
get and staff were supported by existing bureaucratic instructions in the
city. The yearlong budget for the events was around $200 million (Hazar
World 2013). Eskişehir officially received the title of the capital during
the closing activities of Astana 2012, held on November 30, 2012, and
hosted over 100 events ranging from artists meetings to conferences to
concerts and art shows (TÜRKSOY 2013a). Part of these events come
from TÜRKSOY’s portfolio as the organization brings its other p rojects,
let it be the artists meetings or festival, to the capital. For instance,
TÜRKSOY’s ongoing festival of Nawruz took place in the city in 2013

(Eskişehir Valiliği 2013e). Similarly, the International Turkic Culture
Congress—an academic meeting organized by TÜRKSOY since 2006—
took place in Eskişehir (Eskişehir Valiliği 2013a). Moreover, other Turkic
organizations host their events in the capital of culture. The annual meet-
ing of Turkology professors in the region was held in the city (Eskişehir
Valiliği 2013m). Lastly, the city developed new events within the culture
capital framework with the help of TÜRKSOY and local organizations. In
May 2013, the city launched a week-long celebration of Yunus Emre, a
prominent Turkic poet and Sufi thinker who lived in the city from 1240
to 1321, republished his works, and distributed them in the Turkic world
(Eskişehir Valiliği 2013p).
The official opening ceremony for Eskişehir 2013 took place in March,
in conjunction with the Nawruz celebrations (Eskişehir Valiliği 2013e).
The ceremony introduced the main message the city aimed to disseminate
through the yearlong event: the meeting of the Turkic world in one of the
oldest Turkic cities (Eskişehir Valiliği 2013f). Indeed, the name of the city
in Turkish is a combination of the words “old” (eski) and “city” (şehir),
and the city dates back to the fourteenth century BCE (Eskişehir Valiliği
2013f). There has been a continuous Turkic settlement in the city since
eleventh century, making it one of the oldest settlements in the Anatolian
region (Eskişehir Valiliği 2013f). Therefore, the underlying message across
virtually all the events during the year was to demonstrate this historical
continuity and to position Eskişehir and, by extension, Turkey as a hub of
Turkic culture.
The events helped Eskişehir to host artists as well as visitors from the
Turkic world. In June 2013, “the Silk Route Poets Meeting” brought
artists from all member countries to Turkey (Eskişehir Valiliği 2013h). In
July 2013, painters came together both to exhibit their works and to seek
collaboration (Eskişehir Valiliği 2013k). Eskişehir also had the opportu-
nity to host events celebrating the Turkic culture such as the Turkmen
Culture Days andKazan Folk Dances Festival (Eskişehir Valiliği 2013l, i).
Eskişehir 2013 organized a traditional Turkic sports festival that included
mounted archery, jeered (cirit), and wrestling exhibitions (Eskişehir
Valiliği 2013o). These sports, including the Turkic version of wrestling
that was included in the exhibitions, are no longer practiced at profes-
sional or intramural levels, but are seen as cultural relics. The city hosted
a ceramic glaze and painting event entitled From Altai to Danube, From
Baikal to Ural (Eskişehir Valiliği 2013b). This particular event included
an exhibition of professional works as well as workshops that were open
162 E. SEVIN
to public. Apart from the fact that ceramic is widely accepted as a Turkic
tradition within the Turkic world, the geographic landmarks in the title
refer to the area where the majority of the contemporary and past Turkic
populations have lived.
In addition to increasing the city’s profile as an organizer of events,
the title of capital also helped the city to promote itself through various
platforms. As the Turkic capital of culture, Eskişehir was represented in
international tourism fairs in Baku, Azerbaijan, and in Almaty, Kazakhstan
(Eskişehir Valiliği 2013c, d).
Turkish contributions to the Turkic culture in general and Eskişehir’s
contributions specifically were promoted within the Turkic world. It should
be noted that despite its long history and significant location, the diversity
of Eskişehir’s contributions is usually overshadowed by the prominence
of Yunus Emre, a poet known in all Turkic regions. His works are already
seen as important assets by TÜRKSOY by Turkey with the former orga-
nizing an oratorio honoring Yunus Emre and the latter naming one of its
public diplomacy institutions after the poet. Thus, the capital title was also
an opportunity to highlight its contribution to the Turkic culture beyond
Emre. For instance, A gathering of shadow players and puppeteers intro-
duced the Turkish tradition of “Karagöz and Hacivat”15 to the other Turkic
states (Eskişehir Valiliği 2013g). Eskişehir also claims to be a city that Molla
Nasreddin (Nasreddin Hoca)16 called home for decades during the thir-
teenth century (Eskişehir Valiliği 2013j). Molla Nasreddin is a well-known
satirical figure in the Near East region; yet, many other regions and coun-
tries claim Molla to be their own tradition (Rozenthal 2011). Therefore,
the events during 2013 helped Turkey to introduce Molla Nasreddin and
his stories as part of Turkic culture in the Central Asian region.
Eskişehir 2013 also unveiled an event that was later incorporated to the
portfolio of TÜRKSOY and Turkic Capital of Culture: Türkvizyon Song
Contest. Inspired by Eurovision, a Europewide song contest, Türkvizyon
invites artists from all Turkic-speaking countries and regions for a televised
song and performance contest. Türkvizyon has the objective of bringing
Turkic countries and regions together through music. During the prepara-
tions, it was announced that 24 countries and/or regions were going to
participate in the contest—including all members of TÜRKSOY (Eskişehir
Valiliği 2013n). Yet, four countries and/or region, namely Turkmenistan,
Chivashia, Russia and Xinjiang, did not participate, making Turkmenistan
the only TÜRKSOY member country that did not take part in the
competition. In 2014, Kazan hosted the competition as the Turkic capital
of culture with 25 entries, including a participant from Turkmenistan. The

2015 contest was initially announced to be held in Merv, Turkmenistan
as the next capital (Eurovoix 2014). Subsequently, the event was moved
to Ashgabat, Turkmenistan, due to logistical concerns (Eurovoix 2015).
Eventually, Turkmenistan neither hosted nor participated in Türkvizyon
2015, making Turkey the replacement host. Currently, Turkey is scheduled
to host the upcoming 2016 competition as well, removing Türkvizyon
from the Turkic capital of culture event inventory.
The last event of Eskişehir 2013 took place in late March 2014, coin-
ciding with TÜRKSOY’s Nawruz celebration. As summarized by Fırat
Purtaş, the Deputy Secretary of TÜRKSOY, with the words of Yunus
Emre, the organization worked with a “Come, let us all be friends for
once”17 mind-set (Eskişehir Valiliği 2013h). The concentration of events,
both pertaining to hosting and promoting under the framework of cul-
ture capital, is particularly noteworthy. Through new projects and old,
new subjects and old, the Turkic Capital of Arts and Culture brought the
Turkic states and regions across the world together in Eskişehir and raised
the profile of the city, Turkey and Turkic culture.
6.2.2 Analysis of TÜRKSOY
TÜRKSOY, as well as Eskişehir 2013, is a representative case of Turkish
relational public diplomacy practice designed to contribute to achieving
a foreign policy objective. Turkey uses a variety of tools and institutions,
such as the traditional diplomacy and development aid actors outlined in
Table 6.1, to engage the target audiences in Central Asia. TÜRKSOY stands
out as one of the most, if not the most, prominent actor. The organization
has a rich event portfolio composed of different types of activities. Moreover,
through its work, it manages to collaborate with other governmental and
non-governmental actors. The analysis further unpacks the narrative of the
projects shared throughout the chapter. Through further investigating the
practice, the aim is to see how Turkish practitioners of public diplomacy
their contribution to the achievement of public diplomacy.
The first pathway is the soft power–based attraction. Public diplomacy
is used to project attractive soft-power assets to foreign publics, who in
return demand closer relations with Turkey. As argued in the American
and Swedish analyses, if public diplomacy projects use opinion polls
for measurement or make references to soft-power assets in design and
implementation processes, this pathway can be used to link foreign policy
164 E. SEVIN
and public diplomacy. Soft-power concept has been widely used in Turkish
policy circles, especially in the accounts that explain the outcomes of public
diplomacy projects. The inaugural director of KDK, and current presiden-
tial spokesperson, Ibrahim Kalin (2011, 7), labels public diplomacy as “a
platform for the implementation of soft power.” Yet, the attraction path-
way is not equally strongly reflected in the field and among the practitio-
ners. The strongest evidence decreasing the confidence in the pathway is
the lack of public opinion polls carried out by TÜRKSOY or Turkey. Yet,
this is not simply an omitted aspect or is not caused by logistical and/or
financial limitations. The interviews with the practitioners, as well as the
archival research, do not provide any evidence supporting the importance
of mass public opinion in general. Moreover, the public diplomacy activi-
ties seem to value establishing relations and collaborations at the expense
of mass outreach (e.g. cf. TÜRKSOY 2011a, 2013c). The relatively promi-
nent position of soft power in the Turkish policy circles is only reflected in
the practice when discussing the foundation of public diplomacy practice.
Turkey uses its common cultural heritage and ethnic background to con-
nect with the foreign audiences. It is important to note that Turkey tends
to claim cultural affinity with a wide array of regions including the for-
mer Ottoman lands, Muslim nations and Western democracies, based on
respectively common history, common religion and common political insti-
tutions (Oğuzlu 2007; Öner 2013); therefore, this particular soft-power
argument is not necessarily specific to the relations with Central Asia. In
other words, Turkic identity is not a prerequisite for Turkish soft power to
be included in relational public diplomacy projects as the foundation. By
promoting the shared aspects of the cultures, the projects are inherently
designed to increase the attractiveness of Turkic culture. In other words,
the foreign publics are made to realize that the Turkish culture also belongs
to the Turkic tradition; therefore, Turkey is not a “stranger” (Purtaş 2012).
By demonstrating the cultural proximity to target audiences, these proj-
ects contribute to the strength of Turkish soft-power assets, thus generat-
ing soft power for the country. Attraction pathway partially explains the
practice of public diplomacy in the country. Soft-power assets are seen as
project inputs. Public diplomacy projects both use shared cultural assets to
engage with publics and increase the importance of the said assets by mak-
ing them more accessible to a larger number of people.
Benefit of the doubt pathway argues that the outcome of public diplo-
macy is to influence public opinion by introducing the idea that Turkey
and Central Asian Turkic republics share similar interests. Therefore, the
target audiences will assume that increased political and economic relations
with Turkey are an objective beneficial not only for Turkey but also for
their own society. If public diplomacy projects refer to mutual interests
and shared future, benefit of the doubt can be used to link them to foreign
policy. TÜRKSOY believes that the cultural work they produce creates an
environment in which countries see each other as a family working together
(Balçık 2007). Dubbed as the TÜRKSOY House, the headquarters build-
ing is the embodiment of this understanding of belonging together (Koç
2005). The official building is seen as a home for protecting the shared cul-
ture—an objective that all member countries work towards. There are two
strong pieces of evidence increasing the confidence in this pathway. First is
the “one nation, six states”18 argument. This widespread is argument used
to encourage cooperation and coordination among Turkey and the Turkic
republics: these six countries are coming from the same roots and need
each other to tackle the political challenges they face (Gül 2011). Second
piece of evidence comes from Turkish foreign policy statements. The role
of shared linguistic, historical and cultural background is repeated almost
verbatim across the years in the official documents promoting Turkish
foreign policy towards the region (Davutoğlu 2013b; Dışişleri Bakanlığı
2011b, 2012a, 2013). Davutoğlu (2013c, 10) further argues that Turkey
is a country that does not only have the same “historical memory” but
also wants to “unite forces for a stronger role at the global level” with the
Central Asian Republics. Turkish foreign policy also operates on promoting
a view that these six nations have similar—if not the same—interests in for-
eign affairs. The activities of TÜRKSOY are designed to establish a benefit
of the doubt impact by highlighting the similarities between countries and
by encouraging them to work towards a common cultural objective: pre-
serving and promoting Turkic culture. In other words, TÜRKSOY activi-
ties both disseminate and stem from shared interests.
Socialization pathway argues that public diplomacy projects can be
designed to change the way the practitioner country and its representa-
tions interact with the foreign public. The operating assumption is that
Central Asian republics will be more amenable to increased relations with
Turkey as the country is made a more active actor in the host country’s
social life working on a variety of issues. In other words, public diplo-
macy projects help the practitioner country to increase the volume and
breadth of its activities in the host region. TÜRKSOY increases the activ-
ity of Turkey and portrays the image of a country as “a soft power holder
that contributes to the development of the Turkic countries” (Denizhan
166 E. SEVIN
2010, 17). Turkish practice reflects the country as a protector of shared

