Airpower I: "Smart Strategy, Smart Airpower": Syllabus AY 22

AIRPOWER I:
“Smart Strategy, Smart Airpower”1

SYLLABUS
AY 22
JOINT PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION

PHASE I INTERMEDIATE LEVEL COURSE
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE
Twenty-First Century Leaders for Twenty-First Century Challenges
Current as of 4 October 2021
1
John A. Warden III, “Smart Strategy, Smart Airpower,” in Airpower Reborn: The Strategic Concepts of
John Warden and John Boyd, ed. John Andreas Olsen (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2015), 93-127.
AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE
MAXWELL AFB, AL
FOREWORD
This syllabus for the Airpower I course for the Air Command and Staff College, October-
December 2021, provides both an overview of the course narrative and objectives, as well as a
detailed description of each lesson to assist students in their reading and preparation for lecture and
seminar. Included herein is information about the course’s methods of evaluation, the schedule, and
the fulfillment of joint professional military education core goals.
Airpower represents one of the greatest opportunities and challenges of modern times. How we
approach that challenge is now in your hands.
SIGNED
Heather P. Venable, PhD

Course Director, Airpower I
APPROVED
James W. Forsyth, Jr., PhD

Dean
2
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
FOREWORD 2
TABLE OF CONTENTS 3
COURSE DESCRIPTION AND OBJECTIVES 4
COURSE ORGANIZATION AND NARRATIVE 4
ACSC PROGRAM LEARNING OUTCOMES 6
AY 2021-2022 SPECIAL AREAS OF EMPHASIS 7
COURSE REQUIREMENTS 7
COURSE ADMINISTRATION 8
COURSE SCHEDULE
DAY 1 10
DAY 2 11
DAY 3 12
DAY 4 13
DAY 5 14
DAY 6 15
DAY 7 16
DAY 8 17
DAY 9 18
DAY 10 19
DAY 11 20
DAY 12 21
DAY 13 22
DAY 14 23
DAY 15 24
APPENDIX: COURSE FACULTY 25
3
AIRPOWER I
COURSE OVERVIEW
COURSE DESCRIPTION
Airpower I examines the emergence and development of airpower from World War I through the
period immediately following the Vietnam War to better understand the use of airpower today.
Using the lens of great power competition, the course analyzes the development of key ideas,
capabilities, organizations, practices, and limitations that framed the conduct of air warfare in the
first three-quarters of the twentieth century as airmen adapted and innovated rapidly in the air
domain. These events continue to inform debates about airpower’s purpose, utility, and
effectiveness. Course readings, lectures, and seminar discussions will cultivate adaptive leaders and
critical airpower thinkers by challenging officers to improve their ability to lead in complex,
uncertain times while making ethical decisions with the ultimate goal of applying airpower in a joint
context to serve national strategic objectives.
COURSE OBJECTIVES
1. Comprehend the development of airpower and its application in great power competition
from the First World War through the early 1970s.
2. Comprehend the relationship between current doctrine and the application of airpower at the
tactical and operational levels of war in great power competition ranging from peer conflict
to proxy wars.
3. Comprehend the influence of leadership, doctrine, organization, technology, the acquisitions
process, and theory on the evolution of joint airpower and the organizational DNA of the
United States Air Force.
4. Comprehend the lessons of airpower history to analyze the capabilities, limitations, and
effectiveness of airpower in the current and future joint fight to fulfill national security
outcomes in complex and uncertain environments.
COURSE ORGANIZATION AND NARRATIVE

In a 2017 book titled The Future of War: A History, Lawrence Freedman identified three distinct
periods in the history of twentieth century conflict. The first period was dominated by great power
conflict in which the militaries of the great powers focused on attaining decisive victories to end
wars as quickly as possible. This period included the First and Second World Wars and lasted until
the end of the Cold War. What followed has been defined by various terms such as the “End of
History,” the “Unipolar Moment,” and the “Pax Americana.” Although these ideas suggested a
future of peace and prosperity, the rising prevalence of irregular wars indicated that utopian
optimism was unfounded. In a series of conflicts from Africa to the Balkans to the Middle East,
Western militaries found that traditional strategies for decisive battles often failed to produce
satisfying national security outcomes.
By the twenty-first century, many strategists had attempted to rethink strategy for an age of so-
called “New Wars” that required less kinetic force and more nuanced strategies. Yet just as Western
militaries were refocusing on irregular wars, Freedman identifies a shift to a third period that
involves a renewed possibility for great power conflict. The rise of China and the resurgence of
Russian power and aggressiveness, along with states like Iran and North Korea, indicate that great
power wars are a possibility that Western militaries cannot ignore. How to prepare for large-scale
conflicts while still possessing the right strategies for smaller, irregular wars has become a central
challenge for the American military. The fact that it and its partners have to achieve this delicate
balance amid an on-going Information Revolution in which technology is increasing the
4
prominence of the space and cyber domains makes this an even greater challenge.
Airpower I and II adopt Freedman’s model to examine the development and employment of
airpower in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Both courses use historical case studies to
promote critical thinking about the capabilities and limitations of airpower as a tool of national
security strategy. Given the terrible human and material costs of conventional great power wars,
American military leaders have devoted considerable effort to winning them as quickly and
decisively as possible. In particular, the bloody stalemate of the First World War – perhaps best
epitomized by the slaughter at Verdun – drove interest in achieving decisiveness in warfare. As you
learned in War Theory, airpower provided one of the most attractive means of achieving
decisiveness in twentieth century conflict, either by destroying the enemy surface forces from the
air or by attacking the enemy’s home front. It was in this context of great power conflict and total
war that airpower was born.
For most American Airmen, the outcome of the Second World War vindicated their belief that
airpower was an instrument of decisiveness and that it produced inherently strategic effects.
Airpower I allows students to explore this debate in depth while studying the past to learn how
airpower can be effective in great power conflict. The idea of airpower as a decisive instrument
with deterrent capabilities became foundational for the newly independent US Air Force in 1947,
and it remains essential today. In the context of the Cold War, both conventional and nuclear
airpower were used to deter the Soviet Union and to achieve decisive victory if deterrence failed. At
the same time, American involvement in limited proxy wars in Korea and Vietnam forced the
USAF to adapt to other forms of warfare. Finding the proper balance between tactical, operational,
and strategic levels of war became a central concern for American airpower, especially as tactical
and operational success in Korea and Vietnam did not translate into clearly achieved strategic
objectives. In particular, the military’s ability to achieve decisive victory seemed highly suspect
after Vietnam.
What followed was nothing less than an attempted transformation of American military power and
airpower. Remaining focused on possible war with the Soviet Union and other conventional threats,
the American military pursued new ways of training, new doctrine, and innovative technology to
stay ahead in the fight. Drawing upon lessons learned from previous and contemporary conflicts –
including Vietnam and the Arab-Israeli Wars – the US military searched for a new paradigm to
achieve decisive victory should the next great war occur. In addition to improved conventional
military means, the continued expansion of American deterrence capabilities in air and space left
the Soviet Union strategically disadvantaged. When the Cold War ended, the American military
strategy seemed to have been validated. Not long after, a coalition countered Saddam Hussein’s
aggression in Operation Desert Storm (ODS). Coming at the end of the Cold War, Desert Storm
seemed to display U.S. airpower’s potential to achieve decisive victory in any regional conflict.
Unlike the preceding century, the absence of foreseeable great power conflict characterized the
1990s. The USAF subsequently reformed itself in light of a new geopolitical and military theory
that suggested great power conflict was unlikely. Instead, it had to be prepared to intervene when
necessary in smaller regional conflicts and civil wars. In 1999, the Kosovo conflict provided an
opportunity to test this new paradigm. Though debate persists regarding the exact impact of
airpower in the success of Operation Allied Force (OAF), most observers recognize that airpower
greatly contributed to the outcome, with some even claiming that OAF demonstrated airpower’s
5
ability to win wars by itself.
The events of 9/11 shook but did not destroy the confidence and certainty with which Americans
entered the twenty-first century. As the United States embarked upon Operation Enduring Freedom
with the nearly unquestioned belief that airpower and other forms of military power would produce
decisive results. Again in 2003, Operation Iraqi Freedom’s (OIF) “shock and awe” campaign saw
airpower topple the regime of Saddam Hussein, seemingly producing even greater decisiveness
than ODS. Yet in both Afghanistan and Iraq, violent insurgencies soon undermined American
confidence in military power’s ability to bring about ongoing positive strategic outcomes.
Today, as we face increased uncertainty regarding the future, many leaders have significant
questions about the proper role of airpower. As land and sea power remain vital to American
national security, and as space and cyber power continue to develop and evolve amid an on-going
Information Revolution, the joint force faces the challenge of achieving strategic effect with
airpower through multiple domains. While terrorists and insurgents remain significant threats to
American national security, we have returned to great power rivalry and conflict that is and will
continue to profoundly shape American national security strategy. After careful study and
discussion of the historical and contemporary development of airpower, officers will be better
prepared to help develop the best course of action to ensure that airpower remains capable of
achieving national security outcomes.
ACSC PROGRAM LEARNING OUTCOMES (JPME I)

