Csar Searching History

COMBAT SEARCH AND RESCUE:
SEARCHING THE HISTORY; RESCUING THE DOCTRINE
BY
MAJOR MICHAEL A. WORMLEY
A THESIS PRESENTED TO THE FACULTY
FOR COMPLETION OF GRADUATION REQUIREMENTS
SCHOOL OF ADVANCED AIR AND SPACE STUDIES
AIR UNIVERSITY
MAXWELL AFB, ALABAMA
JUNE 2003
Distribution A: Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.

Form Approved
Report Documentation Page OMB No. 0704-0188
Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and
maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information,
including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington
VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it
does not display a currently valid OMB control number.
1. REPORT DATE 2. REPORT TYPE 3. DATES COVERED

JUN 2003 N/A -
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER
Combat Search and Rescue: Searching the History; Rescuing the 5b. GRANT NUMBER
Doctrine
5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER
6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER
5e. TASK NUMBER
5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION

REPORT NUMBER
Air University Press Maxwell AFB, AL 36112-6615
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S)
11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT

NUMBER(S)
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

Approved for public release, distribution unlimited
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
14. ABSTRACT
15. SUBJECT TERMS
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION OF 18. NUMBER 19a. NAME OF
ABSTRACT OF PAGES RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT b. ABSTRACT c. THIS PAGE
UU 65
unclassified unclassified unclassified
Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)

Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18
DISCLAIMER
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author. They
do not reflect the official position of the US Government, Department of Defense, the
United States Air Force, or Air University.
ii
About The Author
Major Michael A. Wormley was commissioned through the Reserve Officer

Training Corps, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University in 1988. Graduating
from Specialized Undergraduate Navigator Training in 1989, he went on to fly EC-130Hs
as a Mission Crew Commander in the 41st Electronic Combat Squadron. Following this
tour, he went on to fly MC-130E and MC-130Hs as an electronic warfare officer (EWO),
instructor EWO, and evaluator EWO at the squadron, group, and MAJCOM levels.
Major Wormley is a senior navigator with over 2,000 flying hours. He has
completed CSAR tours as a flyer and staff officer in Operation DELIBERATE FORCE,
Operation SOUTHERN WATCH, Operation NORTHERN WATCH, and Operation
DESERT THUNDER. He has a bachelor’s degree in History and Political Science from
Virginia Tech and a master’s degree in International Relations from Troy State
University. In July 2003, Major Wormley was assigned to Headquarters, United States
Special Operations Command.
iii
Acknowledgments
I would be sorely remiss in not acknowledging the support and help I received
from my advisor, Lt Col (Dr) Edward Westermann and my reader, Dr Stephen Chiabotti.
Their dedication and efforts have dramatically improved this thesis. Any mistakes and
omissions are solely my fault. I probably disregarded their advice.
I am eternally indebted to three people who eased the research process for the
thesis. First, Darrel D. Whitcomb magnanimously provided his thoughts and unpublished
writings to steer me in the right direction. Second, Ms. Mona Scott, Joint Personnel
Recovery Agency (JPRA) head librarian, opened the archives and allowed me to spread
research materials all over her library. Third, Mr. Joe Caver, Air Force Historical
Research Agency, anticipated what type of materials I would need and preempted my
requests with the perfect documents.
Last, I have to express my gratitude for my wife, Jody. She instinctively knew
when to “disappear” with the kids and allow me to concentrate on this project. Without
her strength and support, I don’t think that I could have completed this thesis.
iv
Abstract
This thesis examines the history of command and control for combat search and
rescue (CSAR) in a quest for proper doctrine. The thesis question is: Should CSAR
command and control be reorganized? The thesis reviews the history of CSAR command
and control from Indochina, Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM, and Operation
ALLIED FORCE. The thesis identifies lessons that should have been learned and
incorporated in joint doctrine. Finally, the thesis provides recommendations to improve
the success of joint CSAR command and control operations.
v
Contents
Page
DISCLAIMER .................................................................................................................... ii
ABOUT THE AUTHOR ................................................................................................... iii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ................................................................................................. iv
ABSTRACT.........................................................................................................................v
CONTENTS....................................................................................................................... vi
ILLUSTRATIONS ........................................................................................................... vii
TABLES .......................................................................................................................... viii
INTRODUCTION ...............................................................................................................1
Assumptions ............................................................................................................4
Current CSAR C2 Joint Doctrine ............................................................................5
INDOCHINA (1962-64)....................................................................................................10
Lessons Learned ....................................................................................................15
INDOCHINA (1964-73)....................................................................................................17
CSAR’s Heyday ....................................................................................................21
Lessons Learned ....................................................................................................25
GULF WAR (1990-91)......................................................................................................29

Desert Storm CSAR...............................................................................................35
Lessons Learned ....................................................................................................42
OPERATION ALLIED FORCE (1999)............................................................................46

Rescue for all my friends.......................................................................................50
Lessons Learned ....................................................................................................53
CONCLUSION..................................................................................................................55
Historical Lessons Learned ...................................................................................56
Conclusion .............................................................................................................57
BIBLIOGRAPHY..............................................................................................................60
vi
Illustrations
Page
Figure 1 Joint CSAR Command Relationships ...................................................................7
Figure 2 Designated Indochina CSAR Sectors..................................................................20
vii
Tables
Page
Table 1 Summary of Navy and Air Force CSAR rescues in Indochina ...........................27
Table 2 Combat Losses in Iraqi Controlled Battle Space .................................................36
Table 3 Operation ALLIED FORCE Command Structure...............................................47
viii
Chapter 1
Introduction
One of the most important peacetime functions of the military

establishment is the perfection of organization along sound lines….It must
never be overlooked in preparations for war. It is the essence of proper
national defense.
General Henry Harley “Hap” Arnold
Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) is a mission area shared by all the U.S. armed
services. The requirement to recover their isolated servicemen is contentious but valid in
most circumstances. The Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA) enumerates four
guiding principles that validate the requirement to recover isolated personnel.
First, and foremost, America places great value on the sanctity of human life. When
America’s Armed Forces are committed, we have the moral obligation to do everything
in our power to bring all of our personnel home safely.
Second, by instilling in the minds of our personnel that if they become
isolated or missing we will recover them, we will build confidence and a
willingness to exert their utmost in times of great stress.
Third, when our nation possesses an effective personnel recovery

capability, we deny our enemies a valuable source of intelligence and
political leverage against our government.
Finally, our people are our most valuable resource that we cannot afford to
lose.1
The passage of time has led some to question the ability of the services to rescue their
people. This paper will explore whether it is possible to improve the ability to recover
isolated survivors by amending joint doctrine for CSAR command and control (C2).
Notes
1
JPRA Mission Pamphlet
1
This paper will survey the history of CSAR C2 from the Indochina conflict (1962-73),
through Operation Desert Shield/Storm (1990-91), and Operation Allied Force (1999).
This study will identify lessons learned from each conflict and answer whether they have
been captured in the current joint warfare doctrine. It will also suggest new mechanisms
for assimilating those un-learned lessons.
CSAR is a subset of personnel recovery (PR). PR includes many mission types such
as: CSAR; non-conventional assisted recovery (NAR); survival, evasion, resistance, and
escape (SERE); and non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO). This study will
consider only pure CSAR missions. It will not analyze PR missions like the evacuation
of the U.S. embassy in South Vietnam (April 1975), the Mayaguez incident (May 1975),
or Operation Eagle Claw (April 1980). As a result, it is incumbent to define two terms.
Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) - a specific task performed by rescue
forces to effect the recovery of distressed personnel during war or military
operations other than war.2
Command and control (C2) – the exercise of authority and direction by a

properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the
accomplishment of the mission. Command and control functions are
performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment,
communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in
planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in
the accomplishment of the mission.3
The recovery of isolated military or civilian personnel in war has always been an
issue of US national strategic interest. The level of interest has grown during the U.S.
limited war campaigns since Vietnam. Despite the growth of interest, success in
recovering isolated personnel has seemingly diminished. In the Vietnam War, the ratio
of rescued pilots to those captured as POWs was 2.1:1. During Operation Desert Storm,
the ratio dropped dramatically, to 1:5.75. For every one downed pilot rescued, almost six
were taken prisoner.4
While these statistics are compelling they are also misleading, because the true
measure of merit for successful CSAR should be the number of isolated personnel
Notes
2
US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated
Terms, (Washington D.C.: 12 April 2001), 77.
3
Ibid., 79.
4
U.S. Army, FM 1-113, Utility and Cargo Helicopter Operations, (Washington, D.C.: 12 Sep 1997), 7-1.
2
divided by the number that could have been reasonably rescued.5 CSAR missions cannot
be launched for every isolated person. Sometimes, the risk to rescue forces exceeds the
amount that any reasonable commander should assume. Sometimes, isolated personnel
are captured too quickly for a CSAR mission. Sometimes, isolated personnel are killed
almost immediately. Examining the number of rescued personnel versus the number
captured is dramatic but misleading. This paper will adopt a better measure of merit:
number rescued divided by number of CSAR airplanes and personnel lost. This paper
will also identify C2 improvements that will maximize the rescue of truly “recoverable”
personnel.
It is past time to review the recent history of CSAR and identify the role of command
and control in failure and success. An improved CSAR organization may reveal itself out
of the analysis, which will answer the following thesis question: Should the command
and control of Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) be reorganized?
In the CSAR mission area there are many factors that impact the success rate. The
geography of the area in which a rescue is to take place is a prime factor. In the triple
canopy jungles of Vietnam and Laos, it was easier for isolated personnel to hide from
enemy searchers. However, it was equally hard for friendly rescue forces to locate and
recover the isolated personnel. In the 1991 Gulf War, the open deserts of Iraq made it
quite difficult for isolated personnel to hide from would-be captors. Theoretically, it was
easy for friendly rescue forces to visually identify isolated personnel. However, in Iraq
the density of the ground-to-air threat ameliorated the effectiveness of search and rescue
forces. In the Indochina conflict, the frequent absence of a ground-to-air threat made
some rescues relatively benign.
Certainly distances to fly, as well as the speed and range of rescue aircraft also play a
critical role in the success rate of CSAR. The ability to place rescue units close to the
locations where aircraft are vulnerable to being shot down in the Indochina conflict helps
explain the high success rate. Technologies like stealth, threat jammers, and terrain-
following radar also mitigate the threat level to rescue aircraft. Theoretically,
technological advantages of the rescue forces of the Gulf War and Operation Allied Force
should have enabled higher success rates than those of the Indochina conflict. Although
Notes
5
Darrel D. Whitcomb suggested this measure of merit.
3
there are many factors that impact the success rate of CSAR, this thesis will concentrate
on organization of command and control.
General Arnold, in the opening quote, advised that the essence of proper defense is
the perfection of the organization. If the combat organization of CSAR can be improved,
it may cost a pittance in new helicopters and threat-protection equipment. It is hoped that
only a change in joint/service doctrine may be required to improve CSAR for future
conflicts.
This paper will consist of four case studies reviewing the history of pre-hostilities
doctrine for CSAR C2, actual CSAR C2 organization, and strengths/problems with
implementation. Chapter two will review the Indochina conflict (1962-64). Chapter
three will review the Indochina conflict (1964-73). Chapter four will review the Gulf
War (1990-91). Finally, chapter five will review Operation Allied Force (1999). A
sample size of four case studies will provide statistical significance for suggested
conclusions concerning improving CSAR C2. Accordingly, the last chapter will examine
three basic questions: What are the problems in current CSAR C2 doctrine? Does the
history of CSAR C2 suggest solutions? What are the implications and potentially new
problems that will arise if we implement the improvements? The last chapter will also
suggest improvements, if applicable.
Assumptions
Improving all aspects of C2 is the key to fighting smarter. Having

belatedly come to recognize this fact, we can’t afford to ignore it just
because defense budgets shrink. Improved C2 will continue to be the
basis for doing more with less.
Thomas P. Coakley
Any suggested changes to joint doctrine must be flexible enough to cover the
spectrum of military conflict. Suggested changes must be applicable to a major theater
war, yet flexible enough to apply to limited-duration humanitarian missions. Closely
related is the assumption that future U.S. “high-intensity” warfare will be waged quickly.
The luxury of on-the-job training will not be available to U.S. combatants. As a result,
CSAR professionals must be highly trained, poised, and ready to successfully recover
isolated survivors from the start of hostilities.
4
The second assumption is that CSAR is indeed a combat mission. Commanders must
weigh the risks of committing combat rescue forces to a recovery. The ability to evaluate
the risk to rescue forces is proportional to the training and experience of commanders and
their staffs who task rescue forces.
The next major assumption is that CSAR is not an optional mission. The national
character and culture of America is exemplified in a collective belief in the sanctity of
individual human life. It is not possible, given the collective U.S. character, to not
consider rescue of American soldiers, airmen, seaman, and Marines. The efficacy of
prosecuting rescue missions has been well explored in previous scholarship.6
Fielding new technology will likely increase the effectiveness of CSAR. The ability
to instantaneously and precisely locate an isolated survivor offers a tremendous
advantage to CSAR forces. The biggest challenge for rescue forces is knowing precisely
where to recover a survivor. Faster en-route speeds and stealth technology for rotary
wing aircraft will assist rescue forces in recovering survivors faster and with less risk to
themselves. These factors have also been well explored in previous scholarship.7 As a
result, other than acknowledging technology’s role in the future success of CSAR, this
paper will not explore this factor.
The final assumption or working hypothesis is that perfecting CSAR C2 organization
through doctrinal changes can improve the success rate of rescues. We can’t change the
geography issues and threats that rescue forces will face. Technological changes to
rescue forces can cost large sums of money. Doctrinal changes are the cheapest and
easiest method to improve CSAR. This paper will attempt to codify combat experience
for joint doctrine.
Current CSAR C2 Joint Doctrine
When you look at the historical data, what hurts us isn’t the speed of the
helicopters, our limited weapons, or limited range. It’s command and
control.
Maj. Mark DiPaolo

Notes
6
I recommend “For Valor or Value: An Examination of Personnel Recovery Operations”, a 2001 School
of Advanced Airpower Studies thesis by Billy D. Thompson.
7
I recommend “The Future of USAF Combat Search And Rescue”, a 1998 School of Advanced Airpower
Studies thesis by Timothy J. Leahy.
5
CSAR MH-60 Pilot in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM
Joint Publication (JP) 3-50.2 (26 January 1996) is the umbrella document for how to
conduct CSAR and like all joint doctrine states, “the guidance in this publication is
authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be followed except when, in the judgment of the
commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise.” In short, joint doctrine is
supposed to be the codification of the body of knowledge on how to best prosecute a
mission.
JP 3-50.2 begins by assigning “primary authority and responsibility for CSAR” to the
joint force commander (JFC). It tasks component commanders to plan and conduct
CSAR in support of their own operations. The component commanders should be
cognizant of joint combat operations and their impact on the joint ability to conduct
CSAR.8
Joint doctrine advises JFCs to establish a Joint Search and Rescue Center (JSRC) to
be the primary planning, coordinating, and executing C2 mechanism for joint CSAR.9
However, the JSRC should only provide command and control for a CSAR mission if a
component cannot prosecute the mission with its own forces. When the JSRC is charged
with a CSAR operation, joint doctrine is clear on responsibilities and roles. The JSRC
director or the component commander who hosts the JSRC exercises JFC command
authority for CSAR.10 Joint doctrine is clear in the requirement for all CSAR missions
to be commanded by a single component commander. Joint doctrine also clearly states
that the JFC normally delegates responsibility for CSAR to the component
commanders.11 Clearly joint doctrine delegates JFC authority and responsibility for joint
CSAR to the component commander who hosts the JSRC.12
Joint doctrine recommends embedding the JSRC in the component staff that has the
preponderance of forces and capabilities plus the means to command, control, and
communicate to pertinent CSAR forces.13 Only if an operation is limited in nature, does
Notes
8
US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 3-50.2, Doctrine for Joint Search and Rescue, (Washington D.C.: 26
January 1996), vii.
9
Ibid., viii.
10
Ibid., ix.
11
Ibid., I-1.
12
Ibid., I-2.
13
Ibid., I-1.
6
joint doctrine advise retention of the JSRC on the JFC staff.14 Traditionally, the Joint
Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) has hosted the JSRC, because he usually
commands the majority of the assets that participate in CSAR missions.
The following figure portrays the CSAR command relationship recommended in joint
doctrine.15
Figure 1 Joint CSAR Command Relationships
Source: US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 3-50.2, Doctrine for

