Republic vs. Manalo (2018)
Republic vs. Manalo (2018)
Republic vs. Manalo (2018)
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impose its beliefs and convictions on the State and the rest of
the citizenry nor can it demand that the nation follow its beliefs,
even if it sincerely believes that they are good for the country.
While marriage is considered a sacrament, it has civil and legal
consequences which are governed by the Family Code. It is in this
aspect, bereft of any ecclesiastical overtone, that the State has a
legitimate right and interest to regulate. The declared State
policy that marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the
foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State,
should not be read in total isolation but must be harmonized with
other constitutional provisions. Aside from strengthening the
solidarity of the Filipino family, the State is equally mandated to
actively promote its total development. It is also obligated to
defend, among others, the right of children to special protection
from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other
conditions prejudicial to their development. To Our mind, the
State cannot effectively enforce these obligations if We limit the
application of paragraph 2 of Article 26 only to those foreign
divorce initiated by the alien spouse. It is not amiss to point that
the women and children are almost always the helpless victims of
all forms of domestic abuse and violence. In fact, among the
notable legislation passed in order to minimize, if not eradicate,
the menace are R.A. No. 6955 (prohibiting mail order bride and
similar practices), R.A. No. 9262 (“Anti-Violence Against Women
and Their Children Act of 2004”), R.A. No. 9710 (“The Magna
Carta of Women”), R.A. No. 10354 (“The Responsible Parenthood
and Reproductive Health Act of 2012”), and R.A. No. 9208 (“Anti-
Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003”), as amended by R.A. No.
10364 (“Expanded Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2012”).
Moreover, in protecting and strengthening the Filipino family as a
basic autonomous social institution, the Court must not lose sight
of the constitutional mandate to value the dignity of every human
person, guarantee full respect for human rights, and ensure the
fundamental equality before the law of women and men.
Civil Law; Family Law; Persons and Family Relations;
Marriages; Divorce; Before a foreign divorce decree can be
recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the
divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law
allowing it.—Indeed, where the interpretation of a statute
according to its exact and literal import would lead to mischievous
results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it
should be construed according to its spirit and reason,
disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law. A statute
may, therefore, be extended to cases not within the literal
meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its spirit or
intent. The foregoing notwithstanding, We cannot yet write finis
to this controversy by granting Manalo’s petition to recognize and
enforce the divorce decree rendered by the Japanese court and to
cancel the entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan,
Metro Manila. Jurisprudence has set guide-
587
LEONEN, J., Concurring Opinion:
588
588 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Manalo
Caguioa, J., Dissenting Opinion:
589
590
591
592
593
may pray for the severance of her marital ties before the RTC
in accordance with the mechanisms now existing under the
Family Code.
Same; Same; Same; Same; View that the Family Code
characterizes marriage as a special contract of permanent union,
and regards the family as “an inviolable social institution whose
nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law” and
generally, not subject to stipulation.—The Constitution mandates
the protection of the family as a basic autonomous social
institution. In this connection, the Family Code characterizes
marriage as a special contract of permanent union, and regards
the family as “an inviolable social institution whose nature,
consequences, and incidents are governed by law” and generally,
not subject to stipulation. Upon these fundamental principles
rests the prohibition against absolute divorce, which had
remained effective and unchanged since the enactment of the
Civil Code in 1950. Adherence to this prohibition is met with
much reservation, as it purportedly forces Filipinos to play second
fiddle to their foreign spouses, and places said Filipinos at a
disadvantage. Moreover, it had been argued in the deliberations
of the Court that such adherence sanctions various forms of abuse
that plague mixed marriages, and deprives Filipinos in such
marriages of a way out. I find that these observations, pressing as
they are, already delve into the wisdom of statutes governing
marriage and personal status with which the Court cannot
interfere.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Divorce; View that the Supreme
Court (SC) is bound to respect the prohibition, until the legislature
deems it fit to lift the same through the passage of a statute
permitting absolute divorce.—To note, Article 26(2) of the Family
Code has remained unchanged since the issuance of EO 227. The
blanket recognition of absolute divorce overturns the Court’s
unequivocal interpretation of the provision as laid down in the
cases of Pilapil, Iyoy, Orbecido, Dacasin, Bayot, Fujiki and
Medina, which span a period of nearly three decades. Ascribing a
contradictory interpretation to the provision, under the guise of
equal protection, essentially rewrites Article 26(2) and gives it a
meaning completely different from the framers’ intention. While I
am not oblivious to the difficulty that results from the prohibition
on absolute divorce and commiserate totally with the respondent
in this regard, I find that the prohibition remains, and thus, must
be faithfully applied. To my mind, a contrary ruling will subvert
not only the intention of the framers of the law, but also that of
the Filipino people, as expressed in the Constitution. The Court
is bound to respect the prohibition, until the legislature
deems it fit to lift the same through the passage of a
statute permitting absolute divorce.
594
RESOLUTION
PERALTA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court (Rules) seeks to reverse and set aside
the September 18, 2014 Decision1 and October 12, 2015
Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in C.A.-G.R. CV
No. 100076. The dispositive portion of the Decision states:
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595
case for initial hearing on April 25, 2012. The petition and the
notice of initial hearing were published once a week for three
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation. During
the initial hearing, counsel for Manalo marked the documentary
evidence (consisting of the trial court’s Order dated January 25,
2012, affidavit of publication, and issues of the Northern Journal
dated February 21-27, 2012, February 28-March 5, 2012, and
March 6-12, 2012) for purposes of compliance with the
jurisdictional requirements.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its
appearance for petitioner Republic of the Philippines
authorizing the Office of the City Prosecutor of Dagupan to
appear on its behalf. Likewise, a Manifestation and Motion
was filed questioning the title and/or caption of the petition
considering that, based on the allegations therein, the
proper action should be a petition for recognition and
enforcement of a foreign judgment.
As a result, Manalo moved to admit an Amended
Petition, which the court granted. The Amended Petition,
which captioned that it is also a petition for recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgment, alleged:
x x x
2. That petitioner is previously married in the Philippines
to a Japanese national named YOSHINO MINORO as
shown by their Marriage Contract x x x;
3. That recently, a case for divorce was filed by herein
[petitioner] in Japan and after due proceedings, a divorce
decree dated December 6, 2011 was rendered by the
Japanese Court x x x;
4. That at present, by virtue of the said divorce decree,
petitioner and her divorced Japanese husband are no longer
living together and in fact, petitioner and her daughter are
living separately from said Japanese former husband;
5. That there is an imperative need to have the entry of
marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila
cancelled, where the petitioner and the former Japanese
husband’s marriage was previously registered, in order that
it would not appear anymore that petitioner is still married
to the said Japanese national who is no longer her husband
or is no longer married to her; furthermore, in the event
that petitioner decides to be remarried, she shall not be
bothered and disturbed by said entry of marriage;
596
The OSG did not present any controverting evidence to
rebut the allegations of Manalo.
On October 15, 2012, the trial court denied the petition
for lack of merit. In ruling that the divorce obtained by
Manalo in Japan should not be recognized, it opined that,
based on Article 15 of the New Civil Code, the Philippine
law “does not afford Filipinos the right to file for a divorce,
whether they are in the country or living abroad, if they are
married to Filipinos or to foreigners, or if they celebrated
their marriage in the Philippines or in another country”
and that unless Filipinos “are naturalized as citizens of
another country, Philippine laws shall have control over
issues related to Filipinos’ family rights and
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597
duties, together with the determination of their condition and
legal capacity to enter into contracts and civil relations, including
marriages.”6
On appeal, the CA overturned the RTC’s decision. It
held that Article 26 of the Family Code of the Philippines
(Family Code) is applicable even if it was Manalo who filed
for divorce against her Japanese husband because the
decree they obtained makes the latter no longer married to
the former, capacitating him to remarry. Conformably
with Navarro, et al. v. Exec. Secretary Ermita, et al.7 ruling
that the meaning of the law should be based on the intent
of the lawmakers and in view of the legislative intent
behind Article 26, it would be the height of injustice to
consider Manalo as still married to the Japanese national,
who, in turn, is no longer married to her. For the appellate
court, the fact that it was Manalo who filed the divorce case
is inconsequential. Cited as similar to this case was Van
Dorn v. Judge Romillo, Jr.8 where the marriage between a
foreigner and a Filipino was dissolved through a divorce
filed abroad by the latter.
