The Limits of Democracy

The Limits of Democracy:
Socio-Political Compromise and Regime

Change in Post-Pinochet Chile
Patrick s Barrett
Introduction
ince the early 1980s, Latin America (and the developing world more generally)
S has undergone a historically significant transition from military to civilian rule.
Like the authoritarianism that preceded it, the number and coincidence of these
transitions have captured the interests of scholars, prompting a new inquiry into
the causes of this most recent wave of regime changes and whether it represents a
decisive movement toward democratic stability. Among the countries that have
recently undergone the transition from authoritarian rule, Chile affords a particu-
larly rich case study for addressing this question. Indeed, despite having suffered
perhaps the most traumatic democratic collapse and undergone the most profound
and far-reaching authoritarian transformation, its transition to civilian rule proved
remarkably smooth and the regime that emerged from that process appears to be
among the most stable of Latin America's new democracies. In fact, when a ma-
jority of Chilean electors voted for the presidential candidate of the center-left
Concertacidn de Partidos por la Democracia (CPPD) in December 1989, it was
the first multiparty majority coalition to be elected in Chile since the early 1940s.
Furthermore, the CPPD's subsequent victory in 1993 marked the first time that an
incumbent government had been reelected since 1946. For the first time in nearly
half a century, moreover, there exists virtually no dispute over the country's devel-
opment strategy, much less the system of capitalist development. And finally, per-
haps the most noteworthy feature of Chile's new found political stability is the
unexpectedly harmonious relations between the CPPD and Chile's business com-
munity. In short, Chile is today enjoying a new socio-political compromise no less
Patrick S. Barrett is the Administrative Director of the Havens Center for the Study of Social Structure and
Social Change at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, where he also received a Ph.D. in Political Science.
His primary interests are in comparative and international political economy and democratization, with a
regional specialization in Latin America. He is currently working on a book manuscript titled The Limits of
Democracy: Socio-Political Compromise and Regime Change in Chile. Address correspondence to: Depart-
ment of Sociology, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 8117 Social Science, Madison, WI 53706.
4 Studies in ComparativeInternational Development / Fall 1999
significant than the so-called estado de compromiso ("compromise state") of the

1930s and 1940s, the other moment in its history when it was regarded as the most
stable and promising of Latin America's democracies.
This remarkable turn of events raises three intriguing questions. First, what are
the causes of Chile's new socio-political compromise? Second, what are the sub-
stantive terms of this compromise; i.e., what tradeoffs underpin it and what ten-
sions is it designed to resolve? Finally, what implications does this compromise
have for the character and trajectory of the post-military order? Does it constitute
the basis for continued democratic stability under post-military rule, or, like Chile's
previous compromise, does it mask underlying political, social, and economic con-
tradictions that bode ill for democratic stability?
Clearly, this outcome has deep historical roots in Chile's prior experiences of
socio-political compromise, democratic collapse, and authoritarian transforma-
tion. The focus of this article, however, is the 199001997 period, during which
Chile's new compromise has been consolidated. 1 Its central argument is that this
compromise can best be understood as a reflection of, and an attempt to contain,
the historical and ongoing tension between the imperative of capital accumulation
and the conflicts over socio-political inclusion and distribution. More concretely,
the article examines struggles over three arenas of conflict that reflect that tension
most clearly: development strategy; labor and social policy; and the structure of
state decision-making. Central to those conflicts, moreover, was the evolving rela-
tionship between business, parties, and the state. Indeed, it is the limitations of that
relationship, and more specifically the limitations on the state's capacity to disci-
pline business, which constitute the limits of Chile's new socio-political compro-
mise. The article concludes that this compromise can be characterized as a
neo-liberal elite pact between big business and political party elites, which rather
than reconciling accumulation and inclusion/distribution, has privileged the former
over the latter.
The article consists of six sections. Section I presents the analytical framework.
Section II briefly examines the period of authoritarian transformation from 1973
to 1989, which established many of the institutional and structural conditions that
shaped and constrained the processes of transition and compromise. Sections III
through V examine the CPPD administrations of Patricio Aylwin and Eduardo Frei
(1990-1997), focusing on the three central pillars of Chile's new compromise.
Finally, the conclusion briefly assesses the prospects for democratic stability in
light of that compromise.
1. Analytical Framework 2
The central theoretical argument of this article is that all capitalist societies are
characterized by a permanent tension between the imperative of capital accumula-
tion and the conflicts over socio-political inclusion and distribution. What distin-
guishes those societies, both from one another and over time, is the capacity to
contain this tension. The degree of democracy and political stability attained by a
given society can therefore be understood as the product of whether and how this
tension is contained. More specifically, it is the product of whether and how state
strategic capacity is generated: i.e., the ability to adapt to changing domestic and
Barrett 5
international circumstances by making timely shifts in development strategy con-

ducive to a process of sustained capital accumulation.3 Above all this means the
capacity to discipline social classes, and private capital in particular. Indeed, it is
whether and how that capacity is generated that determines the limits of democ-
racy under capitalism.
By assigning a central role in the accumulation process to the state, this argu-
ment runs counter to much recent scholarship in the political economy of develop-
ment. This is particularly true of the neo-orthodox perspective, which holds that
rather than contributing to economic development, state intervention has been the
principal cause of economic decline. This perspective, however, suffers from a
number of analytical and historical shortcomings that have been amply discussed
in the literature on development.4 A second, more compelling, line of argument
holds not that the state is the cause of economic decline, but rather that because of
the changing structural character of the international economy (specifically, the
enormous increase in the international mobility of capital and the globalization of
production and trade), the state's capacity for effective intervention has been greatly
diminished (Strange 1996). But while there is indeed evidence that these develop-
ments have constrained national policy-making autonomy (particularly in the area
of macroeconomic policy), 5 the state nonetheless remains central to economic
development.
In the first place, as Robert Wade (1996) has recently argued, reports of the
death of the national economy have been greatly exaggerated, as world production
and investment remain very largely nationally owned and oriented. 6 Moreover, the
need to adapt to a changing international economy does not mean that all countries
will adapt successfully or in the same way (Scharpf 1991; Zysman 1983). States
differ in their endogenous structural capacity for strategic action, in the extent to
which their existing economic structures can adapt to international conditions, and
in their vulnerability to international trends and pressures (Cerny 1991). Perhaps
the most important implication of today's changing international economy, how-
ever, is not simply that it has made effective state intervention more difficult
(which itself has increased the differences among states), but rather that it has
made necessary a shift in the character of that intervention. More specifically,
it has heightened the importance of supply-side, micro-economic forms of in-
tervention, or a greater reliance on industrial and strategic trade policies. 7
This has always been true of late developers, but it is particularly so in light of
the changing structure of international trade (most importantly, the growing
trade in high value-added or "elaborately transformed" manufactures), which
has eroded comparative advantages based on natural resources and cheap la-
bor, while greatly enhancing the importance of technology acquisition and
development, product specialization, and skills training. International com-
petitiveness has, in other words, come to depend increasingly on the ability to
construct "competitive" advantage by actively identifying and selecting particular
sectors in which to encourage investment, facilitate access to technology, promote
R&D and skills training, and develop new infrastructure. Where catching-up is the
priority, simply "getting prices right" is no guarantee of growth; instead, it is likely
to attain static comparative advantage and allocative efficiency at the price of sac-
rificing dynamic comparative advantage and efficiency} Thus, rather than dimin-
6 Studies in Comparative International Development / Fall 1999
ishing the importance of effective state action, the changing international economy
has, if anything, increased it. 9
As stated above, the key to state strategic capacity resides above all in the abil-
ity to discipline social classes, but particularly the owners and corporate managers
of capital, whose significance derives from their control over investment. ~~ In a
capitalist economy, in other words, the satisfaction of business interests is a neces-
sary condition for the satisfaction of all others. This means satisfying the condi-
tions of profitability, which neither the state nor other social and political actors
can undermine without risking losses in production, revenue, and employment and
threatening the stability of the entire social and political order (Lindblom 1977;
Block 1987). But while profitability is a necessary condition for accumulation, it
is not sufficient. Sustained accumulation also requires that private profit-seeking
be disciplined by the state, for there is no guarantee that the discipline of the mar-
ket alone will lead capitalists to invest at high levels and in activities that are both
productive and domestic. Moreover, even market discipline depends on the exist-
ence of a state capable of enforcing it. Disciplining capital, however, is no easy
achievement and indeed is fraught with tensions. This is particularly true of
microeconomic forms of intervention, which constitute a potentially greater intru-
sion upon business autonomy and prerogatives and carry greater risks of the rent-
seeking decried by neo-orthodox scholars. Crucial to disciplining capital, then, is
the ability to influence private investment decisions without either opening the
door to predatory rent-seeking or triggering a defensive reaction in the form of a
decline in investment and/or efforts aimed at restricting the scope of state action.
The state's ability to influence investment in this way, moreover, does not rest on a
capacity to impose its policy objectives over the objections of an entire business
class. The state may be able to do so temporarily, but certainly not in a sustained
way and not without incurring serious economic problems.L1
The question then is under what conditions the generation of strategic capacity
(and in particular, the discipline of capital) can be reconciled with democratization
and under what conditions it cannot. In order to address this question, it is neces-
sary to focus more closely on the tension between accumulation and inclusion/
distribution and whether and how it can be contained. The latter half of this equa-
tion is most clearly reflected in labor and social policies and the structure of state
decision-making.
The importance of labor and social policies resides in the fact that they consti-
tute important instruments for correcting the distributional inequalities generated
by capitalist development, and as such represent important indicators of democra-
tization. ~2 According to the neo-orthodox perspective, however, efforts to achieve
equity through such policies pose an inherent threat to accumulation and economic
efficiency. In the first instance, this is because redistributive measures reduce the
profit share of income and thereby lower investment and growth. Moreover, labor
standards are seen as a major source of labor market rigidity. Indeed, it is only by
restricting union power, deregulating labor markets, and allowing wages to re-
spond flexibly to market signals that full employment, stable prices, and growth
will be achieved. State-provided social protection, moreover, should be made avail-
able only to the certifiably destitute who are unable to participate in the labor
market, while for those who are able to work, social protection should be provided
Barrett 7
by privately organized insurance, with entitlements and benefits reflecting contri-