Joint Search and Rescue, (Washington D.C.: 26 January 1996).
Notes
14
Ibid., I-2.
15
Ibid., III-3.
7
Joint doctrine describes four types of CSAR command relationships at the operational
or theater-level of war. First, a component may prosecute CSAR with its own assets and
retain operational control (OPCON). Second, when a component needs joint capabilities,
the JSRC tasks other components to provide tactical control (TACON) of the augmenting
forces to the component that requires joint capabilities. Third, in a situation where a
component cannot conduct CSAR for its personnel, the JSRC tasks another component to
conduct the CSAR mission with its own forces with the tasked component retaining
OPCON of its forces. Lastly, when no component can prosecute CSAR missions
unilaterally, then the JFC may issue mission- type orders to all components, leveraging
joint capabilities, to build a mission package capable of successfully recovering isolated
personnel. This requires all component commanders to release their forces in a TACON
relationship to a designated component commander, usually the component commander
who hosts the JSRC.16 The common denominator in all four CSAR command
relationships at the operational level of war is the designation of one component
commander with at least TACON of all assets.
Joint doctrine also prescribes two tactical or mission-level C2 relationships: the single
unit and Combat Search and Rescue Task Force (CSARTF). Joint doctrine
unequivocally states that the single unit is the preferred method.17 It is characterized as a
communication-silent, thoroughly pre-planned operation conducted usually by only the
recovery vehicle (normally helicopter). The single unit method embodies the simplest C2
relationship and is usually the preferred method for recoveries in a medium-to-high threat
environment.18 This method puts the fewest numbers of rescuers at risk.
The CSARTF, made famous in Indochina, is redundant in C2 and includes: Airborne
Mission Commander (AMC), On-Scene Commander (OSC), recovery vehicle, rescue
escort, rescue combat air patrol, and the JSRC. The full CSARTF is usually an option
Notes
16
Ibid., III-5.
17
January 1996), II-6.
18
US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 3-50.21, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Combat
Search and Rescue, (Washington D.C.: 23 March 1998), III-5. Defines three levels of threat:
Low Threat: Highly dispersed, thinly concentrated enemy forces and assets; limited ability to reconstitute.
Medium Threat: Significant threats requiring passive and active measures to avoid or degrade the threats
and prevent subsequent engagement.
High Threat: Hostile forces over a wide area of coverage, densely concentrated, and capable of rapid
reconstitution and mobility.
8
only in low to medium-threat environments and when the location of the isolated
personnel is questionable.19 One of the most critical decisions made in CSAR involves
which rescue method to utilize. This paper traces the historical lineage of these four
operational/theater-level and two tactical/mission-level C2 relationships in the next four
chapters.
Notes
19
January 1996), II-7.
9
Chapter 2
INDOCHINA (1962-64)
No matter what era, area, or circumstance is involved, rescue has always

been one of the great human interest stories. Be it a man trapped in a
cave, a survivor drifting aimlessly on a life raft in the ocean, or a lone
(sic) pilot lost and injured in the enemy-thick jungles of Vietnam, there is
no saga quite as inspiring, as exhilarating or as dramatic as that of man
risking serious injury or death itself to help his fellow man in trouble.
Rescue is a compelling, all-encompassing human instinct. In crises people
pull together as never before, often performing deeds far beyond their
normal capacities when a life is in the balance. So it has always been and
will always be. Such is the nature of man.
L.B. Taylor, Jr., That Others May Live
Services pulling together to rescue others in combat may not have been what the
leaders of the U.S. military were expecting as the U.S. entered the Indochina conflict.
However, the lack of service or joint doctrine concerning CSAR led to people pulling
together in an ad hoc fashion to rescue isolated and distressed personnel in the early years
of the Indochina conflict.
The national military strategy of the late 1950s was focused on nuclear war, with
USAF Strategic Air Command bombers prepared to fly over the poles and deliver nuclear
weapons against the Cold War antagonist, the Soviet Union. Consequently, conventional
non-nuclear warfare was deprived of serious thought and funding.20 This dearth of
thinking and resources extended to CSAR. Dedicated combat rescue forces were
relegated to amphibious fixed-wing airplanes for over-water recovery of SAC crews and
Notes
20
Interview with Col. John Warden III, USAF (Ret), (Michael A. Wormley: 2 Feb 2002). Col Warden
discussed how the USAF relied on think tanks like Rand Corporation to conduct the strategy and doctrine
development for the USAF. He also stated that Rand concentrated on nuclear warfare theory and strategy
to the detriment of all non-nuclear aerial warfare roles. Concurrently, all the services diverted large
portions of their budgets to nuclear warfare equipment to the detriment of conventional warfare equipment.
10
helicopters for recoveries in the vicinity of local air bases. Interestingly, the US space
program led to the largest monetary investment in CSAR technology. The requirement to
recover space capsules and astronauts at sea led to planning for longer range and heavier
lift helicopters like the HH-53, plus fixed wing aircraft like the HC-130, to search for and
recover space assets plus provide tactical command and control.
However, the USAF Air Rescue Service (ARS) had been downsized, due to budget
constraints, from fifty squadrons (7,900 personnel) in 1954 to eleven squadrons (1,600
personnel) in 1961.21 Worse than that, its doctrine for employment was changed in the
late 1950s and its CSAR role emasculated:
ARS will be organized, manned, equipped, trained, and deployed to
support peacetime air operations.
No special units or specially designed aircraft will be provided for the sole
purpose of wartime search and rescue (SAR).
Wartime rescue operations will be dictated by the capabilities of

equipment used for peacetime SAR, and will be conducted in accordance
with JANAF (Joint Army, Navy, Air Force) and Standard Wartime SAR
procedures.22
It’s little wonder that when U.S. counterinsurgency warfare evolved in Indochina in
1960, the ARS was not ready with equipment or doctrine to conduct CSAR. Air Force
Regulation 55-7, Wartime Search and Rescue Procedures, referred to in the quote above
stated, “Wartime SAR procedures are essentially an extension of peacetime
procedures.”23 According to a South East Asia Project Contemporary Historical
Evaluation of Combat Operations (CHECO) report, “Following the Korean War, the
combat aircrew recovery requirement was deleted from the ARS mission and combat
crews were denied a planned and trained rescue recovery force to meet tactical
requirements.”24 By 1961, U.S. military involvement in Laos and Vietnam consisted of
aviation and counter insurgency support. Predictably, on March 23, 1961 the first aircraft
was lost over Laos and required a CSAR mission. Unfortunately, there was no
Notes
21
John L. Vandegrift, Jr., ed., A History of the Air Rescue Service. (Winter Park, Fla., 1959), 94.
22
HQ USAF letter to MATS, 26 Sep 1958, in Earl H. Tilford, Jr., The United States Air Force Search and
Rescue in Southeast Asia, 1961-1975. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1980), 16.
23
CHECO Report, USAF Search and Rescue (SAR) in SEA, 1961-1966. (24 Oct 1966, K717.0414-1, in
USAF Collection, AFHRA), 79. Document declassified on 28 Mar 2001.
24
Ibid., 79.
11
organization available to coordinate and control a rescue attempt, let alone dedicated
rescue aircraft and personnel. Subsequently, Captain Stanley P. McGee was captured and
spent seventeen months as a prisoner of the communist Pathet Lao.25
According to the Department of Defense National Search and Rescue Plan of 1956,
overall responsibility for CSAR in Indochina fell to the Commander in Chief, Pacific.
CINCPAC, Admiral Harry D. Felt delegated the mission to his subordinate functional
combatant commanders.26 By requiring each service to rescue its own personnel, this
operational-level C2 relationship closely mirrors current-day joint doctrine, with the
notable exception of no Joint Search sand Rescue Center (JSRC). This exception was
rectified with the December 1961 deployment of rescue personnel to Vietnam.
Two factors caused significant friction in the deployment of professional CSAR
personnel. First, the covert nature of U.S. military and other government agency
participation in counter-insurgency warfare in Indochina necessitated a low profile and
small numbers for U.S. military deployments. Second, ARS personnel had embraced
their doctrinal peacetime SAR role. ARS was not prepared to engage in combat SAR.
Major Alan W. Saunders, the first commander of Detachment 3, Pacific Air Rescue
Center lamented, “We have no professional rescue forces to do this with. We are more or
less beggars. We have to rely on the Army or the Marines, and occasionally the VNAF,
to provide us with the equipment and the crews and helicopters to go into these areas to
rescue people and bring them out.”27 Ironically, on 1 April (April Fools’ Day), 1962, the
Search and Rescue Coordinating Center (SARCC) or Det. 3, Pacific Air Rescue Center,
was officially established at Tan Son Nhut Air Base.28 Manned by three officers and two
noncommissioned officers, it served as a nascent CSAR C2 node.
The Joint Vietnamese/U.S. Search and Rescue Agreement of 15 November 1962
delineated some C2 relationships in theater. The South Vietnamese were responsible for
civil and Vietnamese military SAR. Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command,
Notes
25
Earl H. Tilford, Jr., The United States Air Force Search and Rescue in Southeast Asia, 1961-1975.
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1980), 33.
26
Corona Harvest Report, USAF Search and Rescue in Southeast Asia, 1954-11 March 1968. (31 Jan
1969, in JPRA library), 12-13. Document is declassified.
27
Corona Harvest Oral History Interview, Saunders, A.W., 1 June 1963-1 June 1964. (1 July 1964,
K239.0512-168, in USAF Collection, AFHRA), B-1. Document declassified on 19 Aug 1992.
28
12
Vietnam (MAC-V) and Commander, Second Air Division were concurrently responsible
for all U.S. CSAR in Indochina.29 The establishment of the SARCC and the Joint SAR
agreement allowed ARS personnel to settle into steady-state operations.
The standard operating procedure was for all overdue aircraft to be reported to
Detachment 3, Pacific Air Rescue Center. The rescue controller would request all
available aircraft to search for the missing aircraft. When found, the rescue controller
would send appropriate and available rescue-capable aircraft to the scene. This CSAR
model included Air Force, Army, Navy, and Marine aviation assets. Meanwhile, the Det.
3 commander, one of the few trained rescue professionals, would fly to the crash area to
assume on-scene commander duties.
Despite having a working model for C2 of CSAR missions, it became evident that the
ad-hoc “send whoever is available” approach to CSAR was high-risk and lethal. Not
having professional CSAR forces led to many disasters in the early days of the Indochina
conflict.
In early January 1964, four Americans, a Vietnamese crewmember, and a
Royal Air Force wing commander flying as an observer, were aboard an
armed Huey that crashed in to the mouth of the Mekong after being hit by
Viet Cong small arms fire. The helicopter sank rapidly, carrying two
trapped crewmen to their deaths. The pilot, copilot, Vietnamese crewman,
and the British officer escaped, treading water while another Huey circled
in for the pickup. As it hovered over the water, the rotor wash created a
frontal wave that drowned the hapless pilot. With the pilot dead, the
would-be rescuer wheeled his helicopter around to aid another survivor. A
crewmember had the man by the hand, and was hauling him to safety,
when an Army H-21 that was circling overhead, radioed instructions to
clear the area so Mae West life vests could be dropped. The crewmember
loosed his grip and watched the horror-struck face of the victim slip
beneath the muddy water. The other two men were rescued, and two
bodies washed up on the shore the following morning.30
Major Alan W. Saunders was convinced that ad hoc rescue forces would not lead to
success. “We know of specific instances where we have lost people, due to the lack of
experience of the Army or Marine crew that was attempting the rescue. Or the lack of
knowledge of accepted tactics in performing a rescue and picking people up out of the
Notes
29
Ibid., 14.
30
Earl H. Tilford, Jr., The United States Air Force Search and Rescue in Southeast Asia, 1961-1975.
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1980), 43.
13
water or out of the jungle. That, had they known proper procedures, let’s say,
approaching a man in the water from where they wouldn’t drown him with the rotor
wash, or how to go about picking a man up out of the water, we could have saved a
number of people.”31 Despite the political sensitivities of introducing more U.S. military
forces into Indochina, if the leadership was serious about recovering every human lost, it
would require professional rescue forces and more education for potential survivors.
Accordingly, Major Saunders prepared a study of CSAR highlighting the need for
dedicated rescue forces and survivor training.32 Unfortunately, the study confronted both
the traditional political bugaboo of troop ceilings and some vexing organizational
problems.
The bureaucratic infighting between the Army and the Air Force over combat roles
and ownership of helicopters was the larger problem. The Army felt that their utility
helicopters could accomplish the CSAR mission, despite a notable lack of CSAR
training. As the theater coordination center for CSAR, Det. 3 worked for two masters:
Commander, MAC-V as the Joint Force Commander and Commander, Second Air
Division as the Commander, Air Force Forces (COMAFFOR in current terminology).
The report was endorsed through Air Force channels up to CINCPAC but based on the
inter-service battle over helicopter roles and ownership, it was sat upon in Army (MAC-
V) channels. The stonewalling was resolved in May, 1964 when the Joint Chiefs of Staff
assigned the CSAR mission to the Air Force and ARS.33
During the summer of 1964, the Air Force moved HH-43B (Huskies) designed for
combat rescue into theater. After the Gulf of Tonkin Incident (August 2-4, 1964) and the
subsequent U.S. Congressional resolution, the ARS was able to send factory-new HH-
43Fs into Indochina.34 The story of the buildup of CSAR in Indochina after August 1964
will be told in the next chapter.
Notes
31
Corona Harvest Oral History Interview, Saunders, A.W., 1 June 1963-1 June 1964. (1 July 1964,
K239.0512-168, in USAF Collection, AFHRA), C-1. Document declassified on 19 Aug 1992.
32
33
Ibid., 16.
34
Ibid., 19.
14
Lessons Learned
To me it has always been a source of wonder and pride that the most
potent and destructive military force ever known should create a special
service dedicated to saving life. Its concept is typically American…we
hold human lives to be the most precious commodity on earth.
BG Thomas J. Dubose, Commander, ARS (1952-59)
Many lessons should have been learned from the first four years of U.S. military
involvement in Indochina. Three major issues surface: first, the necessity for joint or
service doctrine for combat search and rescue; second, the requirement for clear
command and control relationships; and third, the need for trained and educated
professional CSAR personnel in C2 nodes and crews flying missions.
The U.S. military in general and the Air Force specifically abrogated their
responsibilities to organize, train, and equip CSAR forces to recover their most precious
commodity, people. In a climate dominated by nuclear warfare, the services paid little
attention to preparing for conventional warfare, and were remiss in building a capability
to fly combat missions to rescue isolated combatants. When USAF doctrine was
promulgated, it boldly stated that CSAR was to be a “come-as-you-are” mission. The
services were not going to invest in CSAR equipment or personnel. In their defense,
tough times did call for tough decisions, and CSAR was relegated to a “discretionary,” ad
hoc status.
Major Saunders’ description of coordinating his CSAR study through dual channels is
illustrative of the necessity of clear command and control relationships. The principle of
unity of command should ensure concentration of effort for every objective under one
responsible commander. In the early days of the Indochina conflict, the organization
charged with coordinating CSAR efforts in theater, the SARCC, was beholden to two
immediate commanders. This resulted in lives lost.
Lastly, the lack of codification of the body of knowledge (doctrine) on how to
conduct CSAR C2 led to a “pick-up” game mentality on the part of the Det. 3 personnel.
The requirement to use “rescue” assets that had no standard rescue training, techniques,
or procedures bordered on criminal, because it resulted in the unnecessary loss of lives.
The ramshackle character of CSAR operations is evidenced in the lack of statistical
15
evidence concerning the success of rescues from April 1962 to August 1964.
Fortunately, the ARS professionals had almost nine more years of CSAR missions in
Indochina to perfect their CSAR C2 organization and provide rescue coverage for their
brothers in arms.
16
Chapter 3
INDOCHINA (1964-73)
When the history of the war in Vietnam is finally written, the story of Air
Rescue may well become one of the most outstanding human dramas in the
entire history of the Air Force.
Secretary of the Air Force, Harold Brown
CSAR C2, based on experience, was off to a good start by the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin
Congressional resolution. ARS personnel in Indochina had used the previous two years
to grow into an effective combat organization through experimentation and practice.
However, the next nine years held even more improvements. Unfettered by the covert
nature of the war previous to the Gulf of Tonkin resolution, the buildup of combat power,
specifically aviation, required the buildup of CSAR forces. Concurrent with the U.S.
buildup, the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong began introducing large numbers of light-
medium anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) and more small arms. The proliferation of 12.7-
mm, 14.5-mm, 37-mm, and 57-mm AAA was particularly lethal to low, slow-flying
rescue helicopters.
In an effort to conserve their valuable aircraft, rescue helicopter crews refused to fly
into a threat area until other assets had located the survivor. ARS rescue staff supported
the crews’ reluctance to fly into threat areas prior to locating survivors.35 To locate
survivors, the now famous Search and Rescue Task Force (SARTF) was codified and
utilized. The SARTF also fulfilled a secondary role of tactical/mission-level C2. It
initially consisted of fixed-wing search aircraft, rescue helicopters, and rescue escort
Notes
35
Interview with Col. James V. Berryhill, 2 May 1977, in Earl H. Tilford, Jr., The USAF Search and
Rescue in Southeast Asia, 1961-1975. (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office,1980), 62. And in
USAF Collection, AFHRA), 49. Document declassified on 28 March 2001.
17
aircraft. In late 1964, the task force consisted of HU-16 amphibious planes and HH-43
helicopters, with A-1 Skyraiders (Sandys) and F-100s in an escort role.
The HU-16 was primarily a search aircraft but it also served as an airborne command
and control aircraft. It functioned as a communication relay station between the SARCC
and the SARTF. In its C2 role, it would determine what other assets were needed for the
rescue, brief the SARTF on survivor information, and relay the threat situation. The
helicopters were the primary pickup vehicles, however the amphibious HU-16 could do
water pickups. Lastly, the escort aircraft would suppress ground and air threats to the
SARTF. In its C2 role, the escort aircraft would act as a platform for on-scene command
and determine the survivor’s location/health status as well as the threat situation. While
specific aircraft changed over time, the SARTF remained the focal point of tactical-level
CSAR command and control for the rest of the Indochina conflict.
The following is a description of the SARTF in action.
A typical search and rescue for the period occurred on June 23, 1965,
when Maj. Robert Wilson’s F-105 was hit by ground fire while on a
mission over southwestern North Vietnam. Wilson could not fly his
damaged Thunderchief over a ridgeline, so he ejected. After a normal
descent he found himself suspended upside down in a tree 150 feet above
the jungle floor. Wilson managed to swing into a crotch of the tree where
he wiggled out of his parachute harness. He then took out his survival
knife and cut a small branch from the tree. Wilson used the branch to snag
his seat pack which contained all his survival equipment. After drawing
the pack over to where he stood, he retrieved his URC-11 survival radio.
Wilson contacted the HC-54 airborne rescue command post called
“Crown” which, in response to his mayday, had moved off its orbit along
the Thai-Laotian border and now flew nearby. Half an hour later four Air
Force A-1 Skyraiders droned into view and contacted the survivor. Soon
the pilots spotted Wilson’s chute and, after radioing the downed pilot’s
exact position to Crown, flew to an orbit several miles away so as not to
reveal Wilson’s location to any enemy troops that might be lurking
nearby. Had Wilson or the A-1 pilots spotted the enemy, the A-1s would
have attacked them with 20-mm cannon fire, rockets, and fragmentation
bombs. Ninety minutes after Wilson’s ejection, an HH-53, from a forward
operating base in Laos, showed up. Wilson fired off a small flare that was
part of his survival equipment. The Huskie pilots spotted it and moved
their chopper directly overhead while the parajumper lowered the
penetrator through the foliage. Wilson grabbed it, strapped himself on,
and began his ascent to the helicopter. A few hours later, safe at the
18
Nakhon Phanom officer’s club, Wilson set up drinks for the chopper
pilots. The next day he returned to Korat.36
CSAR command and control wasn’t always so easy, and the tactical-level SARTF
wasn’t the only C2 improvement. By the summer of 1965, unfettered by political
limitations, large numbers of temporary duty (TDY) rescue forces converted to
permanent party, although tours were only a year long. The professionalism of rescue
forces rose with the introduction of longer-tour personnel.37 Additionally, on 1 July
1965, Det 3, Pacific Air Rescue Center was re-flagged as the 38th Air Rescue Squadron.
The new 38th ARS’s primary mission remained manning the newly-named Joint Search
and Rescue Center (JSARC) in the Air Operations Center (AOC) at Tan Son Nhut AB.38
The JSARC became truly joint in December 1965, with the assignment of a U.S. Navy
rescue officer.39
The JSARCs’ primary mission remained overall control for the coordination of rescue
activities in Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and most of Vietnam. Similar to the infamous
“route package” system, the Navy had primary CSAR responsibility over water and along
the coast of North Vietnam. Despite the Seventh Fleet task force commander’s CSAR
responsibilities, the JSARC still exercised overall CSAR C2 for the theater. The Air
Force operated two regional rescue control centers at Da Nang and Udorn, which
coordinated activities through the JSARC. The following figure illustrates the
geographical responsibilities for CSAR in Indochina.
Notes
36
Earl H. Tilford, Jr., The USAF Search and Rescue in Southeast Asia, 1961-1975. (Washington D.C.:
Government Printing Office,1980), 66.
37
38
39
CINCPAC message to CINCPACFLT, 270047Z Dec 1965, in Earl H. Tilford, Jr., The USAF Search and
Rescue in Southeast Asia, 1961-1975. (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1980), 74.
19
Figure 2 Designated Indochina CSAR Sectors
Source: Office of Naval Research Report, Navy Combat Search