The OSG filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied;
hence, this petition.
We deny the petition and partially affirm the CA’s
decision.
Divorce, the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a
cause arising after marriage, are of two types: (1) absolute
divorce or a vinculo matrimonii, which terminates the
marriage, and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro, which
suspends it and leaves the bond in full force.9 In this
jurisdiction, the following rules exist:
598
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon C. Aquino
signed into law Executive Order (EO) No. 209, otherwise
known as The Family Code
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of the Philippines, which took effect on August 3, 1988.16
Shortly thereafter, E.O. No. 227 was issued on July 17,
1987.17 Aside from amending Articles 36 and 39 of the
Family Code, a second paragraph was added to Article 26.18
This provision was originally deleted by the Civil Code
Revision Committee (Committee), but it was presented and
approved at a Cabinet meeting after Pres. Aquino signed
E.O. No. 209.19 As modified, Article 26 now states:
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16 Republic v. Orbecido III, 509 Phil. 108, 112; 472 SCRA 114, 119
(2005), as cited in San Luis v. San Luis, 543 Phil. 275, 291; 514 SCRA
294, 310 (2007).
17 Id., at pp. 112-113; p. 119, as cited in San Luis v. San Luis, id.
18 Id., at p. 113; p. 119, id.
19 Sempio Diy, Alicia V., Handbook on the Family Code of the
Philippines, pp. 26-27, 1988.
20 Medina v. Koike, supra note 10; and Fujiki v. Marinay, 712 Phil.
524, 555; 700 SCRA 69, 101 (2013).
21 Fujiki v. Marinay, id.
22 Id.
600
custody, care and support of the children or property relations of
the spouses, must still be determined by our courts.23
According to Judge Alicia Sempio Diy, a member of
the Committee, the idea of the amendment is to avoid the
absurd situation of a Filipino as still being married to his
or her alien spouse, although the latter is no longer
married to the former because he or she had obtained a
divorce abroad that is recognized by his or her national
law.24 The aim was that it would solve the problem of many
Filipino women who, under the New Civil Code, are still
considered married to their alien husbands even after the
latter have already validly divorced them under their (the
husbands’) national laws and perhaps have already
married again.25
In 2005, this Court concluded that paragraph 2 of
Article 26 applies to a case where, at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, the parties were Filipino
citizens, but later on, one of them acquired foreign
citizenship by naturalization, initiated a divorce
proceeding, and obtained a favorable decree. We held
in Republic of the Phils. v. Orbecido III:26
The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case
of Quita v. Court of Appeals. In Quita, the parties were, as
in this case, Filipino citizens when they got married. The
wife became a naturalized American citizen in 1954 and
obtained a divorce in the same year. The Court therein
hinted, by way of obiter dictum, that a Filipino divorced by
his naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married under
Philippine law and can thus remarry.
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and
applying the rule of reason, we hold that paragraph 2 of
Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving
parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage
were Filipino citizens,
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23 See Vda. de Catalan v. Catalan-Lee, 681 Phil. 493, 498; 665 SCRA
487, 493 (2012); Roehr v. Rodriguez, 452 Phil. 608, 617-618; 404 SCRA
495, 502 (2003); and Llorente v. Court of Appeals, supra note 13.
24 Sempio Diy, Alicia V., Handbook on the Family Code of the
Philippines, p. 27, 1988. See also Republic v. Orbecido III, supra note 16 at
p. 114; pp. 120-121, as cited in Fujiki v. Marinay, supra note 20; and San
Luis v. San Luis, supra note 16 at p. 292; p. 311.
25 Sempio Diy, Alicia V., Handbook on the Family Code of the
Philippines, p. 27, 1988.
26 Republic v. Orbecido III, supra note 16.
601
Now, the Court is tasked to resolve whether, under the
same provision, a Filipino citizen has the capacity to
remarry under Philippine law after initiating a divorce
proceeding abroad and obtaining a favorable judgment
against his or her alien spouse who is capacitated to
remarry. Specifically, Manalo pleads for the recognition
and enforcement of the divorce decree rendered by the
Japanese court and for the cancellation of the entry of
marriage in the local civil registry “in order that it would
not appear anymore that [she] is still married to the said
Japanese national who is no longer her husband or is no
longer married to her; [and], in the event that [she] decides
to be remarried, she shall not be bothered and disturbed by
said entry of marriage,” and to return and to use her
maiden surname.
We rule in the affirmative.
Both Dacasin v. Dacasin28 and Van Dorn29 already
recognized a foreign divorce decree that was initiated and
obtained by the Filipino
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602
spouse and extended its legal effects on the issues of child
custody and property relation, respectively.
In Dacasin, post-divorce, the former spouses executed an
Agreement for the joint custody of their minor daughter. Later on,
the husband, who is a US citizen, sued his Filipino wife to enforce
the Agreement, alleging that it was only, the latter who exercised
sole custody of their child. The trial court dismissed the action for
lack of jurisdiction, on the ground, among others, that the divorce
decree is binding following the “nationality rule” prevailing in this
jurisdiction. The husband moved to reconsider, arguing that the
divorce decree obtained by his former wife is void, but it was
denied. In ruling that the trial court has jurisdiction to entertain
the suit but not to enforce the Agreement, which is void, this
Court said:
Van Dorn was decided before the Family Code took into
effect. There, a complaint was filed by the ex-husband, who
is a US citizen, against his Filipino wife to render an
accounting of a business that was alleged to be a conjugal
property and to be declared with right to manage the same.
Van Dorn moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the
cause of action was barred by previous judgment in the
divorce proceedings that she initiated, but the trial court
denied the motion. On his part, her ex-husband averred
that the divorce decree issued by the Nevada court could
not prevail over the pro-
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hibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared national
policy; that the acts and declaration of a foreign court
cannot, especially if the same is contrary to public policy,
divest Philippine courts of jurisdiction to entertain matters
within its jurisdiction. In dismissing the case filed by the
alien spouse, the Court discussed the effect of the foreign
divorce on the parties and their conjugal property in the
Philippines. Thus:
604
604 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Manalo
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31 Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr., supra note 8 at pp. 361-363; pp. 143-144.
(Citations omitted)
32 Fujiki v. Marinay, supra note 20.
33 Medina v. Koike, supra note 10.
605
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34 Fujiki v. Marinay, supra note 20 at pp. 549-550; pp. 95-96.
(Citations omitted)
35 642 Phil. 420; 628 SCRA 266 (2010).
36 Garcia v. Recio, supra note 9.
606
initiated and obtained by the Filipino spouse and extended its
legal effects on the issues of child custody and property relation, it
should not stop short in likewise acknowledging that one of the
usual and necessary consequences of absolute divorce is the right
to remarry. Indeed, there is no longer a mutual obligation to live
together and observe fidelity. When the marriage tie is severed
and ceased to exist, the civil status and the domestic relation of
the former spouses change as both of them are freed from the
marital bond.
The dissent is of the view that, under the nationality
principle, Manalo’s personal status is subject to Philippine
law, which prohibits absolute divorce. Hence, the divorce
decree which she obtained under Japanese law cannot be
given effect, as she is, without dispute, a national not of
Japan, but of the Philippines. It is said that a contrary
ruling will subvert not only the intention of the framers of
the law, but also that of the Filipino people, as expressed in
the Constitution. The Court is, therefore, bound to respect
the prohibition until the legislature deems it fit to lift the
same.
We beg to differ.
