NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY

COLLEGE OF LAW
Laoag City, Ilocos Norte

CASES PENNED BY
HON. JUSTICE RAMON PAUL
HERNANDO

Prepared & Submitted by:

JURIS DOCTOR II
(A.Y. 2022 – 2023)

Professor:

Assoc. Solicitor Mark Dave Camarao

PROFESSOR

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 Office of the 2023 Bar Chair
Bar Bulletin No. 1, Series of 2023

Schedule
Operating under the aim of expediting the admission of successful examinees to the legal
profession, the 2023 Bar Examinations shall be held in the month of September. Barring any
unforeseeable circumstance or fortuitous event that might warrant rescheduling, the 2023 Bar
Examinations shall be conducted in three (3) non-consecutive days, in a span of eight (8) days:

September 17, Sunday,

September 20, Wednesday, and
September 24, Sunday.

The rationale is both practical and societal: an earlier conduct of examinations means an earlier
release of examination results; successful Bar examinees can commence their practice of law as
early as December 2023; and new lawyers may begin contributing to their families and to the
society as members of the Bar in the same year they graduated from law school.

Coverage
The 2023 Bar Examinations is divided into six (6) core subjects, distributed over three days
of examination. Two (2) subjects are to be taken per examination day, segmented into morning
and afternoon periods. The morning periods shall run from 8:00 a.m. to 12:00 noon, and the
afternoon periods are to be administered from 2:00 p.m. to 6:00 p.m.
The 6 core subjects are allocated the following weights:
First Day
Schedule Subject Weight
AM Political and Public International Law 15%
PM Commercial and Taxation Laws 20%

Second Day
Schedule Subject Weight
AM Civil Law 15%
PM Labor Law and Social Legislation 20%

Third Day
Schedule Subject Weight
AM Criminal Law 15%
Remedial Law, Legal and Judicial Ethics
PM 20%
with Practical Exercises

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 TABLE OF CONTENTS
AYSON, JOEY
Political Law MAYNILAD WATER SERVICES, INC. VS. SECRETARY OF DENR 5
Commercial Law SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION, VS. ROSARIO A. GOMEZ 8
Taxation Law MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY VS. CITY OF MUNTINLUPA 9
SPS. JOON HYUNG PARK AND KYUNG AH LEE, VS. HON. RICO 10
Civil Law
SEBASTIAN D. LIWANAG
Labor Law CHARLO P. IDUL, VS. ALSTER INT'L SHIPPING SERVICES, INC. 12
Criminal Law PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, VS. ALEX BALUYOT Y BIRANDA 14
Remedial Law VENSON R. ANG VS. ATTY. SALVADOR B. BELARO, JR. 17
Legal Ethics TONY PETER PARTSCH, VS. ATTY. REYNALDO A. VITORILLO 19

CARLET, ESTELLA MARIZ

Political Law
BANK OF PHILIPPINE ISLAND VS. CENTRAL BANK OF THE 23
PHILIPPINES
Commercial Law REAL BANK VS. DALMACIO CRUZ MANINGAS 23
Taxation Law LA FLOR DELA ISABELA VS. COMMISSION ON INTERNAL 24
Civil Law LUISITO PULIDO VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES 25
Labor Law JR HAULING SERVICES VS. GAVINO L. SOLAMO 26
Criminal Law CICL XXX, ET AL. VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES 27
Remedial Law
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. 29
MARIA CRISTINA P. SERGIO AND JULIUS LACANILAO
Legal Ethics
AA TOTAL LEARNING CENTER FOR YOUNG ACHIVERS INC. VS. 29
ATTY. PATRICK A. CARONAN

DIZON, JIRAH
Political Law CORONA RE RETIREMENT 32
Commercial Law METROPLEX BERHAD VS. SINOPHIL CORPORATION 32
Taxation Law PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. GLORIA F. TUYAY 35
Civil Law PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. GLORIA F. TUYAY 36
Labor Law ARIEL M. REYES VS. RURAL BANK OF SAN RAFAEL 37
Criminal Law EDWIN TALABIS VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES 39
ARMANDO H. DE JESUS VS. INTER-ORIENT MARITIME 40
Remedial Law
ENTERPRISES, INC.
Legal Ethics VILLAMOR VS. ATTY. JUMAO-AS 42

DOMINGO, PRINCESS
Political Law MELVIN G. SAN FELIX VS. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION 43
Commercial Law REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. HEREDEROS DE CIRIACO 44
CHUNACO DISTELERIA INCORPORADA
Taxation Law HEDCOR SIBULAN, INC. VS. CIR 46
Civil Law FATIMA GONZALES-ASDALA VS. METROBANK 48
Labor Law JOSE R. DELA TORRE VS. TWINSTAR PROFESSIONAL 49
PROTECTIVE SERVICES, INC.
Criminal Law FERNANDO PANTE VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES 51
Remedial Law
EDISON PRIETO AND FEDERICO RONDAL, JR. VS. ERLINDA 52
CAJIMAT
Legal Ethics HERNANDO PETELO VS. ATTY. SOCRATES RIVERA 53

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FELIPE, JEMARD
Political Law REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. JORGE CASTILLO 55
MAGNA READY MIX CONCRETE CORPORATION VS. ANDERSEN 56
Commercial Law
BJORNSTAD KANE JACOBS, INC.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE VS. PHILEX MINING 57
Taxation Law
CORPORATION
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. JOSEPHINE PONCE- 58
Civil Law
PILAPIL
Labor Law SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION VS. ROSARIO A. GOMEZ 60
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. FLOR PUEYO ALIAS 61
Criminal Law
TITO FLONG
Remedial Law MRS. CONSOLACION V. TIÑA VS. STA. CLARA ESTATE, INC. 62
Legal Ethics EDITHA M. FRANCIA VS. ATTY. QUIRINO SAGARIO 63

LLACUNA, MELROSE
Political Law CSC VS. BERAY, ET.AL. 65
Commercial Law BPI VS. CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES 68
Taxation Law LUMAUAN VS. COA 70
Civil Law RIVO VS. RIVO 72
Labor Law VILLOLA VS. UNITED PHILIPPINE LINES 74
Criminal Law PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ADDIN 76
Remedial Law CIR VS. STANDARD INSURANCE CO 77
Legal Ethics VALMONTE VS. QUESADA 79

LLAMAS, JOCELYN
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY VS. CITY OF MUNTINLUPA AND 81
Political Law
NELIA A. BARLIS
Commercial Law MARIA LEA JANE I. GESOLGON VS. CYBERONE PH., INC. 83
Taxation Law BIR VS. SAMUEL B. CAGANG, 84
Civil Law SPS. BELINDA LIU AND HSI PIN LIU VS. MARCELINA ESPINOSA 86
Labor Law ARTURO BERNAL VS. ROBERTO CUIZON 87
Criminal Law PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINS VS. FLORENTINO LABUGUEN 89
Remedial Law SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM VS. MANUEL F. SENO, JR. 90
Legal Ethics RUBEN A. ANDAYA VS. ATTY. EMMANUEL A. TUMANDA 92

OASAN, FREDELYN
Political Law MERLINA R. DIAZ VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES 95
MULTI-WARE MANUFACTURING VS. CIBELES INSURANCE 97
Commercial Law
CORP.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. BENEDICTA MALLARI AND 99
Taxation Law
CHI WEI-NENG
Civil Law BANCO DE ORO UNIBANK, INC. VS. EDGARDO C. YPIL, SR 101
TELUS INTERNATIONAL PHILIPPINES, INC. VS. HARVEY DE 102
Labor Law
GUZMAN.
Criminal Law THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ADONIS CABALES 104
Remedial Law PASCUAL PURISIMA, JR. VS. MACARIA PURISIMA 105
CLARA R. ICK, RUBY ELINBERGSSON AND TERESITA 106
Legal Ethics
EDOSADA VS. ATTY. ALLAN S. AMAZONA

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AYSON, JOEY (Political Law)

