Mughal Agrarian Relations

Ownership of land rights:

The question of land ownership and land rights in Mughal India was highly debated from the 18thcentury, by
British administrators and historians. Today historians B.R. Grover and Irfan Habib have analysed various
contemporary sources on land rights and rural society from the Mughal period to contribute to this debate
including Ain-i-Akbar from Akbar’s reign, imperial orders like nishans, farmans and parvanas, the Dastur-ul-
Amals or (administrative manuals) and finally original land revenue records maintained by the Patwari specially
from Bikaner and Hyderabad and unofficial works by Kafi Khan, European travellers Bernier, Tavernier and
Manucci.

Land rights were very important in Mughal India since the governing class’s existence revolved around land
grants, land rights and collection of revenue; however land rights were equally important for the raiyat (rural
society). One of the main controversies regarding proprietary rights in Mughal India was regarding the
ownership of land. Habib say controversy emerged as 16th/17th century European travellers like Bernier and
Manucci, asserted that the king was the owner of all land in India. Based on this 18th century British
administrators also held the king owned all land and thus the EEIC had inherited universal land ownership in
India from its predecessors.

Historians like B.R. Grover and Irfan Habib, on the basis of primary sources, critiqued this. Irfan Habib says
that Manucci and Bernier misinterpreted the term Malik(owner), which was used for the king, however he says
this term was used in the context of king having rights over land revenue and not land ownership.
Furthermore western travellers were influenced by concept of universal property rights held by kings in
Europe. Grover shows the Ain-i-Akbari explicitly mentions that the claim of ownership of land was by the
pioneer cultivator of land. He points out that the State did not possess any propriety rights over the vast
cultivable lands already under hereditary possession of the various classes of Riaya(peasant proprietors), it only
possessed propriety rights over all jungles and unclaimed land(banjar). The State could transfer such land to
riayat or zamindars, which was accompanied by possession and proprietary title as long as the land was
cultivated.

In Mughal India there were three types of land-(i)Jagir lands (land allotments by the state) consisting of
Tankha Jagir(transferable land) and Wattan jagir(untransferable land), (ii)Paibaqi lands (Jagir lands
temporarily converted into khalisa or crown lands) and (iii)Khalisa or crown lands.

Regarding ownership of land rights, P. Saran and U.N. Dey while discussing the peasantry’s land rights say
that peasants were the ultimate proprietors (owners)of land in Mughal India since Jagirdars could be
transferred but peasants couldn’t be evicted.

However Irfan Habib critiques this view saying that few documents such as the Farman issued to Mohamad
Hashim refers to peasants as Maliks/Arab-i-zamin(landowners), yet he questions the credibility of this
statement as he says the farman was written according to Shari’at law which bore little relevance to the agrarian
conditions in India. He says documents from Doab also allege that Zamidars purchased land from maliks who
were Kachhis and Chamars- who by their caste were cultivators, similarly Kafi Khan also speaks of
proprietary(ownership) and hereditary rights of peasants being seized by revenue officials.

Furthermore peasant’s hereditary occupancy right was protected by the State. In Mughal India land was
abundant and cultivators few it was common for the peasantry to flee if revenue exactions were too high in a
region. However the State tried to restrict this. E.g. The Farman to Mohammad Hashim states incase the
peasants have the capacity to undertake cultivation and yet they flee, it orders officials to threaten them with
imprisonment. Yet despite this peasants fled at will and were sometimes brought back by officials to their
original village. There is also record of peasant’s rights over land being sold in some areas where the zamidars
didn’t impede this, for example in Vrindaban near Mathura. In conclusion Irfan Habib says that neither the
peasants nor the zamidars possessed absolute property rights instead Mughal land rights were a network of
transferable rights and obligations with different claimants to differently defined shares in the produce from
the same land.

