DECIASSIFIEI AND APPROVED FOR RELEASE

IV TNE CENTRAL INTEWIENCE AGENCY

DATE 2811

REPORT OF THE LOVETT COMMITTEE

The committee took, its duties very seriously and

was ready with its preliminary report scarcely a week after
it had first been convened. The fact that its reasoned
conclusions could be unanimously presented in such a brief
time is an indication of the degree to which the idea of
'a centralized intelligence service had gained acceptance.
A close comparison of the committee's reCommenda-
tions with the final proposal of the Secretaries to the
President and the Presidential directive establishing the
NIA is well worth while. A major and very important differ-
ence appears where the committee recommends that the Central
Intelligence Agency should be supported by an independent
budget. The Secretaries recommended that funds should be
drawn from the various departments, and th6$ recommendation
was implicitly carried out in the Presidential directive.
This Babilemmismispe provision was the result of a compromise
with a very different plan presented by Alfred McCormack, .
Special Assistant to the Secretary of State. His plan is
included in this collection immediately following the report
of the Lovett Committee.
 6 November 194b

MEMORANDUM FOR MAJOR GENERAL H. A. CRAIG, OPD

MAJOR GENERiL E,;* R. QUESADA, AAF
; MAJOR GEYER& W. G. WYMAN, AG?
A

COLONEL J. M. ROAMER, ASP

4 BRIGADIER GENERAL JJHN MAGRUDER, SSU
•SUBJECT: Committee to Study War Department Intelligence
Activities.

1. Mr. Lovett has directed me to inform you that

the preliminary report of the Committee, dated 3 November
1945, has been approved by the Secretary of War.
2. Mr. Lovett has also advised that a new Corznittee
will be appointed to consider intelligence reorganization
within the Army and War Department.

CARTER W. CLARKE
Brigadier General, GSC
Deputy Chief, MS

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• TOP SECRET
 Tr: :?,․) Ce
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3 November 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR TNE SECRETARY OF WAR.

SUBJECT: Preliminary Report of Committee Appointed to Study

War Department Intelligence Activities.

The undersigned special committee was appointdd by

order of the Secretary of War, dated 22 October 1945 (Tab A)
to advise the Secretary of War on certain intelligence matters
more fully set forth in said order, including the formulation
of a plan for War Department activities in the field of
foreign intelligence, the existing and proposed organization
of G-2, A-2 and the Strategic Services Unit, now attached to
the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War, and the future
use or disposition that should be made of all intelligence
activities within the War Department. The Committee was
directed to make its report not later than 3 November 1945.

In the limited time available since its appointment

the committee has made as intensive a study as practicable
of the various subjects covered in the Secretary's order.
It has held nine meetings of the full committee. By means
of a special questionnaire it requested and secured written
reports from the Assistant Chief of Staff, OPD, Assistant
Chief of Staff, 0-2, Assistant Chief of Air Staff-2, Assis-
tant Chief of Staff, G-2, AGF, Director of Intelligence, ASP,
Director, Strategic Services Unit and Director, Spcial Plan-
ning Division, War Department Special Staff. Copies of these
reports are available for inspection. In addition the
committee took the formal testimony of Major General Clayton
Bissell (Assistant Chief of Staff, 0-2, War Department General
0 Staff); Mr. William E. Jackson (formerly Assistant Military
• Attache for Air in Lendon and Chief of Secret Intelligence
Branch of 0-2, ET0); Mr. David A. Bruce (formerly Chief,
Planning Group, OSS), Mr. Russell Forgan (formerly Chief, OSS,
European Theater) and Lieutenant Commander Milton Katz
• (Deputy Chief SI Branch, SSW); Mr. Lowell Weicker and Mr.
• Kingman Douglas (Ur. Weicker served during the war as Acting
A-2 of the Eighth Air Force and Director of Intelligence of
USSTAF, and Mr. Douglas as AAF representative at the Air
Ministry in London); Colonel William Quinn (Executive Officer
of SSU); Colonel Gordon B. Rogers (formerly 0-2, AGF);
Ltl General Stanley D. Embick (member of the Joint Strategic
Survey Committee); and Mr. Alfred McCormack (Special Assistant
to the Secretary of State for Intelligence, and formerly
Director of Intelligence, MIS). In addition, all members .
of the Committee held numerous informal conversations with-

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individuals both within and without the Vex . Department

whose views were believed to be helpful on the subjects
under consideration.
The committee invited the Director of Naval In-
telligence and the Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation to appear before it as witnesses and give
the committee the benefit of their views and recommenda-
tions. Both of these individuals, however, declined to
• appear. .
•

