NAME OF CASE CASE DIGEST

1.Dir. of Lands vs. CA- July 28, DOCTRINE: When the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room for
1997 interpretation, vacillation, or equivocation, there is room only for application

FACTS: On December 8, 1986 private respondent Teodoro Abistado filed a petition for original
registration of his title over 648 square meters of land under PD No 1529. However during the
pendency of his petition, the applicant died. Hence his heirs represented by their aunt, who was
appointed as their guardian, were substituted as applicants.

The land registration court dismissed the petition “for want of jurisdiction” However, it found that the
applicants through their predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive and peaceful
possession of the subject land since 1938.

Records show that the applicants failed to comply with the provision of PD 1529 Section 23 requiring
the applicants to publish the notice of initial hearing in a newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines. The initial hearing was published only in the Official Gazette.

The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC ruling that the publication in the newspaper of
general circulation was merely procedural and that the failure to cause such publication did not deprive
the trial court of its authority to grant the application

ISSUE/S: Whether or not the land registration court can validly confirm and register the title of private
respondents in the absence of any publication in a newspaper of general circulation

RULING: NO. This asnswer is impelled by the demands of statutory construction and the due process
rationale behind the publication requirement.

The law used the term “shall” in prescribing the work to be done by the Commissioner of Land
Registration upon the latter’s receipt of the court order setting the time for initial hearing. The word
denotes an imperative and this indicates the mandatory character of a statute. While concededly, such
literal mandate is not an absolute rule in statutory construction, as its import ultimately depends upon
its context in the entire provision, we hold that in the present case the term must be understood in its
normal mandatory meaning.

Admittedly, there was failure to comply with the explicit publication requirement of the law. Private
respondents did not proffer any excuse; even if they had, it would not have mattered because the
statute itself allows no excuses. Ineludibly, this Court has no authority to dispense with such mandatory
requirement. The law is unambiguous and its rationale clear. Time and again, this Court has declared
that where the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room for interpretation,
vacillation or equivocation; there is room only for application. There is no alternative. Thus, the
application for land registration filed by private respondents must be dismissed without prejudice to
reapplication in the future, after all the legal requisites shall have been duly complied with.
 NOTE/S(optional):

2. People vs. Nazario FACTS:

In the years 1964, 1965 and 1966, in the Municipality of Pagbilao, Quezon, Philippines, Nazario, being
then the owner and operator of a fishpond, refused and failed to pay the municipal taxes required of
him as fishpond operator as provided for under Ordinance No. 4, series of 1955, as amended, in spite
of repeated demands made upon him by the Municipal Treasurer of Pagbilao, Quezon, to pay the
same.

The ordinances in question were Ordinance No. 4, series of 1955, Ordinance No. 15, series of 1965,
and Ordinance No. 12, series of 1966, of the Municipal Council of Pagbilao. Insofar as pertinent to this
appeal, the salient portions thereof are hereinbelow quoted:

Section 1. Any owner or manager of fishponds in places within the territorial limits of
Pagbilao, Quezon, shall pay a municipal tax in the amount of P3.00 per hectare of
fishpond on part thereof per annum. 5

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. l (a). For the convenience of those who have or owners or managers of
fishponds within the territorial limits of this municipality, the date of payment of
municipal tax relative thereto, shall begin after the lapse of three (3) years starting
from the date said fishpond is approved by the Bureau of Fisheries. 6

xxx xxx xxx

Section 1. Any owner or manager of fishponds in places within the territorial limits of
Pagbilao shall pay a municipal tax in the amount of P3.00 per hectare or any fraction
thereof per annum beginning and taking effect from the year 1964, if the fishpond
started operating before the year 1964. 7

The petitioner contended that being a mere lessee of the fishpond, he was not covered since the said
ordinances speak of "owner or manager." He likewise maintained that they are vague insofar as they
reckon the date of payment: Whereas Ordinance No. 4 provides that parties shall commence payment
"after the lapse of three (3) years starting from the date said fishpond is approved by the Bureau of
Fisheries." 9 Ordinance No. 12 states that liability for the tax accrues "beginning and taking effect from
the year 1964 if the fishpond started operating before the year 1964."

Also, Nazario contended that Amendment No. 12 passed on September 19, 1966, clearly provides that
the payment of the imposed tax shall "beginning and taking effect from the year 1964, if the fishpond
started operating before the year 1964.' In other words, it penalizes acts or events occurring before its
passage, that is to say, 1964 and even prior thereto.

ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not the ordinances are null and void for being vague and ambiguous.
2. Whether or not the ordinances in question ex post facto laws.

RULING:
1. No. As a rule, a statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible
standards that men "of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ
 as to its application." 11 It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due
process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the
conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its
provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.

In no way may the ordinances at bar be said to be tainted with the vice of vagueness. It is
unmistakable from their very provisions that the appellant falls within its coverage. As the
actual operator of the fishponds, he comes within the term "manager." He does not deny the
fact that he financed the construction of the fishponds, introduced fish fries into the fishponds,
and had employed laborers to maintain them. 31 While it appears that it is the National
Government which owns them, 32 the Government never shared in the profits they had
generated. It is therefore only logical that he shoulders the burden of tax under the said
ordinances.