and Rescue. (Washington, D.C.: Naval Air Systems Command,
September 1979)
The JSARC was manned twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week by a rescue
officer controller, non-commissioned officer, and radio operator. The staff analyzed the
tactical operations plan for the following day’s joint Air Force/Navy air strike sorties, and
then issued a fragmentary order (FRAGO) to rescue assets. The FRAGO included a
communication plan, alert schedule, and helicopter preposition site assignments.40 By
1966, CSAR C2 was a well-oiled machine, with standard operating procedures and
working doctrine.
Notes
40
Corona Harvest Report, Joint Search and Rescue Center (JSARC) in Southeast Asia, 1954-31 March
1968. (20 March 1969, in JPRA library), 158.
20
In recognition of the yeomen service that Air Rescue Service was providing in
Indochina and to the NASA space program, it was re-designated the Aerospace Rescue
and Recovery Service (ARRS) on 8 January 1966. The influx of more aircraft and
personnel also spelled organizational changes in Indochina. The 3rd Aerospace Rescue
and Recovery Group stood up at Tan Son Nhut to provide administrative and operational
control for all ARRS personnel and aircraft in theater. 41
CSAR’s Heyday
By 1966, the dismal days that saw air operations conducted without
effective rescue forces had passed. A downed aircrew, depending on
where it was located, could look forward to at least a one in three chance
of rescue.
Earl H. Tilford, Jr.
By the time the Rolling Thunder (1966-67) aerial strike campaign commenced, the
doctrine for CSAR command and control had been ironed out, and improvements to
CSAR overall capability were focused on upgrading the rescue equipment. Longer range
HC-130 aircraft replaced HU-16s and HU-54s, heavier-lift HH-53 helicopters replaced
HH-43s and HH-3s, heavier-armed A-1 and OV-10 escorts replaced 0-1s and 0-2s, and F-
4 fighters replaced F-100s. In-flight refueling capability was added to the rescue
helicopters to extend their range and shorten their response time. Helicopter aerial
refueling capability was added to the HC-130, bolstering its multiple-mission capability.
The JSARC, by necessity, grew adept at integrating every type of strike asset. It was
not unusual for B-52s, Navy A-6s, A-7s, F-105s, and AC-119/130s to divert from their
primary missions to aid in a CSAR mission. The JSARC controller’s ability to visualize
the four-dimensional battle space (including time) and synchronize strike sorties to
support the rescue effort grew apace with improvements to equipment and organization.
The ability to visualize the threat to the survivor and the SARTF was paramount to the
JSARC controllers and improved, as one might expect, with experience and the
dedication of resources to the mission. The well-oiled CSAR C2 organization could
successfully improvise during its heyday.
Notes
41
21
The following narrative of the SARTF in action on 15 February 1969 highlights
combat power, bravery, and fine-tuned procedures.
A rescue effort for the pilot of an F-4, down in the enemy-infested A Shau
Valley area near the Laos-South Vietnam border, dragged into its second
day. Enemy 37-mm and 57-mm antiaircraft gunners shot down and killed
the on-scene commander, Sandy (A-1s) Low lead. The whole effort to
rescue the F-4 pilot seemed in jeopardy. Any attempt to use the Jolly
Greens (HH-53s) would have been suicidal. The only hope of success
seemed to be with use of riot control munitions. A-1s, loaded with CBU-
19 (tear gas), took off from Pleiku Air Base, Vietnam, and reached the A
Shau Valley half an hour later. Braving the constant hail of antiaircraft
fire, the Skyraiders made the required mile-long run at 300 feet and 220
knots to hit all their targets – enemy antiaircraft gun positions. While the
gunners choked, coughed, cried, and retched uncontrollably, a Jolly Green,
with its crew wearing gas masks swooped in and saved the pilot.42
As alluded to earlier, helicopters were not the only recovery rescue asset available.
JSARC personnel were well versed in using disparate assets like special operations
ground teams, Marine and Army long-range reconnaissance teams, and Air America
(CIA) aircraft to rescue isolated personnel. Lt. Col. William M. Harris, IV, 37th ARRS
commander, expounds, “During my tour, rescue efforts have called upon every
conceivable military resource as well as commercial air (Air America), special ground
force teams, clandestine operations, frogmen, aircraft carriers, tanks, and so on. There is
no limitation on tactics or concepts to be employed to effect a rescue.”43 Many U.S. and
South Vietnamese airmen were recovered by means other than the traditional SARTF.
The JSARC showed great ability to coordinate such disparate assets.
The numerical peak of the ARRS strength occurred in the summer of 1969. The 3rd
Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Group commanded four squadrons and seventy-one
rescue-dedicated aircraft.44 The change in U.S. presidents and incoming President
Nixon’s new strategy of Vietnamization for the war spelled the end to the heyday of
CSAR in Indochina. Vietnamization meant turning over combat equipment and
responsibility to the South Vietnamese. However, the technologically advanced CSAR-
Notes
42
Government Printing Office, 1980), 96.
43
CORONA HARVEST End of tour report, Lt Col William M. Harris, IV, Commander, 37th ARRS (10
Jun 1972, K318.2131, in USAF Collection, AFHRA), 2.
44
CHECO Report, USAF Search and Rescue (SAR) in SEA, 1 Apr 1972-30 Jun 1973. (27 Nov 1974,
K717.0414-1, in USAF Collection, AFHRA), 14. Document declassified on 31 Dec 1982.
22
dedicated aircraft were not turned over to the South Vietnamese; instead, U.S. CSAR-
dedicated aircraft were drawn down. The new strategy proved workable for U.S. Army
equipment and doctrine, but woefully lacking for aviation.
The aviation-heavy emphasis of CSAR proved unworkable for the South Vietnamese
Air Force. First, by the early 1970s, the ARRS standard equipment was too expensive for
South Vietnam to obtain and maintain. Second, at the risk of sounding elitist, the CSAR
C2 structure of the re-designated Joint Rescue Control Center (JRCC) and the SARTF
was extremely complicated for the nascent South Vietnamese Air Force. Third, the
cultural ethos Americans brought to CSAR was lacking among the South Vietnamese.
The U.S. cultural emphasis on the value of the individual meant that all available
servicemen responded to the mayday call. The influence of Buddhism and other cultural
factors induced a form of fatalism among the South Vietnamese that was not conducive
to rescue. There was an aspect of South Vietnamese culture that squelched the desire to
risk it all for one.45
The heyday of CSAR was also eroded in the early 1970s because of the nature of the
threat. Concurrent with the draw-down in US combat power came the rise in
conventional warfare capability of the North Vietnamese. No longer satisfied with
insurgency warfare, the North Vietnamese began strengthening their conventional army
with more equipment and personnel. This transformation brought significant numbers of
surface-to-air missiles (SA-2, 3, and 7s) into their ranks. Up to this time, the relatively
low threat environment made for easy CSAR C2 decisions. When notified of a Mayday
call, emergency locator beacon, or overdue aircraft, the JRCC immediately launched or
diverted search aircraft into the suspected crash area. When the survivor was located, the
CSARTF had the imbedded firepower to deal with the primary threat (light to medium
AAA) to rescue forces. But by the 1970s, CSAR decision-makers were slow to recognize
the impact that more lethal threats would have on the CSARTF concept.
Despite the draw-down in numbers of rescue-dedicated aircraft and personnel and the
rise in threat, the CSAR organization in Indochina continued to do yeoman work. During
the course of the eleven-day rescue operation (April 1972) for BAT-21B (Lt Col Iceal E.
Notes
45
CHECO Report, USAF Search and Rescue (SAR) in SEA, 1 Jul 1969-31 Dec 1970. (23 Apr 1971,
K717.0414-1, in USAF Collection, AFHRA), 73-81. Document classified, pages cited declassified on 16
May 2003.
23
Hambleton, an EB-66 electronic warfare officer), at least three aircraft were lost and
eleven potential rescuers killed.46 Numerous strike sorties dedicated to support
operations elsewhere were diverted to support the rescue operation. Their diversion
meant incalculable others were not supported. The JRCC imposed a no-fire zone around
Lt Col Hambleton and continued to push rescue aircraft over his location. This meant
that South Vietnamese troops could not effectively interdict a North Vietnamese army
offensive south through their area. The no-fire restriction may have caused South
Vietnamese to lose their lives. Ultimately, Lt Col Hambleton facilitated his own rescue
by floating down a river to a JRCC-arranged rendezvous with a Marine unit in a sampan
boat.47
The BAT-21 rescue mission near the end of CSAR operations in Indochina best
illustrates the central command and control question for CSAR. Is the risk involved in
rescuing one service member worth it? Should we commit to a rescue attempt based on
threat, geography, and our capabilities? This central question illustrates that C2 is the
dependent variable in successful CSAR. Even after ten years of CSAR in Indochina,
there were no written guidelines/regulations that specified when survivors were on their
own. There was a general expectation among American servicemen that they would
always be rescued.
Brigadier General R.G. Cross, Jr., USAF, Deputy Director of Air Operations, MACV
commented, “I believe that it is a definite morale factor that every person that flew over
here felt that if he was to go down that there was some chance he would be rescued.
However, I feel also that there was a tendency on the part of the aircrews to expect that
they must be rescued above the requirements of the battle situation at any one time and as
airmen or soldiers or sailors we should expect that there are times when as one person we
must be sacrificed for the overall.”48 Only effective command could weigh the risk and
answer the go/no-go question.
Notes
46
The definitive account and analysis of the BAT 21B CSAR is in The Rescue of BAT 21 by Darrel D.
Whitcomb.
47
CHECO Report, USAF Search and Rescue (SAR) in SEA, 1 Apr1972-30 Jun 1973. (27 Nov 1974,
48
CHECO Report, USAF Search and Rescue (SAR) in SEA, 1 Apr1972-30 Jun 1973. (27 Nov 1974,
24
After the Vietnam ceasefire agreement in January 1973, the ARRS and JRCC moved
to Thailand to continue to support operations in Laos and Cambodia. The last pure
CSAR mission in Indochina was conducted in early January 1973, before the move. The
ARRS personnel stayed busy nonetheless with CSAR exercises, evacuation planning and
execution (Cambodia/South Vietnam), and hostage recovery missions (Mayaguez). From
1 April 1962 to 15 December 1975, when the Joint Rescue Coordination Center closed
for business, the ARRS professionals had overcome many hurdles.49 In combat, they
had sculpted a C2 organization that suited the conditions of Indochina. Yet even at the
end, they had not conquered the ultimate C2 question: Should we launch?
In his seminal history of USAF Search and Rescue, Earl H. Tilford lists two lessons
learned from the ARRS experience in Indochina. First, readiness: the ability to perform
successful CSAR requires C2, personnel, and equipment ready to fight immediately.
Second, flexibility: possession of the “spirit of innovation and ingenuity that made
combat rescue successful in the wars of Southeast Asia.” Tilford’s analysis is sound,
however there are a few more lessons to be learned.
Lessons Learned
Experience gleaned from the first two years of professional CSAR involvement in
Indochina allowed later CSAR efforts to be successful once the Vietnam War went
conventional in late summer 1964. After the Gulf of Tonkin resolution, three major
issues in CSAR C2 surfaced: first, command and control functions can not be
accomplished by a single person or organization; second, the ability to control many
disparate types of assets is crucial to effective CSAR C2; and third, ultimately someone
has to be in command and make smart decisions on whether to initiate a rescue attempt.
With the rise of the SARTF and the routine diversion to the rescue effort of a myriad
of assets, the mechanisms to exercise tactical control had to be robust and redundant.
The majority of the assets belonged to the US Air Force, so it was helpful for the
JSRC/JRCC to be collocated with the Tactical Air Control Center at Tan Son Nhut. The
ability to reach any or all of the weapon system experts was invaluable when trying to
conduct CSAR with non-rescue organic aircraft. The Tactical Air Control Center was
Notes
49
Government Printing Office, 1980), 154.
25
one of the few places in Indochina that had all the weapon systems represented and the
connectivity. The SARTF required an airborne control center and the overall rescue
effort needed an on-scene commander. These C2 positions needed codified mission
descriptions so that all players knew their role.
Closely related, CSAR was truly a joint operation. In Indochina, it was routine to
integrate Navy strike aircraft, special operations ground teams, Air America (CIA)
aircraft, Army helicopters, or Marine long-range reconnaissance personnel in a rescue
mission/SARTF. Thus, those who commanded and controlled rescue missions had to be
versed in the capabilities/limitations of all these joint assets. At a minimum, they had to
have access to those who had the knowledge to enable effective integration of all the
contributions to the rescue effort. Experience in the later years of the conflict in
Indochina proved that CSAR C2 couldn’t be effective as a pick-up game.
Lastly, the ultimate question in CSAR command and control revolves around whether
or not to employ assets in the rescue attempt. No story highlights this quandary better
than the Bat 21 rescue operation. Bat 21 involved many rescue attempts, loss of rescue
assets and personnel, and it affected the larger war. There are myriad factors in the
CSAR launch decision calculus. Weather, geography, threat, survivor health, and
recovery vehicle capabilities are just a few. Interviews after the BAT-21 rescue attempt
highlight that there were no regulations or guidelines for the JRCC or higher commanders
to lean on to make their decision. Command and control is fundamentally about making
decisions. Ultimately, the CSAR C2 decision-making apparatus revolved around the
experience and training of the individual(s) making the decisions. Luckily, the CSAR C2
decision makers had over a decade to gain the necessary education and institutional
memory. Yet in the case of the Bat 21 rescue, commanders underestimated the threat and
they made the wrong decision.
The first chapter presented statistics that seemed to indicate that CSAR in Vietnam
was very successful, indeed more successful than in Operation Desert Storm. It also
presented a measure of merit that is more comprehensive in assessing the success of
CSAR. This measure of merit includes number of rescue forces lost. This formula
asserts that the success of CSAR cannot be ascertained without accounting for the value
26
of the lives and equipment lost in rescue attempts. The following table uses this formula
and is drawn from a U.S. Navy report on CSAR in Indochina.
Navy CSAR Air Force CSAR
Table 1 Summary of Navy and Air Force CSAR rescues in Indochina
Source: Office of Naval Research Report, Navy Combat Search