butions.
The impact of labor and social policies on accumulation and economic effi-
ciency, however, is far more complex and varied than the neo-orthodox position
suggests. In the first place, as Keynesians contend, wages are not only a cost of
production, but also a source of demand and therefore a stimulus to profits and
investment.13 Moreover, while it may be rational for labor to exercise wage re-
straint in order to generate the profits upon which future growth and employment
depend, private control of investment makes this risky for labor, for it has no guar-
antee that the income it foregoes will be invested productively or that it will share
in the resulting productivity gains. Furthermore, labor market flexibility is an in-
sufficient basis for economic growth and may in fact be counterproductive, since
enabling capital to continually squeeze labor can, on the demand side, limit the
growth of the domestic market, and on the supply side, inhibit the switch to more
productivity-enhancing business strategies. This is especially true in light of the
changing structure of international trade, which has eroded comparative advan-
tages based on cheap labor, while increasing the importance of technology acqui-
sition and development, product specialization, and skills training.
At the same time, there is no guarantee that raising labor standards and incomes
will lead capital to invest in a manner that generates increased productivity. It may
instead lead more quickly to a fall in profitability, capital flight, and/or heightened
distributional conflict. Again, the effort to raise productivity will depend in sig-
nificant measure on the state's capacity to discipline private investment decisions.
Moreover, the changes in the global economy have increased the importance of
microeconomic forms of discipline. But this raises a fundamental problem: it is
here that a workable compromise between capital and labor is most difficult to
achieve. In other words, the state's ability to discipline capital on a microeconomic
level through selective intervention may entail the exclusion of labor, for capital's
reticence toward such discipline is likely to be considerably greater if labor has
any say in it. 14 This is especially true if labor is strong or there is already a consid-
erable history of high labor-capital conflict.
This brings us to the relationship between state strategic capacity and inclusion.
A central assertion of this article is that a primary (though not exclusive) motiva-
tion for engaging in political struggle is to affect how the state intervenes in socio-
economic conditions and relations (most importantly, the creation and distribution
of wealth). But deciding how the state intervenes is not open to all social and
political forces equally, because the state's forms of representation are typically
structured in such a way as to privilege or "select" certain social and political
actors over others. Similarly, the state's forms of intervention are also typically
structured in a manner that privileges the policy preferences of certain actors over
those of others (Jessop 1990). At the heart of the struggle over how the state inter-
venes, then, is the struggle over both the accessibility and the scope of state deci-
sion-making.
In the neo-orthodox view, a state decision-making apparatus that is broad in
scope and accessible to the electorate poses a potentially serious threat to accumu-
lation and sound economic policy-making. This is because it encourages voters
and pressure groups to make unrestrained demands on politicians who are only too
willing to satisfy them in order to attain and retain elective office, thus opening the
door to uncontrolled rent-seeking and an ever expanding politicization of social
and economic relations. The neo-orthodox solution to the problem, therefore, lies
in restricting both the accessibility and the scope of state decision-making in order
to insulate the economy and economic policy-making from the distorting effects
of politics. ~5 However, the relationship between accumulation and inclusion, like
that between accumulation and distribution, is more complex and varied than the
stark choice painted by neo-orthodoxy. To be sure, a decision-making apparatus
that is broad in scope and/or highly accessible may generate excessive politicization
and rent-seeking. But the price for preventing such an outcome will be restrictions
not only on democratic representation, but also on the state's capacity to foster
accumulation. Hence, while a restricted decision-making apparatus may generate
stability at time t, it may be the cause of instability at time t+l because of the
state's inability to accommodate rising demands for expanded popular representa-
tion and/or respond to changing economic conditions. Furthermore, a decision-
making apparatus that is broad in scope or highly accessible is also clearly
compatible with sound economic policy-making and sustained accumulation. ~6
The degree of compatibility depends not only on the particular combination of
institutional factors, but also on the nature of the accumulation strategy. For ex-
ample, a Keynesian-inspired strategy is compatible with an accessible decision-
making arena, but the scope of that arena will likely be primarily limited to
macroeconomic policies. Conversely, an industrial policy strategy will involve a
broader scope of state decision-making (encompassing both macro- and
microeconomic policies), but its accessibility will likely be considerably more
restricted. Finally, a neo-liberal strategy will involve greater restrictions, not only
on the scope of state decision-making, but very likely on its accessibility as well.
To summarize, the central theoretical contention of this article is that the princi-
pal driving force behind the historical process of regime change is the struggle to
contain the tension between the imperative of sustained accumulation and the con-
flicts over socio-political inclusion and distribution. The degree of democracy and
political stability attained by a given society can therefore be understood as a product
of not only whether, but how, this tension is contained. More specifically, it is a
product of whether and how the state succeeds in disciplining social classes, and
private capital in particular, i.e., in a manner that reconciles accumulation and
inclusion/distribution, privileges one over the other, or fails altogether. It is in this
way that Chile's new socio-political compromise should be understood and it is to
an analysis of that compromise that we now turn.
II. Authoritarian Transformation and Transition: The Institutional and Structural

Foundations of Compromise
In a remarkably striking way, the transformative project undertaken by the Chil-

