Judgment Located by A Hyperlink.: Supreme Court of India
Judgment Located by A Hyperlink.: Supreme Court of India
Judgment Located by A Hyperlink.: Supreme Court of India
(Large Bench)
Versus
For the Appellant :- Mr. A.P.S. Goel, Sr. Advocate with Mr. Harikesh Singh,
Devinder Bir Singh for Mr. A.P. Mohanty, Satbir Pillania, Anil Karnawal and
Dr. Sushil Balwada, Advocates.
For the Respondent :- Mr. Rajeev Gaur 'Naseem, Mr. Rajesh Ranjan and Mr.
T.V. George, Advocates.
(iii) If the information was received when the Police Officer was in
Police station with sufficient time to take action, and if the police
officer fails to record in writing the information received, or fails to
send a copy thereof, to the official superior, then it will be a
suspicious circumstance being a clear violation of section 42 of the
Act.
[Para 17d]
[Para 12]
[Para 13]
Cases referred :
The Trial Court acquitted the accused. But, State of Gujarat preferred an
appeal before the High Court. The Division Bench of the High Court set
aside the order of acquittal and convicted the accused of the offences
charged. The convicted accused filed SLP before this Court and
contended that there was non-compliance of Section 42 of the Act
which was enough to vitiate the search as a whole. After referring
Section 42 of the Act and the evidence of police officer as PW 2, the
Court held that (1) he should have taken down the information in
writing; and (2) he should have sent forthwith a copy thereof to his
immediate official superior. After finding that PW 2 - police officer
admitted that he proceeded to the spot only on getting the information
that somebody was trying to transport a narcotic substance and noting
that PW 2 admitted that he proceeded on getting prior information from
a Constable and the information was precisely one falling within the
purview of Section 42(1) of the Act, the Court decided that PW 2 cannot
wriggle out of the conditions stipulated in the said sub-section and
unhesitatingly found that there was non-compliance of Section 42 of the
Act. The State contended before the Bench that such non-compliance
with Section 42 of the Act cannot be visited with greater consequences
than what has been held by the Constitution Bench regarding non-
compliance with the conditions prescribed in Section 50 of the Act.
After referring to the dictum laid down in State of Punjab v. Baldev
Singh, 1999(3) RCR(Criminal) 533 : (1999)6 SCC 172, this Court held
that the views expressed with reference to Section 50 of the Act would
apply with reference to Section 42 also and consequently held as
follows :
"If the officer has reason to believe from personal knowledge or prior
information received from any person that any narcotic drug or
psychotropic substance (in respect of which an offence has been
committed) is kept or concealed in any building, conveyance or
enclosed place, it is imperative that the officer should take it down in
writing and he shall forthwith send a copy thereof to his immediate
official superior. The action of the officer, who claims to have exercised
it on the strength of such unrecorded information, would become
suspect, though the trial may not vitiate on that score alone. Nonetheless
the resultant position would be one of causing prejudice to the accused"
It was also contended by the learned counsel for the State of Gujarat that as
the accused did not dispute the factum of recovery of the "charas" from the
vehicle it does not matter that the information was not recorded at the first
instance by the police officer. The Court did not approve such contention
because it held that non-recording of information has in fact deprived the
accused as well as the Court of the material to ascertain what was the precise
information which PW 2 got before proceeding to stop the vehicle. It further
held that value of such an information, which was the earliest in point of time,
for ascertaining the extent of the involvement of the accused in the offence,
was of a high degree. It further held that it is not enough that PW 2 was able to
recollect from memory, when he was examined in court after the lapse of a
long time, as to what information he got before he proceeded to the scene.
Even otherwise, it held that the information which PW 2 recollected itself
tends to exculpate the appellant rather than inculpate him. Finally the court
held that non-recording of the vital information collected by the police at the
first instance can be counted as a circumstance in favour of the accused. On
analyzing this as well as the other materials, this court ultimately allowed the
appeal filed by the accused/appellant and set aside the conviction and sentence
passed on him by the High Court and restored the order of acquittal passed in
his favour by the trial court. The ratio in Abdul Rashid (supra) is that the non-
recording of vital information collected by the police at the first instance can
be counted as a circumstance in favour of the accused-appellant. The police
officer examined as a crucial witness, PW2, in that case admitted that he
proceeded to the spot only on getting information that somebody was trying to
transport a narcotic substance, but failed to take down the information in
writing. Nor did he apprise his superior officer of any such information either
then or later, much less send a copy of the information to the superior officer.
Thus, it was a case of absolute non-compliance with the requirements of
Section 42(1) and (2).