NATURE OF VILLAGE COMMUNITY, RURAL SOCIETY AND RURAL/PEASANT

STRATIFICANTION:

Interlinked to the issue of land rights was the issue of nature of village community and the stratification of
peasantry. The village community refers to a socio-economic structure and relations within a village. The nature
of village community in India was commented upon by European travellers of the 16th-17th century and later by
British revenue officials &jurists in the 18th century. Traveller Bernier in 16th century assumed it to comprised of
an undifferentiated mass of Indian peasants living under blind oppression. COLONIAL OFFICIALS like James
Mill, Elphinstone, Thomas Metcalf were quick to define the village community as “a little Republic”, a
“homogenous community” and an “organic egalitarian body”. Thomas Metcalf called it an “autonomous, self
sufficient and unchanging entity”, while English jurist Henry Maine emphasised communal ownership of land by
the village and the self sufficient nature of the village community.

However historians like Irfan Habib and B.R. Grover have severly critiqued the notion of a homogenous, self
sufficient village community with communal ownership of land.

Habib argues that there is no evidence of total ownership of land in Mughal India, but only of recognition of
hereditary occupancy rights of the peasant. As far as communal ownership of land by the village community is
concerned Habib and Grover pointed out the basic unit of revenue assessment was the peasant even though
land revenue may have been collected from the village as a whole. If there was communal ownership then the
village would have been the unit of assessment.

Maine had pointed to references of village taxes like malba( a cess comprising a common village fund for
meeting the expense of entertaining revenue officials) and Kharch-i-Deh (a cess levied for services the state
provided at village level or to meet expenses of touring state officials) as evidence for common village funds.
There is no evidence for a common village pool and items in Kharch-i-Deh were deducted from State revenue.
Grover also says wasteland, pastures and Jungles were not owned by the village community but were State
property and villagers had to pay to used them.

Habib and Grover have critiqued the idea of self sufficient/autonomous village community. Decisions regarding
cultivation were made by the peasants yet this decision was not fully autonomous as peasants had to keep in
mind the land revenue to be paid. Secondly the revenue assessment rates were set by the State and were not the
autonomous decision of the village.

(a) Village Administration: Firstly Village officials like the Muqaddam(village headman) had autonomy in
spheres of law and order, revenue collection, allotting land to landless peasants & distribution of agrarian
loans and the Patwari in land record keeping. Yet they didn’t enjoy complete autonomy as they were
answerable to the village community and even the State-e.g muqaddam was answerable to Faujdar.
(b) Economy: The village community was not autonomous economically either as-Often one village depended
on another for a product/service-e.g. one village may specialize in ploughs and provide it to other villages,
or villages of baniyas, dyers or potters provided their services to another. Secondly, B.R. Grover argues that
 in rural India a money economy had emerged which led to the intergration of village economies into
economic systems or nearby town/qasbas, thus disproving, economic autonomy.

III. RURAL STRATIFICATION/STRATIFICATION OF PEASANTRY

Regarding the homogenous nature of the village society and particularly the peasantry, Irfan Habib’s and B.R.
Grover’s analysis yields that rural society or Riyayah was highly stratified on the basis of ownership of land
rights. Habib says that economic differentiation had progressed considerably amongst the peasantry.

Thus peasant stratification on two basis. Firstly on the basis of relationship with the village peasants could
be divided into two categories namely Gaonti and Pahikasht. Gaonti was that section of the peasantry which
belonged to the village in which he resided and cultivated land.

While the pahikasht were migrant peasantry, who had land in one village, yet cultivated land in another village.
Pahikasht peasants were of two types , short term migrants who worked in another village and returned to their
home village everyday and Long term migrants or chapparband who worked in far off villages, they were
initially exempt from revenue payments till they settled into the new village. They usually migrated due to debt,
high revenue rates, or better economic prospects. Importantly the pahikasht peasant had land rights in his home
village and was thus a gaonti in his home village, while being pahikasht in the village to which he migrated. A
pahikasht peasant over a period of time could become a gaonti as he acquired land rights in the village where he
was a migrant.

The second basis of stratification of peasantry was on the nature of land rights and economic resourses
commanded by them; Khudkashta and Muzarian or Balhar.

Khud meant self and Kashta meant cultivation, khudkasht peasants were Gaonti’s who cultivated their land with
their own family labour and implements. B.R. Grover says they were usually high castes and they had hereditary
holdings over which they had full land rights to transfer, mortgage and sell, though such transactions were rare.