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 speaks of “a divorce x x x
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
him or her to remarry.” Based on a clear and plain reading
of the provision, it only requires that there be a divorce
validly obtained abroad. The letter of the law does not
demand that the alien spouse should be the one who
initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce decree was
granted. It does not distinguish whether the Filipino
spouse is the petitioner or the respondent in the foreign
divorce proceeding. The Court is bound by the words of the
statute; neither can We put words in the mouths of the
lawmakers.37 “The legislature is presumed to know the
meaning of the words, to have used words advisedly, and to
have expressed its intent by the use of such words as are
found in the statute. Verba legis non est recedendum, or
from the words of a statute there should be no departure.”38
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Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the word
“obtained” should be interpreted to mean that the divorce
proceeding must be actually initiated by the alien spouse,
still, the Court will not follow the letter of the statute when
to do so would depart from the true intent of the legislature
or would otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with the
general purpose of the act.39 Laws have ends to achieve,
and statutes should be so construed as not to defeat but to
carry out such ends and purposes.40 As held in League of
Cities of the Phils., et al. v. COMELEC, et al.:41
To reiterate, the purpose of paragraph 2 of Article 26 is
to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse
remains married to the alien spouse who, after a foreign
divorce decree that is effective in the country where it was
rendered, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. The
provision is a corrective measure to address an anomaly
where the Filipino spouse is tied to the marriage while the
foreign spouse is free to marry under the laws of his or her
country.42 Whether the Filipino spouse initiated the foreign
divorce proceeding
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and Pioneer Texturizing Corp. v. NLRC, 345 Phil. 1057, 1073; 280 SCRA
806, 822-823 (1997). See also National Food Authority (NFA) v. Masada
Security Agency, Inc., 493 Phil. 241, 251; 453 SCRA 70, 79 (2005); Rural
Bank of San Miguel, Inc. v. Monetary Board, Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas,
545 Phil. 62, 72; 516 SCRA 154, 164 (2007); Republic v. Lacap, 546 Phil.
87, 100; 517 SCRA 255, 268 (2007); and Philippine Amusement and
Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) v. Philippine Gaming Jurisdiction,
Incorporated (PEJI), 604 Phil. 547, 553; 586 SCRA 658, 664-665 (2009).
39 Mariano, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, 312 Phil. 259, 268; 242
SCRA 211, 219 (1995).
40 Id.
41 623 Phil. 531, 564-565; 608 SCRA 636, 663-664 (2009).
42 Fujiki v. Marinay, supra note 20.
608
or not, a favorable decree dissolving the marriage bond and capacitating
his or her alien spouse to remarry will have the same result: the Filipino
spouse will effectively be without a husband or wife. A Filipino who
initiated a foreign divorce proceeding is in the same place and in “like
circumstance as a Filipino who is at the receiving end of an alien
initiated proceeding. Therefore, the subject provision should not make a
distinction. In both instance, it is extended as a means to recognize the
residual effect of the foreign divorce decree on Filipinos whose marital
ties to their alien spouses are severed by operation of the latter’s national
law.
Conveniently invoking the nationality principle is
erroneous. Such principle, found under Article 15 of the
Civil Code, is not an absolute and unbending rule. In fact,
the mere existence of paragraph 2 of Article 26 is a
testament that the State may provide for an exception
thereto. Moreover, blind adherence to the nationality
principle must be disallowed if it would cause unjust
discrimination and oppression to certain classes of
individuals whose rights are equally protected by law. The
courts have the duty to enforce the laws of divorce as
written by the Legislature only if they are constitutional.43
While the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in
providing for a valid classification and that its decision is
accorded recognition and respect by the courts of justice,
such classification may be subjected to judicial
review.44 The deference stops where the classification
violates a fundamental right, or prejudices persons
accorded special protection by the Constitution.45 When
these violations arise, this Court must
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609
discharge its primary role as the vanguard of constitutional
guaranties, and require a stricter and more exacting
adherence to constitutional limitations.46 If a legislative
classification impermissibly interferes with the exercise of
a fundamental right or operates to the peculiar
disadvantage of a suspect class strict judicial scrutiny is
required since it is presumed unconstitutional, and the
burden is upon the government to prove that the
classification is necessary to achieve a compelling state
interest and that it is the least restrictive means to protect
such interest.47
“Fundamental rights” whose infringement leads to strict
scrutiny under the equal protection clause are those basic
liberties explicitly or implicitly guaranteed in the
Constitution.48 It includes the right of procreation,
the right to marry, the right to exercise free speech,
political expression, press, assembly, and so forth, the right
to travel, and the right to vote.49 On the other hand, what
constitutes compelling state interest is measured by the
scale of rights and powers arrayed in the Constitution and
calibrated by history.50 It is akin to the
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Castro, J., Concurring Opinion, Garcia v. Drilon, 712 Phil. 44, 125; 699
SCRA 352, 449 (2013).
46 Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. v. Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas, id.
47 Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc., supra note 45 at p. 282;
p. 278; and Mosqueda v. Pilipino Banana Growers & Exporters
Association, Inc., G.R. Nos. 189185 & 189305, August 16, 2016, 800 SCRA
313, 360. See also Brion, J., Separate Opinion, Biraogo v. Philippine Truth
Commission of 2010, supra note 45; Velasco, Jr., J., Concurring Opinion,
International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-Biotech Applications, Inc.
v. Greenpeace Southeast Asia (Philippines), 774 Phil. 508, 706; 776 SCRA
434, 653 (2015); and Jardeleza, J., Concurring Opinion, Poe-Llamanzares
v. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos. 221697 & 221698-700, March 8,
2016, 786 SCRA 1, 904.
48 Brion, J., Separate Opinion, Biraogo v. Philippine Truth
Commission of 2010, id., at p. 553; p. 359.
49 See Carpio-Morales, J., Dissenting Opinion, Central Bank
Employees Association, Inc. v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, supra note 45
at pp. 697-698; pp. 496-498, as cited by Brion, J., Separate Opinion,
Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission of 2010, id., at p. 553; p. 360; and
Leonen, J., Separate Opinion, Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan
(SPARK) v. Quezon City, G.R. No. 225442, August 8, 2017, 835 SCRA 350.
50 Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc., supra note 45 at p. 298;
p. 296.
610
paramount interest of the state for which some individual
liberties must give way, such as the promotion of public
interest, public safety or the general welfare.51 It
essentially involves a public right or interest that, because
of its primacy, overrides individual rights, and allows the
former to take precedence over the latter.52
Although the Family Code was not enacted by the
Congress, the same principle applies with respect to the
acts of the President, which have the force and effect of law
unless declared otherwise by the court. In this case, We
find that paragraph 2 of Article 26 violates one of the
essential requisites53 of the equal protection
54
clause. Particularly, the limitation of the provision only to
a foreign divorce decree initiated by the alien spouse is
unreasonable as it is based on superficial, arbitrary, and
whimsical classification.
A Filipino who is married to another Filipino is not similarly
situated with a Filipino who is married to a foreign citizen. There
are real, material and substantial differences between
them. Ergo, they
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51 Id.
52 Brion, J., Separate Concurring Opinion, Imbong v. Ochoa, Jr., 732
Phil. 1, 326-327; 721 SCRA 146, 533 (2014).
53 To be valid, the classification must conform to the following
requirements:
1) It must rest on substantial distinctions.
2) It must be germane to the purpose of the law.
3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only.
4) It must apply equally to all members of the same class. (See
Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation [PAGCOR] v. Bureau of
Internal Revenue, 660 Phil. 636, 648; 645 SCRA 338, 349 [2011]; Garcia v.
Executive Secretary, 692 Phil. 114, 141-142; 677 SCRA 750, 778 [2012];
Corpuz v. People, 734 Phil. 353, 405; 724 SCRA 1, 109 [2014]; Ferrer, Jr. v.
Bautista, 762 Phil. 233, 277; 760 SCRA 652, 709-710 [2015]; Drugstores
Association of the Philippines, Inc. v. National Council on Disability
Affairs, G.R. No. 194561, September 14, 2016, 803 SCRA 25, 55; Ocampo
v. Enriquez, G.R. Nos. 225973, 225984, 226097, 226116, 226117, 226120 &
226294, November 8, 2016, 807 SCRA 223; and Mindanao Shopping
Destination Corporation v. Duterte, G.R. No. 211093, June 6, 2017, 826
SCRA 143).
54 Section 1, Article III of the Constitution states:
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of the laws.
611
should not be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and
liabilities imposed. Without a doubt, there are political,
economic, cultural, and religious dissimilarities as well as
varying legal systems and procedures, all too unfamiliar,
that a Filipino national who is married to an alien spouse
has to contend with. More importantly, while a divorce
decree obtained abroad by a Filipino against another
Filipino is null and void, a divorce decree obtained by an
alien against his or her Filipino spouse is recognized if
made in accordance with the national law of the
foreigner.55
On the contrary, there is no real and substantial
difference between a Filipino who initiated a foreign
divorce proceedings and a Filipino who obtained a divorce
decree upon the instance of his or her alien spouse. In the
eyes of the Philippine and foreign laws, both are considered
as Filipinos who have the same rights and obligations in an
alien land. The circumstances surrounding them are alike.