ean military regime in the mid-1970s reflected the fundamental tension between
accumulation and inclusion/distribution that lay at the heart of democratic com-
promise, stalemate, and collapse between 1932 and 1973. The basic pillars of that
project were: (1) a neo-liberal development strategy that transformed the Chilean
economy from one built on state-led ISI to one founded on primary product ex-
Barrett 9
ports, rapid integration into the world economy, and a drastically reduced role for
the state; (2) labor and social policies that sacrificed distribution to accumulation
and sought to depoliticize social relations by reorienting them on the basis of mar-
ket principles; and (3) a highly restrictive constitution designed to prevent the type
of politicization seen to have undermined the previous civilian regime and to insti-
tutionalize the regime's socio-economic model. Finally, the regime's transforma-
tive project came to be explicitly linked to the construction of a post-military (though
not necessarily post-authoritarian) order, complete with elaborate transition mecha-
nisms.
By 1981, the regime's transformative project appeared on its way to consolida-
tion. The following year, however, the economic model collapsed, triggering the
most severe economic crisis experienced by any of Latin America's authoritarian
regimes. Yet, despite the explosion of mass protests and the reemergence of a po-
litical opposition, the regime was able to survive, owing to many of the same
factors that made the implementation of its transformative project possible
(most importantly, the concentration of institutional and coercive power in the
hands of General Augusto Pinochet, the strong backing from big business, and
the divisions among and within the parties of the opposition as well as the
right). This in turn enabled the regime to maintain its transition timetable and
to embark on a second, more solid phase of authoritarian transformation during
the latter half of the 1980s. Indeed, within the relatively short span of five years,
dramatic changes occurred, which not only made possible Latin America's most
orderly and consensual transition to civilian rule, but more importantly laid the
foundations for the construction of Chile's second socio-political compromise
during this century.
What is particularly significant about this period is the way in which institu-
tional and structural factors interacted in constraining and shaping the processes
of transition and compromise. The most important institutional factors at play dur-
ing this period were Pinochet's undiminished control over the state apparatus and
the Armed Forces, the ongoing divisions among and within the parties of the oppo-
sition and the right, and the existence of a set of transition procedures and an
institutional design for the future already in place to which the military had tied its
own institutional interests. This combination of institutional factors gave the re-
gime the strategic upper hand and frustrated the opposition's efforts to force an
early transition to a more open and democratic regime. Yet, paradoxically, the
regime's very strength and determination to defend the Constitution and its transi-
tion procedures eventually had the unintended effect of uniting the opposition. For
by giving it no other choice but to participate in the October 1988 plebiscite over
Pinochet's continuation as president, the regime enabled the opposition to sub-
merge its substantive differences for the sake of the common goal of defeating
Pinochet. The success of this strategy, moreover, opened the way to elections and
gave the opposition sufficient bargaining power to negotiate a series of reforms to
the 1980 Constitution, which while leaving the bulk of the latter's authoritarian
features intact, provided the opposition greater room for political maneuver. At the
same time, the continuing strength of the military regime and Pinochet's strong
showing in the plebiscite maintained the urgency of preserving a united front and
in fact enabled the opposition to perpetuate the plebiscite as the basis of political
identification and struggle. The culmination of this process was Patricio Aylwin's
victory in the 1989 presidential elections.
But while successful, this strategy had other consequences that augured less
well for democratization. By participating in the plebiscite and obtaining only
limited constitutional reforms, the CPPD helped to consolidate the 1980 Constitu-
tion and to restrict its own strategic options significantly. Moreover, despite its
victory in the 1989 elections, it was unable to prevent the right from obtaining a
majority in the Senate, a circumstance that was made possible by the regime's
"binomial" electoral law and the existence of nine "designated" Senators. The
CPPD's strategy also contributed to a demobilization and marginalization of popular
sectors that had played a major role in opposing the military regime (most impor-
tantly the labor movement), and thereby weakened the social base for more far-
reaching change. And perhaps even more significantly, by being forced to act in
accordance with the regime's transition procedures and timetable, the opposition
was unable to prevent the regime from carrying out a second phase of structural
transformations, the most dramatic of which were the phenomenal growth of ex-
ports, a second wave of privatizations, the tremendous expansion of the privatized
social security system as a source of investment capital, the emergence of a busi-
ness community more structurally powerful and dynamic than ever before and
firmly committed to the regime's economic model, and the greatly expanded pres-
ence of transnational capital within the domestic economy. These structural changes,
combined with a series of laws designed to further institutionalize the economic
model, in turn made the transition a rather smooth and stable affair. In other words,
by the end of the 1980s, the structural constraints had become sufficiently strong
that it was possible for the military regime to loosen certain institutional con-
straints and to tolerate the opposition's victories in the plebiscite and the 1989
elections.
This changing set of institutional and structural constraints thus exposed a ma-
jor flaw in the opposition's strategy. The implicit premise of that strategy was that
it was necessary to give priority to the task of increasing the opposition's politico-
institutional space before pushing for changes of a more substantive, socio-eco-
nomic character at a later stage of political struggle. But the elimination of
politico-institutional constraints was sufficiently gradual and limited that it was
more than offset by the emergence of new structural constraints, so that by the
time of the CPPD's victory in the 1989 elections, both its capacity and its inclina-
tion to alter the regime's socio-economic model had been significantly dimin-
ished. In fact, the CPPD's very preferences and objectives had undergone a
significant change, as it began to look increasingly favorably on the regime's eco-
nomic model and the dynamic potential of Chilean business. The importance of
the latter to sustained economic growth also led the CPPD to moderate its pro-
grammatic objectives considerably so as to overcome business' deep-seated dis-
trust of the center-left and thereby avoid a destabilizing fall in investment. 17
The CPPD's positive assessment of the economic model contrasted with its
critical attitude toward the profound social inequalities that had worsened over the
course of the 1980s. It therefore called for increased wages and major reforms of
the regime's repressive labor code. But this laid the basis for a potentially serious
contradiction deriving from the central role that the flexible and extensive use of
Barrett 11
cheap labor played in the regime's accumulation strategy and business' determined
opposition to strengthening the rights and organizational power of labor. The CPPD's
endorsement of the economic model also contrasted with its determination to elimi-
nate the constraints built into the politico-institutional order bequeathed by the
military regime. But here too, it faced a potentially serious contradiction, given the
latter's importance to preserving the socio-economic model. Finding a formula for
containing the tension between accumulation and the pressures for redistribution
and inclusion thus emerged as the principal challenge facing the CPPD. However,
as the sections that follow will show, the structural and institutional constraints
that restricted the CPPD's maneuverability during the 1980s, in some respects
grew stronger during the 1990s. And just as had occurred during the previous de-
cade, as a result of those constraints, the CPPD's very preferences and objectives
continued to undergo a process of moderation. The result was the consolidation of
a neo-liberal elite pact, which rather than reconciling accumulation and inclusion/
distribution, has privileged the former over the latter.
IlL Development Strategy
Without a doubt, the most consensual element of Chile's new compromise, and
that to which the other elements have to a large degree been subordinated, is in the
area of development strategy. In a sharp departure from the more interventionist
development strategy advocated by the center-left throughout most of the 1980s,
upon coming to power the CPPD gave highest priority to the maintenance of mac-
roeconomic stability (and in particular the control of inflation), which was consid-
ered critical to gaining the confidence of business and to creating a climate conducive
to increased investment.t8 In fact, under the CPPD, Chile distinguished itself from
the rest of Latin America by demonstrating a greater capacity to reconcile the
competing objectives of low inflation, a stable real exchange rate, and sustained
economic growth. This was in large part the result of the set of heterodox policies
it deployed in regulating Chile's exchange and capital markets: a crawling peg
exchange rate policy accompanied by occasional reevaluations and sterilized in-
tervention; and controls on the entry of short-term capital. I9 The CPPD govern-
ments also demonstrated greater fiscal responsibility than other transition
governments in Latin America. Indeed, the CPPD was determined to avoid the
experience of Chile's neighbors, where policies of a more populist character un-
leashed inflationary pressures that subsequently undermined economic growth.
With respect to trade policy, the most important non-traditional export promotion
policies initiated during the latter half of the 1980s went unaltered. 2~ In fact, only
two major policy changes were introduced after 1990: the reduction in the uniform
tariff level from 15 percent to 11 percent; and the negotiation of a series of free
trade agreements. Finally, in the area of financial policy, the CPPD governments
placed controls on short-term capital inflows, but left the military regime's liberal
regulations governing FDI unaltered, while enacting other policies designed to
create greater investment opportunities both domestically and internationally (most
importantly, in the area of pension funds).
The economic performance during 1990--1996 was perhaps the most impres-
sive of any seven year period in modern Chilean history (see Table 1). GDP grew
by an annual rate of 6.8 percent, inflation averaged 12.6 percent (falling to 6.6
percent in 1996), unemployment averaged 5.6 percent, the public sector registered
an average surplus of 1.7 percent, and the rates of savings and fixed investment
reached historic levels (averaging 26.8 percent and 25.2 percent, respectively).
Exports also continued to expand at a fast annual pace, nearly doubling in value
between 1990 and 1995. Nonetheless, it is dangerous to extrapolate from this im-
pressive performance, not so much because of the brief period it represents, but
more importantly because of the underlying characteristics of the accumulation
model. Consider the structure of production, and in particular the share of manu-
facturing in GDP. The latter has declined steadily during the 1990s, falling from
the already low level of 18.1 percent in 1989 to 16.2 percent in 1996, its lowest
level since 1946. A somewhat similar pattern is evident in the composition of em-
ployment, with industry's share falling from 16.8 percent in 1990 to 16.0 percent
in 1997 (Central Bank 1998). Clearly, with an annual growth rate of 5.2 percent
during 1990-1996, industry has hardly stagnated; but it is also clear that it is not
the driving force of the economy.
The character of Chile's accumulation model is further reflected in the compo-
sition of its exports. While some observers have claimed that Chile entered the so-
called "second export phase" during the 1990s (Dfaz 1996), Central Bank data
indicate that between 1989 and 1997, the percentage of natural resource-intensive
exports fell only slightly, from 92.1 percent to 87.2 percent. 2~ Using a different