heritage to the countries in the region. TÜRKSOY is designed to make
itself, and indirectly Turkey, a “must-have” partner for current and future
cultural projects.19 In the last 25 years, Turkish practice focused on chang-
ing the dynamics of relations between Turkey and the region.20 The stron-
gest evidence increasing the confidence in the pathway is the change of
policy in Turkey. Shortly after the independence of Turkic republics, the
Turkish policy and academic circles discussed the possibility of a pan-
Turkic approach to the region. Yet, this idea was dismissed, given the
fact the Central Asian republics were not believed to welcome another
country claiming to protect them following their decades of Soviet expe-
rience.21 Thus, Turkey aims to position itself as a viable partner not only
proposing an ethnicity-based rhetoric but through increasing its presence
in the region beyond traditional diplomacy. Through TÜRKSOY and
other public diplomacy organizations, Turkey attempts to the relationship
dynamics between Turkey and the countries in the region.
Direct influence pathway argues that public diplomacy activities can be
opportunities for practitioner states and its representations to interact with key
policy-makers in the host country. The foreign policy objective can, thus, be
achieved by persuading certain key individuals. TÜRKSOY gives Turkey vari-
ous opportunities to interact with key policy-makers, through its Permanent
Council meetings and in the cases where TÜRKSOY acts as a traditional dip-
lomat. Yet, the project designs do not provide evidence of Turkey using direct
contact with policy-makers to achieve its foreign policy objectives. On the
contrary, the evidence suggests Turkey refrains from utilizing these platforms
for unilateral gains. These events are used to advance TÜRKSOY’s orga-
nizational interests. A representative anecdote is told by Polad Bülbüloğlu
former Secretary-General of TÜRKSOY and former Minister of Culture of
Azerbaijan, where Mr. Bülbüloğlu was directly approached by then Minister
of Culture of Turkey, Fikri Sağlar, and was convinced to run for the Secretary-
General position (TÜRKSOY 2006). Bülbüloğlu’s influence was instrumen-
tal in ensuring increased Azerbaijani participation in TÜRKSOY activities.
Therefore, even though Turkey did not necessarily influence Azeri decision-
makers for Turkish gains directly, as Bülbüloğlu’s case demonstrates, the
country was able to influence Azeri policy indirectly through key politicians
to advance TÜRKSOY. Moreover, TÜRKSOY activities tend to take indi-
viduals, rather than people in political offices, as its main target audience in its
activities, thus making it difficult to use this pathway to link foreign policy and
public diplomacy within the Turkish practice.

influence public debate by introducing new topics to the society. By
changing the media and/or the public agenda, foreign policy objectives
might be reached. If public diplomacy projects value the introduction of
new subjects to public debates and/or increasing media exposure, agenda-
setting can be used to create a link with foreign policy. In the case of
TÜRKSOY, evidence suggests that introduction of new topics is relevant.
For instance, the design of the Turkic capital of culture allows the practitio-
ner country to introduce new concepts and subjects to public debates both
in Turkey and Turkic republics. Eskişehir 2013 was designed to highlight
the less-known cultural and traditional similarities among Turkic countries
such as Karagöz and Hacivat, and Molla Nasreddin. Additional evidence
increasing the reliance on agenda-setting comes from the TÜRKSOY
projects attempting to revive certain almost-forgotten aspects of Turkic
culture, such as mounted archery, and translation of out-of-print books
into other Turkic languages, such as the works of Resul Riza (TÜRKSOY
2011a). Even though both examples, mounted archery and Resul Riza,
are important aspects of Turkic culture, they are not widely discussed in
contemporary societies. The topics of TÜRKSOY projects are also chosen
to introduce new items to the cultural agendas of the countries, relevant
to the Turkic culture. The shared nature of Turkic culture or the contribu-
tions of Turkey to the Turkic culture are not necessarily part of the public
agenda. By facilitating the travel of Turkic artists and artworks among
the member countries, TÜRKSOY manages to create new debates within
societies based on Turkic identity.
Framing pathway sees public diplomacy as influencing public debates by
changing the way media covers or public debates on certain issues. Foreign
policy change is assumed to take place with the help of these new outlooks
on existing debates. TÜRKSOY projects are designed to bring “Turkic”
frames to existing discussions in the country. The case of Türkvizyon is par-
ticularly noteworthy in terms of reframing. In 2012, Turkey withdrew from
the Eurovision song contest. Shortly after the decision to leave, TRT—the
institution that is responsible for nominating competitor for Eurovision and
broadcasting the contest in the country as the national broadcaster—intro-
duced a new song contest: Türkvizyon (DHA 2013). Eurovision—a televised
multi-national song contest that started with the aim of bringing European
countries together following the World War II through entertainment—is
reframed within the Turkic context. The end product, Türkvizyon, tries to
bring Turkic countries and communities closer through entertainment. The
168 E. SEVIN
strongest evidence increasing the confidence in the pathway comes from

the post–Cold War politics in the region. After the fall of USSR, the politi-
cal ideology that defined the states during the Cold War was done and the
Central Asian republics were in need of finding new identities (Demirtepe
and Özkan 2011; Çaman 2013). Turkey’s introduction of “Turkic” culture
was well received as an alternative identity. Even though the activities of
TÜRKSOY are designed to influence public debate through both available
pathways, agenda-setting and framing; media and contacts with media are
not necessarily valued. TÜRKSOY and other public diplomacy actors have
specifically designated units for press relations that produce press releases
and maintain contact with the media outlets.22 However, there is no follow-
up process in the projects about whether their activities are covered in the
media. The public agenda and framing seem to be the more important com-
ponents of the projects than mediated agendas and frames.
Table 6.3 presents the findings of the analysis by summarizing the empiri-
cal performance of the pathways in explaining the causal mechanism between
foreign policy and public diplomacy as manifested in the Turkish relational
public diplomacy logic of practice. The pathways show similar empirical per-
formances with the Swedish and American cases, with the exception of fram-
ing. The analysis of Turkish practice also argues that no one single pathway
shows a satisfactory empirical performance to describe how public diplomacy
Table 6.3 Summary of the analysis, Turkish public diplomacy

Public opinion Attraction Relational public diplomacy projects are based

on shared cultural assets
Benefit of the Projects make reference to a common history,
doubt that is, coming from a shared historical
background and moving towards a shared future
Relationship Socialization Projects are designed to increase the quantity of
dynamics Turkish activities in the region as well as give
new role to the country, such as protecting
Turkic culture
Direct influence Direct influence is solely used to advance and
promote the public diplomacy project
Public debates Agenda-setting Projects introduce “Turkic culture” as a new
item to public agenda
Framing Projects bring new frames to identity debates,
put a Turkic spin on existing issues
projects might help achieve foreign policy objectives. Socialization fails to

account for the role of new subjects and tones, whereas agenda-setting and
framing cannot explain the increased level of activities. Benefit of the doubt
pathway—the belief that Turkey is acting in good faith—best describes the
final step of practice. However, such a belief is not created directly. In other
words, the public diplomacy practice is not designed to create such an impact
directly through activities. Rather, the activities increase the presence of the
country and change the terms of public debate relevant to Turkey.
Figure 6.1 summarizes the link between Turkish foreign policy and public
diplomacy as it is observed in the practice of Turkish public diplomacy. The
project inputs are based on soft-power assets. Furthermore, the project out-
puts—publications, events, festivals and other products—build additional
soft-power assets for Turkey as the cultural proximity and affinity among
societies are proven with concrete evidence. Thus, Turkish soft power con-
stitutes the basis of the projects and facilitates the interaction with target
audiences (attraction). The project outcomes include elements that can be
explained by four pathways. First, public diplomacy projects are designed to
demonstrate the shared interests between Turkey and the Turkic republics
(benefit of the doubt). Second, a change relationship dynamic is aimed by
increasing the level and diversifying the topics of Turkish activities in the
Public opinion:
shared
interests
Soft power: Relational Relationship

public Foreign dynamics: Contribution to
Turkey Shared foreign policy
diplomacy Public New/increased
culture objective
projects activities
Socialization
Public
Promoting debates: New
cultural issues and
assets concepts
Agenda-setting
Public
debates: New
tone of
coverage
Framing
Fig. 6.1 Summary of the mechanism, Turkish

170 E. SEVIN
host countries (socialization). Turkish relational public diplomacy projects

also have components that can change public debates through introducing
new issues (agenda-setting) and new frames (framing).
6.3 Conclusion
This chapter presented the link public diplomacy and foreign policy for
the Turkish practice. From the practitioner’s point of view, this research
shows that Turkish relational public diplomacy projects are designed to
use soft-power assets. Rather than simply projecting soft power through
these projects, the country aims at preserving and promoting its cultural
affinity and proximity to target audiences through organizing events,
introducing new topics and changing the tone of coverage. Subsequently,
the projects are expected to create an environment in which Turkey is a
political and an economical partner whose reliability comes from shared/
similar cultural traits. Turkey, thus, aims to project itself as a player acting
in good faith in the world. From a theoretical point of view, the analysis of
Turkish relational public diplomacy through TÜRKSOY provides further
opportunities to test the viability of each of the pathways discussed in this
research as a reflection of public diplomacy practice.
The case of Turkey provides four important insights. First, the anal-
ysis of Turkish relational public diplomacy practice constitutes an addi-
tional opportunity to test the six-pathway framework as an analytical tool.
Similar to the case of Sweden, the Turkish experience provides support
to the compatibility of the research methodology outside the American
public diplomacy practice.
Second, the similarities between the American, Swedish and Turkish
mechanisms increase the possibility of devising a model that is applicable
to other countries. Despite the addition of framing, the causal mechanism
in the Turkish practice also posit that public diplomacy projects are using
soft-power assets to influence public opinion, relationship dynamics and
public debate. Observing the same structure across three different con-
texts increases the confidence in the possibility of crafting a generalizable
causal mechanism for relational public diplomacy projects.
Third, the Turkish case brings a new view on the concept of soft power.
Both American and Swedish soft powers are based on the prominence of the
soft-power assets. In the case of Turkey, the attractiveness of the soft-power
assets is based on the fact that the cultural values are shared. Turkish soft
power is based on cultural affinity with the Turkic regions, as well as other
regions the country engages with, rather than on cultural prominence.
Fourth, the impact of context on public diplomacy projects and their

utcomes is again observed in the case of TÜRKSOY. For instance, the
o
increasing involvement of Kazakhstan through Astana 2012 and through
lobbying for a Kazakh Secretary-General is partially due to the changing
political perspectives in Kazakhstan, especially to the fact that President
Nursultan Nazarbayev intends to raise Kazakh profile in the Turkic world.
Similarly, the relatively less involvement of Uzbekistan is due to the politi-
cal tensions between the Turkish government and the Uzbek President
Islam Karimov who ruled the country since its independence in 1989 until
his death in September 2016.
The next chapter introduces a cross-case comparison. Both Swedish
and Turkish case study chapters include remarks that highlight the simi-
larities across cases. By using these similarities as a starting point, the com-
parison probes the probability of creating a model that links foreign policy
and public diplomacy.
Notes
1. AKP has been the only party in the cabinet since 2002, winning the majority
of the parliament in the 2002, 2007 and 2011. In June 2015 elections, AKP
received the highest number of votes but failed to win the majority in the
parliament. The political parties in the parliament could not form a coalition;
thus, a snap election was held in November 2015. AKP won back the parlia-
mentary majority in this election. As of this writing, the party has formed
seven cabinets, excluding the interim cabinet between the elections in 2015.
2. The short version of the name of the project is “Turkic capital of culture.”
Throughout the chapter, the short version and the full version of the name
“Culture and Arts Capital in the Turkic World,” are used interchangeably.
4. Zerrin Kandemir (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs), personal interview
5. It is important to note that the on-site research at TÜRKSOY and the inter-
views with employees revealed more of a competitive relation between these
two organizations rather than a cooperative one. Yet, the competitive relation
seems to encourage TÜRKSOY to increase its levels of activity to demon-
strate its capabilities in terms of organizing and executing cultural projects.
6. Zerrin Kandemir (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs), personal interview
7. In all international partnerships, Turkey seems to have a preferential treat-
ment due to its control over the budget, founding documents and/or per-
sonnel. Therefore, Turkey is more influential in terms of identifying the
172 E. SEVIN
objectives and creating strategies for these partnerships. This is why