As the actual operator of the fishponds in question, and as the recipient of profits brought
about by the business, the appellant is clearly liable for the municipal taxes in question. He
cannot say that he did not have a fair notice of such a liability to make such ordinances vague.

Neither are the said ordinances vague as to dates of payment. There is no merit to the claim
that "the imposition of tax has to depend upon an uncertain date yet to be determined (three
years after the 'approval of the fishpond' by the Bureau of Fisheries, and upon an uncertain
event (if the fishpond started operating before 1964), also to be determined by an uncertain
individual or individuals." 34 Ordinance No. 15, in making the tax payable "after the lapse of
three (3) years starting from the date said fishpond is approved by the Bureau of Fisheries," 35
is unequivocal about the date of payment, and its amendment by Ordinance No. 12, reckoning
liability thereunder "beginning and taking effect from the year 1964 if the fishpond started
operating before the year 1964 ," 36 does not give rise to any ambiguity. In either case, the
dates of payment have been definitely established. The fact that the appellant has been
allegedly uncertain about the reckoning dates — as far as his liability for the years 1964,
1965, and 1966 is concerned — presents a mere problem in computation, but it does not
make the ordinances vague. In addition, the same would have been at most a difficult piece of
legislation, which is not unfamiliar in this jurisdiction, but hardly a vague law.

As it stands, then, liability for the tax accrues on January 1, 1964 for fishponds in operation
prior thereto (Ordinance No. 12), and for new fishponds, three years after their approval by
the Bureau of Fisheries (Ordinance No. 15). This is so since the amendatory act (Ordinance
No. 12) merely granted amnesty unto old, delinquent fishpond operators. It did not repeal its
mother ordinances (Nos. 4 and 15). With respect to new operators, Ordinance No. 15 should
still prevail.

To the Court, the ordinances in question set forth enough standards that clarify imagined
ambiguities. While such standards are not apparent from the face thereof, they are visible
from the intent of the said ordinances.

2. No. The Court finds no merit in this contention. As the Solicitor General notes, “Municipal
Ordinance No. 4 was passed on May 14, 1955. Hence, it cannot be said that the amendment
(under Ordinance No. 12) is being made to apply retroactively (to 1964) since the reckoning
period is 1955 (date of enactment). Essentially, Ordinances Nos. 12 and 15 are in the nature
of curative measures intended to facilitate and enhance the collection of revenues the original
act, Ordinance No. 4, had prescribed. Moreover, the act (of non-payment of the tax), had
been, since 1955, made punishable, and it cannot be said that Ordinance No. 12 imposes a
retroactive penalty.” As we have noted, it operates to grant amnesty to operators who had
been delinquent between 1955 and 1964. It does not mete out a penalty, much less a
retrospective one.
3. Ortigas & Co vs. Feati Bank
ORTIGAS & CO., LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, vs. FEATI BANK & TRUST CO. G.R. No. L-24670 94
SCRA 533 December 14, 1979

FACTS:

Plaintiff Ortigas & Co. is engaged in real estate business, developing and selling lots to the public while
defendant-appellee Feati bank and Trust Co., is a corporation. On March 4, 1952, plaintiff, as vendor,
and Natividad Angeles, as vendees, entered into separate agreements of sale on installments over two
parcels of land, known as at Lot 5 and 6, block 31 of the Highway Hills subdivision at Mandaluyong,
Rizal. On July 19, 1962, the said vendees transferred their rights and interest over the aforesaid lots in
favour of one Emma Chavez. The agreements of sale on instalment and the deeds of sale contained
the restriction that the parcel of land subject of this deed of sale shall be used by the buyer exclusively
for residential purposes, and she shall not be entitled to take or remove soil, stones or gravel from it or
any other lots belonging to the seller. The restrictions were later annotated in TCT Nos. 101509 and
101511 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal, covering the said lots and issued in the name of Emma
Chavez.

On July 23, 1962 Feati bank & Trust Co. bought Lot No. 5 directly from Emma Chavez while Lot No.6
was acquired from Republic Flour Mills through a “Deed of Exchange”. The building restrictions were
also annotated therein. Plaintiff claims that the restrictions were imposed as part of its general building
scheme designed for the beautification and development of the Highway Hills Subdivision which forms
part of its big landed estate where commercial and industrial sites are also designated or established.

Defendant-appellee maintains that the area along western part of EDSA Shaw Boulevard to Pasig
River, has been declared a commercial and industrial zone, per Resolution no. 27, dated February 4,
1960 of the Municipal Council of Mandaluyong, Rizal. It alleges that plaintiff-appellant completely sold
and transferred to third persons all lots in said subdivision facing EDSA and the subject lots acquired
only on july 23, 1962 or more than two years after the area had been declared a commercial and
industrial zone.