classification scheme, Ffrench-Davis and S~ez (1996) show that while manufac-
tured exports grew from 5.4 percent in 1990 to 9.8 percent in 1993, only 0.8 per-
cent were new industries with high technological content (up from 0.6 percent in
1990). Moreover, the component consisting of primary exports (i.e., unelaborated
agricultural, forestry, and mining products) also increased from 27.8 percent to
31.8 percent. Meanwhile, semi-elaborated exports (e.g., refined copper,
agroindustrial products, cellulose and paper, fishmeal), though falling from 65.4
percent to 56.5 percent, remained the largest component. Although these data ex-
tend only through 1993, those provided by the Central Bank suggest that if any-
thing, the component consisting of manufactured products is likely to have
diminished after that date. 22
Thus, the vast majority of Chile's exports continue to be concentrated in low
value-added natural resource-intensive products, a pattern which contrasts sharply
with the composition of trade worldwide and among East Asian countries in par-
ticular. Moreover, despite its considerable capacity in the area of macroeconomic
policy-making, the CPPD governments were unable to prevent a 23.8 percent ap-
preciation of the exchange rate between 1990 and 1996, a mild version of "Dutch
disease" which poses an important obstacle to exports that are not reliant upon
comparative advantages in natural resources. Furthermore, the growth in manu-
factured exports has largely been concentrated in Latin America. 23 This is un-
doubtedly the result of the economic recovery and greater exchange rate appreciation
experienced by those countries, particularly Argentina and Brazil, which have ac-
counted for roughly half of Chile's exports to the region. And although Latin
America's share of Chilean exports grew rapidly from 12.5 percent in 1990 to 21
percent in 1994, it has declined since then. Asia's share, meanwhile, has grown
steadily from 26.2 percent in 1990 to 34 percent in 1997 (Central Bank 1998). Its
Barrett 13
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share of manufactured exports, however, declined from 6.2 percent in 1990 to 3.1
percent in 1993 (Meller and S~iez 1995). Thus, the composition of Chile's export
markets, while more diversified than in the past, nonetheless continues to pose
obstacles to industrial exports and to leave the economy vulnerable to external
shocks. 24
The foregoing would seem to point to the need for an industrial policy strategy
aimed at accelerating the move to a more advanced stage of export-led growth, as
was in fact originally proposed in the CPPD's 1989 program (CPPD 1989:15). As
it is, much of the success that Chile has enjoyed to date is the result of substantial
state intervention, not only the exchange rate policies and special incentives for
non-traditional exports implemented during the military regime 25 and the con-
trols on short-term capital inflows instituted under the CPPD, but also the struc-
tural reforms and sectoral promotion policies in agriculture and mining
undertaken prior to 1973. Accelerating the move to a more advanced stage of
export-led growth would therefore involve increasing the state's capacity to
channel savings and investment selectively into higher value-added products
that are less intensive in natural resources. Throughout the 1990s, however, the
CPPD has maintained a cautious, hands off approach to fostering the economy's
productive transformation.
A clear illustration of this cautious approach was the government's program of
support for small and medium-sized firms. According to Oscar Mufioz (1996), the
old industrial policies based on sectoral priorities and selective state intervention
do not fit into the new policy framework. The Aylwin administration therefore
converted CORFO, the traditional industrial policy institution, into what it called a
"third floor institution." This involved the allocation of subsidies "through the market
and, in particular, through the commercial banks, subsidizing only the cost of ac-
cess to financing when the latter poses entry barriers to small and medium-sized
firms" (Mufioz 1996, 29-30). The government soon discovered, however, that the
credit program was ineffective. Consequently, in mid- 1991, it launched a new pro-
gram designed to foster associative networks of smaller firms, whose objective
would be to improve the latter's access to new technologies, financing, training,
marketing, etc. But while apparently somewhat more successful, the program has
involved only a tiny minority of Chile's small and medium-sized firms and reflects
the same reluctance to give the state a more active role in the economy's produc-
tive transformation, z6
Another indication of the CPPD's limited capacity, or willingness, to influence
the allocation of investment is the pattern of foreign investment during the 1990s.
As noted earlier, the CPPD introduced controls on the entry of short-term capital.
This policy has helped to generate a larger proportion of FDI inflows than the rest
of Latin America, which would appear to offer greater promise for the country's
productive development than a heavy reliance on short-term capital, as evidenced
by the Mexican foreign exchange crisis of December 1994. At the same time,
however, reliance on regulating short-term capital alone is of limited usefulness.
Unlike South Korea and Taiwan, which until recently carefully channeled FDI into
selected industries and technological cooperation relationships with domestic firms,
Chile has exercised little control over the direction of FDI. 27 It is therefore not
surprising that 42.9 percent of FDI via Decree Law 600 during 1990-1997 has
Barrett 15
been concentrated in mining and 28.4 percent in services (primarily banking, in-
surance, securities, pension funds, and leasing). Only 14.2 percent, meanwhile,
has been in industry, which in fact represents a significant decline from the 22.4
percent registered under the military regime (Central Bank 1997).
Finally, the CPPD has made no effort to strengthen the state's institutional ca-
pacity. The most powerful state institutions are the Ministry of Finance and the
Central Bank, whose institutional bias favor a conservative approach to macroeco-
nomic policy. By contrast, the Economy Ministry and CORFO, the traditional in-
dustrial policy agencies, have been greatly weakened by the military regime. In
fact, as we saw earlier, CORFO's institutional mission was reduced even further
by the Aylwin administration. Furthermore, during 1995-1996, CORFO's payroll
was cut by 30 percent and in 1997, both its ministerial status and its role as the
holding company for state enterprises came to an end. 28 Moreover, although the
CPPD had called in its 1989 program for the creation of a Ministry of Industry to
replace the Economy Ministry as part of a proposed industrial policy strategy (CPPD
1989,15), this objective was never realized. The state's power is also restricted by
the constitutional requirement that selective measures and state involvement in
production gain the approval of Congress, where at least in the Senate, the rightist
opposition has enjoyed a majority. In addition, both the Aylwin and Frei adminis-
trations have denied important policy-making positions to those who are critical of
the prevailing economic model, particularly the left wing of the Socialist Party.
Hence, even if the proponents of greater state intervention had a clear idea of the
sort of intervention to engage in, they have lacked the institutional and political
means to carry it out effectively.
In sum, the macroeconomic performance of the Chilean economy under the
CPPD has been nothing short of impressive. To a large degree, that performance
has been the result of a combination of heterodox state policies (i.e., controls on
short-term capital inflows, a highly interventionist exchange rate policy, and se-
lective incentives for non-traditional exports) and favorable circumstances (e.g.,
the rapid growth of the pension funds, the recovery of neighboring countries' econo-
mies, and an abundance of natural resources and unskilled labor). A close exami-
nation, however, reveals that this accumulation model contains important
limitations. This is clearly indicated by the low and declining share of industry in
overall production, the continued heavy reliance on natural resource-intensive ex-
ports, the sectoral allocation of foreign investment, the composition of Chile's
export markets, and the declining profitability of the pension funds.29 Moreover,
the growth in Chile's labor force is rapidly decelerating and there is a growing
scarcity of skilled labor. 3~ Finally, the high rates of growth in recent years have
come at the price of severe environmental degradation, a problem that the CPPD
has been reluctant to address for fear of alienating the business community and
slowing the process of accumulation? l All of this suggests that without a more
ambitious industrial policy strategy in which the state assumes a more active role
in steering investment, and therefore a greater capacity to discipline capital, the
current dynamism of Chile's accumulation model may prove unsustainable. 32 In-
deed, what Chile may experience in the not too distant future is an economic slow-
down reminiscent of the exhaustion of the initial, "easy" phase of ISI in the late
1940s and early 1950s.
IV. Labor and Social Policy
The second critical element of the CPPD's program, labor and social policy,
was very much shaped by the priority given to development strategy. The CPPD's
primary objective was to find a way of reconciling subordinate class demands for
greater distributive equity with the maintenance of the accumulation model inher-
ited from the military regime, an objective which was expressed in the slogan
"Growth with Equity." However, as noted in section II, such an objective contained
a potentially serious contradiction, given the functional importance of the military
regime's labor and social policies to its accumulation model and business' strong
opposition to strengthening the fights, organizational power, and income share of
labor.
In its 1989 program, the CPPD proposed a series of "profound" changes in the
labor code aimed at restoring the "fundamental rights of workers" and creating
equality in labor-capital relations (1989, 25-30). Soon after its victory in the De-
cember 1989 elections, however, the Aylwin government began to view the mili-
tary regime's Labor Plan more positively and even found that it contained many
"modern" elements. 33 It insisted that its goal was to reconcile worker protection
with labor market flexibility, 34 but while it attempted to stake out a middle posi-
tion, in practice, it gave priority to the latter. Indeed, it argued incessantly that any
reduction in flexibility would threaten the competitiveness of Chile's export
economy. It also argued that changes in the labor code were not an effective means
to strengthening the labor movement. If the latter sought to improve its bargaining
position vis-h-vis business, it would have to achieve it by increasing its power as a
social force rather than by relying on the state. 35 Moreover, the set of legislative
proposals it presented to the Congress were a considerably watered down version
of the CPPD program. For many within the labor movement and the business com-
munity alike, it was also significant that the government introduced the first three
of the four reform projects in the Senate, where it was in the minority. This effec-
tively limited the range of debate and prevented the more open conflict that would
have resulted had they been introduced in the Chamber of Deputies, where the
CPPD enjoyed a majority.36
The resulting reforms were a far cry from both the CPPD's own program and
the aspirations of organized labor. Indeed, the overall thrust of the reforms was to
preserve the fundamental features of the Labor Plan, introducing largely cosmetic
changes that gave it the appearance of greater legitimacy.37 Nonetheless, the gov-
ernment hailed the new labor code as the first promulgated under a democratic
regime in Chilean history. It also pointed to improvements in the material condi-
tions of workers, the growth of unionization, and the absence of labor conflict as
proof that its policies had succeeded in reconciling growth, stability, and equity.
Upon closer examination, however, the experience of labor during this period does
not warrant such a positive assessment.
Beginning with unemployment, it should be stressed that Chile's low unem-
ployment rate (averaging 5.6 percent during 1990-1995) continues to mask the
low quality and precarious character of employment experienced by the vast ma-
jority of Chilean workers, a trend which, in fact, has grown during the 1990s. ~8
Moreover, while the 3.2 percent annual growth in real wages and 5.6 percent growth
Barrett 17
in minimum wages during 1990-1995 signaled a major improvement over 1983-