MAYNILAD WATER SERVICES, INC. VS. SECRETARY OF DENR

G.R. Nos. 202897, 206823 & 207969, 06 August 2019, EN BANC.
Hernando, J.
FACTS:
The Regional Office of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
Environmental Management Bureau-Region III (EMB-RIII) filed a complaint before the DENR's
Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB) charging MWSS and its concessionaires, Maynilad and Manila
Water, with failure to provide, install, operate, and maintain adequate Wastewater Treatment
Facilities (WWTFs) for sewerage system resulting in the degraded quality and beneficial use of the
receiving bodies of water leading to Manila Bay, and which has directly forestalled the DENR's
mandate to implement the operational plan for the rehabilitation and restoration of Manila Bay and
its river tributaries.
The Regional Directors of the DENR EMB-National Capital Region (NCR) and Region VI-A
(RVI-A) also instituted their complaints before the PAB. They similarly charged MWSS, Maynilad,
and Manila Water with failure to (a) Provide, install, or maintain sufficient WWTFs compliant with
the standards and objectives of the Clean Water Act; (b) Construct Sewage Treatment Plants and
Sewerage Treatment Facilities (STPs & STFs) for treatment of household wastes; and (c) Perform its
obligations under the said law. According to the EMB-NCR and EMB-RVI-A, the test results of water
samples taken from Manila Bay showed that the quality of water near the area has worsened
without improvement in all parameters.
Prompted by the said complaints, the SENR issued a Notice of Violation (NOV). The NOV determined
petitioners' violation of Section 8 of the Clean Water Act, in that they have not provided, installed, or
maintained sufficient WWTFs and sewerage connections satisfactory enough in quantity to meet the
standards and objectives of the law, notwithstanding court orders and the lapse of the five-year
period provided by the Clean Water Act
Petitioners’ contentions
MWSS led the defense and averred that they were compliant with the law. Maynilad and
Manila Water also asserted the supremacy of the Concession Agreements executed with MWSS
containing service targets for water supply, sewerage, and sanitation within specific
milestone periods spread over the twenty-five year concession period. They sought refuge
under Section 7 of the Clean Water Act which first requires the Department of Public Works and
Highways (DPWH) to prepare and effect a national program on sewerage and septage
management to guide the MWSS and/or its concessionaries in implementing the law.
Ruling of the SENR
The SENR found MWSS, Maynilad, and Manila Water liable for violation of the Clean Water
Act and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR), imposing fines against them. The
Clean Water Act, specifically, the provisions on the five-year period to connect the existing sewage
lines, is mandatory, and the refusal of petitioners' customers to connect to a sewage line is
irrelevant to Section 8 of the law. The SENR further stated that petitioners' failure to provide a
centralized sewerage system and connect all sewage lines is a continuing unmitigated
environmental pollution resulting in the release and discharge of untreated water into various water
areas and Manila Bay.

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Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA dismissed Maynilad’s petition for violation of procedural rules on motions for
reconsiderations. Moreover, it rebuffed its invocation of the ruling in MMDA vs. Concerned Citizens
of Manila bay which, Maynilad asserts, supersedes the five-year compliance period set by the Clean
Water Act for petitioners to connect all the existing sewage line found in the whole of Metro Manila
and other Highly Urbanized Cities (HUCs) as defined in the Local Government Code of 1991. The CA
dismissed Manila Water’s petition and held that Section 8 of the Clean Water Act is clear, plain and
free from ambiguity, in requiring Manila Water to connect the existing sewage lines in its service
area to sewerage systems ready for and already in use within five years from effectivity of the law. It
held that the compliance period under the Clean Water Act is separate from the compliance
periods provided in the Agreement between MWSS and Manila Water. Moreover, it held that the
DPWH need not first formulate a National Sewerage and Septage Management Program (NSSMP)
before Manila Water can be compelled to comply with Section 8 of the Clean Water Act.
The CA dismissed MWSS’ petition and held that its remedy was incorrect because Orders
were issued not by the PAB, but by the SENR pursuant to Section 28 of the Clean Water Act.
Section 8 of the Clean Water Act expressly mandates MWSS, as the government agency vested with
the duty to supply water and sewerage services, to connect all existing sewage lines to the available
sewage system within five years from the date of effectivity of the law or from May 6, 2004. Thus,
these consolidated petitions for review on certiorari raising grave errors in the foregoing rulings by
the Court of Appeals
Respondent’s arguments through the OSG
The OSG points out petitioners' liability for violation of the Clean Water Act in failing to
provide a centralized sewerage system under Section 8 thereof, which is distinct from the
obligations of various government agencies under the same law. They disagree with the contention
that the conditions contained in Section 7 of the Clean Water Act are conditions precedent for the
implementation of Section 8 thereof. Moreover, they defend that the Order of the SENR finding
petitioners liable for violation of Section 8 of the Clean Water Act were based on substantial
evidence, and that the SENR Order imposing a fine on petitioners for violation of Section 8 of the
Clean Water Act was based on a valid complaint or charge.
ISSUE: Whether or not Petitioners violated Section 8 of the Clean Water Act
RULING:
Yes, the Supreme Court ruled on the following:
a) Public trust doctrine
Protruding from the basic tenet that water is a vital part of human existence, this
Court introduces the Public Trust Doctrine. It aims to put an additional strain upon the duty
of the water industry to comply with the laws and regulations of the land. Article XII, Section
2, of the 1987 Philippine Constitution elaborates on the ownership of the State over the
nation's natural resources and its right and duty to regulate the same. The Regalian doctrine
is an exercise of the State's sovereign power as owner of lands of the public domain and of
the patrimony of the nation. Sources of water form part of this patrimony.
While the Regalian doctrine is state ownership over natural resources, police power is state
regulation through legislation, and parens patriae is the default state responsibility to look
after the defenseless, there remains a limbo on a flexible state policy bringing these doctrines
into a cohesive whole, enshrining the objects of public interest, and backing the security of
the people, rights, and resources from general neglect, private greed, and even from the own
excesses of the State. We fill this void through the Public Trust Doctrine.

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 The public doctrine trust peaks of an imposed duty upon the State and its representative of
continuing supervision over the taking and use of appropriated water. Thus, parties who
acquired rights in trust property only hold these rights subject to the trust and, therefore,
could assert no vested right to use those rights in a manner harmful to the trust. This
conclusion reflected the view that water users could not acquire a vested property right in the
water itself; they merely obtained a usufructuary right to the water.
This doctrine further holds that certain natural resources belong to all and cannot be
privately owned or controlled because of their inherent importance to each individual and
society as a whole. It impresses upon states the affirmative duties of a trustee to manage
these natural resources for the benefit of present and future generations and embodies key
principles of environmental protection: stewardship, communal responsibility, and
sustainability.
The State has an affirmative duty to take the public trust into account in the planning and
allocation of water resources, and to protect public trust uses whenever feasible.
The public is regarded as the beneficial owner of trust resources, and courts can enforce
the public trust doctrine even against the government itself. It is in this same manner that
the right to distribute water was granted by the State via utility franchises to Maynilad and
Manila Water, under express statutory regulation through its delegated representative, the
MWSS. The State conferred the franchise to these concessionaires, working under the firm
belief that they shall serve as protectors of the public interest and the citizenry. In this
regard, water rights must be secured to achieve optimal use of water resources, its
conservation, and its preservation for allocative efficiency. For this purpose, water users who
are subject to regulation by the State or by its own franchise must obtain permits and
comply with the sanctions imposed on them. The enjoyment of these permits is not perpetual
and require a continued demonstration of quality and good service.

b) The Clean Water Act

Via legislative act of police power, the enactment of the Clean Water Act thrusts the
obligation onto the water concessionaires to provide for a proper sewerage and
septage system that complies with environmental and health standards to protect
present and future generations. The magnitude of this law is highlighted by the trust
relationship among the State, concessionaires, and water users, which must reflect a
universal intangible agreement that water is an ecological resource that needs to be protected
for the welfare of the citizens. Hence, the public trust doctrine is based on the notion that
private individuals cannot fully own trust resources but can only hold them subject to
servitude on behalf of the public.
The Clean Water Act requires water utility companies to provide for sewerage and
septage management services within five years of the law's passage. A sewerage system must
be built to provide for a proper infrastructure that enables sewage of water using sewers.
This infrastructure consists of receiving drains, manholes, pumps, storm overflows, and
screening chambers, which allows the water to flow out of the environment. This sewerage or
septage management services requirement is the bone of contention in these cases.
Section 7 is not a condition precedent to compliance with Section 8. Clearly, Section 7
is not worded as a condition precedent of Section 8 of the Clean Water Act. What jumps out
of the two provisions is that both provide for different and disconnected compliance periods
reckoned from the effectivity of the Clean Water Act. In all, nothing in Sections 7 and 8 of the
Clean Water Act or its IRR states or, at the very least, implies that the former is a condition
precedent of the latter. From the foregoing, it is apparent that the obligation imposed on
petitioners by Section 8, as implemented by Rule 8 of DAO No. 05-10, to connect the
existing sewerage lines is mandatory and unconditional. After the expiration of the five-year

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 compliance period, the obligatory force of Section 8 becomes immediate and can be enforced
against petitioners without subordination to the happening of a future and uncertain event

c) Maynilad and Manila Water did NOT comply with Section 8

Basing on Maynilad and Manila Water's own assertions, petitioners' compliance with
Section 8 of the law is dismal at best. Given that a decade has already passed following the
effectivity of the Clean Water Act, both concessionaires' compliance to Section 8 at this
current year do not even reach 20% sewerage coverage. Moreover, they had already been
levying a Sewerage Charge upon the consuming public despite non-compliance with their
legal duty to actually and completely install the already long-delayed sewerage connections.
Lastly, they even executed their respective MOA in which they bound themselves to move the
original expiry to 15 more years. The completion of the septage and sewerage connections
has already been lagging for fifteen years past the effectivity of the Clean Water Act. There is
no one else to blame but petitioners' neglect. The public has already suffered because of this
delay, and no further extensions could possibly be accommodated without inflicting
additional disadvantage to the already aggrieved.
Thus being stated, this Court, also laboring under the Public Trust Doctrine,
construes the MOA between MWSS and Maynilad and the MOA between MWSS and Manila
Water as a complicit acknowledgment of their obstinate defiance of their mandate under the
Clean Water Act. Agreeing among themselves for a 15-year extension will not cancel their
long-running liability under Section 8 of the Clean Water Act, in relation to Section 28 under
the same law. A private contract cannot promote business convenience to the unwarranted
disadvantage of public welfare and trust.