Airpower I develops Program Learning Outcomes addressing Intermediate-Level College Joint
Learning Areas and Objectives for Joint Professional Military Education (JPME), established by the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff via the Officer Professional Military Education Policy
(OPMEP), CJCSI 1800.01F, signed 15 May 2020. The ACSC Curriculum for AY 22 supports the
following ACSC Program Learning Outcomes, by producing graduates who can:
1 – Analyze the effects of great power competition and adapt and innovate to rapid changes in
twenty-first century warfare.
The following lessons meet this outcome: API 500, 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509,
510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 525,526, 527, 528, 500E,
501E, 502E.
2 – Understand the capabilities and limitations of military force and how they are best
integrated with the instruments of national power, allies, and partners.
510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 525,526, 527, 528, 529, 500E,
501E, 502E.
3 – Apply military theory, strategy, doctrine, and joint warfighting principles, in order to
plan, execute and adapt campaigns and globally integrated operations.
511, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 500E, 501E,
502E.
6
4 – Comprehend the concepts of surprise, complexity and uncertainty as they pertain to
leadership and the profession of arms.
512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 525, 526, 527, 528, 500E, 501E, 502E.
5 – Make ethical decisions based on the shared values of the profession of arms.
515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 526, 527, 528, 529, 500E, 501E, 502E.
AY 2021-2022 SPECIAL AREAS OF EMPHASIS FOR JPME-1

Airpower I supports the following AY 2021-2022 Special Areas of Emphasis (SAE) for Joint
Professional Military Education (JPME), listed below with points of explanation:
SAE 1 – Return to Great Power Competition

The following lessons meet this outcome: API 501, 503, 508, 509, 514, 515, 516, 517, 525,526,
527, 528, 529 meet this objective.
SAE 2 – Global Integrated Operations in the Information Environment

The following lessons meet this objective: API 523, 527, 528, 529.
SAE 3 – Strategic Deterrence in the Twenty-first Century

The following lessons meet this objective: API 503, 504, 506, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 525,
527, 529.
SAE 4 – Modern Electromagnetic Spectrum Battlefield

The following lessons meet this objective: API 528.
SAE 5 – Space as a Warfighting Domain

The following lessons meet this objective: API 527, 529.
SAE 6 – Ability to Write Clear, Concise Military Advice Recommendations

Lessons API 500E, 501E, and 502E meet this objective.
COURSE REQUIREMENTS
1. READINGS. Students will complete all assigned readings for the day prior to lecture
and seminar. Students should review the lesson objectives and overviews provided in the
syllabus before reading the assigned texts.
2. LECTURES. Students will attend all faculty lectures related to assigned readings and
seminars in Wood Auditorium at the designated time. These presentations complement the
readings and seminar discussion to enhance knowledge of the course concepts. Lectures
provide additional historical background and different perspectives to stimulate and
enhance learning in seminar.
3. SEMINAR PARTICIPATION. Student participation in seminar discussions is vital to

individual learning and success. Each member of seminar is expected to contribute to the
discussion whether we meet in the classroom or the virtual environment.
7
4. WRITTEN ASSIGNMENTS. One ungraded, and two graded written assignments fulfill
the requirements of the Airpower I course: a one-page response paper, a one four-page
take-home midterm paper, and one five-to-six-page take-home final paper.
5. METHODS OF EVALUATION.
AP 500E A single-page, ungraded response paper
AP 501E Midterm (45 percent)
AP 502E Final Paper (55 percent)
COURSE ADMINISTRATION
There are two types of readings in this course: 1) readings from books issued by ACSC, which can
be seen listed below with full bibliographic information; and 2) selected electronic files posted on
Canvas indicated as “[EL]” (electronic).
ACSC provides students with copies of the following course books, listed below in the order that
they appear in the course. These copies must be returned at the course’s conclusion:
Pape, Robert A. Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press, 1996.
Olsen, John Andreas, ed. Airpower Reborn: The Strategic Concepts of John Warden and John
Boyd. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2015.
Biddle, Tami Davis. Rhetoric and Reality in Air Warfare: The Evolution of British and American
Ideas about Strategic Bombing, 1914-1945. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004.
Overy, Richard. The Battle of Britain: The Myth and Reality. New York: Norton, 2002.
O’Brien, Phillips. How the War Was Won. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015.
Griffith, Thomas E. MacArthur’s Airman: General George C. Kenney and the War in the Southwest
Pacific. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1998.
Crane, Conrad. American Airpower Strategy in World War II: Bombs, Cities, Civilians, and Oil.
Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2016.
Nutter, Ralph. With the Possum and the Eagle: The Memoir of a Navigator's War Over Germany
and Japan. Denton, TX: University of North Texas Press, 2005.
Kaplan, Ed. To Kill Nations: American Strategy in the Air-Atomic Age and the Rise of Mutually
Assured Destruction. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2015.
Crane, Conrad. American Airpower Strategy in Korea, 1950-1953. Lawrence, KS: University Press
of Kansas, 2000.
Corum, James S., and Wray R. Johnson. Airpower in Small Wars: Fighting Insurgents and
Terrorists. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2003.
8
Mrozek, Donald J. Air Power and the Ground War in Vietnam. Maxwell, AL: Air University Press,
1988.
Michel, Marshall. The Eleven Days of Christmas: America's Last Vietnam Battle. New York:
Encounter Books, 2001.
Salmi, Derek. Behind the Light Switch: Toward a Theory of Air Mobility. Maxwell, AL: Air
University Press, 2020.
Olsen, John Andreas, ed. A History of Air Warfare. Lincoln, NE: Potomac Books, 2010.
Please refer any questions to:

• Dr. Heather P. Venable (Course Director, heather.venable@au.af.edu, Office 194)
• Dr. Mary Elizabeth Walters, (Deputy Course Director, mary.walters.1@au.af.edu,
Office 185)
• Lt Col R.A. Orozco (Deputy Course Director, rodolfo.orozco@au.af.edu, Office 187)
9
AIRPOWER I COURSE SCHEDULE
DAY 1: INTRODUCTION
DATE: 18 October 2021
LESSON OBJECTIVES
Context: Comprehend the course objectives, course narrative, course syllabus, methods of
evaluation, and expectations for seminar.
Experience: Comprehend and discuss the United States Air Force’s core missions.
Assessment/Integration: Compare and contrast the strengths and weaknesses of Robert A. Pape’s
and John A. Warden III’s theories of airpower in employing airpower in a joint context to meet
national strategic objectives.
LESSON OVERVIEW
AP 500 (L): Course Overview (Venable) and “Smart Strategy” (Dolman)
Overview: “Airpower” refers to the air, space, and cyber assets available to military leaders
for use in conflicts. This course examines how airpower can contribute effectively to a
nation’s security, as well as how it has been employed in past conflicts and how it might
influence future wars. The course overview introduces students to the key concepts and
framework of the course. Subsequently, Dr. Everett Dolman discusses foundational strategic
concepts that can be applied to airpower.
CONTACT HOURS: 1.0-hour lecture
AP 501 (S): Introduction to Airpower I and Modern Airpower Theory

Overview: In this seminar, instructors introduce themselves to their seminars, discuss
classroom policies, and set the stage for subsequent seminar discussions. Students should also
be prepared to discuss the lecture and the assigned readings, to include the Air Force’s core
missions to begin examining intersections and divergences between the history of airpower
and its future trajectory. Students will also critically examine Robert A. Pape and John A.
Warden III’s theories to identify strengths and weaknesses in applying airpower to meet
national strategic objectives.
CONTACT HOURS: 2.0-hour seminar
*AP 500E-502E PROMPTS WILL BE POSTED ON CANVAS TODAY*

REQUIRED READINGS (122)
1. Air Force Future Operating Concept: A View of the Air Force in 2035, 11-13. [EL]
This document explains how the Air Force Core Missions have developed from the Air
Force’s founding in 1947 to today, and how they will evolve into the future. Students will be
able to identify these core missions and, in subsequent course lessons, will study how they
have evolved.
2. Robert A. Pape, Bombing to Win, 1-86.
3. John A. Warden III, “Smart Strategy, Smart Airpower,” in John Andreas Olsen, Airpower
Reborn, 93-127.
10
DAY 2: INTEGRATING A NEW DOMAIN INTO WARFARE
LESSON OBJECTIVES
Context: Comprehend how nineteenth century notions of decisive battle in great power war shaped
ideas of airpower effectiveness before, during, and after the First World War.
Experience: Comprehend how the application of airpower in the First World War helped refine
pre-war assumptions about airpower’s utility as an instrument of British and US national security
policies.
Assessment/Integration: Comprehend the role of cognitive dissonance in shaping and

institutionalizing enduring ideas about the optimal effectiveness of cutting-edge military
capabilities in future conflict, in particular the idea of strategic attack.
LESSON OVERVIEW
AP 502 (L): Airpower in the First World War (Lukasik)
Overview: When the First World War erupted in Europe in 1914, heavier-than-air flight was
barely a decade old, and it had been used in very few military operations. However, it quickly
became an indispensable aspect of military operations, particularly on the Western Front. By
the end of the war, airpower was used in virtually every role that it fulfills in modern
applications, albeit in a much more primitive fashion. This lecture provides a broad overview
of the first significant attempts to use military airpower and demonstrates how important
airpower was in the development and employment of strategy during the war.
AP 503 (S): The Emergence of Strategic Attack

Overview: The First World War witnessed the birth of the ideas that would shape airpower
theory and doctrine for decades to come. Many of these ideas were grounded in fantasy and
imagination as much as in concrete reality and practical experience. Nevertheless, the
relatively limited use of airpower in the strategic attack role shaped the contours of far-
reaching discussions among American and British Airmen about the future potential of air
warfare to generate strategically meaningful outcomes in wars between industrialized nation-
states. This seminar examines airpower in the First World War, with special focus of debates
about the viability of strategic attack.
*AP 500E UNGRADED RESPONSE PAPER DUE AT 2359 TODAY ON CANVAS*