There were three types of Khudkashta peasants depending on the size of their landholding and recourses they
commanded. There were Khudkasht peasants with large land holdings who thus had to employ extra labour
(either landless labour i.e. Muzarian or pahikasht peasants) to help in cultivation. They usually had surplus
implements and animalswhich they loaned out. Thus they were powerful. Secondly, there were Khudkasht
peasants with medium land holding which utilized all their family labour and implements and finally some
Khudkasht peasants with very small land holdings who thus had a surplus of family labour which had to work
outside as hired labour, and were the weakest section of Khudkasht peasants, yet better than muzarian.

The Muzarian or Balhar were landless peasants who worked as tenants on the lands of landowners or zamindars.
There were two categories of Muzarian, those who cultivated land on a share cropping basis and paid rent as a
crop share and those who cultivated land on a daily wage basis. Muzarian who owned implements/animals but
no land were encouraged by the State to bring waste land under cultivation or to cultivate land of khudkasht
peasants who had fled. Muzarian had a low status as they barely met their subsistence needs and were tenants on
small plots. B.R. Grover says that the Zamindars, Madad-i-Mash assignees and Muqarari riaya(peasants who has
hereditary ownership of land vested by the State and full rights to mortgage, transfer and sell land) all of them
hired muzarian who tilled the land for them and had hereditary possession as long as they paid rent to the
landlords, who in turn paid revenue to the Mughal state.

The stratification of the peasantry was also on the basis of implements/recourses. The minority which
dominated, e.g. large khudkasht peasants had a surplus implements/animals which they loaned out to the
 majority of smaller peasants who didn’t have these. This small dominant section of rural society also had larger
surplus at their disposal as Dilbagh Singh shows, thus they also extended loans to the weaker sections of the
peasantry- e.g. the Muzarian, thus making them even more dependent on the elite zamindars. Even
intermediaries rather than investing their surplus in land they used it for usury. Thus historians argued while
there was enough cultivable land there was low investment in new land. Irfan Habib argues that the Mughal
revenue system intensified rural stratification, as khudkasht peasants, Zamindars, Madad-i-Mash assignees and
Muqarari riaya who were landed and had to pay the State revenue, employed tenants like Muzarian and Pahikasht
peasantry, often set their own high rates for extraction from such peasants and thus passed their own burden
onto their tenants. The tax system also insisted on payment in cash was not compulsory, yet prevalent and harsh.
Thus because of the above reasons rural society was anything but homogenous.

ZAMINDARS:

Irfan Habib says the word zamindar comprises two words of Persian origin- zamin or land and dar or degree of
control not necessarily ownership. In the 14the century the word was used for a chief of a territory/landed
intermediary. In the Mughal period the term was used officially from Akbar’s period for any person with any
hereditary claim to a direct share in the peasantry’s produce. Thus by 17th century it was used
interchangeably with a number of terms for agrarian rights, such as muquaddami, kohli, bhomi etc. It was
also used interchangeably with the termmaliki/malikiyat (Arabic term for ownership), as these landed
intermediaries had rights over a share of the produce. However this broad term, referring to landed
intermediaries was a blanket term used to refer to various types of Zamindars, with differing rights and
relations to the Mughal State.
Historians Moreland and P.Saran while studying land revenue systems didn’t attach much importance to zamindars
and labelled them vassal chiefs who accepted Mughal rule. Their view stemmed from the limitations of their
study and has been critiqued on the ground that zamindars couldn’t have been vassal chiefs as they are found
in villages and not areas directly under mughal control also.

NATURE OF LAND RIGHTS:

Irfan Habib says that zamindari rights were derived from fiscal claims, which survived from pre Mughal period. He
says they existed primarily in the form of certain levies which the zamindars imposed on the peasants over
and above the land revenue assessment, were hereditary and also included revenue collection under the
Mughal State.
He says originally the claims of the zamindars were distinct from land revenue, but over a with the assignment of
revenue collection rights to the Zamindar this distinction blurred. E.g. in Bengal the zamindar was
answerable for revenue collection to the State in his area, thus he seems to have collected revenue from the
peasants for their lands as well as his own lands, for which he was meant to pay and not the peasants. In
other parts of India he was expected to collect tax from primary assesses (cultivators) in return for an
allowance (nakar) paid to him by State as 1/10th or land revenue or in allotment of revenue free land.

