I.

Body Protection Drills

When the VIP leaves the relative security of his residence,office or vehicle and moves around on
foot,problems for the escort and advantages to the attacker are increased.The threat varies with each
situation:
a, Private social occasions and passtimes
b, Public appearances
c, Political-meeting crowds when canvassing for votes etc.
We need a drill or formation which will afford adequate protection to suit each situation.

The 6 principles are to maintain:

Adaptable formations
Capable of adapting to prevailing situations and moving smoothly in therequired direction.

Image
Altough you are giving protection the VIP will wish to amintain his image and he should not be
impeded (flowers,shaking hands)

Observation
Each member of the team has an arc of vision and should be able to identify dangers within it.

Spacing
The escorts seek to remain close enough to put themselves between danger and the VIP.The
protection officer,ideally if he is right handed,should be at the VIP's right shoulder,and if left
handed,his left

Body cover
Adequate protection can be given provided suitable drills are praticed but it remains a question of
balance between the wishes of the principle (personal preference/public image) and the degree of
security required to counter the threat

Security in depth
The CPs are the inner ring of security and must be surrounded by outer cordons such as uniformed
and covert police in the crowd.These cordons will extend to whatever distance is dictated by the
situation and threat.

Possible attack and countermesures

Verbal attack
This could become a physical assault.The 'horns' at the front close in and the VIP is moved quickly
away if it appears that physical attack is likely.

Physical attack
Close to an 'all around' defensive formation and use unarmed combat to remove VIP to safety.Bear
in mind this could be a distraction for a more serious attack.When usingthe unarmed
combattechniques,use only such force as is necessary.Overreaction is bad for your image and the
VIP's.Do not allow yourself to be drawn away.

Missiles
Missiles throwingthe VIP to the ground and yourself on top of him,or seeking proper cover.beware
of dummy explosives or decoys.
Knife or pistol attack
Shield the VIP.Draw and use handguns if appropiate.Get the VIP to safety as soon as possible.

Rifle attack
Professional
Little chance to counter unless lucky (long range)

Amateur
Seek nearest possible cover and get the VIP away as soon as it is safe

Vehiche attack
Do not attempt to shoot at a moving vehicle.Seek the nearest available cover and then find more
permanent safety as soon as possible

Any countermesures must be pratice until it is distinctive.Look and be professional.The escort must
remain alert to anticipate trouble.
Proper advancing of the route etc.will help to reduce the risk.

Body Protection Formations an attack countermesures

The following are exemples of the formations which can be used.It must be borne in mind that the
wishes of a VIP will sometimes conflict with requirement of security.Hence the positionning of
officers may not always comply with the following 'ideals'

One Protection Officer:

A single Protection Officer should position himself slightly behind and to one side of his
Principal.Asa general rule,if he is right handed,he should be on his Principal's right and if he is left
handed,in his left.this rule is not unvariable,howevera full account must be taken of the main
direction of any likely threat.
Two Protection Officers:
1.Classic formation,good for last second physical protection of VIP but cannot always spot danger
early

2.Can be used in busy shopping precinct to check areas in advance of the VIP.good,if danger ahead
is seen but leaves physical protection to one officer

3.One officer drops back slightly.This allows better view of overall picture and protection from
behind.Only one officer provides physical protection,however and the view ahead can be restricted
Three Protection Officers
1.Classic formation

2.One officer is checking in advance

3.One officer drops back several places.Better overall view to the front is restricted
Four Protection Officers

Variations on the above can be used as circumstances dictate

Five men formations

It is not suggested that five men must be used but this is about the maximum able to operate closely
efficienty
1.diamond

Good for protection,bad for image.Used when crowds push in or danger threathens.
2.Box

Not good for image,bad for protection.Open at front and sides,but gaps can be filled by entourage

3.Open V

Allows reasonnable public image.PO only one step away from covering the VIP at the front

Arc of observation and fire

An open V formation's arc of observation and fire should overlap at all times.to avoid confusion,the
terms of 'left and 'right' relate to the main line of route whatever direction ann individual officer is
facing

Abbreviations:
CPO: Close Protection Officer
TL: Team Leader
2i/c: Second in command
BG: Bodyguard
CPD: Continous Professional Developpment
SOP: Standard Operational Procedures
PES: Personal Escort Secstion
SAP: Security Advance Party
RST: Residential Security Team
PST: Personal Security Training
PSO: Protective Security Operation
CM: Conflict Management
IA: Immediate Action
AGM: Annual General Meeting
MOP: Military Overt Protection

II. Secure Advance Party (SAP)

BASIC CONCEPT-Pre Arrival Security

FUNCTION
>To minimise unexpected dramas for the client
>Eyes and ears on the ground
>Reception party for the main group
>Act as a guide for the PES and the client
>Provide extra security as required
PRIORITIES

A must where possible regardless

>check route
>establish communication ASAP
>check area
>secure debus and alternative
>advise PPO

PRE-DEPARTURE CONSIDERATIONS

1.Confirm route with PPO

2.Get an updated copy of the itinerary/program
3.Introduction ID requirements
4.Liaise with any agencies
5.Get names/numbers of all relevant persons involved
6.Confirm vehicles to be used by VIP/PES VRNs
7.Any specialised equipments needed:
-portable IDS
-portable ops room equipments
-communiction equipments
-search equipments
-maps/airport recce report

EN ROUTE

1.Checkroute is clear as per route selection Recce Phase

2.Anything suspicious, inform PPO
3.Switch to alternative route if necessary

PRE-ARRIVAL (CLIENT)

>establish comms with PPO

>meet with all relevant persons
>event/venue co-ordinator
>head of security
>other agencies as necessary (search team,etc.)
>familiarize yourself with protocol involved

CONSIDER THE FOLLOWING:

1.Debus/Embus point
2.Parking and vehucle security
3.Search and secure as required
4.Orientation, floor and ground plans
5.Confirm route which VIP will take from Debus point
6.Confirm seating plan
7.Check escape routes from the VIP location
8.Check route to toilets from VIP location
9.Check lifts (floors,programmable,etc.)
10.Have a guide on hand if necessary
11.Confirm existing security procedures:medical,fire,bomb and access control
12.Basic logistical requirements
13.Establish Ops Room/Control Point if necessary
14.Scrutinize guest list
15.Confirm proximity of the PPO and PES throughout the visit
16.Consider the press
17.Cloakroom procedures
18.SitRep to PPO
19.Await the arrival of the main group
WHENTIME IS LIMITED?PRIORITIZE THE ABOVE LIST

ON FINAL APPROACH

>give all clear to PPO

>traffic control if necessary
>PPO should give countdown on final approach
>final prep:doors/lifts open and everyone in alert

ON ARRIVAL OF MAIN GROUP

>act as a guide for the PPO

>give cover as necessary
>the SAP becomes part of the PES in the overall serurity plan as directed by the PPO

If the client has another function or venue to attend, then procedure is repeated as necessary.

III. Public Appearances

Introduction

The VIP is especially vulnerable when he leaves the controllable environment of his
residence/office.A publicappearancecan therefore feasibly include:
– social functions
– official openings
– political rallies/meetings

To this end,the majority of attacks on VIP's have taken place whilst travelling to or at public venues

The drills for Public Appearances have to be more flexible than Route Selection and Security and
Convoy Drills,because every venue is different politically,geographically and in its vulnerability

Again and again,crucial things in each situation are planning,recce and liaison.

OC Escort must advice the VIP as to whether the threat out weights,potential loss of face for not
attending.

Aim
Suggest procedures for the recce party SAP to take place before and during the event.

Try and bring out various points,which need to be thought about during different forms of venue.

Planning and Liaison

Planning ahead is vita,because of the special and varied arrangements that are necessary.There are
some advantages/disadvantages to planning official functions:

– VIP's presence means security and adminrequests are often met

– venues have well established facilities
– venues is used to coping
– the disadvantage is the need to put faith in other agencies,who may have weak or unknown
ability
– public appearances are well publicized

Good liaison is all important

Initial recce

– OC Escort and 1 SAP to attend

– meeting of all parties during which minimum security arrangements are stated
– local SB or equivalent provide int. updated threat assesment

IV. Vehicle Searching guidelines

Good pratice is that two Operators search a vehicle together as this is time saving

Radios and mibile phones must be switched off and remain switch off for the duration of the
search.Any communication between the search party and control should be verbal during this time

They will communicate any suspicious or findings back to control or the TL

Kit required
- search mirrors
– torch orflashlight
– business/credit card
– plastic tie
– multitool
– overall or large sheet of cardboard
– ultraviolet spray and blacklight (optional)

The eight stage in a vehicle search:

1.approach
2.outside
3.undercarriage
4.inside
5.under bonnet
6.in trunk
7.spare tyre and surround
8.electrics and mobility check

APPROACH

1.look at the vehicle from a distance of 20 meters.Look for anything unusual as you slowly circle
it.Oone operator goes left,one goes right.Eachmake two full circles of the car in this distance;are
there any hanging wires,boxes,tape,ties or perturbence from the body.
2.with the remote,unlock the vehicle from the maximum distance the remote will allow,try to use a
shield or any physical barrier between you and the vehicle to shelter behind.
3.moving in on the vehicle,check for prints or grease marks on the body (good pratice is to keep the
vehicle in pristine condition,altough this is not always achievable)
4.pay particular attention to closely examining anything that can be opened such as a door,fuel cap
or bonnet as this may have been an entry point for the terrorist or a place to place a trip activated
device
5.check wheel arches and wheel hubs.Also look behind bumbers
n.b.:in this stage you are looking only

EXTERIOR

1.using a plastic tie or business card,run gently and slowly along the crack of the bonnet,each
door,the petrol cap and the trunk paying particular attention to the latch area on each door
2.check exterior mirrors,running a plastic tie behind the glass.Move the mirrors at their hinges
3.check front and rear bumpers,knocking on them and listening for irregularities in the sound
reverberated back to you
4.check the grill and any external air flow vents
5.look into theexhaust pipe using your high powered torch

UNDERCARRIAGE

1.using your large piece of cardboard as a base,get under the vehicle and have your search tools
close to hand.The high powered torch and mirror are essential for this aspect of vehicle searching
due to diminished lighting conditions under the car
2.check axles,swing axles,transmission,differential and the underflooring,in particular under where
the Principal may sit.
3.the underbellies of the motor,exhaust system and gas tank should be searched thoroughly.

