Date:June 5–10, 1967

Location:Middle East

Result:Israeli victory

Territorial changes

Israel captures the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula from Egypt, the West Bank (including East
Jerusalem) from Jordan, and the Golan Heights from Syria.

Belligerents

Israel

Egypt

Syria

Jordan

Iraq

------------------------------------------------

Supported by:

■ Algeria

■ Kuwait

■ Libya

■ Morocco

■ Pakistan

■ PLO

■ Saudi Arabia

■ Sudan
■ Tunisia

Commanders and leaders

Yitzhak Rabin

Moshe Dayan

Uzi Narkiss

Motta Gur

Israel Tal

Mordechai Hod

Yeshayahu Gavish (he)

Ariel Sharon

Ezer Weizman

Abdel Hakim Amer

Abdul Munim Riad

Zaid ibn Shaker

Asad Ghanma

Nureddin al-Atassi

Abdul Rahman Arif

Mubarak Abdullah Al-Jaber Al-Sabah

Strength

50,000 troops

214,000 reserves
300 combat aircraft

800 tanks

Total troops: 264,000

100,000 deployed

Egypt: 240,000

Syria, Jordan, and Iraq: 307,000

957 combat aircraft

2,504 tanks

Total troops: 547,000

240,000 deployed

Casualties and losses

776-983 killed

4,517 wounded

15 captured

------------------------------------------------

400 tanks destroyed

46 aircraft destroyed

Egypt – 10,000-15,000 killed or missing

4,338 captured

Jordan – 6,000 killed or missing

533 captured

Syria – 2,500 killed

591 captured

Iraq – 10 killed

30 wounded

------------------------------------------------

hundreds of tanks destroyed

452+ aircraft destroyed

20 Israeli civilians killed

The Six-Day War (Hebrew: ‫מלחמת ששת הימים‬, Milhemet Sheshet Ha Yamim; Arabic: ‫النكسة‬, an-
Naksah, "The Setback" or ۱۹٦۷ ‫حرب‬, Ḥarb 1967, "War of 1967"), also known as the June War,
1967 Arab–Israeli War, or Third Arab–Israeli War, was fought between June 5 and 10, 1967, by
Israel and the neighboring states of Egypt (known at the time as the United Arab Republic),
Jordan, and Syria. The war began on June 5 with Israel launching surprise strikes against
Egyptian air-fields in response to the mobilisation of Egyptian forces on the Israeli border.

A period of high tension had preceded the war. In response to PLO sabotage acts against Israeli
targets, Israel raided into the Jordanian-controlled West Bank and initiated flights over Syria,
which ended with aerial clashes over Syrian territory,Syrian artillery attacks against Israeli
civilian settlements in the vicinity of the border followed by Israeli responses against Syrian
positions in the Golan Heights and encroachments of increasing intensity and frequency into
the demilitarized zones along the Syrian border, and culminating in Egypt blocking the Straits of
Tiran, deploying its troops near Israel's border, and ordering the evacuation of the U.N. buffer
force from the Sinai Peninsula. Within six days, Israel had won a decisive land war. Israeli forces
had taken control of the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula from Egypt, the West Bank,
including East Jerusalem, from Jordan, and the Golan Heights from Syria.

Background and summary of events leading to war

After the 1956 Suez Crisis, there were numerous minor border clashes between Israel and its
Arab neighbors, particularly Syria. On November 4, 1966, the Soviet Union vetoed a six-Power
resolution inviting Syria to prevent incidents that constituted a violation of the General
Armistice Agreement.

Events: Israel–Jordan

Soon thereafter, in response to Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) guerrilla

activity,including a mine attack that killed three Israeli soldiers, the Israeli Defense Force (IDF)
attacked the village of as-Samu in the Jordanian-occupied West Bank.Jordanian units that
engaged the Israelis were quickly beaten back. Between 14 and 21 Jordanian soldiers were
killed in the operation and 37 more were wounded. Overall, 18 were killed, 130 wounded, while
125 houses, the school, and the clinic were destroyed in the attack.Israel's attack was deplored
by the Security Council, which emphasized to Israel that actions of military reprisal could not be
tolerated. King Hussein of Jordan criticized Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser for failing to
come to Jordan's aid, and "hiding behind UNEF skirts". The Samu raid shattered the fragile trust
between Israel and Jordan,leading the Jordanian leadership to believe Israel's strategic goal was
to occupy the West Bank. According to one source, this alleged fear that Israel would invade
the West Bank in the event of a regional war led to King Hussein's decision to sign a joint
defense pact with Egypt.Others however have theorized that Hussein's pact with Egypt was
motivated by a desire to placate domestic pressures and preserve his throne. Still others have
noted that Hussein closed ranks with Nasser because he had to convince Arabs "that he was not
a puppet of the West".

Events: Israel–Syria

Author Jeffrey Sosland argues in his book that before 1967 Syria exacerbated the confrontation
with Israel in order to divert attention from its internal economic and political instability. Not
only land, but water was a major factor in building tensions between Israel and its neighbours
and eventually to the war itself.

From the 1950s onward tensions surrounding water politics had escalated. Israel tapped the
Jordan River (and the Sea of Galilee) by canal for irrigation of the Southern Negev desert, and
Syria started the Headwater Diversion Plan (Jordan River) in order to thwart Israel's plans to use
the water. Cross-border conflicts over water had preceded the war by years, without any
permanent political resolution.
Between 1966 and 1967 Israel’s borders saw repeated Arab terrorist attacks and Syrian military
activity. The Syrians were opposed to any form of Israeli use of the demilitarized zone, even if
only for agricultural purposes. On May 11, UN Secretary General U Thant leveled criticism at
Syria for its sponsorship of Palestinian terrorism, denouncing those attacks as "deplorable",
"insidious" and "menaces to peace". Syria's UN representative protested that, while Fatah
operations were on this rise, such a declaration only encouraged Israel to continue threatening
Syria. On January 24, 1967 the Syrian spokesman declared:"Quiet in the demilitarized zone does
not mean there will be quiet in the occupied territory" (i.e. the Israeli territory).

During 1965–7, Israel's armed forces staged numerous provocations along the Israeli–Syrian
border area. The pattern was of action and reaction. Israeli armoured tractors, often guarded
by police, would start to plow in a disputed area of the DMZ. From its high ground positions,
Syria would fire at those advancing, and, adopting a new policy,[ retaliated for Israeli fire at
Syrian military positions by firing on civilian settlements in the Hula Valley. Israel would retaliate
with raids on Syrian positions, including the use of air power. U.N. officials blamed both Israel
and Syria for destabilizing the borders. This escalation led the Syrians and the Soviets to believe
Israel was planning to overthrow the Syrian regime using military force. On April 7, 1967, a
serious incident broke out between Israel and Syria, after Israel had begun to cultivate more
westerly tracts in the Ha'on sector of the demilitarized zone. Israel took military action against
Syria, and eventually both sides employed artillery, tanks, and mortars. During this clash Israeli
airstrikes were launched a few miles from Damascus. Israel bombed both Syrian border villages
and military targets. After several hours the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization
managed to arrange a cease-fire. Following this confrontation Arab governments pledged their
support to Syria.

On May 7, 1967, the Israeli cabinet authorized a limited retaliatory raid against Syria in case
Syria failed to heed Israel's public warnings and non-coercive methods failed.

Events: Israel–Egypt

After the 1956 Suez Crisis, Egypt agreed to the stationing of U.N. peacekeepers, the United
Nations Emergency Force (UNEF), in the Sinai to ensure all parties would comply with the 1949
Armistice Agreements, the Straits of Tiran were opened to Israeli traffic and the Sinai peninsula
was demilitarized.
The move of Egyptian forces to the Sinai: In May 1967, Nasser received false intelligence
reports from the Soviet Union that an Israeli attack on Syria was imminent.These false reports
followed Israeli officials threatening military action against Syria if the Syrian authorities did not
stop Palestinian guerrillas from crossing the border into Israel. On 14 May 1967 General
Mohammed Fawzi left for Syria for one day tour, verified that the Soviet report was false and
reported that there were no Israeli armed forces near the Syrian border. Still, Nasser declared
full mobilisation in Egypt as of 14 May 1967, citing the joint defence agreement with Syria.
According to Oren, Nasser had by then already started his buildup and he feared that, since a
large portion of his army was already in the Sinai, a sudden callback of those forces would result
in humiliation at a time when Nasser could ill afford it. On May 19, U Thant called statements
attributed to Israeli leaders "so threatening as to be particularly inflammatory in the sense that
they could only heighten emotions and thereby increase tensions on the other side of the
lines". Nasser then misled the Egyptian people by perpetuating the falsehood claiming in an
address on the anniversary of the Egyptian revolution, that the IDF was concentrating forces
"on Syria's doorstep". Israel's threats to invade Syria appeared serious to Arab leaders, and
foreign observers suspected that an Israeli strike on Syria was imminent. According to Michael
Oren, Nasser disregarded the counsel of his own intelligence and began massing his troops in
the Sinai Peninsula on Israel's border (May 16), expelled the UNEF force from Gaza and Sinai
(May 19), and took up UNEF positions at Sharm el-Sheikh, overlooking the Straits of Tiran.
According to Moshe Shemesh, as Egypt and Syria shared a mutual defence pact, Nasser
responded to the Israeli threats by beginning to concentrate his troops in the Sinai Peninsula
according to the "Qahir" (Conqueror) defence plan. He also decided to prepare the feda'iyyun
for carrying out the "Fahd 2 (Leopard) Plan" [murderous attacks] inside Israel and to coordinate
military operations with Syria. Eshkol denounced the Egyptians in his speech on 21 May, but his
response to this development was a model of moderation. He demanded that Nasser withdraw
his forces from Sinai but made no mention of the removal of UNEF from the Straits nor of what
Israel would do if they were closed to Israeli shipping

The Straits of Tiran closure: The Straits were regarded by the Western Powers and Israel as an
international waterway but its legal status was the subject of international controversy. The
Arabs believed that they had the right to regulate passage of ships while Israel, with the
support of other major world powers, countered that the Arab claims were legally not
supportable. In 1967 Israel reiterated declarations made in 1957 that any closure of the Straits
would be considered an act of war, or a justification for war. On May 22, Nasser declared the
Straits closed to Israeli shipping. Nasser stated he was open to referring the closure to the
International Court of Justice to determine its legality, but this option was rejected by Israel.
Egyptian propaganda attacked Israel, and on May 27, Nasser stated "Our basic objective will be
the destruction of Israel. The Arab people want to fight."

