In The High Court of Delhi at New Delhi Date of Decision: 09 November 2022
In The High Court of Delhi at New Delhi Date of Decision: 09 November 2022
In The High Court of Delhi at New Delhi Date of Decision: 09 November 2022
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* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
the disputes had arisen, such person was de-facto and de-jure
ineligible to be appointed as arbitrator; and his mandate must
therefore be terminated.
4. In support of the aforementioned arguments, counsel for the petitioner
relies on the following judicial precedents:
4.1 SREI Infrastructure Finance Ltd. vs. Tuff Drilling Pvt. Ltd.1, on
the point that termination of arbitral proceedings under section 25
is different from termination under section 32(2) of the A&C Act;
4.2 Omaxe Infrastructure and Construction Ltd. vs. Union of India
& Anr. 2 , on the applicability of the Amendment Act-2015 to
disputes where arbitration was invoked pre-amendment, but the
appointment of the arbitrator was made post-amendment;
4.3 KKR Infra Projects Pvt. Ltd. vs. Union of India 3 ,on the
applicability of the Amendment Act-2015 to a case where a
second arbitrator was appointed in the same arbitral proceedings,
however post-amendment;
4.4 Ellora Paper Mills Ltd. vs. State of Madhya Pradesh4, on the
applicability of the Amendment Act-2015 to a case where an
arbitral tribunal was appointed pre-amendment, however arbitral
proceedings had not commenced until post-amendment.
5. In opposition to the petition, Mr. R. Sudhinder, learned counsel for the
respondent has raised several objections, of which the following are
material for a decision of the present matter :
1
(2018) 11 SCC 470
2
2018 SCC Online Del 8914
3
2018 SCC Online Del 12418
4
2022 SCC Online SC 8
5.4 The appointment of the 2nd Arbitrator was made by the CMD,
NTPC as per the procedure agreed to between the parties and was
therefore in conformity with the law as it stood prior to the
Amendment Act-2015, which came into force after the date of
commencement of arbitral proceedings in this case;
5.5 Additionally, the arbitration agreement comprised in clause 56 of
the GCCs expressly stipulates that if an arbitrator cannot be
appointed by the CMD, NTPC in the manner agreed upon, then
the disputes would not be referred to arbitration at all. The
foundation of arbitration proceedings being the consent of parties,
such proceedings cannot be thrust upon the respondent contrary to
the terms it had agreed upon. It is the respondent‟s contention that
the procedure for appointment of an arbitrator cannot be severed
from clause 56, to selectively give effect only to the agreement to
arbitrate, while ignoring the other clauses, especially when the
arbitration clause expressly says that if the arbitrator is not
appointed in accordance with the procedure agreed upon between
the parties, the disputes would not be referred to arbitration at all;
5.6 For the foregoing reasons, the challenge to the mandate of the 2nd
Arbitrator is misconceived, misplaced and premised on a wrong
notion of the law.
6. In support of the above arguments, counsel for the respondent relies on
the following judgements:
6.1 SREI Infrastructure Finance Ltd. vs. Tuff Drilling Pvt. Ltd.5, to
urge that termination of arbitral proceedings under section 25 is
different from termination under section 32(2) of the A&C Act;
and when a tribunal rejects a statement of claim filed late after due
application of mind, such order becomes an award, which can only
be challenged under section 34 of the A&C Act;
6.2 Angelique International Ltd. vs. SSJV Projects Pvt Ltd.6, on the
proposition that a challenge to an arbitral tribunal‟s order
dismissing arbitral proceedings for want of statement of claim,
must be by way of a petition under section 34 of the A&C Act,
and not under section 14 and 15 of the A&C Act;
6.3 ATV Projects India Ltd. vs. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. & Anr.7,
Awasthi Construction vs. GNCTD &Anr.8 and M.L. Lakhanpal
vs. Darshan Lal &Anr. 9 , on the proposition that dismissal of
proceedings under section 25(a) of the A&C Act is deemed to be
an „award‟ and hence must be challenged under section 34 of the
A&C Act;
6.4 Union of India vs. Pradeep Vinod Construction Company10, on
the proposition that the Amendment Act-2015 is not applicable to
arbitrations where notice for arbitration was issued prior to
Amendment Act-2015 coming into force; and that therefore
5
(2018) 11 SCC 470
6
2018 SCC Online Del 8287
7
2013 SCC Online Del 1669
8
2022 SCC Online Del 5443
9
2018 SCC Online Del 6833
10
(2020) 2 SCC 464
11
(2019) 15 SCC 482
12
(2019) 2 SCC 488
13
2017 SCC Online Cal 5835
14
(2009) 8 SCC 520
(emphasis supplied)
12. It is also beneficial at this point to refer briefly to the judgment of the
Supreme Court in Voestalpine Schienen GMBH vs. Delhi Metro Rail
15
Corpn. Ltd , which discusses the need for independence and
impartiality in an arbitrator in the broader perspective, quoting from the
authoritative text of “O.P. Malhotra, The Law and Practice of
Arbitration and Conciliation”(3rd Ed.), revised by Ms. Indu Malhotra
(subsequently Hon‟ble Judge, Supreme Court of India) in the following
words:
(emphasis supplied)
13. Though there is no cavil that the prevailing view as taken by the
Supreme Court inter-alia in Parmar Constructions and Pradeep Vinod
Construction Company (supra) is that the amendments brought in by
way of Amendment Act-2015 apply to arbitration proceedings
that commence - within the meaning of section 21- after the Amendment
15
(2017) 4 SCC 665
15.3 Section 12(5), on the other hand, sets-out the criteria or grounds
that would make a person „ineligible‟, that is to say per-se
disqualified, for appointment as an arbitrator as a matter of
statutory presumption, setting-out the categories of relationships
which would attract such disqualification in the Seventh Schedule
to the A&C Act.
16. Needless to say that ineligibility for appointment must necessarily be
tested at the threshold, when the appointment is to be made; and
therefore, for it to be meaningful and not otiose, section 12(5) must
apply regardless of whether the arbitration proceedings themselves
commenced before or after coming into force of the Amendment Act-
2015, provided the appointment of the arbitrator is being considered on a
date when section 12(5) is in force.
17. Furthermore, looking at the overall scheme and purpose of section 12,
independence and impartiality of an arbitrator is a continuing
requirement since it goes to the very root of the credibility of the arbitral
proceedings; and a person who is ineligible cannot be appointed as an
arbitrator on the facetious plea that since arbitral proceedings had
commenced prior to the coming into force of section 12(5), parties
would have to suffer an ineligible person being appointed or continuing
as their arbitrator. Any other interpretation of section 12(5) would defeat
the legislative intent that informed the amendment.
18. Keeping in mind the purpose and intendment of the Legislature in
inserting section 12(5), in the opinion of this court, only one inference
arises, viz. that if an arbitrator is appointed after section 12(5) has come
into force, the arbitrator would be ineligible if he does not pass muster