TÜRKSOY—or TURKPA and Turkish Academy—should not be seen solely
as international organizations. Rather, they constitute a unique way of
engagement for Turkey—a way in which audiences also have an active role.
8. Fırat Purtaş (TÜRKSOY), personal interview with the author, 24
September 2013.
9. Salim Ezer (TÜRKSOY), personal interview with the author, 24 September
2013.
10. Sancar Mülazımoğlu (TÜRKSOY), personal interview with the author, 24
September 2013.
September 2013.
2013.
13. Since 2015, TÜRKSOY also manages the digital publication of its maga-
zine at http://www.turksoydergisi.com/, last accessed 25 August 2016.
14. Despite the fact that the languages spoken by the countries are all Turkic,
societies cannot understand each other’s languages, making translation a
necessity.
15. Karagöz and Hacivat are the names of the two lead characters in traditional
Turkish shadow puppetry that was popular during the Ottoman era. The
plays are usually based on humorous interactions between the duo caused
by their contrasting characters, akin to contemporary situational comedies.
Karagöz and Hacivat are included in UNESCO’s Intagible Culturale
Heritage List in 2009.
16. Molla Nasreddin’s existence, as well as details of his life, is debated. Yet, his
stories—or the stories that are contributed to him—constitute a satirical
tradition in Anatolia and the Near East region.
17. The full text of this poem can be found here http://www.yunusemre.gov.
tr/index.php/en/poems. Last accessed, 8 August 2016.
18. This particular saying is also used with different numbers of states, ranging
from two to seven depending on the number of participants in an event.
The highest number, seven, is used in reference to Turkey, Turkish
Republic of Northern Cyprus and the five Central Asian Republics. I use
six in this explanation to denote TÜRKSOY’s founding members.
19. Sancar Mülazımoğlu (TÜRKSOY), personal interview with the author, 24
September 2013.
September 2013.
21. Sadin Ayyıldız (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs), personal interview
2013.
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CHAPTER 7
Six Pathways of Connection: A Practical

Roadmap
Six pathways of connection framework stand as the unique contribution

of this research through which I explain a complex causal relationship
between foreign policy and public diplomacy. The framework started out
with a survey of the scholarly work to build its theoretical—or abstract—
foundation. Three areas of impact and all six pathways are derived by
bringing together existing works on public diplomacy coming from a vari-
ety of disciplines. Subsequent case studies brought in the views of practi-
tioners from three countries—the United States of America, Sweden and
Turkey—to assess whether scholarly assumptions were valid or not.
Even though these countries all embrace the concept of public diplo-
macy and use projects to engage with foreign publics, they employ differ-
ent tactics to accomplish different objectives. I define public diplomacy
as a communication tool targeting foreign publics and as a policy tool
capable of showing its impact in foreign affairs. Practitioner countries use
public diplomacy to communicate with foreign publics. This engagement
with public contributes to the achievement of a foreign policy goal. In
the case of the United States, the expected political gain is the improved
and deepened relations with Russia. For Sweden, the goal is to encourage
other countries to participate in international efforts to provide solutions
to environmental issues. Turkey uses public diplomacy to improve political
and economic relations with the countries in Central Asia. Therefore, it
is possible to see a variation between the causal mechanisms. This chapter
brings the findings of these separate case narratives and further details the

180 E. SEVIN
framework to create a roadmap from six apparently independent path-

ways. By comparing the cases coming from three diverse practitioners,
the aim is to build up stronger claims. Thus, the comparison enables the
research to make more confident claims about countries outside the study.
This chapter starts out by outlining the key points and lessons learned
from single case studies. Then, under A Comparative Look heading, I pres-
ent a cross-case comparison. The comparison unfolds the causal mecha-
nism by asking three questions. First, the analysis focuses on identifying
whether a particular pathway stands out as prominent. Then, the analysis
moves to the combination of the pathways and argues for the best com-
bination of pathways. The third question asks about the causal mecha-
nism that links public diplomacy and foreign policy. I conclude the chapter
by explaining the practical implications of six pathways of connection
framework.
7.1 Unpacking the Link
The link between foreign policy and public diplomacy, as I describe in Fig. 1.1
and repeat again in Fig. 7.1, is quite straightforward. The practitioner country
initiates a public diplomacy project to communicate with target audiences,
which, in turn, contribute to the achievement of the foreign policy goals.
Practitioner Public
Foreign Foreign
Country Diplomacy
Public Policy Goal
Project
External
variables
Public
Opinion
Practitioner Public Relation-

Foreign Foreign
Soft Power Diplomacy ship
Country Public Policy Goal
Project Dynamics
Public
Debates
Fig. 7.1 Causal mechanism

SIX PATHWAYS OF CONNECTION: A PRACTICAL ROADMAP 181
This simplicity, however, raises several “how” questions—how do you move

from one step to another? The single case analyses present valuable insights to
provide details about how public diplomacy projects influence foreign policy
outcomes.
American relational public diplomacy practice highlights three impor-
tant points for unfolding the link between public diplomacy and foreign
policy. First, achievement of the foreign policy goals is dependent not
only on public diplomacy interventions but also on external variables.
Even though the activities of the Education, Sports, Culture, and Media
(ESCM) working group were deemed as successful by the practitioners,
Russia’s military aggression caused the suspension of its activities. Second,
soft power is an important project “input.” In other words, the promi-
nence of American institutions and cultural products are used to attract
the attention of target audiences and to engage with them. Third, public
diplomacy projects are designed to manifest an impact on all three areas
that connect public diplomacy and foreign policy: public opinion, rela-
tionship dynamics and public debate.
The analysis of the Swedish case further increases our confidence in the
findings of the American case. The same three observations are made in
Swedish relational public diplomacy practice. First, a host country’s envi-
ronmental policy might be influenced by various factors, such as economy
and domestic politics. Facing the Climate was indeed a successful inter-
vention; yet, it was not the sole determinant of behavior. Second, “the
Swedish model” provides the basis for public diplomacy activities. The
country’s prominent position in climate change negotiations and proven
record in tackling environmental issue make it possible to initiate such a
public diplomacy project. Third, public diplomacy activities are designed
to influence public opinion, relationship dynamics and public debate.
The findings coming from the analysis of Turkish relational public
diplomacy practice are in line with the findings of the former two cases.
First, improving bilateral relations is a foreign policy goal supported by
public diplomacy but depends on other external variables. As observed
in the case of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, bilateral relations are improv-
ing with the former and deteriorating with the latter due to the choices
made by the politicians of these two countries.1 Second, soft power—the
cultural proximity between Turkey and the Turkic cultures—is used to
facilitate engagement with the countries in the region. Following the “one
nation, six states” motto, Turkey reaches out to the publics beyond its
borders and communicates with target audiences in the borders of five
182 E. SEVIN
Turkic republics in Central Asia (BYE 2010). The projects aim to influ-
ence public opinion, change relationship dynamics and lead public debates
within host countries.
The bottom part of Fig. 7.1 presents the link between public diplomacy
and foreign policy. Practitioner countries use their soft-power assets to
design projects. Projects use the attractiveness of a country as the foun-
dation of engagement with foreign publics. This engagement process
attempts to influence public opinion, relationship dynamics and public
debate. These areas of impact were derived from different international
relations theories. Yet, as the case narratives demonstrated, they work in
conjunction with each other. In other words, it is not possible to deduce
the impacts of public diplomacy solely to public debates or any of the
three areas. The same interconnected mechanism is observed, once again
across cases, in terms of six pathways. The changes in these three areas are
expected to contribute to the achievement of foreign policy goals, yet the
actual achievement of a goal is not independent from non-public diplo-
macy variables.
The detailed explanation provided in Fig. 7.1 is the outcome of the
existing literature and the empirical analysis of three cases. Chapters 2
and 3 present the three areas through which public diplomacy and for-
eign policy are connected. In other words, these two chapters provided
the vocabulary to talk about the impacts of public diplomacy projects.
The empirical analyses in Chaps. 4–6 assessed the validity of theoretical
assumptions and presented the sequence and combination of six pathways
to build up a causal mechanism.
The causal mechanism summarized here is solely a combination of the
insights drawn from single cases. In order to provide an answer to the
research question posed in this research—how public diplomacy works2—
there is a need to carry a structured-focused case comparison. The reason
for carrying out a cross-case analysis is to introduce the six pathways ana-
lytical framework to the causal mechanism, identify where countries might
behave differently and provide a more detailed causal mechanism linking
public diplomacy and foreign policy.
7.2 A Comparative Look

Cross-case comparison is made through a structured-focused case com-
parison framework. As the name suggests, the structured-focused case
comparison method has two important characteristics: focus and structure.
First, these studies have to be undertaken with “a specific research objec-

tive in mind and a theoretical focus appropriate for that objective” (George
and Bennett 2005, 70). In other words, this research does not compare all
aspects of American, Swedish and Turkish public diplomacy practices. The
focus remains on how public diplomacy projects help to achieve foreign
policy goals. Second, the same general questions should be posed to each
case study to ensure a structured comparison (George and Bennett 2005,
69). In this research, the questions revolve around the proposed pathways,
therefore, and are geared towards detecting comparable patterns across
cases. Here, it should be noted that this method of comparison is different
from a variable-based comparative approach which might be more familiar
to most of the readers. A variable-based comparative study looks at whether
the absence or existence of certain variables leads to an expect outcome.
In a simplistic example, a variable-based comparison might investigate two
countries—one of which engages in public diplomacy and the other one
does not—analyze whether public diplomacy has an impact on reaching
foreign policy objectives. In this research, the aim is to link two variables,
instead of arguing for the existence of relationship between them. Indeed,
I start out with the assumption that public diplomacy works as a foreign
policy tool. My aim is to show how it works; therefore, the comparison is
based on the process rather than variables. Peter Hall (2003, 393) labels
this process as systematic process analysis and argues for “the examination
of the processes unfolding in the cases.” In my comparative approach, I
look at how these six pathways can be used to explain the process through
which public diplomacy demonstrates an impact on foreign policy and con-
tributes to the achievement of foreign policy goals. Therefore, I compare
the observations drawn from single cases with the theoretical predictions
of the pathways of connection to reach a judgment about their usefulness
(Hall 2003, 394).
I ask three questions to analyze the patterns across cases: (1) Does any
one of the causal mechanisms have a more prominent position? (2) Is
there a combination of pathways that best explain the causal mechanism?
(3) How can public diplomacy be linked with foreign policy? The study
presents its findings as a process map and introduces “conjunction points”
in the process map where there is more than one possibility.3 I highlight
the connections between the parts of the process as conjunction points
and present a statement that summarizes the links.
The first question asks whether it is possible to call one of the six path-
ways as the “best” one. In other words, the discussion focuses on whether
184 E. SEVIN
we can use any one of these six pathways to explain the causal mechanism.
These pathways are statements connecting public diplomacy with contri-
bution to foreign policy. Therefore, they conceivably have the potential
to explain the causal mechanism by themselves. For instance, in a hypo-
thetical situation in which the attraction pathway has the highest empirical
performance, the contribution to foreign policy will occur by increas-
ing the attractiveness of a country’s soft-power assets in the eyes of the
public. If agenda-setting has the highest empirical performance, the new
items introduced in the foreign public will explain the impact on foreign
affairs. Yet, the analyses in the case chapters based on the relevant public
diplomacy practice provide evidence for multi-pathway mechanisms. The
pathways work together or in combination, including at least one path-
way for each of the three areas. For instance, in the case of ECSM, the
projects are designed to increase the interaction between the American
and the Russian public, encourage public discussion on certain issues, and
establish an environment where the United States and Russia are seen as
co-operating partners. In all of the three cases, none of the pathways is
capable of explaining the mechanism by itself. Yet, two pathways surface as
dominant or foundational backbone of the causal mechanism: attraction
as a project input and socialization as an expected outcome.
Attraction pathway constitutes the basis of public diplomacy projects
across three cases. This particular pathway was drawn from soft power–
influenced studies in the field of public diplomacy and, consequently, is
closely linked with soft-power processes. Across three cases, practitioner
countries conceptualize projects on their “strong soft power assets”:
Conjunction Point 1: A country’s soft-power assets are the basis of rela-

tional public diplomacy projects.
A comparison of three countries, however, shows that “soft power”

is not necessarily a uniform concept. The practices present different
approaches to soft power, thus their assessments of “strong” assets are not
the same. The United States uses the attractiveness of its culture, one of
the soft-power assets identified by Joseph Nye (2011), to communicate
with the Russian public. Sweden uses the Swedish model—the Swedish
way of providing solutions to problems (Lundberg 1985). It pertains to
political values and foreign policies of Sweden—the remaining two soft-
power assets identified by Nye (2011)—that are respected by audiences.
TÜRKSOY uses Turkic culture to build bridges between Turkey and
Central Asian countries. In the first two cases, countries rely on promi-
nent and/or recognized assets. American athletes and Swedish policies
are used as the basis of the projects because they are widely known and
appreciated. In the Turkish practice, the attractiveness of the Turkic cul-
ture does not stem from being recognized prominent asset, but a shared
asset. All the Turkic countries share similar cultural traits; thus, audiences
are open to participate in projects that utilize cultural assets. Therefore,
the conjunction point in the attractiveness pathway can be separated into
two: “prominent’ soft power assets (as in the United States and Sweden
cases) or “shared” soft-power assets (as in the Turkish case):
Conjunction Point 1a: Relational public diplomacy projects can use prom-
inent soft-power assets.
Conjunction Point 1b: Relational public diplomacy projects can use shared
soft-power assets.
Regardless of the nature of these assets, all cases include an additional soft-
power dimension. Not only does soft power serve as a base for the public
diplomacy project, soft power or attractiveness of the assets is augmented
through public diplomacy. For instance, Facing the Climate is both based
on the Swedish commitment to environmental issues and promotes
Sweden’s work on the relevant issues. Therefore, relational public diplo-
macy projects do not project soft power; rather, they develop existing soft-
power assets into more effective and attractive assets (cf. Zaharna 2007 for
a similar theoretical argument). Soft power is not only wielded but is also
generated (Fig. 7.2).
Conjunction Point 2: Relational public diplomacy projects generate soft

power by promoting practitioner country’s soft-power assets.
CJ1a: CJ3b:
CJ1: Prominent asset New roles
Soft power as
Public
Practitioner project input Engagement Foreign
Soft Power Diplomacy
Country Public
Project
CJ1b: CJ3a:
Shared asset New events
CJ2: Generating soft power
Fig. 7.2 Pathway from practitioner country to foreign public