On May 30, Jordan and Egypt signed a defense pact. The following day, at Jordan's invitation,
the Iraqi army began deploying troops and armoured units in Jordan. They were later
reinforced by an Egyptian contingent.

According to historian Abd aI-Azim Ramadan, Nasser mistaken decisions to expel the
international peacekeeping force from the Sinai Peninsula and close the Straits of Tiran in 1967,
led to a state of war with Israel, despite the lack of military preparedness.

According to Shlaim & Louis, in the end of May 1967, Nasser claimed in a public speech to have
been aware of the implications of the Egyptian decision to send troops into Sharm El Sheikh:
"Taking over Sharm El Sheikh meant confrontation with Israel. It also means that we ready to
enter a general war with Israel. It was not a separate operation".

Most scholarly accounts of the crisis attribute the drift to war to an escalation that was
unwanted, however despite a desire to avoid war on all sides, everyone was in the end
responsible for making the escalation unavoidable.

Israel politics and diplomacy

On June 1, Israel formed a National Unity Government by widening its cabinet, and on June 4
the decision was made to go to war. Israel's defence forces were confident of victory in any
conflict with the Arab states, and military leaders provided prime minister Eshkol with alarmist
information to persuade him to support an attack. The next morning, Israel launched Operation
Focus, a large-scale surprise air strike that was the opening of the Six-Day War.

Military preparations

Arab preparations
On the eve of the war, Egypt massed approximately 100,000 of its 160,000 troops in the Sinai,
including all of its seven divisions (four infantry, two armoured and one mechanized), four
independent infantry brigades and four independent armoured brigades. No fewer than a third
of them were veterans of Egypt's continuing intervention into the Yemen Civil War and another
third were reservists. These forces had 950 tanks, 1,100 APCs, and more than 1,000 artillery
pieces.

Nasser's ambivalence about his goals and objectives was reflected in his orders to the military.
The general staff changed the operational plan four times in May 1967, each change requiring
the redeployment of troops, with the inevitable toll on both men and vehicles.

Towards the end of May, Nasser finally forbade the general staff from proceeding with the
Qahir ("Victory") plan, which called for a light infantry screen in the forward fortifications with
the bulk of the forces held back to conduct a massive counterattack against the main Israeli
advance when identified, and ordered a forward defense of the Sinai. In the meantime, he
continued to take actions intended to increase the level of mobilization of Egypt, Syria and
Jordan, in order to bring pressure on Israel.

Syria's army had a total strength of 75,000 and amassed them along the Syrian border.Jordan's
army had 55,000 troops and 300 tanks along the Jordanian border, 250 of which were U.S. M48
Pattons, sizable amounts of M113 APCs, a new battalion of mechanized infantry, and a
paratrooper battalion trained in the new U.S.-built school. They also had 12 battalions of
artillery and six batteries of 81 mm and 120 mm mortars.

Documents captured by the Israelis from various Jordanian command posts record orders from
the end of May for the Hashemite Brigade to capture Ramot Burj Bir Mai'in in a night raid,
codenamed "Operation Khaled". The aim was to establish a bridgehead together with positions
in Latrun for an armoured capture of Lod and Ramle. The "go" codeword was Sa'ek and end
was Nasser. The Jordanians planned for the capture of Motza and Sha'alvim in the strategic
Jerusalem Corridor. Motza was tasked to Infantry Brigade 27 camped near Ma'ale Adummim:
"The reserve brigade will commence a nighttime infiltration onto Motza, will destroy it to the
foundation, and won't leave a remnant or refugee from among its 800 residents".
100 Iraqi tanks and an infantry division were readied near the Jordanian border. Two squadrons
of fighter-aircraft, Hawker Hunters and MiG 21, were rebased adjacent to the Jordanian border.

On June 2, Jordan called up all reserve officers, and the West Bank commander met with
community leaders in Ramallah to request assistance and cooperation for his troops during the
war, assuring them that "in three days we'll be in Tel Aviv".

The Arab air forces were aided by volunteer pilots from the Pakistan Air Force acting in
independent capacity, and by some aircraft from Libya, Algeria, Morocco, Kuwait, and Saudi
Arabia to make up for the massive losses suffered on the first day of the war. PAF pilots shot
down several Israeli planes.

James Reston, writing in The New York Times on May 23, 1967, noted, "In discipline, training,
morale, equipment and general competence his [Nasser's] army and the other Arab forces,
without the direct assistance of the Soviet Union, are no match for the Israelis.... Even with
50,000 troops and the best of his generals and air force in Yemen, he has not been able to work
his way in that small and primitive country, and even his effort to help the Congo rebels was a
flop."

Israeli preparations

The Israeli army had a total strength, including reservists, of 264,000, though this number
could not be sustained, as the reservists were vital to civilian life.

Military preparations

Before the war, Israeli pilots and ground crews had trained extensively in rapid refitting of
aircraft returning from sorties, enabling a single aircraft to sortie up to four times a day (as
opposed to the norm in Arab air forces of one or two sorties per day). This enabled the Israeli
Air Force (IAF) to send several attack waves against Egyptian airfields on the first day of the war,
overwhelming the Egyptian Air Force, and allowed it to knock out other Arab air forces on the
same day. This has contributed to the Arab belief that the IAF was helped by foreign air forces
(see Controversies relating to the Six-Day War). Pilots were extensively schooled about their
targets, and were forced to memorize every single detail, and rehearsed the operation multiple
times on dummy runways in total secrecy.

The Egyptians had constructed fortified defenses in the Sinai. These designs were based on the
assumption that an attack would come along the few roads leading through the desert, rather
than through the difficult desert terrain. The Israelis chose not to risk attacking the Egyptian
defenses head-on, and instead surprised them from an unexpected direction.

On the evening of June 1, Israeli Minister of Defense Moshe Dayan called Chief of Staff Yitzhak
Rabin and the General Officer Commanding (GOC), Southern Command Brigadier General
Yeshayahu Gavish to present plans against Egypt. Rabin had formulated a plan in which
Southern Command forces would fight their way to the Gaza Strip and then hold the territory
and its people hostage until Egypt agreed to reopen the Straits of Tiran; while Gavish had a
more comprehensive plan that called for the destruction of Egyptian forces in the Sinai. Rabin
favored Gavish's plan, which was then endorsed by Dayan with the caution that a simultaneous
offensive against Syria should be avoided.

Intelligence

To prepare for war with Syria, Mossad (the Israeli secret service) had sent agent Eli Cohen to
infiltrate the Syrian government, where he exploited his high-ranking position to provide crucial
intelligence. Feigning sympathy for Syrian soldiers, he ordered trees planted by every Syrian
emplacement to shade them. These trees were later used as targeting markers by the Israelis.
Intelligence had revealed where the most difficult terrain was, so a route of attack was chosen
that would avoid natural tank traps and surprise the Syrians.

The Mossad also carried out surveillance on Egypt. By the time war broke out, Mossad had
either a katsa (field intelligence officer) or Egyptian informant in every Egyptian airbase and
military headquarters. Three staff officers at the General High Command Headquarters were
Israeli moles. Among the intelligence collected by the informants was embarrassing personal
information about Egyptian servicemen. This information was sometimes used as blackmail to
gain a new Mossad informant. Mossad also leaked details of many servicemen's private
behavior to their families and colleagues by means of anonymous letters and phone calls.
This campaign caused considerable dissension in the Egyptian military, and led to the suicide of
a senior officer. By early 1967, the Israeli intelligence network in Egypt had detected Nasser's
preparations for war with Israel, and more informants were recruited. By early May 1967, the
Mossad was able to inform Israeli commanders of the precise time to attack Egyptian airbases.

In a campaign called "Operation Yated", Israel passed false information to the Egyptian via a
double agent. In the 1950s, Egyptian intelligence agent Refaat Al-Gammal, posing as an
Egyptian Jew named Jacques Bitton, infiltrated Israel. He was soon arrested as a spy by Shin Bet,
and elected to become a double agent rather than spend decades in prison. On the eve of the
war, Gammal transferred false information to Egypt. He informed his Egyptian handlers that
according to Israeli war plans, Israel would open an attack on Egypt with a ground offensive. His
intelligence was one of the reasons why the Egyptians left their planes out in the open on the
runways of their airbases, allowing the Israelis to easily destroy them.

Israeli population

Even as plans were made for an offensive operation, Israeli society prepared for an Arab
invasion. Israeli civilians dug fortifications and defenses, and preparations were made for
evacuating children to Europe. About 14,000 hospital beds were readied. Antidotes for poison
gas victims, expected to arrive in waves of some 200, were stockpiled, and Germany donated
some 20,000 gas masks. Some 10,000 graves were dug. Diaspora Jews played a key role in the
preparations. Volunteers arrived in great numbers, and preference was given to young and
skilled bachelors.

There were massive donations and fund drives from both Jews and sympathetic non-Jews.
French Jews expressed their willingness to donate blood, house evacuated Israeli children, and
sell artwork to raise money. According to Michael Oren's account of the war, there was a sense
of an approaching catastrophe in Israel, with talk of widespread bombings of Israeli cities and
an entire generation of soldiers being wiped out.

Weapons
With the exception of Jordan, the Arabs relied principally on Soviet weaponry. Jordan's army
was equipped with American weaponry, and its air force was composed of British aircraft.
Israeli weapons were mainly of Western origin. Its air force was composed principally of French
aircraft while its armoured units were mostly of British and American design and manufacture.
Some infantry weapons, including the ubiquitous Uzi, were of Israeli origin.

Type

Arab armies

IDF

AFVs

Egypt, Syria and Iraq used T-34/85, T-54, T-55, PT-76, and SU-100/152 World War II-vintage
self-propelled guns. Jordan used M-47, M-48, and M-48A1 Patton tanks. Panzer IV (used by
Syria)

M50 and M51 Shermans, M48A3 Patton, Centurion, AMX-13. The Centurion was upgraded with
the British 105 mm L7 gun prior to the war. The Sherman also underwent extensive
modifications including a larger 105mm medium velocity, French gun, redesigned turret, wider
tracks, more armour, and upgraded engine and suspension.