and Rescue. (Washington, D.C.: Naval Air Systems Command,
September 1979)
The better SAR loss-per-save ratios for the Navy reflect the higher number of CSAR
missions conducted in relatively benign threat areas, characteristic of over-water
situations. The total all-service numbers are:
A. Total CSAR Rescues: 778
B. CSAR Aircraft lost: 109
C. CSAR Personnel lost: 76
CSAR Loss per Save:
CSAR Aircraft 778/109 = 1 loss per 7.1 rescues
CSAR Personnel 778/76 = 1 loss per 10.2 rescues
The heyday of CSAR in Indochina was dependent on three factors: first, the length of
the conflict evolved mature doctrine and organization; second, the rescue-dedicated
27
aircraft improved dramatically in capability; third, the flying in the majority of the
country was relatively low-threat. Towards the end of the war, when the number of
experienced personnel and aircraft were drawing down and the threat to rescuers was
going up, it wasn’t the rescuers and their equipment that failed. It was the commanders
and decision makers at C2 nodes, who didn’t identify the higher risk to the CSARTF.
Despite all the experience, sometimes commanders made poor decisions and sacrificed
more personnel and equipment. The next chapter on the 1991 Gulf War will explore the
legacy of Indochina CSAR decision making in more detail.
28
Chapter 4
GULF WAR (1990-91)
I was appalled at the situation with CSAR prior to (Desert Shield/Storm)

starting…I thought that the Air Force leadership had been very
shortsighted…The decision made by the corporate Air Force was to spend
the absolute minimum on SAR or CSAR, and we would leave that
responsibility to somebody else.
Buster C. Glosson
On the eve of the invasion of Kuwait by the Iraqi military in late summer 1990, the
US military had again relegated CSAR to a secondary mission at best. The dominant
paradigm consisted of US military forces resisting the invasion of Warsaw Pact forces
through the Fulda Gap on the European plains. Most military planners accepted the fact
that combat rescue of isolated personnel among the high-threat Soviet military forces
would not be feasible. So faced with an insurmountable task, the US military logically
forgot about CSAR.
In the USAF during the mid-1980s, the 23rd Air Force was the numbered air force
responsible for CSAR. In light of the growing strength of Special Operations Forces
(SOF), the USAF approved the plan to transfer all rescue HC-130s and HH-53s to SOF in
May 1986. This left the Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Service (ARRS) with the old
HH-3 rescue helicopter. The HH-3 had been originally replaced by the HH-53 during the
heyday of CSAR in Indochina, 20 years earlier. The ARRS had also decommissioned its
UH-1N fleet. The ARRS had some new but generic UH-60A helicopters, which had very
little combat capability. 23rd Air Force concluded that after the transfer to SOF, “all the
29
assets remaining in rescue units were non-combat capable.”50 Further compounding the
problem, the new SOF units did not take the CSAR mission with the new assets. Per Air
Staff direction, the designed operational capability (DOC) statement for SOF units did
not include combat search and rescue.51
General Cassidy, Military Airlift Command (MAC) commander, vowed to fix the loss
of USAF CSAR capability. First, he reorganized air rescue by divorcing ARRS from 23rd
Air Force. ARRS re-activated as the Air Rescue Service (ARS) on August 8, 1989 at
McClellan AFB, CA. This left 23rd Air Force focused on Special Operations and gave
General Cassidy full responsibility for USAF CSAR. Second, he pressed the
procurement program for HH-60G combat rescue helicopters. The new ARS published
its mission statement accepting the CSAR mission on 2 July 1990.52
Air Rescue Service (ARS) is the focal point for USAF rescue.
The missions of ARS include combat rescue, peacetime SAR,

humanitarian SAR, support for the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration, and worldwide USAF Rescue Coordination Center
activity.53
The primary mission of ARS is combat rescue which traditionally involves

the helicopter recovery of downed aircrew members from a hostile
environment, usually supported by HC-130 tankers and dedicated fighter
aircraft.54
Unlike the ARS of the late 1950s, the ARS of the late 1980s understood its primary
mission was to recover isolated personnel in combat. However, very much like the
earlier ARS, it did not have the equipment completely fielded to successfully conduct the
mission in Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM.
Notes
50
Lt Col Joe E. Tyner, AF Rescue and AFSOF: Overcoming Past Rivalries for Combat Rescue Partnership
Tomorrow. (National Defense Fellows Program, HQ USAF and Air University, undated) in Darrel D.
Whitcomb, Mixed Bag: Combat Search and Rescue in DESERT STORM. (Un-published edition, 3 Feb
2003), 20.
51
Military Airlift Command History CY90, Vol 1 in Darrel D. Whitcomb, Mixed Bag: Combat Search and
Rescue in DESERT STORM. (Un-published edition, 3 Feb 2003), 24.
52
History of Air Rescue Service, 1 Jan-31 Dec 1990, Volume I. (HQ MAC, K318.2, in USAF Collection,
AFHRA), 2.
53
Ibid. 3.
54
Ibid. 6.
30
In the US Navy, a similar story was playing out. In testimony before the House
Armed Services Committee in 1983, Admiral Paul T. Gilchrist summarized Navy CSAR
investment:
Coming out of Vietnam, having learned much about the survivability of
aircraft in a modern threat environment, but faced with a very constrained
budget to work with, the Navy was really faced with a choice to either put
its resources into improved survivability or to modernize its rescue
capability. The Navy elected to do the former.55
Two Navy Reserve units, HCS-4 and HCS-5, inherited the proud heritage of CSAR
earned by the HC-7 squadron in Indochina. At the start of the Gulf War, they were better
equipped with HH-60H Seahawks than their ARS brethren. Downed Airman Locator
System (DALS) was a critical capability that USN rescue HH-60s had over the ARS H-
3s. DALS allowed rescue aircraft to home in on discrete channels resident in the new
PRC-112 survival radio. The only drawback to USN CSAR capability was its
organization in the Reserve component. This was a drawback because deploying the
units required a Presidential Selected Reserve Call-up (PSRC). This requirement meant
that USN CSAR capability did not deploy until December 1990.56
Deployment wasn’t just a USN problem though. The deployment of US military
forces to the Persian Gulf region was administered on a time schedule called the Time
Phased Force Deployment List (TPFDL). The ARS forces identified on the TPFDL to
deploy in case of war in the Persian Gulf region were not available when alerted to
deploy. Many of the units no longer existed and some were not coded combat capable.
The conversion from HH-3 to HH-60 was underway, and minimal combat-capable
aircraft were available. ARS was not ready for CSAR at the start of the Gulf War.
The JFC, General H. Norman Schwarzkopf (CENTCOM commander), could not
accept the long train-up and organization time that CSAR in the Indochina conflict took.
He also understood that ARS was not ready for the war. He pragmatically assigned
Notes
55
House Armed Services Committee testimony by Admiral Paul T. Gilchrist, Director, Aviation Plans and
Requirements Division, Washington, D.C., 5 April 1983, in Major Rickey L. Rife, “Combat Search and
Rescue, a Lesson we fail to Learn.” (Unpublished Research Paper, School of Advanced Military Studies,
Fort Leavenworth, Ks: May 1994), 15.
56
Detachment Summary Report, Helicopter Combat Support Special Squadron 4 (HCS-4), DESERT
SHIELD/STORM, 9 DEC 90-20 Mar 91 in Darrel D. Whitcomb, Mixed Bag: Combat Search and Rescue
in DESERT STORM. (Un-published edition, 3 Feb 2003), 42.
31
command of the theater CSAR mission to his SOF component, Special Operations
Command, Central Command (SOCCENT).57 Military planners recognized, particularly
in light of the high threat level, that the combat rescue capable assets and experience now
resided in SOF. Col Jesse Johnson, SOCCENT commander, tasked his aviation
component, Air Force Special Operations Command, Central Command (AFSOCCENT)
as “the single manager for all CSAR aviation.”58 Col George Gray, AFSOCCENT
commander, and his deputy, Col Ben Orrell, were well qualified to provide command and
control for CSAR. Col Orrell had earned the Air Force Cross for combat rescue in
Indochina.59
Unfortunately, unity of command was not achieved, because the war plan also
designated Lt Gen Chuck Horner, Commander, US Central Command Air Force
(COMUSCENTAF), as the SAR Coordinator. OPLAN 1002-90 defined SAR
Coordinator as:
SAR Coordinator (SC)- The designated SAR representative of the area
commander, with overall responsibility and authority for operation of the
JRCC and for joint SAR operations within the assigned geographical
area.60
According to the war plan, Lt Gen Horner had the authority to direct components and
use assets from other components to conduct CSAR.61 Lt Gen Horner was responsible
for hosting the CENTCOM Joint Rescue Coordination Center (JRCC). The JRCC, using
Lt Gen Horner’s authority, would control and coordinate all CSAR in the theater and task
supporting components for CSAR assets.62
The CENTCOM JRCC was established at Lt Gen Horner’s Tactical Air Control
Center (TACC) in Riyadh in September. Lt Col Joe Hampton was brought into theater
from the Air Force RCC at Scott AFB to lead the JRCC. No one on his staff had CSAR
experience. In his post-conflict lessons learned, Lt Col Hampton noted:
Notes
57
Gulf War Air Power Survey, VOL IV. (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1993), 301.
58
Gulf War Air Power Survey, VOL IV. (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1993), 301.
59
Interview with Colonel Ben Orrell,1st SOW. (Hurlburt AFB, Fl.: 1st SOW, undated) in Darrel D.
2003), 30.
60
APPENDIX 6 TO ANNEX C TO USCINCCENT OPLAN 1002-90. (18 July 1990, NA-41, in USAF
Collection, AFHRA), C-6-1.
61
Ibid. C-6-2.
62
Ibid. C-6-2.
32
Deployed JRCC controllers did not receive adequate combat rescue
training prior to deployment.
Most of the people that were sent to Operation DESERT SHIELD were
not familiar with combat search and rescue (CSAR) procedures, and none
had participated in any previous exercises.
RCC controllers are trained in peacetime SAR operations. They receive

no combat SAR training during initial training at the National SAR
School.63
Major John Steube, a USMC representative to the JRCC recalled:

In the JRCC, nobody had any combat experience. There wasn’t a single
person there who was a combat SAR type. They were all the Scott AFB
guys and they had two Navy liaisons and two Marine liaisons and none of
us had any combat SAR experience… There were a lot of shortcomings
there. It was obvious to me that CSAR was an afterthought in the whole
DESERT STORM experience.64
After arriving, Lt Col Hampton realized that a SOF liaison officer in the TACC,
Captain Randy O’Boyle, had already started planning Operation DESERT STORM
CSAR operations. Integrating some of Capt. O’Boyle’s work, Lt Col Hampton produced
the theater CSAR plan.
Dated 1 Nov 1990, the OPERATION DESERT SHIELD COMBAT SEARCH AND
RESCUE PLAN, established detailed procedures for accomplishing CSAR in theater. Lt
Gen Horner endorsed the plan in writing. It detailed the capabilities and limitations of
the Army, Air Force, Marine Corps, Navy, Special Ops, Royal Saudi Air Force, French
Air Force, and Royal Air Force CSAR assets. Interestingly, in this long list, the US Air
Force stands out as the only force without rescue helicopters. The other interesting
aspect of the plan was the absolute assertion that the JRCC would only coordinate CSAR;
all rescue assets would remain under the operational control (OPCON) of their normal
command structure. Lt Col Hampton recognized that the JRCC did not have the ability to
provide command and control of the rescue helicopters.65 Lack of training, personnel,
Notes
63
Joint Universal Lessons Learned System (JULLS) # 14943-28400, (04/06/91, in JPRA library).
64
Interview with Major John Steube. (Darrel D. Whitcomb: 6 Jan 2000) in Darrel D. Whitcomb, Mixed
Bag: Combat Search and Rescue in DESERT STORM. (Un-published edition, 3 Feb 2003), 163.
65
Interview with Lt Col Joe Hampton. (Darrel D. Whitcomb: 12 Mar 2000) in Darrel D. Whitcomb, Mixed
33
equipment, and doctrine prohibited his JRCC ad hoc team from being the C2 node for all
CSAR forces.
However, the Air Force component did command and control the majority of the
search assets traditionally involved in CSAR: strike aircraft that could do the initial
search for downed aircrew (usually wingmen), E-3 (AWACS), EC-130E (ABCCC), A-10
(Sandys), and OA-10 (FAC). Strike aircraft were assisted in searching by intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets like RC-135 (Rivet Joint) and space-based
assets. Despite a lack of recovery vehicles, the USAF contribution to CSAR was
substantial.
The delineation between USAF searching and SOF rescuing led to a tense
relationship between the JRCC and SOCCENT. No quote captures the friction better
than these post-conflict comments from Lt Col Hampton:
The JRCC was not empowered to be the overall focal point for CSAR
within the AOR.
Other components perceived the JRCC to be nothing more than a

component RCC. Whenever questions arose about guidelines, authority,
or taskings, the JRCC was left out of the decision making because it was
essentially only functioning as the USCENTAF RCC. SOCCENT
representatives, therefore, did not feel they had to attend JRCC
conferences since they were on an equal footing with USCENTAF.
Accordingly, SOCCENT tried to establish itself and operate as if it were a
JRCC. SOCCENT directly coordinated and tasked other component
agencies to provide dedicated assets for CSAR, and in some cases delayed
employing them on a particular mission.
The JRCC was not the central coordination agency for CSAR. If SOF
forces are to be employed as dedicated rescue assets, then they should
coordinate with the JRCC and avoid operating independently.
Use of SOF forces to perform the dedicated CSAR mission, leads to

conflicts in roles, missions, tactics, command and control, and general
philosophy on how CSAR should be performed.66
However, Col Gray was comfortable with the theater CSAR plan. He knew that SOF
could not provide C2 for the Air Force search assets. The delineation of tasks was quite
clear: Conventional Air Force assets would locate and authenticate the survivor, and then
Notes
66
Joint Universal Lessons Learned System (JULLS) # 14951-37900, (04/06/91, in JPRA library).
34
dedicated SOF aircraft would go rescue the survivor.67 This relationship violated unity of
command for CSAR under one commander and caused friction within the C2 nodes, but
it was workable.
Desert Storm CSAR
We did not expect to be part of a SARTF that much. We expected to talk to