186 E. SEVIN
Socialization is the second pathway that remains at the center of each

case and provides a more comprehensive explanation of the mechanisms
than the other pathways. The pathway argues that public diplomacy proj-
ects change the way the practitioner country interacts with foreign publics
in the country by undertaking projects in new areas. In all three cases, the
projects enable the practitioner countries to engage foreign audiences by
increasing their levels of activity in the host countries. Therefore, social-
ization can be used to explain the link between public diplomacy project
and outreach to foreign publics by further detailing the engagement. First,
public diplomacy projects push the foreign representations and/or coun-
tries to organize more events. They generate additional opportunities for
interaction:
Conjunction Point 3a: Relational public diplomacy increases the volume

of projects of the embassies, consulates, and other representations of the
practitioner country targeting the publics in the host country.
Additionally, these new events do not necessarily comply with tra-

ditional diplomatic or foreign policy functions. Diplomatic representa-
tions, from a strictly traditional view, expected to focus exclusively on
inter-governmental relations. Through public diplomacy projects, they
gain new roles in the host societies. ECSM encouraged American rep-
resentations to organize cultural events, competitions and sports game
in Russia. Facing the Climate positions Sweden as an advocacy actor for
climate change policies in host countries. In the case of TÜRKSOY,
Turkey becomes a cultural hub. In short, relational public diplomacy
projects change the relationship dynamics by increasing not only the vol-
ume of projects engaging foreign publics through new projects and/or
by extending the breadth through organizing public diplomacy projects
on new subjects.
Conjunction Point 3b: Relational public diplomacy introduces new sub-

jects and topics for the activities of the practitioner country through
embassies, consulates, and other representations in the host country.
The second question in the cross-case comparison asks what combina-

tion of pathways can best describe the causal mechanism between public
diplomacy and contribution to foreign policy. Both the American and

the Swedish have identical mechanisms, using four pathways: attraction,
socialization, benefit of the doubt and agenda-setting. The Turkish mecha-
nism uses a similar combination of the pathways and also includes framing.
As summarized in Table 7.1, across all three cases, at least one pathway is
used from the three possible categories.
The contribution of the relational public diplomacy projects to achieving
foreign policy goals happens by influencing change in all three areas. Thus,
relational public diplomacy projects include elements that have the poten-
tial to influence public opinion, relationship dynamics and public debates,
rather than focusing on one of the categories. The public diplomacy proj-
ects aim to create changes in the foreign public engaged in three areas:
Conjunction Point 4: Relational public diplomacy projects influence pub-

lic opinion, relationship dynamics, and public debates.
The analyses of the cases decrease our confidence in attraction and

direct influence pathways as plausible explanations of the expected out-
comes of relational public diplomacy projects. All three cases show that
public diplomacy practice prefers face-to-face interaction to reaching
the public en masse, undermining the fundamental assumption of the
attraction pathway. Similarly, relational public diplomacy projects engage
with individuals. Even in the instances where there is direct contact with
policy-makers, the projects do not attempt to influence the views of these
high-profile individuals. The relative importance of individuals is against
the main operating assumption of the direct influence pathway. In other
words, prior to the empirical analysis, I argued for the existence of six
possible pathways to explain the link. Based on the cross-case analysis,
Table 7.1 Combination of pathways in cases

United States Sweden Turkey
Input Public opinion Attraction Attraction Attraction

Expected Public opinion Benefit of the Benefit of the Benefit of the
outcome doubt doubt doubt
Relationship Socialization Socialization Socialization
dynamics
Public debate Agenda-setting Agenda-setting Agenda-
settingframing
188 E. SEVIN
Table 7.2 Empirical performances of pathways

High empirical performance Low empirical performance
Public opinion Benefit of the doubt Attraction (limited to input)

Relationship dynamics Socialization Direct influence
Public debate Agenda-setting framing
Framing
I argue there are only four plausible pathways. As Table 7.2 shows, the
exclusion of attraction and direct influence pathways leave only one path-
way to explain the changes that occur in public opinion and relationship
dynamics.
An inclusive analysis studying the impact of a public diplomacy proj-
ect, therefore, should include all three areas and should look for evidence
for four pathways. In terms of attraction, the focus should be on ben-
efit of the doubt. The projects have a specific way to change the public
opinion. Instead of focusing on raising the attractiveness or favorability of
the practitioner country, the projects underline the partnerships/partner-
ship potential between the host and practitioner countries. In all three
cases, practitioner countries attempted to position themselves as partners
seeking cooperation with the host countries. ECSM argued for “many
common national interests” between the United States and Russia (EUR
2009). Facing the Climate was shown as part of the Swedish contribu-
tion to help Albania achieve its environmental policy goals (Amiot 2013).
TÜRKSOY (2011) protects the common cultural heritage of Turkic
nations. Public diplomacy projects are reflected as not being based on the
needs of the practitioner or the host country but rather as opportunities
for collaboration.
Conjunction Point 4a: Host country’s policy decisions are influenced by

the assumption that practitioner country is acting in good faith.
By engaging with foreign publics, projects increase the volume and

breadth of relationships established by the practitioner country. As pre-
vious studies have shown (such as Pamment 2014), lobbying is a plau-
sible way to achieve foreign policy goals. However, none of the practices
included in the study included lobbying elements. As seen in the Swedish
case, where direct contact with policy-makers were used to promote the
public diplomacy project, and in the Turkish case, where direct contact
with policy-makers were used to further develop TÜRKSOY, lobbying
and socialization seem to be mutually exclusive choices with the former
being reserved for projects carried out by specialized lobbying agencies
(Manheim 1994). Public diplomacy projects reaching foreign publics, by
definition, ignore decision-makers for the sake of establishing relations
with individuals.
Conjunction Point 4b: Host country’s policy decisions are influenced by

the new roles and relationships established by the project.
In the third area of impact, public opinion, both agenda-setting and

framing pathways are supported by the evidence coming from the cases.
Practitioner countries might introduce new items to public agenda, topics
that are not discussed prior to the public diplomacy intervention. ECSM
brought US–Russia relations and Reset policy discussions to groups that
have not been necessarily interested in the topics—such as athletes and
scholars. Facing the Climate aims to raise environmental awareness by
engaging with general public in countries where climate change is not an
agenda item. TÜRKSOY introduces Turkic culture and identity as a new
item in public agenda.
Conjunction Point 4c: Host country’s policy decisions are influenced by

new issues in the public agenda.
The Turkish case also presents evidence for the viability of framing
pathway. TÜRKSOY does not solely present Turkic culture and identity as
a new item. Certain projects, such as Türkvizyon and artist meetings, put
a Turkic spin on existing discussions. Türkvizyon is a project created by
Turkic-fying the Eurovision concept. Artist meetings encourage individu-
als to focus their work on Turkic culture. For instance, Turkic photogra-
phers, for instance, have already been interested in organizing exhibitions.
TÜRKSOY (2016) cultivates the existing interest and invites these artists
to organize an exhibition composed of photos they have taken in Adana,
a Turkish city.
Conjunction Point 4d: Host country’s policy decisions are influenced by

the tone of coverage.
190 E. SEVIN
Public CJ4a: Shared interests

opinion
CJ1a CJ3a CJ4: CJ4b:
Three areas New roles and
CJ1 Public
Practitioner Foreign of impact Relation- relations Policy
Soft Power Diplomacy ship
Change
Country Public Dynamics
Project
CJ1b CJ3b
Public CJ4bc: New issues
debates
CJ2
CJ4d: New debates
Fig. 7.3 Causal mechanism
The third and final question in the cross-case analysis focused on

connecting public diplomacy with international relations. Through the
review of the literature and analysis of the data coming from three diverse
cases, this research provides a casual mechanism. Following the cross-case
analysis, it is possible to provide a comprehensive answer to the research
question guiding this study. Public diplomacy works through the causal
mechanism shown in Fig. 7.3.
In summary, the research question is answered by combining the find-
ings from the literature review and case analyses. The literature review
provides the causal mechanism with the main pathways as the main com-
ponents of the mechanism. The case analyses unfold which pathways and
which combinations have the highest empirical performance. In other
words, pathways are the abstract and theoretical “cogs” in the final causal
“mechanism.” The empirical and theoretical findings come together to
build up the causal mechanism—an explanation of how countries move
from public diplomacy projects to helping achieve foreign policy goals.
Practitioner countries use soft-power assets to design public diplomacy
projects, which increases their engagement with the foreign public, which
in return influences public opinion, relationship dynamics and public
debates to contribute to the achievement of a foreign policy goal.
7.3 Reflection on the Practice

Public diplomacy is a practice-driven field. Scholarly work is expected
to both follow the practice and to contribute to its development. While
building the six pathways of connection, my aim was also in line with
this practice-based approach.4 The framework unpacks the assumptions
that have existed in the practice of public diplomacy. The practitioners
were aware of the fact that their projects have a foreign policy component,
yet the details were not clear. This is why my leading question was not
whether public diplomacy works or not. I started out with the assumption
that public diplomacy works and focused on explaining how.
Basically, public diplomacy works through engagement created by pub-
lic diplomacy projects. These projects require the existence of a soft-power
asset (CJ1). These assets facilitate the engagement with foreign publics.
American sports clinics with professional hockey players attracted the
attention of Russian hockey players, making it easier for SportsUnited to
recruit participants. In a hypothetical scenario involving a country with no
prominent hockey background (e.g. Turkey), replicating the same proj-
ect would be difficult. Practitioner countries might use their prominent
(CJ1a) and/or shared soft-power assets (CJ1b). In return, the projects
increase foreign public’s interest in the assets used and augment the soft
power for the practitioner country (CJ2).
These particular soft power–related arguments, once again, dem-
onstrate the importance of non-public diplomacy variables for engage-
ment. A soft-power asset is an a priori requirement. Engagement with
foreign publics cannot take place without existing assets. Even though
public diplomacy projects can augment their strength, it is not possible
to create assets solely through communication. In the American case, the
assets were created by non-governmental resources, such as professional
leagues and media industries. Swedish assets were the result of continued
activism in international politics. Turkish assets were based on historical
connections.
It should also be noted that soft-power assets should not be seen as uni-
versal. In the case of “shared” assets, it is obvious that their effectiveness
is limited to publics that share them: Turkic culture might not be an effec-
tive strategy to reach American audiences. Prominent assets are also prone
to the same situation. Reversing the hypothetical hockey scenario, Turkish
audience is less likely to appreciate the prominence of American assets as
hockey is not a popular sport in the country. Therefore, a hockey exchange
might not be able to facilitate engagement. Practitioners should assess the
attractiveness of soft-power assets to the audiences prior to engagement.
Next part of the causal mechanism shows that public diplomacy proj-
ects increase the volume (CJ3a) and breadth (CJ3b) of the practitioner
country outreach to the foreign public. The engagement takes place by
communicating with foreign public through an increased level of activity
and on a variety of subjects. In other words, public diplomacy acts as a
new and/or improved communication platform that gives the practitioner
192 E. SEVIN
country to increase its engagement with the foreign public. TÜRKSOY

gives Turkey a new platform to communicate with Turkic countries as
there were no existing cultural communication opportunities, whereas
Facing the Climate improved Swedish outreach to Albania. The coun-
tries were co-operating on an institutional level through development
diplomacy. The cartoon exhibit expanded this communication platform to
include artists and general public.
As an output, public diplomacy projects are expected to create an
impact on all three areas: public opinion, relationship dynamics and pub-
lic debates (CJ4). Thus equating public diplomacy as a tool to move the
proverbial needle in public opinion polls (Banks 2011) will not be able to
capture the impact of the projects. The contribution to foreign policy, in
return, can be reached through the assumption of practitioner country’s
good faith (CJ4a), new roles and relations (CJ4b), new issues (CJ4c) or
new coverage of old issues (CJ4d). As the case studies demonstrate, the
impact cannot be solely deduced to any of these four pathways. Rather, a
given project influences the foreign public in a way that is best explained
through a combination.
The framework can be used both for designing new public diplomacy
initiatives and for assessing existing ones. As argued throughout the book,
the objective of public diplomacy is to contribute to the achievement of
foreign policy goals and to advance national interests in the international
arena. Thus, a successful initiative needs to be designed in a manner that
can create such an impact on foreign policy. The six pathways of connec-
tion framework clearly lay out the necessary components for such a proj-
ect. The conjunction points can be used as a check list:
• Is the design based on a soft-power asset?

