Reviewer

MEAD: Mind, self, and society: From the standpoint of a social behaviorist
Besides four "Supplementary Essays" the material is divided into four divisions: "The Point of
View of Social Behaviorism," "Mind," "The Self," and "Society." In the first, a general
psychological foundation is laid down. Mead rejects the view that psychology deals with
consciousness in the sense of something existing prior to and bringing about behavior. But he is
just as much opposed to Behaviorism which deals exclusively with bodily processes. Social
psychology for Mead studies inner experience or activity which arises within a social process.
The paradigm is language, which consists both of meaning or intelligence and
intercommunicative (social) behavior. Mead thought that the origin of psychological phenomena
in social processes saved it from any taint of parallelism.
The second division constitutes a lengthy argument purporting to show that mind arises through
communication by a conversation of gestures in a social process. For Mead the mind is well
characterized by the processes of meaning, knowing, significance, and reflection. Now meaning
lies within the field of gesture. When an individual's gesture indicates a subsequent behavior to
another organism, then it has meaning. When the organism has indicated to it that the other
organism is responding to his gesture, then the gesture is significant. Such significant gestures
are symbolic of and basic to intelligence and reflection.
The self arises in the process of gesture conversation or symbolic communication when the
individual takes the attitude of another and acts toward himself as others do. The self comprises
two aspects in so far as the "I" consists of the responses of the organism to the attitudes of others,
while the "me" consists of the set of attitudes of others which the individual himself assumes. In
terms of these two aspects of the self Mead explains social control (the "me" limits the "I") and
social change (the "I" asserts itself within the limits of his society).
Since society is not only the source of the individual in so far as he is mind or self but also the
perennial locus of his activity, the section entitled "Society" consists of a discussion of various
adjustments of individuals. Sympathy is calling out in ourselves the attitude of the person we are
assisting, while self realization consists in having others partake in and accept one's own
attitudes.
In the large, Mead's social psychology sums up to a dialectic of mind quite in the tradition of the
post-Kantian idealists. But so modern is his gestural dialectic that it becomes for him basic to a
criticism of even recent conceptions of mentality, for the intercourse of individuals reaches down
to a level of biological functions. Thus mind is an objective fact in a world of observable
phenomena.
Howsoever well satisfied philosophers may be with Mead's social psychology, we fear that it
may not be entirely acceptable to the psychologist, since the latter will question whether it
touches the concrete realities of psychological phenomena. Instead of giving a description of
how individuals build up and perform responses to stimuli—whether personal or social—in a
definite reactional biography, Mead offers merely a generalized statement of mental genesis.
The psychologist will undoubtedly ask whether mental phenomena are developed only in
gestural give-and-take to the exclusion of the individual's private interactions with objects. In
detail, he will ask whether all mentality is social in Mead's sense. So far as distinctly social
psychological developments are concerned, the psychologist will miss especially the description
of the individual's contacts with anthropological phenomena (actual institutional objects and
events) which constitute so sure a guide to the origin of his concrete ideas, beliefs, and feelings.
For, despite Mead's expressed objectivity, institutions for him are nothing but organizations of
attitudes which we all carry in us (p. 211).
The psychologist may interpose another query: Why should social psychology be limited to the
genesis of mind and not include the actual performance of psychological activities? Mead comes
closest to the latter in discussing the "I" and the "me." But here again the activity stresses the
emergence of the two phases of the self. The student of human behavior may justifiably become
sceptical of the dialectic, precisely because it is so well adapted to explain such differences
between the "I" and the "me," which after all are probably only names for a person's behavior
equipment.
No one can fail to be attracted to Mead's brilliant statement of the genesis of a generalized mind,
and especially if one is interested in the implications it carries concerning traditional moral and
social theories. On the other hand, it may possibly not be regarded as a comprehensive treatment
of the problems of social psychology.
Behaviorism – focuses on the idea that all behaviors are learned through interaction with the
environment. This learning theory states that behaviors are learned from the environment, and
says that innate or inherited factors have very little influence on behavior.
Mead’s me
- refers to the socialized component of the individual
- represents the Self as an object of consciousness
Mead’s I
- refers to the engaged element
- represents the Self as a subject of consciousness.
Mead describes how the individual mind and self arises out of the social process. Instead of
approaching human experience in terms of individual psychology, Mead analyzes experience
from the “standpoint of communication as essential to the social order.”
Language, in Mead’s view, is communication through significant symbols. A significant symbol

is a gesture

Reviewer

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Reviewer

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Reviewer

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

MEAD: Mind, self, and society: From the standpoint of a social behaviorist

Language, in Mead’s view, is communication through significant symbols. A significant symbol

You might also like