On or about May 5, 1963, defendant-appellee began construction of a building devoted to banking

purposes but which it claims could also be used exclusively for residential purpose. The following day,
the plaintiff demanded in writing that the construction of the commercial building devoted to banking
purposes but it which claims could also be used exclusively for residential purpose. The following day,
the plaintiff demanded in writing that the construction of the commercial building be stopped but the
defendant refused to comply contending that the construction was in accordance with the zoning
regulations.

ISSUES:

Whether or not Resolution No. 27 declaring Lot 5 and 6 to be part of an industrial and commercial zone
is valid considering the contract stipulation in the Transfer Certificate of Titles.

RULING:

YES.

Resolution No. 27 prevails over the contract stipulations. Section 3 of RA 2264 of the local autonomy
act empowers a municipal council to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations for the
Municipality. Section 12 of RA 2264 states that implied power of the municipality should be “liberally
construed in its favour “, “to give more power to the local government in promoting economic conditions
, social welfare and material progress in the community”.

Article III section 10 of 1987 constitution stated “ No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be
passed” is not absolute, since it must be reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police power. The
power to prescribed regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order of safety
and general welfare of the people. Resolution No. 27 was obviously passed in exercise of police power
to safeguard health , safety, peace, and order and the general welfare of the people in the locality as it
 would not be a conducive residential amount of traffic, pollution, and noise which results in the
surrounding industrial and commercial establishment

Decision dismissing the complaint of Ortigas is AFFIRMED.

4. People vs. Mapa GR L-22301

PEOPLE V. MARIO MAPA MAPULONG
August 30, 1967

FACTS:
The situation was that on August 13, 1962, the Accused (Mapa) was caught in the City of Manila,
unlawfully possessing one revolver with no serial number and 6 rounds of ammunition. He had no
permit for his firearm. Mapa was indicted on August 14 1962, and subsequently accused in violation of
Section 878 of the Revised Administrative Code (RAC).

The case was heard by the lower court on September 3, 1963. Mapa did not deny that he held such
possession.

Mapa’s counsel presented 4 exhibits presenting his appointment, on June 2, 1962, as secret agent of
Feliciano Leviste, Governor of Batangas.

Next, another document issued by Gov. Leviste addressed to Mapa directed him to proceed to Manila,
Pasay, and Quezon city on a confidential mission. Mapa was only assumed to have assumed his oath
as a secret agent through a certificate dated March 11, 1963.

The accused was convicted by the lower court on November 27, 1963 for the crime of illegal
possession of firearms. The decision was appealed to the higher courts, on the question of law.

ISSUE: WON an appointed “secret agent” of a governor can possess a firearm without a license.

RULING: NO.
The law is explicit as specifically stated: “it shall be unalwful for any person to … possess any firearm,
… or ammunition therefore.” The next section (Sec. 879, RAC) provides that “firearms and ammunition
regularly and lawfully issued to officers, soldiers, sailors, or marines, … guards in the employment of
the Bureau of Prisons, municipal police, provincial governors, … are not covered when such firearms
are in possession of such officials and public servants for use in the performance of their official
duties.”

No provision is made for a secret agent. The first and fundamental duty of the courts is to apply the
law. Construction and interpretation only come after the law cannot possibly be applied.

Mapa relied on People v. Macarandang as a defense, where a secret agent was acquitted on the basis
 of maintenance of peace and order campaigns and detention of crimes, and whether that put Mapa in
the category of a peace officer - even equivalent to a member of the municipal police, by virtue of Sec.
879. THE COURT RULED THAT SUCH RELIANCE IS MISPLACED. It is not within the power of the
court to set aside the clear and explicit mandate of a law or provision. Hence, there is no authority to
say that People v. Macarandang conflicts with the present decision.

Special notes from digester:

- FUNCTIONS AS A “PEACE OFFICER”:

Consider the difference between Macarandang’s appointment as a secret agent to maintain

peace and order and detention of crimes, and Mapa’s appointment as secret agent tasked
with a confidential mission. Does Mapa fall into the exception indicated in Sec. 879 of the
RAC as a “peace officer”, like Macarandang did? (Cross Reference with GR. L-48112)

- TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION:

Likewise, consider Macarandang’s scope of operation within Gov. Dimakuta’s province of

Lanao, and Mapa’s scope of operation beyond Gov. Leviste’s province of Batangas, operating
in Manila, Pasay and Quezon. (Cross Reference with GR. L-48112)

- DATES OF APPOINTMENT AND APPOINTMENT STATUS:

Finally, consider Macarandang’s official appointment as a secret agent on October 1, 1953,

and his indictment on June 8, 1954. Prior to this appointment, Macarandang maintained the
status of Datu.

Contrast such with Mapa’s appointment through document on June 2, 1962, with his
appointment through oath of office on March 11, 1963, and his indictment on August 14, 1962.
Can it be inferred that at the time of indictment, Macarandang was officially appointed as a
secret agent with the functions of peacekeeping, whereas Mapa was not?