AWACS and the high wingman. We did not expect ourselves to be in the
old classic Sandy daisy chain.
Brigadier General Richard Comer
The quote from then Lt Col Comer, 20th SOS commander, is about how the SOF MH-
53 helicopters expected to rescue isolated personnel at night without the SARTF. Based
on the level of threat to the recovery vehicle, the SOF helicopters planned to minimize
exposure to threats by flying low-level at night and without the large signature of an
armada of aircraft to recover survivors. This concept of recovery was antithetical to
many Air Force senior leaders who flew in Indochina when the dominant paradigm was
that rescue helicopters would launch when it was certain an American was down in
“Indian” country. This old paradigm was to be painfully shattered during the next six
weeks of DESERT STORM. Combat rescue professionals had discarded that old
paradigm quickly after the Indochina conflict, but their thoughts were not communicated
to the rest of the US military. As discussed in the previous chapter, by the end of the war
in Vietnam, combat rescue professionals had realized that the threat to rescue vehicles
was rising quickly and to successfully recover isolated personnel would require a new
construct for CSAR doctrine. The notion of putting slow-moving aircraft in a medium to
high-threat area to find and then rescue survivors during daylight was ludicrous.
SOF personnel felt that the theater CSAR plan captured the new dynamics well.
USAF combat search assets would have to locate and authenticate survivors in most
cases before rescue vehicles could launch to recover them. With the coordinates for
location, SOF would then analyze the type of threat likely to be encountered and plan a
flight profile to minimize the risk to their aircraft. After the first few combat losses,
when SOF did not launch rescue helicopters, the message started to be understood. It did
Notes
67
Interview with Col George Gray. (Darrel D. Whitcomb: 3 May 2001) in Darrel D. Whitcomb, Mixed
35
not make sense to immediately launch rescue helicopters if the location and status of
isolated personnel were not reasonably known.
The JRCC maintained surveillance over all lost or potentially isolated personnel.
Similar to Indochina operations, the JRCC monitored all mayday calls and overdue
aircraft reports. JRCC monitored communications between airborne C2 platforms like
AWACS and ABCCC. The JRCC was well postured to coordinate the initial response to
shoot downs. In fact, six CSAR exercises were executed during the Operation DESERT
SHIELD to iron out C2 problems.68 The following table, based on the JRCC log,
captures all the combat losses of aircraft in or near Iraqi controlled battle space.
DATE SERVICE CALLSIGN AIRCRAFT PERSONNEL CSAR Launch? OUTCOME
17-Jan USN Sunliner 403 F-18 Lt Cmdr Speicher none/no contact MIA
RAF Norwich 02 Tornado Flt Lt Peters/Flt Lt Nichol none Captured in 1 hour
Kuwaiti AF Bergan 23 A-4 1 Man crew none Rescued by Kuwaiti Resistance in minutes
RAF Norwich 21 Tornado W ing CC Elsdon/Flt Lt Colier none KIA
USAF T-Bird 56 F-15E Major Koritz/Major Holland none KIA
USN Quicksand 12 A-6 Lt W etzel/Lt Zaun none/no contact Lost Radios & were captured with an hour
18-Jan Italian AF Caeser 44 Tornado 2 Man crew none/no contact Captured in minutes
USMC Hostage 75 OV-10 Lt Col Acree/CW O4 Hunter search effort Captured in minutes
USN Jackal 11 A-6 Lt Costen/Lt Turner search effort KIA
19-Jan USAF Stroke 65 F-16 Major Tice search effort Captured in minutes
USAF Clap 74 F-16 Captain Roberts none/no contact Captured in minutes
RAF Newport 15 Tornado Flt Lt W addington/Flt Lt Stewart none/no contact Captured in minutes
USAF Corvette 03 F-15E Col Eberly/Major Griffith search effort Both evaded for 50 hours before capture
20-Jan USN Slate 46 F-14 Lt Jones/Lt Slade rescue effort Rescued by AFSOF / Captured after 4 hours
22-Jan RAF Stamford 01 Tornado Flt Ldr Lennox/ Flt Ldr W eeks none KIA
23-Jan USAF W olf 01 F-16 Major Ball rescue effort USN rescue in Persian Gulf
24-Jan RAF Dover 02 Tornado Flt Lt Burges/Sqd Ldr Ankerson none Captured in minutes
28-Jan USMC Cat 36 AV-8 Capt Berryman search effort Captured in minutes
USAF Spirit 03 AC-130 14 Man Crew search effort KIA
2-Feb USN Heartless 531 A-6 Lt Connor/Lt Cdr Cooke search effort KIA
USAF Uzi 11 A-10 Capt Storr search effort Captured in minutes
9-Feb USMC Jump 51 AV-8 Capt Sandborn search effort Captured in minutes
13-Feb RSAF Hunter 26 F-5 1 Man crew search effort Captured
USAF Ratchet 75 EF-111 Capt Bradt/Capt Eichenlaub search effort KIA
14-Feb RAF Belfast 41 Tornado Flt Lt Clark/Flt Lt Hicks none Captured in minutes/KIA
USAF Enfield 37/38 2 x A-10 Capt Phyliss/Lt Sweet none KIA/Captured in minutes
17-Feb USAF Benji 53 F-16 Capt Thomas rescue effort Rescued by ARSOF
19-Feb USAF Nail 53 OA-10 Lt Col Fox none Captured in minutes
20-Feb USA Tango 15 OH-58 2 man crew search effort KIA
23-Feb USMC Pride 16 AV-8 Capt W ilbourn none KIA
25-Feb USMC Jump 42 AV-8 Capt W alsh none Recovered by USMC in minutes
USMC Pepper 77 OV-10 Major Small/Capt Spellacy none Captured in minutes/KIA
USA AH-64 Capt Klingele/CW 4 Butler none Recovered by flight member AH-64 in minutes
27-Feb USMC Magic 14 AV-8 Capt Underwood rescue effort KIA
USA UH-1 4 man crew rescue effort 3 KIA/ one recovered by USA
USA UH-60 6 man crew rescue effort 6 KIA
USAF Mutt 41 F-16 Capt Andrews rescue effort Captured in minutes
USA Bengal 15 UH-60 8 Person Crew none 5 KIA/3 Captured in minutes
Search effort - when location questionable

Rescue effort - when location determined
Table 2 Combat Losses in Iraqi Controlled Battle Space
Sources: Author’s collation of archival data.

Notes
68
Gulf War Air Power Summary, VOL V. (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1993), 180.
36
The numbers show that the coalition lost 39 aircraft and 85 potential survivors in or
near Iraqi controlled battle space. Of the 85 potential survivors, 47 were killed in action
and 26 were captured within minutes upon landing, leaving 12 isolated personnel (14%)
who had a reasonable chance of being rescued.
The CSAR command and control for these 12 isolated personnel was adequate.69 On
the first day of air war, two of the 12 personnel were put into difficult situations. First,
Sunliner 403, Lt Cmdr Michael Speicher never made a MAYDAY call which was heard.
His flight mates never saw him shot down or eject. No CSAR attempt was made because
no one reasonably knew where he was or if he survived. His status was initially reported
as missing in action (MIA). It was changed to KIA after the war but recently has been
returned to MIA. Second, Bergan 23, a Kuwaiti A-4 pilot was shot down by AAA and
ejected over Kuwait. Kuwaiti resistance soldiers quickly picked him up.
Corvette 03, was a USAF F-15E shot down near Al Qaim, an area of western Iraq
covered by extensive surface-to-air missile (SAM) threat and large troop concentrations.
70
The area was nicknamed “Sam’s town” due to large number of SAMs. The two-man
crew of Colonel Dave Eberly and Major Tom Griffith evaded capture for over 50 hours
after ejection. The flight lead reported the shoot down and rough coordinates. Lt Col
Hampton, JRCC director, wanted to launch helicopters. When the request was passed to
SOF, they wanted to wait for the survivors to be better located and authenticated. SOF
initially felt that the high threat area precluded a rescue helicopter doing a search of the
area for survivors that whom no one had spoken.
The next night, two separate flights of aircraft made voice contact with Corvette 03.
The first aircraft commander had no idea who Corvette 03 was. He was neither briefed
that there were downed aircrew near the area where he was flying nor prepared to
authenticate the survivors. However, he did report the contact. The second contact was
luckily made between Major Griffith and his squadron commander, Lt Col Steve Turner.
Notes
69
The narrative of the CSAR C2 of these 12 isolated personnel is drawn heavily from Darrel D.
2003).
70
Corvette 03 is the most controversial CSAR incident of Desert Storm. To get a better understanding for
the incident, I recommend Rick Atkinson, Crusade. (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1993), pp.
124-139; Tom Clancy and General Chuck Horner, Every Man A Tiger. (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons,
1999), pp. 397-410; and especially Darrel D. Whitcomb, Mixed Bag: Combat Search and Rescue in
DESERT STORM. (Un-published edition, 3 Feb 2003), pp. 78-88.
37
While Lt Col Turner didn’t authenticate Corvette 03 using CSAR standard procedures,
the two men’s close relationship was enough for SOF to launch a rescue attempt using
forces out of Turkey.
Unfortunately, diplomatic problems arose which delayed the rescue attempt. To
minimize the en-route flight time and threat to the rescue helicopters, a MH-53 two-ship
formation was to fly out of southwestern Turkey through Syrian airspace to orbit along
the border near Al Qaim. It took time to obtain the diplomatic clearance for over-flight
from the Syrians. Once the helicopters got to their orbit location, the high wingman/on-
scene commander that the helicopters had requested was a no-show. They had requested
a fighter-type aircraft to remain in high orbit near the area to help search for and
authenticate Corvette 03, plus destroy ground to air threats if necessary.
Not wanting to waste the sortie, the two helicopters made radio calls for Corvette 03
and drew intense AAA fire onto their location in the process. It was apparent that the
Iraqis were direction finding the radio calls and using the information to aim their AAA
guns. After searching and without a response from Corvette 03, the MH-53s flew back to
Turkey. Unbeknownst to the MH-53 crews, Col Eberly and Major Griffith had already
been taken prisoner after over two days on the ground.
However, the day prior, MH-53s based in Saudi Arabia had been successful in
making the first rescue by US forces. Slate 46, a US Navy F-14 was shot down by an
SA-2 near H-1 airfield in western Iraq. A member of their strike package was able to
radio ejection and rough location of the two-man crew to AWACS. The JRCC received
this information and diverted an on scene commander (OSC) to orbit over the survivors.
With voice contact and a rough location in a relatively low-threat area, a single SOF MH-
53 launched to recover the two survivors. It searched for almost half an hour in the
general location provided (about 50 miles south of the real location) without contact. The
MH-53, by then low on fuel and options, returned to Saudi Arabia.
In the meantime, AWACS continued providing airborne command and control to the
search effort by pushing A-10s into the search area. Their efforts paid off, when one of
the A-10 (Sandys) made voice contact with Lt Devon Jones, pilot of Slate 46. With voice
contact and direction finding equipment the A-10s steered to his position. Hearing the A-
10 make voice contact with Lt Jones, the MH-53 crew flew back into Iraq in daylight
38
with another MH-53 to rescue Slate 46. After rendezvousing with the A-10 (Sandys),
the MH-53 finally landed less than 100 meters from the pilot, Lt Jones. Unfortunately,
the radar intercept officer (RIO), Lt Larry Slade had been captured hours earlier, after
evading the enemy for almost four hours.
Wolf 01, a USAF F-16 piloted by Major Jon Ball issued an AWACS-monitored
MAYDAY call after his aircraft erupted in flames after striking targets in Kuwait City.
Major Ball turned his dying jet out over the waters of the Persian Gulf and safely ejected.
AWACS contacted the JRCC, which tasked the Navy to rescue the pilot. An SH-60
helicopter with Navy SEALs aboard, quickly plucked Major Ball from the dangerous
waters off the coast of Kuwait.
Benji 53, a USAF F-16 piloted by Capt Scott Thomas had its engine fail over
southern Iraq. Turning south for Saudi Arabia, Capt Thomas ejected when the engine
irretrievably seized. The alerted AWACS continually pushed USAF strike aircraft over
Capt Thomas’s position to maintain contact and act as an on-scene commander (OSC).
Meanwhile two US Army SOF MH-60 helicopters based along the Saudi/Iraqi border
launched to recover Benji 53 roughly 60 miles into Iraq.71
Jump 42, a USMC AV-8 Harrier piloted by Capt Scott Walsh was hit and severely
damaged by an infrared heat seeking missile while providing close air support over
Kuwait. Attempting to land at soon-to-be-liberated Al Jaber airfield in Kuwait, Capt
Walsh had to eject from his badly crippled aircraft. An airborne forward air controller
(FAC) working with him radioed his situation to the Marine Corps TACC. Within
minutes of being on the ground Capt Walsh linked up with USMC ground forces and was
returned to friendly control. Despite JRCC participation, this rescue dramatically
highlights the importance of immediate notification and locating of isolated personnel in
proper C2 of CSAR.
A US Army (USA) AH-64, crewed by Capt Mike Klingele and CW4 Mike Butler,
had a similar quick recovery. Fatally crippled by a SAM, it crashed and its flight member
(AH-64) immediately landed and recovered the crew. The next day, another USA
helicopter, a UH-1 was hit by enemy fire and crashed immediately killing three of the
four crewmembers aboard. The Army rescue coordination center (RCC) directed the
Notes
71
Conduct of Persian Gulf Conflict. An Interim Report to Congress. (DOD, July 1991), 5-5.
39
rescue of the fourth individual. These two incidents did not involve the JRCC or a full
theater CSAR effort. But they do highlight the importance of responsive C2 in combat
search and rescue.
Of the 12 cases of isolated personnel who could reasonably expect to be rescued from
“Indian” country, eight were rescued. This equates to a 66 percent success rate.
Excepting the rescues of Bergan 23, Jump 42, and the two USA helicopters, all of which
did not require JRCC or SOF involvement, this leaves 7 isolated personnel who needed
help. Three of these 7 survivors were rescued by the efforts of the JRCC and SOF. This
equates to a 42 percent success rate. However, the non-rescue of the remaining four men
(Lt Cmdr Speicher, Col Eberly, Maj Griffith, and Lt Slade) deserves re-examination.
Lt Cmdr Speicher was not seen ejecting nor was voice contact ever made with him.
Col Eberly and Maj Griffith were never formally authenticated nor positioned with any
degree of certainty. Lastly, voice contact was never made with Lt Slade. Of these four,
clearly Col Eberly and Maj Griffith’s situation is the most contentious. There is plenty of
blame to spread around for the non-rescue of these two men. Per the theater CSAR
command and control plan, perhaps CENTAF could have done more to find and
authenticate the survivors and perhaps SOCCENT could have bent their rules a little and
tried to search for them sooner than two days after their shoot down. In later rescues,
AWACS did a much better job maintaining and diverting aircraft to remain on-scene to
find and protect isolated airmen on the ground. In later rescues, SOF pushed across the
border much quicker than two days after the shoot down, as was the case in the Corvette
03 CSAR mission. SOF claimed that the threat level around the presumed location of
Corvette 03 was too high to facilitate search operations by their helicopters. The last
tragic CSAR mission of Desert Storm seems to exonerate the SOF insistence on voice
authentication and location.72
Mutt 41, a USAF F-16 piloted by Capt Bill Andrews was interdicting Iraqi
Republican Guard mechanized units fleeing north out of Kuwait to Basra. His aircraft
was wracked by an explosion and consumed in fire. He quickly ejected and while
drifting to ground under his parachute radioed his position. An OA-10 (FAC) nearby
Notes
72
The narrative of the CSAR C2 of these missions is drawn heavily from Darrel D. Whitcomb, Mixed
Bag: Combat Search and Rescue in DESERT STORM. (Un-published edition, 3 Feb 2003), pp. 134-144.
40
heard his calls and an intense conversation ensued. Capt Andrews’s situation was passed
to AWACS, which quickly passed the information to the JRCC. JRCC sent a rescue
request to SOF units on alert. Since it was daytime and a high threat environment, SOF
responded that they would plan a night pickup.
Meanwhile, Capt Andrews hit the ground hard and broke his right leg. Worse, Iraqi
soldiers immediately surrounded him and took him prisoner. The FAC who had been in
contact with Capt Andrews, reported that he was sure Capt Andrews had been captured
when the radio conversation he had been having with Mutt 41 abruptly ended.
Back at the TACC, unsatisfied with the SOF response, the US Army battlefield
coordination element (BCE) was asked if they had any capability to pick up Mutt 41.
The BCE passed the request to the US Army XVIII Corps, where it was received with
skepticism. Unfortunately, the request also was passed to the aviation brigade of the
101st Division. In the fog and friction of war, the request was interpreted as an order,
which was given to 2nd Battalion/229th Aviation Regiment. Without consulting their
regimental commander and armed with only a call sign and rough location, Bengal 15, a
UH-60, launched with two AH-64 Apache helicopters for armed escort.
After take off, Bengal 15 made contact with AWACS, which provided vectors to the
shoot down location. AWACS also started to divert strike aircraft to the area to aid the
CSAR effort. After several attempts to find Mutt 41 and after receiving multiple infrared
surface-to-air missile launches and AAA volleys, all the strikers warned AWACS that the
area was too hot for helicopters to enter. However, Bengal 15 did enter the area and was
shot down by AAA. In the ensuing crash, five crewmembers were killed instantly and
three were captured immediately. The escort Apaches also took fire, but they were able
to escape after watching Bengal 15 crash with all hopes of any survivors onboard dashed.
2nd Battalion/229th Aviation Regiment commander Lt Col Bill Bryan was a veteran of
Indochina and vividly remembered the CSAR sacrifices from that conflict.
My experience from (Vietnam) had molded my feelings that you need to
think long and hard about sending 4, 5, 6, 7 or more people to rescue
someone who is possibly mortally injured, captured, or dead. That may
sound cold-blooded but at some point, someone has to say ‘no more.’ I
was prepared to make that decision if I had to. That is some of the
unwritten stuff that commanders get paid to do, but not necessarily
trained.
41
Had I been there when this mission came up, the first thing I would have
done would to insist on knowing about the ground situation. That
information was non-existent because of the ‘rout.’ But what was known
was that the Iraqis had shot down an F-16, the pilot had ejected and was
talking on his radio going down…and the Iraqis were shooting at him in
the chute. Knowing these facts (or lack of them) would have led me to
conclude that the pilot had either survived and was now a POW or he was
dead – murdered by Iraqi cowards who shot him before he hit the ground
or shortly thereafter.
For me the next decision would have been easy. I would not put another
3-4 aircraft and 10-15 of America’s sons and daughters at risk! Some
would scoff at that, but I remain firmly convinced that that rationale was
valid then and is valid today.
CSAR is like any other military mission. It takes planning, coordination,