APCs/IFVs

BTR-40, BTR-152, BTR-50, BTR-60 APCs

M2 / M3 Half-track

Artillery

M1937 Howitzer, BM-21, D-30 (2A18) Howitzer, M1954 field gun, M-52 105mm self-propelled
howitzer (used by Jordan)

M50 self-propelled howitzer and Makmat 160 mm self-propelled mortar, Obusier de 155 mm
Modèle 50, AMX 105mm Self-Propelled Howitzer

Aircraft

MiG-21, MiG-19, MiG-17, Su-7B, Tu-16, Il-28, Il-18, Il-14, An-12, Hawker Hunter used by Jordan
and Iraq

Dassault Mirage III, Dassault Super Mystère, Sud Aviation Vautour, Mystere IV, Dassault
Ouragan, Fouga Magister trainer outfitted for attack missions, Nord 2501IS military cargo plane

Helicopters

Mi-6, Mi-4

Super Frelon, Sikorsky S-58

AAW

SA-2 Guideline, ZSU-57-2 mobile anti-aircraft cannon

MIM-23 Hawk, Bofors 40 mm

Infantry weapons

Port Said submachinegun, AK-47, RPK, RPD, DShK HMG, B-10 and B-11 recoilless rifles

Uzi, FN FAL, FN MAG, AK-47, M2 Browning, Nord SS.10, RL-83 Blindicide anti-tank infantry
weapon, Jeep-mounted 106mm recoilless rifle

The fighting fronts

Preliminary air attack

Israel's first and most critical move was a surprise attack on the Egyptian Air Force. Initially,
both Egypt and Israel announced that they had been attacked by the other country.

Egypt had by far the largest and the most modern of all the Arab air forces, consisting of about
420 combat aircraft, all of them Soviet-built and with a heavy quota of top-of-the line MiG-21s.
Of particular concern to the Israelis were the 30 Tu-16 "Badger" medium bombers, capable of
inflicting heavy damage on Israeli military and civilian centers. On June 5 at 7:45 Israeli time, as
civil defense sirens sounded all over Israel, the IAF launched Operation Focus (Moked). All but
12 of its nearly 200 operational jets launched a mass attack against Egypt's airfields. The
Egyptian defensive infrastructure was extremely poor, and no airfields were yet equipped with
hardened aircraft shelters capable of protecting Egypt's warplanes. Most of the Israeli
warplanes headed out over the Mediterranean Sea, flying low to avoid radar detection, before
turning toward Egypt. Others flew over the Red Sea.

Meanwhile, the Egyptians hindered their own defense by effectively shutting down their entire
air defense system: they were worried that rebel Egyptian forces would shoot down the plane
carrying Field Marshal Abdel Hakim Amer and Lt-Gen. Sidqi Mahmoud, who were en route from
al Maza to Bir Tamada in the Sinai to meet the commanders of the troops stationed there. In
any event, it did not make a great deal of difference as the Israeli pilots came in below Egyptian
radar cover and well below the lowest point at which its SA-2 surface-to-air missile batteries
could bring down an aircraft.

Although the powerful Jordanian radar facility at Ajloun detected waves of aircraft approaching
Egypt and reported the code word for "war" up the Egyptian command chain, Egyptian
command and communications problems prevented the warning from reaching the targeted
airfields. The Israelis employed a mixed attack strategy: bombing and strafing runs against
planes parked on the ground, themselves, and bombing the runways with special tarmac-
shredding penetration bombs developed jointly with France to disable them and leave surviving
aircraft unable to take off. The runway at the Arish airfield was spared, as the Israelis expected
to turn it into a military airport for their transports after the war. The surviving aircraft were
later taken out by several more attack waves. The operation was more successful than
expected, catching the Egyptians by surprise and destroying virtually all of the Egyptian Air
Force on the ground, with few Israeli losses. Only four unarmed Egyptian training flights were in
the air when the strike began. A total of 338 Egyptian aircraft were destroyed and 100 pilots
were killed, although the number of aircraft actually lost by the Egyptians is disputed.

Among the Egyptian planes lost were all 30 Tu-16 bombers, 27 out of 40 Il-28 bombers, 12 Su-7
fighter-bombers, over 90 MiG-21s, 20 MiG-19s, 25 MiG-17 fighters, and around 32 assorted
transport planes and helicopters. In addition, Egyptian radars and SAM missiles were also
attacked and destroyed. The Israelis lost 19 planes, including two destroyed in air-to-air combat
and 13 downed by anti-aircraft artillery. One Israeli plane, which was damaged and unable to
break radio silence, was shot down by Israeli Hawk missiles after it strayed over the Negev
Nuclear Research Center. Another was destroyed by an exploding Egyptian bomber.

The attack guaranteed Israeli air superiority for the rest of the war.
Attacks on other Arab air forces took place later in the day as hostilities broke out on other
fronts.

The numbers of Arab aircraft claimed destroyed by Israel were at first regarded as "greatly
exaggerated" by the Western press. However, the fact that the Egyptian Air Force, along with
other Arab air forces attacked by Israel made practically no appearance for the remaining days
of the conflict proved that the numbers were most likely authentic. Throughout the war, Israeli
aircraft continued strafing Arab airfield runways to prevent their return to usability. Meanwhile,
Egyptian state-run radio had reported an Egyptian victory, falsely claiming that 70 Israeli planes
had been downed on the first day of fighting.

Conquest of Sinai. June 5–6

The Egyptian forces consisted of seven divisions: four armoured, two infantry, and one
mechanized infantry. Overall, Egypt had around 100,000 troops and 900–950 tanks in the Sinai,
backed by 1,100 APCs and 1,000 artillery pieces. This arrangement was thought to be based on
the Soviet doctrine, where mobile armour units at strategic depth provide a dynamic defense
while infantry units engage in defensive battles.

Israeli forces concentrated on the border with Egypt included six armoured brigades, one
infantry brigade, one mechanized infantry brigade, three paratrooper brigades, giving a total of
around 70,000 men and 700 tanks, who were organized in three armoured divisions. They had
massed on the border the night before the war, camouflaging themselves and observing radio
silence before being ordered to advance.

The Israeli plan was to surprise the Egyptian forces in both timing (the attack exactly coinciding
with the IAF strike on Egyptian airfields), location (attacking via northern and central Sinai
routes, as opposed to the Egyptian expectations of a repeat of the 1956 war, when the IDF
attacked via the central and southern routes) and method (using a combined-force flanking
approach, rather than direct tank assaults).

The northern (El Arish) Israeli division

The northernmost Israeli division, consisting of three brigades and commanded by Major
General Israel Tal, one of Israel's most prominent armour commanders, crossed the border at
two points, opposite Nahal Oz and south of Khan Yunis. They advanced swiftly, holding fire to
prolong the element of surprise. Tal's forces assaulted the "Rafah Gap", a seven-mile stretch
containing the shortest of three main routes through the Sinai towards Qantara and the Suez
Canal. The Egyptians had four divisions in the area, backed by minefields, pillboxes,
underground bunkers, hidden gun emplacements and trenches. The terrain on either side of
the route was impassable. The Israeli plan was to hit the Egyptians at selected key points with
concentrated armour.

Tal's advance was led by the 7th Armored Brigade under Colonel Shmuel Gonen. The Israeli
plan called for the 7th Brigade to outflank Khan Yunis from the north and the 60th Armored
Brigade under Colonel Menachem Aviram would advance from the south. The two brigades
would link up and surround Khan Yunis, while the paratroopers would take the Rafah. Gonen
entrusted the breakthrough to a single battalion of his brigade.

Initially, the advance was met with light resistance, as Egyptian intelligence had concluded that
it was a diversion for the main attack. However, as Gonen's lead battalion advanced, it suddenly
came under intense fire and took heavy losses. A second battalion was brought up, but was also
pinned down. Meanwhile, the 60th Brigade became bogged down in the sand, while the
paratroopers had trouble navigating through the dunes. The Israelis continued to press their
attack, and despite heavy losses, cleared the Egyptian positions and reached the Khan Yunis
railway junction in little over four hours.

Gonen's brigade then advanced nine miles to Rafah in twin columns. Rafah itself was
circumvented, and the Israelis attacked Sheikh Zuweid, eight miles to the southwest, which was
defended by two brigades. Though inferior in numbers and equipment, the Egyptians were
deeply entrenched and camouflaged. The Israelis were pinned down by fierce Egyptian
resistance, and called in air and artillery support to enable their lead elements to advance.
Many Egyptians abandoned after their commander and several of his staff were killed.

The Israelis broke through with tank-led assaults. However, Aviram's forces misjudged the
Egyptians' flank, and were pinned between strongholds before they were extracted after
several hours. By nightfall, the Israelis had finished mopping up resistance. Israeli forces had
taken significant losses, with Colonel Gonen later telling reporters that "we left many of our
dead soldiers in Rafah, and many burnt-out tanks." The Egyptians suffered some 2,000
casualties and lost 40 tanks.

Advance on Arish

With the road open, Israeli forces continued advancing towards Arish. Already by late
afternoon, elements of the 79th Armored Battalion had charged through the seven-mile long
Jiradi defile, a narrow pass defended by well-emplaced troops of the Egyptian 112th Infantry
Brigade. In fierce fighting, which saw the pass change hands several times, the Israelis charged
through the position. The Egyptians suffered heavy casualties and tank losses, while Israeli
losses stood at 66 dead, 93 wounded and 28 tanks. Emerging at the western end, Israeli forces
advanced to the outskirts of Arish. As it reached the outskirts of Arish, Tal's division also
consolidated its hold on Rafah and Khan Yunis.

The following day, the Israeli forces on the outskirts of Arish were reinforced by the 7th
Brigade, which fought its way through the Jiradi pass. After receiving supplies via an airdrop,
the Israelis entered the city and captured the airport at 7:50 am. The Israelis entered the city at
8:00 am. Company commander Yossi Peled recounted that "Al-Arish was totally quiet, desolate.
Suddenly, the city turned into a madhouse. Shots came at us from every alley, every corner,
every window and house." An IDF record stated that "clearing the city was hard fighting. The
Egyptians fired from the rooftops, from balconies and windows. They dropped grenades into
our half-tracks and blocked the streets with trucks. Our men threw the grenades back and
crushed the trucks with their tanks."Gonen sent additional units to Arish, and the city was
eventually taken.

Yoffe's attack allowed Tal to complete the capture of the Jiradi defile, Khan Yunis . All of them
were taken after fierce fighting. Gonen subsequently dispatched force of tanks, infantry and
engineers under Colonel Yisrael Granit to continue down the Mediterranean coast towards the
Suez Canal, while a second force led by Gonen himself turned south and captured Bir Lahfan
and Jabal Libni.