* closely examine Sec 879 of the RAC and contrast the facts and exhibits of documents submitted to
the courts in both Mapa and Macarandang cases. Assess Jabinal thereafter to find out why Jabinal
was likewise acquitted.

5. People vs. Jabinal

Facts:

This is an appeal from the judgment of the Municipal Court of Batangas (provincial capital), Batangas,
in Criminal Case No. 889, finding the accused guilty of the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearm and
Ammunition and sentencing him to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from one (1) year and one
(1) day to two (2) years imprisonment, with the accessories provided by law, which raises in issue the
validity of his conviction based on a retroactive application of Our ruling in People v. Mapa.

At the arraignment on September 11, 1964, the accused entered a plea of not guilty, after which trial
was accordingly held.

The accused admitted that on September 5, 1964, he was in possession of the revolver and the
ammunition described in the complaint, without the requisite license or permit. He, however, claimed to
be entitled to exoneration because, although he had no license or permit, he had an appointment as
Secret Agent from the Provincial Governor of Batangas and an appointment as Confidential Agent from
the PC Provincial Commander, and the said appointments expressly carried with them the authority to
 possess and carry the firearm in question.

On March 15, 1964, the accused was also appointed by the PC Provincial Commander of Batangas as
Confidential Agent with duties to furnish information regarding smuggling activities wanted persons,
loose firearms, subversives and other similar subjects that might affect the peace and order condition
in Batangas province, and in connection with these duties he was temporarily authorized to possess an
ROHM revolver, Cal. .22 RG-8 SN-64, for his personal protection while in the performance of official
duties.

The accused contended before the court a quo that in view of his above-mentioned appointments as
Secret Agent tind Confidential Agent, with authority to possess the firearm subject matter of the
prosecution, he was entitled to acquittal on the basis of the Supreme Court’s decisions in People v.
Macarandang and People v. Lucero.

The trial court, while conceding that on the basis of the evidence of record the accused had really been
appointed Secret Agent and Confidential Agent by the Provincial Governor and the PC Provincial
Commander of Batangas, respectively, with authority to possess and carry the firearm described in the
complaint, nevertheless held the accused in its decision dated December 27, 1968, criminally liable for
illegal possession of a firearm and ammunition on the ground that the rulings of the Supreme Court in
the cases of Macarandang and Lucero were reversed and abandoned in People v. Mapa, supra.

The court considered as mitigating circumstances the appointments of the accused as Secret Agent
and Confidential Agent.

Issue: Whether decisions of Supreme Court are considered evidence of what the law means.

Ruling:

Decisions of this Court, although in themselves not laws, are nevertheless evidence of what the laws
mean, and this is the reason why under Article 8 of the New Civil Code, “judicial decisions applying or
interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system x x x.”

The interpretation upon a law by this Court constitutes, in a way, a part of the law as of the date that
law was originally passed, since this Court’s construction merely establishes the contemporaneous
legislative intent that the law thus construed intends to effectuate. The settled rule supported by
numerous authorities is a restatement of the legal maxim “legis interpretado legis vim obtinet”—the
interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force of law.

The doctrine laid down in Lucero and Macarandang was part of the jurisprudence, hence, of the law, of
the land, at the time appellant was found in possession of the firearm in question and when he was
arraigned by the trial court.

It is true that the doctrine was overruled in the Mapa case in 1967, but when a doctrine of this Court is
overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively, and should
not apply to parties who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof. This is especially
true in the construction and application of criminal law, where it is necessary that the punishability of an
act be reasonably foreseen for the guidance of society.

It follows, therefore, that considering that appellant was conferred his appointment as Secret Agent and
Confidential Agent and authorized to possess a firearm pursuant to the prevailing doctrine enunciated
in Macarandang and Lucero, under which no criminal liability would attach to his possession of said
firearm in spite of the absence of a license and permit therefor, appellant must be absolved. Certainly,
appellant may not be punished for an act which at the time it was done was held not to be punishable.

6. Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan

 FACTS:

On April 25, 2001, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution in Criminal Case No. 26558, finding
probable cause that petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, then the President of the Philippines has
committed the offense of plunder, and that he be prosecuted under RA 7080 (An Act Defining and
Penalizing the Crime of Plunder). The petitioner contended that RA 7080 was unconstitutional, on the
grounds that 1.) it was vague; 2.) it dispenses with the “reasonable doubt” standard in criminal
prosecutions; and 3.) it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under the
Revised Penal Code, thus violating the fundamental rights of the accused. The said law allegedly
suffers from vagueness on the terms it uses, particularly: ‘combination’, ‘series’, and ‘unwarranted’.
Based on this, the petitioner used the facial challenge to question the validity of RA 7080.

ISSUE:

1.WON the Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being vague.

RULING:

1. NO. A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms are used
therein, or because of the employment of terms without defining them; much less do we have
to define every word we use. Besides, there is no positive constitutional or statutory command
requiring the legislature to define each and every word in an enactment.

