1.

Project Overview of Sydney Opera House

Because it is one of the most recognizable buildings in the world, the Sydney Opera House is an
unmistakable representation of the city of Sydney. It is estimated that $775 million is added to
the economy of Australia each year as a result of sales of tickets, purchases made in retail stores,
and expenditures made on food and beverages. Once ticket sales reached a steady state, it
became clear that the extension of the Sydney Opera House was a financial success (IEEE,
2008). To finish the project as envisioned in the beginning would need a time commitment of six
years and a financial investment of seven million dollars. The completion of the project required
about one hundred million dollars and sixteen years of effort. This whole undertaking has been a
complete and utter failure from the point of view of project management. When it was initially
envisaged, the Sydney Opera House was going to come equipped with a stage in addition to an
orchestra pit. In the early 1950s, the conductor of the Sydney Symphony Orchestra, Eugene
Goosens, had a discussion with the Premier of New South Wales, Joseph Cahill, about the
possibility of constructing a new music hall that might accommodate as many as 40,000 people.
The world-famous Sydney Opera House is viewed from a distance. In 1955, Cahill organized a
competition for foreign designers to choose a plan for the construction of a new national opera
house in Sydney. When the deadline approached, there had been submissions from 222 different
designers. In January in the year 1957, Prime Minister Cahill issued a statement praising the
winning design, which was numbered 218, and designed by the Danish architect Jorn Utzon. The
event will take place at the National Gallery of Art in Washington, DC. As a structural engineer,
Utzon contributed to the construction of the Sydney Opera House with Ove Arup and Partners.
Premier Cahill exerted a lot of pressure to have construction started before the election in March
1959, although the working drawings and the shell design hadn't been approved yet. The
customer is not aware of the presence of a competent project manager. The incapacity of the
government to make adjustments midway through the project resulted in considerable increases
in both the amount of money and time needed to finish the undertaking. After taking office in
May 1965, the Liberal Party of New South Wales suspended funds for the project until Utzon
made concessions on the project's scale and cost (Anantatmula, 2008). Utzon walked away from
the project in 1966 because it lacked sufficient funding. The current government has transferred
responsibility for the project to Australian architects who were selected for the post. They were
given this opportunity because of their qualifications. Since the unconventional architectural
design was implemented after the building's facade was finished, the structure of the building
was not compromised in any way by its implementation. Over one hundred million dollars and
fourteen years were spent working on the project until it was finally finished in 1973. (which was
15 times the initial budget).

1.1 Role of Stakeholders

Ove Arup and his team of structural engineers had a major hand in the project, as did Jrn Utzon,
a prominent architect. Since it was the state of New South Wales's initiative and money that
started the corporation, it has a strong claim to ownership (Anantatmula, 2008). For the
engineering and architectural companies involved, as well as their consultants, this was a crucial
undertaking. Partners in the SOH venture are the employees of the aforementioned engineering
and construction businesses who made direct contributions to the project in return for financial
payment. Finally, because this project was originally envisioned as a kind of entertainment, the
people of Sydney and Australia at large have a vested interest in it.

Figure 1- Stakeholder’s Role

The state of New South Wales in Australia took note of the fact that the building's growth
was going above and beyond what had been predicted. On October 19, 1959, the project
experienced significant setbacks when New South Wales Premier John Cahill, a supporter of safe
workplaces, passed away while working. In 1965, when Stage 2 of the construction of the Opera
House finally got underway after a significant delay caused by the completion of Stage 1, the
Opera House Committee gave Public Works Minister David Hughes control of the project's
finances. This occurred after a lengthy delay because Stage 1 had been completed. Using the
information gathered by the New South Wales (NSW) state government (1997 archive). This
decision was made by Robert Askins, who had only been elected to the position of prime
minister. Askins and Hughes discussed the possibility of employing pressure to keep the
expenditures, delays, and other elements of the SOH project under control. This discussion took
place even though the two were doubtful about the performance and consequences of the project.
The government anticipated that the public would be dissatisfied with the ever-increasing costs
and the delayed completion of the stages of the project. In a letter that was sent out in August of
1964, the government of New South Wales noted that the previous administration had allowed
expenditure to get out of hand by allowing it to spiral out of control. Despite this, the raffles'
capacity to bring in money was gradually improving over time. After taking into account the
effects of inflation, the financial records of the Opera House project revealed between the years
1965–1955 a deficit of $5,151,288 (payables) and a surplus of $2,979,847 (revenue) Duncan
(2008).