INTERIOR

In order to get into the vehicle we will first need to open the doors to gain entry.This must be done
with caution as it is common pratice of the terrorist to boobytrap the doors,trunk and bonnet of
vehicles.
It is advisable thet two Operator assist each other to safely open all doors before proceeding to the
internal search.Both work in unison to open all doors in the prescribed manner before moving on to
the searching of the interior.
It is also advisable that the first door to be opened is the door,on the side that allows access to pop
the bonnet.
When the bonnet is opened,then the searchers would proceed to the trunk and open that using the
SOP for opening vehicle doors.This gives each searcher a station to then work from.On completion
of the trunk and motor search,the remaining car doors would be opened and one searcher would be
responsible for searching the front of the cabin,the other,the rear.
Communication between the team members is important in this instance,when a team member has
searched their workstation they should verbally declare it clear to their mate so as to avoid
confusion over who searched where.

OPENING A CAR DOOR

1.firstly check the latch,examining the underneath

2.one Operator puts pressure against the door and gently pulls on the latch until the door lock
disengages

3.the other Operator,who directly carrying out the search, directs the door opener and gently probes
the aperture that is being created as the door opens.A plastic tie is useful for this.

4.as more space is created,the searcher can use fingers to feel

LOOK-TOUCH-FEEL

OPENING THE BONNET/TRUNK

1.as with any door,start at the latch area and examine this first.Once again,you will need a collegue
to assist on this opening as is with the car door opening system

2.with your collegue,putting downward pressure on the bonnet,you pop the bonnet after having
examined the surround of the bonnet opening switch.Sometimes it can be a lever;sometimes a
button.Trunks are usually either key operated or remoted.Either way what you should try to prevent
is the bonnet popping up too much and triggering a trip wire.

3.the bonnet is slowly opened on the command of a searcher as they examine the opening.Little by
little,the bonnet is raised as the searcher continuously check the perimeter.

MOTOR

1.check headlights,brakes,electronic ignition and air filters

2.be familiar with your vehicle,take a picture of the engine when it is sterile,blow the picture up to
A4 size and laminate then use for reference

3.check the battery,alternator,starter,belts and radiator

4.lift and open any lids or covers-look,touch and smell contents

5.re-secure everything when clear

TRUNK

1.check handle for devices or prints

2.open door as you would any other door,with the aide of a colleague and with caution

3.inside check area over rear wheels (storage areas)

4.best pratice is to keep the trunk sterile by removing everything every night.Removing the jack and
brace,the spare wheel, and emergency kit,fire extinguisher or first aid box and storing in the Control
Room.

5.check the wheelwell

6.check rear seats from behind and the headliner

7.check interior lights

8.check spare tyre for air.Is it full ofhigh pressure air,or something else?

9.remove tyre and bounce it a few times,check area behind it

CABIN

1.DO NOT LAY WEIGHT OF SIT IN TO THE INTERIOR OF THE VEHICLE AT THIS POINT!

2.start with the seats,look,touch and feel them,check for abnormalities.The furnishing should be soft
and flexible as you would expect from a seat built for comfort.

3.check the seat belt,at all point of attachment.Check the seatbelt closing mechanism

4.check under the seat using light and mirror.Under the seat may have a lot of electrics,so it is
important to familiarize oneself with your particular vehicle

5.check the footwells and up underneath the dashboard.Check foot pedals and behind them.Check
under mats if present (good pratice is to remove them completely)

6.check the head rests,the central isle and all its compartments

7.check ait ducts/vents

8.check steering wheel including airbag

9.check dash area

10.check glove compartment,doortrays,ashtrays,behind sunvisors and all compartments

11.check headliner and any consoles,also overhead lights-don't turn them on yet

REAR CABIN/BACK SEATS

1.if the seats come up,lift them and check underneath

2.check any gaps or openings in the upholstery

3.check rear headrests and the area behind them

4.check the rear headliner

n.b.:only put pressure or sit in the vehicle when all low areas (front and back) have been searched
thoroughly

ELECTRICAL/MECHANICAL CHECK

1.turn the ignition but don't start the car

2.start to check all functional buttons and switches now,turn them on,off,on again

3.turn all light on and off at least twice

4.open and close all windows,manual or electric,twice

5.turn window wipers on at various speeds and run for 10 seconds

6.turn indicators,hazards,headlights and fogs on.Test the horn.Check aircon

7.move the seats backwards and forwards

8.turn the stereo on and test all its functions,radio,CD and auxillaries,vary the volume

9.open and close the sunroof if there is one present

10.start car,colleague standing well clear.Leave run for 10 seconds then bring the revs up to 4000-
4500,ease back down,and repeat

11.move 5 meters forwards and back,repeat 2-3 times

12.rotate the steering wheel all the way to the left and right at least twice

13.test breaks,including handbrake

SECURE THE VEHICLE-DO NOT LEAVE UNATTENDED!

V. How the terrorists operate-Attack Cycle

Introduction

To counter-terrorist attacks try and think like they do.Study previous attacks and learn
retrospectively.The modern day terrorists are professionals and have developped and mastered their
trade.
This subject covers a suggested sequence of events which the terrorist attempts to adhere to.This
sequence is naturally similar to the planning of a military operation.

Types of terrorist operations-the Attack Cycle

Phase 1-Target Selection

1.Personnel: -ransom value

-publicity value
-revenge/intimidation
2.Proprety: -financial loss-product contamination
-large scale disruption
-threta of life

Phase 2-Information Gathering

1.Public sources: -who is who?/target selection

-army list/information selection
-regimental magazines
-electoral registers
-poll tax registers
-telephone directories
-local papers and magazines

2.Recces and surveillance

To confirm:
-locations
-routes and timings
To identify:
-patterns of movement
-weak points in security

note:terrorists are vulnerable during this activity:operating in unknown ground and by setting up
their own pattern of movementnaround the target

Phase 3-Preparation

Assesment/Routine habits weak point in security:when,where,how?

1.detailed planning
2.detailed briefings
3.rehearsals/dry runs
4.testing equipments

Phase 4-Attack

Success of the attack depends on professionalism and amount of planningof the group

Phase 5-Follow Up

There are further actions that a group will carry out.What actually happens,will depend on type and
aim of the attack:

-claims
-negotiation
-deadlines
-further threats
-release/escape

Method of Attack

1.small arms-long range or sniping,close in or ambush

2.victim operated IED-letter,under car
3.command operated IED-wire,radio control
4.other explosive means-mortar,rocket,missile,car bomb,proxy bomb

Examples of previous attacks

-Hans Martin Schleyer and 4 BG killed 1977

-Aldo Moro and all 5 BG killed 1978
-Attempt Pinochet 5 BG killed 11 vs. 1 1986
-Roslea PVCP 2 soldiers killed 2 vs. 1 1989

Summary

Forever bear in mind the methods of terrorists must use a plan and carry out their operations.They
are ruthless professionalgroups who carry out deadly and succesful attacks yet they from
routines,make mistakes,generally wishing to escape and can,and are defeated regularly.Be thorough
and stay alert.

VI. IED Awareness Outline Structure

Principles of make up of an IED

Basic components.A device is made up of the following:

1.power source
2.switching mechanism
3.initiator
4.main charge
5.container

The individual components can take many different forms and therefore this lesson will not give a
definitive list.If you understand the principles,you will realize that it only takes imagination to make
up the individual components.

*Commercial: manufactured so effects are known.Obtained legally or illegally from quarries,stores?

etc.

*Military:powerful and easy to handle.Differences in appearance and type dependent upon country
of origin

Components

1.Power source: most modern IED's require an electric current to fire the initiator.This can be in
the form of:
-dry cell batteries of different size,type and number.Be aware of flat batteries as found in Polaroid
-mains power supply
-integral batteries,i.e. Car,casette recorder.Power can also be produced by a chemical reaction of
even a spring forcing a striker

2.Initiator: this is required to set off the main charge.It can take the form of detonator,plain or
electric.
3.Detonator cord: this is used to link the main charge to the initiator or various charges to each
other.Appearance depends of manufacturer.

4.Main charge: can be incendary or explosive

5.Container: an IED can be contained in almost anything.Remember the type of container may
assist the effect of the IED ie.car,tin,metal,pipe,cardboard box for incendary.For greater effect,an
IED will be concealed and so the terrorist will use an everyday object to contain the device or
attempt to make the device blend in, ie. Concealing an UVET in a drain pipe.

6.Switches: this is the most important part of the device as it will determine when it will
fonction.Recognition of switches is especially important,when there is a threat of booby traps.