• Is the asset relevant (either prominent or shared) to the target
audience?
• Does the design augment the strength of the asset?
• Does the design increase the level of activity in the country?
• Does the design create new roles for the practitioner country?
• Does the design include elements for all three areas of impact?
Such an approach will increase the likelihood of successful engagement

with target audiences by making sure the design includes the necessary
components for success.
For assessment, the six pathways of connection framework focus on out-

comes rather than outputs. In other words, success is evaluated ultimately
through the contribution to the achievement of foreign policy objectives,
penultimately through the changes occurring within the host public.
The project outputs—such as number of students involved in a student
exchange—is not relevant. The most important outcome for a public diplo-
macy project is the achievement of foreign policy objectives. However, it
should be noted that a public diplomacy project cannot be deemed unsuc-
cessful solely based on foreign policy. Despite being the ultimate objective
of projects, foreign policy is affected by external variables as well. As seen
in the American case, the failure of Reset era does not necessarily mean the
failure of American public diplomacy. An external variable, Russian annex-
ation of Crimea,5 was the main culprit for the end of Reset policy. Similarly,
a foreign policy objective can be reached even if public diplomacy projects
yield no contributions. Therefore, the assessment should continue on to
the changes within the host country (CJ4a through d) should be assessed
to evaluate performance of the public diplomacy projects.
The critical contribution of six pathways framework to assessment is
based on its process understanding. As the causal mechanism presents a
roadmap,6 practitioners can demonstrate the links between public diplo-
macy projects and their outcomes. In other words, solely arguing for new
roles and relations (CJ4b) is incomplete. Rather, there is a need to dem-
onstrate how public diplomacy projects created these new roles and rela-
tions. The framework encourages practitioners to ask both whether there
is a foreign policy success as an outcome and whether their contribution is
observable in the process.
Succinctly stated, the causal mechanism unfolds the link between for-
eign policy and public diplomacy by introducing the pathways, a com-
bination of which can be used to create a sequence of events that help
explain how an analysis can move from public diplomacy to foreign policy
goals. A project design using the framework will make sure that necessary
components for success are included in public diplomacy initiatives. An
assessment using the framework will start from the foreign policy outcome
and demonstrate the role of public diplomacy initiatives in the process.
194 E. SEVIN
Notes
1. Sadin Ayyıldız (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs), personal interview
2. I find it necessary to reiterate that the actual research question throughout
the project was worded different based on methodological concerns: What
is the causal mechanism through which relational public diplomacy projects are
designed to advance national interests?
3. In line with the methodological terminology, these conjunction points can
be seen as hypotheses. A process induction design, such as this research,
leads to hypothesis generation. However, given the comparative nature of
this study raises the confidence in the findings, making it possible to label
them as theoretical frameworks.
4. This research is labeled as a theory-building study in academic circles.

Basically, I used case studies to create a framework that has the potential to
explain a larger social phenomenon.
5. It is, hypothetically, possible to argue that a successful public diplomacy
project could have prevented the Russian aggression. Such an argument has
its merits. Indeed, public diplomacy could have been used to alter Russian
behavior towards third countries—even though ECSM did not have this
particular mandate. However, public diplomacy is not a magic wand and
should not be expected to solve all the problems. ECSM carried out its
mandate successfully. Yet, external variables made it impossible to realize
the foreign policy objectives. Evaluating the success of a public diplomacy
project should focus on whether the design had all the necessary compo-
nents and whether the implementation was successful.
6. The main method used in this research is process tracing. As the name sug-
gests, this method traces the process and points the causal links between
different parts. The end result, causal mechanism, is a collection of these
causal links. By following the sequence in causal mechanism, it is possible to
attribute that a particular outcome is caused by an event. In other words, an
assessment attempt that uses six pathways of connection should not only
show that there are new issues in the public agenda but should also show
the process through which public diplomacy introduces them.
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2(3): 213–228. doi:10.1163/187119007X240505.
CHAPTER 8
Conclusion: Connecting Foreign Policy

and Communication
Public diplomacy works, but how? It was a challenging task to design a

research that can answer this question, mostly due to the fact that the
young multi-disciplinary field of public diplomacy studies does not present
theoretical or methodological frameworks to carry out an analytical study
of the concept. The scholarly work on public diplomacy is found to be
predominantly descriptive and geared towards providing normative pol-
icy recommendations—more often than not to American policy-makers
based on the experience of former Foreign Service Officers. Therefore, the
research undertook the objectives of proposing a theoretical framework to
understand public diplomacy and a methodological framework to analyze
projects. In Chap. 1, I argued for the necessity of such a research and
discussed why public diplomacy carried the label of diplomacy. I argued
that public diplomacy should be seen as an expansion of traditional diplo-
macy. From state-level negotiations carried out among an exclusive group
of professional diplomats, public diplomacy moved to include additional
actors and topics.
In Chap. 2, I presented the theoretical framework based on the survey
of the literature. Based on the practice and prior study in the field, I argued
for a trans-disciplinary approach to public diplomacy that acknowledged
the role of communication, the actors involved in the communication
activities, state functions and expected outcomes of public diplomacy proj-
ects. I then summarized the “old” and “new” public diplomacy discussions
in the field and showed that the “new” public diplomacy differed from the

198 E. SEVIN
earlier practice as (1) the objective of the communication activities started

moving away from information dissemination and towards establishing
relations, and (2) other countries (i.e. countries that are not the United
States) started to invest on public diplomacy institutions. Consequently,
this research focused on “relational” public diplomacy and included two
countries in addition to the United States. Last, I introduced an approach
to public diplomacy, influenced by international relations theories, to iden-
tify ways to connect foreign policy and public diplomacy. I argued that
public diplomacy could influence foreign policy in three connections: by
changing public opinion, relationship dynamics and public debates. These
three propositions—a trans-disciplinary approach, relational multi-actor
new public diplomacy and three connections—constituted the theoretical
framework on which the research methodology was established.
In Chap. 3, I outlined my research methodology. I argued that the
most appropriate analytical focus for my research was the practice of public
diplomacy. Thus, I designed a research that looks at the logic of practice in
public diplomacy. In my analysis, I studied the views of the practitioners.
In other words, I asked how they saw the mechanisms through which
their projects helped achieve foreign policy goals. I justified my choice by
presenting a framework that inductively collected subjective information
from the practitioners and deductively analyzed them, using theoretical
pathways to ensure objectivity. I used six pathways identified through a
study of the literature based on the three connections between foreign
policy and public diplomacy: attraction and benefit of the doubt under pub-
lic opinion, socialization and direct influence under relationship dynamics,
agenda-setting and framing under public debates.
Chapters 4–6 were my case chapters, respectively, for public diplo-
macy in the United States, Sweden and Turkey. Each chapter had the same
structure and was composed of three sections. The first section presented
a brief overview of the history of public diplomacy in the country and
its current institutions. The second section gave a descriptive analysis of
the representative project and analyzed a representative component of the
project. The last section analyzed the empirical performance of the six
pathways to link public diplomacy and foreign policy.
In Chap. 4, I profiled and analyzed the American public diplo-
macy practice through the case of the Education, Culture, Sports, and
Media (ECSM) Working Group of the US–Russia Bilateral Presidential
Commission (BPC). ECSM was established to improve and deepen the
relations between the United States and Russia through people-to-people
CONCLUSION: CONNECTING FOREIGN POLICY AND COMMUNICATION 199
communication. The findings of my analysis suggested that the practitio-

ners designed their projects to use the attractiveness of American cultural
values, as well as of its institutions—such as university and professional
sports associations—to engage with the Russian target audiences. These
engagements were also expected to enable the United States and its rep-
resentations in Russia to be more active in different aspects of the Russian
social life—in education, culture, sports and media as the name of the
working group suggests. The activities were also to bring Russian and
Americans together to work on issues of mutual interest, such as pre-
serving shared culture and improving education. The projects were also
designed to help the United States to encourage public debate in Russia
on issues relevant to American interests, such as democratization, citizen
journalism and entrepreneurship. Thus, in the case of the United States,
relational public diplomacy projects were designed to use American soft
power (attraction) to influence relationship dynamics, public opinion and
public debates, explained respectively through socialization, benefit of the
doubt and agenda-setting pathways.
In Chap. 5, I profiled and analyzed the Swedish public diplomacy prac-
tice through the case of Facing the Climate project. Facing the Climate
was a traveling exhibit including political cartoons on the issues of cli-
mate change and sustainability. The idea was based on the prominence
of Swedish contributions in and commitment to environmental sustain-
ability issues. The attractiveness of Swedish values facilitated the country’s
engagement with foreign publics with Facing the Climate project. Public
diplomacy practitioners saw hosting Facing the Climate as an opportu-
nity to connect with local civil society groups working on climate-relevant
issues as well as raise the awareness of the general public. The project
visited the countries that already had showed an interest in climate issues
and worked together with local actors to further develop the interest
among target audiences. The co-organized nature of the projects was
emphasized in the project implementation to promote that Sweden and
host country share similar interests. In the case of Sweden, the findings
suggested that the relational public diplomacy projects were designed to
use the “Swedish model”—the country’s core values and way of provid-
ing solutions to problems—to facilitate engagement with target audiences
and to affect relationship dynamics, public opinion and public debates,
and explained, respectively, through socialization, benefit of the doubt and
agenda-setting pathways.
200 E. SEVIN
In Chap. 6, I profiled and analyzed the Turkish public diplomacy prac-

tice through the case of TÜRKSOY. TÜRKSOY, as an international orga-
nization established and supported by Turkey, was instrumental in the
country’s outreach to the former Soviet Turkic countries in Central Asia.
Most of its activities were based on the shared culture, history and eth-
nic heritage between Turkey and the Turkic countries. The projects were
designed both to remind their Turkic identities to the societies and to
encourage discussions about Turkey among target audiences. The find-
ings also suggested that the projects were also bringing countries together
to work on preserving and promoting Turkic cultural heritage. Turkish
public diplomacy practice was found to manifest its impact on foreign
policy through relationship dynamics, public opinion and public debates,
as explained respectively through socialization, benefit of the doubt, and
framing as well as agenda-setting pathways.
In Chap. 7, I provided an answer to the research question. I first pre-
sented the combination of the pathways in the cases. Based on the insights
drawn from the application of the six-pathway framework to analyze the
cases of American, Swedish and Turkish relational public diplomacy, I
introduced the causal mechanism. I carried out a structured-focused case
comparison to introduce the pathways and conjunction points to the long
form of the causal mechanism. I concluded the chapter by introducing the
practical implications of the framework.
This chapter concludes the study by linking foreign policy and public
diplomacy discourses. Building upon the causal mechanism presented in
the last chapter, I first argue that there is a need to refrain from stretch-
ing the concept (Sartori 1970; Collier and Mahon 1993) of soft power.
I then introduce how this research contributed to situating public diplo-
macy as foreign policy too and outline possible ideas for future research
to continue the “rapprochement” between the fields of international rela-
tions and public diplomacy. Last but not the least, I share three personal
revelations I had throughout the four-year period I spent working on this
research and book manuscript.
8.1 Moving Away from Soft Power