Irfan Habib delineated three types of Zamindars, even though the term zamindar was a generic term used by the
Mughal state, zamindars were by no means a homogenous class. The three types were- Semi-Autonomous
zamindars, Intermediary zamindars and Primary or village level zamindars. He says these categories were not
exclusive and there was mobility amongst them.

The semi-autonomous zamindars were hereditary rulers of their territories, referred to as Rais, Ranas and
Rawats. They commanded vast powers, military and fiscal recourses thus being a constant threat to the Mughal
State. From the Sultanate period in fact there is evidence of Balban contending with rebelling chiefs and of
Allaudin Khilji setting up an administrative policy to also deal with them. Mughals were equally awareof their
threat, yet were forced to deal with them in order to deal with the peasantry. Autonomous zamindars ranged
from large powerful chiefs to small petty chiefs (e.g. Kachuwahas of Rajasthan).

B.R. Grover says ethnographically they belonged to a dominant ruling minority or a majority tribe or clan that
over time established regional socio-economic and political territorialism. Thus they could be tribal chiefs who
slowly became territorial chiefs e.g. Rathores of Marwar. Arif Khandari mentions they comprised 200-300 Rajas
possessing forts, with their collective recourses amounting to 4.4million according to Abul Fazl. Thus these
chiefs couldn’t be overlooked by the Mughal State and the State sometimes used force against them.

Akbar’s realizing the importance of controlling these semi autonomous chiefs he divided into two categories
-zamidran-i-zortalab(recalcitrant chiefs) and zamidran-i-rayati(loyal chiefs).He evolved an administrative policy to
control them by entering into alliances , offering them a tankha jagirs and high mansab rank in his court and
through granting them local autonomy over them untransferable their Wattan jagir. In return these chiefs were
meant to accept certain conditions. Due to this policy three different levels of relationships emerged between
the State and semi-autonomous zamindars.

Firstly, that of a Mansabdar- i.e. zamindars who were inducted into the Mughal administration and given a
tankha jagir in addition to their wattan jagirand in return had to maintain military contingents and fulfil revenue
collection duties(example:Marwar, Kachwahas). Secondly, those who accepted Mughal sovereignty but were not
given a Mansab they only paid tribute (peshkash) and had a limited military obligation within their territory.
They were only allowed to retain their Wattan Jagir and assist Pargana officials in revenue collection functions.
And finallyf those who entered a limited alliance with the Mughal state, accepting Mughal suzerainty, yet not
being given a Mansab, and thus having no obligation towards the State. They also only retained their wattan jagir.
N.A. Sadiqui indentified a fourth category of chieftains- those who didn’t pay tribute or accept Mughal
suzerainty but accepted Mughal currency.

The State exercised control over these semi-autonomous chiefs, through measures- such as military power,
Peshkash (financial tribute), which could be in cash or kind ( the value of this varied and was paid while visiting
the Mughal court or when the Emperor toured throughchief ’s territory). It was not a yearly payment and was
only given by a wattan jagir holder. These chiefs were also expected to pay personal homage to the king, at times
they also had to leave their heirs at the Mughal court as hostages.

Alliances between the Mughals and vassal of larger chieftains in a region to undermined the autonomy of bigger
chiefs. The Mughals decided matters of succession for chieftains, who were accepting a mansab and they
compelled chiefs to accept imperial rules regarding trade, peasantry etc. These measures reduced the risks posed
by semi-autonomous chiefs and garner military contingents and able administrators in the process.