1989, the real wage level attained in 1995 was only 9.3 percent greater than it had
been a quarter century earlier and the minimum wage level remained 11.2 percent
below that attained in 1981 (PET 1996). Without a doubt, the CPPD's most signifi-
cant accomplishment has been the reduction in poverty from 38.6 percent in 1990
to 23.2 percent in 1996. But the rate of reduction has slowed considerably, and a
large number of those who have left poverty (21A million or 18% of the population
in 1994) remain precariously close to it. More importantly perhaps, the distribu-
tion of income has worsened slightly, with 56.7 percent of national income going
to the top 20 percent and only 4.1 percent going to the bottom 20 percent, a ratio of
13.8/1 (compared to 56.9 percent, 4.4 percent, and 12.9ll, respectively, in 1990)
(Hardy 1997). In fact, Chile ranked as the sixth most unequal in a World Bank survey
of sixty-four less developed countries (1997a), while its Gini Coefficient during the
early 1990s (0.5469) far surpassed the average for Latin America and the Caribbean
(0.4931), the most inequitable region in the world (World Bank 1997b).
The Aylwin administration also argued that it had fostered a growth in unioniza-
tion and peaceful labor-capital relations. In fact, the rate of unionization increased
from 11.5 percent in 1989 to 15.4 percent in 1991, while strikes involved only 0.6
percent of the working population during 1990-1995. Despite the increase in union-
ization through 1991, however, it declined in the years that followed, falling to
12.7 percent in 1995 and registering a total growth of only 10.4 percent during the
entire period (and starting from a very low level). Particularly striking is the de-
cline in the absolute number of union members after 1992, which fell by 86,000,
or 11.9 percent, between 1993 and 1995. Moreover, when taking into consider-
ation only enterprise unions (still the only ones capable of bargaining collectively),
the rate of unionization for 1995 falls to 8.3 percent, which in relation to 1989
represents an increase of only 5.1 percent (and starting from an even lower level). 39
Meanwhile, the average size of unions fell from 71.3 workers in 1989 to 50 in
1995, a 29.9 percent decline. Finally, the number of strikes, striking workers, and
days lost during 1990-1995 increased by 256 percent, 261 percent, and 258 per-
cent, respectively, over 1983-1989. This apparently alarming growth in strike ac-
tivity should not be regarded as significant, given the small percentage of the
workforce involved and the short duration of strikes (an average of 12.8 days). 4~
But neither should the much more modest growth in unionization. Indeed, rather
than evidence of peaceful capital-labor relations, the low level of strike activity
can more accurately be interpreted as evidence of the fundamental power imbal-
ance between capital and labor.
Government actions in the area of social policy provide an equally clear illus-
tration of the limited priority given by the CPPD to distributive equity. Indeed, the
most salient feature of social policy under the CPPD is its basic continuity with the
policy orientation of the military regime, the main thrust of which was to reduce
the state's role in the provision of social services, transferring it as much as pos-
sible to the private sector. Thus, with respect to social spending, the CPPD main-
tained the military regime's emphasis on targeting social spending toward the
poorest social groups, combining it with more universal programs, particularly in
education and health care? ! It also raised the level of social spending by 7 percent
annually, or from 58.7 percent of total government spending during 1987-1989 to
18 Studies in ComparativeInternationalDevelopment/ Fall 1999
62.6 percent during 1990-1995 (Ruiz-Tagle 1996, 29), the bulk of which was fi-
nanced by the 1990 tax reform. It bears noting, however, that in 1993, the poorest
20 percent of the population received only 18.5 percent of social expenditure, while
the richest 20 percent received 26.6 percent. If pension contributions, which con-
stituted over 40 percent of social spending, are excluded, the share of the poorest
quintile would increase to 28.3 percent and that of the upper quintile would de-
cline to 12.7 percent; but the redistributive effect would still be quite small (Sc"tt
1995). 42 An important component of the increased revenues generated by the tax
reform, moreover, came from an increase in the Value Added Tax (VAT) from 16
percent to 18 percent, a regressive form of taxation which in recent years accounts
for roughly 50 percent of total tax revenue. It is this tax, in fact, that the CPPD has
been most determined to maintain. 43 Furthermore, the problems in health and edu-
cation remain severe, especially in the former, where inequalities are great. 44 Fi-
nally, the CPPD abandoned its earlier calls for reforms of the military regime's
privatized social security system designed to make it more "solidaristic" and in-
crease worker participation in the administration of the pension funds. 45 Instead, it
focused its efforts on loosening the restrictions on fund investments as part of the
capital market reforms passed in 1993. 46 But many of the same trends that were a
source of concern during the 1980s (with respect to coverage, administrative costs,
and corporate control) continued, and even worsened, during the 1990s. 47 And
although the system continued to generate significant savings during the first half
of the 1990s, in recent years the profitability of the funds has fallen dramatically.
While business was very pleased with the CPPD's labor and social policies, 48
the labor movement was left profoundly disillusioned. 49 Indeed, the Unitary Workers
Central (CUT), Chile's principal labor central, strongly denounced the government's
failure to fulfill its program and the "insensitivity" of the economic team, and
made a series of threats directed at both the government and business. None of the
threats were ever carried out, however, in large part because of the CUT's organi-
zational weakness and its fear of undermining the still fragile process of transition.
But this only served to deepen the internal divisions that had plagued the CUT
throughout the 1980s, and rather than seeing its organizational and mobilizational
capacity increase, the absence of tangible victories made the CUT appear weak
and insignificant. 5~ The sense of disillusionment only deepened under the Frei
administration. For while the CUT had been extremely disappointed by the Aylwin
administration's policies, it had at least enjoyed strong personal ties with some of
its principal policy makers. The same could not be said of the Frei administration,
which was perceived as cold, distant, and even more importantly, strongly pro-
business. 51 The CUT's disillusionment was reinforced by the government's failure
to offer a clear response to the set of labor reforms it had proposed soon after the
new administration was inaugurated. As a result, the CUT quickly distanced itself
from the government and pursued a more aggressive, mobilizational strategy. 52
The government gave in to the pressure in January 1995, when it submitted a new
package of labor reforms to the Congress23 The CUT reacted favorably to the
reforms and reestablished relations, but their rejection by the right and business,
and the government's less than energetic efforts to see them passed, led the CUT to
resume its confrontational approach. 54 Furthermore, the rising tensions within the
labor movement failed to abate, as evidenced by the declining support for the PDC
Barrett 19
and a surge in support for the Communists in a series of federation elections. 55 The
latter's resurgence only served to worsen relations between CPPD trade unionists,
on the one hand, and their parties and the government, on the other. It also helped
to set the stage for a dramatic CUT election in April 1996, in which the CUT's
Socialist vice president brokered a deal with the Communists, thus marking the
collapse of the CPPD alliance within the labor movement/6
In sum, the foregoing provides strong evidence that the CPPD's stated goal of
reconciling "growth with equity" can hardly be considered a success; indeed, it is
increasingly being labeled a failure (Fazio 1997; Hardy 1997; Lavandero 1996).
Among the factors explaining this outcome are the precarious structure of employ-
ment, the extreme concentration of asset ownership, and the limited redistributive
effect of the CPPD's tax and social policies. An equally important factor, however,
has been organized labor's weak bargaining position vis-~t-vis capital. Throughout
this period, the CPPD governments have argued that the CUT's trouble has been
its obsession with legislation that would afford it greater protection from the state,
rather than focusing on the task of strengthening itself as a social force capable of
bargaining with capital on an even footing. But while by its own admission, the
CUT could have done more to build its organizational capacity, the overwhelming
effect of the labor legislation enacted during these years was to create legal ob-
stacles to strengthening the labor movement and putting it on an equal footing
with business. Moreover, more than the labor movement being obsessed with its
protection, the government has been obsessed with maintaining labor market flex-
ibility and the confidence of business, the economic consequences of which have
not been questioned. Most importantly, as argued in section I, by enabling busi-
ness to place almost the entire burden of adjustment on labor, a flexible labor
market can actually impede innovation. An equally, if not more justifiable objec-
tive, therefore, would be to impose greater flexibility (or disciplipe) on capital by
protecting labor. Hence, the "stability" in labor-capital relations witnessed during
this period has not been the product of a national "consensus," but rather the in-
ability of a weak and marginalized labor movement to prevent an accommodation
between the government, business, and the right. The growing turmoil in the labor
movement suggests, however, that this stability may not endure.
V. State Decision-Making
The third and final critical element of the CPPD's program concerned its pro-
posals for politico-institutional reform. The principal target of those proposals was
the 1980 Constitution and its supporting laws, which were no less central to the
military regime's transformative project than its social and economic "accomplish-
ments." Indeed, they were designed specifically to prevent the latter's unmaking,
as well as to block the type of politicizatioo .nat had undermined the previous
civilian regime. More specifically, the Consti,ution established nearly total presi-
dential domination over the Congress, while at the same time countering the
president's powers by expanding the prerogatives and autonomy of several state
agencies (most importantly, the Constitutional Tribunal, the Central Bank, the
Comptroller General, the National Security Council, and the Armed Forces). The
Constitution also sought to institutionalize the military regime's economic model
by elevating its basic principles to constitutional rank. And it sought to prevent the
