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BORROMEO Vs MINA Digest

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BORROMEO 

vs.  MINA
G.R. No. 193747, June 05, 2013

FACTS:
Subject of this case is a parcel of agricultural land registered in the name of respondent. It
appears from the TCT that respondent’s title over the said property is based on Emancipation
Patent 77 issued by the DAR.

Petitioner filed a Petition seeking that (a) his landholding over the subject property (subject
landholding) be exempted from the coverage of the government’s OLT program under
Presidential Decree No. 27; and (b) respondent’s emancipation patent over the subject
property be consequently revoked and cancelled. He alleged that he purchased the aforesaid
property from its previous owner as evidenced by a deed of sale. However, he was not able to
effect the transfer of title in his name. He filed a subsequent Petition also with the PARO which
contained identical allegations as those stated in his first Petition.

Records show that petitioner changed his theory on appeal with respect to two (2) matters:
first, the actual basis of his ownership rights over the subject property, wherein he now claims
that his ownership was actually based on a certain oral sale in 1976 which was merely
formalized by the 1982 deed of sale; and second, the status of respondent as tenant of the
subject property, which he never questioned during the earlier stages of the proceedings
before the DAR but presently disputes before the Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the change of theory by the petitioner on his appeal can be admitted?

RULING:

No. Settled is the rule that a party who adopts a certain theory upon which the case is tried and
decided by the lower courts or tribunals will not be permitted to change his theory on appeal,
not because of the strict application of procedural rules, but as a matter of fairness. Basic
considerations of due process dictate that theories, issues and arguments not brought to the
attention of the trial court would not ordinarily be considered by a reviewing court, except
when their factual bases would not require presentation of any further evidence by the adverse
party in order to enable him to properly meet the issue raised, such as when the factual bases
of such novel theory, issue or argument is (a) subject of judicial notice; or (b) had already been
judicially admitted, which do not obtain in this case.

Clearly, the factual bases of the foregoing theories require the presentation of proof as neither
of them had been judicially admitted by respondent nor subject of judicial notice. Therefore,
the Court cannot entertain petitioner’s novel arguments raised in the instant petition.
Accordingly, he must rely on his previous positions that (a) his basis of ownership over the
subject property rests on the 1982 deed of sale; and (b) that respondent’s status as the tenant
of the subject property remains undisputed.

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