Were it not for paragraph 2 of Article 26, both are still
married to their foreigner spouses who are no longer their
wives/husbands. Hence, to make a distinction between
them based merely on the superficial difference of whether
they initiated the divorce proceedings or not is utterly
unfair. Indeed, the treatment gives undue favor to one and
unjustly discriminate against the other.
Further, the differentiation in paragraph 2 of Article 26
is arbitrary. There is inequality in treatment because a
foreign divorce decree that was initiated and obtained by a
Filipino citizen against his or her alien spouse would not be
recognized even if based on grounds similar to Articles 35,
36, 37 and 38 of the Family Code.56
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612
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believing in good faith that the solemnizing officer had the legal authority
to do so;
(3) Those solemnized without a license, except those covered by the
preceding Chapter;
(4) Those bigamous or polygamous marriages not falling under Article
41;
(5) Those contracted through mistake of one contracting party as to
the identity of the other; and
(6) Those subsequent marriages that are void under Article 53.
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such
incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. (As amended by
E.O. 227)
Art. 37. Marriages between the following are incestuous and void
from the beginning, whether the relationship between the parties be
legitimate or illegitimate:
(1) Between ascendants and descendants of any degree; and
(2) Between brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half blood.
Art. 38. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning for
reasons of public policy:
(1) Between collateral blood relatives, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, up to the fourth civil degree;
(2) Between stepparents and stepchildren;
(3) Between parents-in-law and children-in-law;
(4) Between the adopting parent and the adopted child;
(5) Between the surviving spouse of the adopting parent and the
adopted child;
(6) Between the surviving spouse of the adopted child and the
adopter;
(7) Between an adopted child and a legitimate child of the adopter;
(8) Between the adopted children of the same adopter; and
(9) Between parties where one, with the intention to marry the other,
killed that other person’s spouse or his or her own spouse. (82)
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence
of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration
of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four
consecutive years and the spouse present has a well-founded belief that
the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there
is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of
Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be
sufficient.
613
_______________
614
614 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Manalo
crime or wrong,57 that a person intends the ordinary
consequences of his voluntary acts,58 that a person takes
ordinary care of his concerns,59 that acquiescence resulted from a
belief that the thing acquiesced in was conformable to the law and
fact,60 that a man and woman deporting themselves as husband
and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage,61 and
that the law has been obeyed.62 It is whimsical to easily attribute
any illegal, irregular or immoral conduct on the part of a Filipino
just because he or she opted to marry a foreigner instead of a
fellow Filipino. It is presumed that interracial unions are entered
into out of genuine love and affection, rather than prompted by
pure lust or profit. Third, We take judicial notice of the fact that
Filipinos are relatively more forbearing and conservative in
nature and that they are more often the victims or at the losing
end of mixed marriages. And fourth, it is not for Us to prejudge
the motive behind a Filipino’s decision to marry an alien national.
In one case, it was said:
The 1987 Constitution expresses that marriage, as an
inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family
and shall be pro-
_______________
615
tected by the State.64 Nevertheless, it was not meant to be
a general prohibition on divorce because Commissioner
Jose Luis Martin C. Gascon, in response to a question by
Father Joaquin G. Bernas during the deliberations of the
1986 Constitutional Commission, was categorical about
this point.65 Their exchange reveal as follows:
MR. RAMA.
Mr. Presiding Officer, may I ask that Commissioner Bernas be
recognized.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Colayco).
Commissioner Bernas is recognized.
FR. BERNAS.
Just one question, and I am not sure if it has been categorically
answered. I refer specifically to the proposal of Commissioner Gascon.
Is this to be understood as a prohibition of a general law on divorce?
His intention is to make this a prohibition so that the legislature
cannot pass a divorce law.
MR. GASCON.
Mr. Presiding Officer, that was not primarily my intention. My
intention was primarily to encourage the social institution of
marriage, but not necessarily discourage divorce. But now that he
mentioned the issue of divorce, my personal opinion is to discourage it,
Mr. Presiding Officer.
FR. BERNAS.
No. My question is more categorical. Does this carry the meaning of
prohibiting a divorce law?
MR. GASCON.
No. Mr. Presiding Officer.
_______________
616
FR. BERNAS.
Thank you.66
Notably, a law on absolute divorce is not new in our
country. Effective March 11, 1917, Philippine courts could
grant an absolute divorce on the grounds of adultery on the
part of the wife or concubinage on the part of the husband
by virtue of Act No. 2710 of the Philippine
Legislature.67 On March 25, 1943, pursuant to the
authority conferred upon him by the Commander-in-Chief
of the Imperial Japanese Forces in the Philippines and
with the approval of the latter, the Chairman of the
Philippine Executive Commission promulgated an E.O. No.
141 (“New Divorce Law”), which repealed Act No. 2710 and
provided eleven grounds for absolute divorce, such as
intentional or unjustified desertion continuously for at
least one year prior to the filing of the action, slander by
deed or gross insult by one spouse against the other to such
an extent as to make further living together impracticable,
and a spouse’s incurable insanity.68 When the Philippines
was liberated and the Commonwealth Government was
restored, it ceased to have force and effect and Act No. 2710
again prevailed.69 From August 30, 1950, upon the
effectivity of Republic Act No. 386 or the New Civil Code,
an absolute divorce obtained by Filipino citizens, whether
here or abroad, is no longer recognized.70
Through the years, there has been constant clamor from
various sectors of the Philippine society to reinstitute
absolute divorce. As a matter of fact, in the current
17th Congress, House Bill (H.B.) Nos.
_______________
617
116,71 1062,72 238073 and 602774 were filed in the House of
Representatives. In substitution of these bills, H.B. No.
7303 entitled “An Act Instituting Absolute Divorce and
Dissolution of Marriage in the Philippines” or the Absolute
Divorce Act of 2018 was submitted by the House Committee
on Population and Family Relations on February 28, 2018.
It was approved on March 19, 2018 on Third Reading —
with 134 in favor, 57 against, and 2 abstentions. Under the
bill, the grounds for a judicial decree of absolute divorce are
as follows:
1. The grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of
the Family Code, modified or amended, as follows:
a. Physical violence or grossly abusive conduct
directed against the petitioner, a common child, or a
child of the petitioner;
b. Physical violence or moral pressure to compel the
petitioner to change religious or political affiliation;
c. Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the
petitioner, a common child, or a child of the
petitioner, to engage in prostitution, or connivance in
such corruption or inducement;
d. Final judgment sentencing the respondent to
imprisonment of more than six (6) years, even if
pardoned;
_______________
71 Entitled “Instituting Absolute Divorce in the Philippines and for
Other Purposes,” with Representative Edcel C. Lagman as Principal
Author.
72 Entitled “An Act Amending Title I, Chapter 3, of Executive Order
No. 209, otherwise known as the Family Code of the Philippines,
Prescribing Additional Ground for Annulment,” with Representative
Robert Ace S. Barbers as Principal Author.
73 Entitled “An Act Introducing Divorce in the Philippines, Amending
for the Purpose Articles 26, 55 to 66 and Repealing Article 36 Under Title
II of Executive Order No. 209, as Amended, otherwise known as the Family
Code of the Philippines, and for other Purposes,” with Gabriela Women’s
Party Representatives Emmi A. De Jesus and Arlene D. Brosas as
principal authors.
74 Entitled “An Act Providing for Grounds for the Dissolution of a
Marriage,” with Representatives Teddy B. Baguilat, Jr., Rodel M.
Batocabe, Arlene D. Brosas, Ariel B. Casilao, France L. Castro, Nancy A.
Catamco, Pia S. Cayetano, Emmi A. De Jesus, Sarah Jane I. Elago,
Gwendolyn F. Garcia, Ana Cristina Siquian Go, Edcel C. Lagman,
Pantaleon D. Alvarez, Antonio L. Tinio, and Carlos Isagani T. Zarate as
Principal Authors.