AYSON, JOEY (Commercial Law)

SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION, VS. ROSARIO A. GOMEZ

G.R. No. 200815, August 24, 2020.
Hernando, J.
FACTS:
In 2001, San Miguel Corporation (SMC) entered into business with C2k, a corporation
engaged in courier and delivery services. After three months, their business relationship began to
strain when C2K encountered difficulty in collecting its service fee from SMC. It was found out that
C2K’s former manager, Daniel Tamayo, formed another courier services group, Starnec, which had
been using fake C2K receipts and collecting the fees pertaining to C2K. However, C2K claims that it
was through Rosario Gomez’s intervention, who was then assigned as coordinator in the Mailing
Department of SMC, that Tamayo was able to transact with SMC. In the affidavit executed by C2K’s
President, Gomez was mentioned to have been collecting 25% commission from the total payment
received by C2K; and in the audit conducted, it was alleged that she was involved in anomalies that
caused tremendous losses to SMC.
Hence, SMC conducted an administrative investigation and hearing to address the matters in
hand. After investigation, SMC issued a Notice of Termination of Services on December 20, 2002 on
the grounds of fraud or willful breach of trust; reposed on her due to her alleged acceptance of a
commission from C2K and Tamayo’s group, and for allegedly allowing the courier to increase the
actual weights of the package in order to compensate her commission. This prompted Gomez to file
a case for illegal dismissal with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).
In March 30, 2006, the Labor Arbiter (LA) held that Gomez was validly dismissed from
service. NLRC, however reversed and set aside Labor Arbiter’s decision. This was later on affirmed
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by the Court of Appeals in October 20, 2011, pointing out that Gomez’s reason for dismissal was
not founded on clearly established facts. Thus, herein petitioner filed with the Supreme Court a
Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking to challenge and reverse Court of Appeal’s Decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not Gomez was illegally dismissed.
RULING:
Yes. In Cadavas vs. Court of Appeals, the Court summarized the requisites for valid dismissal
on ground of loss of trust and confidence: 1) the employee concerned must be holding a position of
trust and confidence; 2) there must be an act that would justify the of loss of trust and confidence;
3) such loss of trust relates to the employee’s performance of duties. In view of the foregoing, the
Court finds that Respondent holds a position of trust and confidence, since she was entrusted with
SMC’s property, which she was routinely charged with custody of mail matter. In addition, SMC
substantially proved the second requisite. Since Starnec was able to transact with SMC; where
Gomez as the Mail Department Coordinator should have known and notice the said fake receipts
since she previously transacted with C2K. Thus, the Court finds that Gomez willfully, knowingly
and purposedly and without justifiable cause disregards her company (SMC) ’s rules and
regulations. Also the Court gave credence to the fact that Gomez was found guilty of receiving bribes
through commission. With these findings, SMC sufficiently discarded the burden of proving
Gomez’s dismissal. Hence, The Court held that Gomez was validly terminated on the ground of loss
of trust and confidence.

AYSON, JOEY (Taxation Law)

MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY VS. CITY OF MUNTINLUPA and

NELIA A. BARLIS
G.R. No. 198529, 09 February 2021.
Hernando, J.
FACTS: 
Manila Electric Company (Meralco) is a public utility corporation organized under Philippine
laws with a franchise to construct, operate and maintain a distribution system for electricity in the
National Capital Region, among others. The City of Muntinlupa was converted from a municipality
to a highly urbanized city by Republic Act No. 7926 in 1995. On January 01, 1994, the Revenue
Code of the Municipality of Muntinlupa (MO 93-35) imposed a franchise tax on public utilities
operating within its jurisdiction. In 1999, the City Treasurer of Muntinlupa demanded payment of
the franchise tax owed by Meralco from 1992 to 1999. Meralco ignored the demand and filed a
petition in the Regional Trial Court to declare Section 25 of MO 93-35 as null and void. Meralco
argued that municipalities do not have the authority to impose a franchise tax.
The City of Muntinlupa argued that it has the authority to impose a franchise tax based on
R.A. No. 7160 and its implementing rules and regulations. The RTC ruled in favor of Meralco, but
the Court of Appeals modified the decision and held that the subject section of MO 93-35 was cured
of its legal infirmities when the Municipality of Muntinlupa was converted to a highly urbanized
city. However, the obligation to pay the franchise tax begins only from March 01, 1995.
ISSUES:
A) Whether or not Section 25 of MO 93-35 is valid and

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 B) whether or not the conversion of the Municipality of Muntinlupa to a highly urbanized city
cured the infirmity of Section 25 of MO 93-35.
RULING:
A) No, the Supreme Court ruled that Section 25 of MO 93-35 is null and void. The two tests
used in determining the validity of an ordinance are the Formal Test and the Substantive Test. The
Formal Test checks if the ordinance was enacted within the corporate powers of the local
government unit and if it was passed according to the procedure laid down by law. The Substantive
Test evaluates the reasonableness and fairness of the ordinance, its compliance with the
Constitution and existing statutes. The Court held that MO 93-35 failed both tests. The Formal Test
was failed as the passage of the subject ordinance was beyond the corporate powers of the then
Municipality of Muntinlupa. The Substantive Test was failed as the subject section deviated from
the provisions of R.A. No. 7160, which only allows provinces and cities to impose a franchise tax.
The Municipality of Muntinlupa had no power to enact the franchise tax ordinance. 
B) No, the Supreme Court stated that the curative effect of Section 56 of the Charter of
Muntinlupa City cannot cure the infirmity of Section 25 of MO 93-35. The CA’s ruling that the
curative effect of the conversion of Muntinlupa into a highly urbanized city cured the infirmity of
Section 25 of MO 93-35 is incorrect. A legal infirmity cannot be cured by a mere change of status
from a municipality to a highly urbanized city. In this case, Section 25 of MO 93-35, being ultra
vires and in violation of R.A. No. 7160, remains null and void. The conversion of Muntinlupa into a
highly urbanized city cannot give it the power to impose a franchise tax, which power is exclusively
vested in provinces and cities under R.A. No. 7160. Hence, the RTC’s ruling in favor of Meralco was
correct, and the CA’s ruling modifying the same was erroneous.

AYSON, JOEY (Civil Law)