Intermediary Zamindars- second category of zamindars. They didn’t proclaim proprietary rights, like semi
autonomous zamindars. Thus they only got a share in their produce called malikana. They collected revenue
from Primary Zamindars and passed it on to semi-autonomous zamindars and maintained armed contingents to
do so. They often commanded revenue of a large area. Their malikana or share in the revenue usually 1/10th of
the revenue collected was their hereditary right and they often got larger shares when they collected revenue.
They aspired to be semi autonomous zamindars as they had forts and contingents and thus came into conflict
with them state.
 Primary zamindars were small khudkasht peasants or sometimes original colonizers of an area. Their rights were
historically created over time either by virtue of them being original colonizers or from long term occupation of
land. Their hereditary rights were called malikiyat, which implied a share in the revenue but were not proprietary
rights. In 17th-18th century references to sale and purchase of zamindari rights emerged. B.R. Grover says,
malikana varied from region to region, it could be collected in cash or kind, and there was no uniform rate or
term for it.E.g.in Awadh it was called razm-i-zamindari, Bhumi in Rajasthan, Banth in Gujarat. In Gujarat Banth
implied collection of 10 ser of crop from a bigah and one copper coin, while in Awadh it was only 10 ser of rice
per bigah.In some regions the malikana which was collected as part of what was due to the State thus it ranged
between 2.5 to 25% depending on productivity. For example in Rajasthan it was 2.5 to 3% of the produce due to
infertile soil, in north India it was 10%, while in Gujarat and the Deccan it was 25%. Malikana thus depended on
the productivity of land and local custom. Apart from obtaining the malikana when zamindars performed the
crucial role of revenue collection they got additional share in the revenue called nankar.

B.R. Grover points out that there was another category of zamindars at the primary level which comprised
zamindars created by the State. As land was abundant in Mughal times sometimes the State gave zamindari
rights to important villagers who had the recourse to colonize new land, which the government sold to them.
This land was usually banjar (waste land) or forest land. This land was given at low revenue assessment rates
initially to these zamindars that usually comprised Muquaddams and Chaudhuries of the village and not
common peasants. Such zaminadars were also created by the State to subdue recalcitrant peasantry for example
in Banswara regions Afghans were given zamindari rights. These zamindars also further sublet their lands to
tenants and the zamindar claimed his malikana from his lands under the possession of tenants.

Apart from revenue collection functions the almost all zamindars had to maintain revenue records, law and
order and expand the area under cultivation. They were also providers of loans and of implements especially
primary zamindars. Because of these functions the zamindars could often exploit and coerce the peasantry,
which often took loans from them.

Regarding the income of zamindars Irfan Habib says that they usually was lesser than the land revenue, but it
was lucrative and usually amounted to 10% or more of his initial investment, while the amount he extracted
from the peasants was probably 2/5th of land revenue, most of which he used to maintain his establishment and
troops. According to B.R. Grover zamindars had the right to transfer, mortgage and sell their zamindari rights
e.g. In Awadh the sale price of zamindari rights in 5 villages amounted 2.3 times the land revenue. It is also said
that the social homogeneity of zamindari class was gradually eroded specially in the later Mughal period due to
high rates of sale and purchase.

Regarding the strength of the zamindari class Irfan Habib says that caste and military basis, personal ties with
the peasantry and a deep knowledge of customary practices and large fiscal recourses all made the zamindars a
powerful class which the State could never ignore. The Mughal State would have ideally preferred a direct
relationship with the peasantry but despite their attempts the zamindars couldn’t be diluted, thus they developed
a workable relationship with this powerful class as seen especially with the semi-autonomous zamindars. Yet
Mughal records saw them as a potential threat despite the relationship between zamindars and the State and few
records mention their significance.

Within the zamindar class conflict existed at times due to clan rivalry, also because zamindars tried to subjugate
other zamindars to expand their territories. Regarding conflict between the State and larger zamindars, this was
usually over surplus appropriation. The crisis of the jarigdari system intensified this conflict between state and
zamindar because as the Mughal state expanded there was a large gap between the jamma and the hasil. This led
to the Jagirdars extracting more revenue from the zamindars, who either held back revenue payment, or passed
 the pressure onto the peasantry, to deal with this crisis. The main impact of these conflicts was the suffering of
the peasantry.

LAND REVENUE SYSTEM/DAHSALA SYSTEM:

The Mughal land revenue system or Dahsala system constituted an indispensable source of income for the
Mughal state. The principal objectives of the Mughal land revenue policy were to curtail the exploitation of the
peasantry and revenue maximization by accurately assessing in the agrarian conditions (soil fertility and
productivity etc.) so that jama(estimated rev) and hasil(collected revenue) could be as close to each other as
possible. It is with these aims the Mughal state created the Dahsala system but only a number of experiments
with existing traditional forms of revenue assessment.