618
e. Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism or
chronic gambling of the respondent;
f. Homosexuality of the respondent;
g. Contracting by the respondent of a
subsequent bigamous marriage, whether in the
Philippines or abroad;
h. Marital infidelity or perversion or having a
child with another person other than one’s
spouse during the marriage, except when upon
the mutual agreement of the spouses, a child is
born to them by in vitro or a similar procedure
or when the wife bears a child after being a
victim of rape;
i. Attempt by the respondent against the life of
the petitioner, a common child or a child of the
petitioner; and
j. Abandonment of petitioner by respondent
without justifiable cause for more than one (1)
year.
When the spouses are legally separated by judicial
decree for more than two (2) years, either or both
spouses can petition the proper court for an absolute
divorce based on said judicial decree of legal
separation.
1. Grounds for annulment of marriage under
Article 45 of the Family Code, restated as
follows:
a. The party in whose behalf it is sought to have
the marriage annulled was eighteen (18) years
of age or over but below twenty-one (21), and the
marriage was solemnized without the consent of
the parents, guardian or person having
substitute parental authority over the party, in
that order, unless after attaining the age of
twenty-one (21), such party freely cohabited
with the other and both lived together as
husband or wife;
b. Either party was of unsound mind, unless
such party after coming to reason, freely
cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
c. The consent of either party was obtained by
fraud, unless such party afterwards with full
knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud,
freely cohabited with the other as husband and
wife;
d. The consent of either party was obtained by
force, intimidation or undue influence, unless
the same having disappeared or ceased, such
party thereafter freely cohabited with the other
as husband and wife;
619
e. Either party was physically incapable of
consummating the marriage with the other and
such incapacity continues or appears to be
incurable; and
f. Either party was afflicted with a sexually
transmissible infection found to be serious or
appears to be incurable.
Provided, That the grounds mentioned in b, e and f
existed either at the time of the marriage or
supervening after the marriage.
1. When the spouses have been separated in fact
for at least five (5) years at the time the petition
for absolute divorce is filed, and reconciliation is
highly improbable;
2. Psychological incapacity of either spouse as
provided for in Article 36 of the Family Code,
whether or not the incapacity was present at the
time of the celebration of the marriage or later;
3. When one of the spouses undergoes a gender
reassignment surgery or transitions from one
sex to another, the other spouse is entitled to
petition for absolute divorce with the
transgender or transsexual as respondent, or
vice versa;
4. Irreconcilable marital differences and conflicts
which have resulted in the total breakdown of
the marriage beyond repair, despite earnest and
repeated efforts at reconciliation.
To be sure, a good number of the Filipinos led by the
Roman Catholic Church react adversely to any attempt to
enact a law on absolute divorce, viewing it as contrary to
our customs, morals, and traditions that has looked upon
marriage and family as an institution and their nature of
permanence, inviolability, and solidarity. However, none of
our laws should be based on any religious law, doctrine, or
teaching; otherwise, the separation of Church and State
will be violated.75
_______________
620
simple terms, would cause the State to adhere to a
particular religion and, thus, establish a state religion.76
_______________
621
over, in protecting and strengthening the Filipino family as
a basic autonomous social institution, the Court must not
lose sight of the constitutional mandate to value the dignity
of every human person, guarantee full respect for human
rights, and ensure the fundamental equality before the law
of women and men.81
A prohibitive view of paragraph 2 of Article 26 would do
more harm than good. If We disallow a Filipino citizen who
initiated and obtained a foreign divorce from the coverage
of paragraph 2 of Article 26 and still require him or her to
first avail of the existing “mechanisms” under the Family
Code, any subsequent relationship that he or she would
enter in the meantime shall be considered as illicit in the
eyes of the Philippine law. Worse, any child born out of
such “extramarital” affair has to suffer the stigma of being
branded as illegitimate. Surely, these are just but a few of
the adverse consequences, not only to the parent but also to
the child, if We are to hold a restrictive interpretation of
the subject provision. The irony is that the principle of
inviolability of marriage under Section 2, Article XV of the
Constitution is meant to be tilted in favor of marriage and
against unions not formalized by marriage, but without
denying State protection and assistance to live-in
arrangements or to families formed according to indigenous
customs.82
This Court should not turn a blind eye to the realities of
the present time. With the advancement of communication
and information technology, as well as the improvement of
the transportation system that almost instantly connect
people from all over the world, mixed marriages have
become not too uncommon. Likewise, it is recognized that
not all marriages are made in heaven and that imperfect
humans more often than not create imperfect
unions.83 Living in a flawed world, the unfortunate reality
for some is that the attainment of the individual’s full
human potential and self-fulfillment is not found and
achieved in the context of a marriage. Thus, it is hypocriti-
_______________
81 Article II, Sections 11, 12 and 14. See also Republic Act Nos. 7192
(“Women in Development and Nation Building Act”) and 9710 (“The Magna
Carta of Women”).
82 Bernas, Joaquin G., S.J., The Intent of the 1986 Constitution
Writers, p. 1132, 1995 edition, citing Records, Volume V, pp. 40, 44.
83 See Paras v. Paras, 555 Phil. 786, 804; 529 SCRA 81, 100 (2007).
622
cal to safeguard the quantity of existing marriages and, at
the same time, brush aside the truth that some of them are
of rotten quality.
Going back, We hold that marriage, being a mutual and
shared commitment between two parties, cannot possibly
be productive of any good to the society where one is
considered released from the marital bond while the other
remains bound to it.84 In reiterating that the Filipino
spouse should not be discriminated against in his or her
own country if the ends of justice are to be served, San Luis
v. San Luis85 quoted:
623
_______________
624
_______________
p. 495; and San Luis v. San Luis, supra note 16 at p. 294; pp. 313-314.
93 Rollo, pp. 29-30.
94 Garcia v. Recio, supra note 9 at pp. 733-734; p. 450.
625
ground of collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of fact or
law, albeit an opportunity to do so.95
Nonetheless, the Japanese law on divorce must still be
proved.
Since the divorce was raised by Manalo, the burden of
proving the pertinent Japanese law validating it, as well as
her former husband’s capacity to remarry, fall squarely
upon her. Japanese laws on persons and family relations
are not among those matters that Filipino judges are
supposed to know by reason of their judicial function.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review
on certiorari is DENIED. The September 18, 2014 Decision
and October 12, 2015 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
C.A.-G.R. CV No. 100076, are AFFIRMED IN PART. The
case is REMANDED to the court of origin for further
proceedings and reception of evidence as to the relevant
Japanese law on divorce.
SO ORDERED.
_______________
626
CONCURRING OPINION
LEONEN, J.:
I concur with the ponencia of Justice Peralta, adding the
following points.
I
The proposal of the Solicitor General is to give Article
261 of our Family Code an interpretation which capacitates
and empowers the Japanese husband the option to divorce
and how such choice has effects in our country while, at the
same time, disallowing the Filipina wife from being able to
do the same simply because she is a Filipina.
_______________
** Designated Acting Chief Justice per Special Order No. 2539 dated
February 28, 2018.
1 Family Code, Art. 26 provides:
Article 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have
capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
627
That interpretation may be unconstitutional. Article II,
Section 14 of our Constitution provides:
This constitutional fiat advances the notion of gender
equality from its passive formulation in Article III, Section
12 to its more active orientation.
Article III, Section 1 simply states that “nor shall any
person be denied the equal protection of the laws.”
Traditionally, this means that the State has no duty to find
ways and means to ensure equality. It is only a prescription
that whatever legal burdens and benefits are given to men
should likewise be given to women. It does not require the
State, through any of its organs, to find affirmative ways
and means to battle the patriarchy — that complex of
political, cultural, and economic factors that ensure
women’s disempowerment.
By enacting our Constitution and signing on to our
political obligations to the Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, we have
legally committed to do better.
We likewise note that the Family Code was followed by
Republic Act No. 7192 or the Women in Development and
Nation Building Act. Within this law are provisions which
ensure equal treatment between men and women, thus:
_______________
628
....
Section 5. Equality in Capacity to Act.—Women of
legal age, regardless of civil status, shall have the
capacity to act and enter into contracts which shall in
every respect be equal to that of men under similar
circumstances.