1.2 Failures of Sydney Opera House

In-depth research of the Sydney Opera House construction project has revealed various dangers
that increase the likelihood of the project being scrapped. As soon as political conditions permit,
work may begin on Phase I. Now that construction has started before the design phase is
complete, issues are more likely to arise later. The many modification orders were a major factor
in the overall cost overruns. The original budget of 7 million Australian dollars was a gross
underestimate. Due to the absence of a formal project manager, Utzon was ultimately
accountable for all aspects of the endeavor's planning, design, construction, and development.

There was never a set timetable for assessing the project's execution techniques, and they were
constantly evolving. To guarantee that a deviation from the original design was implemented, the
government erected, dismantled, and rebuilt two more theaters. The completion of the Sydney
Opera House was pushed back by a long period due to political meddling. Projects in the public
sector are fraught with political danger. To lessen the need for feasibility studies, politicians may
occasionally bury information that shows the public won't support a project. (Heimbuch, 2009).

1.3 Challenges and Issues of Sydney Opera House

The New South Wales government opted to start constructing the Sydney Opera House before
the election, despite concerns from the Utzon design team that the structure's design was not yet
complete. The choice necessitated major adjustments to the project's core construction, which
had far-reaching effects. Since many people involved in the project have varying estimates for
how long it would take and how much it will cost, there have been several issues and arguments.
Due to incompetent project management and a lack of version control, the project failed to meet
expectations. Two theaters will be constructed initially using this design (Thomas, 2008). After
realizing that the design team would have to revise their first concept, the New South Wales state
government asked for extra theaters. These alterations at the last minute added a lot of time and
money to the project. The customer did not provide any budgetary constraints at the outset. The
new administration opted to end support for Utzon because of the project's inability to go ahead.
Utzon quit his employment after a salary dispute, taking his files with him. The project needed
more client engineers to finish. The newly hired engineers were tasked with implementing
certain essential modifications and redesigns.

1.3.1 Cost and Schedule overrun.

Despite the lack of engineering or planning costs for the proposal, the judges ultimately decided
on the only submission from unknown Danish architect Jorn Utzon. The judges convinced the
government authorities that seven million Australian dollars would be needed to complete the
project. Total costs exceeded $100,000,000 once everything was factored in. Since the design
wasn't finished, we couldn't provide you with a price for the work. The cost of the modification
orders went up as a direct consequence of this. Payroll would not disburse funds until they had
concrete evidence that the job had been completed. A very long time had passed before the
project's second phase had even begun before any significant progress had been made. Due to
boredom, Utzon left the project, taking his plans and drawings with him. The second phase of the
project was finished in 1967 by a group led by three local architects working under their
"guidance" (Tolbert, 2008).

1.3.2 Design and Construction

There were several changes made to the original plan while it was being developed and put into
action. Costly design and construction mistakes were made in the opera house since it was built
before the idea was finalized. In the neighborhood $30,000 was spent on the removal and
replacement of the structural columns. Utzon, however, finished the roof three or four years after
construction was done.
 1.3.3 Government and Media Scandals

Due to disagreements with the client and management over his position, the architect offered his
resignation before the completion of stage 3 because of the previous Australian government's
unwillingness to incorporate input from internal stakeholders in the agreements it had with Utzon
(Government, Minister, and SOHEC).

1.4 How they were addressed

In July 1957, the local government of Sydney, Australia, decided to start a lottery to raise money
for the Sydney Opera House. It is feasible that the earnings from the lottery will pay the majority
of the expenditures associated with the project. Despite all of the challenges, the proposal was
ultimately successful in the end. Since 1975, when a lottery system was first introduced, the
government has not been required to pay for any of the continuing costs associated with the
initiative. Three tower cranes from France, each of which cost one hundred thousand euros, were
brought in to ease the construction difficulties that arose around the sails of the Opera House
(AUS). Instead of being joined with concrete, the rib segments of the shells needed to be bonded
around one another so that the construction could be completed more quickly. Utzon came up
with a plan to use super glue to hold the coverings in place when the building was paused
because of a concrete block junction (Turner, 2011). Even though it was ultimately successful,
the Sydney Opera House Project did not adhere to the generally established standards for
determining whether or not a project is viable as part of the management of the project. Despite
the severe warnings given by the designers and builders of the Sydney Opera House Project, the
project ultimately resulted in a tremendous financial windfall for the state government of New
South Wales. The effects were even more fantastic than expected, which was quite satisfying to
see. The fact that Utzon was presented with the Pritzker Prize for Architecture lends credence to
this assertion. In 1973, when Queen Elizabeth II initiated the program for the first time, she did
so with the full knowledge that it would ultimately be successful. The magnitude of the project
and the aesthetic value it possesses more than compensate for the public's and other people's
investments in it. (Roberts, 2015).
 1.5 Lesson Learned