and resources. Because we are dealing with life and death here and
extreme urgency, many overlook the planning, coordination, and resource
requirement.73
Did SOF err by not sending rescue helicopters into the Corvette 03 search area sooner
or did the US Army err by rushing into the Mutt 41 search area too soon? The Gulf War
CSAR experiences re-validated the overarching C2 question: Do we launch a rescue?
Lessons Learned
The next Chuck Horner to fight an air war had better pay close attention
to the way he (or she) organizes and controls the employment of his or her
combat search-and-rescue efforts.
Gen Charles Horner
In Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM, the theater CSAR C2 relationships

wrestled with the decision to launch. In his Gulf War biography, Gen Chuck Horner
concludes his discussion of CSAR with this observation.
The combat search-and-rescue mission involves lots of heart-breaking
decisions. In Vietnam, we tried so hard to rescue all downed pilots that on
some occasions we lost more aircraft and aircrews than were saved.
CSAR is not a no-risk situation. It requires rescue crews that take risks
that are far beyond those normally expected in combat operations.
Notes
73
Email from Lt Col Bill Bryan to Darrel D. Whitcomb. (12 Mar 2002) in Darrel D. Whitcomb, Mixed
42
And it takes commanders who are hard-hearted enough to leave a downed
airman to the mercies of the enemy when it is likely that more men and
women will be killed or captured.
In Desert Storm, there was a failure to fully coordinate these aspects of the
CSAR mission. While there were at times brilliant rescues, the aircrews
were far from confident in the system. 74
Three major C2 issues emerge from the CSAR experience in the Gulf War: first, the
JRCC was an ad hoc organization; second, not having OPCON/TACON of recovery
vehicles hampered CENTAF plans for rescue; and third, confused C2 relationships
destroyed unity of command.
The JRCC was constituted using personnel un-trained in CSAR procedures, tactics,
and doctrine. Despite six CSAR exercises during DESERT SHIELD, the JRCC was still
not adequately prepared to command, control, or coordinate all aspects of CSAR. The
JRCC did not have the authority to divert airborne assets to search for and protect
survivors. The JRCC had no SOF personnel on staff. All these facts combine to
illuminate the ad hoc nature of the JRCC organization, which hampered effective C2 of
CSAR.
Due to peacetime political and budgetary decisions, the USAF did not have a credible
CSAR recovery vehicle. The ARS HH-60 program had just started, but there were no
combat capable squadrons ready to deploy. As a consequence, CENTAF was the only
component or coalition air force that did not have an organic rescue helicopter capability.
Despite having the lion’s share of search assets, inability to launch rescue helicopters
hampered CENTAF’s concept of how they wanted to prosecute CSAR. Brig Gen Buster
Glosson, CENTAF C-5, summed up the situation:
I think that not having the CSAR under the direct tasking order of the air
component commander is the dumbest thing I have ever seen. Give me a
break! We chop all air related weapon systems in a theater to the air
component commander except CSAR? Now how damn stupid is that?…
If those assets are going to be used for other than CSAR purposes, they
should be under the special ops commander. But when there is a CSAR
requirement whether they go or not should be at the discretion of that air
component commander and not at the discretion of some other
Notes
74
Tom Clancy and General Chuck Horner, Every Man A Tiger. (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1999),
410.
43
commander. It is just not right. It defies all logic of chain of command
and jointness.75
Closely related, the decision to task SOF for theater rescue and CENTAF for SAR
Coordinator (SC) ruined unity of command. Undoubtedly, SOF was best trained and
equipped to C2 its helicopters and CENTAF was best trained to C2 its search assets.
However, CSAR should be a seamless operation that smoothly transitions from finding
and authenticating survivors to recovering them. By establishing two de facto
commanders for CSAR, CENTCOM caused undue friction and strife in command and
control of CSAR.
Ultimately, the CSAR C2 decision-making apparatus revolves around the experience
and training of the commanders and staffers making the decisions. How successful was
CSAR in the Gulf War? Surveying all combat rescues:
CSAR Loss per Save:
CSAR Aircraft 8/1 = 1 loss per 8 rescues
CSAR Personnel 8/8 = 1 loss per 1 rescue
The aircraft lost number is comparable to Indochina numbers (1 loss per 7.1 rescues),
but the personnel lost ratio is unacceptable. Granted the sample size is very small, but no
commander could justify losing personnel for rescued survivors on a one for one basis.
Examining only CSAR missions coordinated by the JRCC:
CSAR Loss per Save:
CSAR Aircraft 3/0 = no loss
CSAR Personnel 3/0 = no loss
This table does not capture the dozens of other JRCC-coordinated CSAR sorties
flown that were not successful in rescuing isolated personnel who were captured quickly
Notes
75
Interview with Brigadier General Buster C. Glosson. (Darrel D. Whitcomb: 25 Sept 2002) in Darrel D.
2003), 163.
44
or killed. However, despite its small sample size, it does unequivocally show that joint
CSAR C2 was successful in the Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM. Despite
confused C2 relationships, joint CSAR in the Gulf War was successful, especially when
compared to Indochina. In almost all instances, when survivors could evade capture and
make contact with CSAR assets, they were recovered.76 Equally important, no JRCC-
coordinated CSAR assets were unnecessarily put at risk and lost in combat.
Notes
76
Corvette 03 is the only exception, which makes it controversial.
45
Chapter 5
OPERATION ALLIED FORCE (1999)
Rescue is a compelling, all-encompassing human instinct. In crises people

pull together as never before, often performing deeds far beyond their
normal capacities when a life is in the balance. So it has always been and
will always be. Such is the nature of man.
L.B. Taylor, Jr.
By March 1999, the world community had reached the breaking point with Slobadan
Milosevic. The President of Serbia was encouraging an ethnic cleansing campaign in
Kosovo. NATO was prepared to initiate an air campaign to force Serbian military forces
to withdraw from Kosovo and end the ethnic genocide. The strategy called for a limited
series of air strikes to compel Milosevic to withdraw from Kosovo. Accordingly, Gen
Wesley Clark, commander of European Command (EUCOM) turned to the Joint Task
Force- Noble Anvil (JTF-NA) Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC), Lt Gen
Michael Short to execute a short air campaign.
46
Table 3 Operation ALLIED FORCE Command Structure
Source: Air War Over Serbia, One Year report. (Washington, D.C.: HQ
USAF, Oct 2000)
The wiring diagram above shows the dual C2 relationships for Operation ALLIED
FORCE. Particularly misleading is the designation of USAF CSAR forces under SOF
operational control (OPCON). This is misleading because in April 1999, there were no
USAF CSAR forces in theater. The USAF rescue-dedicated assets like the HH-60D and
HC-130, did not initially participate in the air campaign due to compelling requirements
elsewhere. USAF rescue units were deployed providing CSAR coverage for Operation
NORTHERN WATCH (Turkey) and Operation Southern Watch (Kuwait) and
responsible for SAR coverage in Iceland.
Unlike Indochina and the Gulf War, by this time there was approved joint
doctrine offering guidance for the prosecution of CSAR C2.77 The joint doctrine
reviewed in the opening chapter offered authoritative guidance that commanders were to
use in accomplishing CSAR. Unfortunately, long-established CSAR C2 relationships
between USAF and SOF would complicate rescue efforts. Since 1993, SOF helicopters
Notes
77
Specifically, Joint doctrine publications 3-50.2 (26 Jan 1996) and 3-50.21 (23 Mar 1998).
47
and refueling aircraft had been providing CSAR coverage for UN and NATO air
operations in the former Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). This six year-old tasking had
conditioned SOF to conduct CSAR in accordance with joint doctrine, using special
operations tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP).78 For example, in Operation
Deliberate Force (1995), the French lost a Mirage (call sign: Ebro 33) and SOF
deliberately planned a search and rescue mission that launched days after the aircraft was
lost. In this case, it was prudent because the location and condition of the survivors was
uncertain and the threat level was relatively high.
Lt Gen Short made it quite clear that in this limited series of air strikes, SOF would
operate using joint CSAR not special operations TTP. As JFACC, Lt Gen Short placed
great emphasis on successfully recovering all isolated airmen. The political ramifications
of losing airmen as POWs in a short-duration coercive air campaign were unacceptable.79
In Lt Gen Short’s mind, the SARTF was to be used in all CSAR situations and the A-10
(Sandy), as On Scene Commander (OSC), was to be the tactical-level commander.80 For
the SOF helicopters, this C2 relationship ran counter to the six years of experience and
organization that they had been utilizing in the region. SOF joint doctrine and TTP
directed using the recovery vehicle as the tactical level CSAR commander and SOF
routinely put an extra field-grade officer on board their helicopters to serve as air mission
commander unfettered by aircrew duties. This difference in concepts of operation would
cause undue friction between the Air Force and SOF personnel.
As in the Gulf War, although USAF rescue units existed, they were not available for
Operation ALLIED FORCE. Therefore, the JFACC had to rely solely on SOF assets to
provide the recovery vehicle for CSAR. Unlike the Gulf War, Lt Gen Short was adamant
about achieving unity of command and treated all aircraft that flew as his assets. He
asserted, “You are in the ATO, you will do what you’re told.”81
The strategic level C2 relationship for CSAR was based on personal relationships.
Gen Clark, the Joint Force Commander never issued orders tasking Lt Gen Short to be
Notes
78
Joint Publication 3-50.2, F-2.
79
Interview with Lt Gen Michael Short. (Michael A. Wormley: 25 Feb 2003).
80
Interview with Lt Gen Michael Short. (Michael A. Wormley: 25 Feb 2003).
81
Oral history interview with Lt Gen Michael Short. (27 Jul 1999, K570.051-59, in USAF Collection,
AFHRA), 7. Document classified, page cited is unclassified.
48
responsible for CSAR.82 Brig Gen Eldon Bargewell, the Joint Force Special Operations
Component Commander (JFSOCC), was not relieved of SOF’s six-year old responsibility
to provide CSAR coverage in the region. There was no formal turnover of CSAR
responsibility at the start of Operation ALLIED FORCE. However, there was an
understanding between the two component commanders, that the JFACC would
command and control CSAR and JFSOCC would provide rescue assets. Lt Gen Short
recalled, “at my level, there never was a bid by the SOF to be in charge of CSAR.
Bargewell and I got together and we understood and agreed that the A-10 guys, who did
CSAR for a living, would always be the on-scene commander and mission
commander.”83 Brig Gen Bargewell understood that the JFACC already controlled most
of the search assets and had the most interest in recovering his airmen.
At the operational level, C2 relationships were strained by the same rivalries that
beset the Gulf War relationships. The JFACC stood up a Personnel Recovery
Coordination Cell (PRCC) to provide theater CSAR command and control. The director
of the PRCC, Major John McGonagil, was a career USAF CSAR helicopter pilot.
Despite not having combat experience, he did have an advantage of being in theater for a
year.84 His time on station allowed him to become familiar with the region and draft a
CSAR plan prior to hostilities. The Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) at San
Vito Air Station was somewhat hampered by six years of experience doing CSAR in-
theater their way. Based on the two organizations’ length of time studying the theater
CSAR issue, friction was unavoidable but surmountable.
Major McGonagil’s theater CSAR plan was in accordance with joint doctrine and the
JFACC’s wishes. It called for utilizing the SARTF as the primary method for recovery of
isolated personnel. However, Major McGonagil noted, “SOF doesn’t like doing what we
call professional CSAR.”85 Despite some SOF reluctance to employ in accordance with
the CSAR plan, Major McGonagil noted that Lt Gen Short insisted, “Hey, you’re ready,
you have to do this in a conventional mode, you are going to work with the SARTF,
Notes
82
Author interview with Lt Gen Michael Short. (Michael A. Wormley: 25 Feb 2003).
83
Oral history interview with Lt Gen Michael Short. (27 Jul 1999, K570.051-59, in USAF Collection,
84
Oral history interview with Maj John McGonagil. (1 Jul 1999, K570.051-60, in USAF Collection,
85
49
you’re going to work with the A-10 and ABCCC and we’re going to have (an) immediate
response.”86
The previous six years of experience in the theater had prepared SOF for working
with the A-10s and they were prepared for an immediate launch, but no one in theater
was prepared for the operation of the entire CSARTF. There were no exercises using all
the parts of CSARTF. There was no attempt to practice linking the PRCC, ABCCC,
AWACS, Sandys, RC-135, rescue helicopters, MC-130, and survivor on the same
communication radio nets. Despite the lack of exercise, CSAR C2 in Operation ALLIED
FORCE was successful by any measure of merit.
Rescue for all my friends
JFACC understood CSAR. He had a big investment in it and he made