-Arming switch: may be included to ensure the terrorist is safe whilst positionning the device and
to enable him to withdraw

-Firing switch: this is the switch which will actually close the circuit and set off the device.There
can be many types of firing switch.Most fall into the following categories:
>Timed-terrorist has to determine optimum time for initiation and preset as necessary
1.Mechanical: clocks,watches,memo pack timers
2.Electronic: watches,video timers,electronic components

>Command: terrorist can initiate device at optimum moment,usually placed within 20m of target at
obvious slowing down points,stopping places or assembly points.Can be line of sight,or use dickers
or aiming marks:
1.Command wire.Can be any length,dug in or surface laid
2.RCIED
3.Others e.g. projectile command

>Victim operated (booby trap):relay on victim performing a certain function.Manu switches can be
used for this following these principles of operation:

-pull e.g; clothes peg and trap wire

-pressure e.g. mat,micro,switch
-pressure release e.g. trap wire
-trembler e.g. security systems
-tilt e.g. mercury tilt switch
-light sensitive,light interrupt
-high tech e.g. IR,microwave

Component Summary

1.components may take many functions

2.will utilize readily available and reliable items
3.certain terrorist group may favour a particular type of componentt or MO
4.some components may be pre-prepared e.g. TPU's (if used)

Principles of use

From studies of terrorist campaigners it would appear that there are 10 principles thet the
terroristsshould follow if they are to carry out a successful bomb attack.These are applicable to
other types of attack as well as booby traps:
-concealment
-constricted localities
-concentration of booby traps
-double blutt (come on)
-inconvenience
-curiosity
-everyday operations
-attractive items
-alternative methods of firing
-variety

Terrorists IED's may also take the appearance of more concentional weapons.They will still relay on
the basic components,but this may not be obvious-not that it matters if you are attacked in this
manner.Some examples are as follows:

Grenades. Can be modified military munitions or completely home produced.May use a striker and
cap,electrical power or burning fuse.

Other weapon systems. They have been improvised by the terrorists dependent upon their
ressources,training and opportunities.

Summary

IED's come in many shapes and forms and will often not be recognizable as such at a cursory
glance.The ways of setting off the device are numerous and varies,but whatever its design and make
up it is dangerous and intended to main or kill.

Conclusion

The IED threat can be countered by alertness and suspicion.Routine and habit must be avoided and
due consideration given the normal actions of everyday life.By being aware of the principles of
make up,operation and use of IED's your awareness will be heightened and the risk to yourselves
and those you are responsible for will be greatly reduced.

VEHICLE-BORNE IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES (VBIEDs)

Vehicle bombs are one of the most effective weapons in the terrorist's arsenal.These bombs are
capable of delivering a large quantity of explosives to target and can cause a great deal of
damage.In general,vehicle bombs fall into three categories:

Large Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device (LVBIED). An LVBIED is a lorry or truck,filled

with explosives.These vehicles enable terrorists to carry very large amounts of explosives,possibly
several tonnes,to a target and cause casualities and destruction over a range of hundreds of meters.

Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED). A VBIED is a car or van filled with
explosive,driven to a target and then detonated.

Under Vehicle Improvised Explosive Device (UVIED). A UVIED is a type of small,boobytrap

improvised explosive device placed in,on,or under a vehicle,and designed to explode when the
vehicle moves.
Vehicle bombs typically use an improvised explosive,sometimes a flammable substances is added to
enhance the effect e.g; liquified petroleum gas (LPG).The bomb can be made in advance at a safe
location some distance from the target.the explosive may be in the load-carrying area of the
vehicle,concealed in the chassis or behind panels,or in one or more containers such as a beer
kegs,dustbins wheelie bins or large suitcases.
Once assembled,the bomb can be delivered at a time of the terrorist's choosing and with
reasonnable precision,depending on defences.It can be detonated from a safe distance using a timer
or remote control,or detonated on the spot by a suicide bomber.
Building a vehicle bomb requires a significant investment of time,resources and expertise.Because
of it,terrorists will seek to obtain the maximum impact for their investment.They generally choose
high-profile targets where they can cause the most damage,inflict mass casualities and attract
widespread publicity.

VII. Route Selection and Security

Principles of Route Selection and Security on Route:

1.Avoid routine
Avoid travelling at the same time of day if the journey is a regular one,for example,the daily
journey to the workplace,residence or school,if protection is provided for children.Also varying the
route taken is an important factor in maintaining security.

2.Secrecy of times and dates

Times and dates of travel are to be kept secret and should only be shared on a strict need to know
basis.

3.Maximum possible speed

This is another important factor in route selection,choose a route that allows maximum possible
speed for the convoy,usually motorways are chosen over “A” roads because it is usually more
achievable to maintain a high speed.Of course this is not always the case,but as a generality,the
convoy has a better chance of moving faster on a multi lane motorway.

4.Used correct vehicle

Choose and use the correct vehicle for the type of journey to be taken.If the journey involves going
off road even for a short while then a four wheel drive vehicle would be a more sensible option.The
distance to be covered,the terrain,hostile areas (possibly requiring armoured vehicles as opposed to
soft skin vehicles) are all considerations.The Principal's personal choice of vehicle should have a
very limited influence on vehicle selection as their choice may not always be the securest or safest
option.

5.Safest, not shortest route

Choose a route that offers maximum security as opposed to being the shortest route.This couples
with point C above (maximum speed possible) where a motorway is a safer route than an “A” road
even though the motorway may add miles to your journey.

6.Adequate security en route

It is important that adequate security is provided throughout the journey.Quite often the Principal is
most vulnerable while in transit so resources need to be adequate (vehicles and manpower).All
agents involved in the vehicle convoy should remain alert,scanning the area around the convoy and
taking notice of other vehicles while in transit.

7.Reserve of men and equipment

Again,this relate to the previous point,adequate manpower and equipment (vehicles and comms)
willgreatly effect the effectiveness of the operation.

8.Communications
Communications (comms) should be secure and tested by the SAP for blackspots.It may be a radio
blackspot,it may be a cellphone blackspot.Some areas,particularly around military installations are
notorious for poor comms due jamming signals emitted in order to prevent their communications
from being hacked.There should be regular radio checks between vehicles and backup plan in place
should radio comms be diminished or breakdown.All operatives should be issued with a cellphone
(should not use their own)

Additional points:
-high banks,bends
-combustibles
-arrival,departure,stops en route
-time of day,weather
-safe havens
-medical
-communications
-service support
-unusual occurrances

Planning
1.security in depth
2.timing for the journey.quite
3.emergency precautions
-reaction force
-safe havens
-medicals
4.communications

Organising security
1.Security Committee
2.Assisting Forces
3.Sequence
4.Adequate warning must be given to prepare well
5.Contingency plans

Journey

Phases of operation

1.Selection of routes:
This starts in the operations room well advance if possible.The more time you have in advance the
better you can prepare.Below are a list of considerations for selecting routes:
-map study-detailed,cross referring,make sure maps are up to date
-airian photography,other data
-select wide fast roads
-least number of vulnerable points

2.Recce:
This will be done in advance by the Secure Advance Party (SAP).It is imperative that a route recce
is carried out as opposed to winging it.The recce should involve photographs and videos if possible
so as to educate team members who will be travelling the route on the day.The recce should be
carried out at the same time of day,that the journey is intended and if possible on the same day of
the week,hence the need for advance warning of the journey
-detailed recce of routes selected
-divide routes into phases/stages
-time and distance
-time of recce
-direction of the journey
-details required:
-embus and debus points
-selected route
-alternative routes
-plotting vantage and vulnerable points
-estimating manpower and equipments
-vulnerable/vantage points en route:
-thick traffic
-traffic lights
-quiet unlit areas
-roundabouts/junctions
-overlooking features
-tunnels,bridges,and culverts
-level crossings
-thick scrub/trees
-gradients

Liaison
Use the police for a lot of details needed
Recce report
1.from-to
2.map sheet no.
3.DTG
4.camera unit
5.vehicle used
6.communications
Route Recce Report
Layout
Title Page
The title page should include the following details:
-classification
-recce team members
-level of assessed threat
-DTG of recce
-DTG of intended journey
-references:
Maps
-map sheet numbers
-map titles
map folds
-scale
Aerial photos
Polaroids
Street maps
-vehicles used
-traffic conditions
-any additional relevant information

Main Route Report

From-To
Total distance
Average speed
Total time
serial GD description Type of security
1 491729 junction 1 man traffic control
2 478784 T/nights -
Plan
The recce team give the OC their recommandations and routes.The OC dose an appreciation and
makes the plan

-security in depth

-times

-emergency(precautions,QRF,safe hours,medical)

-communication dead spots

-hospitals (location of hospitals en route capability of the hospital,major operations and

instructions,name and phone number of the chief admin in the hospital)

-communications (log the location of phone boxes on route

-service and support (where refueling,agency,heavy loads on route)

-problems on route (public service,gas etc.)

to:
date:

serial time mile speed total time from/to remarks

1 16:30:00 15 60 mph 25min base(SitGes) to Secure house,air
roundabout force,hospital,police banchory.
(GR502597) Road conditions:minor road works
outside leisure center
Vulnerable points

Route details

Any details regarding the route such as:

1.Embus/Debus point.Description,diagram and pictures,security measures,vulnerable areas

2.Main route.Including route card (see above),safe havens,refueling,feeding

shops,toilets,telephones,hospitals,emergency services,vulnerable points, route map (with spots)

3.Alternative route.As above.