In the post-Sultanate period, in order to get accurate jama figures the state undertook a number of regional land
surveys and evolved a revenue system with two parts to it— Tashkhis (land assessment) and Tahsil (revenue
collection). In Akbar’s period we observe three phases in the evolution of the land revenue system. In the first
phase, upto 8th regnal year, Akbar continued with Sher Shah’s land assessment system (traditional assessment
methods). In the second phase, from the 8 to24th regnal year was a period of experiments and reform. It was
only in the 24th regnal year the Dahsala system was introduced.

PHASE I: Upto-8th regnal year.

In this first period, of the Tashkhis System or Traditional Revenue Assessment, the State indicated a proportion of the total
produce to be given as revenue. At the time, assessment of the revenue could be done in four ways:
Qarardad: the state fixed its share when the harvested crop was taken to the threshing floor; Khadbatai: the
state inspected the field and demarcated an area. The produce from this part of the field was the state’s
share; Langbatai: Post-harvest the crop would be stored in heaps and the State would fix a certain number of
heaps as its share; and Kankut: used for assessing agricultural productivity and was a rough estimation based
on the number of oxen engaged in the field or total area under cultivation.
There were, however, a number of problems with the traditional revenue assessment. Since it was not based on
assessment of actual productivity of soil there was scope for manipulation of figures and under-assessment

During Alauddin Khalji’s period the first attempt to assess the agricultural productivity was made through the
introduction of Masahat system of land measurement. This was, however, used along with the traditional
methods of assessment. It was not until Sher Shah’s period that revenue assessment was made by calculating
the area under cultivation and the productivity of the soil. The calculation of land under cultivation took
place through the zabti system that was introduced for land measurement (zabt meant to confiscate in Persian
but it was also used to refer to a standard measuring rod. The sikandari gazh was the standard measure of
length and one gazh was equivalent to 32 units of the zabti rod. This was continued by Akbar till his 8th
regnal year.

Sher Shah also introduced the crop schedule system or Rai. The schedule recorded different assessment rates for
each crop by calculating average productivity of each crop on one bigah of land (the schedule calculated the
crop productivity on three types of soil— highly fertile soil, average soil fertility and poor fertility— and
averaged them). Irfan Habib says one doesn’t know whether the crop rate was fixed in perpetuity or revised
periodically.
However, by Akbar’s period the schedule established by Sher Shah’s suffered from administrative lapses.
Ain-i-Akbari mentions a “lag” between the time the land assessment report was sent to the State and its
 application to the crop rate. This resulted in suboptimal revenue collections. This was the principle reason
for experiments that the Mughal state undertook in the second phase of the evolution of the land revenue
system.

PHASE II 8-24th regnal year:

In this second phase, between the 8TH regnal year and 24th regnal year, the primary objective of reforms was to
evolve a system of revenue administration that would factor local agrarian conditions.

In the 10th and 11th regnal year Todarmal and Muzaffar Khan Turbadi instructed the qanungos to send figures
on soil fertility based on the Khasra records. This data was used to determine the actual yield and revenue
collection (hal-i-hasil) and on this basis, the revenue assessment (jama or mahsul) was revised in the 15th regnal
year and a new rent roll prepared for different crops.

In the 13th regnal year, Abul Fazl states that the ‘zabt-i-harsala’ (annual measurement of land) was replaced by
nasaq system. There has been a historiographical debate on what nasaq implied.

While historians like P Saran suggests that nasaq referred to the Kankut system of rough assessment, Moreland
had suggested that it implied group assessment.

Irfan Habib has critiqued these notions and held that nasaq did not imply a replacement of annual
measurement of land but that past records could be factored in revenue assessments. Thus, if there was a delay
in the measurement of land, the peasants were permitted to select a previous revenue assessment as the basis for
determining the present tax liability. Therefore, annual assessment continued to be conducted but peasants had a
remedy in case of late assessment.

In the 19th regnal year Akbar introduced the tanab or bamboo rod as the standard measuring device, replacing
the jarib or rope that was not a stable means of measuring length and by the 31st regnal year, the Ilahi gazh was
introduced (replacing the Sikandari gazh) with 1 gazh = 42 units of the measuring rod;.