1. Tami Davis Biddle, Rhetoric and Reality in Air Warfare, 1-68.
2. JP 3-0: Joint Operations, III-35 – III-36 (Strategic Attack/Global Strike) [EL]
Students should consider the ways in which current joint doctrine on strategic attack has
been informed by past discussions and debates about airpower’s effectiveness as a
strategic instrument.
11
DAY 3: INTERWAR AIRPOWER
LESSON OBJECTIVES
Context: Comprehend how the legacies of the First World War did and did not influence the
subsequent development of airpower in Europe and North America.
Experience: Comprehend how factors like geography, economics, politics, and institutional culture
help to explain differences and similarities in the development of airpower in Germany, France,
Britain, and the United States between the world wars.
Assessment/Integration: Given contextual factors and developments in airpower, assess how well
each nation prepared for future warfare during this period.
LESSON OVERVIEW
AP 504 (L): Interwar Airpower Theory and Application in France and Germany (Muller)
Overview: This lecture examines the variety of responses by major powers to learning
lessons from World War I. By comparing the types of aerial services created by France and
Germany, Dr. Muller of SAASS demonstrates the “paths not taken” by the British and
American airpower organizations to show there was no common conception of aviation in the
interwar period.
AP 505 (S): The Emergence of Airpower Theory and Doctrine in Britain and the United
States
Overview: While France and Germany largely concentrated their airpower on supporting
ground force maneuver on the eve of the Second World War, most airpower leaders in Britain
and the United States embraced the idea of strategic attack as airpower’s primary mission.
This seminar explores the factors that shaped airpower’s development in Britain and the
United States during the interwar period. Students will compare and contrast the way that
British and American airmen understood airpower and the idea of strategic attack. The
seminar will continue discussion of Tami Davis Biddle’s work on cognitive dissonance in
military organizations by examining the way that British and American airmen strove to
enhance capabilities of the newly emerging air domain. This work provides meaningful
lessons for military officers looking to leverage new concepts and capabilities today.

1. Tami Davis Biddle, Rhetoric and Reality in Air Warfare, 69-175.
2. Rebeca Grant, “The Billy Mitchell Syndrome,” Air Force Magazine, December 2006. [EL]
12
DAY 4: AIRPOWER IN THE EARLY STAGES OF WORLD WAR II
LESSON OBJECTIVES
Context: Comprehend the origins and early conduct of the Second World War in Europe.
Experience: Comprehend the operational dynamics of the air campaign over Britain in the summer
and fall of 1940.
Assessment/Integration: Comprehend the importance of the Battle of Britain in shaping past and
present understandings of airpower effectiveness.
LESSON OVERVIEW
AP 506 (L): Overview of the Second World War in Europe (T. Beckenbaugh)
Overview: This lecture provides a brief overview of the Second World War in Europe. It
explains the origins of the war, the geopolitical and ideological stakes involved, the major
strategies and operational approaches, the role of industry, and the experience of total war.
While much of the course’s readings focus on the British and American war efforts, the
lecture highlights the German and Soviet war experiences to provide context and an
alternative perspective.
AP 507 (S): The Battle of Britain

Overview: The Battle of Britain remains the only significant example of a successful
defensive air campaign in history. Consequently, it merits careful study by military
professionals. The battle’s conduct and outcome provide compelling insights into the
dynamics of such universal factors in air warfare as the interplay of strategy and technology,
the function of leadership and reliable intelligence in shaping the contours of an aerial
campaign, and the elusive nature of air superiority. As one of the first major, sustained aerial
encounters of the Second World War, the Battle of Britain exercised an important influence
on the mindsets of the American and British Airmen who, later in the war, sought to erode
Germany’s capacity and will to fight by means of a major strategic bombing campaign.

1. Richard Overy, The Battle of Britain, all.
2. JP 3-01: Countering Air and Missile Threats, I-3 – I-8. [EL]
3. JP 3-0: Joint Operations, III-33 (Control of the Air/Integrating Air and Missile Defense). [EL]
Students should consider the implications of the Battle of Britain for current doctrinal
concepts pertaining to Control of the Air and Integrated Air and Missile Defenses. How
much does the Battle of Britain tell us about the importance of Air Superiority or
Adaptive Domain Control?
13
DAY 5: AIRPOWER IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER
DATE: 1 November 2021
LESSON OBJECTIVES
Context: Comprehend the origins of the theory and practice of “tactical” airpower in the Second
World War.
Experience: Comprehend the conduct of the Combined Bomber Offensive (CBO) and evaluate its
effectiveness in facilitating Allied strategy.
Assessment/Integration: Compare and contrast how “tactical” and “strategic” airpower

contributed to meeting coalition objectives in Europe in the Second World War.
LESSON OVERVIEW
AP 508 (L): The American Approach to “Tactical” Airpower: Theory and Practice in the
Second World War (Venable)
Overview: This lecture examines how well American airmen pursued tactical airpower during
the interwar airpower to further assess how deeply cognitive dissonance affected them.
Although American airmen had stressed strategic bombardment in the interwar period, they
also quickly found themselves employing airpower more broadly during World War II.
Critical uses of tactical airpower included close air support as well as air interdiction. This
lecture particularly stresses the challenge of determining how to allocate airpower without the
luxury of an overwhelming numerical superiority.
AP 509 (S): The Combined Bomber Offensive

Overview: The strategic air offensive against Germany was the most complex air offensive
ever undertaken. The US Army Air Forces (USAAF) had to adapt in real-time along a steep
learning curve when operations did not mirror planning. After obtaining some semblance of
air superiority, American, British, and Commonwealth Airmen mounted an all-out air
offensive against German civilian, military, industrial, petroleum, synthetic fuels, and
transportation targets to destroy Germany’s ability to continue to fight the Allies. Students
will consider how much this strategic air offensive helped to meet coalition objectives while
evaluating its effectiveness in light of previously-examined theories.

1. Phillips O’Brien, How the War Was Won, 1-16, 266-339, and 349-373.
2. JP 3-0: Joint Operations, III-33 – III-35 (Interdiction). [EL]
3. JP 3-03: Joint Interdiction, II-9 (Strategic Attack Operations). [EL]
14
DAY 6: AIRPOWER IN THE PACIFIC THEATER (DAY 1 OF 2)
LESSON OBJECTIVES
Context: Comprehend how the Pacific theater’s strategic environment demanded greater flexibility
from American airpower including naval aviation.
Experience: Comprehend the conditions that both facilitated and constrained Gen George
Kenney’s ability to effectively function as Gen Douglas MacArthur’s air component commander.
Assessment/Integration: Comprehend the roles and responsibilities of the theater air commander
in relation to the theater commander’s strategic priorities.
LESSON OVERVIEW
AP 510 (L): Naval Aviation in the Pacific (Springer)
Overview: This lecture provides an overview of naval airpower operations in the Pacific
theater during the Second World War. It begins by examining the Pearl Harbor attack and
follows the US Navy’s counteroffensive through the Central Pacific, culminating with cross-
domain operations against the Marianas Islands, a series of attacks designed primarily to
create airbases for strategic attacks against the Japanese homeland.
AP 511 (S): George Kenney: Airpower Leadership in Joint and Combined Operations
Overview: The air campaign in the Southwest Pacific during the Second World War is not as
well-known as other, more high-profile air campaigns of that conflict. Nonetheless, it proved
a crucial element in the larger strategic context to enable American forces to defeat Japan. It
also provided the backdrop for the emergence of Gen George Kenney as an airpower leader
whose success in confronting a set of leadership and operational challenges marked him as
one of history’s most effective and innovative American air commanders. Kenney’s ability to
direct an effective air campaign in a complex environment with minimal resources makes his
leadership worthy of careful study by contemporary military professionals.

1. Thomas E. Griffith, MacArthur’s Airman, 42-153.
2. JP 3-30: Command and Control of Joint Air Operations, I-1 – I-4 (Command and Control of
Joint Air Operations). [EL]
Gen George Kenney essentially filled the role of the first JFACC under Gen Douglas
MacArthur in the South West Pacific Theater. Consider possible links between his
experience and current doctrine on Command and Control of Joint Air Operations.
15
DAY 7: AIRPOWER IN THE PACIFIC THEATER (DAY 2 OF 2)
LESSON OBJECTIVES
Context: Comprehend the factors that shaped American airpower strategy against Japan.
Experience: Comprehend how competing visions of airpower’s effectiveness as a tool of national

strategy in the air campaign against Japan shaped the planning and conduct of the campaign.
Assessment/Integration: Consider the validity of the claim that the air campaign against Japan
fulfilled the prophecies of the classical airpower theorists.
LESSON OVERVIEW
AP 512 (L): Victory Through Airpower (film)
Overview: This Walt Disney production made with the support of Alexander de Seversky
provides a unique insight into American ideas of airpower during the Second World War. In
seminar, students will discuss how the film depicts the strategic attack operations against
Japan in 1945, especially the interwoven themes of airpower, technology, science, and the
bombing of population centers.
CONTACT HOURS: 1.0-hour film
AP 513 (S): Strategic Airpower against Japan

Overview: The strategic bombing of Germany, though important, failed to deliver on the
ultimate promise of “victory without ground invasion.” With the war in Asia driving towards
an amphibious landing of terrible promise, the newly operational B-29 seemed to fulfill
Douhet’s vision of strategically effective airpower, replacing the bloodshed of ground combat.
This seminar examines the USAAF’s air campaign against Japan and the emergence to
prominence of Curtis E. LeMay, one of the most successful operational commanders in the
history of American airpower.
*AP 501E MIDTERM DUE TODAY AT 2359 ON CANVAS*