Soft power and public diplomacy have an intricate relationship. Soft power
is the most theory-like framework available to public diplomacy scholars
(Melissen 2007), causing studies to often use these two terms together.
They have become so close that, as Craig Hayden (2012, 287) claims,
a study of public diplomacy is also a study of how soft power is used to

justify the necessity of engagement with foreign publics. Yet, soft power
was crafted as a policy concept, more specifically, as—at best—an ana-
lytical framework to normatively evaluate American foreign policy in the
post–Cold War era (Sevin 2016). Subsequent conceptual traveling and
stretching (Sartori 1970) cause soft power to become a catch-all term
that includes practically any policy behavior that does not include military
intervention.
This argument should not be seen as an attempt to discredit or disprove
soft power.1 The concept, indeed, is important in our understanding of
public diplomacy. However, the vocabulary it presents is specific to a cer-
tain time and a case. Employing soft power to new cases (conceptual trav-
eling), those that do not have the same background with the post–Cold
War era American foreign policy, the provided vocabulary is not necessar-
ily sufficient to provide an explanation. More often than not, this causes
a distortion on the concept (conceptual stretching). In order to avoid
such an issue, there is a need to limit the usage of soft-power concept, as
described in the works of Joseph Nye, to cases that match the necessary
background (such as Goldsmith and Horiuchi 2009, 2012; Nye 2011).
Scholarship can move away from a limited understanding of soft power
through two different means. First, there is a need to contextualize (Sartori
1970; Collier and Mahon 1993) soft power in terms of both the practice
environment and foreign policy. A country’s public diplomacy strategy or
even a design of project is highly influenced by past and present bureau-
cratic organizations. As comparative studies of public diplomacy present
(such as Pamment 2013; Sevin 2016; Hayden 2012), the logistical abili-
ties of a country, as well as the organizational memory shape the rhetoric
around soft power.
Second, it is possible to move away from soft power by articulating its
specific role in the practice. The findings of this research posit that soft
power has the role of initiating a public diplomacy project and facilitating
engagement with foreign publics. Thus, soft-power assets are situated as
the building blocks for projects. Additionally, two different c haracteristics
of these assets are identified: prominent assets and shared assets. The attrac-
tiveness of a given asset might come from the fact that a particular aspect
of a country’s culture, values and policy is well known and appreciated by
target populations. Similarly, the attractiveness might be based on the fact
that target populations have the same asset. In the case of American and
Swedish practices, the prominence of their soft-power assets was found
202 E. SEVIN
to be instrumental in their communication attempts with foreign publics

whereas the Turkish practice relied on the shared cultural roots and ethnic
heritage with Turkic audiences.
8.2 Public Diplomacy as a Foreign Policy Tool

By demonstrating how public diplomacy works, a practical objective is
to argue for its role as a foreign policy tool. Developing new tools and
methods to argue for its impact make public diplomacy a more prominent
tool in the foreign policy toolkit. The major contribution of the study,
six pathways of connection, is a step towards this goal. The existing body
of literature is criticized for being composed of normative policy recom-
mendation and for not working towards establishing theories (Hayden
2012; R. Brown 2012). The six pathways framework organizes the exist-
ing scholarship into six identifiable categories, operationalizes their appli-
cation as analytical tools and demonstrates their potential in explaining
the outcomes of public diplomacy projects. Application of six pathways
makes it possible to discuss how public diplomacy advances national inter-
ests without necessarily trying to quantify non-quantifiable aspects of the
projects (Seib 2013). As such, the framework can be used to advocate for
the need of public diplomacy when resources and budgets are limited. The
pathways contribute to the theory-building attempts in the field of public
diplomacy. As the study demonstrated, no one single pathway is capable
of explaining the outcomes. Rather, an inclusive approach to the impact
assessment requires the use of a combination of pathways that highlight
changes in three distinct areas simultaneously: public opinion, relationship
dynamics and public debates. The findings constitute an important contri-
bution to the practice and study of public diplomacy that do not necessar-
ily attempt to look for evidence of impact in all three areas.
Another contribution, related to the six pathways, is the articulation of
the causal mechanism. The value of the causal mechanism is the fact that
it introduces both a new research agenda and a new way of thinking about
public diplomacy. Traditionally, studies tend to be limited by disciplinary
boundaries (cf. Chap. 2). Therefore, scholars focus on certain segments
and parts of public diplomacy projects. The causal mechanism, on the
other hand, presents a more integrated and comprehensive approach to
analyzing how public diplomacy works. It is also a means to conceptualize
public diplomacy as a tool to engage with foreign publics with the objec-
tive of achieving a policy change. This approach demonstrates the points
to take into consideration while designing, implementing and evaluating

projects. In other words, the causal mechanism provides a roadmap to cre-
ate new public diplomacy projects and to assess the existing projects, thus
articulating the impact on foreign policy clearly.
Scholars can help position public diplomacy as a viable foreign policy
tool by studying the practices in more details. Instead of discussing pub-
lic diplomacy strategies in general, this research puts the role of practice
under investigation. Public diplomacy studies cannot present a complete
analysis unless the views of the practitioners and their understanding of
the practice are included. Theoretical discussion can and should be used
to objectively assess the subjective information gathered from the practice.
This is why the research design advocated for studying the “practice” to
analyze the impact of public diplomacy. Moreover, such research designs
encourage collaboration between practitioners and scholars, a relationship
that is beneficial for both parties involved.
The detailed accounts of Turkish and Swedish public diplomacy prac-
tice enrich our understanding of public diplomacy and diversify the avail-
able analytical accounts of practice in the field. In line with the call for
the introduction of non-American cases in the literature, the disserta-
tion presents one of the first studies of Swedish and Turkish practices.
By comparing these cases to the United States, the similarities and dif-
ferences between non-American and American cases are presented, and
the existence (or lack thereof) of different “schools of practice” in public
diplomacy is identified. Public diplomacy is not exclusive to developed
countries, but middle powers can also take advantage of international
communication in their foreign policy.
Future research should consider advocating the role of public diplo-
macy as a foreign policy. I encourage future research in three distinct areas.
First, the causal mechanism requires further testing by introducing new
cases—both in terms of countries and of projects from the countries stud-
ied in this research. The theory-building attempt should be continued by
theory-testing studies, in the form of process tracing or other appropriate
research methods. This vein of research can enable the generalization of
the causal mechanism. Second, there is a need for impact studies. The
causal mechanism points the researchers towards the areas in which public
diplomacy projects can cause “change.” Yet, there is still a question that
needs to be answered: are projects actually causing the change they are
designed to do? For instance, can a public diplomacy introduce new issues
to foreign publics? Third, the logic of practice in public diplomacy needs
204 E. SEVIN
further elaboration. Studying the logic through the final outcome—design

and implementation of a public diplomacy project—is but one approach
to the practice. It is important to note that there are different groups of
people working on public diplomacy—from field officers to desk officers
to Foreign Service officers. Introducing new cases and further discussing
the impact of practice will surely strengthen the position of public diplo-
macy as a foreign policy tool.
8.3 Final Remarks

I want to conclude this research by acknowledging its limitations and rais-
ing three final points based on my experience during the last couple of
years working on this project. First, I intentionally left out non-relational
public diplomacy projects. These projects, such as broadcasting (Rawnsley
2015; Cull 2010), are still widely used by various practitioner countries—
including the United States, Sweden and Turkey. The projects using medi-
ated platforms or other one-way communication methods have a different
engagement process with the foreign target audiences. Therefore, the
findings of this research cannot be used to explain how these projects help
achieve foreign policy goals.
Second, the research question asks “how” public diplomacy works
and not “what” works in public diplomacy. In other words, the research
focuses on unearthing the assumptions of expected impact on foreign
policy. By demonstrating how public diplomacy projects are designed to
advance national interests, a new analytical framework is introduced. Yet,
the strategies used by the countries included in the study should not be
seen as “best-practices” for success. The research does not provide strate-
gies to conduct successful public diplomacy projects, but solely a way to
design public diplomacy projects that has the necessary components for
success. Changing public opinion is a way to reach success, but the answer
to which projects/communication tools can better influence the views of
the public is beyond the scope of this research.
During the research process, I was personally intrigued by three revela-
tions. First, institutional memory is very strong in public diplomacy prac-
tice. For instance, the experience of United States Information Agency
(USIA) is still observable in the American public diplomacy practice
though USIA has been gone for over two decades right now. Yet, I have
witnessed practitioners refer to the USIA experience in many of my inter-
views, site visits, archival documents, as well as public diplomacy events
organized in the Washington, DC, area. It is not possible to understand

American public diplomacy without the USIA. Moreover, public diplo-
macy is highly influenced by the activities of other bureaucratic and politi-
cal institutions. If we are arguing that public diplomacy is a policy tool,
we cannot exclude other political variables from our analysis. For instance,
TÜRKSOY’s relatively low level of activities in Uzbekistan since 2003
are a reflection of the Turkish foreign policy (Bozkurt 2014) towards the
country. After the passing of Islam Karimov, we might observe more pres-
ence in Uzbekistan. The activities of ECSM—as well as other components
of the BPC—were suspended in 2014, not because of the performance
of the ECSM projects but due to the recent tensions between Russia and
Ukraine and the role of the United States in the debate. In other words,
public diplomacy decisions are not taken exclusively in public diplomacy
contexts but are influenced by—and hopefully influence—international
politics.
Second, as scholars, we need to move beyond the disciplinary bound-
aries if we are to “create” knowledge that has “practical” implications.
During my doctoral studies, I realized the academic disciplines were not
able to respond to the changes in practice rapidly. We are living in an era in
which companies argue for their “social” roles and countries invest in their
“brands” even though the expected pattern of behavior for companies is
to focus on their brands at the expense of their social roles and vice versa
(Olins 2000). These patterns challenge the fundamental assumptions of
some of our theoretical tools. We need to have a more pragmatic approach
to disciplines—combining the most appropriate theories and methods for
our research, and even proposing new ones when necessary to contribute
to the practice. This contribution is especially important for public diplo-
macy. During this research, I had the opportunity to interact with public
diplomacy practitioners from various countries, all of whom were looking
for information about their practice in academia. I argue that it is our
responsibility as scholars and researchers to create knowledge and we can-
not fulfill our responsibility if we are stuck within disciplinary boundaries.
Last but not the least, public diplomacy studies need to focus on devel-
oping new tools and methods to argue for the “impact” of the practice.
It is indeed quite difficult to argue for quantifiable impacts of any given
public diplomacy project, however, without any arguments showing any
impact; we will witness shrinking public diplomacy programs and projects.
For instance, the United States is still discussing a cut to the budget of
the Fulbright Program (Redden 2014)—the program that is dubbed as
206 E. SEVIN
the “flagship international education exchange program sponsored by the

U.S. government” (ECA 2014). Given the fact that the arguments against
the budget proposal do not necessarily include tangible aspects about how
the program is useful, the cut is likely to take place (Schuman 2014).
Public diplomacy advocacy cannot happen unless scholars can describe
how public diplomacy works.
I am convinced this study constitutes a strong example of an academic
research that also contributes to the practice of public diplomacy. I spe-
cifically want to express that the causal mechanism is a unique a way to
talk about the impact of public diplomacy without trying to quantify it,
an attempt that has proved to be almost impossible (Banks 2011)—yet,
it is just one step. I hope future research in the field will continue provid-
ing works that contribute both to the practice and to the study of public
diplomacy.
Note
1. I believe in the merit of reiterating this point in more details. Soft power is
a valid concept, but it is not a theoretical framework. It explains its given
case—U.S. foreign policy starting with early 1990s—yet fails to provide any
analytical insights that go beyond the American practice. Unfortunately, the
lack of established theoretical frameworks has pushed scholars of public
diplomacy, including myself, to treat soft power as a theory.
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Appendix: Testing Procedure
Throughout the case chapters, I presented reconstructed narratives that

were created after the analyses were completed. I did not present any neg-
ative results nor shared details about the testing to ensure clarity in my
explanations. In this appendix, you can find further information about the
testing procedure and summary of the results.
David Collier (2011) introduces four different types to assess the
empirical performance of the pathways: straw-in-the-wind, hoop, smoking-
gun and doubly-decisive. These tests differ based on whether the passage
(or the failure) of a given test is necessary and/or sufficient for accepting
(or rejecting) an explanation of a causal mechanism. Straw-in-the-wind tests
are the weakest. If a hypothesis passes this test, its relevance is affirmed; if it
fails, its relevance is weakened. As this type of test is neither sufficient nor
necessary for affirming causal links, it is not included in this research. The
rest of the tests were systematically applied. Process-tracing method relies
on four possible types of evidence: trace, account, sequence and pattern
evidence (Beach and Pedersen 2013, 99–105). The fourth type of evidence
is pattern evidence that “relates to the predictions of statistical patterns in
the evidence” (Beach and Pedersen 2013, 99). In other words, statistical
data can be used to look for patterns. Pattern evidence is not included in
this research because statistical pattern data were not available for any one
of the projects studied in this case due to their recent nature.