In all contractual obligations where married men
have the capacity to act, married women shall have
equal rights.
To this end:
(1) Women shall have the capacity to borrow and
obtain loans and execute security and credit
arrangements under the same conditions as
men;
(2) Women shall have equal access to all
government and private sector programs
granting agricultural credit, loans and non-
material resources and shall enjoy equal
treatment in agrarian reform and land
resettlement programs;
(3) Women shall have equal rights to act as
incorporators and enter into insurance
contracts; and
(4) Married women shall have the rights equal to
those of married men in applying for passports,
secure visas and other travel documents,
without need to secure the consent of their
spouses.
In all other similar contractual relations, women
shall enjoy equal rights and shall have the capacity to
act which shall in every respect be equal to those of
men under similar circumstances. (Underscoring
supplied)
Republic Act No. 9710 or the Magna Carta of Women
reflects the state policy to “[abolish]. . . the unequal
structures and practices that perpetuate discrimination
and inequality”3 between the sexes, and
_______________
629
Section 19 of the law is specific on the equality of women
and men as to rights relating to marriage and family
relations:
_______________
izes that equality of men and women entails the abolition of the unequal
structures and practices that perpetuate discrimination and inequality. To
realize this, the State shall endeavor to develop plans, policies, programs,
measures, and mechanisms to address discrimination and inequality in
the economic, political, social, and cultural life of women and men. The
State condemns discrimination against women in all its forms and
pursues by all appropriate means and without delay the policy of
eliminating discrimination against women in keeping with the Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
(CEDAW) and other international instruments consistent with Philippine
law. The State shall accord women the rights, protection, and
opportunities available to every member of society.
The State affirms women’s rights as human rights and shall intensify
its efforts to fulfill its duties under international and domestic law to
recognize, respect, protect, fulfill, and promote all human rights and
fundamental freedoms of women, especially marginalized women, in the
economic, social, political, cultural, and other fields without distinction or
discrimination on account of class, age, sex, gender, language, ethnicity,
religion, ideology, disability, education, and status. The State shall
provide the necessary mechanisms to enforce women’s rights and adopt
and undertake all legal measures necessary to foster and promote the
equal opportunity for women to participate in and contribute to the
development of the political, economic, social, and cultural realms.
The State, in ensuring the full integration of women’s concerns in the
mainstream of development, shall provide ample opportunities to enhance
and develop their skills, acquire productive employment and contribute to
their families and communities to the fullest of their capabilities.
In pursuance of this policy, the State reaffirms the right of women in
all sectors to participate in policy formulation, planning, organization,
implementation, management, monitoring, and evaluation of all
programs, projects, and services. It shall support policies, researches,
technology, and training programs and other support services such as
financing, production, and marketing to encourage active participation of
women in national development.
630
(a) the same rights to enter into and leave
marriages or common law relationships referred
to under the Family Code without prejudice to
personal and religious beliefs;
(b) the same rights to choose freely a spouse and to
enter into marriage only with their free and full
consent. The betrothal and the marriage of a
child shall have no legal effect;
(c) the joint decision on the number and spacing of
their children and to have access to the
information, education and means to enable
them to exercise these rights;
(d) the same personal rights between spouses or
common law spouses including the right to
choose freely a profession and an occupation;
(e) the same rights for both spouses or common law
spouses in respect of the ownership, acquisition,
management, administration, enjoyment, and
disposition of property;
(f) the same rights to properties and resources,
whether titled or not, and inheritance, whether
formal or customary; and
(g) women shall have equal rights with men to
acquire, change, or retain their nationality. The
State shall ensure in particular that neither
marriage to an alien nor change of nationality
by the husband during marriage shall
automatically change the nationality of the wife,
render her stateless or force upon her the
nationality of the husband. Various statutes of
other countries concerning dual citizenship that
may be enjoyed equally by women and men shall
likewise be considered.
Customary laws shall be respected: Provided,
however, That they do not discriminate against
women. (Underscoring supplied)
Section 19 is straightforward: the State shall ensure
that men and women are to have “the same rights to enter
into and leave marriages.”
631
Following Section 19 of Republic Act No. 9710, Article 26
of the Family Code should be read to mean that who
initiates the divorce proceedings abroad is immaterial.
Once a divorce decree is issued, the foreign spouse is
deemed to have “obtained” a divorce which capacitates him
or her to remarry. The same status should therefore be
afforded to the Filipino spouse.
Besides, in many jurisdictions, the foreign spouse is
given the option to divorce on the basis of a mutual
recognition that irreconcilable differences have surfaced in
the context of their relationship. Some foreign laws,
therefore, allow joint filing for a divorce decree to ensure
that there be less incrimination among the spouses, a more
civil and welcoming atmosphere for their children, and less
financial burden for the families affected. The
interpretation proposed by the Solicitor General does not
accommodate this possibility. It is blind to the actual
complexities experienced by our citizens in mixed
marriages.
II
Justice Caguioa provides the argument that interpreting
Article 26 of the Family Code in the manner provided in
the ponencia violates the nationality principle enshrined in
Article 15 of the Civil Code.
I disagree.
Article 15 of the Civil Code provides:
Clearly, it is not only Article 26 of the Family Code or
the Civil Code that applies. It should also include the
Constitution, which is the bedrock of rights of any citizen.
Thus, the State’s obligation to “ensure the fundamental
equality before the law of women and men”4 applies with
equal if not greater force. In my view, this is the full extent
of the nationality principle. It is borne of rational
interpretation, not judicial legislation.
_______________
632
III
Finally, my agreement with the ponencia is also
impelled by my understanding that divorce is more
consistent with the constitutionally entrenched
fundamental freedoms inherent in individuals as human
beings. It is also most consistent with the constitutional
command for the State to ensure human dignity.
The restrictive nature of our marriage laws tends to
reify the concept of a family which is already far from the
living realities of many couples and children. For instance,
orthodox insistence on heteronormativity may not compare
with the various types of care that various other
“nontraditional” arrangements present in many loving
households.
The worst thing we do in a human relationship is to
regard the commitment of the other formulaic. That is, that
it is shaped alone by legal duty or what those who are
dominant in government regard as romantic. In truth, each
commitment is unique, borne of its own personal history,
ennobled by the sacrifices it has gone through, and defined
by the intimacy which only the autonomy of the parties
creates.
In other words, words that describe when we love or are
loved will always be different for each couple. It is that
which we should understand: intimacies that form the core
of our beings should be as free as possible, bound not by
social expectations but by the care and love each person
can bring.
Yet, the present form and the present interpretation we
have on the law on marriage constrains. In love, there are
no guarantees. In choosing our most intimate partners, we
can commit mistakes. It is but part of being human.
Our law cruelly defines the normal. The legal is coated
in a false sense of morality poorly reasoned. It condemns
those who have made bad choices into a living inferno.
In my view, this case is a step forward in the right
direction.
633
IV
1
As I stated in a dissent I wrote in 2016, we had
absolute divorce laws in the past. Act No. 2710,2 enacted in
1917, allowed the filing of a petition for divorce on the
ground of adultery on the part of the wife, or concubinage
on the part of the husband.3
Eleven grounds for divorce were provided in Executive
Order No. 141,4 effective during the Japanese occupation.
These grounds included “intentional or unjustified
desertion continuously for at least one year prior to the
filing of a [petition] for divorce” and “slander by deed or
gross insult by one spouse against the other to such an
extent as to make further living impracticable.”5
After the Japanese left, the laws they enacted were
declared void.6 Act No. 2710 again took effect until the
Civil Code’s enactment in 1950. Since then, absolute
divorce has been prohibited in our jurisdiction.
A world whose borders are increasingly becoming permeable
with the ease of travel as well as with the technological advances
will definitely foster more intercultural relationships. These
relationships can become more intimate.
I am of the belief that the law never intended for the
Filipino to be at a disadvantage. For so long as the
Constitution itself guarantees fundamental equality, the
absurd result from a literal and almost frigid and unfeeling
interpretation of our laws should not hold. To say that one
spouse may divorce and the other may not contributes to
the
_______________
634
patriarchy. It fosters an unequal relationship prone to abuse in
such intimate relationships.