The committee has come to the, conclusion that it

•is not desirable to attempt to cover in this preliminary
report all of the subjects enumerated in the Memorandum
of the Secretary of War (Tab A). With the approval of the
Secretary of War it is therefore restricting the conclu-
sions herein to the two most pressing problems that have
been submitted, viz., the question of the establishment of
a Central Intelligence Agency for the United States Govern-
ment, and the future of the Strategic Services Unit now
attached to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War.
It is intended to supplement this preliminary report at the
earliest practicable date with a further report of the
other subjects referred to by the Secretary.
GENERAL OBSERVATIONS
Prior to the outbreak of the war, this nation had
no foreign intelligence collection system worthy of the
name. It appears to have been contrary to national policy
• to engage in clandestine intelligence or to maintain a
'foreign espionage system. Partly as a result of this lack
of an adequate foreign intelligence system in peacetime,
the majority of Army Officers who otherwise possessed the
capability-of top command did not sufficiently understand
the techniques and methods of utilization of foreign
intelligence.
During the course of the war, various uncoordinated
efforts were made to.compensate for this deficiency in our
system of national defense. As might have been expected,
most' of these expedients were unsatisfactory. Much effective
work in the specialized field of foreign espionage and
counter-espionage was accomplished by G-2 and the Office of
Strategic Services, but because of lack of direction, of
coordination and of cooperation among all agencies, as well
as for other reasons, even these organizations were unable
to fill the great need that existed for complete intelligence
coverage. However, it is not the purpose of this report

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 to review in detail either the accomplishments, or lack
of accomplishments, of the units engaged in the foreign
intelligence field. It is sufficient to point.out that
there was generally a lack of harmony and cooperation, a
state of overlapping functions and confusion and a failure
to cover certain important fields, that in retrospect
appear quite extraordinary. Throughout the war there
existed, and to a large extent there still exists, a feeling
of jealousy and mistrust among the various intelligence
organizations of the Government, and between a surprising
number of officers and civilians engaged in the various
intelligence activities.
The lack of trained and experienced intelligence
officers in both military services has been an important
contributing factor to the unsatisfactory situation. It
is important to note that there has never been any serious
effort to make intelligence a career activity. Officers
who were undoubtedly competent in the combat arms or ser-
vices, but who had had no intelligence training, were from
time to time pressed into service in intelligence roles.
The natural tendency was for them to seek to return to their
own basic branch at the first opportunity. Changes among
the top personnel were frequent. During the war there were
in succession four Assistant Chiefs of Staff, G-2, eight
.Assistant Chiefs of Air Staff-2 and five heads of the Office
of Naval Intelligence.
The committee wishes to stress with all of the
/ emphasis at its command the vital importance to this nation
of the early correction of this entire situation. In the
difficult years that lie ahead the United States must have
a national intelligence organization, competent and alert
to the extreme of possibility. It must be manned with an
adequate number of permanent personnel of the highest
Caliber, thoroughly trained in the numerous specialties
that are the necessary components of a modern intelligence
system. This will require a totally different approach
to the entire subject or intelligence than has been had in
the United States up to the present. At this particular
time the greatest pains must be taken not only to create
an organization and system that will be adapted to future
growth, but also to retain for the Government the services
of the many capable individuals tho are now available in
various departments, and who, although not yet properly
organized, have received invaluable training in the hard
school of war-time experience. Haphazard demobilization
of existing intelligence units 1111 result in dangerous
delay in reaching the objective.
 As indicated above, the following paragraphs of
this report will deal only with the questions of the
establishment of a central intelliience organization and
the immediate disposition to be made of the Strategic
Services Unit. The committee believes that extensive
additional study should be given to the organization and
consolidation of other intelligence functions of concern
to the Military Services.
THE ESTABLISHMENT 02 A CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIO
,r'
The committee has unanimously reached the conclusion
that this Government should establish as promptly as pos-
sible a National Intelligence Authority and a Central In-
telligence Agency. The committee has considered a number
of recommendations, received from various sources, as to
the composition, functions and the location of such central
organizations, including those contained in the report of
the Director of the Office of Strategic Services and in the
Joint Chiefs of Staff Study of September, 1943 (JCS1181/0).
The committee finds itself more nearly in agreement with the
recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff than with any
of the other proposals that have been advanded. In setting
forth below its own recommendations, it will therefore adopt
in a substantial part the language of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff memorandum, modified so as to accord with the committee's
views in certain particulars.
The committee recommends the creationof a National
Intelligence Authority composed of the Secretaries of State,
War and Navy, and a Representative of the Joint Chiefs of
. Staff. When and if the National Defense Organization in-
cludes a Secretary or Under Secretary of Air, the Authority
should be expanded by the addition of that individual. Pro-
vision should also be made for the addition of other members
of the Authority upon the recommendation of the existing
members, with the approval of the President.
The National Intelligence Authority should have com-
plete authority to formulate policies which shall be binding
upon the Central Intelligence Agency and all intelligence •
activities in other Government departments and agencies.
The Authority should be charged with the responsibility fcr
such overall sad intelligence-planning and development, and
such coordination of all federal intelligence activities,
as to assure the most effective accomplishment of the in-
tellii:ence mission related to the national security.