SPS. JOON HYUNG PARK AND KYUNG AH LEE, VS. HON. RICO
SEBASTIAN D. LIWANAG
G.R. No. 248035, November 27, 2019.
Hernando, J.
FACTS:
Petitioners Spouses Joon Hyung Park and Kyung Ah Lee (petitioners) are American citizens
residing in the Philippines, particularly in Makati City . They are the petitioners in the Petition for
Adoption with Change of Name of the minor "Mayca Alegado" a.k.a. "Innah A1egado" (Innah) before
the RTC of Makati City, docketed as Sp. Proc. Case No. R-MKT-16-01300-SP, and raffled to Branch
136 thereof presided over by respondent Judge Rico Sebastian D. Liwanag (respondent Judge).
Petitioners have been residing in the Philippines since 2007 (in the case of petitioner Park)
and since 2009 (in the case of petitioner Lee). They have been gainfully employed in the Philippines
for almost the same length of time that they have been residing in the country. Petitioner Park is the
President of two Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA)-located corporations, Wyntron, Inc.
and Danam Philippines, Inc., while petitioner Lee is the Senior Adviser of Banco De Oro's (BDO's)
Korean Desk. Innah was born on December 13, 2012 in Tuguegarao City. She was barely 22 days
old when rescued by a non-government organization from traficking and referred to the Department
of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) Field Office in Cagayan. Innah's biological mother
attempted to give her away in exchange for transportation fare. Innah is now six years old. She was
a little over one year old when her care and custody was officially bestowed by the DSWD upon
petitioners on January 18, 2014, through a Pre-Adoption Placement Authority.
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 Petitioners have also adopted another girl, Hannah, through domestic adoption. The RTC of
Makati City, Branch 144, granted Hannah's adoption on August 30, 2016. Hannah is now 10 years
old, and Innah considers her as her older sister. The DSWD processed petitioners' application for
adoption of Innah, and issued on May 30, 2016 its Affidavit of Consent. The DSWD's Affidavit of
Consent instructed petitioners to file a petition for domestic adoption, stating that the prospective
adoptive parent shall initiate judicial proceeding by filing the petition to adopt not later than 30
days from date of receipt of the DSWD's written consent to adoption.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
In an Order10 dated September 11, 2017, respondent Judge found that since petitioners are
both foreigners, then the Petition for Adoption with Change of Name of the minor Innah presented a
proper case of inter-country adoption, instead of considering said petition as being appropriately
filed under the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998. Thus, pursuant to Section 32 of the Rule on
Adoption and Section 30 of the Amended Implementing Rules and Regulations on Inter-Country
Adoption, the trial court directed the transmittal of a copy of the petition and its annexes to the
Inter-Country Adoption Board (ICAB) for appropriate action
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On September 12, 2018, petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court with the CA, which assailed respondent Judge's Orders dated September 11, 2017, June
19, 2018, and July 10, 2018. However, in its November 21, 2018 Resolution, the CA dismissed the
Petition for Certiorari for being filed out of time. The CA reasoned that the 60-day period should
have been counted from the denial of petitioners' First Motion for Reconsideration, not the second.
Said Resolution partly reads: In this case, the petitioners alleged that they received the 19 June
2018 Order, which denied their first Motion for Reconsideration, on 2 July 2018. Following the
express provision of Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the petitioners had 60 days from 2
July 2018, or until 31 August 2018, within which to file a petition for certiorari. Instead, the
petitioners filed a Manifestation and Second Motion for Reconsideration. Only upon the denial of
their second Motion for Reconsideration did the petitioners initiate the certiorari proceeding.
Considering that the instant Petition for Certiorari was filed only on 12 September 2018, this Court
cannot give due course thereto for being filed out of time.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration. They argued that the transmittal of the copies
of the records of the case to the ICAB was in the nature of an interlocutory order, and not a final
decision; and as such, a second Motion for Reconsideration was permissible.24  However, in the CA
Resolution dated June 19, 2019, it denied petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Judge erred in referring the Petition for Adoption to the ICAB
since said Petition was appropriately filed under the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998.
RULING:
No, the Supreme Court finds that petitioners' Petition for Adoption was appropriately filed
under the Domestic Adoption Act in order for the appropriate Family Court or RTC to take
cognizance thereof. Furthermore, the Court also take cognizance of the agreement entered into
between the Supreme Court and the ICAB regarding the treatment of foreigners who reside in the
Philippines and who file a petition for adoption through the courts. Thus, said agreement which is
incorporated in the DSWD' s Memorandum dated June 1, 2018, Re: Domestic Adoption by
Foreigners Habitually Residing in the Philippines, reads: This is to share with you the agreements
between the Supreme Court and the Inter-country Adoption Board (ICAB), relative to cases of
foreign adoptive families who are habitually or permanently residing in the Philippines.
The Supreme Court en banc in OCA Circular 213-2017 states that foreigners who have filed an
application for adoption with the assistance and approval of the DSWD MUST attach the following
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to their petition to the courts: A Certification Declaring a Child as Legally Available for Adoption
(CDCLAA); Home Study Report to be prepared by an ICAB accredited Foreign Adoption Agency, if
not possible/available, a Certification regarding the same should be executed by the Central
Authority or Embassy of the receiving country. A Certification regarding the alien's legal capacity to
adopt and that his/her government allows the adoptee to enter his/her country as his/her adopted
child. If not possible, a Certification should be executed by the Central Authority or Embassy of the
receiving country. This implies that these foreigners should still secure a certification from their
Foreign Adoption Agencies and/or Embassies that since they are not residents in their countries
and habitually residing in the Philippines, the said agencies could not issue the documents required
by the domestic courts in support to their Petitions filed for domestic adoption. If ever their cases
will be endorsed to ICAB by the courts, ICAB will file a manifestation on this matter so that the
domestic adoption could be pursued. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, even if the instant adoption proceeding would be referred to the ICAB, as what the RTC
did, there is still a high probability that the ICAB will file a manifestation so that the domestic
adoption before the trial court could be pursued, considering the circumstances of the case.
Consequently, the referral to the ICAB would only cause a delay in the adoption proceedings, a
matter that would be clearly prejudicial to the interest of the adoptee and the petitioners. At this
juncture, it must also be stressed that the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), in its
Comment, noted that the dismissal by the CA was based purely on procedural grounds.
Citing Aguam v. Court of Appeals, the OSG opined that: "It is a far better and more prudent course
of action for the court to excuse a technical lapse and afford the parties a review of the case on
appeal to attain the ends of justice rather than dispose of the case on technicality and cause a grave
injustice to the parties, giving a false impression of speedy disposal of cases while actually resulting
in more delay, if not miscarriage of justice."
In addition, the Court also note that petitioners' effort during the proceedings in the trial
court have already gone as far as securing authenticated copies of the relevant California laws on
adoption, U.S. immigration laws, the taking of expert witness Ms. Tifany Markee's deposition
through written interrogatories, and the submission of several documents to support their petition
for adoption. We also take cognizance of the fact that the child, Innah, had been living with
petitioners for six years and has recognized them as her parents. In view of this, We hold that since
the case properly falls under the Domestic Adoption Act, it is for the best interest of the child that
the instant case be speedily disposed by continuing the proceedings in the trial court for the
determination of whether petitioners are indeed qualified to adopt the child, instead of
inappropriately referring the instant domestic adoption case to the ICAB where the proceedings may
have to start anew and might be referred back to the trial court for the continuation of the domestic
adoption proceedings. Settled is the rule that in adoption proceedings, the welfare of the child is of
paramount interest.

AYSON, JOEY (Labor Law)

CHARLO P. IDUL, VS. ALSTER INT'L SHIPPING SERVICES, INC.

G.R. No. 209907, June 23, 2021.
Hernando, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner Charlo P. Idul (Idul) was employed by Alster Int'l Shipping Services, Inc. (Alster
Shipping) on behalf of its principal, Johann Mkbluementhal GMBBH Reederei, for a period of 12
months. On April 14, 2008, he boarded the vessel M/V IDA to commence his services as a bosun.
Page | 12
On December 4, 2008, Idul figured in an accident while working when the lashing wires broke and
hit his left leg resulting to a fracture. He disembarked the vessel and underwent surgery in a
hospital in France. Thereafter, he was repatriated back to the Philippines for further medical
attention. On December 11, 2008, he was referred by the company to Metropolitan Medical Center
(MMC) under the care of Dr. Robert Lim (Dr. Lim), and orthopedic surgeon, Dr. William Chuasuan
Jr. (Dr. Chuasuan). He was given medication and instructed to undergo rehabilitation therapy. He
was also asked to come back for follow-up check-ups.
The company-designated physician issued medical reports dated February 2, 2009, March 9,
2009, March 30, 2009, June 15, 2009, and July 6, 2009. In the medical report dated July 6, 2009,
Dr. Chuasuan gave Idul a Grade 10 disability rating due to "immobility of ankle joint in abnormal
position." Prior to this, or on March 16, 2009, Idul sought the opinion of his own doctor of choice,
Dr. Venancio P. Garduce Jr. (Dr. Garduce). After a single consultation, Dr. Garduce assessed Idul to
be totally and permanently disabled. Thereafter, Alster Shipping offered to pay Idul the amount of
$10,750.00 as disability benefit in accordance with the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration Standard Employment Contract (POEA SEC). However, Idul rejected the offer and
insisted that he was entitled to full disability benefits.
On June 3, 2009, Idul filed a complaint for total and permanent disability benefits with
damages before the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE). During the preliminary
mandatory conference, the parties failed to reach a settlement. In Idul's Position Paper, he claimed
that he was entitled to full disability benefits since the injury he suffered rendered him incapable of
performing his grueling duties as a bosun. Due to the extent of his injury, he argued that he was
entitled to a Disability Rating of Grade 1 or an equivalent of $60,000.00 in disability benefits. He
posited that both doctors already concurred as to the extent and nature of his injury but Alster
Shipping still failed to satisfy his claim. Additionally, he asked for sickness allowance and damages.
On the other hand, Alster Shipping denied liability for full disability benefits. It maintained
that Idul was not eligible for full disability benefits considering that he was assessed by the
company-designated physician to be suffering from a Grade 10 disability only. Thus, the parties are
bound by such declaration of the company-designated physician in accordance with the POEA SEC.
To support this assertion, it pointed out that Idul's condition did not even fall under Section 32 of
the POEA SEC which enumerates Grade 1 disabilities.
Moreover, the disability rating by Dr. Chuasuan was issued within the 240-day period,
negating any claim that the temporary total disability developed into a permanent total disability.
Additionally, Alster Shipping belied any claim against Mr. Almodiel, who was merely their VP for
operations. Lastly, it contended that Idul is not entitled to damages and attorney's fees for lack of
factual and legal basis.
Ruling of the Labor Arbiter:
The Labor Arbiter, in a May 31, 2010 Decision, ruled in favor of Alster Shipping. It gave more
credence to the findings of Dr. Lim and Dr. Chuasuan who were able to monitor and observe Idul
while he was undergoing treatment and rehabilitation, rather than Dr. Garduce's assessment which
was made after a single consultation.
Ruling of the National Labor Relations Commission:
In its December 14, 2010 Decision, the NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter's findings. It
explained that it is the loss of earning capacity and not the mere medical significance of the injury
that determines the gravity of disability. Thus, Idul's inability to perform his job for more than 120
days from the time he was examined by Dr. Chuasuan entitled him to permanent disability benefits.
Despite Alster Shipping establishing Idul's disability grading within the extended 240-day

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temporary total disability period, the fact remains that he was still unable to return to work beyond
the 120-day period.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals:
The CA, in its April 30, 2013 Decision, upheld the ruling of the LA. It held that Idul's
condition cannot be considered a permanent total disability that would entitle him to the maximum
disability benefit of $60,000.00. It stressed that a temporary total disability becomes permanent
only when the company-designated physician declares it to be so within the 240-day period, or
when after the lapse of said period, the physician fails to make such declaration. The appellate
court also reiterated that the POEA SEC provides that when a seafarer sustains a work-related
injury, one's fitness to work shall be determined by the company-designated physician. If the
seafarer's physician of choice disagrees with that of the company-designated physician, the opinion
of a third doctor may be jointly decided upon by the employer and seafarer, whose decision shall be
binding on both parties.