Assets required

Internal-numbers required to carry out the task

External-all assisting forces (police,military,medical,fire,recovery)

Hospitals-grids,adresses,telephone numbers of accident and emergency

Safe havens

Landing sites for helicopter

Service support

Dress
Equipments
Rations
Weapons
Transport

Communication and control

1.deadspots

2.communications with supporting agencies and your Operations Room

3.back up systems e.g. Vodaphone

Any additional information

any unusual occurrences during recce

Types of journey

Daily

This type of journey can leave the Principal and convoy vulnerable as the Principal will usually
leave the same residence togoto the same workplace every day.Therefore,particular attention should
be paid to these routes.The Close Protection Team should:
-recce all routes
-compile records
-secure alternative routes daily
-Security Advance Party
-contingency plans

Short notice

These journeys are far from ideal,but part of the job,the Principal has to live and it is the CP Team's
job to ensure that they are safe while doing so.This is where flexibility and the ability to organize
quickly becolme apparent in Close Protection Operations.The Close Protection Team should:
-recce and secure in time available
-embus and debus
-stopping points
-SAP travel route could be redirected to secure destination

Special

Special journeys are sometimes required depending what industry or business your Principal is
involved in.These are undertaken to award ceremonies,charity fund raisers,A.G.M.s or any other
type of activity that goes beyond the daily routine.Special journeys differ from short notice,in that
we are given time to prepare for these events,sometimes weeks in advance,this gives us time to
prepare.The Close Protection Team should:

1.recce all routes

2.recommendations for locations to be secured
3.assisting forces required (venue security,police etc.)
4.special requirements,air support,ambulance,search team etc.
5.headaches you may encounter:
-well publicized events
-time required to organize
-distance involved
-unknown ground
-coordination and cooperation required

VIII. Surveillance

Surveillance is:monitoring of people's behaviour.Systems surveillance is the process of monitoring

the behaviour of people,objects or processes within systems for comfortity to expected or desired
norms.Altough the word “surveillance” in French literally means:watching over.

Surveillance types
*eavesdropping
*telephone tapping
*directional microphone
*covert listening devices or 'bugs'
*sub-miniature cameras
*closed circuit television
*GPS tracking
*bait car
*electronic tapping
*military reconnaissance
*aerial reconnaissance
*satellite reconnaissance
*trusted computing devices
*internet and computer surveillance
*however,surveillance also includes simple,relatively no- or low technology methods such as direct
observation,observation with binoculars,postal interception,or similar methods.

Antisurveillance:method for avoid surveillance

Counter-surveillance:surveillance against surveillance

Equipments

*camera
*binocular
*radio microphone
*video
*computer
*telephone monitoring device
*tracking device

Surveillance covert
*to secretive watch without the target being avare
*to obtain evidence
*to obtain detailed informations
*to develop leads
*to know at all times where the subject is
*to confirm reliability
*to locate people
*to identify people

Methods

*by foot
*by vehicle
*static
*technical
*combined
*mobile
Surveillance overt

*CCTV
*deliberate knowledge of surveillance
*mainly public
*used as deterrent
*open observation

Counter-surveillance

*actions and maneouvres to confirm you are first under surveillance

*identify the presents of surveillance
*create a reaction
*prevent it (hard action drills)
*anti-surveillance measures
*evade or lose the surveillance
*CST counter-surveillance team
*constant checking
*confirm present of devices
*countermesures
*tactical response

Unwanted attention

*the press and media

*followers
*stalkers
*fixated persons
*criminals

Reconnaissance

*to collate and record information

*photograph,video,notes
*vulnerabilities,risks,threats,safety
*alternatives, escape routes, support agencies
*routes, equipments, safe houses, recourse

Incidents

*physical attack
*hijacking
*assault with weapon
*confrontation
*agressive person
*explosives
*snipers

Dilemmas

*equipment brake down

*illness
*missed transport
*lost luggage
*lost documents
*change of venue
*access denied
*traffic accident
*injury
*unscheduled stops
*weather
*road works

Surveillance Terminology

Alpha male
Bravo vehicle
Charlie building
Echo female
Rucksack police
Plug child (Alpha/Echo Plug)
Scratch dog
Possible stand by Possible move (e.g. door of C1 opens)
Stand by,stand by Target/Principal moving now
I have I am in control of the target
I have from the front I have control of the target from the front
I don't have I am not incontrol of the target
At and towards At a point and towards such&such
Halfway to Halfway to
approaching approaching
Can you now Can you take over now
backing I am in position to take control of the target
when required
No longer backing I am no longer in a position to take control of
the target
I can I can take the target
I no longer can I can no longer take the target
Temporary unsighted Observations lost for a short while ie.a bend in
the road
Unsighted at Observation losts at such&such
Unsighted to me Target not visible to me
I am checking Searching a given area
I have the trigger I am watching the target or target area
covering I have control of a specific area
intending Indicating right/left or pointing towards/away
from
Lift off Stop following
Stop,stop,stop Target has stopped
foxtrot On foot
mobile Vehicle moving
Can you at Asking the backing c/s if he can take at a
particular point
Complete Returned or inside,ie.A1 complete B1
held Held temporarily ie.traffic light
Not one,not two Indicates that the target vehicle has passed a
certain exit on a roundabout
One up/two up Indicates the amount of people in a vehicle
possible Used in conjunction with stand by,if you are
unsure about the subject's identity
probable Used in conjunction with stand by,if you are
more certain of the subject's identity
reciprocal Going back on the same route
Have you visual Can you see

Describing People

Describing individuals accurately is important when filling reports,making statements or relaying

information to a CP Team for them to be aware of.A full description would consist of:

A AGE The approximated age of the person

B BUILD The persons physical build.Consider bulky or lose clothing
C CLOTHING Type,colours and images
D DISTINGUISHING Anything about the person that makes them stand out (facial scars
FEATURES or tattoos) or even someone they look like
E ELEVATION Person's height
F FACIAL Description of the facial features,skin colour,size of their
nose,ears,a wide smile,narrow mouth etc.
G GAIT How the person carries himself and walk
H HAIR The colour,style and legth of his hair

A hasty description would consist of:

sex-race-age-dress-other obvious distinguishing features

IX . Residence Security
Introduction
The basic philosophy of all good security system is:

Deter>Detect>Delay
The order is important,because only this order makes a security system act as a true filter with
maximum efficiency.

1.Deter:The presence of a fence,wall,barred windows,solid door or just an alarm bell box is enough
to deter most intruders.
2.Detect:If an intruder is determined to break in,then he must be detected at the earliest possible
moment.
3.Delay:After being detected,the intruder has to be delayed as long as possible by the physical or
electrical barriers in order to allow time to apprehend him.

Security is about Percentages and Probability,it is an art not a science,but is based on scientific
principles and fundamentals.

Perfect System

The implementation of security systems based on this basic philosophy takes the form of:
1. An Outer Berrier with electronic detection
2. An Inner Barrier with electronic detection
3. A sterile zone between with electronic detection
4. CCTV surveillance
5. Low level lighting

It can be seen that the elements of this ideal system satisfies the basic philosophy as follows:
Deter by 1,2,4,5
Detect by 2,3,4
Delay by 1,2

Needless to say the ideal system is rarely,if ever achieved in practise.So security is about
Compromise as well as Percentages and Probability.
It can also be seen that each element of a system performs at least two functions
(deter,detect,delay), and for this reason it is imperative that all elements are considered together.

Perimeter Intruder Detection Systems (PIDS)

General
These can be broken down into two areas:
-Indoor
-Outdoor

Altough some devices can be used in both areas,consideration to environmental conditions in the
design and choice must be taken into account.

An efficient system must:

1. Effectively cover the protected area or point
2. Be highly resistant to tampering
3. Be acceptably free from false alarms
4. Fail safe,ie. Failure in any part,must cause alarm to operate
5. Continue to operate when the mains fail or disconnected
Typical System

An Intruder Detection System(IDS) comprises of detection devices situated at vulnerable points

connected into one or more detection circuits which radiate from an alarm indicator panel.A
disturbance or fault on a detection circuit or device causes an alarm to be sounded at the indicator
panel which indicates and identifies each detection circuit under alarm conditions.

The system thus comprises of:

1. The detecting device or sensor
2. The transmission link
3. The alarm indicators
4. Reaction or guard force

Circuits should be protected and this may involve the use of an alarm Control Unit.This is usually
locted with the Alarm Display Panel and in modern equipment comprises of an electronic system
for monitoring circuits.The design of the electronic system is important because it controls the
ability to detect tampering at the same time as maintaining stability and freedom from unwanted
alarms.

Vibration Sensors

Inertia Switches

An acceleration sensitive device comprising of a metal ball supported on contact.When clamped to

a steel window grill,a wall or similar rigid structure,the device will be affected by any mechanical
interference which will cause it to produce a minute break in the associated detection circuit.This
break is detected electronically and an alarm given.The device may be used on structures not
normally subject to vibration during the protected period or where they cannot be readily disturbed
by accident.It is however relatively selective to vibration frequencies in that it responds readily to
high frequencies such as produced by sawing or hammering,but is less sensitive to low frequencies
due to such causes as road traffic or wind pressure.Modern versions of this device are equipped
with a sensitivity control and are sufficiently versatile to be used both internally on
containers,windows and conduit piping,and externally on walls or fences.