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 There should also be created a Central Intdlligence
Agency headed by a Director who should be appointed or
removed by the President on the recommendation of the
National Intelligence Authority. The committee believes
that in order to insure continuity the Director should be
app4nted'for a long term of years, preferably not less
than six. The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency
should be responsible to the National Intelligence Auth-
ority and sit as a non-voting member thereof.
. There should be created witilin the Central Intelli-
gence Agency an Intelligence Board which should consist
of the Assistant Chief of Staff, o-e, WDGS, the Assistant
Chief of Air Staff-2 and the Director of Naval Intelligence
and the Chiefs Of the principal civilian intelligence
agencies having functions re]sted to the national security
as determined by the National Intelligence Authority. The -
functions of this Board should be to assist the Director,
who shall serve as its Chairman, in the carrying out of
all of the activities and purposes of the Central Intelli-
gence Agency and to facilitate coordination between the
Central Intelligence Agency and the departments and agencies
represented on the Board. The Director shall consult with
and secure the opinion of the Board on all important ques-
tions which may arise in the course of the operations of
the Central intelligence Agency. In the event of a dif-
ference of opinion between the Director and members of the
Intelligence Board, the decision of the Director shall be
controlling, subject, however, to the right of any member
of the Board to have the question submitted for final
decision to the National Intelligence Authority. The
Director should also consult with the Board before deliv-
ering any estimates and appreciations to the President or
any member of the Cabinet, and if there shall be a dif-
ference of opinion among the Director and the members of
the Board, in anysuch case the differing opinions should
accompany the Director's report..
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Except for its responsibility to the National
Intelligence Authority, the Central Intellizence Agency
should be independent. It should be supported by an in-
dependent budget, and its appropriations should be ob-
tainable without public hearings.
.Subject to the direction and control of the
National Intelligence Authority, the Central Intelligence
Agency should:
a. Operate as the sole collection agency for
all departments of the Government in the
foreign espionage and counter-espionage
fields.
 Perform for the benefit of departmental
b. Perform
• intelligence agencies such other in-
telligence services of common concern
• as the National Intelligence Authority
determines can be more efficiently ac-
complished by a common agency, including
the direct procurement of intelligence.
c. Coordinate the_activities of all intel-
ligence agencies of the Government whose
activities relate to the national security
and recommend to the National Intelligence
Authority the establishment of such over-
all policies and objectives as will
assure the most effective accomplish-
ment of the national intellience mission.
d. Purnish to any Government department or
agency, upon the request of its repre-
sentative on the intelligence Board, any
.intelligence material or evaluation,
which, in the opinion of that member,
is necessary for his department or agency,
provided, however, that in the event
. that the Director believes it undesir-
able for any such material or evaluation
to be so furnished, he may submit the
matter to the Intelligence Board for
decision or, in the event of disagreement
• within the Board, to the National Intel-
ligence Authority.
e. Accomplish the evaluation and synthesis
of intelligence collected or assembled
by it, and the appropriate dissemination
within the Government and among the sev-
eral departments of the resulting strategic
and national pollcy intelligence.
f. Perform such other functions and duties
related to intelligence as the National
Intelligence Authority may from time to
time direct.
The Central Intelligence Agency should not conduct
; espionage activities within the United States. It should
have no police or law enforcement functions either within
' or without the United States.