The mid front (Abu-Ageila) Israeli division

Further south, the Israeli 38th Armored Division under Major-General Ariel Sharon assaulted
Um-Katef, a heavily fortified area defended by the Egyptian 2nd Infantry Division under Major-
General Sa'adi Nagib, and consisting of some 16,000 troops. The Egyptians also had a battalion
of tank destroyers and a tank regiment, formed of Soviet World War II armour, which included
90 T-34-85 tanks, 22 SU-100 tank destroyers, and about 16,000 men. The Israelis had about
14,000 men and 150 post-World War II tanks including the AMX-13, Centurions, and M50 Super
Shermans (modified M-4 Sherman tanks).

Two armoured brigades in the meantime, under Avraham Yoffe, slipped across the border
through sandy wastes that Egypt had left undefended because they were considered
impassable. Simultaneously, Sharon's tanks from the west were to engage Egyptian forces on
Um-Katef ridge and block any reinforcements. Israeli infantry would clear the three trenches,
while heliborne paratroopers would land behind Egyptian lines and silence their artillery. An
armoured thrust would be made at al-Qusmaya to unnerve and isolate its garrison.

As Sharon's division advanced into the Sinai, Egyptian forces staged successful delaying actions
at Tarat Umm, Umm Tarfa, and Hill 181. An Israeli jet was downed by anti-aircraft fire, and
Sharon's forces came under heavy shelling as they advanced from the north and west. The
Israeli advance, which had to cope with extensive minefields, took a large number of casualties.
A column of Israeli tanks managed to penetrate the northern flank of Abu Ageila, and by dusk,
all units were in position. The Israelis then brought up 90 105mm and 155mm artillery guns for
a preparatory barrage, while civilian buses brought reserve infantrymen under Colonel Yekutiel
Adam and helicopters arrived to ferry the paratroopers. These movements were unobserved by
the Egyptians, who were preoccupied with Israeli probes against their perimeter.

As night fell, the Israeli assault troops lit flashlights, each battalion a different color, to prevent
friendly fire incidents. At 10:00 pm, Israeli artillery began a barrage on Um-Katef, firing some
6,000 shells in less than twenty minutes, the most concentrated artillery barrage in Israel's
history. Israeli tanks assaulted the northernmost Egyptian defenses and were largely successful,
though an entire armoured brigade was stalled by mines, and had only one mine-clearance
tank. Israeli infantrymen assaulted the triple line of trenches in the east. To the west,
paratroopers commanded by Colonel Danny Matt landed behind Egyptian lines, though half the
helicopters got lost and never found the battlefield, while others were unable to land due to
mortar fire.
Paratroopers dropped behind Egyptian lines, neutralized their artillery, destroying much of the
ammunition dumps, and separated gun crews from their batteries, sowing enough confusion to
significantly reduce Egyptian artillery fire. Egyptian reinforcements from Jabal Libni advanced
towards Um-Katef to counterattack, but failed to reach their objective, being subjected to
heavy air attacks and encountering Israeli lodgements on the roads. Egyptian commanders then
called in artillery attacks on their own positions. The Israelis accomplished and sometimes
exceeded their overall plan, and had largely succeeded by the following day. The Egyptians took
heavy casualties, while the Israelis lost 40 dead and 140 wounded.

Yoffe's attack allowed Sharon to complete the capture of the Um-Katef, after fierce fighting. The
main thrust at Um-Katef was stalled due to mines and craters. After IDF engineers had cleared a
path by 4:00 pm, Israeli and Egyptian tanks engaged in fierce combat, often at ranges as close
as ten yards. The battle ended in an Israeli victory, with 40 Egyptian and 19 Israeli tanks
destroyed. Meanwhile, Israeli infantry finished clearing out the Egyptian trenches, with Israeli
casualties standing at 14 dead and 41 wounded and Egyptian casualties at 300 dead and 100
taken prisoner.

Other Israeli forces

Meanwhile, two Israeli reserve brigades under Brigadier-General Avraham Yoffe, each equipped
with 100 tanks, penetrated the Sinai south of Tal's division and north of Sharon's, capturing the
road junctions of Abu Ageila, Bir Lahfan, and Arish, taking all of them before midnight. Two
Egyptian armoured brigades counterattacked, and a fierce battle took place until the following
morning. The Egyptians were beaten back by fierce resistance coupled with airstrikes,
sustaining heavy tank losses. They fled west towards Jabal Libni.

Further south, the 8th Armored Brigade under Colonel Albert Mandler, initially positioned as a
ruse to draw off invasion forces from the real invasion routes, attacked the fortified bunkers at
Kuntilla, a strategically valuable position whose capture would enable Mandler to block
reinforcements from reaching Um-Katef and to join Sharon's upcoming attack on Nakhl. The
defending Egyptian battalion, outnumbered and outgunned, fiercely resisted the attack, hitting
a number of Israeli tanks. However, most of the defenders were killed, and only three Egyptian
tanks, one of them damaged, survived. By nightfall, Mendler's forces had taken Kuntilla.
With the exceptions of Rafah and Khan Yunis, Israeli forces had initially avoided entering the
Gaza Strip. Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan had expressly forbidden entry into the area.
After Palestinian positions in Gaza opened fire on the Negev settlements of Nirim and Kissufim,
IDF Chief of Staff Yitzhak Rabin overrode Dayan's instructions and ordered the 11th Mechanized
Brigade under Colonel Yehuda Reshef to enter the Strip. The force was immediately met with
heavy artillery fire and fierce resistance from Palestinian forces and remnants of the Egyptian
forces from Rafah.

By sunset, the Israelis had taken the strategically vital Ali Muntar ridge, overlooking Gaza City,
but were beaten back from the city itself. Some 70 Israelis were killed, along with Israeli
journalist Ben Oyserman and American journalist Paul Schutzer. Twelve members of UNEF were
also killed. On the war's second day, the Israelis were bolstered by the 35th Paratroopers
Brigade under Colonel Rafael Eitan, and took Gaza City along with the entire Strip. The fighting
was fierce, and accounted for nearly half of all Israeli casualties on the southern front.
However, Gaza rapidly fell to the Israelis.

The Egyptian army

During the ground fighting, remnants of the Egyptian Air Force attacked Israeli ground forces,
but took losses from the Israeli Air Force and from Israeli anti-aircraft units. Throughout the last
four days, Egyptian aircraft flew 150 sorties against Israeli units in the Sinai.

Many of the Egyptian units remained intact and could have tried to prevent the Israelis from
reaching the Suez Canal or engaged in combat in the attempt to reach the canal. However,
when the Egyptian Field Marshal Abdel Hakim Amer heard about the fall of Abu-Ageila, he
panicked and ordered all units in the Sinai to retreat. This order effectively meant the defeat of
Egypt.

President Nasser, having learned of the results of the air strike, decided together with Field
Marshal Amer to pull out the troops from Sinai within 24 hours. No detailed instructions were
given concerning the manner and sequence of withdrawal.
The next fighting days

Conquest of Sinai. June 7–8, 1967

As Egyptian columns retreated, Israeli aircraft and artillery attacked them. Israeli jets used
napalm bombs during their sorties. The attacks destroyed hundreds of vehicles and caused
heavy casualties. At Jabal Libni, retreating Egyptian soldiers were fired upon by their own
artillery. At Bir Gafgafa, the Egyptians fiercely resisted advancing Israeli forces, knocking out
three tanks and eight half-tracks, and killing 20 soldiers. Due to the Egyptians' retreat, the
Israeli High Command decided not to pursue the Egyptian units but rather to bypass and
destroy them in the mountainous passes of West Sinai.

Therefore, in the following two days (June 6 and 7), all three Israeli divisions (Sharon and Tal
were reinforced by an armoured brigade each) rushed westwards and reached the passes.
Sharon's division first went southward then westward, via An-Nakhl, to Mitla Pass with air
support. It was joined there by parts of Yoffe's division, while its other units blocked the Gidi
Pass. These passes became killing grounds for the Egyptians, who ran right into waiting Israeli
positions and suffered heavy losses. According to Egyptian diplomat Mahmoud Riad, 10,000
men were killed in one day alone, and many others died from hunger and thirst. Tal's units
stopped at various points to the length of the Suez Canal.

Israel's blocking action was partially successful. Only the Gidi pass was captured before the
Egyptians approached it, but at other places, Egyptian units managed to pass through and cross
the canal to safety. Due to the haste of the Egyptian retreat, soldiers often abandoned
weapons, military equipment, and hundreds of vehicles. Many Egyptian soldiers were cut off
from their units had to walk about 200 kilometers through by foot before reaching the Suez
Canal with limited supplies of food and water and were exposed to intense heat.

Thousands of soldiers died as a result. Many Egyptian soldiers chose instead to surrender to the
Israelis. However, the Israelis eventually exceeded their capabilities to provide for prisoners. As
a result, they began directing soldiers towards the Suez Canal and only taking prisoner high-
ranking officers, who were expected to be exchanged for captured Israeli pilots.
During the offensive, the Israeli Navy landed six combat divers from the Shayetet 13 naval
commando unit to infiltrate Alexandria harbor. The divers sank an Egyptian minesweeper
before being taken prisoner. Shayetet 13 commandos also infiltrated into Port Said harbor, but
found no ships there. A planned commando raid against the Syrian Navy never materialized.
Both Egyptian and Israeli warships made movements at sea to intimidate the other side
throughout the war, but did not engage each other. However, Israeli warships and aircraft did
hunt for Egyptian submarines throughout the war.

On June 7, Israel began the conquest of Sharm el-Sheikh. The Israeli Navy started the operation
with a probe of Egyptian naval defenses. An aerial reconnaissance flight found that the area
was less defended than originally thought. At about 4:30 am, three Israeli missile boats opened
fire on Egyptian shore batteries, while paratroopers and commandos boarded helicopters and
Nord Noratlas transport planes for an assault on Al-Tur, as Chief of Staff Rabin was convinced it
was too risky to land them directly in Sharm el-Sheikh.

However, the city had been largely abandoned the day before, and reports from air and naval
forces finally convinced Rabin to divert the aircraft to Sharm el-Sheikh. There, the Israelis
engaged in a pitched battle with the Egyptians and took the city, killing 20 Egyptian soldiers and
taking 8 prisoner. At 12:15 pm, Defense Minister Dayan announced that the Straits of Tiran
constituted an international waterway open to all ships without restriction.

On June 8, Israel completed the capture of the Sinai by sending infantry units to Ras Sudar on
the western coast of the peninsula.

Several tactical elements made the swift Israeli advance possible: first, the surprise attack that
quickly gave the Israeli Air Force complete air superiority over the Egyptian Air Force; second,
the determined implementation of an innovative battle plan; third, the lack of coordination
among Egyptian troops. These factors would prove to be decisive elements on Israel's other
fronts as well.