Congress is not restricted in the form of expression of its will, and its inability to so define the
words employed in a statute will not necessarily result in the vagueness or ambiguity of the
law so long as the legislative will is clear, or at least, can be gathered from the whole act,
which is distinctly expressed in the Plunder Law.

Premises considered, the Court holds that RA 7080 otherwise known as the Plunder Law, as
amended by RA 7659, is CONSTITUTIONAL. Thus, the petition to declare the law
unconstitutional is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Notes:

The void-for-vagueness doctrine states that a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an
act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and
differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process of law.

7. Primicias vs. Mun. of JUAN AUGUSTO B. PRIMICIAS, plaintiff-appellee,

Urdaneta
vs.
 THE MUNICIPALITY OF URDANETA, PANGASINAN, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
G.R. No. L-26702 October 18, 1979

FACTS:
February 8, 1965, Juan Augusta B. Primicia was driving his car within the jurisdiction of Urdaneta when
a member of Urdaneta’s Municipal Police asked him to stop and he was found violating Municipal
Order 3, Series of 1964 for “particularly, overtaking a truck”. The Courts of First Instance decided that
from the action initiated by Primicias, the Municipal Order was null and void and had been repealed by
Republic Act 4136, the Land Transportation and Traffic Code
The policeman then asked for plaintiff’s license which he surrendered, and a temporary operator’s
permit was issued to him. This incident took place about 200 meters away from a school building, at
Barrio Nancamaliran, Urdaneta. Thereafter, a criminal complaint was filed in the Municipal Court of
Urdaneta against Primicias for violation of Ordinance 3 (S. 1964). Due to the institution of the criminal
case, Primicias initiated an action for the annulment of said ordinance with prayer for the issuance of
preliminary injunction for the purpose of restraining defendants Municipality of Urdaneta, Mayor Perez,
Police Chief Suyat, Judge Soriano and Patrolman Andrada from enforcing the ordinance.

ISSUES:
1. W/N the Municipal Order No. 3 is valid
2. W/N the Municipal Order is not definite in its terms or ambiguous.

HELD:
1. No. Ordinance No. 3 is said to be patterned after and based on Section 53 of Act No. 3992.
However, Act No. 3992 has been explicitly repealed by RA No. 4136 (The Land and
Transportation Code). By this express repeal, the general rule is that a later law prevails over
an earlier law.
2. Yes. The Municipal Council of Urdaneta used the phrase "vehicular traffic" (Section 1,
Ordinance) did not distinguish between passenger cars and motor vehicles and motor trucks
and buses. This conclusion is bolstered by the fact that nowhere in the Ordinance is "vehicular
traffic" defined. Considering that this is a regulatory ordinance, its clearness, definiteness and
certainty are all the more important so that "an average man should be able with due care,
after reading it,, to understand and ascertain whether he will incur a penalty for particular acts
or courses of conduct."

8. People vs. Santayana People vs. Santayana

No. L-22291. November 15, 1976.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JESUS
SANTAYANA Y ESCUDERO, defendant-appellant.

Doctrine: Criminal liability; Applicability of rule permitting special agents to possess firearms without
license which rule prevailed at time of appointment of accused as special agent and of his
apprehension for possession of firearm without license.

FACTS:

1. Jesus Santayana y Escudero, was found guilty of the crime of illegal possession of firearms
and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from two (2) years and to pay the costs.

2. On February 19, 1962, appellant Jesus Santayana, was appointed as “Special Agent” by then
Colonel Jose C. Maristela, Chief of the CIS and was issued an certificate that the accused
was an accredited members of CIS

3. Upon appointment as special agent , he was given a pistol , described in the Memo. Receipt
that he was authorized to carry and possess the same in the performance of this official duty
and personal protection.

4. On October 29, 1962, the accused was found in Plaza Miranda in possession of the above
described pistol, without a license to possess them. An investigation was conducted and
thereupon, a corresponding complaint was filed against the accused.

5. The case underwent trial after which the accused was convicted of the crime charged with its
corresponding penalty.

6. Hence, the case was appealed to US and the appellant assigned three errors allegedly
committed by the trial court in disposing of this case.

ISSUE:

WON the appointment of the appellant as special agent of the CIS which authorized him to possess
and carry firearms exempts him from securing a license or permit ( Sec. 879 RAC) ?

RULING:

1. No. The plain meaning rule cannot be applied in this case since, the doctrine of the Macarandang
case which was then prevailing during appellants apprehension.

The doctrine in effect at the time of the appellant's arrest is established in the case of People
vs. Macarandang, where it was decided that a civilian's appointment as a "secret agent to assist in the
 maintenance of peace and order campaign and detection of crimes sufficiently puts him within the
category of a "peace officer," even to a member of the municipal police expressly covered by Section
879.

However, the appellant would cite People v. Macarandang, in which a secret agent was found
not guilty after an appeal on the basis that his appointment as a secret agent "sufficiently put him within
the category of a "peace officer" equivalent even to a member of the municipal police expressly
covered by section 879."