It is clear from Sajan Abraham (supra) that to enforce the law under the
Narcotic Drugs And Psychotropic Substances Act stringently against the
persons involved in illicit drug trafficking and drug abuse, the legislature has
made some of its provisions obligatory for the prosecution to comply with,
which the courts have interpreted to be mandatory. It is further clear that this
is in order to balance the stringency for an accused by casting an obligation on
the prosecution for its strict compliance. The court however while construing
such provisions strictly should not interpret them literally so as to render their
compliance impossible. It concluded that if in a case, the strict following of a
mandate results in delay in trapping an accused, which may lead the accused
to escape, then the prosecution case should not be thrown out. It is also clear
that when substantial compliance has been made it would not vitiate the
prosecution case.
6. In the light of the above decisions and the principles enunciated therein, it
would be appropriate to refer to Section of the Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances Act which is relevant for the present purpose as it
stood before its amendment by Act 9 of 2001. It reads as under :-
(a) enter into and search any such building, conveyance or place;
(b) in case of resistance, break open any door and remove any obstacle
to such entry;
(c) seize such drug or substance and all materials used in the
manufacture thereof and any other article and any animal or conveyance
which he has reason to believe to be liable to confiscation under this Act
and any document or other article which he has reason to believe may
furnish evidence of the commission of any offence punishable under
Chapter IV relating to such drug or substance; and
(d) detain and search, and, if he thinks proper, arrest any person whom
he has reason to believe to have committed any offence punishable
under Chapter IV relating to such drug or substance :
Provided that if such officer has reason to believe that a search warrant
or authorisation cannot be obtained without affording opportunity for
the concealment of evidence or facility for the escape of an offender, he
may enter and search such building, conveyance or enclosed place at
any time between sunset and sunrise after recording the grounds of his
belief.
(2) Where an officer takes down any information in writing under sub-
section (1) or records grounds for his belief under the proviso thereto,
he shall forthwith send a copy thereof to his immediate official
superior."
"(2) Where an officer takes down any information in writing under sub-
section (1) or records grounds for his belief under the proviso thereto,
he shall within seventy two hours send a copy thereof to his immediate
official superior."
7. It is well established that search and seizure are essential steps in the
armoury of an investigator in the investigation of a criminal case. The Code of
Criminal Procedure in various provisions, particularly, Sections 96 to 103 and
Section 165 recognizes the necessity and usefulness of search and seizure
during the investigation. Sub-section(1) of Section 41 of the Act provides that
a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Magistrate of the First Class or any Magistrate
of Second Class specially empowered by the State Government may issue a
warrant for the arrest of any person whom he has reason to believe to have
committed any offence punishable under Chapter IV. Sub-Section (2) of
Section 41 refers to issue of authorisation for similar purposes by officers of
departments of Central Excise, Narcotics, Customs, Revenue Intelligence, etc.
8. Sub-section (1) of Section 42 lays down that the empowered officer, if has a
prior information given by any person, should necessarily take it down in
writing and where he has reason to believe from his personal knowledge that
offences under Chapter IV have been committed or that materials which may
furnish evidence of commission of such offences are concealed in any
building etc. he may carry out the arrest or search, without warrant between
sunrise and sunset and he may do so without recording his reasons of belief.
The proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 42 lays down that if the empowered
officer has reason to believe that a search warrant or authorisation cannot be
obtained without affording opportunity for the concealment of evidence or
facility for the escape of an offender, he may enter and search such building,
conveyance or enclosed place, at any time between sunset and sunrise, after
recording the grounds of his belief.
10. We may note that Abdul Rashid followed State of Punjab v. Balbir Singh,
1994(1) RCR(Criminal) 736 : 1994(3) SCC 299.
(3) Under Section 42(1), such empowered officer who takes down any
information in writing or records the grounds under proviso to Section
42(1) should forthwith send a copy thereof to his immediate official
superior. If there is total non-compliance of this provision the same
affects the prosecution case. To that extent it is mandatory. But if there
is delay whether it was undue or whether the same has been explained
or not, will be a question of fact in each case."
11. A careful examination of the facts in Abdul Rashid and Sajan Abraham
shows that the decisions revolved on the facts and do not really lay down
different prepositions of law. In Abdul Rashid, there was total non-compliance
with the provision of section 42. The police officer neither took down the
information as required under section 42(1) nor informed his immediate
official superior, as required by Section 42(2). It is in that context this Court
expressed the view that it was imperative that the police officer should take
down the information and forthwith send a copy thereof to his immediate
superior officer and the action of the police officer on the basis of the
unrecorded information would become suspect though the trial may not be
vitiated on that score alone. On the other hand, in Sajan Abraham, the facts
were different. In that case, it was very difficult, if not impossible for the Sub-
Inspector of police to record in writing the information given by PW-3 and
send a copy thereof forthwith to his official superior, as the information was
given to him when he was on patrol duty while he was moving in a jeep and
unless he acted on the information immediately, the accused would have
escaped. The Sub-Inspector of Police therefore acted, without recording the
information into writing, but however, sent a copy of the FIR along with other
records regarding arrest of the accused immediately to his superior officer. It is
in these circumstances that this Court held that the omission to record in
writing the information received was not a violation of Section 42.