ISSUE: Whether the appellate court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in promulgating the assailed Decision and Resolution, which gave credence to
the company-designated physician and found petitioner not entitled to permanent and total
disability benefits.
RULING:
No, the Supreme Court ruled that the CA did not act with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in annulling the Decision of the NLRC, and reinstating
the Labor Arbiter's Decision. The CA correctly concluded that a temporary total disability only
becomes permanent when 1) the company-designated physician declares it to be so within the 240-
day period; or 2) when after the lapse of the 240-day period, the company-designated physician fails
to make such declaration.
In this case, the medical reports issued by Dr. Lim and Dr. Chuasuan reveal that Idul was
examined, treated, and rehabilitated for about seven (7) months. Thereafter, Dr. Chuasuan's
assessment of Idul's disability grading was issued on July 6, 2009 or on the 207th day from
December 11, 2008, and therefore, well within the 240-day period. Clearly, Idul's condition did not
become a permanent total disability just by the mere lapse of the 120-day period, especially since
the extension was necessary for his rehabilitation. As to the conflicting findings of Dr. Chuasuan on
one hand and Dr. Garduce on the other, the medical findings of Dr. Chuasuan must prevail. Under
Section 20 (A) (3) of the 2010 POEA-SEC, if a doctor appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the
assessment, a third doctor may be agreed jointly between the employer and the seafarer, whose
decision shall be final and binding on both parties.
At this point, it bears stressing that the employee seeking disability benefits carries the
responsibility to secure the opinion of a third doctor. In fact, the employee must actively or
expressly request for it. The referral to a third doctor has been recognized by this Court to be a
mandatory procedure. Failure to comply therewith is considered a breach of the POEA-SEC, and
renders the assessment by the company-designated physician binding on the parties. Considering
the foregoing circumstances, Dr. Chuasuan's assessment of a Grade 10 disability, which was a
result of months of consultations, examinations, and treatments, prevails. It certainly bears more
weight than the findings of Dr. Garduce who only examined Idul once and based his medical
assessment on the latter's previous medical history.
AYSON, JOEY (Criminal Law)

Page | 14
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, VS. ALEX BALUYOT Y BIRANDA
G.R. No. 243390, October 05, 2020.
Hernando, J.
FACTS:
On March 5, 2013, a confidential informant (CI) of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency
(PDEA) informed the team of Intelligence Officer 1 Froilan Bitong (IO1 Bitong) about the drug
activity of a certain Alex in Caloocan City. IO1 Bitong's team is based in Camp Olivas, Pampanga.
The team was able to procure the necessary authority in order to conduct a buy-bust operation
outside of its jurisdiction. Intelligence Officer 1 Ronnel Molina (IO1 Molina) was assigned as the
poseur-buyer for the operation while Intelligence Officer 1 Regie Pinto (IO1 Pinto) was designated as
the arresting officer. There were three to four other members of the team. Two five hundred peso
(P500.00) bills were given to IO1 Molina to serve as buy-bust money. He then placed his initials,
"REM," on the left portion of the bills. The team agreed that after the sale, IO1 Molina will ring up
the cellphone of IO1 Pinto to signal that the latter may proceed to make the arrest.
The CI then called Alex to inform him that IO1 Molina is a possible buyer of shabu. The
cellphone was passed to IO1 Molina and he asked if Alex had one thousand pesos worth
of shabu on hand. Alex answered in the affirmative. Hence, the team proceeded to the target area in
Caloocan City. At around 9:00 p.m. of the same day, IO1 Molina and the CI walked to the house of
Alex while the other team members proceeded to their positions. The CI introduced IO1 Molina to
Alex as the buyer. Alex showed them only one plastic sachet of shabu and said that he only has five
hundred pesos (P500.00), worth of shabu. IO1 Molina said that one plastic sachet is enough. The
sale took place. Alex handed the sachet to IO1 Molina. In turn, IO1 Molina gave the marked five-
hundred peso bill to Alex as payment. Shortly thereafter, IO1 Molina called up the cellphone of IO1
Pinto, giving the signal for the arrest to proceed.
IO1 Pinto and the other team members rushed to the scene and arrested Alex.[21] IO1 Pinto
recovered the marked five-hundred peso (P500.00) bill from Alex and handed it to IO1 Molina.
Another medium-sized plastic sachet containing two smaller plastic sachets of shabu was recovered
from Alex's black sling bag. However, IO1 Pinto stated in his testimony that he was not able to see
the contents of the black sling bag at the time of the operation until IO1 Molina subsequently
opened it. IO1 Molina marked the plastic sachet subject of the illegal sale as "EXH A REM
3/5/2013," and the medium plastic sachet as "EXH B-2a REM 3/5/2013" when they were already
in the PDEA National Headqua11ers in Quezon City, as they opted to leave the site because of the
possible danger. He did not mark the two smaller plastic sachets inside the medium plastic sachet.
He then executed an inventory receipt. He also prepared the requests for laboratory examination of
the seized items and drug test on Alex, which were signed by IO1 Bitong.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On August 27, 2015 the RTC rendered its Decision on the case. In Criminal Case No. 89534,
the RTC found Alex guilty of violation of Section 5, Article II of RA 9165 or Illegal Sale of Dangerous
Drugs. He was sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of
P500,000.00. The trial court ruled that the prosecution was able to establish beyond reasonable
doubt the elements of Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs. On the other hand, in Criminal Case No.
89535, the RTC found Alex not guilty of violation of Section 11, Article II of RA 9165 or Illegal
Possession of Dangerous Drugs. The trial court ruled that the prosecution failed to establish with
certainty the identity of the subject specimens. On October 5, 2017, the CA rendered its assailed
Decision denying the appeal and modifying the RTC ruling in Criminal Case No. 89534 to the extent
that Alex shall be ineligible for parole.
Page | 15
ISSUE: Whether or not Alex is guilty of Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs.
RULING:
No, the Supreme Court agrees with Alex that the chain of custody rule was not properly
observed during the operation. Related to establishing the identity of the object of the illegal sale is
the observance of the chain of custody rule. The chain of custody rule in Section 21, Article II of RA
9165 has been amended on July 15, 2014 by RA 10640 to the extent that the witness requirement
during the marking of the seized items has been relaxed. But the applicable rule for this case is
Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 prior to its amendment as the transaction happened on March 5,
2013. The foregoing provisions provide that the marking, photographing, and inventory of the seized
items must be done immediately after seizure and confiscation of the items in the presence of three
witnesses-a representative from the media, the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected
official. The purpose of this rule is to preserve the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
dangerous drugs in order to fully remove doubts as to its identity.
The provisions allow exceptions to the chain of custody rule. The case of Belmonte v.
People mentions that under varied field conditions, the strict compliance with the requirements of
Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 may not be always possible as long as the integrity and evidentiary
value of the seized items are preserved.
The IRR of RA 9165 likewise provides that the marking, photographing, and inventory of the
seized items may be done "at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending
officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures." In his testimony, IO1 Molina
stated that he marked the seized items only in the PDEA National Headquarters in Quezon
City. They opted to leave the buy-bust site as soon as possible because of possible danger to their
safety and because it was already night time. The RTC ruled, as affirmed by the CA, that the failure
to immediately mark the seized items at the place of arrest was not fatal to the prosecution. This
Court agrees with the RTC and the CA in this regard. However, the Court notes that the PDEA
officers failed to observe the three-witness requirement during the marking of the seized items. This
lapse in procedure warrants the acquittal of Alex.
The prosecution must show that the apprehending officers employed earnest efforts in
procuring the attendance of witnesses for the inventory of the items seized during the buy-bust
operation. Mere statements of unavailability of the witnesses given by the apprehending officers are
not justifiable reasons for non-compliance with the requirement. This is because the apprehending
officers usually have sufficient time, from the moment they received information about the alleged
illegal activities until the time of the arrest, to prepare for the buy-bust operation that necessarily
includes the procurement of three (3) witnesses. If one of the individuals invited refuses to
participate as witness, the apprehending officers can still invite another individual to become a
witness. In this case, only two (2) witnesses were present during the marking of the seized
items. Kagawad Jose Ruiz of Barangay Pinyahan, Quezon City was the elected public official; Mr.
Jimmy Mendoza was the representative from the media. There was no representative from the DOJ.
The records did not show that the prosecution explained or justified the absence of said
representative from the DOJ during the marking, photographing, and inventory of the seized items.
In fact, IO1 Molina, when asked during his cross examination, admitted that there were only two (2)
witnesses present during the inventory of the seized items. Neither did IO1 Molina nor IO1 Pinto
provide any explanation to justify the absence of a representative from the DOJ.
Furthermore, the PDEA officers had sufficient time to procure a third witness. The records
show that the operation was scheduled, and was in fact conducted late in the afternoon of March 5,
2013 with the actual buy-bust conducted at night. They had the whole day to procure the third
witness after they were informed of the alleged illegal activities in the morning of the same day; yet,
they have failed to do so. The failure to comply with the three-witness requirement produces a gap
Page | 16
in the chain of custody of the seized items that adversely affects the integrity and evidentiary value
of the seized items. This raises doubts that the integrity of the seized items may have been
compromised. The prosecution also cannot just rely on the saving clause provided in Section 21 of
the IRR of RA 9165. The clause requires showing of justifiable grounds for non-compliance and that
the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items were preserved. In this case, however, the
prosecution failed to offer evidence to show justifiable grounds for non-compliance. It also failed to
prove that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items were preserved despite this lapse
in the procedure.
It is a well-settled rule that in criminal cases, the accused's guilt must be proven beyond
reasonable doubt. This burden lies with the prosecution. In this case, the prosecution was not able
to prove Alex's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The failure of the drug enforcement officers to
observe the three-witness rule seriously compromised the integrity of the seized items and
ultimately casted reasonable doubt on Alex's guilt.
AYSON, JOEY (Remedial Law)

VENSON R. ANG VS. ATTY. SALVADOR B. BELARO, JR.