politicization that had undermined the pre-1973 political system by imposing se-
vere restrictions on the scope of popular representation (most notably, by limiting
the powers of Congress, creating the autonomous state agencies mentioned above,
requiring that a third of the Senate be non-elected and instituting a so-called "bi-
nomial" electoral system). In short, the politico-institutional structure embodied
in the 1980 Constitution was designed to limit both the scope and the accessibility
of state decision-making, thereby preserving a neo-liberal socio-economic order. 57
As noted in section II, in 1989 the CPPD succeeded in negotiating a series of
modest constitutional reforms) 8 No sooner had the reforms been approved, how-
ever, than the CPPD incorporated those that it failed to achieve as key features of
its government program (CPPD 1989, 3). Indeed, it was in this area that the CPPD
advanced perhaps its clearest agenda of change. But this was also the area in which
it saw its objectives most consistently frustrated. The only significant advances
achieved during this entire period, in fact, were accords over the holding of mu-
nicipal elections (the first since 1971) and the shortening of the presidential term
from eight to six years. In all other respects, the CPPD confronted the permanent
veto of the rightist majority in the Senate (see Table 2), which was itself a product
of the military regime's institutional design (i.e., the designated senators and the
binomial electoral system).
At the same time, the CPPD's actions in this area provide further evidence of
the evolving character of its preferences, objectives, and internal relations of power.
This was already evident, in fact, during the negotiation of the 1989 reforms. At
the time of the Constitution's promulgation, the opposition strongly condemned
the manner in which it institutionalized the military regime's economic model,
arguing that the economic norms established in a constitution should be suffi-
ciently broad and flexible to make possible the application of diverse economic
schemes, including a mixed economy and democratic socialism. 59 By 1989, how-
ever, this emphasis on the Constitution's link to the military regime's economic
model had disappeared. The one exception was the CPPD's opposition to the new
Central Bank law. But even here, it dropped its earlier criticism of the Bank's
institutional autonomy in exchange for altering the composition of its board of
directors. On this basis, it easily reached an accord with the military regime in
August 1989.
The CPPD also came to look more favorably on other aspects of the politico-
institutional order inherited from the military regime. With respect to the electoral
law, for example, the eagerness for reform among government officials was not
always consistent with the government's public pronouncements. 6~ Indeed, the
electoral system was most beneficial to the largest parties (especially the PDC; see
Table 2), as well as the strongest candidates within each party. 6~ It also had the
effect of fostering the emergence of two large electoral blocs--thus reinforcing
the division between "authoritarians" and "democrats" generated by the 1988 plebi-
s c i t e - a n d it helped to keep the govemment coalition together. 62 Moreover, while
important elements of the CPPD remained critical of the excessively presidentialist
character of the 1980 Constitution, others, particularly those who occupied the
Executive branch, came to view it much more positively. 63 In fact, the key minis-
try in both CPPD administrations has been the Secretary General of the Presi-
Barrett 21
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22 Studies in ComparativeInternational Development / Fall 1999
dency, a creation of the military regime which the Aylwin administration elevated
to ministerial rank. 64 It is also the case that the institutional constraints built into
the Constitution have enabled the CPPD to make policy in a technocratic, anti-
populist fashion. Indeed, according to one Finance Ministry official, the insulation
and autonomy afforded to policy-makers by the current institutional environment
is a major reason why "the period of conflictual politics, inefficient policymaking,
and economic stagnation, which lasted for more than half a century, is finally
coming to an end" (Velasco 1994, 411). 65
Finally, the fact that Constitutional reforms had little chance for approval al-
lowed the CPPD to reap some important political dividends. Most importantly,
their rejection enabled the CPPD to portray itself as the force for democratization
and the right as its obstacle, thereby maintaining the political cleavage between
"democrats" and "authoritarians" established in the plebiscite and strengthening
its hold on power. In fact, during the Aylwin administration, the reform proposals
were introduced into Congress with full knowledge that they would be rejected. 66
This tactic had a significant effect on the right, particularly the moderate wing of
the largest opposition party, National Renovation (RN), whose entire political strat-
egy turned on shedding the authoritarian legacy of the military regime in order to
put an end to the political division created by the plebiscite. Indeed, the issue
nearly caused RN to splinter in April 1996, as seven of its senators voted against a
constitutional reform package brokered by party president, Andrfs Allamand, and
the Frei administration. 67
Thus, the CPPD's enthusiasm for politico-institutional reforms tended to wane
over time, as some powerful elements of the coalition began to see certain advan-
tages in the institutional order bequeathed by the military regime. But this evolu-
tion in the CPPD's position was not without negative consequences. First, it was
cause for serious division within the coalition. This was most true during the Frei
administration, which at the outset, placed little importance on politico-institu-
tional reforms. Indeed, in a reversal of the strategy adopted by the CPPD in the late
1980s of seeking to expand its political space in order to realize greater socio-
economic change, the Frei administration spoke of a separation between its socio-
economic and politico-institutional goals. Emphasis was to be placed on the former,
while the latter was to be postponed until the end of Frei's term, at which point,
apparently, they would be introduced largely for their electoral effects. This strat-
egy triggered a major controversy and only intense pressure from within the coali-
tion (particularly, the Socialists) forced the Frei administration to put the reforms
back on the agenda. Even then, however, many perceived that the government did
so only to get the issue out of the way, so as to concentrate on its socio-economic
agenda. 68
Second, the institutional restrictions built into the Constitution not only severely
limit the democratic character of the state, but also its repertoire of strategic op-
tions. As we saw in section III, the state does enjoy a degree of technocratic capac-
ity in the area of macroeconomic policy. Moreover, the state's institutional features
(e.g., the autonomy of the Central Bank, the Executive's control over the budget,
and the constitutional restrictions on state intervention) have enabled it to resist
the sort of rent-seeking that contributed to macroeconomic instability in the de-
cades preceding military rule. However, not only is the state's maneuverability in
Barrett 23
this area limited by the heightened international mobility of capital, 69 but domes-
tically this is an essentially negative form of autonomy. In other words, the state
can preserve its autonomy only by preserving its neutrality, for it is in no position
to make the sort of selective interventions characteristic of East Asian industrial
policy, without quickly succumbing to rent-seeking pressures. Most importantly,
it lacks the means to discipline private capital and steer investment into productive
activities, a defining feature of the East Asian model at the height of its s u c c e s s . 7~
Business, not surprisingly, has been strongly opposed to further Constitutional
reforms, seeing in them a serious threat to Chile's new socio-economic order, vl A
growing imbalance has thus resulted, as the state's institutional capacity has not
kept pace with either the growing power of capital or the demands of Chile's ma-
turing export-oriented economy.72
Finally, the state's capacity to make policy in a coherent, technocratic fashion
has in significant measure been made possible by the nature of the government's
relationship to the CPPD. This was best illustrated by the Aylwin administration,
whose policy-making effectiveness was greatly enhanced by the autonomy granted
to it by the CPPD. Because of their concern for ensuring the stability of the Aylwin
administration, which they regarded as one of transition, the CPPD parties feared
that a more active role on their part might generate some of the instability that
plagued governments in the decade preceding military rule. Moreover, Aylwin pro-
ceeded to designate a cabinet, which while dominated by Christian Democrats,
was composed of a group of moderate figures who had played key roles in the
CPPD's formation and whose ties to each other and loyalty to his administration
rivaled those to their respective parties. These characteristics, in fact, earned them
the nickname Partido Transversal. v3
The Frei administration's relationship to the CPPD parties, by contrast, has been
very different. Not only have those parties been determined to play a more active
role (now that the transition is no longer perceived to be in jeopardy), but Frei,
who himself was largely politically inactive during the 1980s, was not able to draw
on a group like the Partido Transversal. Thus, after first putting together a cabinet
composed of high-ranking party officials, he resorted to relying on a group of
close personal friends. The result was a deterioration in the government's relation-
ship with the CPPD and a great deal less policy coherence than that exhibited by
the Aylwin administration. 74 Moreover, there has been a growing competition both
among and within the parties of the coalition. What is striking about that competi-
tion, however, is the degree to which it has focused on the distribution of political
power, much more than substantive policy differences.75 Furthermore, the CPPD
has paid a price for this growing preoccupation with power. This was evident in the
string of Communist victories in student and union federation elections during the
mid-1990s. Even more alarming was the outcome of the 1997 Congressional elec-
tions (see Table 2); while the CPPD lost only one Senate seat and maintained its
share of seats in the Chamber of Deputies, it saw its total votes fall by over 1
million and its share of the vote fall to 50 percent. But more alarming still was the
number of voters who turned in blank or defaced ballots (over 1.23 million or
nearly 1 out of 5) and the similar number of young people who did not register to
vote. Thus, while the CPPD remained the country's most important political group-
ing, there are growing signs that it is losing its popular support.