Break Glass Detector (Vibro)

A springy metal strip,which completes a circuit under normal conditions,opens to create an alarm
condition when vibrations of sufficient intensity are received from the window.Such devices can
only be fitted to plate glass windows and tend to be unreliable due to the need for precise
adjustment.A typical sensor covers approximately 0.5 square meters of glass.

Break Glass Detector (Audio)

An alarm condition is generated when the special ultrasonic sound created by breaking glass is
detected.Such a system can provide protection for a number of panes of glass,but unfortunately may
not be installed in any room which a telephone is located,since the telephone operates on a similar
frequency to that produced by breaking glass.

Linear/Area protection
Such system provide greater protection than that provided by Point Protection systems and
generally provide a cigar-shaped or conical area of protection up to,in some cases,as much as 300
meters.These systems fall into the following general categories:

1.Beam Devices:
-Infrared-most modern systems use a modulated infrared beam and are used to detect entry through
openings.Effective coverage usually requires a multiplicity of beams making use of several beam
devices with or without mirrors so that any beam which is interrupted causes an alarm.Beams are
more economical on long ranges of windows or large door openings such as garage entrances.Small
openings are generally costly to cover with this methods.Modern devices use a laser transmitted
beam with a narrow band width and consequent difficulty in detection.

-Microwave: Not used indoors due to the difficulties in sitting,high cost and false alarm rate.

2.Volumetric Systems:

This type of detection comprises of a transmitter and receiver operating at a frequency above audio
sound located within the space to be protected.Reflections from walls and fixed objects within the
room are sensed by the receiver,but providing there is a constant relationship between transmitted
and received signal,no alarm condition arises.Any movement within the room however causes the
frequency of the reflected signal to change relative to the one transmitted.The change in frequency
(Doppler shift) is sensed within the electronic system of the device and an alarm signal is passed
along the transmission link to the alarm indicator panel.In all cases the sensitivity of the unit
requires to be adjusted so that it is no higher than necessary.Excessive sensitivity may prove a
serious false alarm hazard.Two types:

-Ultrasonic: Detection of an intruder only after entry.Uses an acoustical pressure wave at a

frequency above the limit of human hearing of the range 20-50 Khz.May detect air movements due
to draughts or heat transmitted from radiators,hot water pipes etc.,hence correct siting is
important.Solid objects and certain “soft” surfaces (carpets,clothes,cartons etc.) may absor some of
the radiation and result in a shadow effect.

-Microwave: Like ultrasonic sensors,detect only on entry and have the ability to penetrate thin
walls,windows,partitions etc.,hence correct siting is required to prevent false alarms.Unlike
ultrasonic,microwave system propagates electromagnetic waves in the frequency range 400-
25000MHz.Metal objects ie. Filling cabinets,can cause shadows where an intruder would not be
detected.

Passive Infrared (PIR)

These devices comprise of a faceted mirror or leans which focuses received infrared radiation onto
a sensing device.The received radiation is the normal infrared radiation existing within the protected
area.The effect of the faceted mirror or lens is to divide the protected area into sensitive and non-
sensitive zones.If an object moves into or through a zone,a change in infrared radiation is detected
by the sensing device,which produces an input to a processing device.If this change in radiation
corresponds to that associated with an intruder,an alarm is given.

Outdoor Systems

All these systems are designed to withstand the rigours of weather through out the year.They can be
broken down into two basic types:
1.Visible
2.Invisible
As will be seen this refers to the detection medium and not the devices themselves.

Visible

1. Proximity/Contact wire-mounted on or near a fence and alarms when an intruder touches or

is in close proximity causing a change in the electrostatic field created by the wires e.g. T or
G line.
2. Taut wire-alarms when cut or displaced by an intruder thereby causing a change in tension
on the sensing elements e.g. DTR 2000.
3. Microphonic Cable-consists of a length of electric sensor cable attached to the fence or other
barrier and connected to a signal processor.Noise and vibrations caused by the intruder is
picked by the cable and converted into an electrical signal.This signal is then processed to
differentiate between normal barrier noise and the intruder e.g. shorrock fence cut sensor
(FCS), Geoquip FPS-2,PDS-100.
4. Geophonic Transduces-detects the mechanical vibrations generated in the fence during a
forced penetration e.g. cutting or climbing.These vibrations are converted to a signal which
is fed to a processor which decides whether it is an intruder or normal fence noise.
5. Fibre Optic Cable-using a fibre optic cable,any change in the level of received signal caused
by the bending,breaking or squeezing of the cable causes an alarm. e.g. Pilkinton Sabretape.

Invisible

Burried Systems-if installed correctly,dificult to detect.Usually installed away from fences and
walls or in the sterile area in between.There is a number of different systems:

1. Geophonic Transducers-unlike the fence installed type,this sensor is buried in the ground
and detects an intruder walking or crawling near by.It has a range of approximately 5 meters
but care must be taken on installation as tree roots,water pipes and traffic noise can give rise
of false alarms.
2. Pressure Sensors-detects the changing pressure exerted on the ground by the intruder
walking or crawling over the sensor.The sensor itself can be pipes filled with a
liquid,piezoelectric cable or fibre optic cable. e.g. GPS or Sabreline.
3. Magnetic Anomaly Detection (MAD) -a system that detects any change in the normal
magnetic field surrounding the device caused by an intruder passing carrying a weapon or
other ferrous metal. e.g. Quell,PMS-200
4. Ported Coax -a pair of coaxal cables one transmits,one receives,that has the sheath ported
along its length to allow a portion of the RF energy to escape thus producing a field around
the cable.A set amount of this signal is received in the other cable and any change in this
signal caused by an intruder passing over initiates an alarm condition. e.g. Panther,Sentrax.

Microwave Systems

1.Obscuration types -microwave energy emanates from transmitter and is directed towards a
receiver,typically 100 meters away.The characteristics of the transmitter and receiver produces a
cigar-shaped detection beam between them.The receiver is looking for a set amount of signal and
any reduction in this signal caused by an intruder passing in between (thus obscuring the receiver)
will result in an alarm condition.Detection performance varies with the reflective propreties of the
ground e.g. soil,grass,concrete,shingle etc. as would the number of false alarms due to animals.The
area in between the tx and rx must be clear of grass and bushes as these will also cause an alarm
condition.It is usual to overlap adjacent zones and corners to prevent blind spots near the mounting
posts. e.g. Shorock Mk7,Racal Guardian FG-310,Electron MW-30.
2.Doppler types -this system has both the transmitter and receiver in one unit,with the detection
zone a balloon shape in front of the unit.An intruder causes the received signal's frequency to
change (Doppler effect) thus effecting an alarm.Usually mounted high and pointed down giving
ranges up to 60 meters,but with the same installation points as the obscuration type. e.g. MilPac
375C

Infrared Systems (IR)

1.Active (beam) -this system can consist of either pairs of transmitters and receivers,or one
transmitter and a number of receivers to enable the beam pattern to be varied.As with
microwave,infrared is not terrain following and the detection sensitivity is reduced in fog and heavy
rain.Again the receiver is looking for a set level of infrared energy which when reduced or altered
by an intruder will cause the systemto alarm.Corners and adjacent systems should be overlapped as
with obscuration micriwave. e.g. First Security WBA-304,Rayonnet-2

2.Passive -the optics within the system creates parallel detection fingers in which the IR content is
monitored.When sufficient change in both fingers occurs within a preset timescale then the alarm is
activated.Ranges of up to 150 meters is possible for intruders on foot but up to 1 kilometer for
vehicles so correct siting is essential.

Close Circuit Television (CCTV)

CCTV systems will comprise a mix of video cameras,monitors,camera mounting and movement
equipments,interconecting signal and control cabling and,in some cases,video motion detection and
playback system.
The type of camera selected depends mainly on the amount and type scene illumination available
under the worst case conditions and the cost.
Various types of cameras are availables,Vidicon,Ultricon,Chalnicon,Super Chalnicon,Silicon
Intensified Tube (SIT),IntensifiedSilicon Intensified Tube (ISIT) and Charge Coupled Device
(CCD),we will consider three of the most popular:

1.Vidicon -common,cheap camera used for general indoor/outdoor applications,where the scene can
be permanently well illuminated.Suffers badly from burns marks on the tube if directed towards
bright light for any length of time,which show as brown marks on the monitor and can be a visual
misance.

2.SIT -expensive but as can be seen from the performance chart,performs well in low light level
applications e.g. covert operations, edges of urban areas or locations near to street
lighting.Particulary useful for levels down to half moonlight and with infrared lighting.

3.CCD -cheap,compact size,rugged,long MTBF (mean time before failure),low power

consumption,plus a fairly good response for low light and infrared lighting makes the CCD camera
a popular choice in modern installations.

Camera optics can be provided to give almost any field of view required but the size of the intruder
as seen on a monitor at the point of penetration relative to this field of view needs to be considered.
The smaller the intruder image,particularly in poor lighting/contrast conditions the less readily will
he be detected either by direct monitor viewing or if linked to Video Motion Detection.
It is usual to use an auto iris lens to control the amount of light into the camera,but if not then a lens
F1.4 or better must be used.
Camera mounts can either be fixed or functional:
-Fixed: as its name implies,gives a constant field of view (unless zoom facilities are provided)

-Functional: cameras have varying degrees of pan and tilt.These allow greater visual coverage but if
they are the sole means of viewing an area and are themselves observable to an intruder it may be
possible to pass them undetected.Functional cameras should never be linked to Video Motion
Detection system.

Video Motion Detection

These systems operate by electronically looking for changes in the camera picture.Some systems for
user definiable parts of the picture to be sensitised.When picture changes occur an alarm is
iniciated,the system should never be used as the primary means of detection.