A.C. No. 12408, 11 December 2019.
Hernando, J.
FACTS:
The late Peregrina Dela Rosa (Peregrina) owned a parcel of land with a building erected
thereon which is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 528991 situated in San Francisco del
Monte, Quezon City. In 1982, she appointed complainant Venson as administrator of the subject
property. Upon Peregrina's demise on November 24, 2002, the property was inherited by
complainant Venson and his siblings namely: Virginia Ang Ting, Venhart Dela Rosa Ang, Villy Ang
Teng Him Buenaventura (Villy), and Vermont Dela Rosa Ang (Vermont). The siblings never
partitioned the property or assigned their rights to any of the co-owners.
On March 6, 2015, complainant Venson and his siblings were surprised to learn that
Peregrina's title to the subject property was already cancelled by virtue of an Extrajudicial
Settlement of Estate Among Heirs with Waiver of Rights (Extrajudicial Settlement) which they
allegedly executed on March 26, 2014. The Extrajudicial Settlement was notarized by respondent
Atty. Belaro on March 26, 2014 before whom complainant Venson and his siblings purportedly
personally appeared and subscribed therein. Complainant Venson and his siblings also discovered
two other versions of the same document that were submitted to the Manila Electric Company
(MERALCO) and the Office of the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City4 that
were likewise notarized by respondent Atty. Belaro.
Perusal of the three versions of the Extrajudicial Settlement showed several irregularities
therein. These are: (a) the name of Virginia Dela Rosa Ang-Ting was misspelled as Verginia Rosa
Ang-Ting; (b) the husband of Villy was not stated therein; (c) the Extrajudicial Settlement
instrument was allegedly executed on March 26, 2014, but the subject property remained in the
name of Peregrina as of July 2014; (d) only the version of the instrument that was submitted to the
Land Registration Authority (LRA) showed the date of death of Peregrina and that it was published
under the law; (e) Villy was indicated as a signatory therein despite her demise on April 5, 2012, two
years before it was executed; and (f) the Extrajudicial Settlement submitted to MERALCO bore no
witnesses while the LRA's copy was signed by two unknown witnesses, and the instrument
submitted to the RTC-Quezon City indicated Ma. Shiela Dioneda (Dioneda), the alleged secretary of
respondent Atty. Belaro, as the sole witness therein.

Page | 17
 Complainant Venson and his siblings also discovered that respondent Atty. Belaro notarized
a Deed of Absolute Sale dated December 16, 2014 which was purportedly executed by and between
Vermont and Rowena Ang (Rowena) as sellers, and Lou Aldrin Ridad, Louzelle Ann Ridad, Louisse
May Ridad, Louie Aaron Ridad, and Louissa Liendle Ridad as buyers. An Acknowledgement Receipt
dated December 16, 2014 was likewise notarized by respondent Atty. Belaro showing that Vermont
and Rowena allegedly received P5,000,000.00 from the buyers in consideration of the purported
sale of the subject property.
As a result thereof, complainant Venson filed the instant letter-complaint. Attached to the
complaint were the reproduction copies of the questioned documents, the specimen signatures of
respondent Atty. Belaro that were requested from the office of the Executive Judge of RTC-Quezon
City, and a Certification dated March 20, 2015 issued by the Office of the Clerk of Court of the said
trial court. On April 8, 2015, the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), through Director Dominic C.M. Solis, issued an Order directing the parties to file
their respective verified position papers. The Investigating Commissioner thereafter set the
mandatory conference on June 25, 2015. However, only complainant Venson appeared during the
mandatory conference. Respondent Atty. Belaro then filed an undated Manifestation with Motion for
Reinvestigation informing the CBD that he belatedly received the copy of its Order as it was sent to
the school where he reports only on weekends. Also, the annexes mentioned in the complaint were
not attached therein. Thus, respondent Atty. Belaro requested the CBD for 10 days within which to
file his answer or position paper and to photocopy the annexes of the complaint.
Pending the resolution of is Manifestation with Motion for Reinvestigation, respondent Atty.
Belaro filed his Answer to the letter complaint denying that he notarized the questioned documents
involving the subject property. He claimed that his alleged signatures found therein were forgeries
as evidenced by his specimen signatures submitted before the RTC-Quezon City when he applied for
a notarial commission. Respondent Atty. Belaro also denied having caused the filing of the
questioned notarized documents before the government agencies concerned. He further averred that
he did not know the differences and alterations made in the different versions of the Extrajudicial
Settlement instrument which were submitted to MERALCO, the LRA, and the Clerk of Court of RTC-
Quezon City. Lastly, he claimed that he does not personally know Dioneda and that she was never
employed as his secretary.
Subsequently, the parties filed Joint Motion to Dismiss before the CBD seeking the dismissal
of the complaint claiming that it arose from a misapprehension of facts. Attached to the joint motion
is an Affidavit of Desistance executed by complainant Venson. Respondent Atty. Belaro also
informed the CBD of his intention to withdraw his Motion for Reinvestigation.
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner
In a Report and Recommendation dated July 30, 2014, Investigating Commissioner Arsenio
P. Adriano noted that the signatures of respondent Atty. Belaro in the Extrajudicial Settlement
instrument appear to be falsified as these were different from his genuine signatures submitted to
the Executive Judge of RTC-Quezon City when he applied for a notarial commission.
Despite the alleged forgery, his notarial seal was used in the documents. Based on this, the
Investigating Commissioner concluded that respondent Atty. Belaro failed to properly secure the
same since no other person was allowed to use it other than him.
The IBP Board of Governors' (BOG) Recommendation
On April 29, 2016, the IBP-BOG issued Resolution No. XXII-2016-280 which adopted and
approved the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, with the modification
that respondent Atty. Belaro be instead meted the penalty of revocation of his existing notarial
commission, disqualification from appointment as notary public for two years, and suspension from
Page | 18
the practice of law for three months. An Extended Resolution was issued by the IBP-BOG with
respect to the said modification of the recommended penalties to be imposed against respondent
Atty. Belaro. Aggrieved, respondent Atty. Belaro filed a Motion for Reconsideration25 before the IBP-
BOG. He claimed that the findings of the IBP were not based on substantial evidence; that it merely
relied on complainant's evidence; and that his motion for reinvestigation was not even acted upon
or considered prior to the disposition of the complaint against him. Hence, he was not given a
chance to present his own evidence which would have shown that he was a victim of the conspiracy
perpetrated by the sibling of complainant Venson.
ISSUE: Whether or not the IBP violated respondent Atty. Belaro's right to due process.
RULING:
No, the Supreme Court ruled that there was no violation of respondent Atty. Belaro's right to
due process. The right to be heard is the most basic principle of due process. It is a settled rule that
there is no denial of due process when a party has been given an opportunity to be heard and to
present his case. There is only denial of due process when there is total absence or lack of
opportunity to be heard or to have one's day in court. Respondent Atty. Belaro claims that the IBP
violated his right to due process because the case was already submitted for resolution when it
came to his knowledge. He also insists that the IBP's resolution was solely based on complainant
Venson's evidence as the IBP did not act on his motion for reinvestigation.
Technical rules of procedure are not strictly applied in administrative proceedings and
administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense.
In Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, the Court defined administrative due process in this wise: Due
process, as a constitutional precept, does not always and in all situations require a trial-type
proceeding. Due process is satisfied when a person is notified of the charge against him and given
an opportunity to explain or defend himself. In administrative proceedings, the filing of charges and
giving reasonable opportunity for the person so charged to answer the accusations against him
constitute the minimum requirements of due process. The essence of due process is simply to be
heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side, or an
opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. (Citations omitted)
A thorough examination of the records shows that respondent Atty. Belaro was accorded
ample opportunity to defend himself and adduce his own evidence. The IBP duly notified him of the
proceedings by sending the notices via registered mail to St. Dominic Savio College of Law, where he
used to teach and was the College Dean.
While respondent Atty. Belaro claimed that the notices were not sent to his registered
address of place of business, such bare assertion deserves scant consideration as he failed to
sufficiently prove that the service of notices was highly irregular. Notably, upon being informed of
the notices, respondent Atty. Belaro filed a Manifestation with Motion for Reinvestigation and a
subsequent Answer to Letter-Complaint Requesting for Formal Investigation dated September 22,
2015. He even filed a Motion for Reconsideration before the IBP assailing the April 29, 2016
Resolution which was in fact given due course by the IBP. Therefore, the minimum requirements of
administrative due process have been observed and met by the IBP.