24 Studies in Comparative InternationalDevelopment/ Fall 1999
In sum, the decision-making apparatus inherited from the military regime has
contributed to stability during the 1990s by limiting state action to a narrow range
of strategic options and restricting popular representation. In this respect, it re-
sembles the structure of state decision-making that prevailed during the 1930s and
1940s, the heyday of Chile's first compromise. However, if Chile's experience
from 1952 to 1973 is any guide, that same institutional structure may subsequently
become a major source of instability if the state is unable to respond to changing
economic conditions by carrying out timely changes in the country's development
strategy, if it is subjected to rising pressure for expanded popular participation, or
if the governing coalition suffers a breakdown. 76
VI. Conclusion
The singularity of the Chilean experience has long been the fact that while it has
undergone processes that have occurred elsewhere in Latin America, it took those
processes further, such that their contradictions and consequences stood out in
greater relief. This was true of its first socio-political compromise during the 1930s
and 1940s, the instability and institutional collapse that was its legacy from the
early 1950s to the early 1970s, and the process of authoritarian transformation
following 1973. So too with Chile's new socio-political compromise; indeed, Chile
is today widely regarded as the most promising of Latin America's new democra-
cies. But as this article has demonstrated, it is also a great exemplar of how democ-
racy can be severely hampered by institutional and structural constraints: among
the former, an institutional apparatus that limits state action to a narrow range of
strategic options, impedes popular access to state decision-making, and restricts
the bargaining power of labor; and among the latter, an accumulation model that
relies on the country's comparative advantages in natural resources and the flex-
ible use of cheap labor, an extreme concentration of wealth and income, and a
powerful domestic business class with strong links to international capital and
determined to resist all but the most modest changes in the socio-economic status
quo. In short, Chile's new compromise can be characterized as a neo-liberal elite
pact that has privileged accumulation over both inclusion and distribution.
This outcome is no accident. Indeed, it has not departed significantly from the
sort of post-military order envisioned by the authors of the military regime's trans-
formative project. Moreover, the principal political opponents of military rule
adopted a strategy that placed a high priority on stability and envisioned democra-
tization as a gradual process, which has had the effect of privileging continuity
over change. Thus, not unlike Chile's previous compromise, there are significant
limitations built into its current one. Whether that compromise is capable of gener-
ating the strategic capacity that would enable the state to adapt to changing cir-
cumstances, and in a manner compatible with continued political stability and
ongoing democratization, will depend on the nature of the relations between the
party system, business, and the state. The key question is whether those relations
are sufficiently resilient as to foster an evolving consensus capable of accommo-
dating greater demands for social and political integration and changing patterns
of state intervention, or, as in the case of Chile's previous compromise, are so
narrow and contingent as to prevent such an evolving consensus.
Barrett 25
With respect to political parties, the ability of the parties of the CPPD to forge a
governing majority and implement a coherent policy program constitutes a sig-
nificant historical accomplishment and distinguishes Chile from many other Latin
American countries where weak and fragmented party systems have hampered the
capacity of governments to resolve social and economic problems through demo-
cratic means. The existence of a center-left coalition, itself a major historical ac-
complishment, also places the Chilean government in a stronger negotiating position
vis-t~-vis business and its party allies, thereby increasing the prospects for the so-
cial and political integration of subordinate classes. At the same time, however,
neither the integrity of the coalition, its ability to continue the current approach to
policy-making, nor its capacity to bring about greater social and political integra-
tion can be taken for granted. In fact, there are serious tensions within the coali-
tion, as well as between it and the executive. The suppression of those tensions has
largely been facilitated by the perpetuation of the political cleavage created by the
1988 plebiscite and the resulting lack of political alternatives outside of the CPPD
and the principal parties of the right. However, as soon as Chilean politics is no
longer defined in terms of a referendum on Pinochet and the military regime, the
ability of the coalition to maintain unity and make policy in a non-populist, supra-
party, and technocratic fashion will diminish. Indeed, such a process has clearly
begun under the Frei administration, though the rising levels of disillusionment
remain without a clear, organized expression. Furthermore, much of the consensus
that exists within the governing coalition over development strategy is more the
result of inertia than of a clearly defined strategic choice. This suggests that should
structural conditions change and economic growth become increasingly difficult,
the current consensus may not be maintained and, more significantly, the CPPD
may well be ill prepared to chart a coherent alternative course.
The CPPD demonstrates even greater short-comings with respect to the promo-
tion of social and political integration. The current situation strongly resembles an
elite pact, as there exist greater understanding and lines of communication be-
tween the parties in power and big business than between those parties and their
popular constituencies among subordinate classes. Indeed, not unlike the Popular
Front fifty years ago, the government is engaged in an accommodation with forces
not part of its electoral coalition, pursuing policies far more in line with the latter's
interests and demands than with those of their own supporters. This is a potentially
risky formula, as Chile's experience in the 1940s demonstrates, but it can be sus-
tained as long as the economy continues to grow, labor remains weak, and subor-
dinate class actors perceive there is little alternative to the coalition in power.
However, it bears repeating that once growth slows and/or the sense of limited
alternatives fades, social conflicts are likely to intensify and the political pressure
for meeting popular demands will likely increase, as the events of 1996-1997
would seem to indicate. This could lead to greater popular participation in state
decision-making and the construction of a new consensus based on more equitably
distributed sacrifices and benefits. Such a development, which approximates some-
thing of a transition from an elite pact toward a democratic class compromise,
would in turn depend upon stronger ties with better organized subordinate class
actors, particularly the labor movement. It would also depend upon the ability to
confront potential opposition from business and the right. To the degree that those
conditions fail to obtain, however, Chile's multiparty system could resume some
o f the populist, polarizing, and immobilizing tendencies it exhibited in the past.
Finally, Chilean business is far less defensive and enjoys a much more solid
position within the political and economic order than at any time in the last sev-
enty-five years. Moreover, as a result of this process, there exists a pragmatic ele-
ment that has gained strength and has contributed to the forging o f Chile's new
socio-political c o m p r o m i s e . This t e n d e n c y m a y well continue, particularly if
the sense o f threat to capital diminishes even further. At the same time, how-
ever, the state's inability to discipline capital and steer investment into activi-
ties e m b o d y i n g higher levels o f technological sophistication brings into question
the l o n g - t e r m viability o f the current accumulation model. Furthermore, one
o f the side effects o f a more powerful business c o m m u n i t y is its greater de-
termination to limit the participation of subordinate classes. Indeed, as was true
during the 1932-1973 period, there are strong limits to the reformist inclinations
o f even the more pragmatic and conciliatory elements within Chile's economic
elite.
It is altogether possible that, despite recent developments among social move-
ments and at the polls, the civilian regime in place today in Chile can b e c o m e
consolidated and remain stable. Indeed, Chile may live up to its promoters' claim
of being a model o f the new Latin American democracy. But if that is the case, it
will be a highly restricted model, a neo-liberal elite pact characterized by a very
limited scope o f social and political integration and an inequitable distribution o f
income. If it is not, it is possible that the regime will be unable to provide the
institutional mechanism for reconciling the tension between the imperative o f sus-
tained accumulation in today's international e c o n o m y and the conflicts over inclu-
sion and distribution that until now have largely been held in check.
Notes
Research for this article was made possible by grants from the John D. and Catherine T.
MacArthur Foundation, the Fulbright Institute for International Education, and the Institute
for the Study of World Politics. I would also like to thank Gretchen Bauer, Vivek Chibber, Ken
Roberts, Gay Seidman, and especially Rachel Schurman for their comments on earlier ver-
sions of this article.
1. For a full treatment of the emergence, crisis, and collapse of Chile's previous compromise and
the process of authoritarian transformation that followed, see Barrett (1997), chapters Three
through Six.
2. This section is a substantially shortened version of Barrett (1997), chapter Two.
3. The term "strategic capacity" is borrowed from Frederic Deyo who defines it as the "capacity
to direct...resources on behalf of strategic development goals...and to generate flexible strat-
egies that foster developmentally favorable linkages to the world economy" (1987, 238).
4. See, for example, Chang and Rowthorn (1995) and Putterman and Rueschemeyer (1992). See
also the extensive literature on East Asian development, which neo-orthodox observers have
erroneously attributed to a nearly exclusive reliance on market forces. A partial bibliography
would include Amsden (1989); Chu (1995); Haggard (1990); Maclntyre (1994); and Wade
(1990).
5. For discussions of the limits imposed on macroeconomic policy by the globalization of fi-
nance, see Cerny (1993), Frieden (1991), Goodman and Pauly (1993), Stewart (1984), Underhill
(1991), and Webb (1991).
6. See also Paul Doremus, et al., (1998) and Kozul-Wright and Rowthorn (1998).
Barrett 27
7. For a somewhat similar argument, see Boix (1998).