Disadvantages of this system:

1. changes in natural lighting,reflections of water and movement of foliage and wildlife can
cause nuisance alarms
2. detection probability falls in poor lighting and poor contract conditions
3. sensitivity may need to be frequently reset to compensate for changes in natural lighting
from daytime to nighttime.Some systems can be preprogrammed to automatically
compensate for this
4. too much reliance can be placed on them.

Security Lighting

We can define exterior security lighting as outdoor lighting provided about premises and operated
from dawn to dusk every day of the year with the prime objective of increaseing the security from
intrusion.

Capability :Security lighting systems provide enhanced night security by:

1. Deterring the intruder

2. Revealing him before,during and after the attack
3. In many cases,concealing the defenders from the view of the attacker

Cost effectiveness

Comes from:
1. Ability to supervise large areas and long perimeters with small defending force
2. Reduced need for stringent physical defences
3. Lonf life of the equipment,hugh reliability and low maintenance and running costs
compared witch other more sophisticated systems

Philosophy

It is better to have a security system that positively discourages the attacker,and which actually aids
the handling of an intrusion situation,than to have a sophisticated system to ring a bell to inform you
that an attack is taking place.Lighting is a positive asset when dealing with an intrusion,and is
clearly a deterrent,thus it is always better to have the lights on all night than turn them on (manually
or automatically) when an intrusion-detection alarm is triggered.Triggered lighting(trip-lighting)
can be easily be abused and outwitted by an intelligent attacker.
Physiological Factors

Security lighting techniques use proven science based concepts involving understanding of the
process of vision at low lighting levels,the behaviour of the dark-adapted eye,and the phenomenon
of glare.Moonlight levels of general lighting always better than “colditz”(beam searching)
installations or use of handlamps when patrolling, both of which are heavily outweighed in favour
of the intruder.

Techniques

Five basic techniques are used,which are based on traditional lighting methods:

1.Perimeter lighting(lighting of a fence or boundary,commonly with outward facing luminaires

arranged to cause glare to the intruder)

2.Checkpoint lighting (lighting to enable persons and vehicles to be checked at a point of entry,this
may include special lighting within the checkpoint hut and special window arrangements to enable
the security guards within the hut to see out without themselves being visible.

3.Area lighting (lighting of ground spaces from luminaires mountedon local structures or on pole or
towers)

4.Floodlighting of buildings,plant,walls,etc. (to reveal persons locally within the lighted area,or to
travel them by silhouette against the bright surfaces viewed from a greater distance)

5.Topping up (the provision of lighting in areas which otherwise would be shadowed by

canopies,deep doorways,narrow spaces between buildings etc.

Infrared Lighting

Infrared lighting which is frequently preferable to visible flood-lighting because it is less

apparent,improves nighttime viewing of most cameras without the need to duplicate the installation
with expensive low light level cameras.
It must be noted however that the range of view of this lighting is limited,at best to about 80
meters.Additionally,the contrast of the view,whilst better than without such lighting,is significally
reduced from daylight conditions.

X.Hotel Security

In practice we would be required to provide venue security for visiting VIP's hotels more than any
other location.In the principle,London hotels this provide very few problems;management and staff
are used to the demands of VIP Protection Teams and by and lagre offer every cooperation.When it
is necessary to make the advance arrangements for a VIP's stay at other hotels a tactful approach to
the manager by a member of the escort will usually ensure full cooperation-never forget that the
visit of the VIP will enhance the hotel's reputation and a smooth visit in all respects might
encourage similar business,a fact of which the hotel manager will be only too aware.

The Advance must endeavour to establish and cultivate contact with staff at the hotel;not only the
management and hotel security,but also hall porters,doormen,restaurant managers,floor waiters etc.
who are often more aware of what goes on in the hotel,than management,and should be briefed to
contact to protection team if they see anything unusual before and during the visit.This is dependent
of the profile of the visit,the above will apply to an overt stay and the reverse will be the case in a
covert stay.security will be considered under four basic headings:

1. Security of area surrounding the hotel

2. Security of the hotel itself-this may well amount to a totally secured perimeter
3. Security of the immediate area (suite) where the VIP will sleep
4. Security within the hotel,when the VIP is moving around

The degree of security in all the above categories is,of course,totally dependent on the
assessed threat.

Security of area surrounding the hotel

All buildings and roofs overlooking the hotel entrances,public rooms and the VIPs suite must be
checked,occupants vetted and if necessary secured during the visit.
Similar action should be taken on approach roads to the hotel entrances that the VIP will be forced
to use.
If demonstrations are contemplated,adequate uniform police must be available to control crowds
and allow the VIP's motorcade to arrive and depart without hindrance (this aspect has,on some
occasions,been the subject of incident and criticism)
Consider the use of surveillance teams in the area,in addition to normal line of route procedures.

Security of hotel itself

General:

If necessary,the building itself must be considered a defended area with all entrances under assisting
forces control-in practice this is extremely difficult in a large busy hotel without severely disrupting
the hotel routine.At minimum level the entrance used by the VIP must be controlled during periods
of arrival and departure.This is the greatest risk area,as recent history shown.

Assisting forces engaged on perimeter security must be equipped with PR and on the same
networks as VIP protection control room at hotel.The VIP should not move from his suite or arrive
at many entrance until clearance has been obtained from officers on duty in the vicinity of the
entrance.

Vetting of staff may be considered necessary and should be done with tact and discretion,special
attention being paid to employees of the same nationality as the Principal

In some cases vetting of guests as a roll-on procedure throughout the visit should be undertaken.The
lack of personel details in this case always presents a problem,remember that most aliens are
accustomed to surrendering their passports to hotel reception on arrival (for collection the following
day)

Check that occupants on either side above and below VIP are reliable.If in doubt-have them
moved:hotel management can always find a pausible excuse to re-allocate rooms.Think not only in
terms of physical threat to VIP,but potential embarrassement-a VIP suite adjacent to a room where
all night parties take place,will do little to enhance overall security (check the floor waiter)

Fire:
Fire is a real and often overlooked threat to the VIP which must be considered at all stages of the
stay.Part of the advance will include a detailed fire survey,which is to be carried out by a trained
member of the escort and if possible he should be accompanied by the local fire inspector.the aim of
the survey is to determine the following:
1. Escape routes from all locations that the VIP is likely to use,main and alternative
2. Deployed locations for fire tenders with detailed plans and orders for the evacuation of the
VIP and entourage
3. The hotels main evacuation routes and assembly areas
4. Serviceability of fire alarms and emergency lighting
5. Serviceability,locations and capabilities of fire appliances
6. Availability of breathing apparatus to be held in the control room

Before deployment,the escort are to be briefed in detail on the action be taken in the event of a
fire.The preparations and actions of the escort will be dependent on the importance and profile of
the VIP and common sense.

Security of VIP suite

The Advance should ensure that the suite selected is in the most secure location compatible with the
nature of the accomodation:this might not necessarily be the suite in the hotel.

Location:

If possible,secure a suite:

1. Not below the height of a thrown object, ie. second floor;do not necessarily try top floor,this
entrails longer time spent in lifts or on stairs.It is seldom possible to seal off an entire
floor,but this is ideal
2. Not overlooked by other buildings
3. At the end of a corridor with adjoining rooms for VIP,personal protection officers and
entourage-any person approaching the area is then suspect?Note that an end of corridor
location frequently includes fire escape doors to stairs;these cannot be secured effectively so
must be fitted with IDS linked to control room.Consider CCTV.
4. Free of external access-fire escapes and adjoining balconies;if either exist they must be
covered by IDS linked to the control room.Consider CCTV.
5. Lock and remove keys from all doors to adjoining suite (if linked) and all but one access to
corridor (you want to be sure that your VIP will only leave by one route).Consider
contacting this door to control room (VIP's do get up at 3 and walk around)
6. All keys accessing the suite should be located in control room,the key to sole exit door
(usually to lounge) should be retained by protection officer guarding suite.He is to let the
VIP in-the VIP should be advised to lock the door from the inside at night (key will override
lock from outside).Remember that masterkeys exist in profusion in all hotel.
7. The suite should be thoroughly searched and secured well before arrival of VIP (explo and
dogs) and once secured should be guarded continuously until VIP leaves whether or not he
is there.No person should be allowed access to the suite unless known personally to VIP or
Protection Officer-this includes hotel staff and management.Visits by unaccompanied
persons,once identified by VIP,should be recorded.
8. Ensure that all incoming calls are re-routed to secretary or aides room,or as a last resort, the
police control room.
9. Consider installing PABs in lounge and at bedside (portable radio)
10. Ensure that windows are covered from direct line of sight during the day,and curtains drawn
 at night.
11. The SOP, includes an operational log, to be kept.

Residence Protection Control Room:

A stay of one or more nights by VIP requires a control room for Protection Officers detailed to
guard suite:this detail must never be manned by less than two armed body guards.

The room should include toilet facilities and kettle.

The room should be located directly opposite door to VIP suite or between VIP suite and area of
hotel having public access.

Assisting forces and PR communications equipments should be installed and the monitor for any
IDS or CCTV equipment installed.

Consider passive IR for use in corridor in quite hours.

Ensure that hotel management keep all charges for bodyguard accomodation and means separate
unless a written commitment to accept the cost has been given by another organization, this must be
approved by the OC escort.

All letters,packages,flowers etc. must be delivered to control room for checking.Letters and parcels
must only be opened if suspect,and after first notifying VIP's secretary or aide.