AYSON, JOEY (Legal Ethics)

TONY PETER PARTSCH, VS. ATTY. REYNALDO A. VITORILLO

A.C. No. 10897, January 04, 2022.
Hernando, J.
Page | 19
FACTS:
In March 2012, Partsch, a Swiss national, desired to purchase a piece of beachfront real
property located in Bayabas, Cagayan de Oro. Upon information of the adjacent land owners,
Partsch sought Atty. Vitorillo in the latter's law office in Cagayan de Oro City. Atty. Vitorillo claimed
ownership over 800 square meters of the said beachfront lot (subject property). He represented to
Partsch that 100 square meters of the subject lot were already titled under his name. The remaining
700 square meters of the subject lot were still pending registration, but will allegedly be completed
in three months' time. Atty. Vitorillo offered to sell to Partsch the 800 square-meter subject property
for the total amount of P2,500,000.00, ten percent (10%) of which shall constitute down payment
and the balance shall be paid upon delivery of the two titles within three months.
On April 4, 2012, Partsch tendered a check in the amount of P230,000.00 and P20,000.00 in
cash to Atty. Vitorillo as partial payment for the subject property. While Atty. Vitorillo gave Partsch
a receipt for the transaction, no deed of absolute sale was executed. Instead, Atty. Vitorillo promised
Partsch to draw the deed of absolute sale along with the land titles after three months. After three
months, or in July 2012, Partsch followed up the written contract and the land titles.
Partsch also inquired on the title over the 100-square-meter portion that Atty. Vitorillo
represented to have been already registered in his name, and other documentary proof of Atty.
Vitorillo's ownership over the other 700-square-meter portion of the subject property. Atty. Vitorillo,
however, only offered the following excuses: (1) he cannot give the title to the 100-square-meter
portion as it is his only access thereto; and (2) the 700-square-meter portion was given to him by
his clients as compensation for legal services and which was still under litigation before the regional
trial courts of Cagayan de Oro City. Atty. Vitorillo assured Partsch that his client's pending case
shall soon be resolved and be granted in their favor, and that the title over the 700-square-meter
portion shall be released in September 2012. Atty. Vitorillo also rescheduled his undertaking to
deliver all the documents for the purchase to September 2012. In September 2012, Partsch again
asked about Atty. Vitorillo's promise. Atty. Vitorillo answered that the case over the 700-square-
meter portion of the subject property was not yet done, and thus, the titles could not still be
delivered to Partsch. Atty. Vitorillo further advised Partsch to just possess the subject property and
fence it. Partsch did not heed the advice, believing that he has no right to do so without the titles
and the deed of absolute sale, and because there already existed a wooden structure on the subject
property belonging to another person.
On November 24, 2012, Atty. Vitorillo informed Partsch that he is no longer selling the
subject property. As alternative, Atty. Vitorillo proposed for sale another lot located in the
highlands. Partsch rejected the offer and demanded instead the reimbursement of his down
payment plus interests. Atty Vitorillo refused, saying he needed to dispose of the land first and
promising anew to prepare a deed of rescission of contract to sell. Partsch also asked for a
promissory note for the return of Partsch's down payment. Like before, these promises only dried
up. On November 26, 2012, Partsch sent Atty. Vitorillo a letter formally demanding the
reimbursement of P250,000.00 plus one percent (1%) monthly interest from receipt of the letter
under pain of legal action. Atty. Vitorillo responded to the formal demand. In his November 29,
2012 letter to Partsch, Atty. Vitorillo told Partsch that, while he was vexed by Partsch letter and
actions, they could proceed with the original sale transaction under the condition that Partsch pays
in full the balance of P2,250,000.00 as they have initially stipulated. Partsch declined Atty.
Vitorillo's condition. On December 7, 2012, the parties ended up in a mediation proceeding before
the Katarungang Pambarangay of Cugman, Cagayan de Oro City. During the hearing, Atty. Vitorillo
scolded Partsch for sending him the formal demand letter. He further intimidated Partsch with a
criminal case for unjust vexation unless the latter apologizes then and there. Afraid to jeopardize
his visiting status in the country, Partsch did as he was told. He was also compelled to again grace
Atty. Vitorillo with more time to reimburse his money without resorting to any court action.
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 Two years passed and another formal demand letter to pay14 was sent to Atty. Vitorillo. The
reimbursement, however, remained unpaid. Thus, on September 1, 2015, Partsch filed this
complaint15 for disbarment against Atty. Vitorillo. On December 9, 2015, the Court required Atty.
Vitorillo to comment on the complaint.
Atty. Vitorillo's comment:
Atty. Vitorillo admitted that he entered into a written contract to sell18 the 800-square-meter
subject property with Partsch but denied that he undertook to deliver the land titles within three
months. It was Partsch who proposed the sale and enticed him with the 10% down payment of
P250,000.00. Partsch knew of the nature and the status of the subject property beforehand. Atty.
Vitorillo had not been dishonest as Partsch painted him to be and that he acted in utmost good
faith in informing Partsch that the subject property was under litigation. Atty. Vitorillo attributed
the delay in the delivery of the title to the 700-square-meter portion of the subject property to the
trial court's eventual dismissal of the case. Atty. Vitorillo held himself responsible for the return of
Partsch's P250,000.00 but not for the interest claimed. His reasons were that he was likewise
unable to use the subject property since April 2012 when he allowed Partsch to enter the premises,
and that his inability to deliver the title over the 700-square-meter portion was neither deliberate
nor malicious. On August 1, 2016, the Court ordered Partsch to file a reply to Atty. Vitorillo's
comment.
Partsch's reply:
Partsch maintained that Atty. Vitorillo had never furnished him a copy of any written
contract to sell, much less had he signed any such contract. Atty. Vitorillo's omission to provide
Partsch the requisite documents for the purchase of the 800-square-meter subject property
allegedly meant that Atty. Vitorillo had never intended to be bound by their verbal agreement to sell
the subject property, for which Partsch has already paid the down payment.
Report and Recommendation of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines:
In ignoring the constitutional prohibition against alienation of private lands to foreigners and
by continuously refusing to return the money he received from Partsch, Atty. Vitorillo was deemed
to have seriously impaired his status as a member of the Bar. The Investigating Commissioner of
the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) determined that Atty. Vitorillo's actuations and
misrepresentations have ripened into willful and Gross Dishonesty and Gross Misconduct and
deemed him guilty of violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and Rule 7.01 of Canon 7 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR).
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Vitorillo has violated the CPR
RULING:
Yes, the Supreme Court finds Atty. Vitorillo guilty of deceitful conduct proscribed by Canon
1, Rule 1.01 of the CPR. In the contract to sell that Atty. Vitorillo himself submitted before the
Court, Atty. Vitorillo expressly named himself as the seller and absolute owner of the subject
property. The verity of such contractual status rests upon a single fact – that Atty. Vitorillo held
absolute ownership over the entire 800-square-meter subject property at the time he offered it for
sale to Partsch. The facts at hand reveal that he did not. Atty. Vitorillo had never denied the grave
accusations of his non-ownership in the complaint despite the opportunity to do so in his comment.
His clients may have agreed to compensate Atty. Vitorillo's legal services in kind, but only to the
following extent and subject to the highlighted caveats, per the stipulations in their deed of partition
& assignment executed before the questioned sale.
Atty. Vitorillo failed to show the factual bases of his absolute ownership, i.e., that the 800-
square-meter subject property has already been transferred to him in any legal manner, indicative