Public Diplomacy, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-49334-3
210 Appendix: Testing Procedure
The testing procedure includes uses of systematic hoop, smoking-gun

and doubly-decisive tests with the help of respectively trace, account and
sequence evidence to evaluate the empirical performance of each pathway.
The first step, hoop test, looks for the existence of fundamental pieces of
evidence that are deemed necessary for the relevance of a pathway in inter-
view scripts and archival documents. The smoking-gun test is introduced to
examine the content of the evidence found in the first step and to assess the
relevance of a pathway. The last step, doubly-decisive test, is administered to
analyze the expected sequence of outcomes and to argue whether a given
pathway can be used to explain the causal link between advancing national
interests and public diplomacy as well as to place the pathway in the appro-
priate sequence of events in the causal mechanism. If a pathway fails any of
these tests, evidence supporting the low-empirical performance is sought,
as summarized in Table 3.2. This Appendix demonstrates the details of
the tests and illustrates the thinking beyond the process. The narrative
explanation outlines the process for the first case study—the American
practice. The same process is replicated for the remaining two case studies.
Tables A1, A2, and A3 present the testing process for each case.
For attraction pathway, the initial step is to look for evidence about mass public
opinion monitoring and references to public opinion. In the case of ECSM, there
is no reference to public opinion found in the interviews or project documents as
an expected outcome. Rather, the public diplomacy activities cultivate the interest
of the Russian public in American cultural assets (ECSM 2009a), sports teams
(ECSM 2009c) and educational institutes (ECSM 2009b). In other words, evi-
dence suggests that the United States organizes activities based on the soft-power
assets that are known and appreciated by the Russian public. However, without a
design element related to change in mass public opinion—such as mass outreach
or references to the increase of attractiveness of a country in general—it is difficult
to argue the projects are structured to invoke such a change. To exclude this par-
ticular pathway from the causal mechanism, the low-performance scenario arguing
for the relative importance of “last-three-feet” at the expense of mass outreach is
used. The annual reports (BPC 2010a, 2011a, 2012a, 2013a), as well as the nature
of the activities (EUR 2009a), support the idea that the United States focuses on
interpersonal and face-to-face communication. Therefore, the confidence in
attraction pathway to link public diplomacy and foreign policy is weakened.
The initial test for benefit of the doubt pathway seeks references to
erception and perception analysis. Starting with the mission statement of
p
BPC, the United States refers to the role of perception of interests (EUR
2009a). Therefore, perception of interests cannot be seen as insignificant.
The second step looks at the content of the evidence. The United States
Appendix: Testing Procedure 211
Table A1 Tests for United States

Pathway Hoop Test Smoking-Gun Test Doubly-Decisive Tests
Attraction No public opinion As an input—the As an input—project
polls. Recurring attractiveness of increases exposure to
references to soft education, culture, American soft-power
power. (Evidence sports and media. assets. (Evidence
found in QDDR, (Evidence found in found in youth
interviews.) Joint Plans, Joint swimming
Reports.) exchanges.)
Benefit of Mutual interests, Local partnerships, Projects encourage
the doubt shared future. working on projects cooperation in places
(Evidence found relevant to both where it does not exist.
in mission countries’ interests. (Evidence found in
statement of (Evidence found Rumble on Rails.)
ECSM/BPC.) in Fort Ross
restoration, ice
hockey exchanges.)
Socialization Increases New roles and Projects are expected
activities, new increased activity. to change the roles
subjects. (Evidence found the United States and
(Evidence in interviews, U.S. representations
found in list newsletters, Joint in the host country.
of activities.) Reports.) (Evidence found in St.
Petersburg Baseball
Federation.)
Direct No reference to N/A N/A (Low-
influence contacts performance scenario
exists; target audience
is “ordinary”
individuals across the
board.)
Agenda Press Importance of Projects are expected
setting releases/reports media coverage to introduce new
exist. (Evidence (Evidence found issues. (Evidence found
found in Joint on Tumblr for in sports workshops,
Reports, DoS journalists.) and entreprenuership for
archive.) of new issues. students workshops.)
(Evidence found
in Joint Plans and
Memoranda of
Understanding.)
Framing No reference to N/A N/A (Low-
existing debates performance scenario
exists; new issues and
debates are more
important.)
Table A2 Tests for Sweden

Attraction No public As an input—Swedish As an input—

opinion polls. model is incorporated project increases
Reference to into the project exposure to Swedish
Swedish model (Evidence found in model. (Evidence
DC exhibit, found in Korca,
publications, annual Shkodra.)
reports.)
Benefit of Shared interests/ Partnerships are Projects encourage
the doubt investment in important. Local cooperation in
climate. (Evidence partnerships are places where it does
found in project encouraged. (Evidence not exist. (Evidence
kit, interview.) found in project kit, found in Brazil and
annual reports.) South Africa
reports.)
Socialization Increases New roles and Projects expected to
activities, new increased activity change the way
subjects (interviews, reports, Sweden interacts
(project kit) project kits, press with local public.
releases) (Evidence found in
Albania interview,
annual reports,
reporting items.)
Direct Contacts are Inconsequential, Ordinary individuals
influence made. (Evidence limited to opening. are preferred
found in (Evidence found in audiences.
interviews.) Albania, Brazil and (Evidence found in
the United States.) workshops,
organized tours in
Albania.)
Agenda Press releases/ Media coverage is Projects are
setting reports exist reported back. expected to
(annual reports (Evidence found in stimulate
and embassy embassy reports.) conversation about
reports) environmental
issues. (Evidence
found in project kit,
interviews and
annual reports.)
Framing No reference to N/A N/A (Low-
existing debates, performance
only existing scenario exists; new
interest issues and debates
are more
important.)
Table A3 Tests for Turkey
Attraction No public As an input—the As an input—project

opinion polls. attractiveness of shared increases exposure to
Shared culture culture. (Evidence found shared soft-power
references exist. in annual report, Eskişehir assets. (Evidence
(Evidence found 2013 project justification.) found in secretary-
in TÜRKSOY general speeches.)
and KDK laws.)
Benefit of Shared history, One nation, six states. Projects encourage
the doubt shared future. (Evidence found in Turkish cooperation in places
(Evidence found foreign policy statements.) where it does not
in mission exist. (Evidence
statements.) found in interviews,
TÜRKSOY reports.)
Socialization Increases New roles and increased Projects are expected
activities, new activity. (Evidence found to change how
subjects. in interviews,TÜRKSOY Turkey interacts with
(Evidence found publications.) the public. (Evidence
in interviews, found in interviews,
annual reports.) Turkish foreign policy
statements.)
Direct Reference to Public diplomacy creates Contacts are used to
influence contacts, access to foreign policy- further the interests of
high-level makers. (Evidence found the public diplomacy
meetings. in summit meeting projects. (As seen in
(Evidence found minutes, annual report) the case of Bülbüloğlu.
in summit Low-performance
meeting scenario exists; target
minutes.) audience is “ordinary’
individuals)
Agenda Press releases/ Media coverage is reported Projects are expected
setting reports exist. back. (Evidence found on to introduce new
(Evidence found Eskişehir 2013 website.) issues. (Evidence
in annual report, New issues are introduced. found in interviews,
interviews.) (Evidence found in types of activities.)
publication portfolio.)
Framing Reference to Projects follow existing Projects are expected
existing cultural cultural debates in the to introduce a Turkic
debates. countries. (Evidence found spin on existing
(Evidence found in artists’ meetings.) cultural debates.
in Eskişehir 2013 (Evidence found in
reports.) Turkic capital of
culture and
Türkvizyon.)
argues that both countries recognize the existence of “many common

national interests” (EUR 2009a). In other words, the references to per-
ception are relevant to the benefit of the doubt pathway, which posits that
public diplomacy projects attempt to change the perception of the interests
of the practitioner country and to present the idea of mutual and shared
interests. The American practice reflects the “shared interests and common
goals” of the countries (BPC 2013a, 4). The final step is carried out to
assess whether public diplomacy activities are designed as an intervention
to shift the perception of such interests towards mutuality. There is con-
stant reference to the activities as opportunities for collaboration and plat-
forms (BPC 2011b) for working towards shared interests (BPC 2013b).
Thus, it is possible to claim a sequential and a causal link between public
diplomacy projects and changed perception of interests. American public
diplomacy activities are designed to create an environment in which their
foreign policy interests are seen as mutual and shared by the host public.
Socialization pathway argues for new relationship dynamics occurring
through increased level and diversified activities. The hoop test looks for
references to the volume and breadth activities. The annual reports, as
well as list of activities, provide evidence for the relative importance of the
frequency of interaction (ECA and DoS 2013). Subsequently, the focus
shifts to the subject of these new activities to assess whether it is possible
to argue that public diplomacy projects are designed to influence the rela-
tionship dynamics. Majority of the activities carried out by ECSM present
the United States opportunities to interact with the Russian public on
new subjects and areas—such as establishing a baseball federation in St.
Petersburg (US Consulate General St. Petersburg 2011). The final test
asks whether the public diplomacy projects are designed to change the
role of the United States and its foreign representations within the host
country. The practitioners posit that their activities are executed to estab-
lish “contact and interaction […] through vigorous and creative actions”
(BPC 2013a, 4). In other words, the increased level of activity is not
inconsequential but an anticipated outcome of the projects.
The hoop test for direct influence pathways seeks references to com-
municating with influential individuals. This research cannot present any
evidence supporting the idea that public diplomacy projects help the
United States engage policy-makers. The low empirical performance sce-
nario argues that ordinary citizens should be proclaimed as primary target
audiences. ECSM sees civil society groups, journalists, young athletes, stu-
dents and other individuals that are not necessarily involved in high-level
Appendix: Testing Procedure 215
policy-making as its target audience (ECSM 2009b; Joint Analysis and

Lessons Learned Centre 2013; EUR 2011).
Agenda-setting pathway initially asks whether the research design sup-
ports the dissemination of new subjects in the mediated and/or public
agenda. There is trace evidence for both organizing projects about new
subjects—such as social inclusion and entrepreneurship—and attempted
media outreach through newsletters and press releases (such as BPC
2013b). The second round of testing looks at the content of trace evi-
dence. It is observed that the working group as well as the participating
foreign representations reports back the media outreach and the resonance
of new subjects (examples can be seen in BPC 2011a). In other words,
the new subjects and media relations are relevant to the explanation of
the link between public diplomacy and foreign policy. The third and final
round of testing focuses on whether these outcomes are anticipated or
inconsequential. The sequence evidence supports the idea that American
intervention is designed to raise interest among media contacts and to
introduce new topics to the Russian public debates (Such as EUR 2012).
Framing pathway hypothesizes that public diplomacy projects can
influence the existing debates and coverage of certain issues. The hoop
test for the pathway seeks references for framing monitoring, in other
words for awareness of the existing relevant debates within the host pub-
lic. This research does not provide any such evidence. The low empirical
performance scenario for framing refers to resources spent on introduc-
ing new issues rather than influencing ongoing debates. As the agenda-
setting pathway tests argue, the American practice focuses exclusively on
new issues.
The testing process increases our confidence in three pathways for
explaining the outcome of public diplomacy projects. Additionally, attrac-
tion pathway is highlighted due to its role in explaining the project input.
The next section details the results of the analysis of ECSM by present-
ing the causal mechanism and further justifications for including and
excluding the pathways.
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Index1
A B
ACPD. See United States Advisory benefit of the doubt, 56–8, 60, 64,
Commission on Public Diplomacy 66, 85, 86, 95, 96, 98, 99, 101,
(ACPD) 120, 129, 132, 133, 153, 154,
agenda-setting, 28, 56, 61–3, 66, 85, 164, 165, 168, 169, 187, 188,
97, 99, 101, 120, 131–3, 153, 198–200, 210–14
154, 166–9, 184, 187–9, Brand Sweden, 113, 115
198–200, 215 British Council, 7, 27, 34, 41n7,
AKP. See Justice and Development 56, 59, 60
Part (AKP) broadcasting, 1, 4, 6, 30, 31, 35, 38,
Albania, 110, 122–7, 129–31, 188, 61, 78–81, 145, 167, 204
192, 212 Broadcasting Board of Governors
Anadolu Ajansı / Anatolian (Anadolu) (BBG), 78, 79, 81
Agency (AA), 145
areas of impact, 14, 51–6, 63, 179,
182, 192 C
arts diplomacy, 8, 30 Canada, 35, 122, 123
attraction, 27, 56–8, 64, 66, 85, 86, Central Asia, 7, 15, 41n7, 65,
95, 96, 99, 101, 120, 128, 132, 143–5, 147–53, 157, 162–5,
153, 154, 163, 164, 168, 169, 167, 172n18, 179, 182,
184, 187, 188, 198, 199, 185, 200
210–13, 215 China, 7, 34
Note: Page numbers followed by “n” denote notes.