Security within hotel

Even if hotel is totally secure,the VIP must be accompanied at all times by his Personal Protection
Officer or Residence Protection Officer when moving around within the perimeter.

Meals,if possible,should be taken in the main restaurant and the table selected by the Protection
Team:away from windows,near but not net to exit and in a position where other diners will not
pass.Try and seat the VIP with his back to the wall.if the visit is more than one day,select different
table for each meal.

Unless invited by VIP,Protection Team should select a table at a discreet distance having a clear
view of VIP and entrances.They should be near enough to react if unknown persons approach the
VIP's table but far enough away that the VIP's conversation cannot be overheard.

If private dining rooms are used,these must be searched and secured in the same manner as the
VIP's suite.No bodyguard carrying a loaded firearm should drink alcohol of any description at any
time,either on or off duty.

If the VIP visits any public toilet in the hotel,he must be discretly preceded and followed by
protection officers.

Ensure that the Restaurant Manager or Head Waite is aware,who you are and what you are there for.
Explain that you must be served before the VIP and kept,if possible,one course ahead of VIP
party.Your bill must be signed or the meal paid for immediately you have finished eating-you do not
want your VIP to leave when you are halfway through your fillet steak,or to be pursued to the door
by an irate waiter demanding payment.

All the above points are equally applicable to meals at restaurants other than inside hotel.

General

Remember that a VIP's luggage must be guarded totally whilst no under his arm or his aides
control-do not let hotel staff handle it unless supervised.

Remember that a VIP's vehicle is vulnerable unless locked in a secure garage when not used-if the
vehicle is not an official police vehicle arrangement,should be made for it to be garaged under
police control.When in use,it must either be guarded by police the absence of the driver,or subject to
security check before VIP enters the vehicle on each occasion.

Conclusion

The security of a VIP during a hotel stay presents the escort with a challenge as they are operating
in an environment which is not familiar to them and where theynare having to rely on other
agencies for different aspects of security.A throgh recce,good liaison with all agencies and diligence
mixed with flexibility will ensure that the VIP has a safe stay.

XI. Searching and Securing Accomodation

What we are searching for:
1. Booby traps/explosive devices
2. Undesirable persons
3. Hidden eaves dropping devices

Types of search:

1. Daily
2. Hasty
3. Special

Daily search-Residence/Office

Search time.SAP needs to leave only one hour ahead because:

-there are secure cordons
-there is no access to unauthorised persons
-the layout is well known by the BG

Hasty search

Usually due to a change in schedule,where:

-the SAP are redirected
-Standby Team carry out the task

Hasty search priorities:

-debus points
-route from debus to rooms VIP will use
Special search

A planned search other than residence and office

Phases of Special Search:

1. Recce
2. Search and secure
3. Reception VIP

Phase 1-Recce:

General-Team is tasked to cover all aspects of the visit

-route
-venue arrangements
-security in depth at all stages

Recce Team:

1.High level:OC Escort/PPO or 2iC plus members of Standby team or search on the day
2.Low level:members of Standby Team responsible on the day

Liaison:
-local police
-host of function organize
-coop essential
-function preparation and how it will effect search and secure

Obtain:
1. Diagram of accomodation photos
2. Plan of building floor plan
3. Sketch map of outside area
4. Aerial photos
5. Video

Estimate:

1. Additional manpower/dogs
2. Facilities
3. Communications
4. Search kit and specialist equipments
5. Overall time search will take

Phase 2:Search and secure

Determine the depth of search.Search must be:

-logical
-systematic
-very thorough

To achieve this,you need adequate manpower with tight control.

On arrival SAP OC should:
1. Establish control point
2. Establish communication with Main Escort
3. Ensure assisting forces communicate with CP
4. Brief assisting forces

Areas of responsibility:

-far distance
-middle distance
-immediate
-building

All personel serching must be briefed on what they are searching for and action on finding it.

Remember they are searching for:

Booby traps/explosive devices

Undesirable persons
Hidden eaves dropping devices

Acquire a guide for

-explanation-local knowledge-caretaker
-gain access
-remove valuable items

Search equipments

-overalls
-plastic strips
-pliers
-adjustable spanners
-screwdrivers
-mirrors
-illuminated probes
-torch lamps
-string
-detection devices

Once outside areas searched,must be under observation patrolled by assisting forces.

Internal search

-floor
-walls
-ceilings
-furniture appliances
-avoid damage
-emphasize value of surrounding
-aid to searching
Once a room is clear:

-rearrange furniture as necessary

-no direct view to VIP
-no silhouette
-carry out arc of fire test
-windows
-patrolled
-process repeated
-electricity
-physical securing of opening
-all unused rooms locked

Phase 3:Arrival

1. confirm
2. inform
3. await arrival SAP/VIP

Conclusion

Comprehensive recce to evaluate.Put forward realistic recommandations

XII.Radio Communication
Advantages:
-quick and easy
-facilites coordination
-until 3 miles

Disadvantages:
-not always reliable
-limited to line of sight use
-insecure
-battery dependent

Voice Procedure:Security-Accuracy-Discipline

Aids to Security:

-callsigns
-codewords
-authentifications

Aids to Accuracy:

-natural rithm
-slightly slower
-normal volume
--phonetic alphabet
-prowords

Aids to Discipline:
Texts kept to a minimum so that others can use the net.Maintain a constant listening.Calls are
answered in the correct order.
Radio Prowords:

Prowords are words used to convey a lot of information or set the context for the information you
are about to send in a single,or very few words in order to simplify the radio communication
process.Prowords are the follows:

Hello I am transmitting,listen in for callsign

Over Is the end of my transmission,a reply is expected
Wait I will come back to you shortly
Out This is the end of my transmission,no reply is expexted or required
Out to you This is the end of my transmission to you,a transmission to another callsign
follows immediately
Roger Received and understood
Priority Requests priority use of the net to send important traffic
Say again Say your last message again
Say again all after* Send your last message again from the * point
Say again all before* Send your last message again from thebeginning to * point
I spell I will spell phonetically
Figures I will say the numbers
Read back Repeat to me the information I have sent
Wrong My previous statement was incorrect
Cancel Disregard this transmission
Nothing heard I have received nothing from you in reply to my calls
Acknowledge Confirm the reception
Affirmative
Negative
All after
All before
Correct
Correction
Do not answer
Silence lifted
Fetch Give someone to me
Speaking
From
To
This is
Say again
Send
Relay to Forward my message to someone
Roger Copy
Roger so far Are you copy
Wilco I heard and I am executing

Signal strength Readability

LOUD CLEAR
GOOD READABLE
WEAK DISTORTED
VERY WEAK WITH INTERFERENCE
NOTHING HEARD UNREADABLE

Phonetic Alphabet

The phonetic alphabet is used to aid accuracy when communicating via radio or telephone,used to
spell words or used when speaking alphanumeric sequences,each letter is represented by a word
starting with the letter it represents which sounds like no other word in the phonetic alphabet.

A ALPHA N NOVEMBER
B BRAVO O OSCAR
C CHARLIE P PAPA
D DELTA Q QUEBEC
E ECHO R ROMEO
F FOXTROT S SIERRA
G GOLF T TANGO
H HOTEL U UNIFORM
I INDIA V VICTOR
J JULIET W WHISKY
K KILO X X-RAY
L LIMA Y YANKEE
M MIKE Z ZULU

XIII. Various CP roles

The CPO is an individual formed to make up the Close Protection
-may not be always in team
-tasks variable

His qualities:
-reliable
-organised
-has integrity
-confident
-motivated
-able to communicate
-flexible
-observant

CP Team:

1.Team Leader-TL

-administration
-updating the traits and risks
-issuing team orders and Standard Operational Procedures
-overseeing Team
-liaison with the Clients and Principal
-TL has most contact with Principal of all team members
-TL is to manage the Team,ensuring harmony during operation

2.Second in Command-2i/c

-nominated member of the Team

assists the TL in his duties

3. Bodyguard-BG

-directly responsible for the Principal

-co-ordinates the PES when moving
-maintains contact between the Team-TL Principal
-must be alert to any situations

4.Personal Escort Section-PES

-maintain the security around the BG and Principal

-enter,check,secure areas
-aid the BG to maintain all around awareness

5.Security Advanced Party-SAP

-reconnaisance routes
-secure locations ahead of the Principal's arrival
-confirm the appropriate arrangements are made as required

6.Residential Security Team-RST

-maintainig security at residence
-recording and handling people movements around the residence
-surveying residence
-searching deliveries

7.Driver

-ensuring VHLs are in good condition

-responsible for VHL security
-to be familiar with routes and notable points along the route

8.Additional roles

-Personal Assistant
-Surveillance Operator
-Intelligence Officer
-Medical Officer
-Security Driver
-Personal Aid

The Principal is the person who benefits our protection.The Client is the person who hires us to
provide protection.Our fidelity is for the Principal.

Protocol is the professional discipline that allows the CPO to behave in a way at all times
appropriate to the life and lifesafe of the Principal.To conduct yourself,is a manner synonimous with
the Principal and the situations you may find yourself in the areas of the good
protocol:dress,hygiene,habits,behaviour.

XIV. Conflict Management

The importance of the Conflict Management is being proactive in the job.