1. Conrad Crane, American Airpower Strategy in World War II, 64-100, 161-186.
2. Ralph Nutter, With the Possum and the Eagle, ix-xii, 220-85.
3. JP 3-0: Joint Operations, III-36 (Limiting Collateral Damage). [EL]
Does the firebombing and atomic bombing of Japan accord with current joint doctrine on
Limiting Collateral Damage? Does this application of airpower meet the principle of
proportionality as established in current joint doctrine?
16
DAY 8: STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND & THE BIRTH OF ATOMIC AIR STRATEGY
LESSON OBJECTIVES
Context: Comprehend the influence of the grand strategy of containment and the emergence of
limited geopolitical crises such as the Berlin Airlift and the Korean War on the employment of
airpower.
Experience: Comprehend how the proliferation of increasingly powerful nuclear weapons

influenced the USAF’s perception of its role in America’s national security posture as well as its
vision of strategic air war.
Assessment/Integration: Comprehend the extent to which the advent of nuclear weapons has
altered airpower’s effectiveness as an instrument of American national security.
LESSON OVERVIEW
AP 514 (L): Strategies of Containment (Redman)
Overview: This lecture overviews US nuclear policy from 1945 through 1962. John Lewis
Gaddis identified five strategies of containment that informed U.S. policy during the Cold
War. This lecture examines the first four: the original concept as presented by George Kennan
in the “long telegram” and expressed by President Harry Truman (1947-1949); President
Eisenhower, Secretary Dulles, NSC-68, and the imperative of the Korean War (1950-1953);
President Eisenhower, Secretary Dulles, and the “New Look” (1953-1961); and the early
Kennedy presidency and the beginnings of “Flexible Response.” The lecture examines how
national security strategy and national military strategy adapted to the strategic change
brought about by nuclear weapons and the rise of the Soviet Union in the two decades after
the end of the Second World War.
AP 515 (S): The USAF at the Dawn of the Nuclear Age

Overview: The approach to strategic bombing dramatically changed in the early Cold War.
During the Second World War, massive fleets of bombers delivered large quantities of
conventional weapons against single targets. In many ways, this approach held true following
the detonation of the atomic weapons. Yet, other factors changed due to technology,
especially how the compression of time affected airpower employment. Ed Kaplan’s To Kill
Nations highlights the importance of comprehending the links between strategic guidance and
operational planning within the context of sound civil-military relations. Students will
consider the challenges of integrating new capabilities into preexisting organizations and
doctrinal frameworks in the context of great power competition. Students should also be
prepared to discuss the extent to which foundational notions of deterrence established in the
1950s are reflected in current joint doctrine.

1. Ed Kaplan, To Kill Nations, vii-50 and 68-131.
2. JP 3-0: Joint Operations, VI-3 – VI-4 (Deterrence). [EL]
17
DAY 9: KOREAN WAR
LESSON OBJECTIVES
Context: Comprehend the influence of the grand strategy of containment and the emergence of
limited geopolitical crises and wars on the employment of airpower in the Korean War.
Experience: Comprehend the technological, organizational, and command and control challenges
that the newly established USAF confronted in the Korean War and evaluate its success in
overcoming them.
Assessment/Integration: Comprehend the extent to which airpower functioned as an effective

instrument of national policy in the Korean War.
LESSON OVERVIEW
AP 516 (L): Overview of the Korean War (L. Beckenbaugh)
Overview: This lecture covers the causes, major combat operations, and the outcomes of the
Korean War. Highlights include the political, diplomatic, and military activities of the period.
Students will leave better understand how the Korean War fit into the Cold War as a global
historical event and better appreciate the war’s ground combat.
AP 517 (S): American Airpower Strategy in Korea

Overview: In Korea, a USAF increasingly focused on developing its nuclear capability faced
a conventional conflict where strategic airpower struggled to achieve wartime goals. The
disconnect between strategic airpower capability and limitations imposed by national policy
challenged airpower leaders to develop an effective strategy to win a limited war.
Additionally, as American Airpower Strategy in Korea provides little context on the Chinese
air force, 70 Years of the PLA Air Force will provide supplementary information.

1. Conrad Crane, American Airpower Strategy in Korea, 1-9, 40-92, 110-131, 155-184.
2. Kenneth Allen and Cristina Garafola, 70 Years of the PLA Air Force, 67-79. [EL]
18
DAY 10: TRANSFORMATIVE TECHNOLOGY, CULTURE,
AND STRATEGY IN THE COLD WAR
LESSON OBJECTIVES
Context: Arguably, thermonuclear weapons proved even more revolutionary than the first atomic
weapons used against Japan in 1945. They not only transformed US military strategy but also US
culture. Comprehend the extent to which culture, technology, and strategy interact and shape the
alternatives that military leaders present to civilian leadership, sometimes unknowingly.
Experience: Comprehend the key elements of the sophisticated acquisitions approach the Air Force
pursued in developing the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM).
Assessment/Integration: Consider the extent to which new technology affected airpower’s ability
to contribute to national security objectives. How did this technology change the military’s thinking
about airpower employment in contrast to civilian thinking under the Truman, Eisenhower, and
Kennedy administrations? How did these ideas similarly affect the trajectory of air-atomic strategy?
Finally, consider Kaplan’s concluding points regarding current thinking about the employment of
nuclear weapons.
LESSON OVERVIEW
AP 518 (L): MAD was Mad (Walters)
Overview: In 1941, Harrold Lasswell warned of the rise of a “world of ‘garrison states’— a
world in which the specialists on violence are the most powerful group in society” and where
a society directed most of its industrial output towards warfighting. The Eisenhower
administration particularly took this warning to heart and saw nuclear weapons as a means of
reducing military expenditure while maintaining American security. Yet as nuclear weapons
got bigger and both the United States and Soviet Union increased their arsenals, the logic
underpinning both air-atomic strategy and its rival Mutually Assured Destruction became
more and more strained. This lecture explores the paradox of the limits of power: the ability to
annihilate an opponent, yet the inability to credibly use that power.
AP 519 (S): ICBMs and Mutually Assured Destruction

Overview: Enabling complex organizations with disparate cultures to focus on and achieve a
single objective is an essential element of military leadership. The US race to field an
operational ICBM before the Soviet Union exemplifies how leaders are challenged in complex
organizations. This seminar examines how the Air Force rapidly integrated the technologically
complex domains of air and space power in new ways. The development of the ICBM
represents an important advance in systems thinking and continues to shape modern space and
acquisition processes. Please note that this is the second day to discuss Ed Kaplan’s To Kill
Nations, which has been broken up to better discuss Air Force history chronologically.

1. Ed Kaplan, To Kill Nations, 162-223.
2. Thomas P. Hughes, Rescuing Prometheus, “Managing a Military-Industrial Complex:
Atlas,”69-140. [EL]
19
DAY 11: WAR IN SOUTH VIETNAM (DAY 1 OF 2)
DATE: 2 December 2021
LESSON OBJECTIVES
Context: Comprehend how the confluence of dominant airpower theory, USAF organizational
culture, and the character of the First Indochina War shaped the patterns of air warfare in Southeast
Asia.
Assessment/Integration: Comprehend the effectiveness of airpower in producing meaningful

strategic outcomes in irregular conflicts.
LESSON OVERVIEW
AP 520 (L): The First Indochina War: Prelude to America’s Vietnam War (Hayworth)
Overview: As James Corum and Wray Johnson argue, to succeed in counterinsurgency
airpower must be employed within a comprehensive political and military strategy. Although
counterinsurgents have relied heavily on airpower to combat insurgencies, the results have
been decidedly mixed. In many cases, insurgents have found ways to overcome
technologically superior counterinsurgents, either by prolonging the war, raising costs, or
imposing outright defeat. This lecture will consider two examples of counterinsurgent failure
and one example of success. In the First Indochina War, the French faced a determined
adversary in Ho Chi Minh’s Viet Minh. Despite the eventual backing of the United States,
France ultimately failed to end the communist and nationalist insurgency and lost its colony in
dramatic fashion at Dien Bien Phu. France built upon tactical and operational successes in the
Indochina War as it turned its attention against the revolutionary civil war in Algeria. In this
case, the French proved highly skillful and innovative in employing airpower against the
Algerian National Liberation Front army. Yet resistance continued until French President
Charles De Gaulle controversially decided that further effort to retain Algeria was not in
France’s national interests. Although the British failed to defeat many insurgencies across
their empire in the twentieth century, their political and military strategy in the Malayan
Emergency constitutes one of the landmark examples of successful counterinsurgency.
AP 521 (S): From Small Wars to Big Wars: Smart Strategy in Vietnam?
Overview: Even as the United States became increasingly involved in South Vietnam
following the French withdrawal, the Air Force remained focused on general nuclear war. Yet
in irregular war, tasks such as close air support, mobility, and allied advising are key. This
seminar will broadly discuss the utility of airpower in irregular wars by focusing on the early
years of the American war in Vietnam. The texts by James Corum and Wray Johnson and
James Sbrega present some contrast on the utility of airpower in small wars that students
should be prepared to discuss and evaluate in seminar

1. James Corum and Wray Johnson, Airpower in Small Wars, 1-10, 225-274.
2. James Sbrega, “Southeast Asia,” Case Studies in Close Air Support, 411-490. [EL]
3. JP 3-24: Counterinsurgency, ix – xi (Overview of Insurgency/Counterinsurgency). [EL]
4. JP 3-09.3: Close Air Support, xi – xiv (Overview of Close Air Support Fundamentals). [EL]
20
DAY 12: DIGGING DEEPER: WAR IN SOUTH VIETNAM (DAY 2 OF 2)
LESSON OBJECTIVES
Context: Comprehend the importance of technological adaptation and the difficulty of
incorporating new technologies into existing organizations, cultures, and processes.
Experience: Comprehend the factors that accounted for the failure of American ground and air
forces’ inability to produce favorable strategic outcomes despite their overwhelming technological
advantages and numerous tactical and operational successes in South Vietnam.
Assessment/Integration: Comprehend enduring debates concerning airpower’s utility as a military

instrument in limited war and unconventional conflicts.
LESSON OVERVIEW
AP 522 (L): America’s War in South Vietnam (Weaver)
Overview: This lecture examines American involvement in Vietnam with a particular focus
on the challenges of land forces conducting operations against the Viet Cong and North
Vietnamese conventional forces from 1964 through 1972.
AP 523 (S): Smart Technology, Smart Ideas in South Vietnam?