damn sure that it was going to be conducted the way the CSAR experts
would have wanted it conducted. That was the big difference. His marked
involvement made the impact.
Major John McGonagil
On the third night of the air war (27 March 1999), a F-117 Stealth fighter surprisingly
was lost over Serbia.87 The shock of losing an aircraft, which many felt was immune to
shoot- down, was palpable in the Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) and PRCC.
The pilot, call sign Vegas 31, immediately contacted allied forces on his survival radio
while floating down to ground under his parachute. The shock of the loss wore off
quickly as the rescue staff began to ascertain the survivor’s location. Survivor
authentication data was passed to pertinent parties and alert A-10s (Sandys) were
launched from Italy. Despite uncertainty surrounding the survivor’s location, the PRCC
told the SOF helicopters to launch from Tuzla, Bosnia-Herzegovina to rendezvous with
the Sandys at a certain time and place. However, there was confusion between Zulu time
and local time, one of those minor details that a full dress rehearsal probably would have
Notes
86
87
The narrative of the CSAR C2 for the 2 OAF rescues relies heavily on the: oral history interview with
Maj John McGonagil. (AFHRA: 1 Jul 1999); 20th SOS After Action Report for CSAR of Vega 31 (5 Apr
1999); SOF Rescue Mission Commander After Action Report for Hammer 34 Rescue Mission (2 May
1999); and Major Mike McKinney and Mike Ryan, Chariots of the Damned. (New York: Thomas Dunne
Books, 2001), pp. 180-192.
50
caught. Based on the wrong time, the SOF helicopters (2 MH-53s and a MH-60), took
off to meet their Sandy escort.
Arriving at the rendezvous point, which was many miles and opposite direction away
from the survivor, the SOF helicopters realized that the A-10 escorts were not there. To
conserve fuel they landed and tried to get communication with any CSARTF asset for
further direction and await the arrival of their escorts. Meanwhile, the A-10s were
searching for Vegas 31. Between the survivor’s reporting and electronic intelligence, the
CSARTF was able to pinpoint Vegas 31. After the SOF helicopter crews received an
updated survivor location, they realized that they would need more fuel. They passed
their intentions to refuel to the CSARTF. They took off heading for the survivor and
aerial refueled en-route to the pickup location.
Ignorant of the helicopters’ capability to refuel en-route to the survivor and assuming
that aerial refueling would delay the SOF helicopters, the A-10s also left the immediate
area to refuel.88 The SOF helicopters arrived at the Serbian border, prepared to cross and
rescue Vegas 31, but PRCC held them for two hours awaiting the A-10 escort that was
refueling. Ignorance of SOF TTP and capabilities caused near-tragic delays in the
CSARTF crossing the border to rescue Vegas 31. This lack of knowledge is also
information that a full dress rehearsal could have imparted to all the CSARTF members.
The weather over Serbia obscured visibility to the point where A-10 escort could not
provide fire support if the helicopters received enemy fire. However, the Sandys were
able to fly ahead of the helicopters, authenticate the survivor, and precisely locate Vegas
31 again. After finally receiving the execution order from Sandy, the SOF helicopters
crossed the border and ingressed to the survivor location, without A-10 escort. The SOF
MH-60 was able to land within meters of Vegas 31, and he was rescued after spending
almost seven hours on the ground.89 The pickup could have been at least four hours
sooner, if the helicopters had not been quickly launched toward an erroneous survivor
location and if they had not been held at the Serbian border awaiting an escort that never
happened. The SOF after-action report noted, “After given an order to launch
immediately, we spent 4.5 hours holding while C2 agencies coordinated other
Notes
88
89
20th SOS After Action Report for CSAR of Vega 31 (5 Apr 1999, in JPRA library), 3.
51
movements associated with the rescue.”90
Despite a successful rescue, the PRCC realized that synchronization of the CSARTF
or the ability to link the CSARTF together needed more thought and planning.91 The
theater CSAR plan was strengthened with inclusion of SOF planning factors and
capabilities, but more importantly, experience was gained for all the elements of the
CSARTF from the Vegas 31 rescue. That experience would pay off on the morning of 2
May 1999.
At approximately 0015 Zulu time, Hammer 34, a USAF F-16CG was shot down by a
surface-to-air missile over Serbia. Unlike the Vegas 31 CSAR, Hammer 34’s wingman
immediately assumed the On-Scene Commander (OSC) role. With allied aircraft
overhead and daylight approaching, the PRCC decided to launch the SOF helicopters
immediately from Tuzla towards the general location of the survivor, less than 40 miles.92
A-10 Sandys launched from alert posture in Italy to rendezvous with the helicopters over
the survivor. Synchronization, compared to Vegas 31 CSAR, was a much easier prospect
for the PRCC.
The PRCC used the single-unit method as its C2 model. However, the weather was
good over Serbia and the PRCC did not direct the pre-border crossing linkage of escort
and helicopter. Subsequently, the helicopters lost the firepower of the escort A-10s and
on ingress, the SOF helicopters took fire from surface-to-air missiles and AAA. “It was
extremely dangerous. We had pushed in maybe a little too quick because of the daylight
thing,” recalled Major McGonagil.93 Fortunately, none of the helicopters were fatally hit
by the missiles or AAA and continued on to the recovery area. The SOF MH-60 was
able to land within meters of Hammer 34, and he was rescued after spending roughly two
and half hours on the ground.94
These were the only two aircraft lost in the air war over Serbia. The difference in
Notes
90
20th SOS After Action Report for CSAR of Vega 31 (5 Apr 1999, in JPRA library), 6.
91
92
93
94
SOF Rescue Mission Commander After Action Report for Hammer 34 Rescue Mission (2 May 1999, in
JPRA library), 2.
52
how the two CSAR efforts were controlled was stark and highlights the necessity to have
flexible TTP and doctrine. The Vegas 31 CSAR basically went according to
conventional CSAR doctrine with the full SARTF operation and took a long time to
complete. The Hammer 34 CSAR was more akin to the single-unit method and was
executed very quickly when compared to Vegas 31. Both were successful, but
encountered difficulties that could have been significantly lessened by more training and
exercises.
Lessons Learned
One of the keys to future CSAR success would be the ability of both
conventional and special operations forces to retain the flexibility to mold
their operations to fit each particular situation rather than force inflexible
models onto inappropriate situations.
SOCEUR After Action Report
In an interview shortly after Operation ALLIED FORCE, Major McGonagil stated,

“One of the big lessons learned should be conventional rescue mission is always going to
be applied… if you’re going to make a commitment, it can’t be piecemeal. It’s got to be
all the way. It’s got to be an honest commitment to insure that we don’t get more
survivors on the ground, have more people out there. We have to have the equipment and
training to be able to do that.”95 The training he refers to is not just for the CSAR
professionals, but also all aviation assets that might find themselves assisting the CSAR
effort. From strike aircraft wingmen who might need to assume on scene commander
duties to reconnaissance aircraft like the RC-135 that have capabilities to search for
isolated personnel. Additionally, the component commander who is responsible for
CSAR, usually the JFACC, must be trained. Major McGonagil identified, “We need to
train the JFACC… we need to train those Lt Gen’s out there, but Gen Short understood
CSAR.”96
Two other lessons should be learned from the CSAR experiences in Operation
ALLIED FORCE: first, everyone needs to be flexible enough to execute a CSAR while
Notes
95
AFHRA), 22-23. Document classified, page cited is unclassified.
96
53
minimizing the risk; and second, never underestimate the power of unity of command.
Despite the “this is way we always have done it” attitude of the SOF in theater prior
to the start of Operation ALLIED FORCE, the entire CSARTF was able to come together
and successfully execute. Without a full exercise of the C2 relationships, the operators
were able to overcome friction and rescue the survivor on the Vegas 31 CSAR mission.
With experience and revamped planning, the PRCC and JFACC were able to command
and control the Hammer 34 CSAR using the single-unit method to achieve a successful
rescue. Every CSAR mission will be different, and dogmatic execution of doctrine is
unwarranted and unwise.
Lt Gen Short, JFACC and Brig Gen Bargewell, JFSOCC were able to set aside
traditional turf wars to ensure that one commander had responsibility for rescuing
isolated personnel during the air war. The JFACC had the preponderance of CSAR
forces and the means to control them. Yet despite having the explicit tasking of CSAR
for the ongoing Operation NOBLE ANVIL, Brig Gen Bargewell did not wait for orders
from Gen Clark to give tactical control (TACON) of his SOF helicopters to the JFACC
for Operation ALLIED FORCE CSAR missions.97 With unity of command over all
CSAR forces, Lt Gen Short was able to craft a responsive organization and posture it for
success.
Using the formula proposed in the first chapter, it is clear that they were successful.
D. CSAR Loss per Save:
CSAR Aircraft 2/0 = no loss
CSAR Personnel 2/0 = no loss
Despite its small sample size, it does show that joint CSAR C2 was successful in the
Operation ALLIED FORCE. Despite tension within the tactical level of C2, joint CSAR
in Operation ALLIED FORCE was extremely successful, especially when compared to
Indochina. Most important, no PRCC-controlled CSAR assets were lost in combat.
Notes
97
Author interview with Lt Gen Michael Short. (Michael A. Wormley: 25 Feb 2003).
54
Chapter 6
CONCLUSION
I am tempted indeed to declare dogmatically that whatever doctrine the

Armed Forces are working on now, they have got it wrong. I am also
tempted to declare that it does not matter that they have got it wrong.
What does matter is their capacity to get it right quickly when the moment
arrives.
Sir Michael Howard
Following the above quote, Sir Michael Howard asserts, “still it is the task of military
science in an age of peace to prevent the doctrines from being too badly wrong.” This
thesis assumed that joint CSAR C2 doctrine was wrong or at least inadequate. The
research and analysis demonstrated the difficulty for doctrine to foresee and address all
situations. The best that one can hope for is doctrine that is flexible enough to apply in
most situations.
A trend in the nature of US warfare from Indochina to the Gulf War to Serbia has
been the shorter duration of combat operations and declining numbers of CSAR missions.
This means that CSAR forces will not have the advantage of on-the-job training in the
future. Thus preparation through adequate doctrine and training is essential to ensure
success.
The trend of declining numbers of CSAR missions may lead some to question the
efficacy of investing in and prosecuting CSAR. There are four key reasons for retaining
and improving the CSAR mission area. First, Americans place great value on the sanctity
of human life. The US military has a moral obligation to recover all its personnel.
Second, by assuring our military members that we will do everything within reason to
recover them, we sign an implicit contract with them. In return, they will exert their
utmost in times of great stress. Third, rescue and recovery of our military members
55
denies our enemies valuable sources of intelligence. Fourth, all trends are cyclical and
future combat may put more military personnel in isolated survivor status. We cannot
discard CSAR as a valuable mission, because the future by its very nature is unknown.
The four case studies examined in this thesis are helpful in identifying the current trend.
However, future combat operations will differ from the nature of these four case studies.
So what of the thesis question and its corollaries? Should command and control of
CSAR be reorganized? Will reorganizing CSAR command and control doctrine make it
more effective? Has the current joint doctrine for CSAR C2 captured the historical
lessons? Will new problems arise if we implement the historical lessons learned?
The analysis of the historical development of CSAR indicates that the current joint
doctrine has captured most of the lessons learned. In other words, there are no major
problems with current joint doctrine for CSAR C2. Anecdotal evidence suggests that
most members of the US military, particularly the USAF and USSOCOM, are not very
familiar with joint doctrine concerning CSAR. Based on historical evidence, it is the
potential for poor application of doctrine, due to lack of knowledge, that could cause
problems in CSAR, not the lack of good doctrine.
Historical Lessons Learned
The detailed presentation of a historical event, and the combination of

several events, make it possible to deduce a doctrine: the proof is in the
evidence itself.
Carl Von Clausewitz
From the early years of conflict in Indochina, the CSAR history indicates that: we
must have joint and service doctrine; clear command and control relationships; and
trained/educated CSAR professionals working in C2 nodes. The CSAR history of the
later years of the conflict in Indochina indicates that: CSAR is truly a joint mission;
CSAR professionals must be trained and educated to employ joint assets; and CSAR
demands unity of command—ultimately, one commander must be tasked with
prosecuting joint CSAR.
From Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM, the CSAR history demonstrates that:
the JRCC was a “pick-up game” of poorly trained individuals; not having
56
OPCON/TACON of recovery vehicles hampered CENTAF plans for rescue; and
confused C2 relationships destroyed unity of command. The history of Operation
ALLIED FORCE demonstrates that: everyone needs to be flexible enough to execute a
CSAR while minimizing the risk; and we must never underestimate the power of unity of
command.
The cases studies examined within this thesis offer three overarching lessons learned:
1. Unity of Command: one commander for joint CSAR is essential
2. CSAR demands well-trained and educated personnel to be successful
3. CSAR joint doctrine should be applied flexibly
Conclusion
While individual training is generally good, there are problems in getting

realistic training for staff organizations and the rescue task forces. As a
result, we do a lot of ‘on the job training’ during the opening days of a
conflict, such as in Operation Allied Force and during the rescue
operation.
General Henry H. Shelton