The Sydney Opera House Lottery Fund was established by the government of Sydney, which is
located in Australia, in July 1957. Lotteries may supply all of the necessary funding for the
project. The effort was eventually successful despite all of the challenges that it faced. In 1975,
lottery winnings were first used to fund the costs of construction for the first time. As a result,
there was no unnecessary expenditure of public funds over the long term. The sails of the Opera
House were erected with the assistance of three tower cranes from France, which cost a
combined sum of $300,000. (AUS). Instead of being joined with concrete, the rib segments of
the shells needed to be bonded around one another so that the construction could be completed
more quickly. Utzon came up with a plan to use super glue to hold the coverings in place when
the building was paused because of a concrete block junction (Turner, 2011). Although in the
end the Sydney Opera House Project was deemed a success, the project management practices
that should have been followed were not followed. This quotation demonstrates that the state
government of South Wales considers the Sydney Opera House to be a huge success, even
though the architects and construction workers who worked on the project may perceive it as a
failure. The forecasts were right on the money, but the real result was far more favorable. The
fact that Utzon was awarded the Pritzker Prize in Architecture for the groundbreaking project he
designed lends credence to the validity of the aforementioned argument. In addition, Her Majesty
Queen Elizabeth II had complete faith in the accomplishment of the initiative from the moment it
was initially implemented in 1973. The public's and other parties' investments of time and money
into the project are more than adequately repaid by the sheer scope, quality, and impressiveness
of the project. (Roberts, 2015).

2. Role of Innovation in Project Delivery

2.1 Innovation of Sydney Opera House

2.1.1 Concert Hall

Improvements are needed in the seating area, the stage, the game plan, the front staging, and the
back of the performance area. When students attend classes in a facility dedicated to creative
education, they are immersed in a setting that fosters innovation and the use of one's flair for
teaching. (Freeman, 2017)

2.1.2 Entrance and Foyers

As a consequence of the innovation known as "Entrance & foyers," there will be the creation of a
supplementary entrance that is not accessible by vehicle and has a gathering place. The main box
entrance will have increased seating options, improved accessibility, and simplified functioning
(Yaneva, 2016).

2.1.3 Insights

Considering the potential for embracing the Utzon design dynamics without compromising the
Sydney Opera House's history or character. Some of the issues discussed were management
strategy and collaboration with a prominent conservation body.

2.1.4 Factors of Tourism

Travel and tourism have emerged as critical forces driving expansion in the global economy. The
Sydney Opera House is an important economic engine for Australia in the realms of performing
arts and infrastructure. The Opera House is located in the city of Sydney. As a result, the Sydney
Opera House has been used as a test case to evaluate the relevance of the Opera House
financially (Moulis, 2018).

The Concert Hall of the Sydney Opera House can host a wide variety of events, including those
including live music, choral groups, and symphony orchestras. The remaining areas of the
Sydney Opera House are typically reserved for dance performances like ballet and may seat up to
1500 more visitors. On the forecourt located farthest to the south, open-air activities are held. It
is possible to locate this multi-use area in the city of Sydney, which is located in the state of New
South Wales in Australia. It is common practice to rank the Sydney Opera House as Australia's
most popular tourist destination. Because it controls such a significant portion of the international
tourism industry, the Sydney Opera House is a significant contributor to the Australian economy.
The Sydney Opera House was used to hold a diverse range of events throughout the years. Each
year, the Sydney Opera House played host to a diverse range of events and performances of a
wide variety of genres. The usage of the arena by several different tours is advantageous to the
economy of Australia. It is estimated that more than 10.9 million people might fit inside the
Sydney Opera House at the same time.