The case of People vs. Mapa revoked the doctrine in the Macarandang case only on August
30,1967. Under the Macarandang rule therefore obtaining at the time of appellant’s appointment as
secret agent, he incurred no criminal liability for possession of the pistol-in question.

The decision appealed from is hereby reversed and appellant Jesus Santayana y Escudero
is hereby acquitted.

NOTE/S:
Sections 879 of the Revised Administrative Code provides —
Exemption as to firearms and ammunition used by military and naval forces or by peace officers. This
article shall not apply to firearms and ammunition regularly and lawfully issued to officers, soldiers,
sailors, or marines of the United States Army and Navy, the Philippine Constabulary, guards in the
employment of the Bureau of Prisons, municipal police, provincial governors, lieutenant governors,
provincial treasurers, municipal treasurers, municipal mayors, and guards of provincial prisoners and
jails, when such firearms are in possession of such officials and public servants for use in the
performance of their official duties.

Plain meaning rule - is an approach to legal proceedings that relies on the usual and ordinary meaning
of a law's text. This rule is the starting point for courts and legal experts attempting to determine
legislative intent.

9.People vs. Desierto Doctrine: Probable cause signifies a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances
sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man's belief that the person accused is guilty of
the offense with which he is charged.

Facts:This is an instant Petition for Certiorari and mandamus filed by the Republic of the Philippines,
through the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), against the above-named private
respondents. Petitioner alleged that the Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing his
Resolution dated September 5, 1997 dismissing its (petitioner's) complaint for violation of Section 3(e)
of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, against the
above-named private respondents

Issue: Whether or not the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in dismissing petitioner's complaint for lack of probable cause?

Ratio: In the case at bar, we hold that the Ombudsman committed no grave abuse of discretion in
finding that there was no probable cause against the private respondents to hold them liable for
 violation of Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019. Probable cause signifies a reasonable ground of suspicion
supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man's belief that
the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged. The grounds for suspicion must
be reasonable and supported by sufficiently strong circumstances. As previously discussed, the
Ombudsman correctly found that some of the essential elements of the offense charged are not
present. Verily, we cannot attribute any arbitrariness or despotism to him.Ï‚Î

Ruling: DISMISSED. The Resolution of the Ombudsman dated September 5, 1997 dismissing
petitioner's complaint against private respondents in OMB Case No. 0-91-0382 is AFFIRMED.

10.Alonzo vs. Intermediate

Appellate Court Facts:

Five siblings inherited in equal pro indiviso a land from their deceased parents, wherein two of
them, Celestino Padua and Eustaquia Padua, sold their shares to the Alonzo’s who occupied an area
representing the portions sold to them by enclosing it in a fence and building a house.

The other coheirs lived in the same lot, including the portions sold to the Alonzo’s. Eustaquia, who had
sold her portion, was staying in the same house with her sister Tecla Padua, who later claimed
redemption petition, was close friends with the Alonzo’s and are neighbors whose children went to
school together.

Two of the coheirs, Mariano Padua and Tecla Padua, sought to redeem the area sold to the petitioners
on two separate occasion, but was both dismissed by the trial court; the first because it appeared that
he was an American citizen and the second was on the ground that the right has lapsed, not having
been exercised within 30 days from notice of the sales.

The Intermediate Appellate Court reversed the decision of the trial court, citing Articles 1088 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, wherein the coheirs are entitled to redeem the portion being sold within
30 days from notice in writing of the sale, and Article 1623 that deliberately selected a particular
method of giving notice, which is written notice.

Issue:

Whether or not the trial court interpreted and applied the relevant laws correctly.

Ruling:

Yes, the trial court interpreted and applied the relevant laws correctly because the details prove
the likelihood of the notice happening at one point. Although Articles 1088 and 1623 are explicit in their
condition, the court stuck to the spirit of the law and gave leeway to the Alonzo’s. The court was
satisfied that the other brothers and sister were actually informed, although not in writing, of the sales,
and that such notice was sufficient.

11.People vs. Concepcion

G.R. No. L-19190 November 29, 1922

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

VENANCIO CONCEPCION, defendant-appellant.

FACTS:

● Venancio Concepcion, President of the Philippine National Bank, sent telegrams and a
confirmation letter to the manager of the Aparri branch of PNB, authorizing an extension of
credit in favour of Puno y Concepcion, S. en C. in the amount of P300,000.00.

● This special authorization limited the discretional power of the local manager of the Aparri
branch to grant loans and discount negotiable documents to P5,000, which in certain cases,
could be increased to P10,000.

● Pursuant to this authorization, credit aggregating P300,000 was granted to Puno y

Concepcion, S. en C., the only security required consisting of six demand notes. This Puno y
Concepcion, S. en C., in reality is in a copartnership capitalized at P100,000 wherein,
Venancio Concepcion’s wife owns half of the copartnership.