The law is far from frigid. It should passionately
guarantee equality and I stand with this Court in ensuring
that it does.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to deny the Petition for Review
on Certiorari and to affirm, with modification, the Court of
Appeals’ Decision in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 100076. The case
should be remanded to the court of origin for further
proceedings and reception of evidence as to the relevant
Japanese law on divorce.
DISSENTING OPINION
CAGUIOA, J.:
On the basis of the Court’s rulings in Van Dorn v.
Romillo, Jr.2 (Van Dorn), Republic of the Philippines v.
Orbecido III3 (Orbecido), and Dacasin v.
4
Dacasin (Dacasin), the ponencia holds that Article 26(2) of
the Family Code permits the blanket recognition, under
_______________
635
636
_______________
5 Minutes of the 146th Joint Meeting of the Civil Code and Family Law
Committees dated July 12, 1986, p. 5.
637
Accordingly, Article 26(2) did not appear in the initial
version of the Family Code under Executive Order (EO)
209 which was signed into law by then President Corazon
Aquino on July 6, 1987. Days later, or on July 17, 1987,
President Aquino issued EO 227 which incorporated,
among others, Article 26(2). Thus, when the Family Code
finally took effect on August 3, 1988, Article 26, in its
entirety, read as follows:
6 Minutes of the 149th Joint Meeting of the Civil Code and Family Law
Committees dated August 2, 1986, pp. 14-15.
638
While Article 26(2) was reinstated by executive fiat, it is
nevertheless clear that the true spirit behind the provision
remains explicit in the Committee deliberations — Article
26(2) had been crafted to serve as an exception to the
nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the
Civil Code, which states:
The deliberations show that Article 26(2) has the effect
of (i) enforcing divorce decrees which are binding on foreign
nationals under their national law; and (ii) recognizing the
residual effect of such foreign divorce decrees on their
Filipino spouses who are bound by the prohibition against
absolute divorce under the Civil Code.7
To be sure, Article 26(2) had not been crafted to dilute
the Philippines’ policy against absolute divorce. In fact, this
perceived possible dilution is precisely what prompted the
majority of the Committee members to vote for the deletion
of Article 26(2) in the initial version of the Family Code
found in EO 209. As the deliberations indicate, the
exception provided in Article 26(2) is narrow, and
intended only to address the unfair situation that
results when a foreign national obtains a divorce
decree against a Filipino citizen, leaving the latter
stuck in a marriage without a spouse, thus:
Justice Caguioa explained that the intention of the
provision is to legalize foreign divorces for the Filipino so
that in the case of a Filipina, who was married to an
American, who in turn later secured a divorce, said Filipina
will be allowed to remarry. Justice Puno and Judge Diy
remarked that this is not clear in the provision [Article
26(2)]. Justice Puno, however, commented
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639
In Orbecido, a Filipino citizen sought permission to
remarry before the courts, claiming that his former Filipina
wife had obtained a divorce decree against him from an
American court after she had become
_______________
8 Minutes of the 146th Joint Meeting of the Civil Code and Family
Law Committees dated July 12, 1986, p. 5.
9 Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr., supra note 2 at p. 361; p. 143.
10 Id., at p. 362; p. 144.
11 Id.
640
a naturalized American citizen. The Court held that the
effects of the divorce decree should be recognized in
the Philippines since it was obtained by the former
wife as an American citizen in accordance with her
national law, and that as a consequence, the Filipino
husband should be allowed to remarry pursuant to
Article 26(2). In so ruling, the Court laid down elements
for the application of Article 26(2), thus:
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin
elements for the application of paragraph 2 of Article
26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been
celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the
parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage,
but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the
latter to remarry.
In this case, when [the Filipino spouse’s] wife was
naturalized as an American citizen, there was still a
valid marriage that has been celebrated between
[them]. As fate would have it, the naturalized alien
wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce
capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin
requisites for the application of paragraph 2 of Article
26 are both present in this case. Thus x x x the
“divorced” Filipino spouse, should be allowed to
remarry.12 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Still, in Dacasin, a Filipino wife secured a divorce decree
against her American husband from an Illinois court. The
decree awarded sole custody over the parties’ daughter in
favor of the Filipino wife. While the parties subsequently
executed a Joint Custody Agreement, the Filipino wife
refused to honor the agreement, prompting the American
husband to seek redress before the Philippine courts. The
Court held that the Illinois divorce decree is binding on the
American citizen, and that the latter cannot be permitted
to evade the terms of the custodial award. Citing the
nationality principle, the Court stressed that “a
foreign divorce decree carries as much valid-
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641
ity against the alien divorcee in this jurisdiction as it
does in the jurisdiction of the alien’s nationality,
irrespective of who obtained the divorce.”13 It bears
stressing that the issue raised in Dacasin was the
enforceability of the Joint Custody Agreement against the
American husband, and not the validity of the foreign
divorce decree as against the Filipino wife.
Thus, rather than serving as bases for the blanket
recognition of foreign divorce decrees in the
Philippines, I believe that the Court’s rulings in Van
Dorn, Orbecido and Dacasin merely clarify the
parameters for the application of the nationality
principle found in Article 15 of the Civil Code, and
the exception thereto found in Article 26(2) the
Family Code. These parameters may be summarized as
follows:
1. Owing to the nationality principle, all Filipino citizens
are covered by the prohibition against absolute divorce.
As a consequence of such prohibition, a divorce decree
obtained abroad by a Filipino citizen cannot be
enforced in the Philippines. To allow otherwise
would be to permit a Filipino citizen to invoke
foreign law to evade an express prohibition under
Philippine law.
2. Nevertheless, the effects of a divorce decree obtained by
a foreign national may be extended to the Filipino
spouse, provided the latter is able to prove (i) the
issuance of the divorce decree, and (ii) the personal law
of the foreign spouse allowing such divorce.14 This
exception, found under Article 26(2) of the Family Code,
respects the binding effect of the divorce decree on the
foreign national, and merely recognizes the residual
effect of such decree on the Filipino spouse.
It should be emphasized, however, that the prohibition
against absolute divorce only applies to Filipino citizens.
Accordingly, it cannot
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642
be invoked by a foreign national to evade the effects of a
divorce decree issued pursuant to his national law. To
reiterate, a divorce decree issued by a foreign court
remains binding on the foreign spouse in the
Philippines, regardless of the party who obtained
the same provided that such decree is valid and
effective under the foreign spouse’s national law.
In essence, the applicable rule (whether Article 15 of the
Civil Code on one hand, or Article 26[2] of the Family Code
on the other), is determined by (i) the law upon which the
divorce decree had been issued; (ii) the party who obtained
the divorce decree; (iii) the nature of the action brought
before the Philippine courts; and (iv) the law governing the
personal status of the party seeking relief.
The corresponding effect of these determining factors
are, in turn, illustrated by the relevant cases involving the
issue at hand, decided after the issuance of EO 227:
_______________
15 256 Phil. 407; 174 SCRA 653 (1989) [Per J. Regalado, Second
Division].
643
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16 507 Phil. 485; 470 SCRA 508 (2005) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Second
Division].
17 591 Phil. 452; 570 SCRA 472 (2008) [Per J. Velasco, Jr., Second
Division].
18 712 Phil. 524; 700 SCRA 69 (2013) [Per J. Carpio, Second Division].
644
The factual circumstances in the foregoing cases
illustrate and confirm the legislative intent behind Article
26(2), that is, primarily, to recognize foreign divorce
decrees secured by foreign nationals insofar as they affect
Filipinos who would otherwise be precluded from invoking
such decrees in our jurisdiction, and, as well, to recognize
those foreign divorce decrees obtained by Filipinos insofar
as they affect their foreign spouses whose national laws
allow divorce. For emphasis, I quote the relevant portion of
the deliberations:
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645
principle.
The ponencia characterizes Article 26(2) of the Family
Code as unconstitutional, as it proceeds from a “superficial
[and] arbitrary” classification.22 This position appears to be
based on the premise that Article 26(2) creates new
distinctions in itself. This premise, however, is simply
erroneous.
The classification under Article 26(2), (that is, between
Filipinos in mixed marriages and Filipinos married to
fellow Filipinos) was cre-
_______________
20 Minutes of the 149th Joint Meeting of the Civil Code and Family
Law Committees dated August 2, 1986, pp. 14-15.