1

246 INDEX
climate change, 10, 14, 15, 16n5, 65, 83–91, 93–100, 184, 186, 188,
110, 116–20, 123–6, 131, 181, 189, 194n5, 198, 199, 205, 210,
186, 189, 199 211, 214, 215
Cold War, 7, 27, 30, 33, 53, 57, 78, Erasmus, 1, 55, 68n2
80, 81, 84, 96, 98, 111, 148, Erdoğan, Recep Tayyip, 160
167, 201 Eskişehir, 144, 156, 159–63, 166, 213
collaboration, 9, 22, 32, 33, 55, 64, European and Eurasian Affairs (EUR),
85, 109–37, 158, 161, 163, 188, 64, 67, 76, 84, 86, 90, 188, 210,
203, 214 214, 215
collaborative diplomacy, 32, 37
conjunction points, 183–9, 192,
194n3, 200 F
constructivism, 52, 55 Facing the Climate, 7, 14, 15, 16n5,
Council for the Promotion of Sweden 65, 67, 101, 110, 115, 117–34,
(NSU), 65, 113–15, 121 181, 185, 186, 188, 189, 192,
Cull, Nicholas, 4–6, 8, 10, 20, 29, 199
33–5, 61, 77–80, 204 foreign policy goals, 2, 5, 6, 8–10,
cultural diplomacy, 6–8, 30, 58, 64, 12–14, 16n4, 37–40, 51, 52,
83, 147 54, 58, 60, 62, 64–6, 68, 75,
79, 83, 85, 95, 97, 99–101,
111, 115, 120, 132, 134, 159,
D 179–83, 187, 188, 190, 192,
Davutoğlu, Ahmet, 144, 147, 149, 193, 198, 204
153, 165 framing, 22, 28, 56, 61–4, 66, 85, 86,
development, 3, 12, 20, 32, 35, 53, 98, 99, 120, 132, 154, 167–70,
59, 64, 82, 87, 88, 92, 93, 98, 187–9, 198, 200, 211–13, 215
112–19, 124, 125, 127–9, Fulbright, 37, 87, 205
135n10, 145, 146, 150, 151,
157, 163, 165, 190, 192
dialogue, 12, 22, 23, 31–3, 35, 85, H
89, 90, 133 hyphenated diplomacy, 6–8
digital diplomacy, 32, 114
direct influence, 59, 60, 64, 66, 85,
86, 97, 99, 120, 130–2, 153, I
154, 166, 168, 187, 188, 211–14 International Information Programs
(IIP), 64, 67, 76, 81, 84, 86, 89,
101, 102n4
E International Organization of Turkic
Educational and Cultural Affairs Culture (TÜRKSOY), 7, 15, 65,
(ECA), 67, 76, 81, 84, 86–92, 67, 144, 148, 150–70, 171n5,
95, 97, 101, 206, 214 171n7, 172n8–13, 172n18–22,
Education, Culture, Sports, and Media 184, 186, 188, 189, 192, 200,
(ECSM), 14, 64, 68, 76, 77, 205, 213
INDEX 247
J P
Justice and Development Part (AKP), pathways of connection, 9, 11–15, 40,
144, 146–9, 171n1 41, 51–69, 85, 134, 179–94, 202
power, 27–9, 35, 36, 52, 53, 55,
91, 95, 117, 143, 144, 148,
K 149, 185
KDK. See Office of Public Diplomacy process map, 183
(KDK) process-tracing, 16n4, 38, 39, 42n15,
94, 194n6, 203, 209
public debates, 14, 40, 52, 55, 61–4,
L 68, 85, 86, 94, 99–101, 120,
liberalism, 52, 54 131–4, 153, 154, 166–70, 181,
logic of practice, 15, 40, 42n17, 68, 69n5, 182, 187, 188, 190, 192,
94, 127, 133, 159, 168, 198, 203 198–200, 202, 215
public diplomacy,, 1, 19–42, 51,
75–102, 109–37, 143, 179,
M 197, 210
marketing, 19, 20, 23–5, 36, 59, 113 public diplomacy 2.0, 32–4
Medvedev, Dmitry, 64, 76, 84 public opinion, 23, 25, 30, 38, 40,
multi-disciplinary approaches, 36 52–4, 56–8, 64, 66, 68, 77, 78,
85, 86, 94–6, 99–101, 111, 112,
120, 128, 129, 132–4, 147, 153,
N 154, 163, 164, 168, 170, 181,
nation branding, 6, 24, 25, 35, 109, 182, 187–90, 192, 198–200,
112, 113, 135n5 202, 204, 210–13
networks, 24, 27, 32, 33, 37, 55, 59, public relations (PR), 13, 19–21,
79, 83 23–5, 29
new public diplomacy, 20, 29–37, 82,
143, 192, 197, 198, 203
Norway, 35, 68n2 Q
NSU. See Council for the Promotion Quadrennial Diplomacy and
of Sweden (NSU) Development Review
Nye, Joseph, 27–9, 54, 56–8, 95, 128, (QDDR), 211
184, 201
R
O realism, 52
Obama, Barack, 7, 58, 64, 82, 84, relational, 9, 11, 12, 14, 15, 20, 29,
92, 97 31–4, 37, 40, 53, 59, 64, 65, 68,
Office of Public Diplomacy (KDK), 76, 81–3, 85, 94, 96, 98–101,
35, 42n12, 67, 145, 147, 109, 119, 128, 133–5, 143, 153,
163, 213 163, 164, 168–70, 181, 184–7,
Özal, Turgut, 147–9 198–200, 204
248 INDEX
relationship dynamics, 14, 40, 52, 55, T

56, 59, 60, 64, 68, 85, 86, 94, Track Two diplomacy, 3
96, 99–101, 120, 132, 134, 153, Turkey, 7, 12, 13, 15, 19, 35, 41n7,
166, 170, 181, 182, 186–8, 190, 42n12, 60, 65, 67, 68n2, 143–72,
192, 198–200, 202, 214 179, 181, 184, 186, 187, 191,
Reset policy, 14, 76, 84, 90, 94, 98, 192, 198, 200, 204, 213
100, 101n1, 189, 193 Turkish Cooperation and
Development Agency (TIKA), ̇
146, 148, 151, 152
S Turkish Radio and Television (TRT),
Shared values initiative, 31 145, 151, 167
socialization, 60, 64, 66, 86, 99, 101, Turks Abroad and Related
129, 132, 133, 154, 168, 169, Communities (YTB), 147, 151
184, 186–9, 198–200, 211–13 TÜRKSOY. See International
soft power, 7, 14, 15, 27, 28, 56, 57, Organization of Turkic Culture
85, 95, 99–101, 128, 133, 134, (TÜRKSOY)
150, 153, 163–5, 169, 170, 181,
182, 184–6, 190–2, 199–202,
206n1, 210, 211, 213 U
South Korea, 57 United States (US), 1, 4, 12–14, 19,
sports diplomacy, 7, 8, 30, 64, 76, 29–31, 35, 37, 53, 54, 57–62,
90–2, 94, 95 64, 67, 75–102, 111, 122, 124,
SportsUnited, 7, 90–4, 191 136n21, 144, 149, 179, 184,
structured focused comparison, 182, 200 185, 187–9, 198, 199, 203–5,
student exchange, 4, 41n7, 64, 76, 210–12, 214
112, 193 United States Advisory Commission
Sweden, 12–14, 16n5, 19, 21, 35, on Public Diplomacy (ACPD),
41n7, 61, 65, 67, 109–37, 170, 54, 67, 81
179, 184–6, 198, 199, 204, 212 United States Information Agency
Swedish Institute, 14, 15, 35, 42n9, (USIA), 29–31, 78–82, 90, 159,
42n10, 65, 67, 69n4, 110–12, 204, 205
114, 135n1, 135n8, 135n9, United States Information Service
135n11, 136n13, 136n14, (USIS), 78–80
136n16, 136n17, 136n19, Uzbekistan, 65, 152, 158, 171, 181, 205
136n20, 136n25, 136n28
Swedish Institute for Cultural
Exchange with Foreign Countries, V
111, 112 Voice of America (VoA), 1, 4,
Swedish International Development 5, 77–80
Cooperation Agency (Sida), 112,
115, 117, 119, 125
Swedish model, 14, 15, 110, 114, Z
115, 117–20, 124, 127, 128, Zaharna, R.S., 20, 30–2, 55, 59, 82,
132–4, 181, 184, 199, 212 83, 128, 185

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PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND THE

IMPLEMENTATION OF FOREIGN POLICY

Palgrave Macmillan Series in

More information about this series at

Public Diplomacy and

Palgrave Macmillan Series in Global Public Diplomacy

Library of Congress Control Number: 2017930632

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2017

Cover illustration: © Benoit Daoust / Alamy Stock Photo

Printed on acid-free paper

This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by Springer Nature

1 The Need for Communication1

2 Public Diplomacy: The New Foreign Policy “Tool”19

3 Six Pathways of Connection: A Theoretical Framework51

3.3 Relationship Dynamics: Direct Influence and Socialization59

4 The Pioneer of Public Diplomacy:

5 Collaboration and Public Diplomacy: Sweden109

6 History and Culture: Turkey143

7 Six Pathways of Connection: A Practical Roadmap179

8 Conclusion: Connecting Foreign Policy

Appendix: Testing Procedure209

AA Anadolu Ajansı. Anatolian (Anadolu) Agency

KDK  Kamu Diplomasisi Koordinatörlüğü. Office of Public

USIA United States Information Agency

Fig. 1.1 Public diplomacy and foreign policy 8

Table 3.1 Summary of the pathways 64

The Need for Communication

Why do countries establish embassies in foreign lands? I start my public diplo-

© The Author(s) 2017 1

the umbrella of public diplomacy. Subsequently, I introduce the leading

1.1 Why Diplomacy?

1.2 Communicating Beyond Diplomacy

dissemination and to actually engage with audiences. Moreover, they need

1.3 New Topics for Public Diplomacy

et al. 2011)—or deepen it by further delineating existing themes—such

1.4 Public Diplomacy Works, But How?

Fig. 1.1 Public diplomacy and foreign policy

manifest their impacts on foreign policy. This research provides a more

foreign policy statements of the countries, budget documents of the

(Gilboa 2008, 291). However, the assessment of foreign policy outcomes

works on communication, public diplomacy and foreign policy. Based on

and measure the impact of public diplomacy. Six pathways of connection

1.5 Outline of the Book

Chapter 3 introduces six pathways of connection as an analytical frame-

based on the Swedish model. Facing the Climate is a multi-year travelling

Murray, Stuart. 2012. The Two Halves of Sports-Diplomacy. Diplomacy &

Public Diplomacy: The New Foreign

© The Author(s) 2017 19

the impacts of this practice on foreign policy. The chapter is devoted to

2.1 Defining Public Diplomacy

of global actors (e.g. states, international organization) promote their

mediated and non-mediated communication. In the former case, the focus

In addition to the multitude of studies on the impacts of media

non-governmental organizations that entail media relations, promotional

public diplomacy by demonstrating the compatibility of corporate objec-

decentralized and the authority to conduct relations across borders is

In his subsequent writings, Nye further develops the concept of soft

2.2 A “New” Public Diplomacy?

2.2.1 From the Early Days of USIA to 9/11

1 The Need for Communication1

2 Public Diplomacy: The New Foreign Policy “Tool”19

3 Six Pathways of Connection: A Theoretical Framework51

3.3 Relationship Dynamics: Direct Influence and Socialization59

5 Collaboration and Public Diplomacy: Sweden109

6 History and Culture: Turkey143

7 Six Pathways of Connection: A Practical Roadmap179

Appendix: Testing Procedure209

KDK Kamu Diplomasisi Koordinatörlüğü. Office of Public

Fig. 1.1 Public diplomacy and foreign policy 8

Table 3.1 Summary of the pathways 64

A representative project, the US–Russia Bilateral Presidential Com-