13. Section 50 prescribes the conditions under which search of a person shall
be conducted. Sub-section (1) provides that when the empowered officer is
about to search any suspected person, he shall, if the person to be searched so
requires, take him to the nearest gazetted officer or the Magistrate for the
purpose. Under sub-section (2) it is laid down that if such request is made by
the suspected person, the officer who is to take the search, may detain the
suspect until he can be brought before such gazetted officer or the Magistrate.
Sub-section (3) lays down that when the person to be searched is brought
before such a gazetted officer or the Magistrate and such gazetted officer or
the Magistrate finds that there are no reasonable grounds for search, he shall
forthwith discharge the person to be searched, otherwise, he shall direct that
the search be made.
10. The proviso to sub-section (1) lays down that if the empowered
officer has reason to believe that a search warrant or authorisation
cannot be obtained without affording opportunity for the concealment of
evidence or facility for the escape of an offender, he may enter and
search such building, conveyance or enclosed place, at any time
between sunset and sunrise, after recording the grounds of his belief.
Vide sub-section (2) of Section 42, the empowered officer who takes
down information in writing or records the grounds of his belief under
the proviso to sub-section (1), shall forthwith send a copy of the same to
his immediate official superior. Section 43 deals with the power of
seizure and arrest of the suspect in a public place. The material
difference between the provisions of Section 43 and Section 42 is that
whereas Section 42 requires recording of reasons for belief and for
taking down of information received in writing with regard to the
commission of an offence before conducting search and seizure, Section
43 does not contain any such provision and as such while acting under
Section 43 of the Act, the empowered officer has the power of seizure of
the article etc. and arrest of a person who is found to be in possession of
any narcotic drug or psychotropic substance in a public place where
such possession appears to him to be unlawful."
It is to be noted that Baldev Singh's case (supra) has dealt with Section 50 of
the Act and the effect of non-compliance of the same. It was held that the
same provisions of Section 50 containing certain protection and safeguards
implicitly make it imperative and obligatory and cast a duty on the
investigating officer to ensure that search and seizure of the person concerned
is conducted in a manner prescribed by Section 50. The unamended Section 50
as existed during that period is as follows :
(1) When any officer duly authorised under section 42 is about to search
any person under the provisions of section 41, section 42 or section 43,
he shall, if such person so requires, take such person without
unnecessary delay to the nearest Gazetted Officer of any of the
departments mentioned in section 42 or to the nearest Magistrate.
(2) If such requisition is made, the officer may detain the person until he
can bring him before the Gazetted Officer or the Magistrate referred to
in sub-section (1).
(3) The Gazetted Officer or the Magistrate before whom any such
person is brought shall, if he sees no reasonable ground for search,
forthwith discharge the person but otherwise shall direct that search be
made.
16. The advent of cellular phones and wireless services in India has assured
certain expectation regarding the quality, reliability and usefulness of the
instantaneous messages. This technology has taken part in the system of police
administration and investigation while growing consensus among the policy
makers about it. Now for the last two decades police investigation has gone
through a sea-change. Law enforcement officials can easily access any
information anywhere even when they are on the move and not physically
present in the police station or their respective offices. For this change of
circumstances, it may not be possible all the time to record the information
which is collected through mobile phone communication in the
Register/Records kept for those purposes in the police station or the respective
offices of the authorised officials in the Act if the emergency of the situation
so requires. As a result, if the statutory provisions under Section 41(2) and
42(2) of the Act of writing down the information is interpreted as a mandatory
provision, it will disable the haste of an emergency situation and may turn out
to be in vain with regard to the criminal search and seizure. These provisions
should not be misused by the wrongdoers/offenders as a major ground for
acquittal. Consequently, these provisions should be taken as discretionary
measure which should check the misuse of the Act rather than providing an
escape to the hardened drug-peddlers.
17. In conclusion, what is to be noticed is Abdul Rashid did not require literal
compliance with the requirements of Sections 42(1) and 42(2) nor did Sajan
Abraham hold that the requirements of Section 42(1) and 42(2) need not be
fulfilled at all. The effect of the two decisions was as follows :
(a) The officer on receiving the information (of the nature referred to in
Sub-section (1) of section 42) from any person had to record it in
writing in the concerned Register and forthwith send a copy to his
immediate official superior, before proceeding to take action in terms of
clauses (a) to (d) of section 42(1).
(b) But if the information was received when the officer was not in the
police station, but while he was on the move either on patrol duty or
otherwise, either by mobile phone, or other means, and the information
calls for immediate action and any delay would have resulted in the
goods or evidence being removed or destroyed, it would not be feasible
or practical to take down in writing the information given to him, in
such a situation, he could take action as per clauses (a) to (d) of section
42(1) and thereafter, as soon as it is practical, record the information in
writing and forthwith inform the same to the official superior.
18. We answer the reference in the manner aforesaid. Let the appeals be now
placed for disposal before the appropriate Bench.
Order accordingly.