West Bank
Jordan was reluctant to enter the war. Nasser used the obscurity of the first hours of the
conflict to convince King Hussein that he was victorious; he claimed as evidence a radar sighting
of a squadron of Israeli aircraft returning from bombing raids in Egypt, which he said was an
Egyptian aircraft en route to attacking Israel.One of the Jordanian brigades stationed in the
West Bank was sent to the Hebron area in order to link with the Egyptians. Hussein decided to
attack.

The Jordanian Armed Forces included 11 brigades totalling some 55,000 troops, equipped with
some 300 modern Western tanks. Of these, nine brigades (45,000 troops, 270 tanks, 200
artillery pieces) were deployed in the West Bank, including elite armoured 40th, and two in the
Jordan Valley. The Jordanian Army, then known as the Arab Legion, was a long-term-service,
professional army, relatively well-equipped and well-trained. Furthermore, Israeli post-war
briefings said that the Jordanian staff acted professionally as well, but was always left "half a
step" behind by the Israeli moves. The small Royal Jordanian Air Force consisted of only 24
British-made Hawker Hunter fighters, six transports, and two helicopters. According to the
Israelis, the Hawker Hunter was essentially on par with the French-built Dassault Mirage III –
the IAF's best plane.

Against Jordan's forces on the West Bank, Israel deployed about 40,000 troops and 200 tanks (8
brigades).Israeli Central Command forces consisted of five brigades. The first two were
permanently stationed near Jerusalem and were called the Jerusalem Brigade and the
mechanized Harel Brigade. Mordechai Gur's 55th paratrooper brigade was summoned from the
Sinai front. The 10th Armored Brigade was stationed north of the West Bank. The Israeli
Northern Command provided a division (3 brigades) led by Major-General Elad Peled, which
was stationed to the north of the West Bank, in the Jezreel Valley. The IDF's strategic plan was
to remain on the defensive along the Jordanian front, to enable focus in the expected campaign
against Egypt.

Intermittent machine-gun exchanges began taking place in Jerusalem at 9:30 am, and the
fighting gradually escalated as the Jordanians introduced mortar and recoilless rifle fire. Under
the orders from General Narkis, the Israelis responded only with small-arms fire, firing in a flat
trajectory to avoid hitting civilians, holy sites or the Old City. At 10:00 am on June 5, the
Jordanian Army began shelling Israel. Two batteries of 155mm Long Tom cannons opened fire
on the suburbs of Tel Aviv and Ramat David Airbase. The commanders of these batteries were
instructed to lay a two-hour barrage against military and civilian settlements in central Israel.
Some shells hit the outskirts of Tel Aviv.

Israel assumed that the attacks were a symbolic gesture of solidarity with Egypt, and sent a
message to King Hussein promising not to initiate any action against Jordan if it stayed out of
the war. King Hussein replied that it was too late, "the die was cast". At 11:15 am, Jordanian
howitzers began a 6,000-shell barrage at Israeli Jerusalem. The Jordanians initially targeted
kibbutz Ramat Rachel in the south and Mount Scopus in the north, then ranged into the city
center and outlying neighborhoods. Military installations, the Prime Minister's Residence, and
the Knesset compound were also targeted. Israeli civilian casualties totalled 20 dead and about
1,000 wounded. Some 900 buildings were damaged, including Hadassah Ein Kerem Hospital.

At 11:50 am, sixteen Jordanian Hawker Hunters attacked Netanya, Kfar Sirkin and Kfar Saba,
killing one civilian, wounding seven and destroying a transport plane. Three Iraqi Hawker
Hunters strafed civilian settlements in the Jezreel Valley, and an Iraqi Tu-16 attacked Afula, and
was shot down near the Megiddo airfield. The attack caused minimal material damage, hitting
only a senior citizens' home and several chicken coops, but sixteen Israeli soldiers were killed,
most of them when the Tupolev crashed.

Israeli cabinet meets

When the Israeli cabinet convened to decide what to do, Yigal Allon and Menahem Begin
argued that this was an opportunity to take the Old City of Jerusalem, but Eshkol decided to
defer any decision until Moshe Dayan and Yitzhak Rabin could be consulted. Uzi Narkiss made a
number of proposals for military action, including the capture of Latrun, but the cabinet turned
him down. Dayan rejected multiple requests from Narkiss for permission to mount an infantry
assault towards Mount Scopus. However, Dayan sanctioned a number of more limited
retaliatory actions.

Initial response

Shortly before 12:30 pm, the Israeli Air Force attacked Jordan's two airbases. The Hawker
Hunters were refueling at the time of the attack. The Israeli aircraft came within two waves, the
first of which cratered the runways and knocked out the control towers, and the second wave
destroyed all 21 of Jordan's Hawker Hunter fighters, along with six transport aircraft and two
helicopters. One Israeli jet was shot down by ground fire.

Israeli aircraft also attacked H-3, an Iraqi Air Force base in western Iraq. During the attack, 12
MiG-21s, 2 MiG-17s, 5 Hunter F6s, and 3 Il-28 bombers were destroyed or shot down. A
Pakistani pilot stationed at the base managed to shoot down an Israeli fighter and bomber
during the raid. The Jordanian radar facility at Ajloun was destroyed in an Israeli airstrike. Israeli
Fouga Magister jets attacked the Jordanian 40th Brigade with rockets as it moved south from
the Damiya Bridge. Dozens of tanks were knocked out, and a convoy of 26 trucks carrying
ammunition was destroyed. In Jerusalem, Israel responded to Jordanian shelling with a missile
strike that devastated Jordanian positions. The Israelis used the L missile, a surface-to-surface
missile developed jointly with France in secret.

Battle of Ammunition Hill

A Jordanian battalion advanced up Government House ridge and dug in at the perimeter of
Government House, the headquarters of the United Nations observers, and opened fire on
Ramat Rachel, the Allenby Barracks and the Jewish section of Abu Tor with mortars and
recoilless rifles. UN observers fiercely protested the incursion into the neutral zone, and several
manhandled a Jordanian machine gun out of Government House after the crew had set it up in
a second-floor window. After the Jordanians occupied Jabel Mukaber, an advance patrol was
sent out and approached Ramat Rachel, where they came under fire from four civilians,
including the wife of the director, who were armed with old Czech-made weapons.

The immediate Israeli response was an offensive to retake Government House and its ridge. The
Jerusalem Brigade's Reserve Battalion 161, under Lieutenant-Colonel Asher Dreizin, was given
the task. Dreizin had two infantry companies and eight tanks under his command, several of
which broke down or became stuck in the mud at Ramat Rachel, leaving three for the assault.
The Jordanians mounted fierce resistance, knocking out two tanks.

The Israelis broke through the compound's western gate and began clearing the building with
grenades, before General Odd Bull, commander of the UN observers, compelled the Israelis to
hold their fire, telling them that the Jordanians had already fled. The Israelis proceeded to take
the Antenna Hill, directly behind Government House, and clear out a series of bunkers to the
west and south. The fighting, often conducted hand-to-hand, continued for nearly four hours
before the surviving Jordanians fell back to trenches held by the Hittin Brigade, which were
steadily overwhelmed. By 6:30 pm, the Jordanians had retreated to Bethlehem, having suffered
about 100 casualties. All but ten of Dreizin's soldiers were casualties, and Dreizin himself was
wounded three times.

Israeli invasion

During the late afternoon of June 5, the Israelis launched an offensive to encircle Jerusalem,
which lasted into the following day. During the night, they were supported by intense tank,
artillery and mortar fire to soften up Jordanian positions. Searchlights placed atop the Labor
Federation building, then the tallest in Israeli Jerusalem, exposed and blinded the Jordanians.
The Jerusalem Brigade moved south of Jerusalem, while the mechanized Harel Brigade and
paratroopers under Mordechai Gur encircled it from the north.

A combined force of tanks and paratroopers crossed no-man's land near the Mandelbaum
Gate. One of Gur's paratroop battalions approached the fortified Police Academy. The Israelis
used bangalore torpedoes to blast their way through barbed wire leading up to the position
while exposed and under heavy fire. With the aid of two tanks borrowed from the Jerusalem
Brigade, they captured the Police Academy. After receiving reinforcements, they moved up to
attack Ammunition Hill.

The Jordanian defenders, who were heavily dug-in, fiercely resisted the attack. All of the Israeli
officers except for two company commanders were killed, and the fighting was mostly led by
individual soldiers. The fighting was conducted at close quarters in trenches and bunkers, and
was often hand-to-hand. The Israelis captured the position after four hours of heavy fighting.
During the battle, 36 Israeli and 71 Jordanian soldiers were killed.

The battalion subsequently drove east, and linked up with the Israeli enclave on Mount Scopus
and its Hebrew University campus. Gur's other battalions captured the other Jordanian
positions around the American Colony, despite being short on men and equipment and having
come under a Jordanian mortar bombardment while waiting for the signal to advance.
At the same time, the mechanized Harel Brigade attacked the fortress at Latrun, which the
Jordanians had abandoned due to heavy Israeli tank fire. The brigade attacked Har Adar, but
seven tanks were knocked out by mines, forcing the infantry to mount an assault without
armoured cover. The Israeli soldiers advanced under heavy fire, jumping between stones to
avoid mines. The fighting was conducted at close-quarters, often with knives and bayonets.

The Jordanians fell back after a battle that left two Israeli and eight Jordanian soldiers dead, and
Israeli forces advanced through Beit Horon towards Ramallah, taking four fortified villages along
the way. By the evening, the brigade arrived in Ramallah. Meanwhile, the 163rd Infantry
Battalion secured Abu Tor following a fierce battle, severing the Old City from Bethlehem and
Hebron.

Meanwhile, 600 Egyptian commandos stationed in the West Bank moved to attack Israeli
airfields. Led by Jordanian intelligence scouts, they crossed the border and began infiltrating
through Israeli settlements towards Ramla and Hatzor. They were soon detected and sought
shelter in nearby fields, which the Israelis set on fire. Some 450 commandos were killed, and
the remainder escaped to Jordan.

From the American Colony, the paratroopers moved towards the Old City. Their plan was to
approach it via the lightly defended Salah al-Din Street. However, they made a wrong turn onto
the heavily defended Nablus Road. The Israelis ran into fierce resistance. Their tanks fired at
point-blank range down the street, while the paratroopers mounted repeated charges. Despite
repelling repeated Israeli charges, the Jordanians gradually gave way to Israeli firepower and
momentum. The Israelis suffered some 30 casualties – half the original force – while the
Jordanians lost 45 dead and 142 wounded.