People from all over the world, not only those who live in Australia, go here to see it. The
Sydney Opera House is one of the few locations that is always filled, regardless of the season,
and this is one of the reasons why. Every every day, the lineup of performances at the Sydney
Opera House, which is one of the city's most well-known and biggest venues, is completely
different. In the two years between 2016 and 2017, the Sydney Opera House generated over $1.2
billion (Australian).

2.2 Impact of Innovation

Because of its widespread appeal, the vast bulk of the money was generated by customers
attending in-house performances and visitors (Hill, 2015). There is little question that the area's
ascent to fame in 2013 was aided in part by the growing number of Australian visitors who
visited the region. The Sydney Opera House is visited by a significant number of people on an
annual basis, and this tendency has only continued to increase in the most recent two years, 2016
and 2017. More than ninety percent of tourists from other countries who come to Sydney make a
beeline for the Opera House. It is reasonable to predict that in the not-too-distant future, the
government of Australia will get financial benefits resulting from the aforementioned fields. One
hundred eighty-eight percent of respondents to a worldwide study on tourism to the region
around the Sydney Opera House answered that they would go there if they had the chance to do
so. The predicted increase of $44.6 billion in expenditures made by visitors to Australia in 2019
is mostly attributable to growth in demand. For visitors to Australia, seeing the world-famous
Sydney Opera House was the highlight of their trip, according to 82% of survey respondents.

Because of its impeccable standing, the federal government of Australia now gives it a higher
priority than it did in the past. During the 2011–2012 season, there were around 1.4 million
guests who attended 1,800 different performances. The Great Barrier Reef is three times as
valuable as the iconic Sydney Opera House, which is a key tourist attraction and serves as a
symbol of the country. Research conducted by Deloitte Access Economics indicates that the
Sydney Opera House is responsible for bringing in an annual revenue of $775 million for the
state of New South Wales (Deloitte, 2020). It is estimated that the Sydney Opera House provides
a total of 8,439 full-time jobs, both directly and indirectly, including indirectly via the tourism
industry.

Back then, there wasn't a whole lot of effort put into marketing a particular location as a tourist
attraction. Since more people have been made aware of the location, there has been a rise in the
number of visitors visiting the region ( Choi, Ok, and Choi, 2015). Despite this, DMO has
imposed stringent regulations on competitors in the tourism business. A DMO is responsible for
the management of everything, from buildings and cafes to attractions and events, transportation,
and tour guides. Not only do they manage these things, but they also plan and carry them out. As
a result of the tourist industry's ongoing efforts to develop innovative concepts and approaches in
the hope of luring in a larger number of customers, a particular location is seeing an
unprecedented level of customer foot traffic. The Sydney Opera House is promoted to tourists
from all over the globe by the DMO to safeguard the survival of the monument. It is due to the
efforts of the DMO that the region has performed better than its competitors everywhere else in
the globe. The Sydney Opera House has partnered with a destination marketing company to
increase visitor numbers to the city of Sydney (Bertelli, Buffa, and Martini, 2015). Management
has been working closely with the DMO to carry out tourism marketing activities such as the
Dine & Wine and Moment Capturing events. Offering a one-of-a-kind and individualized
experience to each customer is one strategy for maintaining a lead over the competition. A
location must have a destination marketing organization (DMO) to assist in attracting tourists
from all over the world.

The utility, value, and historical relevance of the infrastructure are maintained via various forms
of upkeep and upgrading. Having a plan in place for the subsequent five years, from 2017 to
2022, will ensure that the policy is carried out in the manner that was intended. The execution of
this plan should culminate in the provision of digital media, pleasant waiting places, and on-site
displays for visitors. (Sanchez et al., 2015).
Conclusion
Although it is a marvel of architecture and the tallest building in the world, the Sydney Opera
House did not meet the three conventional criteria of a successfully managed project because it
was finished late, went over budget, and was deemed unsatisfactory. However, it holds the
record for being the highest structure in the world (Sydney Opera House). Despite this, the vast
majority of people in Sydney and Chicago see it as an impressive architectural achievement and
a wonderful monument. During the building of the Sydney Opera House, there were issues with
both the project management and the administration of the building, as should be pointed out.
The ineffective administration of the project was caused by a lack of both a designated manager
and a defined framework for managing the project.

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