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Current joint CSAR C2 doctrine has already incorporated historical lessons learned
and is appropriate for ensuring the success of CSAR. The only historical lesson learned
that can be codified in joint doctrine is the requirement for unity of command (one
combatant commander for joint CSAR). The current joint doctrine clearly states that the
Joint Search and Rescue Coordinator (JSRC) director or the component commander who
hosts the JSRC exercises Joint Force Commander (JFC) command authority for CSAR.98
Joint doctrine is clear in the requirement for all CSAR missions to be commanded by a
single component commander. Joint doctrine also clearly states that the JFC normally
delegates responsibility for CSAR to the component commanders.99 Clearly, joint
doctrine delegates authority and responsibility for joint CSAR to the component
commander who hosts the JSRC.100
Joint doctrine describes four types of CSAR command relationships at the operational
Notes
98
January 1996), ix.
99
Ibid., I-1.
100
Ibid., I-2.
57
or theater-level of war. First, a component may prosecute CSAR with its own assets and
retain operational control (OPCON). Second, when a component needs joint capabilities,
the JSRC tasks other components to provide tactical control (TACON) of the augmenting
forces to the component that requires joint capabilities. Third, in a situation where a
component cannot conduct CSAR for its personnel, the JSRC tasks another component to
conduct the CSAR mission with its own forces with the tasked component retaining
OPCON of its forces. Lastly, when no component can prosecute CSAR missions
unilaterally, then the JFC may issue mission- type orders to all components, leveraging
joint capabilities, to build a mission package capable of successfully recovering isolated
personnel. This requires all component commanders to release their forces in a TACON
relationship to a designated component commander, usually the component commander
who hosts the JSRC.101 The common denominator in all four CSAR command
relationships at the operational level of war is the designation of one component
commander with at least TACON of all assets.
In warfare, one component commander must be tasked with overall responsibility for
the execution of joint CSAR. At the operational or theater-level of war, based on
preponderance of assets and the means to control them, in most cases it should be the
Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC). At a minimum, the JFACC should
always have tactical control (TACON) of any asset tasked to support the joint CSAR
mission. Operation ALLIED FORCE is the case study that proves that with one
commander responsible for CSAR, a successful command-and-control relationship is
attainable. Despite its small sample size, the objective measure of merit was the recovery
of 100 percent of “recoverable” personnel with no losses of rescue assets.
The other two historical lessons learned can be addressed only by having the joint
doctrine known and followed. For the best use of joint CSAR assets, all personnel
working in the Joint Search and Rescue Center (JSRC) or Personnel Recovery
Coordination Center (PRCC) must be educated in the capabilities and limitations of joint
CSAR assets. All components must send augmenting personnel who are well versed in
their service capabilities and limitations as well as familiar with other service assets. All
CSAR professionals must be flexible and must be intimately familiar with joint CSAR
Notes
101
Ibid., III-5.
58
doctrine and understand the risks associated with deviating from the doctrine.
Current joint CSAR doctrine recommends two tactical-level C2 relationships. The
single-unit method is doctrinally preferred. However, its use requires the survivor’s
location to be known. The CSARTF is only recommended if the survivor’s location
cannot be pinpointed and armed escort is required for the recovery vehicles. Neither
method is always best, and success in CSAR can be dependent on which method is
chosen. Choosing which tactical-level C2 relationship to use requires trained and
educated CSAR professionals.
The only cost in adopting these conclusions is the price of educating the US military
on joint CSAR doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures. The training and
education piece requires large joint force-on-force exercises that include CSAR tasks.
The price for not adequately preparing to execute joint CSAR doctrine pales in
comparison to the cost of losing isolated personnel and their would-be rescuers.
The solution to improving joint CSAR resides in ensuring unity of command,
following joint doctrine, and educating CSAR professionals. The current joint doctrine
for CSAR C2 has already incorporated the historical lessons learned and is appropriate
for ensuring the success of CSAR. Based on the evidence, it is not appropriate to change
joint doctrine. The doctrine for CSAR C2 has evolved, as it should, with the history of
CSAR.
59
Bibliography
Anderson, Captain B. Conn. USAF Search and Rescue in Southeast Asia (1961-66).
CHECO Report. 24 October 1966, K717.0414-1, in USAF Collection, AFHRA.
Document is now declassified.
APPENDIX 6 TO ANNEX C TO USCINCCENT OPLAN 1002-90. 18 July 1990, NA-
41, in USAF Collection, AFHRA.
Atkinson, Rick. Crusade: The Untold Story of the Persian Gulf War. Boston: Houghton
Mifflin Company, 1993.
Bell, Dan Captain, USN. "Do We Still Need Navy CSAR” letter to editor. Proceedinqs
vol 126/9/1, 171 (Sep 2000): 18-20.
Berger, Carl, ed. The United States Air Force in Southeast Asia, 1961-1973: An
Illustrated Account. Washington D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1984.
Bissonnette, Major Stephen H. “Joint CSAR-Does the Current Organization Provide the
Joint Task Force with the Most Effective Tools?” Unpublished Research Paper,
Navy War College, Newport, Rhode Island: February 2002.
Blumentritt, Major John W. "Playing Defense and Offense: Employing Rescue Resources
as Offensive Weapons." Unpublished Research Paper, School of Advanced
Airpower Studies, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: May 1999.
Brehm, Jack and Pete Nelson. That Others May Live. New York: Crown Publishers,
2000.
Cardoso, Captain James L., Vega 31 Mission Flight Lead. Memorandum. To Joint
Special Operations Task Force. Subject: After Action Report for CSAR of Vega 31,
5 April 1999, in JPRA Library.
Carmody, Major Russell D. "Theater Combat and Rescue." Unpublished Research Paper,
US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: 1993.
Chavez, Captain Robert M. "The Ideal Combat Search and Rescue Task Force
(CSARTF) – Sandy One's Perspective” USAF Weapons Review vol 48, no.2
(Summer 2000): 37-44.
Chiarelli, Peter W. "Beyond Goldwater-Nichols." Joint Forces Quarterly (Autumn 1993):
71-81.
Chinnery, Philip D. Any Time, Any Place; A History of USAF Air Commando and
Special Operations Force. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1994.
Clancy, Tom and General Chuck Horner (Ret.). Every Man a Tiger. New York: G.P.
Putnam’s Sons, 1999.
Clausewitz, Carl von. On War. Edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976.
Coakley, Thomas P. Command and Control for War and Peace. Washington, D.C.:
National Defense University Press, 1992.
60
Cordesman, Anthony H. The Lessons and Non-Lessons of the Air and Missile Campaign
in Kosovo. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2001.
Coyne, James P. Airpower in the Gulf. Arlington, VA: Air Force Association Book,
1992.
Daso, Dik A. Hap Arnold and the Evolution of American Airpower. Washington, D.C.:
Smithsonian Institution Press, 2000.
Dorr, Robert F. "New Command Needed to Take Over Combat Search, Rescue." Air
Force Times, vol. 60, issue 20, 20 December 1999, 54-55.
Dorr, Robert F. "Kind Words For Black Knights; Criticism for Search and Rescue." Air
Force Times, vol. 60, issue 26, 24 January 2000, 46-47.
Doherty, Major Thomas I. "Combat Rescue-How Much is Enough?" Unpublished
Research Paper, Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell Air Force Base,
Alabama: May 1981.
Dunphy, LCDR Christopher C. "Combat Search and Rescue: An American Way of War"
Unpublished Research Paper, Marine Corps Command and Staff College, Quantico,
Virginia: May 2001.
Durkee, Richard A. USAF Search and Rescue (July 1966-November 1967). CHECO
Report. 19 January 1968, K717.0414-1, in USAF Collection, AFHRA. Document is
now declassified.
Ebert, Major Douglas A. "Combat Search and Rescue of Distressed Aircrew in the Year
2010." Unpublished Research Paper, Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell Air
Force Base, Alabama: May 1995.
Evans, Andy. Combat Search and Rescue. New York: Sterling Publishing Company,
1999.
Every, Martin G. Navy Combat Search and Rescue. Office of Naval Research.
Washington, D.C.: Naval Air Systems Command, September 1979.
Frabott, Terry L. "Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR)." Army Aviation, 44: 31 July
1995.
Francis, David G., and David R. Nelson. Search and Rescue in Southeast Asia (1 April
1972-30 June 1973). CHECO Report. 27 November 1974, K717.0414-1, in USAF
Collection, AFHRA. Document is now declassified.
Fuqua, Captain Michael T. "We Can Fix Combat SAR in the Navy." Proceedinqs vol
123/9/1,135 (September 1997): 40-42.
Griffith, Major Thomas C. "Position Paper on Improved Search and Rescue."
Unpublished Research Paper, Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell Air Force
Base, Alabama: 15 October 1991.
Gulf War Airpower Survey, Volume II. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
1993.
Gulf War Air Power Survey, Volume IV, (Unclassified Edition). Washington D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1993.
Haas, Colonel Michael E. Apollo's Warriors; United States Air Force Special Operations
during the Cold War. Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1997.
Haas, Colonel Michael E. and Tsgt Dale K. Robinson. Air Commando! 1950-1975;
Twenty- five Years at the Tip of the Spear. Air Force Special Operations Command,
1994.
61
Hallion, Richard P. Storm Over Iraq Air Power and the Gulf War. Washington, D.C.:
Smithsonian Institution Press, 1992.
Hampton, Lt Col Joseph C. Operation DESERT SHIELD Combat SAR Plan, 1
November 1990, in JPRA library. (Secret)
Hampton, Lt Col Joseph C. Joint Universal Lessons Learned System (JULLS) # 14943-
28400, 6 April 1991, in JPRA library.
Hampton, Lt Col Joseph C. Joint Universal Lessons Learned System (JULLS) # 14951-
37900, 6 April 1991, in JPRA library.
Harris, Lt Col William M. End-of-Tour Report, 19 September 1972, K318.2131, in
USAF Collection, AFHRA. Document is now declassified.
Hewish, Mark and Janssen, Joris "Pinpoint and pick up: Combat search and rescue."
Jane's International Defense Review, vol 31 (January 1998): 35-39.
History. Air Rescue Service (Volume 1), 1 January-31 December 1990, K318.2, in USAF
Collection, AFHRA. (FOUO)
Holloway, James, L. "Time for Joint Task Force-CSAR." Unpublished Research Paper,
U.S. Naval War College, Newport, RI: 2001.
Howard, Sir Michael. “Military Science in an Age of Peace.” Journal of the Royal United
Services Institute for Defence Studies, vol 119 (March 1974): 3-11.
Hunt, Lt Col Bob L. "Combat Search and Rescue: A Future Special Operations
Mission?" Unpublished Research Paper, Air War College, Maxwell Air Force Base,
Alabama: 1 April 1996.
Jordan, Bryant. "Easing Search and Rescue's Load Proves an Uphill Battle." Air Force
Times, vol. 59, issue 34, 29 March 1999: 13.
Jordan, Bryant. "Search and Rescue Advocate Promises to Get 'Back on Track'." Air
Force Times, vol. 59, issue 35, 5 April 1999: 12-13.
Jordan, Bryant. "Worked to Death: How Doing Too Much Caused 12 Crewmembers
Their Lives." Air Force Times, vol. 59, issue 34, 29 March 1999: 12-15. Joint
Personnel Recovery Agency. Mission pamphlet. 2002.
Kelly, Orr. From a Dark Sky; The Story of U.S. Air Force Special Operations. Novato,
CA: Presidio Press, 1996.
Kocks, Kathleen. "Search and Rescue's New Direction." Journal of Electronic Defense,
vol.23, issue 4, Apri1 2000: 45-50.
Laushine, Lt Col Stephan J., Rescue Mission Commander. Memorandum. To
Commander, Joint Special Operations Task Force. Subject: After Action Report for
Hammer 34 Rescue Mission, 2 May 1999, in JPRA Library.
Leahy, Major Timothy J. "The Future of USAF Combat Search and Rescue."
Unpublished Research Paper, School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Air University,
Maxwell AFB, Ala.: 1998.
Lippman, Thomas W. "U.S. Rescues Pilot as NATO Widens Attack, Stealth Fighter
Down." Washington Post, 28 March 1999, Final Ed.
Little, Donald D. "Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Service, 1946-1981: An Illustrated
Chronology." Office of MAC History. Scott AFB, Illinois, 1983.
Lynch, Walter F. USAF Search and Rescue in Southeast Asia (1 Jul 69-31 Dec 70).
CHECO Report. 23 April 1971, K717.0414-1, in USAF Collection, AFHRA.
Information extracted is now declassified.
62
Martini, Major Michael J. "Air Rescue in the US Air Force: A Historical Perspective."
Unpublished Research Paper, Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell Air Force
Base, Alabama: April 1987.
McGonagil, Major John B. Oral history interview by Lt Col Charles Flock, 1 Jul 1999.
Typed transcript, K570.051-60, in USAF Collection, AFHRA. (Secret)
McKinney, Mike and Mike Ryan. Chariots of the Damned. New York: St. Martin’s Press.
2001.
Meggett, 2Lt Dave "Organizing for Search and Rescue: Force Structure in a Joint
Environment.” Airpower Journal vol 9, no.2 (Summer 1995): 82-88.
Minish, Timothy, R. "The Joint Rescue Task Force: Dedicated CSAR Capability for the
Joint Force Commander." Unpublished Research Paper, U.S. Naval War College,
Newport, RI: 1996.
Moentmann, James, E. "Joint Combat Search and Rescue-Operational Necessity or
Afterthought?" Joint Forces Quarterly no.18 (Spring 1998): 44-51.
Moschler, Major Raymond F. "Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) in the Laser Age."
USAF Weapons Review (Winter 1996): 22-24.
Nadel, Joel and J.R. Wright. Special Men and Special Missions. Washington, D.C.:
Greenhill Books, 1994.
Packet, LTC Virgil L. and Capt Bobby Brooks "Combat Search and Rescue: Whose
Responsibility?" US Army Aviation Digest, vol 1-92-6, (October 1996): 18-21.
Palmer, Gen Bruce Jr., The 25-Year War America's Military Role in Vietnam. Lexington,
Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky, 1984.
Pioneer Technologies. "USAF Combat Rescue Analysis of Alternatives: Combat Rescue
Operational Review, A Summary of Combat Rescue Operations from Vietnam to
Kosovo", Draft for Coordination and Review. Las Vegas, Nevada: 29 September
2000.
Priest, Dana. "'A Huge Sigh of Relief' Pentagon Stands Firm After Mission to Save
Flier." Washington Post, 28 March 1999, Final Ed., A.
Redfern, Matthew D. "The JFC's Dilemma: The USMC TRAP Mission Verses the
Combat SAR Mission." Unpublished Research Paper, U.S. Army War College,
Carlisle Barracks, PA, 1995
Rife, Major Rickey L. "Combat Search and Rescue, a Lesson We Fail to Learn."
Unpublished Research Paper, School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort
Leavenworth, Kansas, May 1994
Renuart, Victor, E. "Combat Search and Rescue: A Search For Tomorrow." Unpublished
Research Paper, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 1992.
Rucci, Commander Gregory. "Do we still need Navy CSAR ?" U.S. Naval Institute
Proceedings, (July 2000): 58-61.
Saunders, Major Alan W. Corona Harvest Oral History Interview, 1 July 1964,
K239.0512-168, in USAF Collection, AFHRA. Document is now declassified.
Schemmer, Benjamin F. "No USAF Combat Rescue Aircraft in Gulf: It Took 72 Hours to
Launch One Rescue." Armed Forces Journal International, (July 1991): 37-38.
"Search and Rescue." Air Power History, vol. 47, issue 2, Summer 2000, 42-43.
Shelton, Gen Henry H., Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Address. DOD Personnel
Recovery Conference, Fort Belvoir, Va., 27 October 1999.Shershun, Major Carrol S.
"It's The Greatest Mission of Them All." Aerospace Historian, Autumn 1969.
63
Short, Lt Gen Michael. Oral history interview by Lt Col Charles Flock, 27 Jul 1999.
Typed transcript, K570.051-59, in USAF Collection, AFHRA. (Secret)
Stewart, Lt Col William P. "Air Force Combat Search and Rescue: Past, Present, and
Prescription for the Future." Unpublished Research Paper, Air War College,
Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, 1 April 1996.
Taylor Jr., L. B. That Others May Live. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co. 1967.
Thompson, Major Billy D. "For Valor or Value: An Examination of Personnel Recovery
Operations." Unpublished Research Paper, School of Advanced Airpower Studies,
Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: June 2001.
Thompson, Mark. To Hanoi and Back. Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press,
2000.
Tilford Jr., Earl H. The United States Air Force Search and Rescue in Southeast Asia.
Washington D.C.: Office of Air Force History, USAF, 1980.
Tilford Jr., Earl H. "Operation Allied Force and the Role of Air Power." Parameters
(Winter 1999-2000), 24-38.
US Air Force. Air War Over Serbia, One Year Report (U) Washington, D.C.: Oct 2000.
K905.01 V.1, in USAF Collection, AFHRA. (Secret)
US Air Force. Air Force Basic Doctrine (Air Force Doctrine Document 1) Washington,
D.C.: September 1997.
US Air Force. Combat Search and Rescue (Air Force Doctrine Document 2-1.6)
Washington, D.C.: 15 July 2000.
US Air Force. National Search and Rescue Manual (Air Force Manual 64-2) Washington,
D.C.: July 1959.
US Air Force. Search, Rescue, and Recovery Operations (Air Force Manual 2-36)
Washington, D.C.: 3 January 1967.
US Army. Utility and Cargo Helicopter Operations (Field Manual 1-113) Washington,
D.C.: 12 September 1997.
US Department of Defense. Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict: An Interim Report to
Congress. Washington D.C.: July 1991.
US Department of Defense. Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict: Final Report to
Congress. Washington D.C.: April 1992.
US Department of Defense. Non-Conventional Recovery in the Department of Defense,
(Department of Defense Instruction 2310.6) Washington, D.C.: 13 October 2000.
US Department of Defense. Personnel Recovery (PR), (Department of Defense Directive
2310.2) Washington, D.C.: 30 June 1997.
U.S. Department of Defense. Personnel Recovery, (Department of Defense Directive
2310.2) Washington, DC: 22 December 2000.
US Department of Defense. Personnel Recovery Response Cell (PRRC) Procedures,
(Department of Defense Directive 2310.3) Washington, D.C.: 6 June 1997.
U.S. House. Committee on Armed Services. Statement by General John Jumper:
Operations in Kosovo: Problems Encountered Lessons Learned and Reconstitution:
Hearing before the Subcommittee on Military Readiness. 106th Cong., 1st sess., 26
October 1999.
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Doctrine Development System (Joint Pub 1-01).
Washington, D.C.: 29 Ju1 2001.
64
US Joint Chiefs of Staff. Doctrine for Joint Special Operations (Joint Pub 3-50).
Washington, D.C.: 17 April 1998.
US Joint Chiefs of Staff. Doctrine for Joint Combat Search and Rescue (Joint Pub 3-
50.2). Unpublished Final Draft, in JPRA library, March 1991.
US Joint Chiefs of Staff. Doctrine for Joint Combat Search and Rescue (Joint Pub 3-
50.2). Washington, D.C.: 26 January 1996.
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) Joint Tactics. Techniques
and Procedures (Joint Pub 3-50.21). Washington, D.C.: 23 March 1998.
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Special Operations Operational Procedures (Joint Pub 3-
05.3). Washington, D.C.: 25 August 1993.
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures (Joint
Pub 5- 00.2). Washington, D.C.: 13 January 1999.
Veda Incorporated. "Combat Search and Rescue Report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and
the Executive Agent for Combat Search and Rescue", Combat Search and Rescue
Requirements Study. Washington, D.C.: 10 February 1997.
Weigley, Russell F. The American Way of War. Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana
University Press, 1977.
Westermann, Capt Edward B. “Air Rescue Service: A Direction for the Twenty-First
Century.” Airpower Journal, Fall 1990, 60-71.
Whitcomb, Darrel D. The Rescue of Bat 21. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press,
1998.
Whitcomb, Darrel D. "Combat Search and Rescue: A Longer Look." Aerospace Power
Journal, Summer 2000, 28-35.
Whitcomb, Darrel D. “Mixed Bag: Combat Search and Rescue in DESERT STORM.”
Unpublished Manuscript, Joint Personnel Research Agency, Fort Belvior, VA: Feb
2003.
Whitcomb, Darrel D. "Thanks, I Knew That You Would Come." Air Force Times, vol.
59, issue 19, 14 December 1998, 36.
Ziegler, Russell M. "Combat Search and Research (CSAR): Time to Find a Real Fix."
Unpublished Research Paper, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, RI: 1993.
65

Csar Searching History

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Csar Searching History

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Csar Searching History

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

COMBAT SEARCH AND RESCUE:

SEARCHING THE HISTORY; RESCUING THE DOCTRINE

MAJOR MICHAEL A. WORMLEY

A THESIS PRESENTED TO THE FACULTY

FOR COMPLETION OF GRADUATION REQUIREMENTS

SCHOOL OF ADVANCED AIR AND SPACE STUDIES

MAXWELL AFB, ALABAMA

Distribution A: Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.

1. REPORT DATE 2. REPORT TYPE 3. DATES COVERED

6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER

5e. TASK NUMBER

5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION

11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT

12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

15. SUBJECT TERMS

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)

Major Michael A. Wormley was commissioned through the Reserve Officer

ABOUT THE AUTHOR ................................................................................................... iii

ILLUSTRATIONS ........................................................................................................... vii

TABLES .......................................................................................................................... viii

GULF WAR (1990-91)......................................................................................................29

OPERATION ALLIED FORCE (1999)............................................................................46

Figure 1 Joint CSAR Command Relationships ...................................................................7

Figure 2 Designated Indochina CSAR Sectors..................................................................20

Table 2 Combat Losses in Iraqi Controlled Battle Space .................................................36

Table 3 Operation ALLIED FORCE Command Structure...............................................47

One of the most important peacetime functions of the military

General Henry Harley “Hap” Arnold

Third, when our nation possesses an effective personnel recovery

Command and control (C2) – the exercise of authority and direction by a

Improving all aspects of C2 is the key to fighting smarter. Having

Current CSAR C2 Joint Doctrine

Maj. Mark DiPaolo

Figure 1 Joint CSAR Command Relationships

Source: US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 3-50.2, Doctrine for

No matter what era, area, or circumstance is involved, rescue has always

L.B. Taylor, Jr., That Others May Live

Wartime rescue operations will be dictated by the capabilities of

BG Thomas J. Dubose, Commander, ARS (1952-59)

Secretary of the Air Force, Harold Brown

Source: Office of Naval Research Report, Navy Combat Search

Earl H. Tilford, Jr.

Navy CSAR Air Force CSAR

Table 1 Summary of Navy and Air Force CSAR rescues in Indochina

Source: Office of Naval Research Report, Navy Combat Search

GULF WAR (1990-91)

I was appalled at the situation with CSAR prior to (Desert Shield/Storm)

The missions of ARS include combat rescue, peacetime SAR,

The primary mission of ARS is combat rescue which traditionally involves

RCC controllers are trained in peacetime SAR operations. They receive

Major John Steube, a USMC representative to the JRCC recalled:

Other components perceived the JRCC to be nothing more than a

Use of SOF forces to perform the dedicated CSAR mission, leads to

Desert Storm CSAR

We did not expect to be part of a SARTF that much. We expected to talk to

Brigadier General Richard Comer

Search effort - when location questionable

Table 2 Combat Losses in Iraqi Controlled Battle Space