Meanwhile, the Israeli 71st Battalion breached barbed wire and minefields and emerged near
Wadi Joz, near the base of Mount Scopus, from where the Old City could be cut off from Jericho
and East Jerusalem from Ramallah. Israeli artillery targeted the one remaining route from
Jerusalem to the West Bank, and shellfire deterred the Jordanians from counterattacking from
their positions at Augusta-Victoria. An Israeli detachment then captured the Rockefeller
Museum after a brief skirmish.
Afterwards, the Israelis broke through to the Jerusalem-Ramallah road. At Tel al-Ful, the Israelis
fought a running battle with up to thirty Jordanian tanks. The Jordanians stalled the advance
and destroyed a number of half-tracks, but the Israelis launched air attacks and exploited the
vulnerability of the external fuel tanks mounted on the Jordanian tanks. The Jordanians lost half
their tanks, and retreated towards Jericho. Joining up with the 4th Brigade, the Israelis then
descended through Shuafat and the site of what is now French Hill, through Jordanian defenses
at Mivtar, emerging at Ammunition Hill.

With Jordanian defenses in Jerusalem crumbling, elements of the Jordanian 60th Brigade and
an infantry battalion were sent from Jericho to reinforce Jerusalem. Its original orders were to
repel the Israelis from the Latrun corridor, but due to the worsening situation in Jerusalem, the
brigade was ordered to proceed to Jerusalem's Arab suburbs and attack Mount Scopus. Parallel
to the brigade were infantrymen from the Imam Ali Brigade, who were approaching Issawiya.
The brigades were spotted by Israeli aircraft and decimated by rocket and cannon fire. Other
Jordanian attempts to reinforce Jerusalem were beaten back, either by armoured ambushes or
airstrikes.

Fearing damage to holy sites and the prospect of having to fight in built-up areas, Dayan
ordered his troops not to enter the Old City. He also feared that Israel would be subjected to a
fierce international backlash and the outrage of Christians worldwide if it forced its way into the
Old City. Privately, he told David Ben-Gurion that he was also concerned over the prospect of
Israel capturing Jerusalem's holy sites, only to be forced to give them up under the threat of
international sanctions.

The Old City (June 7)

On June 7, heavy fighting ensued. Dayan had ordered his troops not to enter the Old City;
however, upon hearing that the UN was about to declare a ceasefire, he changed his mind, and
without cabinet clearance, decided to capture it.Two paratroop battalions attacked Augusta-
Victoria Hill, high ground overlooking the Old City from the east. One battalion attacked from
Mount Scopus, and another attacked from the valley between it and the Old City. Another
paratroop battalion, personally led by Gur, broke into the Old City, and was joined by the other
two battalions after their missions were complete. The paratroopers met little resistance. The
fighting was conducted solely by the paratroopers; the Israelis did not use armour during the
battle out of fear of severe damage to the Old City.

In the north, one battalion from Peled's division was sent to check Jordanian defenses in the
Jordan Valley. A brigade belonging to Peled's division captured the western part of the West
Bank. One brigade attacked Jordanian artillery positions around Jenin, which were shelling
Ramat David Airbase. The Jordanian 12th Armored Battalion, which outnumbered the Israelis,
held off repeated attempts to capture Jenin. However, Israeli air attacks took their toll, and the
Jordanian M48 Pattons, with their external fuel tanks, proved vulnerable at short distances,
even to the Israeli-modified Shermans. Twelve Jordanian tanks were destroyed, and only six
remained operational.

Just after dusk, Israeli reinforcements arrived. The Jordanians continued to fiercely resist, and
the Israelis were unable to advance without artillery and air support. One Israeli jet attacked
the Jordanian commander's tank, wounding him and killing his radio operator and intelligence
officer. The surviving Jordanian forces then withdrew to Jenin, where they were reinforced by
the 25th Infantry Brigade. The Jordanians were effectively surrounded in Jenin.

Jordanian infantry and their three remaining tanks managed to hold off the Israelis until 4:00
am, when three battalions arrived to reinforce them in the afternoon. The Jordanian tanks
charged, and knocked out multiple Israeli vehicles, and the tide began to shift. After sunrise,
Israeli jets and artillery conducted a two-hour bombardment against the Jordanians. The
Jordanians lost 10 dead and 250 wounded, and had only seven tanks left, including two without
gas, and sixteen APCs. The Israelis then fought their way into Jenin, and captured the city after
fierce fighting.

After the Old City fell, the Jerusalem Brigade reinforced the paratroopers, and continued to the
south, capturing Judea and Gush Etzion. Hebron was taken without any resistance. Fearful that
Israeli soldiers would exact retribution for the 1929 massacre of the city's Jewish community,
Hebron's residents flew white sheets from their windows and rooftops, and voluntarily gave up
their weapons. The Harel Brigade proceeded eastward, descending to the Jordan River.

On June 7, Israeli forces seized Bethlehem, taking the city after a brief battle that left some 40
Jordanian soldiers dead, with the remainder fleeing. On the same day, one of Peled's brigades
seized Nablus; then it joined one of Central Command's armoured brigades to fight the
Jordanian forces; as the Jordanians held the advantage of superior equipment and were equal
in numbers to the Israelis.

Again, the air superiority of the IAF proved paramount as it immobilized the Jordanians, leading
to their defeat. One of Peled's brigades joined with its Central Command counterparts coming
from Ramallah, and the remaining two blocked the Jordan river crossings together with the
Central Command's 10th. Engineering Corps sappers blew up the Abdullah and Hussein bridges
with captured Jordanian mortar shells, while elements of the Harel Brigade crossed the river
and occupied positions along the east bank to cover them, but quickly pulled back due to
American pressure. The Jordanians, anticipating an Israeli offensive deep into Jordan,
assembled the remnants of their army and Iraqi units in Jordan to protect the western
approaches to Amman and the southern slopes of the Golan Heights.

No specific decision had been made to capture any other territories controlled by Jordan. After
the Old City was captured, Dayan told his troops to dig in to hold it. When an armoured brigade
commander entered the West Bank on his own initiative, and stated that he could see Jericho,
Dayan ordered him back. It was only after intelligence reports indicated that Hussein had
withdrawn his forces across the Jordan River that Dayan ordered his troops to capture the West
Bank.According to Narkis:

“First, the Israeli government had no intention of capturing the West Bank. On the contrary, it
was opposed to it. Second, there was not any provocation on the part of the IDF. Third, the rein
was only loosened when a real threat to Jerusalem's security emerged. This is truly how things
happened on June 5, although it is difficult to believe. The end result was something that no
one had planned.

The Battle of Golan Heights, June 9–10.

Syria's attack

False Egyptian reports of a crushing victory against the Israeli army and forecasts that Egyptian
forces would soon be attacking Tel Aviv influenced Syria's willingness to enter the war. Syrian
artillery began shelling northern Israel, and twelve Syrian jets attacked Israeli settlements in the
Galilee. Israeli fighter jets intercepted the Syrian aircraft, shooting down three and driving off
the rest. In addition, two Lebanese Hawker Hunter jets, two of the twelve Lebanon had, crossed
into Israeli airspace and began strafing Israeli positions in the Galilee. They were intercepted by
Israeli fighter jets, and one was shot down.

A minor Syrian force tried to capture the water plant at Tel Dan (the subject of a fierce
escalation two years earlier), Dan, and She'ar Yashuv. These attacks were repulsed with the loss
of twenty soldiers and seven tanks. An Israeli officer was also killed. But a broader Syrian
offensive quickly failed. Units of Syrian reserves were broken up by Israeli air attacks, and
several Syrian tanks were reported to have sunk in the Jordan River.

Other problems included tanks too wide for bridges, lack of radio communications between
tanks and infantry, and units ignoring orders to advance. A post-war Syrian army report
concluded "Our forces did not go on the offensive either because they did not arrive or were
not wholly prepared or because they could not find shelter from the enemy's planes. The
reserves could not withstand the air attacks; they dispersed after their morale plummeted." The
Syrians abandoned hopes of a ground attack and began a massive bombardment of Israeli
communities in the Hula Valley instead.

On the evening of June 5, the Israeli Air Force attacked Syrian airfields. The Syrian Air Force lost
some 32 MiG 21s, and 23 MiG-15 and MiG-17 fighters, and two Ilyushin Il-28 bombers, two-
thirds of its fighting strength. The Syrian aircraft that survived the attack retreated to distant
bases without playing any further role in the ensuing warfare. Following the attack, Syria
understood that the news it had heard from Egypt of the near-total destruction of the Israeli
military could not have been true.

On June 7 and 8, the Israeli leadership debated about whether the Golan Heights should be
attacked as well; the attack on Syria was initially planned for June 8, but was postponed for 24
hours. At 3 am on June 9, Syria announced its acceptance of the cease-fire. Despite this, four
hours later at 7 am, Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan "gave the order to go into action
against Syria". Syria had supported the pre-war raids that had helped raise tensions and had
routinely shelled Israel from the Heights, so some Israeli leaders wanted to see Syria punished.
Military advice was that the attack would be extremely costly, since assailing the heights would
be an uphill battle against a strongly fortified enemy. The western side of the Golan Heights
consists of a rock escarpment that rises 500 meters (1700 ft) from the Sea of Galilee and the
Jordan River, and then flattens to a more gently sloping plateau. Dayan believed such an
operation would yield losses of 30,000 and opposed it bitterly. Prime Minister Levi Eshkol, on
the other hand, was more open to the possibility of an operation in the Golan Heights, as was
the head of the Northern Command, David Elazar, whose unbridled enthusiasm for and
confidence in the operation may have eroded Dayan's reluctance. Eventually, as the situation
on the Southern and Central fronts cleared up, intelligence estimated that the likelihood of
Soviet intervention had reduced, reconnaissance showed some Syrian defenses in the Golan
region collapsing, and an intercepted cable showed Nasser urging the President of Syria to
immediately accept a cease-fire, Dayan became more enthusiastic about the idea, and he
authorized the operation.

The Syrian army consisted of about 75,000 men grouped in nine brigades, supported by an
adequate amount of artillery and armour. Israeli forces used in combat consisted of two
brigades (the 8th Armored Brigade and the Golani Brigade) in the northern part of the front at
Givat HaEm, and another two (infantry and one of Peled's brigades summoned from Jenin) in
the center. The Golan Heights' unique terrain (mountainous slopes crossed by parallel streams
every several kilometers running east to west), and the general lack of roads in the area
channeled both forces along east-west axes of movement and restricted the ability of units to
support those on either flank. Thus the Syrians could move north-south on the plateau itself,
and the Israelis could move north-south at the base of the Golan escarpment. An advantage
Israel possessed was the excellent intelligence collected by Mossad operative Eli Cohen (who
was captured and executed in Syria in 1965) regarding the Syrian battle positions. Syria had
built extensive defensive fortifications in depths up to 15 kilometers,comparable to the
Maginot Line.