Overview: In this seminar, students will apply the lessons learned from Mark Clodfelter’s and
Donald Mrozek’s texts as they dig deeper in seeking to understand the complex American
experience in South Vietnam the Air Force struggled to adjust to the ground war in South
Vietnam, a role it had neither equipped nor prepared for adequately. The Air Force turned to
new – and repurposed old – technologies to adapt to its new missions. As such, this seminar
challenges students to think broadly about technological advancement in the context of
strategy. In Vietnam, the Air Force adapted and provided increasingly effective support to the
ground forces, but the overall strategy could not address the underlying causes of the
insurgency, nor prevent the insurgents from building an effective organization.

1. Jeremy Black, “Introduction,” War and Technology, 1-54. [EL]
2. Mark Clodfelter, “The Limits of Airpower or the Limits of Strategy: The Air Wars in Vietnam
and Their Legacies,” Joint Forces Quarterly 78, (3rd Quarter, July 2015): 111-124. [EL]
3. Donald J. Mrozek, Air Power and the Ground War in Vietnam, 99-186.
4. JP 3-0: Joint Operations, III-27-III-30 (Intelligence). [EL]
21
DAY 13: AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM
LESSON OBJECTIVES
Context: Comprehend the factors that accounted for changing approaches to strategic bombing
between the Johnson and Nixon Administrations during the American War in Vietnam. Understand
the capabilities and limitations of bombing in a war that spanned both conventional ground combat
and insurgency.
Experience: Comprehend the relative effectiveness of Operations Rolling Thunder, Linebacker I,

and Linebacker II in America’s Vietnam War in relationship to changing US strategic objectives.
Assessment/Integration: Comprehend the Vietnam War’s implications for airpower theory and
practice and the USAF’s organizational culture.
LESSON OVERVIEW
AP 524 (L): Air Campaigns over North Vietnam (Batura)
Overview: This lecture highlights the three main air campaigns against North Vietnam,
including their ever-shifting political objectives and their relationship to airpower
effectiveness. In particular, the lecture explores the operational challenges of Operation
Rolling Thunder and the state of civil-military relations during the Johnson Administration as
opposed to the far more limited political objectives of the Nixon Administration. The lecture
will also consider deconstructing the extent to which civilian leadership required the military
to fight with one proverbial hand tied behind its back.
AP 525 (S): Smart Strategy?: Kinetic Air War in Vietnam

Overview: Many commenters view Operation Rolling Thunder as a landmark case study in
the history of airpower because it presents the useful perspective of “what not to do.” By
contrast, some view the Easter Offensive as a more traditional air-ground campaign in which
North Vietnam massed mechanized forces, providing plentiful targeting opportunities for the
United States. Finally, some hold up Linebacker II as the decisive air activity of the war. This
seminar requires students to analyze the use of bombing in Vietnam and the narratives about
airpower that have become part of the war’s legacy in comparing and contrasting the three
operations.

1. “Rolling Thunder Program Begins,” Pentagon Papers, US National Archives, i-viii; available
online at https://nara-media-001.s3.amazonaws.com/arcmedia/research/pentagon-
papers/Pentagon-Papers-Part-IV-C-3.pdf [EL]
2. Phil Haun and Colin Jackson, “Breaker of Armies: Air Power in the Easter Offensive and the
Myth of Linebacker I and II in the Vietnam War.” International Security 40, no. 3 (2016):
139-178. [EL]
3. Marshall Michel, The Eleven Days of Christmas, 11-20, 86-122, 139-163, 193-203, 217-238.
22
DAY 14: AIR MOBILITY
LESSON OBJECTIVES
Context: Comprehend the importance of air mobility to America’s national military strategy
especially in enabling the flexible application of joint military power.
Experience: Comprehend air mobility’s contribution to varied airpower operations during the Cold
War, Vietnam, and the Middle East in 1973 ranging from more “tactical” to more “strategic” uses.
Assessment/Integration: Analyze the strategic effectiveness of mobility operations in warfare.

Comprehend the interrelations between freedom of movement, C2, logistics, technology, and
training that enable mission success across the spectrum of military operations and all levels of war.
LESSON OVERVIEW
AP 526 (L): From Over the Hump to Helicopters (Terino)
Overview: As emphasized during War Theory, maneuver is vital for tactical, operational, and
strategic success. With the advent of the steam engine and the internal combustion engine,
mobility transformed the conduct of war, among other things. In particular, a hallmark of the
modern American way of war has been the leveraging of both mobility and maneuver to
achieve battlefield success, and airpower’s contributions in this regard have been notable since
the Second World War. This lecture analyzes these contributions through multiple case
studies.
AP 527 (S): The Key to Airpower? Mobility and Integration of Capabilities Across the
Spectrum of Operations
Overview: The potential impact of airpower goes beyond immediate kinetic effects on the
battlefield. The ability to influence and shape a favorable environment hinges on the capacity
to support force requirements persistently. This seminar explores the application of mobility
concepts in warfare by examining the linkages between airpower employment, innovations in
tactics and technology, and national security objectives. Through a survey of historical air
mobility operations, students will consider a contemporary theory of air mobility and the
critical factors that enable its success. By looking at the important role of air mobility, and
associated lessons from previous operational experiences, practitioners will be better prepared
to maximize its effectiveness in pursuit of national strategy. How is air mobility an instrument
of national power? How is the air mobility system essential to future warfighting concepts? Is
air mobility really the key to airpower?

1. Derek Salmi, Behind the Light Switch: Toward a Theory of Air Mobility, xiii-25, 63-98, 109-
140, 175-180.
2. Donald J. Mrozek, Air Power and the Ground War in Vietnam, 73-97.
3. Charles Q. Brown et al., “Untethered Operations: Rapid Mobility and Forward Basing Are
Keys to Airpower’s Success in the Antiaccess/Area-Denial Environment,” Air and Space
Power Journal 27, no. 4 (May-June 2015): 17-28. [EL]
4. JP 3-17: Air Mobility Operations, vii-xvi (Executive Summary). [EL]
23
DAY 15: AIR SUPERIORITY
LESSON OBJECTIVES
Context: This seminar highlights the Israeli Air Force’s organizational and technological
adaptations and the testing of these changes in warfare. It also discusses more recent adaptations by
the Russians and Chinese, bringing the course full circle to use history to consider future directions.
Experience: The panel draws on the operational and academic experience of practitioners and
experts in air superiority.
Assessment/Integration: Students should consider possible continuities and disconnects in future

struggles for air superiority in an increasingly competitive international security environment.
LESSON OVERVIEW
AP 528 (L): Past, Present, and Future Paradigms of Air Superiority (Panel)
Overview: This course has stressed the importance of air superiority, as well as how concepts
surrounding it have changed and evolved in response to numerous varying factors. This panel
sets up the transition to Airpower II after the winter break, exploring what factors might be of
utmost importance in thinking about the near-, mid-, and long-term future of air superiority.
AP 529 (S): Returning to Traditional Peer Conflict: Soviet Airpower and Soviet Client States
Overview: After the Vietnam War, the US military returned its focus to preparation for more
traditional peer-on-peer conflict. The events of the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli Wars reinforced this
shift. The Israeli Air Force merits attention in this course as one of the world’s leading air forces.
Historically, airpower has been central to Israeli national security and military strategy. Facing an
existential threat after its creation in 1948, Israel saw a need for a military capable of achieving
decisive victories against numerically superior opponents. Perhaps no better illustration of this exists
than Israel’s achievement of air superiority in 1967. Numerous Arab states – many supported by the
Soviet Union – responded to Israel’s air capabilities with new air defense systems that seemed to blunt
Israel’s offensive striking power. The lessons learned from the Arab-Israeli Wars helped shape the US
Air Force’s approach to ensuring that it could achieve air superiority.
*AP 502E FINAL PAPER DUE AT 1600 ON 17 DECEMBER 2021 ON CANVAS*