Another important innovation in the 19th regnal was the Karori experiment. The territorial expansion of the
Mughal state had led to an expansion in khalisa lands and for that purpose a new revenue administrative
structure was devised. In this experiment, all khalisa land was divided into 182 circles, each meant to yield
revenue worth 1 crore and headed by an amil (called karori). The amil was responsible for collecting the 1 crore
revenue target. However, Fazl says most amils fell short of their targets and Karori experiment failed to raise
the revenue of the state. However, the Karori experiment led to detailed land surveys and records that were
indispensable in the establishment of the Dahsala system.

PHASE III- 24th Regnal year- Dahsala System:

In this third period, the Dahsala System was visualized and put into practice. Fazl says the Dahsala or ten year system
implied that revenue assessment for 10 years (hal-i-dahsala) was taken into consideration while determining
the revenue demand (mal-i-harsala). Moreland has argued that the annual revenue demand was calculated by
taking an average of the revenue assessment for the past 10 years.
Irfan Habib has critiqued this notion by saying this was a misinterpretation of the Dahsala system and it could not
explain why the state would assess land annually at all— for by Moreland’s explanation, the existing revenue
assessment was sufficient to determine the present revenue demand.
Habib offers an alternative view he says, the average produce of each crop for each region over 10 years was taken
into account. This average productivity was multiplied by the total area under cultivation and the crop price
to ascertain the total value of the crop. The state took usually took one-third of the total value as tax but this
 varied in some cases. Thus, Habib pointed out that the revenue assessment for every year was applied in the
determination of the revenue rate for the subsequent year. As a result, deliberate under-assessment by the
peasant-revenue collector alliance would not substantially alter the tax liability. This was because firstly, the
current revenue assessment would only be factored in the calculation of the revenue demand for the
subsequent year and secondly it would constitute only 1/10th of the final assessed value.
During periods of crop failure, the state made adjustments and concessions. Loans were given to peasants and in
some cases area under cultivation was reduced (the un-assessed area was called nabud) so that the revenue
burden on peasants declined.
Under this system, the areas with similar agrarian conditions put under one circle or dastur. Therefore, Delhi was
divided into 8 circles and this was done by classifying soil fertility into 4 types (polat, jhajhar, parauti and
banjar). The unit of assessment under this system was the individual peasant. After the assessment was
made a patta notes the details of revenue and the peasant had accept a qubuliat or terms of revenue.
The rates of revenue varied between 1/3rd to ½ on a average, depending on soil fertility etc. Thus In Thar region the
rate was low 1/7th-1/8th, but in more fertile eastern Rajasthan an Thatta it was 1/3rd the average rate of the
time acc. to Habib. Revenue could be paid in cash or kind, but the state preferred payment in cash.
Finally under Akbar the system was implemented in most provinces from Indus to Ghargar(Bihar) acc. to Fazl and
Todar Mal tried to introduce it into Gujarat.

IMPACT ON PEASANTS/ PROBLEMS:

Irfan Habib has outlined a number of problems with the Dahsala system.

Firstly, there is an assumption that crop productivity in an entire region would be the same. Often, variations in
soil fertility within a region caused varying productivity which was not factored.
Secondly, the large revenue administration meant it was an expensive system (a zabitana got 1 dam for every
bigha of land he assessed)

Irfan Habib argues that the Dahsala system was exploitative and burdened the peasantry. Firstly, the system was
regressive as it had a uniform revenue rate (1/3) for the entire peasantry irrespective of the economic
differentiation within the peasantry. As a result, the burden of taxation was greater for the lower peasantry.
Secondly, the insistence on cash payment exposed the peasant to market fluctuation and the strangle hold of
moneylenders. This increased peasant indebtedness. Thirdly, the high taxation rate deterred capital investment in
land or improvement of production. Only large landowners had the surplus to investment in high value crops
(like indigo, sugarcane and cotton) while poor peasantry remained confined to subsistence farming.

Lastly, Muzaffar Alam says the exploitation of the peasantry by intermediaries (who were constituents of the
revenue administration) was also a reason for rural impoverishment. He observed the social dimension to
peasant uprisings and says the peasant revolts targeted non-Mughal rural elite. E.g. in Punjab, Banda Bahadur
attacked the Rajput landowners. This showed that revolts were an expression of social grievances and not
necessarily political opposition to the Mughal state.