● Venancio Concepcion was found guilty by the CFI for violation of Section 354 of Act 2747
which provides that: : "The National Bank shall not, directly or indirectly, grant loans to any of
the members of the board of directors of the bank nor to agents of the branch banks."

ISSUE/S:

1. WON granting of a credit of P300,000 to the copartnership "Puno y Concepcion, S. en C." by

Venancio Concepcion, President of the Philippine National Bank, a "loan" within the meaning
of section 35 of Act No. 2747?

● YES. The "credit" of an individual means his ability to borrow money by virtue of the
confidence or trust reposed by a lender that he will pay what he may promise. A "loan" means
the delivery by one party and the receipt by the other party of a given sum of money, upon an
agreement, express or implied, to repay the sum loaned, with or without interest. The
concession of a "credit" necessarily involves the granting of "loans" up to the limit of the
amount fixed in the "credit”.

2. WON granting of a credit of P300,000 to the copartnership "Puno y Concepcion, S. en C.," by

Venancio Concepcion, President of the Philippine National Bank, a "loan" or a "discount"?

● LOAN. Discounts are favored by bankers because of their liquid nature, growing, as they do,
out of an actual, live, transaction. But in its last analysis, to discount a paper is only a mode of
loaning money, with, however, these distinctions: (1) In a discount, interest is deducted in
advance, while in a loan, interest is taken at the expiration of a credit; (2) a discount is always
on double-name paper; a loan is generally on single-name paper.

Conceding, without deciding, the law covers loans and not discounts, yet the conclusion is
 inevitable that the demand notes signed by the firm "Puno y Concepcion, S. en C." were not
discount paper but were mere evidences of indebtedness, because (1) interest was not
deducted from the face of the notes, but was paid when the notes fell due; and (2) they were
single-name and not double-name paper.

3. WON granting of a credit of P300,000 to the copartnershop was an “indirect loan” within the
meaning of Section 35 of Act 2747?

● Yes. In the interpretation and construction of statutes, the primary rule is to ascertain and give
effect to the intention of the Legislature. In this instance, the purpose of the Legislature is
plainly to erect a wall of safety against temptation for a director of the bank. The prohibition
against indirect loans is a recognition of the familiar maxim that no man may serve two
masters — that where personal interest clashes with fidelity to duty the latter almost always
suffers. If, therefore, it is shown that the husband is financially interested in the success or
failure of his wife's business venture, a loan to partnership of which the wife of a director is a
member, falls within the prohibition.

That it was the intention of the Legislature to prohibit exactly such an occurrence is shown by
the acknowledged fact that in this instance the defendant was tempted to mingle his personal
and family affairs with his official duties, and to permit the loan P300,000 to a partnership of
no established reputation and without asking for collateral security.

4. WON granting of a credit of P300,000 to the copartnership "Puno y Concepcion, S. en C." by

Venancio Concepcion, President of the Philippine National Bank, in violation of section 35 of
Act No. 2747, penalized by this law?

● The answer is that when the corporation itself is forbidden to do an act, the prohibition
extends to the board of directors, and to each director separately and individually. Under the
statute which the defendant has violated, criminal intent is not necessarily material. The doing
of the inhibited act, inhibited on account of public policy and public interest, constitutes the
crime.

RULING:

No reversible error was committed in the trial of this case, and that the defendant has been
proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crime charged in the information. The penalty imposed
by the trial judge
falls within the limits of the punitive provisions of the law.

Judgment is affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the appellant

12. Ramos vs. CA

Ramos vs Court of Appeals
GR No. 124354 December 29, 1999

FACTS:
 Plaintiff Erlinda Ramos was, until the afternoon of June 17, 1985 a 47-year old robust woman. Except
for occasional complaints of discomfort due to pains allegedly caused by presence of a stone in her
gall bladder, she was as normal as any other woman. Married to Rogelio Ramos, an executive of
Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT), she has three children whose names are
Rommel, Roy Roderick, and Ron Raymond. Because of the discomforts somehow interfered with her
normal ways, she sough professional advice. She was told to undergo an operation for the removal of
a stone in her gall bladder. She underwent series of examination which revealed that she was fit for the
said surgery. Through the intercession of a mutual friend, she and her husband met Dr. Osaka for the
first time and she was advised by Dr. Osaka to go under the operation called cholecystectomy and the
same was agreed to be scheduled on June 17,1985 at 9:00am at the Delos Santos Medical Center.
Rogelio asked Dr. Osaka to look for a good anesthesiologist to which the latter agreed to. A day before
the scheduled operation, she was admitted at the hospital and on the day of the operation, Erlinda’s
sister was with her insider the operating room. Dr. Osaka arrived at the hospital late, Dr. Guttierez, the
anesthesiologist, started to intubate Erlina when Herminda heard her say that intubating Erlinda is quite
difficult and there were complications. This prompt Dr. Osaka to order a call to another
anesthesiologist, Dr. Caldron who successfully intubated Erlina. The patient’s nails became bluish and
the patient was placed in a trendelenburg position. After the operation, Erlina was diagnosed to be
suffering from diffuse cerebral parenchymal damage and that the petitioner alleged that this was due to
lack of oxygen supply to Erlinda’s brain which resulted from the intubation.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the doctors and the hospital are liable for damages against petitioner for the result to
Erlinda of the said operation.