1. Shmuel L. Gordon, “Air Superiority in Israel Arab Wars, 1967-1982" in History of Air
Warfare, ed. John Olsen, 127-155.
2. Justin Bronk, "Russian and Chinese Combat Air Trends," RUSI, Whitehall Reports, 30 Oct
2020,1-59. [EL]
3. Kenneth Allen and Cristina Garafola, 70 Years of the PLA Air Force, 79-86. [EL]
4. Alex Grynkewich, “The Future of Air Superiority, Part I: The Imperative,” War on the Rocks,
3 Jan 2017. [EL]
5. Alex Grynkewich, “The Future of Air Superiority, Part I: The 2030 Problem,” War on the
Rocks, 5 Jan 2017. [EL]
6. JP 3-01: Counter Air and Missile Threats, IV-12 – IV-16 (Suppression of Enemy Air
Defenses). [EL]
24
APPENDIX: COURSE FACULTY
Airpower I Course Director
Dr. Heather P. Venable is an Associate Professor of Military and Security Studies in the
Department of Airpower. She has taught Airpower I, Airpower II, and electives on close air support
and the historical experience of combat. She also has served as the Airpower Two course director.
As a visiting professor at the US Naval Academy, she taught naval and Marine Corps history. She
graduated with a B.A. in History from Texas A&M University and a M.A. in American History
from the University of Hawai’i. She received her PhD in military history from Duke University. She
also has attended the Space Operations Course as well as the Joint Firepower Course, where she
was a distinguished graduate. She has written How the Few Became the Proud: The Making of the
Marine Corps’ Mythos, 1874-1918 (Naval Institute Press, 2019). Previous published work includes
“‘There’s Nothing that a Marine Can’t Do’: Publicity and the Marine Corps, 1905-1917” in New
Interpretations in Naval History: Selected Papers from the Sixteenth Naval History Symposium and
“The China Marines and the Crucible of the 54 Warrior Mythos, 1900-1941” in Crucibles: Selected
Readings in U.S. Marine Corps History. She is also a non-resident fellow at Marine Corps
University’s Krulak Center. Her professional service includes service as a managing editor for
Strategy Bridger. She also has contributed many articles about airpower and the current Air Force to
other online publications including War on the Rocks and the Modern War Institute (feel free to
reach out if you want guidance beginning online publishing at heather.venable@au.af.edu!). Her
current research centers on intersections between theory and pre-war thinking and the application of
airpower in combat.
Airpower I Deputy Course Director
Dr. Mary Elizabeth Walters is an Assistant Professor of Military and Security Studies in the
Department of Airpower. Walters received both her MA and PhD in military history from the
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. She teaches Airpower I, Airpower II, War Theory, and
electives on strategy and Star Wars, the Balkans, and peacekeeping. Her book project, Hospitality is
the Law of the Mountains: The 1999 Kosovo War, argues that Albanians – motivated by the
Albanian concept of hospitality – took strangers into their homes and communities and changed the
course of the refugee crisis. Their actions bought time for the U.S. military to mobilize, rebuild
Albania’s shattered infrastructure, and bring in massive amounts of aid. Previous published work
includes “‘Tree Hugging Work’: The Shifting Attitudes and Practices of the U.S. Marine Corps
Toward Peace Operations in the 1990s” in Marine Corps History and “A Tantalizing Success: The
1999 Kosovo War” in The Strategy Bridge. Before joining ACSC, Walters was an assistant
professor in the History Department at Kansas State University where she taught graduate and
undergraduate courses on American military history, the history of strategy, and the Vietnam
War(s).
Airpower I Deputy Course Director
Lt Col R. A. Orozco is an Instructor in the Department of Airpower at the US Air Force’s Air
Command and Staff College (ACSC). He teaches the Airpower I, Airpower II, and Leader
Development courses. Prior to this assignment, he served as Political-Military Affairs Strategist and
Director of Operations, 571st Mobility Support Advisory Squadron at Travis AFB, CA. He is a
prior-enlisted KC-135 Boom Operator, an F-15E Weapon Systems Officer, an Air Ground
Operations School instructor, an Undergraduate Combat Systems Officer Training instructor, and a
25
senior Air Advisor. During his operational assignments, he deployed in support of Operation
Southern Watch, Operation Enduring Freedom, a theater security package detachment to the Korean
Peninsula, and numerous security cooperation engagements within USSOUTHCOM. Lt Col Orozco
received a Bachelor of Science degree from the US Air Force Academy. He also holds a Master of
Arts in Human Relations from the University of Oklahoma and a Master of Military Operational Art
and Science degree from ACSC.
Faculty
Major Timothy Jay (T.J.) Ablay is an Air University Fellow and Instructor in the Department of
Airpower at the US Air Force’s Air Command and Staff College (ACSC). He enlisted in the USAF
as an In-Flight Air Refueling Specialist where he flew on the KC-135R Stratotanker as an
Evaluator/Instructor Boom Operator from 2002-2008. As an Acquisitions Officer, he has held
several assignments at the branch, group, division, and headquarters levels. Prior to his current
position, Major Ablay was the Chief of Strategic Engagements, Office of the Assistant Secretary of
the Air Force for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, Headquarters Air Force, the Pentagon,
Washington DC. Major Ablay holds a Bachelor of Science in Professional Aeronautics from
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University, Master of Arts, Business Administration and Management
from American Military University, and a Master of Military Operational Art and Science from Air
University.
Lt Col Todd L. Arthur is an instructor of Airpower I and II in the Department of Airpower at the
Air Command and Staff College (ACSC). He is a 2004 graduate of the US Air Force Academy
where he also received his commission. He holds a Bachelor of Science in Management and a
minor in Military Doctrine, Operations and Strategy. Upon completing Undergraduate Pilot
Training at Laughlin AFB, Texas in 2005, Lt Col Arthur was assigned as a first assignment
instructor pilot in the 86th Flying Training Squadron. After Lt Col Arthur attended C-5 training he
was assigned to the 9th Airlift Squadron where he was selected to be an instructor at the C-5 Formal
Training Unit. In his following assignment, Lt Col Arthur was selected to be the Wing Executive
Officer while also serving as a T-6A instructor pilot at the 12th Flying Training Wing, Joint Base
San Antonio-Randolph, Texas. Lt Col Arthur’s subsequent assignment was an Air University
Fellowship where he was a Professional Military Education Squadron Officer School instructor and
Director of Operations of the 29th Student Squadron before completing ACSC in residence. Prior to
his current position, Lt Col Arthur was the Wing Director of Staff for the 47th Flying Training
Wing and a T-1A Instructor Pilot. Lt Col Arthur’s deployed experiences include support of
Operation Enduring Freedom, Operation Iraqi Freedom and operations off the Horn of Africa as an
analyst for the Air Mobility Division Commander in the Combined Air and Space Operations
Center (CAOC).
Dr. Amber B. Batura is an Assistant Professor of Leadership Studies in the Department of Leader
and Research Development at the Air Command and Staff (ACSC) College. Prior to joining ACSC
in March 2021, she was an Instructor at Texas Tech University in Lubbock, Texas. She also taught
online courses for Texas Tech Costa Rica and the University of Texas Permian Basin. Dr. Batura
graduated with her Bachelor of Arts in History from the University of Texas Permian Basin in
Odessa, Texas in 2009, a Master of Arts (2012), and a PhD (2018) in History from Texas Tech
University. Her specialization looks at the intersection between war and culture and war and
society, with a special focus on gender and the military. She has published articles in The New York
Times, the Journal of American-East Asian Relations, and has contributed to edited volumes on the
26
Vietnam War. She is currently working on a manuscript on the importance of Playboy magazine to
soldiers in the Vietnam War.
Dr. Lisa L. Beckenbaugh is the Chair of the Leader and Research Development Department at the
US Air Force’s Air Command and Staff College (ACSC). Dr. Beckenbaugh received her bachelor’s
and master’s degrees from St. Cloud State University and her PhD from the University of Arkansas.
Dr. Beckenbaugh has taught at a variety of undergraduate and graduate civilian institutions. Her
book, The Versailles Treaty: A Documentary and Reference Guide for ABC-CLIO, was published
in 2018. Dr. Beckenbaugh also serves as the faculty advisor for the Gathering of Eagles elective and
has edited five of their published books, most recently, Why We Stay: Stories of Unity and
Perseverance. Dr. Beckenbaugh’s current research is on the 1st MASH (Mobile Army Surgical
Hospital), later redesignated 8209th MASH, during the Korean War. Research Interest/Expertise:
Oral History, American POWs, World War II, Women in Combat, Battlefield Medicine, and
MASH Units in the Korean War.
Dr. Terry Beckenbaugh is an Associate Professor in the Department of Air Power at the US Air
Force’s Air Command and Staff College (ACSC). He came to ACSC from the US Army Command
and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, where he taught for nine years in the
Department of Military History. Dr. Beckenbaugh received his PhD in 19th Century US History
from the University of Arkansas, and his Masters and Bachelors in US History and History,
respectively, from Shippensburg University of Pennsylvania. Beckenbaugh has taught at a variety
of undergraduate and graduate civilian institutions. He is currently working on a book on the White
River Campaign in Arkansas in the spring-summer of 1862, and has numerous publications and
conference presentations.
Major Chris Cagle is an Air University Fellow and Instructor in the Department of Airpower at the
US Air Force’s Air Command and Staff College (ACSC). Major Cagle is a civil engineer officer
and has served in various assignments at the squadron, AF center, and combatant command levels.
He holds a Bachelor of Science in Civil Engineering from The Citadel, a Master of Science in Civil
Engineering from the University of Illinois at Urbana – Champaign, and a Master of Military
Operational Art and Science from the Air University. Major Cagle is a Joint Qualified Officer and a
licensed Professional Engineer in the state of Florida.
Lt Col John “Garick” Chamberlin, PhD, is an Assistant Professor of Military and Security
Studies in the Department of Airpower at the United States Air Force’s Air Command and Staff
College (ACSC). He holds a PhD in History from Purdue University, an MA in National Security
Affairs from Naval Postgraduate School, and a BS in Middle East Studies from Excelsior College
(USNY). Garick has split his Air Force career roughly equally between intelligence and education
assignments, having taught at the Defense Language Institute and the US Air Force Academy, and
commanded a Student Squadron at Squadron Officers School prior to his assignment to ACSC. In
the Intelligence field, he was attached to the RC-135 both as an enlisted aviator and as an
intelligence officer, and also served on the 3rd Air Force and US Air Forces in Europe staffs and as
the Chief of Wing Intelligence for the 22 ARW at McConnell AFB. Garick has over a dozen
deployments to the Middle East, as well as one to Kosovo. His research focuses on the diplomatic
and military history of the Early American Republic, primarily related to North African affairs.
Major Matthew A. Dearborn is an Air University Fellow and an instructor in the Department of
Airpower at the US Air Force’s Air Command and Staff College (ACSC). He graduated from the
ACSC In-Residence program in May 2021. Prior to ACSC, Maj Dearborn was the Chief of
27
Standardization and Evaluation, a C-17A Evaluator Aircraft Commander, and Prime Nuclear Airlift
Force (PNAF) courier in the 4th Airlift Squadron, Joint Base Lewis-McChord, WA. He received his
commission as a distinguished graduate of the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) program at
Sacramento State University and earned his wings through Joint Specialized Undergraduate Pilot
Training (JSUPT) at Vance AFB, OK. Maj Dearborn is a Senior Pilot with more than 3,500 hours in
the C-17 and trainer aircraft. Maj Dearborn graduated Cum Laude with a Bachelor of Science in
Mechanical Engineering from the University of California, Davis and earned a Master of Military
Operational Art and Science from Air University.
Major Carissa D. Deeney is an Air University Fellow and an instructor in the Department of
Airpower at the US Air Force’s Air Command and Staff College (ACSC). She completed the ACSC
In-Residence program in May 2021 as a Distinguished Graduate. Prior to ACSC, Maj Deeney was
the Operations Officer at the 731st Air Mobility Squadron, Osan Air Base, Republic of Korea and,
most recently, served as an instructor at Officer Training School (OTS), Maxwell Air Force Base,
AL. She has held positions at various echelons from squadron to headquarters and deployed three
times in support of counter-narco terrorism, humanitarian assistance, and Operations Iraqi and
Enduring Freedom. She graduated from Ball State University with a Bachelor of Science in
Psychology and received her commission in 2007 from OTS as a Logistics Readiness Officer. Maj
Deeney also earned a Master of Business Administration from Webster University as well as a
Master of Military Operational Art and Science from Air University.
Major Laura W. Evans is an Air University Fellow and Instructor in the Department of Airpower
at the US Air Force’s Air Command and Staff College (ACSC). Maj Evans graduated from the
ACSC In-Residence program in May 2021. She received her commission from the US Air Force
Academy in 2009 and is a Force Support Officer (38F) with experience at 16AF, AFPC, AFMC,
and AETC. Prior to coming to ACSC, Maj Evans was the Chief of AFPC’s Force Development
Operations responsible for the $110M Developmental Education Cycle, executing HAF A1’s Force
Developmental policies. Maj Evans spent four years at Hanscom Air Force Base as the Operations
Officer of the 66 FSS and deployed to Thumrait Air Base, Oman in support of Operation Enduring
Freedom supporting the multi-model retrograde mission. Maj Evans spent four years at Fort George
G. Meade as the Squadron Section Commander in the 22nd Intelligence Squadron as well as the
MPF Commander in the 70th FSS. She holds a Master Degree in Education from Ashford
University as well as a Masters of Military Operational Art and Science from Air University.
Lt Col Dustin Hart is an Air University Fellow and Instructor in the Department of Airpower at
the US Air Force’s Air Command and Staff College (ACSC). He teaches the Airpower 1 and
Airpower II courses. Colonel Hart is a career Public Affairs Officer, previously serving in PA
assignments at the wing, air component, major command ,and combatant command levels. Prior to
this assignment, Colonel Hart served as the Ninth Air Force (Air Forces Central) Director of Public
Affairs at Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar, from 2020-2021. He also previously served as US Air Forces
in Europe and Air Forces Africa Public Affairs Deputy Director from 2017-2020 and commanded
the 341st Recruiting Squadron from 2015-2017. He also deployed as part of a Provincial
Reconstruction Team to Jalalabad, Afghanistan, from 2008-2009 in support of Operation Enduring
Freedom. He commissioned in 2002 through the University of Florida’s ROTC program and holds
a Master’s of Business Administration and Management from Webster University and a Master’s in
National Security Studies from the College of Naval Command and Staff at the Naval War College.
Dr. Jordan Hayworth is an Associate Professor of Military and Security Studies in the Department
of Leadership and Research Development at the Air Command and Staff College. He serves as the
28
Director of Electives and Deputy Department Chair. He received his B.A. in History from High
Point University in the Piedmont-Triad region of North Carolina. He earned his M.A. and Ph.D. in
European History from the University of North Texas in Denton, Texas, where he studied under Dr.
Michael V. Leggiere as a Student Fellow of the Military History Center. His doctoral dissertation
won the 2016 Edward M. Coffman First Manuscript Prize through the Society for Military History.
His first book, Revolutionary France’s War of Conquest in the Rhineland: Conquering the Natural
Frontier, 1792-1797 was published by Cambridge University Press in spring 2019. Currently, he is
writing a new history of the 1794 Fleurus Campaign during the French Revolutionary Wars.
Major Thomas J. Heisel is an Air University Fellow and instructor in the Department of Airpower
at the United States Air Force’s Air Command and Staff College (ACSC). He teaches the Airpower
I and Airpower II courses. Prior to this assignment he was the Director of Operations for the 1st
Special Operations Communications Squadron, Hurlburt Field. He directed the Air Force’s most
deployed Communications Squadron and $72M worth of secure and unsecure networks supporting
base-wide infrastructure, deployable systems and airborne mission networks for Special Operations
Forces and Air Force warfighters. He is a Senior Expeditionary Warfare Communications Officer
and has held multiple positions at the squadron, group, battalion, and headquarters levels. He has
deployed in support of Operations Enduring Freedom, Inherent Resolve, and Spartan Shield. He
was commissioned through the US Air Force Academy in 2007. He later earned a Master’s degree
in Operations Management from the University of Arkansas in 2012 and graduated from ACSC in
May of 2021.
Dr. Sebastian H. Lukasik is an Associate Professor of Comparative Military Studies in the