As opposed to all the other campaigns, IAF was only partially effective in the Golan because the
fixed fortifications were so effective. However, the Syrian forces proved unable to put up an
effective defense largely because the officers were poor military leaders and treated their
soldiers poorly; often officers would retreat to escape danger, leaving their men confused and
ineffective. The Israelis also had the upper hand during close combat that took place in the
numerous Syrian bunkers along the Golan Heights, as they were armed with the Uzi, a
submachine gun designed for close combat, while Syrian soldiers were armed with the heavier
AK-47 assault rifle, designed for combat in more open areas.
The Israeli attack: the first day

On the morning of June 9, Israeli jets began carrying out dozens of sorties against Syrian
positions from Mount Hermon to Tawfiq, using rockets salvaged from captured Egyptian stocks.
The airstrikes knocked out artillery batteries and storehouses and forced transport columns off
the roads. The Syrians suffered heavy casualties and a drop in morale, with a number of senior
officers and troops deserting. The attacks also provided time as Israeli forces cleared paths
through Syrian minefields. However, the airstrikes did not seriously damage the Syrians'
bunkers and trench systems, and the bulk of Syrian forces on the Golan remained in their
positions.

About two hours after the airstrikes began, the 8th Armored Brigade, led by Colonel Albert
Mandler, advanced into the Golan Heights from Givat HaEm. Its advance was spearheaded by
Engineering Corps sappers and eight bulldozers, which cleared away barbed wire and mines. As
they advanced, the force came under fire, and five bulldozers were immediately hit. The Israeli
tanks, with their maneuverability sharply reduced by the terrain, advanced slowly under fire
toward the fortified village of Sir al-Dib, with their ultimate objective being the fortress at Qala.
Israeli casualties steadily mounted. Part of the attacking force lost its way and emerged
opposite of Za'ura, a redoubt manned by Syrian reservists. With the situation critical, Colonel
Mandler ordered simultaneous assaults on Za'ura and Qala. Heavy and confused fighting
followed, with Israeli and Syrian tanks struggling around obstacles and firing at extremely short
ranges. Mandler recalled that "the Syrians fought well and bloodied us. We beat them only by
crushing them under our treads and by blasting them with our cannons at very short range,
from 100 to 500 meters." The first three Israeli tanks to enter Qala were stopped by a Syrian
bazooka team, and a relief column of seven Syrian tanks arrived to repel the attackers. The
Israelis took heavy fire from the houses, but could not turn back, as other forces were
advancing behind them, and they were on a narrow path with mines on either side. The Israelis
continued pressing forward, and called for air support. A pair of Israeli jets destroyed two of the
Syrian tanks, and the remainder withdrew. The surviving defenders of Qala retreated after their
commander was killed. Meanwhile, Za'ura fell in an Israeli assault, and the Israelis also captured
the 'Ein Fit fortress.
In the central sector, the Israeli 181st Battalion captured the strongholds of Dardara and Tel
Hillal after fierce fighting. Desperate fighting also broke out along the operation's northern axis,
where Golani Brigade attacked thirteen Syrian positions, including the formidable Tel Fakhr
position. Navigational errors placed the Israelis directly under the Syrians' guns. In the fighting
that followed, both sides took heavy casualties, but the Israelis lost all nineteen of their tanks
and half-tracks.

The Israeli battalion commander then ordered his twenty-five remaining men to dismount,
divide into two groups, and charge the northern and southern flanks of Tel Fakhr. The first
Israelis to reach the perimeter of the southern approach laid bodily down on the barbed wire,
allowing their comrades to vault over them. From there, they assaulted the fortified Syrian
positions. The fighting was waged at extremely close quarters, often hand-to-hand.

On the northern flank, the Israelis broke through within minutes and cleared out the trenches
and bunkers. During the seven-hour battle, the Israelis lost 31 dead and 82 wounded, while the
Syrians lost 62 dead and 20 captured. Among the dead was the Israeli battalion commander.
The Golani Brigade's 51st Battalion took Tel 'Azzaziat, and Darbashiya also fell to Israeli forces.

By the evening of June 9, the four Israeli brigades had all broken through to the plateau, where
they could be reinforced and replaced. Thousands of reinforcements began reaching the front,
those tanks and half-tracks that had survived the previous day's fighting were refueled and
replenished with ammunition, and the wounded were evacuated. By dawn, the Israelis had
eight brigades in the sector.

Syria's first line of defense had been shattered, but the defenses beyond that remained largely
intact. Mount Hermon and the Banias in the north, and the entire sector between Tawfiq and
Customs House Road in the south remained in Syrian hands. In a meeting early on the night of
June 9, Syrian leaders decided to reinforce those positions as quickly as possible, and to
maintain a steady barrage on Israeli civilian settlements.

The Israeli attack: the next day

Throughout the night, the Israelis continued their advance. Though it was slowed by fierce
resistance, an anticipated Syrian counterattack never materialized. At the fortified village of
Jalabina, a garrison of Syrian reservists, leveling their anti-aircraft guns, managed to hold off the
Israeli 65th Paratroop Battalion for four hours before a small detachment managed to
penetrate the village and knock out the heavy guns.

Meanwhile, the 8th Brigade's tanks moved south from Qala, advancing six miles to Wasit under
heavy artillery and tank bombardment. At the Banaias in the north, Syrian mortar batteries
opened fire on advancing Israeli forces only after Golani Brigade sappers cleared a path through
a minefield, killing sixteen Israeli soldiers and wounding four.

On the next day, June 10, the central and northern groups joined in a pincer movement on the
plateau, but that fell mainly on empty territory as the Syrian forces retreated. At 8:30 am, the
Syrians began blowing up their own bunkers, burning documents and retreating. Several units
joined by Elad Peled's troops climbed to the Golan from the south, only to find the positions
mostly empty. When the 8th Brigade reached Mansura, five miles from Wasit, the Israelis met
no opposition and found abandoned equipment, including tanks, in perfect working condition.
In the fortified Banaias village, Golani Brigade troops found only several Syrian soldiers chained
to their positions.

During the day, the Israeli units stopped after obtaining manoeuvre room between their
positions and a line of volcanic hills to the west. In some locations, Israeli troops advanced after
an agreed-upon cease-fire to occupy strategically strong positions. To the east, the ground
terrain is an open gently sloping plain. This position later became the cease-fire line known as
the "Purple Line".

Time magazine reported: "In an effort to pressure the United Nations into enforcing a ceasefire,
Damascus Radio undercut its own army by broadcasting the fall of the city of Quneitra three
hours before it actually capitulated. That premature report of the surrender of their
headquarters destroyed the morale of the Syrian troops left in the Golan area."

Conclusion of conflict and post-war situation

Israel

By June 10, Israel had completed its final offensive in the Golan Heights, and a ceasefire was
signed the day after. Israel had seized the Gaza Strip, the Sinai Peninsula, the West Bank of the
Jordan River (including East Jerusalem), and the Golan Heights. Overall, Israel's territory grew
by a factor of three, including about one million Arabs placed under Israel's direct control in the
newly captured territories. Israel's strategic depth grew to at least 300 kilometers in the south,
60 kilometers in the east, and 20 kilometers of extremely rugged terrain in the north, a security
asset that would prove useful in the Yom Kippur War six years later.

The political importance of the 1967 War was immense; Israel demonstrated that it was able
and willing to initiate strategic strikes that could change the regional balance. Egypt and Syria
learned tactical lessons and would launch an attack in 1973 in an attempt to reclaim their lost
territory.

Speaking three weeks after the war ended, as he accepted an honorary degree from Hebrew
University, Yitzhak Rabin gave his reasoning behind the success of Israel:

Our airmen, who struck the enemies' planes so accurately that no one in the world
understands how it was done and people seek technological explanations or secret weapons;
our armoured troops who beat the enemy even when their equipment was inferior to his; our
soldiers in all other branches ... who overcame our enemies everywhere, despite the latter's
superior numbers and fortifications-all these revealed not only coolness and courage in the
battle but ... an understanding that only their personal stand against the greatest dangers
would achieve victory for their country and for their families, and that if victory was not theirs
the alternative was annihilation.

In recognition of contributions, Rabin was given the honour of naming the war for the Israelis.
From the suggestions proposed, including the "War of Daring", "War of Salvation", and "War of
the Sons of Light", he "chose the least ostentatious, the Six-Day War, evoking the days of
creation".

Dayan's final report on the war to the Israeli general staff listed several shortcomings in Israel's
actions, including misinterpretation of Nasser's intentions, overdependence on the United
States, and reluctance to act when Egypt closed the Straits. He also credited several factors for
Israel's success: Egypt did not appreciate the advantage of striking first and their adversaries did
not accurately gauge Israel's strength and its willingness to use it.

Egypt

According to Heikal, Nasser had admitted his responsibility for the military defeat in the June
1967.

After the 1973 Yom Kippur War, Egypt reviewed the causes of its loss of the 1967 war. Issues
that were identified included "the individualistic bureaucratic leadership"; "promotions on the
basis of loyalty, not expertise, and the army's fear of telling Nasser the truth"; lack of
intelligence; and better Israeli weapons, command, organization, and will to fight.

The aftermath of the war

Following the war, Israel experienced a wave of national euphoria, and the press praised the
military's performance for weeks afterward. New "victory coins" were minted to celebrate. In
addition, the world's interest in Israel grew, and the country's economy, which had been in
crisis before the war, flourished due to an influx of tourists and donations, as well as the
extraction of oil from the Sinai's wells.

The war also had a great effect on diaspora Jewry, which was swept up in overwhelming
support for Israel. According to Michael Oren, the war enabled American Jews to "walk with
their backs straight and flex their political muscle as never before. American Jewish
organizations which had previously kept Israel at arms length suddenly proclaimed their
Zionism." Record numbers of Jewish immigrants arrived from Western countries after the war,
although many of them would later return to their countries of origin. Most notably, the war
stirred Zionist passions among Jews in the Soviet Union, who had by that time been forcibly
assimilated. Many Soviet Jews subsequently applied for exit visas and began protesting for their
right to immigrate to Israel. Following diplomatic pressure from the West, the Soviet
government began granting exit visas to Jews in growing numbers. From 1970 to 1988, some
291,000 Soviet Jews were granted exit visas, of whom 165,000 immigrated to Israel and
126,000 immigrated to the United States.
Following the war, Israel made an offer for peace that included the return of most of the
recently captured territories. According to Chaim Herzog:

On June 19, 1967, the National Unity Government [of Israel] voted unanimously to return the
Sinai to Egypt and the Golan Heights to Syria in return for peace agreements. The Golans would
have to be demilitarized and special arrangement would be negotiated for the Straits of Tiran.
The government also resolved to open negotiations with King Hussein of Jordan regarding the
Eastern border.