21 Republic v. Iyoy, supra note 16 at pp. 503-504; pp. 527-528.
22 Ponencia, p. 610.
646
ated as a matter of necessity, in recognition of the
classification between Filipinos and foreign nationals
which had been created by Article 15 of the Civil Code
decades prior.
In his Separate Opinion in Pilapil, Justice Paras
highlights the interplay between these two provisions,
thus:
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647
which render the adoption thereof necessary; it would be
tantamount to insisting that Filipinos should be governed
with whatever law they choose.
Article 26(2) of the Fam-
ily Code rests on substan-
tinctions.
It has been argued that the verba legis interpretation of
Article 26(2) of the Family Code violates the equal
protection clause, and that the application of the provision
in this manner would not only be oppressive, but likewise
unconstitutional.
These reservations appear to proceed from three
different classifications which, in turn, have been called
into question — first, that between Filipinos in mixed
marriages and Filipinos who are married to fellow
Filipinos; second, that between Filipinos and foreigners;
and finally, that between men and women.
As earlier discussed, the ponencia finds the first
classification “superficial [and] arbitrary”24 insofar as it
limits the scope of recognition to cover only those divorce
decrees obtained by foreign nationals.
It bears to stress, however, that the guarantee of equal
protection under the Constitution does not require that all
laws indiscriminately operate with equal force with respect
to all subjects at all times;25 the guarantee does not
preclude classification provided they are reasonable and
based on substantial distinctions.26
_______________
24 Ponencia, p. 610.
25 See generally Department of Education, Culture and Sports v. San
Diego, 259 Phil. 1016; 180 SCRA 533 (1989) [Per J. Cruz, En Banc].
26 See Fariñas v. The Executive Secretary, 463 Phil. 179, 206-208; 417
SCRA 503, 525 (2003) [Per J. Callejo, Sr., En Banc].
648
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649
_______________
28 Ponencia, p. 610.
29 Minutes of the 149th Joint Meeting of the Civil Code and Family
Law Committees dated August 2, 1986, p. 14.
650
the laws of the Philippines regardless of their place of residence.
Clearly, foreigners and Filipinos are not similarly situated.
Hence, the determination of their legal status, among others,
cannot be made subject to the same parameters. In any case, I
emphasize, at the sake of being repetitious, that such
classification had been created not by Article 26(2) of the Family
Code, but rather, the nationality principle under Article 15 of the
Civil Code:
Finally, I find that Article 26(2) does not make any
discernable distinction between men and women, as the
exception therein may be invoked by both men and women
with equal force to attain the same end, provided that the
requirements for its application obtain. While I am
certainly aware that the respondent in this case is one of
the many Filipino women who find themselves in
unsuccessful marriages with foreign nationals, I am
equally aware that this unfortunate circumstance is
similarly faced by Filipino men, who, like their female
counterparts, are precluded from obtaining an absolute
divorce under Philippine law.
Respondent’s case falls
outside of the scope of
Article 26(2) of the
Family Code.
In this case, it has been established that (i) the
respondent is a Filipino citizen who married a Japanese
national; (ii) it was the respondent who subsequently
obtained a divorce decree against her Japanese
husband from a Japanese court; and (iii) the respondent
thereafter filed a Petition for Recognition and Enforcement
of a Foreign Judgment30 before the RTC.31 It is clear that
respondent is, and has always been, a Filipino citizen.
Pursuant to the
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651
nationality principle, respondent’s personal status is
subject to Philippine law which, in turn, prohibits absolute
divorce.
Hence, the divorce decree which respondent obtained
under Japanese law cannot be given effect, as she is,
without dispute, a national not of Japan, but of the
Philippines. Nevertheless, the verba legis application of
Article 26(2) does not deprive the respondent of legal
remedies, as she may pray for the severance of her marital
ties before the RTC in accordance with the mechanisms
now existing under the Family Code.
The Constitution mandates the protection of the family
as a basic autonomous social institution.32 In this
connection, the Family Code characterizes marriage as a
special contract of permanent union, and regards the
family as “an inviolable social institution whose nature,
consequences, and incidents are governed by law” and
generally, not subject to stipulation.33 Upon these
fundamental principles rests the prohibition against
absolute divorce, which had remained effective and
unchanged since the enactment of the Civil Code in 1950.34
Adherence to this prohibition is met with much
reservation, as it purportedly forces Filipinos to play
second fiddle to their foreign spouses, and places said
Filipinos at a disadvantage. Moreover, it had been argued
in the deliberations of the Court that such adherence
sanctions various forms of abuse that plague mixed
marriages, and deprives Filipinos in such marriages of a
way out. I find that these observations, pressing as they
are, already delve into the wisdom of statutes governing
marriage and personal status with which the Court cannot
interfere.
To note, Article 26(2) of the Family Code has remained
unchanged since the issuance of EO 227. The blanket
recognition of absolute divorce overturns the Court’s
unequivocal interpretation of the provision as laid down in
the cases of Pilapil, Iyoy, Orbecido, Dacasin, Bayot,
Fujiki and Medina, which span a period of nearly three decades.
Ascribing a contradictory interpretation to the provision, under
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652
the guise of equal protection, essentially rewrites Article 26(2)
and gives it a meaning completely different from the framers’
intention.
While I am not oblivious to the difficulty that results
from the prohibition on absolute divorce and commiserate
totally with the respondent in this regard, I find that the
prohibition remains, and thus, must be faithfully applied.
To my mind, a contrary ruling will subvert not only the
intention of the framers of the law, but also that of the
Filipino people, as expressed in the Constitution. The
Court is bound to respect the prohibition, until the
legislature deems it fit to lift the same through the
passage of a statute permitting absolute divorce.
As recognized by the ponencia, there are currently four
bills on the subject of divorce and severance of marriage
pending before the 17th Congress: (i) House Bill No. 116
(HB 116) and House Bill No. 2380 (HB 2380) which propose
different grounds for the issuance of a judicial decree of
absolute divorce; (ii) House Bill No. 1062 (HB 1062) which
proposes the inclusion of separation in fact as an additional
ground for annulment of marriage; and (iii) House Bill No.
6027 (HB 6027) which proposes additional grounds for
dissolution of marriage. These bills have been consolidated
and substituted by House Bill No. 730335 (HB 7303), which,
at present, is awaiting deliberations before the Senate.36
HB 7303 proposes the issuance of divorce decrees on the
basis of the following grounds:
1. The existing grounds for legal separation and
annulment of marriage under Articles 55 and 45 of
the Family Code;
2. Separation in fact for at least five years;
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653
3. Psychological incapacity, whether or not present at
the time of the celebration of the marriage;
4. Gender reassignment surgery or transition from one
sex to another undertaken by either spouse; and
5. Irreconcilable marital differences.37
These movements towards the passage of a divorce law
illustrate that the difficulty which results from the
absolute prohibition against marriage is being addressed
by the 17th Congress through a statute specifically crafted
for the purpose. That the legislature has seen it
necessary to initiate these proposed laws is a clear
delineation of the Court’s role — that is, to simply
apply the current law and not for it to indulge in
judicial legislation.
Indeed, it is desirable, if not imperative, that statutes in
a progressive democracy remain responsive to the realities
of the present time. However, responsiveness is a matter
of policy which requires a determination of what the
law ought to be, and not what the law
actually is.38 Widening the scope of the exception found in
Article 26(2) so as to indiscriminately recognize foreign
divorce in this jurisdiction is doing, in Justice Elias Finley
Johnson’s39 words, “exactly what the Legislature itself
[has] refused to do.”40 It not only subverts the standing
public policy against absolute divorce; worse, it sanctions a
violation of the fundamental principle of separation of
powers — a violation which cannot be undone by any
subsequent law. To wield judicial power in this manner is
to arrogate unto the Court a power which it does not
possess; it is to forget that this State, is foremost governed
by the rule of law and not of men, however wise such men
are or purport to be.
Considering the foregoing, I submit that the Court of
Appeals erred when it reversed the RTC’s order denying
respondent’s Petition for Enforcement. Hence, I vote
to GRANT the instant Petition for Review.
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654
654 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Manalo
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