Department of Airpower at the US Air Force’s Air Command Staff College (ACSC). He received a
PhD in American History from Duke University. He has served as Course Director for the
Leadership and Warfare courses and the Airpower I course. Prior to arriving at ACSC, he taught as
a visiting instructor at Duke University and North Carolina State University. In addition to teaching
courses in the ACSC core curriculum, he offers elective classes on Combat Motivation and Morale
in Historical Perspective, Cultural History of Flight, and war and society in the era of the World
Wars.
Dr. S. Mike Pavelec is Chair of the Department of Airpower at the Air Command and Staff
College. He has extensive teaching experience within JPME, including the Naval War College, the
School of Advanced Air and Space Studies (SAASS), and the Joint Advanced Warfighting School
(NDU). He earned his PhD at The Ohio State University in 2004. He offers electives on “World
War I in the Air” and “The Evolution of Airpower Technology and Theory.” A prolific researcher
and writer, he has five books in print and two under contract. His most recent book is Airpower
Over Gallipoli, 1915-1916, (Naval Institute Press, 2020), in addition to journal articles and book
chapters on airpower, history, space, and cyber. He can be seen on National Geographic’s hit TV
show Nazi Megastructures.
Major Ben Peacock is an Instructor in the Department of Airpower at the US Air Force’s Air
Command and Staff College (ACSC). Prior to instructing at ACSC, Maj Peacock was a member of
ACSC’s AY20 class. He received his commission from OTS and after graduating pilot training at
Vance AFB, OK, Maj Peacock was assigned to fly the C-17 while stationed in Charleston, SC
followed by an assignment as a MC-12W Pilot and Mission Commander while stationed at Beale
AFB, CA. Most recently, he trained USAF and international student pilots as a T-1 Instructor Pilot
at Columbus AFB, MS. Maj Peacock graduated with a BA in Communications from Elon
University and also received a MAS in Aviation Aerospace Management from Embry-Riddle
29
Aeronautical University. He is a senior pilot with more than 3,000 flying hours in the C-17, MC-12,
and T-1 aircraft.
Dr. Allen G. Peck, Lt Gen, USAF (Retired) is an Associate Professor of Military and Security
Studies at the Air Command and Staff College’s Department of Airpower. Prior to joining the
ACSC faculty, Dr. Peck served as director of the Air Force Research Institute. During his 36 years
on active duty, Dr. Peck commanded an air operations group in Germany, an air expeditionary wing
in Saudi Arabia, the Air and Space Expeditionary Force Center at Langley AFB, the LeMay Center
for Doctrine Development and Education, and the Air University at Maxwell AFB. He was a key
planner for NATO’s Kosovo operation and later served as Deputy Combined Force Air Component
Commander at Al Udeid Airbase, Qatar. As an aviator, Dr. Peck was qualified as aircraft
commander and instructor in the air-to-air and air-to-ground variants of the F-15. He holds a BS in
Mathematics from the US Air Force Academy, an MS in Operations Research from the Air Force
Institute of Technology, an MA in International Relations from Salve Regina College, and a PhD in
Aviation from Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University.
Dr. Edwin H. Redman, Colonel, USAF (Retired), is an Assistant Professor of Military and
Security Studies in the Department of Airpower at the US Air Force’s Air Command and Staff
College (ACSC). Dr. Redman is a command pilot with tours in each of the Air Force’s bomber
aircraft. He served as an instructor pilot in the T-38, B-1 and B-2, and flew combat missions in
Operation IRAQI FREEDOM in 2003 in the B-2. He is a graduate of the US Air Force Academy,
ACSC, and the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies (SAASS). Following SAASS, Dr.
Redman attended Duke University, where he received his PhD in History. His last operational
assignment was Deputy Commander, 509th Operations Group, Whiteman Air Force Base. He
completed his active-duty service at Air University, holding several positions, including Director of
Warfighting Education at the LeMay Center for Doctrine Development and Education, and Director
of the Grand Strategy Seminar, Air War College. He retired from the Air Force in 2014 and joined
Air University as a civilian professor in 2015.
Dr. Paul J. Springer is a full professor of comparative military studies. He holds a PhD in military
history from Texas A&M University. He is the author or editor of more than a dozen books,
including America’s Captives: Treatment of POWs from the Revolutionary War to the War on
Terror; Military Robots and Drones: A Reference Handbook; Transforming Civil War Prisons:
Lincoln, Lieber, and the Laws of War; Cyber Warfare: A Reference Handbook; and Outsourcing
War to Machines: The Military Robotics Revolution. In addition, he has published hundreds of
shorter pieces, on a variety of subjects including military history, terrorism, strategy, technology,
and military robotics. In 2019, he was asked by CSAF General David Goldfein to co-author a book
on leadership and command, which will be published by the Air University Press. Dr. Springer is a
Senior Fellow of the Foreign Policy Research Institute, and the series editor for both the History of
Military Aviation and Transforming War series, produced by the U.S. Naval Institute Press.
Currently, he is completing three books, including a collective biography of the West Point Class of
1829; a military history textbook (co-authored with ACSC Professor S. Michael Pavelec); and an
examination of the post-Civil War creation of higher education institutions in the South. Research
Interest/Expertise includes: POW operations; military leadership and command; strategy; military
technology; artificial intelligence; cyber warfare; and U.S. military history.
Lt Col Andrew J. Swartzer, PhD, is an Assistant Professor of Military and Security Studies in the
Department of Airpower at the US Air Force’s Air Command and Staff College (ACSC). He
30
currently teaches Airpower I, Airpower II, Joint-Warfighting, and co-teaches an elective on the
history of Airpower Technology. He graduated with a B.S. in Biomedical Sciences from Auburn
University, an M.S.A. in Information Resources Management from Central Michigan University,
and an M.S. in Adult Education from Troy University. Dr. Swartzer received his PhD in History
(History of Technology) from Auburn University in 2020. A career Space and Missile officer, he
has held assignments in the Minuteman III ICBM and in the Global Positioning System (GPS), as
well as multiple joint and training assignments. Previously assigned to ACSC, he served as an
instructor and deputy department chair in the Department of Airpower before being selected to earn
his Advanced Academic Degree (AAD) through the Air Force Institute of Technology’s Civilian
Institute Program (AFIT/CIP). He and his wife, Amy, have four children.
Dr. Christopher Stamper is an Assistant Professor of Military and Security Studies in the
Department of Joint Warfighting at the Air Command and Staff College. A retired U.S. Navy
Commander, he has a Bachelor’s of Science Degree in Oceanography from the United States
Naval Academy, and a Master of Arts in National Security and Strategic Studies from the U.S.
Naval War College. He holds a Doctorate in Public Administration from Capella University,
specializing in East African Affairs. He has been a flight instructor and taught at the US Naval
Academy and the Air War College.
Chaplain, Lt Col Richard “Rick” Steen is an instructor in the Department of Leadership at the
US Air Force’s Air Command and Staff College. He holds a Bachelor’s Degree in History from
Bob Jones University in Greenville, SC (1998), a Master of Divinity from The Master’s University
and Seminary in Sun Valley, CA (2003), and a Master of Military Operational Art and Science
from Air University (2019). Prior to ACSC, Lt Col Steen served 14 years as a staff chaplain and
Wing Chaplain at the 134th Air Refueling Wing, an Air National Guard Wing in Knoxville,
Tennessee. Additionally, Lt Col Steen has served as Deputy Wing Chaplain, and a Clinical
Pastoral Resident at the University of Tennessee Medical Center.
Major Jason E. Steinlicht is an Instructor at the US Air Force’s Air Command and Staff College
(ACSC). He teaches Leadership, Airpower I, and Airpower II courses. Maj Steinlicht graduated
from the ACSC In-Residence program in June 2019. Prior to ACSC, Maj Steinlicht was a C-130J
Instructor Pilot and Assistant Director of Operations at Dyess Air Force Base, in Abilene TX. Prior
to Dyess, Major Steinlicht was an Evaluator Navigator on the KC-135 Stratotanker. During his time
at Dyess and McConnell, he instructed and commanded missions in support of Operations Enduring
Freedom, Iraqi Freedom, New Dawn, Odyssey Dawn, and Freedom Sentinel logging over 650
combat hours. His most recent deployment in 2018, he served as the Director of Operations for the
75th Expeditionary Airlift Squadron at Camp Lemmonier, Djibouti. Maj Steinlicht received
Magnum Cum Laude honors and was a 2nd Team ESPN National Academic Award Winner from
the University of Dubuque in Iowa. Maj Steinlicht is a Distinguished Graduate from Joint
Undergraduate Pilot Training, C-130J Initial Pilot Qualification, and Squadron Officer School. He
graduated with a BS in Flight Operations from the University of Dubuque and he also received a
MS in Aeronautical Science from Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University as well as a MS in
Military Operational Art and Science from Air University.
Dr. Michael E. Weaver is an associate professor of history in the Department of Air Power. He
joined the faculty of ACSC in 2002 after completing his doctorate at Temple University under the
tutelage of Russell Weigley. Weaver’s first book was Guard Wars: The 28th Infantry Division in
World War II (Indiana University Press, 2010). His second, The Air War in Vietnam (Texas Tech
31
University Press), should be in print in the fall of 2021. In The Journal of Aeronautical History,
Intelligence and National Security, Air Power History, and Diplomatic History he has published
articles on the Cuban Missile Crisis, air intelligence during World War II, aircraft capabilities, and
air combat training during the Cold War. Weaver specializes in aviation history, the Cold War, and
World War II.
32