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f:60 vitt.;

Subject to coordination . by the Central Intelligence

Agency, and to the limitations expressed above, the exist-
ing agencies of the Government should continue to collect,
evaluate; synthesize, and disseminate departmental intelligence,
. herein defined as that intelligence required by the several
departments and independent agencies for the performance:
of their proper functions. Such departmental intelligence
as is required by the Central Intelligence Agency should
he made freely available to it for synthesis. When
approved by the National Intelligence Authority, the
operation of the departmental intelligence agencies should
be open to inspection by the Central Intelligence Agency
in connection with its coordinating functions. In the
interpretation of this paragraph the National Intelligence
Authority and the Central Intelligence Agency will be re-
sponsible for fully protecting intelligence sources and
methods which, due to their nature, have a direct and
highly important bearing on military operations and national
security.
Operating personnel, including specialists, should
be furnished to the Central Intelligence Agency by the
various departme nts and agencies engaged in intelligence
activities. The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency
should have the right, with the approval of the Intelligence
Board, to call upon any such departments and agencies to
furnish the Agency with personnel for advisory and functional
.positions.
INTERIM DISPOSITION OF THE STRATEGIC SERVICES UNIT
At the present time the Strategic Services Unit is
attached to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of V.
The committee regards this as an unsatisfactory arrangements,
because it seemingly establisties two separate intelligence
.units within the War Department. This objection is increased
by the fact that at the present time G-2 is engaged in both
foreign espionage and foreign counter-espionage matters,
which activities constitute an important part of the present
functions of the Strategic Services Unit.
The Committee has considered the advisability of
transferring the Strategic Services Unit to G-2 and amal-
gamating its functions with similar activities of G-2.
However, because of its conclusions that all foreign
espionage and counter-espionage activities of the Government
should be transferred to the Central Intelligence Agency
as soon as possible after the establishment of that body,
and in order to avoid further administrative complications,
the committee believed that continuingAhe Strategic
Services Unit under the supervision of the Office of the

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 Assistant Secretary of war on a purely interim basis is
justified. Accordingly the committee so recommends. .
The committee believes that during this interim
period it is important that two things be done. The first
is the proper coordination of the 'operations of the
Strategic Services Unit with similar operations of G-2.
The second is the elimination from the Strategic Services
Unit of all personnel engaged in activities other than
foreign espionage and counter-espionage activities, and
also the reduction of the personnel engaged in these two
activities to a small and efficient group that will be of
maximum value' to the Central Intelligence Agency when that
body is constituted.'

In order to accomplish the foregoing, the committee

recommends that there forthwith be appointed and placed
in the War Department under the immediate supervision of
the Assistant Secretary of War, and Interim Activities
D irector, Who should be an officer of the rank of Major
General, or higher. In consultation with the Assistant
Chief of Staff, G-2 and the Ditector of the Strategic
Services 'Unit, this Director should, during the interim
period referred to above, have direct charge of the opera-
tion and administration of the Strategic Services Unit
and should be responsible for coordinating its activities
with similar activities of G-2. He shall also take whatever
0000i steps are necessary to reduce the personnel of the Strategic
Services Unit in the manner indicated in the preceding
paragraph, and effect the transfer of such personnel to
the Central Intelligence Agency as soon as it is organized.
The committee is of the opinion that as soon as
the Central Intelligence Agency is created l. there should
also be transferred to it appropriate personnel of G-2
now engaged in foreign espionage and counter-espionage
activities. In order that this may be accomplished without
delay, and in order to further coordinate such activities
in the interim period with the similar activities of the
Strategic Services Unit, 'the Interim Activities Director
should make recommendations to the Secretary of War with
respect to (a) the reduction of personnel controlled by
G-2 who are engaged in foreign espionage and counter-
espionage activities, and (b) the transfer of personnel in
G-2 engaged in such activities to the direct control of
the Interim Activities Director pending creation of the
Central intelligence Agency.

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 If such a program is successfully carried out,
them will be assembled under the direct control of the
Interim Activities Director all personnel controlled
by the War Department who are engaged in foreign eapionage
and counter-espionage activities, whom it is desired to
transfer to the Central Intelligence Agency, and it will
be possible to coordinate their various activities until
such time as their transfer to the central Intelligence
Agency can be effected. In the event that higher authority
finally decides not to create a Central intelligence
Agency, the personnel so controlled by the Interim Acti-
vities Director should be then transferred to the direct
control and administration of the Assistant Chief of
Staff, G-2.
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1/44) .
.. Top nr"-vRET

Respectfully submitted,

ROBERT A. LOVETT
Assistant Secretary of Var for Air
Chairman

H. A. CRAIG E. R. QUESADA
Maj. General, OPD Maj. General, ALF

..1

W. G. A/NAN •C. W. CLARKE

Maj. General, AG? Brig. General, 0-2

J01111 MAGRUDER J. M. ROAMER

• Brig. General, SSU Colonel, AS?