RULING:

YES.

Yes. The private respondents were unable to disprove the presumption of negligence on their part in
the care of Erlinda and their negligence was the proximate case of her piteous condition.

Nevertheless, despite the fact that the scope of res ipsa liquitor has been measurably enlarged, it does
not automatically follow that it apply to all cases of medical negligence as to mechanically shift the
burden of proof to the defendant to show that he is not guilty of the ascribed negligence. Res ipsa
liquitor is not a rigid or ordinary doctrine to be perfunctorily used but a rule to be cautiously applied,
depending upon the circumstances of each case.

13. Socorro Ramirez vs. CA G.R. No. 93833 September 28, 1995

Kapunan, J.

DOCTRINE: Legislative intent is determined principally from the language of a statute. Where the
language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is applied according to its express terms, and
interpretation would be resorted to only where a literal interpretation would be either impossible or
absurd or would lead to an injustice

FACTS:
● Ramirez filed a civil case damages in Quezon City RTC against Garcia after a confrontation
where the former was allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated
 ● Ramirez produced a verbatim transcript and sought moral damages, litigation and other
expenses in the amount of Php 600,000
● Garcia filed a criminal case before Pasay City RTC for violation of RA 4200
● Upon arraignment, Ramirez filed a Motion to Quash agreed by the trial court
● Garcia filed a petition for Review on Certiorari; case was referred to CA
● CA promulgated its assailed Decision declaring TC’s order null and void
● Ramirez filed MR

ISSUE/S: W/N RA 4200 is applicable (private communication v. private conversation, taping is done by
one of the parties to the conversation)

RULING: YES
● Section 1 provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by
all the parties to any private communication to secretly record such communication by means
of a tape recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be
penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the
private communication. The statute's intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such
recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier "any". Consequently, as respondent Court
of Appeals correctly concluded, "even a (person) privy to a communication who records his
private conversation with another without the knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a violator"
under this provision of R.A. 4200.
● In enacting R.A. 4200, lawmakers contemplated making illegal, unauthorized tape recording
of private conversations or communications taken either by the parties themselves or by third
persons. The unambiguity of the express words of the provision, plainly supports the view
held by the respondent court that the provision seeks to penalize even those privy to the
private communications. Where the law makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish.
● The nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of the statute. The substance of
the same need not be specifically alleged in the information.
● Ramirez's contention that the phrase "private communication" in Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does
not include "private conversations" narrows the ordinary meaning of the word
"communication" to a point of absurdity. The word communicate comes from the latin word
communicare, meaning "to share or to impart." In its ordinary signification, communication
connotes the act of sharing or imparting signification, communication connotes the act of
sharing or imparting, as in a conversation, or signifies the "process by which meanings or
thoughts are shared between individuals through a common system of symbols (as language
signs or gestures)" These definitions are broad enough to include verbal or non-verbal, written
or expressive communications of "meanings or thoughts" which are likely to include the
emotionally-charged exchange.

WHEREFORE, because the law, as applied to the case at bench is clear and unambiguous and leaves
us with no discretion, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The decision appealed from is
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

NOTE/S(optional):

Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, " An Act to Prohibit and Penalized Wire Tapping and Other Related
Violations of Private Communication and Other Purposes," provides:
 Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private
communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement,
to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using a device
commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or
however otherwise described.

14. People vs. Macarandang G.R. No. L-12088 December 23, 1959
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MORO SUMAGUINA MACARANDANG, defendant-appellant.
FACTS:

Moro Sumaguina Macarandang, accused, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously keep
and have in his custody and control one Riot Gun, Winchester, 12 GA. SN-942131 and eight (8) rounds
of ammunitions, without first having obtained the proper license or permit therefor from competent
authority.

In the present appeal the accused, admitting the ownership and possession of the firearm and
ammunition in question, invokes as legal excuse or authority therefor, the appointment issued him by
Governor Dimakuta as secret agent on October 1, 1953

It may be true that, as held by the trial court, the Governor has no authority to issue any firearm license
or permit; but Section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code provides, as shown at least by the
subject matter therefore, that “peace officers” are exempted from the requirements relating to the
issuance of the license to possess firearms. The appointment of the accused as secret agent to assist
in the maintenance of peace and order campaigns and detection of crimes, sufficiently put him within
the category of a “peace officer” equivalent even to a member of the municipal police expressly
covered by Section 879.

ISSUE:
Whether or not defendant should be acquitted for possessing the firearms

RULING:
Yes.

As held by the trial court, the Governor has no authority to issue any firearm license or permit. But
Section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code provides, “peace officers” are exempted from the
requirements relating to issuance of license to possess firearms. The accused was acquitted and the
decision was reversed.