The Israeli decision was to be conveyed to the Arab nations by the United States. The U.S. was
informed of the decision, but not that it was to transmit it. There is no evidence of receipt from
Egypt or Syria, and some historians claim that they may never have received the offer.

In September, the Khartoum Arab Summit resolved that there would be "no peace, no
recognition and no negotiation with Israel". However, as Avraham Sela notes, the Khartoum
conference effectively marked a shift in the perception of the conflict by the Arab states away
from one centered on the question of Israel's legitimacy toward one focusing on territories and
boundaries and this was underpinned on November 22 when Egypt and Jordan accepted United
Nations Security Council Resolution 242.

The June 19 Israeli cabinet decision did not include the Gaza Strip, and left open the possibility
of Israel permanently acquiring parts of the West Bank. On June 25–27, Israel incorporated East
Jerusalem together with areas of the West Bank to the north and south into Jerusalem's new
municipal boundaries.

Yet another aspect of the war touches on the population of the captured territories: of about
one million Palestinians in the West Bank, 300,000 (according to the United States Department
of State)fled to Jordan, where they contributed to the growing unrest. The other 600,000
remained. In the Golan Heights, an estimated 80,000 Syrians fled. Only the inhabitants of East
Jerusalem and the Golan Heights became entitled to receive full Israeli citizenship, as Israel
applied its law, administration and jurisdiction to these territories in 1967 and 1981
respectively, and the vast majority in both territories declined to do so. See also Israeli-
Palestinian conflict and Golan Heights.
Both Jordan and Egypt eventually withdrew their claims to the West Bank and Gaza (the Sinai
was returned on the basis of the Camp David Accords of 1978). After Israeli conquest of these
newly acquired 'territories', a large settlement effort was launched to secure Israel's permanent
foothold. There are now hundreds of thousands of Israeli settlers in these territories, though
the Israeli settlements in Gaza were evacuated and destroyed in August 2005 as a part of
Israel's unilateral disengagement plan.

The 1967 War laid the foundation for future discord in the region.

On November 22, 1967, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 242, the "land
for peace" formula, which called for Israeli withdrawal "from territories occupied" in 1967 and
"the termination of all claims or states of belligerency". Resolution 242 recognized the right of
"every state in the area to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from
threats or acts of force." Israel returned the Sinai to Egypt in 1978, after the Camp David
Accords, and disengaged from the Gaza Strip in the summer of 2005, though its army frequently
re-enters Gaza for military operations and still retains control of border crossings, seaports, and
airports.

The aftermath of the war is also of religious significance. Under Jordanian rule, Jews were
effectively barred from visiting the Western Wall (even though Article VIII of the 1949 Armistice
Agreement demanded Israeli Jewish access to the Western Wall). Jewish holy sites were not
maintained, and their cemeteries had been desecrated. After the annexation to Israel, each
religious group was granted administration over its holy sites. Despite the Temple Mount's
importance in Jewish tradition, the al-Aqsa Mosque is under sole administration of a Muslim
Waqf, and Jews are barred from praying on the Temple Mount.

After following other Arab nations in declaring war, Mauritania remained in a declared state of
war with Israel until about 1999.

Casualties

Israeli casualties of war

Between 776 and 983 Israelis were killed and 4,517 were wounded. 15 Israeli soldiers were
captured. Arab casualties were far greater. Between 9,800 and 15,000 Egyptian soldiers were
listed as killed or missing in action. An additional 4,338 Egyptian soldiers were
captured.Jordanian losses are estimated to be 6,000 killed or missing and 533 captured, though
Gawrych cites a number of some 700 killed in action with another 2,500 wounded. The Syrians
were estimated to have sustained some 1,000 killed in action. 367 Syrians were captured.

Controversies

Preemptive strike v. unjustified attack

At the commencement of hostilities, both Egypt and Israel announced that they had been
attacked by the other country. The Israeli government later abandoned its initial position,
acknowledging Israel had struck first, claiming that it was a preemptive strike in the face of a
planned invasion by Egypt. On the other hand, the Arab view was that it was unjustified to
attack Egypt.

Allegations of atrocities against Egyptian soldiers

It has been alleged that Nasser did not want Egypt to learn of the true extent of his defeat and
so ordered the killing of Egyptian army stragglers making their way back to the Suez canal zone.
There have also been allegations from both Israeli and Egyptian sources that Israeli troops killed
unarmed Egyptian prisoners.

Allegations of military support from the U.S., U.K. and Soviet Union

There have been a number of allegations of direct military support of Israel during the war by
the U.S. and the UK, including the supply of equipment (despite an embargo) and the
participation of U.S. forces in the conflict. Many of these allegations and conspiracy theories
have been disputed and it has been claimed that some were given currency in the Arab world
to explain the Arab defeat. It has also been claimed that the Soviet Union, in support of its Arab
allies, used its naval strength in the Mediterranean to act as a major restraint on the U.S. Navy.

America features prominently in Arab conspiracy theories purporting to explain the June 1967
defeat. Heikal, Nasser confidant, claims that President Lyndon Johnson was obsessed with
Nasser and that Johnson conspired with Israel to bring him down. The reported Israeli troop
movements seemed all the more threatening because they were perceived in the context of a
U.S. conspiracy against Egypt. Salah Bassiouny of the Foreign ministry, claims that Foreign
Ministry saw the reported Israeli troop movements as credible because Israel had reached the
level at which it could find strategic alliance with the United States. During the war, Cairo
announced that American and British planes were participating in the Israeli attack. Nasser
broke off diplomatic relations following this allegation. Nasser's image of the United States was
such that he might well have believed the worst. However Anwar Sadat implied that Nasser
used this deliberate conspiracy in order to accuse the United States as a political cover-up for
domestic consumption. Lutfi Abd al-Qadir, the director of Radio Cairo during the late 1960s,
who accompanied Nasser to his visits in Moscow, had his conspiracy theory that both the
Soviets and the Western powers wanted to topple Nasser or to reduce his influence.

The USS Liberty incident

On June 8, 1967, USS Liberty, a United States Navy electronic intelligence vessel sailing 13
nautical miles (24 km) off Arish (just outside Egypt's territorial waters), was attacked by Israeli
jets and torpedo boats, nearly sinking the ship, killing 34 sailors and wounding 171. Israel said
the attack was a case of mistaken identity, and that the ship had been misidentified as the
Egyptian vessel El Quseir. Israel apologized for the mistake, and paid compensation to the
victims or their families, and to the United States for damage to the ship. After an investigation,
the U.S. accepted the explanation that the incident was friendly fire and the issue was closed by
the exchange of diplomatic notes in 1987. U.S. intelligence specialists who saw transcripts of
intercepted Israeli communications say the attack on the ship was deliberate.

Displaced populations
Arab

As a result of the war, a wave of Palestinians was displaced. An estimated 300,000 Palestinians
left the West Bank and Gaza, most of whom settled in Jordan.

In his book Righteous Victims, Israeli "New Historian" Benny Morris writes:

“In three villages southwest of Jerusalem and at Qalqilya, houses were destroyed "not in battle,
but as punishment ... and in order to chase away the inhabitants ... — contrary to
government ... policy," Dayan wrote in his memoirs. In Qalqilya, about a third of the homes
were razed and about 12,000 inhabitants were evicted, though many then camped out in the
environs. The evictees in both areas were allowed to stay and later were given cement and
tools by the Israeli authorities to rebuild at least some of their dwellings.

But many thousands of other Palestinians now took to the roads. Perhaps as many as seventy
thousand, mostly from the Jericho area, fled during the fighting; tens of thousands more left
over the following months. Altogether, about one-quarter of the population of the West Bank,
about 200–250,000 people, went into exile.... They simply walked to the Jordan River crossings
and made their way on foot to the East Bank. It is unclear how many were intimidated or forced
out by the Israeli troops and how many left voluntarily, in panic and fear. There is some
evidence of IDF soldiers going around with loudspeakers ordering West Bankers to leave their
homes and cross the Jordan. Some left because they had relatives or sources of livelihood on
the East Bank and feared being permanently cut off.

Thousands of Arabs were taken by bus from East Jerusalem to the Allenby bridge, though there
is no evidence of coercion. The free Israeli-organized transportation, which began on June 11,
1967, went on for about a month. At the bridge they had to sign a document stating that they
were leaving of their own free will. Perhaps as many as seventy thousand people emigrated
from the Gaza Strip to Egypt and elsewhere in the Arab world.

On July 2, the Israeli government announced that it would allow the return of those 1967
refugees who desired to do so, but no later than August 10, later extended to September 13.
The Jordanian authorities probably pressured many of the refugees, who constituted an
enormous burden, to sign up to return. In practice only 14,000 of the 120,000 who applied
were actually allowed by Israel back into the West Bank by the beginning of September. After
that, only a trickle of "special cases" were allowed back, perhaps 3,000 in all. (328–9)

In addition, between 80,000 and 110,000 Syrians fled the Golan Heights, of which about 20,000
were from the city of Quneitra. According to more recent research by the Israeli daily Haaretz,
130,000 Syrian inhabitants were expelled from the territory, most of them by the Israeli army.

Jews in Arab countries

The minority Jews living across the Arab world had immediately faced persecution and
expulsion, following the Israeli victory. According to historian and ambassador Michael B. Oren:

“Mobs attacked Jewish neighborhoods in Egypt, Yemen, Lebanon, Tunisia, and Morocco,
burning synagogues and assaulting residents. A pogrom in Tripoli, Libya, left 18 Jews dead and
25 injured; the survivors were herded into detention centers. Of Egypt's 4,000 Jews, 800 were
arrested, including the chief rabbis of both Cairo and Alexandria, and their property
sequestered by the government. The ancient communities of Damascus and Baghdad were
placed under house arrest, their leaders imprisoned and fined. A total of 7,000 Jews were
expelled, many with merely a satchel.

Jews in communist countries

Following the war, a series of antisemitic purges began in Communist countries. Some 11,200
Jews from Poland immigrated to Israel during 1968 Polish political crisis and the following year.