Airpower I: "Smart Strategy, Smart Airpower": Syllabus AY 22

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Airpower I: "Smart Strategy, Smart Airpower": Syllabus AY 22

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Airpower I: "Smart Strategy, Smart Airpower": Syllabus AY 22

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

AIRPOWER I:

“Smart Strategy, Smart Airpower”1

JOINT PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

Current as of 4 October 2021

Heather P. Venable, PhD

James W. Forsyth, Jr., PhD

COURSE DESCRIPTION AND OBJECTIVES 4

COURSE ORGANIZATION AND NARRATIVE 4

ACSC PROGRAM LEARNING OUTCOMES 6

AY 2021-2022 SPECIAL AREAS OF EMPHASIS 7

APPENDIX: COURSE FACULTY 25

COURSE ORGANIZATION AND NARRATIVE

ACSC PROGRAM LEARNING OUTCOMES (JPME I)

AY 2021-2022 SPECIAL AREAS OF EMPHASIS FOR JPME-1

SAE 1 – Return to Great Power Competition

SAE 2 – Global Integrated Operations in the Information Environment

SAE 3 – Strategic Deterrence in the Twenty-first Century

SAE 4 – Modern Electromagnetic Spectrum Battlefield

SAE 5 – Space as a Warfighting Domain

SAE 6 – Ability to Write Clear, Concise Military Advice Recommendations

3. SEMINAR PARTICIPATION. Student participation in seminar discussions is vital to

Please refer any questions to:

AP 501 (S): Introduction to Airpower I and Modern Airpower Theory

*AP 500E-502E PROMPTS WILL BE POSTED ON CANVAS TODAY*

DATE: 21 October 2021

Assessment/Integration: Comprehend the role of cognitive dissonance in shaping and

AP 503 (S): The Emergence of Strategic Attack

*AP 500E UNGRADED RESPONSE PAPER DUE AT 2359 TODAY ON CANVAS*

DATE: 25 October 2021

REQUIRED READINGS (112)

DATE: 28 October 2021

AP 507 (S): The Battle of Britain

REQUIRED READINGS (137)

DATE: 1 November 2021

Assessment/Integration: Compare and contrast how “tactical” and “strategic” airpower

AP 509 (S): The Combined Bomber Offensive

REQUIRED READINGS (113)

DATE: 4 November 2021

REQUIRED READINGS (111)

DATE: 8 November 2021

Experience: Comprehend how competing visions of airpower’s effectiveness as a tool of national

AP 513 (S): Strategic Airpower against Japan

*AP 501E MIDTERM DUE TODAY AT 2359 ON CANVAS*

DATE: 15 November 2021

Experience: Comprehend how the proliferation of increasingly powerful nuclear weapons

AP 515 (S): The USAF at the Dawn of the Nuclear Age

REQUIRED READINGS (116)

DATE: 18 November 2021

Assessment/Integration: Comprehend the extent to which airpower functioned as an effective

AP 517 (S): American Airpower Strategy in Korea

REQUIRED READINGS (148)

DATE: 22 November 2021

AP 519 (S): ICBMs and Mutually Assured Destruction

REQUIRED READINGS (132)

DATE: 2 December 2021

Assessment/Integration: Comprehend the effectiveness of airpower in producing meaningful

REQUIRED READINGS (138)

DATE: 6 December 2021

AP 500E-502E PROMPTS WILL BE POSTED ON CANVAS TODAY

AP 500E UNGRADED RESPONSE PAPER DUE AT 2359 TODAY ON CANVAS

AP 501E MIDTERM DUE TODAY AT 2359 ON CANVAS

AP 502E FINAL PAPER DUE AT 1600 ON 17 DECEMBER 2021 ON CANVAS