8. Amsden (1992); Fajnzylber (1990); Fishlow (1990); Gereffi (1995); Hikkino and Amsden
(1994); Pack (1992); Pack and Westphal (1986); Shapiro and Taylor (1990).
9. Clearly, the pursuit of an industrial policy strategy carries significant risks of its own; indeed,
the landscape is littered with examples of failure, including Chile prior to military rule. None-
theless, a close reading of the development literature and of history demonstrates that there are
in fact very few successful cases of "catching up" among late developers, and that these have
relied heavily on industrial and strategic trade policies.
10. For an elaboration of this argument, see Barrett 1999. See also Amsden (1989, 1992).
11. Indeed, as Chile's experience in the two decades preceding military rule demonstrates, state
efforts to impose its objectives on a resistant capitalist class can prove truly disastrous. See
Barrett (1997) and Barrett and Chibber (1998).
12. This is not to say that labor and social policies always succeed in reducing inequalities. To the
contrary, they are as likely to preserve the structure of inequality, or create a new one, as they
are to correct it (Esping-Andersen 1990).
13. The degree to which this is true will vary with the degree to which an economy depends on
exports, but even in a heavily export-oriented economy, wages are not only a cost of produc-
tion. As long as the domestic market is also growing, rising wages will also be a source of
demand.
14. Pontusson (1991, 1992); Landesmann (1992); and Okimoto (1989).
15. A clear example of this is the growing trend toward independent Central Banks, which are
more likely to pursue restrictive monetary policies than non-independent banks.
16. On the question of central bank independence, for example, in those countries where employ-
ment and welfare goals have been most fully attained (Sweden, Norway, Austria), central banks
have enjoyed little independence (Uusitalo 1984; Epstein and Schor 1990; Scharpf 1990;
Landesmann and Vartiainen 1992). Similarly, in those countries where industrial policy has
been most successfully implemented (e.g., Japan, South Korea, France), central banks have
had little autonomy from executive authority.
17. For detailed discussions of the evolving strategic orientation of business and parties during
this period, see Barrett (1998a and forthcoming).
18. The business community made it clear from the start that it would not tolerate an alteration of
the economic model. For its part, the government sought to gain business' confidence by dem-
onstrating that it had no intention of doing so. The government was also very careful in its
choice of economic team and other key policy makers, selecting figures who were pro-market
and/or were drawn from the business world. For the most part, moreover, business leaders had
little difficulty gaining access to the economic team. For more on business' posture toward the
CPPD and its policies during the 1990s, see Barrett (1998a).
19. For detailed discussions of Chile's macroeconomic policies, see Agosin (1995); Agosln and
Ffrench-Davis (1996); Ffrench-Davis, et al., (1995); Aninat and Larrain (1996); Ffrench-Davis
and L a b ~ (1996); and Laban and Larrain (1993).
20. These included: (1) the elimination of stamp taxes on exports and of the value-added tax on
investment for exports; (2) a refund (draw-back) of 10 percent on the net return of exports
amounting to US$2.5 million or less, specifically designed for emerging non-traditional ex-
ports; (3) expansion of the list of capital goods and intermediate inputs benefiting from re-
duced import duties; and (4) subsidization of the forestry industry.
21. Natural resource-intensive exports include: mining; agriculture; forestry; fishing; food and
beverages; wood and furniture; and paper, pulp, and paper derivatives. Chile's main non-natu-
ral resource-intensive exports are categorized as: textiles; chemical and petroleum products;
basic metallic products; metallic and electrical products; transport equipment; and other.
22. According to the Central Bank (1997), after peaking at 44.1 percent in 1993, industrial exports
declined to 41.4 percent in 1997, while the component consisting of non-natural resource-
intensive manufactures fell from 13.6 percent to 12.8 percent (during the same period, mining
exports rose from 43 percent to 48.4 percent). This trend is corroborated by the Association of
Manufactured Exports (ASEXMA), whose own data indicate that after peaking at 18.9 percent
of total exports in 1993, manufactured exports have fallen since then: 1994 (17.3%); 1995
(15.4%); 1996 (17.8%); 1997 (15.2%). On the basis of this data, in fact, ASEXMA has re-
jected the government's claim that Chile has entered the second export phase (see Qud Pasa,
September 13, 1997, p. 60).
23. During 1990-1993, Latin America's share of Chile's manufactured exports grew from 36.8
percent to 53.8 percent (Meller and S~tez 1995).
24. The vulnerability of the Chilean economy can be seen in the effects of the East Asian crisis of
1997-1998, which has caused a significant fall in Chile's export revenues and prices and the
value of its currency, as well as the growing balance of payments deficits. These problems have
in turn forced the government to make budget cuts and to enact policies to defend the peso,
including an end to capital controls. The Chilean economy is also likely to be adversely af-
fected by the more recent Brazilian crisis.
25, According to Shez and Ffrench-Davis (1996), the great majority of Chile's manufactured ex-
ports (70 percent in 1994) have benefited from special incentives.
26. For more on the government's program of support for small and medium-sized firms, see
Rom~in and Rojas (1994).
27. For in-depth discussions of foreign investment in Chile, see Agosfn (1995); Agosfn and Ffrench-
Davis (1996); Ffrench-Davis et al., (1995); Mayorga and Montt (1995); and OECD (1997). On
East Asia, see Lall (1995).
28. Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report: Chile, 4th quarter, 1996.
29. The annual rate of return registered in 1995-1996 (0.5%) represents the worst two year perfor-
mance of the system since its inception in 1981. According to press reports, this poor perfor-
mance continued during 1997-1998.
30. According to the World Bank (1995, 211), the average annual growth in Chile's labor force
declined from 2.4 percent during 1970-1980 to 2.2 percent in 1980-1993 and is projected to
fall to 1.4 percent during 1993-2000.
31. For treatments of the environmental consequences of Chile's economic model, see Claude
(1997); Schurman (1996); and Quiroga and Van Hauwermeiren (1996).
32. For a similar conclusion, see Agacino (1996).
33. Author interview with Guillermo Campero, Labor Ministry adviser, Santiago, July 8, 1993.
34. Author interview with Joseph Ramos, economic consultant to Labor Ministry, Santiago, July
10, 1993. See also Joseph Ramos (1993) and Cort~zar (1993, 26-28).
35. Labor policy was therefore "based on the understanding that in both public and private compa-
nies, labor relations should be defined by workers and management, autonomously of the
state" (Cortfizar 1996, 120).
36. It also enabled the government to put the blame for the limited character of the reforms on the
rightist opposition. This view was expressed in many interviews with labor and business leaders
and labor lawyers. In fact, according to Alvaro Pizarro, the technical adviser on labor reforms of the
leading opposition party, RN, the government worked very closely with RN in defining those limits
and making certain that the opposition provided the government with the necessary counterbal-
ance to demands for more far-reaching change (author interview, Santiago, May 5, 1993).
37. For a detailed discussion of the 1990-1993 labor reforms, see Barrett (1998b).
38. Diaz (1997, 172-175); Agacino (1995, 134-136); and M~rquez Belloni (1994, 132-143).
39. Moreover, fully 30 percent of the legally constituted unions in 1993 were in recess (up from
21.7 percent in 1991), which, if applied to 1995, would bring the rate of unionization for that
year down to 8.9 percent for all unions and only 5.8 percent for enterprise unions.
40. The data in this paragraph are drawn from Fffas (1992, 1994, and 1996).
41. It also implemented new programs designed to help the poor to help themselves through group
formation. The best example is the Social Investment and Solidarity Fund (FOSIS). For de-
tailed discussions of CPPD social policies, see Scott (1995); Raczynski (1995); Vergara (1993
and 1994); and Rufz-Tagle (1996).
42. For more on the redistributive effect of social spending, see Qu~ Pasa, July 22, 1995.
43. On the CPPD's position toward the VAT, and its regressive consequences, see Qud Pasa, Au-
gust 9, 1997.
44. The recent fall in export revenue and decline in the value of the peso resulting from the East
Asian crisis have led the Frei administration to make budget cuts, especially in health.
45. The CPPD did not disagree that the old social security system was in crisis and in need of
reform. In fact, reforming the system had been on the agenda of every government since the
Barrett 29
early 1950s. The central feature of the social security reform of 1981 was the replacement of
the old state-run, pay-as-you-go pension system with a private system of individual capitaliza-
tion administered by private corporations, or AFPs. For detailed discussions of Chile's new
social security system, see Arellano (1984); Barrientos (1993); Diamond and Valdrs-Prieto
(1994); Gillion and Bonilla (1992); Marcel and Arenas (1992); and Mesa-Lago (1989).
46. According to Joaqufn Vial, the government also felt compelled to incorporate safeguards to
ensure the transparency of the system because, given the system's lack of legitimacy, it would
have been difficult to obtain political support for legislation that sought only to diversify the
pension funds' investment portfolios (Vial 1996, 35).
47. For discussions of recent developments in the pension system, see Rufz-Tagle (1994 and 1997)
and Albuquerque (1997).
48. Many candidly acknowledged privately that no real changes had been made in the labor code
and that their flexibility vis-ti-vis labor had not been reduced (author interviews, October 1992-
July 1993). This is not to say, however, that the labor reforms came without a major fight,
particularly within the business community. For more on this, see Barrett (1998a and 1998b).
49. The evolution of labor's relations with the CPPD and business is examined in greater detail in
Barrett (1998b).
50. Author interviews with labor leaders, October 1992-July 1993. For more on the level of disil-
lusionment within the labor movement, see the results of a survey of 200 labor leaders in
Sapag (1993).
51. Frei and several of his inner circle were closely tied to the business community (Barrett 1998a).
The CUT reacted by denouncing the government for favoring business over labor (Hoy, Janu-
ary 10-16, 1994 and December 12-18, 1994; APSI, July 11-24, 1994).
52. See Ercilla, July 15, 1994; and Hoy, December 12-18, 1994 and January 2-8, 1995.
53. For details, see QudPasa, January 7, 1995; Hoy, January 12-15, 1995; and Ercilla, January 13,
1995.
54. APSI, August 21-September 3, 1995.
55. The most dramatic example was the PC's victory in the Teachers Association, the largest of the
CUT's federations and a traditional PDC stronghold. For details of the PC's resurgence, see
Hoy, August 12-18, 1996.
56. The events leading up to the election were quite complicated. For details, see Qu~ Pasa, April
29, 1996; and Hoy, April 22-28 and April 29-May 5, 1996
57. The restrictions on state decision-making built into the Constitution reflected the neo-liberal
conception of democracy of its principal author, Jaime Guzmfin. Guzm~in contended that the
problems facing Chile were increasingly socio-economic in character, and that these required
ever more technical and complex solutions that could only be realized by concentrating deci-
sion-making power in the Executive and limiting the irresponsible tendencies of parliamentary
assemblies. On the other hand, he argued that the scope of state decision-making also had to be
restricted. Indeed, according to Guzmfin, a stable democracy is a system in which one's adver-
saries can come to power, but are unable to pursue a course of action much different from that
which one would pursue were one to come to power. Democratic stability, in other words,
depends not so much on who governs, as on the set of options available to those who govern
(Guzm~ 1991a, 1991b, 1991c). For an analysis of the 1980 Constitution, see Maira (1988).
58. For a detailed discussion of the reforms, see Andrade (1991); Ensalaco (1994); Geisse and
Ramffez (1989); and Loveman (1991).
59. See, for example, Boeninger (1979) and PDC (1984).
60. For the Aylwin administration's electoral reform bill, see El Diario, March 18, 1992.
61. See, for example, Hoy, November 7-13, 1995.
62. As one government official put it, "it has saved us" (author interview with Ignacio Walker,
chief of political and institutional relations, Ministerio Secretaria de la Presidencia, Santiago,
March 9, 1993).
63. See Hoy, November 25-December 1, 1991. Frei went so far as to declare publicly that he
would exercise each and every one of the generous faculties that the Constitution had bestowed
on him and that eventual reforms aimed at reducing those faculties would apply to his succes-
sors (APSI, March 21-April 3, 1994). The CPPD's parliamentarians, meanwhile, were far less
enamored of the extensive powers that the Constitution had given the Executive (Hoy, July 15-
21 and November 25-December 1, 1991). They were more inclined to replace the presidential
system with a parliamentary or semi-presidential one (C~nara de Diputados 1992).
64. For a discussion of the role of the Secretary General of the Presidency, see Rehren (1993).
65. For the CPPD's anti-populist conception of "governance," see Boeninger (1992).
66. For the Aylwin administration's constitutional reform bill, see El Diario, March 19, 1992 and
El Mercurio, June 2, 1992.
67. Hoy, April 15-21, 1996.
68. Hoy, March 28-April 3 and April 18-24, 1994; Qud Pasa, August 27, 1994; APS1, April 4-17,
1994. For a description of the various constitutional reform proposals advanced by the Frei
administration, see Hoy, March 4-10, 1996.
69. As described in section III, despite its comparatively greater capacity in the area of macroeco-
nomic policy, the government was unable to prevent a steady appreciation of the peso during
1990-1997. With the onset of the East Asian crisis, however, the opposite problem has oc-
curred, with the government forced to defend the value of the peso, by among other things
abandoning controls on the entry of short-term capital.
70. A dramatic example of the limitations on the state's capacity was the Constitutional Tribunal's
February 1995 ruling that severely restricted the Central Bank's legal powers to regulate pri-
vate banks indebted to it as a result of the 1983 financial crisis. See Hoy, February 13-19,
1995.
71. Author interviews with business leaders, October 1992-July 1993. For more on business' pos-
ture toward the Constitution, see Barrett (1998a); C~lceres (1992); and CPC (1993).
72. The state's diminishing power vis-a-vis business contrasts with the Pinochet regime, whose
distinguishing feature was its capacity to discipline business in carrying out a radical reorien-
tation of Chile's development model. This was, to be sure, discipline of a limited sort, for it did
not go much beyond enforcing market discipline and in fact gave rise to unchecked financial
speculation that led to the economic crisis of the early 1980s. Moreover, while during the latter
half of the 1980s, the regime implemented a series of policies that more effectively channeled
investment into productive activities, the state's capacity to discipline business remained far
short of that witnessed in East Asia. Nevertheless, the radical reorientation of the economy
during the 1970s demonstrated a greater capacity to discipline business than that of any of
Pinochet's civilian predecessors or military neighbors. And while business pressed for many of
the policy changes the regime adopted in the latter half of the 1980s, economic policy re-
mained very much an initiative of the state. More importantly perhaps, the growing power of
capital proved to be an asset of the Pinochet regime in its efforts to preserve and project its
transformative project beyond military rule. It may well have been that had Pinochet won the
plebiscite and remained in office, the state's power vis-h-vis capital would have diminished
tremendously. But that problem was left to Pinochet's civilian successors, who in addition to a
highly distrustful and increasingly powerful business class, confronted a set of institutional
constraints the military regime did not. The military regime also presided in the 1980s over a
stage in Chile's export-led development that did not require the same kind of disciplinary
capacity that a more advanced stage is likely to require. For a discussion of state-business
relations under military rule, see Barrett 1998a.
73. Appointments at the undersecretary level, however, sought to achieve a political balance by
naming individuals with different party affiliations than the Ministers they served (Hoy, Febru-
ary 26-March 4, 1996).
74. Hoy, April 3-9, May 1-7, and May 8-14, 1995; Qu~ Pasa, March 15, 1997, APSI, September
6-19, 1993.
75. The evolution of the party system is examined in greater detail in Barrett (forthcoming).
76. For an analysis of the role of the structure of state decision-making in the emergence, crisis,
and collapse of Chile's previous compromise, see Barrett (1997), chapters Three and Four.
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The Limits of Democracy

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The Limits of Democracy:

Socio-Political Compromise and Regime

significant than the so-called estado de compromiso ("compromise state") of the

international circumstances by making timely shifts in development strategy con-

by privately organized insurance, with entitlements and benefits reflecting contri-

II. Authoritarian Transformation and Transition: The Institutional and Structural

In a remarkably striking way, the transformative project undertaken by the Chil-

IlL Development Strategy

IV. Labor and Social Policy

in minimum wages during 1990-1995 signaled a major improvement over 1983-

7. For a somewhat similar argument, see Boix (1998).

CENTRAL BANK OF CHILE

KOZUL-WRIGHT, RICHARD AND BOB ROWTHORN, EDS.

PET (PROGRAMA DE ECONOMIA DEL TRABAJO)

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