The potential risks for CPO:
-large number of people
persons-objects -places (POP)

Fight or Flight

SAFER,to avoid a conflict:

-Step back
-Assesss threat
-Find a help
-Evaluate options
-Respond

The 4A model,torecognising and defusing conflict:

-do not get Angry
-manage Abuse
-maintain a positive Attitude
-be Assertive

Attack Cycle Model:

1. Target selection
2. Surveillance
3. Final target selection
4. Planning and final surveillance
5. Attack team arriving
6. Attack

Stages of Kidnapping:

1.Abduction-taking off a person against his will

2.Concealement-hiding him in a secret place
3.Demand

Threat awareness,evaluation and avoidence are the key of effective protection.A threat assessment
must be logical,clear,accurate relevant and comprehensive

Threat categories:

LEVEL 1: high risk

LEVEL 2: medium risk
LEVEL 3: low risk

LEVEL 1: 1. Bodyguard-BG
2. Protective Escort Section-PES
3. max. protection on place

LEVEL 2: 1.Bodyguard-BG
2. Protective Escort Section-PES
3. 3. some of the above mentionned groups

LEVEL 3: 1. Bodyguard-BG
2. routine search at residence
3. 3.escort section if needed

Profiling a threat assessment by 7Ps:

-Personal relationships
-People
-Places
-Personality
-Prejudices
-Personal history
-Private lifestyle

Dilemma< >Incident

A dilemma does not jeopardise the safety of Principal (ex. Lost bagage,unexcepted hostility)
Incident,ex. Principal take ill,attack

Operational Planning OP

-details
-timing
-reconnaissance
-liaison
-appreciation

OP order reading

-grounds
-situations (the 7Ps,medic infos,threats)
-mission
-execution
-service support (detailed equipment list)
-command and signals

Annexes

INITIAL VISIT-CITY FILE

CITY

COUNTRY
PRINCIPAL LANGUAGE SPOKEN

TIME DIFFERENCE FROM GMT

LAST VISITED

CURRENCY AND CURRENT EXCHANGE

AIRPORT
AIRPORT CODE

DISTANCE FROM AIRPORT TO CITY

POLICE CONTACT LOCAL

POLICE CONTACT NATIONAL

ELECTRONIC SECURITY SPECIALIST

BOMB DOG HANDLER

LIMO SERVICE AND TRAINED DRIVERS

LINGUIST/TRANSLATOR
ACCEPTABLE MEDICAL FACILITIES

MEDEVAC AND AIR SERVICES

ENGLISH SPEAKING DOCTORS

FAVOURITE HOTELS & NUMBERS

FAVOURITE RESTAURANTS & NUMBERS

SPECIAL THREATS OR DANGERS

1 CRIMINALS

2 TERRORISTS
3 ETHNIC/RELIGIOUS

4 MEDICAL
WEAPONS RESTRICTIONS&LICENCES

GUNSHOP/ARMOURER/GUNSMITH
EMBASSIES

INFORMATIONS REGARDING USE OF

RADIOS
INFORMATIONS REGARDING USE OF
MOBILES
LOCAL CUSTOMS REGARDING
GRATUITIES
BRIBES

IMPORTANT TABOOS
PRINCIPAL RELIGIONS

DRY CLEANERS,LAUNDRIES
TRANSPORTATION
YACHT BASSIN,HARBOUR

RAH.STATION
HELIPORT

OTHER USEFUL INFORMATION

Security Advance Preparation-Route Survey Form

Route description: Date of survey: Time of survey:

Country: City: State or province:

Start point
Street adress: City: State or province: Country:

End point
Street adress: City: State or province: Country:

Type of movement Type of escort Have secondary routes

*single vehicule *police been surveyed:
*with escort *Private SecurityDetail *yes
*no
Daily traffic flow: Holyday and weekend Are there road
*light traffic flow: construction zone:
*moderate *light *yes
*heavy *moderate *no
*time of day *heavy *if yes,what do the
*time of day detour signs look like
*not applicable

Identify the following potential hazards along Identify the following

the route: resources along the
*bridges route:
*overpasses *hospital
*culverts *polite stations
*tunnels *police checkpoints
*railroad crossings *fire stations/houses
*road constructions *Medical Emergency
*intersections Response Units
*roundabouts
*potential attack areas
Have safe areas been identified: Will a Surveillance Have checkpoints been
*yes Detection Team: selected and codes
*no *yes assigned as necessary:
*not applicable *no *yes
*not applicable *no
*not applicable
Remarks:

Security Advance Preparation-Route Survey Form

Route card End Point-Residence/Office/Airport

End mileage:
 Start point-Residence/Office/Airport
set mileage to zero

Security Advance Preparation-Hotel Survey Form

City: State/country: Person filled out this form:

General information
Name of hotel: Phone: Email:
Street adress:
Primary POC: Phone: Email:
General Phone: Email:
manager:
Security Phone: Email:
manager:
Does the facility have a CCTV/cameras:
fire alarm/sprinkler *yes,monitor location:
system: *no
*yes
*no
Does the facility What type of internet access:
provide internet access: *dial up modem
*yes,in room *broadband/DSL
*yes,business center *wireless
*no *other
Foreign currency Electric current withinthe room/plug type:
exchange rate: *110V
*220V
Credit cards accepted: Type of overnightsite:
*Visa *public hotel
*Mastercard *private residence
*American Express *other
*Dinners Club
*other
Room Room Is breakfast included:
rate,suite: rate,single: *yes
*no
Hotel services
Porters/ Dry Currenc Fitness Restaurant:
luggage cleaning y center
carts: /laundry exchang *24
: e: hour
*hours
of
operatio
n:
Room Late Early Busines Other:
service: check check s center:
out: in:
Will the hotel remove/exchange furniture in security control and commo rooms:
*N/A
*no
*yes-specify if there is an added charge:
Has the minibar in the Is there a gym/health/spa:
security control room *yes
been sealed or *no
removed:
*yes
*no
*n/a
Did we receive maps of the applicable floors within the hotel:
*yes
*no
*n/a
Time/date all room keys will be available for pick up at front desk:
Location of room keys upon arrival of the principal:
*Security team member
*speech manager
*PR manager
*Principal required to register at front desk and obtain key from reception
*other-explain
Departure
Principal's final Time/date luggage needs to be in the vehicle:
departure time/date:
Prior to departure the executive's baggage will When and who will conduct a room sweep:
be:
*picked up by Security Team member
*delivered to Security Team member Is a luggage sweep required:
*delivered to Communications Control Room
*other-explain
Type of luggage sweep: POC: Phone: Email:
K-9
X-ray POC: Phone: Email:
magnetometer POC: Phone: Email:
other POC: Phone: Email:
Communications
Name/organization of person installing IDD Time/date IDD lines will be installed:
lines:

Direction needed for satellite communication: Time/date IDD lines will be operational:

If necessary,will facility allow to roof of building for satellite communication:

*yes
*no
*other
Medical informations
Name of hospital during visit to the site: Phone:

Notes:

Arrival
Principal's initial arrival time/date:

Will a hotel representative greet the Principal Where will the limo and chase vehicles park:
upon arrival: *parking lot adjacent to the main entrance
*yes-name,title *hotel parking,garage
*no *vehicles will be released for the evening
*other-explain
Where will the Principal and motorcade If Principal will use stairs,how many flights:
arrive/depart the hotel:
*the hotel main entrance,located on the ground
floor
*other-explain
Describe the walking route from the hotel entrance to the Principal's room:

Describe the emergency evacuation route from the Principal's room:

Capacity of hotel elevators: What floor is the Principal's Will elevator be locked down:
weight: max.occupants: room on: *no
*yes-POC for keys:
How will tips be paid: How many pieces of luggage will be
*by a member of the Security Team accompanying the Principal:
*billed to a member of the Security
Team-cost/bag $:
Which elevator will be used for baggage: Where will the baggage truck unload and load:
*the main ones,located in hotel lobby *the hotel's main entrance,located on the ground
*the hotel service elevator floor
*other-explain
What role will the hotel security or host nation security assume during the Principal's stay:
*security checkpoints
*elevator lockdown
*roving guard/increased visibility
*none
*n/a
Will the facility provide the name of persons staying in the rooms next to,above and below the
Principal:
*yes,see attached hotel roster
*no
*n/a
Will the facility provide a list of hotel employees that will provide service to the Principal and
staff:
*yes,see attached roster
*no
A local police name check was completed of hotel personnel,who will be close to the Principal:
*yes
*no
What type of security sweep will take place in the Principal's room:
*K-9
*TCSM
*none
*other
 Security Advance Preparation-Hospital Survey Form
City: State/country: Person filled out this form:
Name of facility:
Street adress:
Type of facility
*civilian Inpatient with Inpatient without Outpatient with Outpatient without
*military emergency room emergency room emergency room emergency room
Emergency room informations
Emergency room primary POC: Phone (direct line):
Emergency room alternative POC: Phone:
Hospital security manager Phone:
Ambulance service: Phone:
Medevac POC: Phone:
Describe facility's medevac procedure:

During medevac,would company staff be able to stay with Principal:

*yes
*no
Is the emergency room easy to locate by vehicle:
*yes
*no-explain:
Is the emergency room open 24 hours:
*yes
*no-explain:
Is an English speaker interpreter on-duty 24 hours by day:
*yes
*no
*n/a
Injury referred to another Name of hospital: Phone:
hospital:
Injury referred to another Name of hospital: Phone:
hospital:
Injury referred to another Name of hospital: Phone:
hospital:
Emergency room information
*emergency room *X-ray *cardiologist *neurosurgeon *whole blood
*trauma unit *burn unit *operating team *heliport *medevac