Page | 21
of a dishonest intent. First, deeds of transfer in Atty. Vitorillo's favor, certificates of title in his
possession, or at least any affidavit from the true registered owners constituting him as the new
owner of the entire 800-square-meter subject property would have sufficed as proof. Suspiciously,
Atty. Vitorillo was unbothered to provide these despite repeated requests from Partsch.
Second, the litigated main lot that included the subject property was still unregistered in the
names of Atty. Vitorillo's clients. Records disclose that the earlier case for quieting of title involving
the main lot had been ruled against Roberto T. Caingin (Caingin), the party adverse to Atty.
Vitorillo's clients. Nevertheless, a free patent in Caingin's name still existed over the main lot. Thus,
Atty. Vitorillo's clients filed a petition seeking to cancel the existing free patent. The petition,
however, was ordered dismissed by the trial courts, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals (CA), since
it was determined to be a case for reversion to the government of lands of the public domain, and
Atty. Vitorillo's clients had no personality to institute it. They had even been advised by the CA in
the quieting of title case to "legalize their claim over the land through the filing of the proper judicial
or administrative remedy." Hence, Atty. Vitorillo's clients cannot automatically declare their
possession over and legal entitlement to the main lot. This is more so with Atty. Vitorillo, as his
assertions of ownership is only derivative from the title of his clients. Faced with the fact that the
cancellation of the free patent over the main lot including the subject property was still under active
litigation, Atty. Vitorillo's statements that he is the owner thereof cannot simply be taken as bible
truth.
Third, even if Atty. Vitorillo's clients truly had in their names the 800-square-meter subject
property, only 700 square meters were clearly assigned to Atty. Vitorillo in the Deed of Partition and
Assignment. In all, the Court is inclined to view Atty. Vitorillo's claims of ownership over the 800-
square-meter subject property as specious.
In taking the Lawyer's Oath, Atty. Vitorillo swore "to do no falsehood, nor consent to its
commission." Above circumstances show that he broke this honored pledge. There is proof that
Atty. Vitorillo truly misrepresented himself as the subject property's owner to Partsch, who fully
relied thereon and readily agreed to the transaction. What Atty. Vitorillo had was at best an
inchoate right, anchored on mere hope that the subject property shall someday be transferred to his
name. A person possessing only expectancies of ownership over a piece of property cannot and
should not legally hold oneself out as the absolute owner thereof. This carries heftier relevance if
such person is one well-versed in law like Atty. Vitorillo.
This expectancy was admittedly conditioned on the issuance of a final court ruling cancelling
the title over the main lot in favor of his clients, who were the ones directly claiming ownership over
the subject property in their own right. However, Atty. Vitorillo conveniently forgot that courts
decide cases depending on the relevant law and evidence presented. He fed Partsch false assurances
that the trial court would grant his cause. He even openly blamed the trial court's supposed delay
in resolving the pending ownership dispute over the main lot and its eventual dismissal of the case
that prejudiced his expectancy.
In so doing, Atty. Vitorillo demeaned the integrity of legal processes and tarnished the image
of impartiality of the courts that he had professionally vowed to espouse, per Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of
the CPR. Furthermore, for Atty. Vitorillo to gaslight Partsch, in that the latter should have been
more circumspect in transacting with real property in the Philippines, is irrelevant in negating Atty.
Vitorillo's administrative transgressions. The prohibition against foreign ownership of Philippine
private lands is too basic a rule for even non-attorneys to be unaware of. As a lawyer, Atty. Vitorilllo
is presumed to know this. Despite being equipped with such knowledge, Atty. Vitorillo still
marketed the subject property for sale to Partsch, a Swiss national. More telling of Atty. Vitorillo's
ethical obliquity is his questionable instruction to Partsch to just proceed with the fencing of the
subject property without any acceptable guarantee of Atty. Vitorillo's title thereto. Again, Atty.

Page | 22
Vitorillo had not refuted this serious allegation. He is deemed to have acted in contravention of
Canon 1, Rule 1.02 - CPR's proscription against counseling activities aimed at defiance of the law.
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides that a member of the Bar may be disbarred or
suspended from his office as attorney by the Court for any deceit, gross misconduct in such office,
or violation of the Lawyer's Oath. The Investigating Commissioner recommended the penalty of
suspension for two years, which the IBP-Board of Governors approved.

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CARLET, ESTELLA MARIZ (Political Law)

BANK OF PHILIPPINE ISLAND VS. CENTRAL BANK OF THE

PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 197593, October 12, 2020.
Hernando, J.
FACTS:
BPI Laoag City Branch discovered outstanding discrepancies in its inter-bank reconciliation
statements in CBP in the amount of P9 million. The matter was referred to NBI for investigation.
NBI’s reports showed that an organized criminal syndicate committed bank fraud was precipitated
by the connivance of some personnel of the CBP. RTC convicted Desiderio and Estacio of 3 counts
of estafa thru falsification of public documents. BPI argues that CBP’s function of operating clearing
house facilities for regional check is propriety in character as the same may be assigned to and
exercised by private entities.
CBP argues that its operation of the clearing facility was purely governmental in nature.
Under Section 10735 of RA 265, the establishment of a clearing facility was CBP’s responsibility
and mandate. RTC ruled in favour of BPI holding that CBP, as employer, is liable for the damage
caused by its employees. However, the same was reversed by the CA holding that the State may be
liable for quasi-delicts as an ordinary employer employer when it is performing propriety acts, citing
Fontanilla v. Maliaman. Hence, the petition before the court.
ISSUE: Whether or not CBP may be held liable for the acts of its employees.
RULING:
The Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Hernando, ruled that, CBP cannot be
answerable for the acts of its employees. The state in the performance of its governmental functions
is liable only for the tortous acts of its special agents.
In case at bar, CBP is not liable for the acts of its employees because Valentino and Estacio
are no “special agents”. Therefore, CBP has not consented itself to be sued.

CARLET, ESTELLA MARIZ (Commercial Law)

REAL BANK VS. DALMACIO CRUZ MANINGAS

G.R. No. 211837, March 16, 2022.
Hernando, J.
FACTS:
Maningas is a Filipino- British national who was living in London, England at the time of the
case. He maintained a savings account and a checking account with Metrobank Greenhills,
Eisenshower Branch. On August 22, 2006, while in London, Maningas issued two crossed checks
with an amounts of P550, 000.00 and P602, 000.00 in favour of his friend Bienvenido Rosaria.
Maningas issued the checks as payment to Rosaria for a parcel of land he purchased. However,
Maningas wrote that name BIENVINIDO ROSARIA as payee of the two checks. As Rosaria was also
in London that time, he instructed Maningas to mail the checks to Maxima Jumawan, Rosaria’s
sister who resides at that time in Dongalo, Paranaque City with a request to deposit the checks to
Rosaria’s account.
Page | 24
 After a week Maningas inquest of the checks were received, Rosaria informed him that the
checks did not arrived; when Maningas checked his account balance, he discovered that the
amount of the check was already deducted. He clarified it with Metrobank and found out that the
checks were paid to a person named Bienvinido Rosaria as he sued the checks in opening an
account with Real Bank in Bacoor, Cavite Branch; the full amount was withdrawn.
Allegedly, the person who represented himself as Bienvinido Rosaria was referred by a retired
manager fi the Real bank branch for opening account. During the interview, the person presented
three valid identifications cards, no showing a sign of tampering in which the branch manager of
the bank approves the opening of account; the checks are deposited and the Metrobank allowed the
clearing of the transaction. Maningas then alerted the Metrobank, they attempted to return the
checks but to no avail, he also sent an electronic mail to Real Bank informing the checks were paid
to a person named Bienvinido Rosaria who opened an account into their branch. The incidence was
also ignored by the Real Bank hence sent a formal demand letter on September 15, 2006.
ISSUE: Whether Real Bank is liable to return the amount of the checks to respondent Manginas.
RULING:
The petition has no merit. The Court affirms the ruling of the CA and RTC. Real Bank is
liable to return the amount of the checks to Maningas.
It is clear that the case is a case of unauthorized payment to a person other that the intended
payee named on the check. The RTC and the CA determined that the intended payee of the checks
was indeed Rosaria. As found, the checks made their way to the hands of an impostor who used the
named Bienvinido Rosaria for encashment.
Metrobank did not file a notice of appeal to assail the RTC decision because the trial court
absolved it from liability. The CA decision also notably did not touch upon Metrobank’s liability.

CARLET, ESTELLA MARIZ (Taxation Law)

LA FLOR DELA ISABELA VS. COMMISSION ON INTERNAL

REVENUE
G.R. No. 202105, May 10, 2021.
Hernando, J.
FACTS:
On September 6, 2000, the CIR issued a Letter of Authority for the examination of La Flor’s
books of account for “all internal revenue taxes for the period January 1, 1999 to December 31,
1991. La Flor executed five waivers of the stature of limitation to the CIR’s period to assess and
collect the deficiency taxes. The company then received a Preliminary Assessment Notice dated
March 19, 2003; she also received a Formal Letter of Demand last March 14, 2005 with its
attachments. The company filed a protest on March 30, 2005 against the Formal Letter of Demand
and a Supplemental Protest Letter on April 12, 2005. Thereafter, on July 9, 2007, it received the
CIR’s Final Decision on Disputed Assessment (FDDA) on June 1, 2007 with a total assessment of
deficiency taxes amounting to P10, 460, 217.23.
On October 8, 2003, La Flor applied for a tax amnesty under Republic Act No. 9480
pursuant to Section 204 of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC). On the 23 rd of November
2007, the company received an undated Warrant of Distraint and/or Levy issued by the
Commission on Internal Revenue. This urged the petitioner to file a Petition for Review with the
Page | 25
Court of tax Appeal on November 29, 2007 assailing the CIR’s issuance of Warrant of Distraint
and/or Levy.

ISSUE(S):
1. Whether the Court of Tax Appeal has jurisdiction to rule on the validity or invalidity of the
assessments and the Warrant of Distraint and/or Levy.
2. Whether the Commission on Internal Revenue validly issued the WLD to collect the
deficiency taxes.
RULING:
1. In the Philippine Journalist, the Court ruled that the CTA’s appellate jurisdiction is not
limited to cases involving decisions of the CIR on matter relating the assessments or refund,
Section 7 (a) (2) of RA 9282 also covers “other matter arising under the National Internal
Revenue Code or other laws administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue. The CTA has
jurisdiction to determine whether the WDL issued by the BIR is valid and rule on the validity
of the five waivers of the statute of limitations and La Flor’s application for tax amnesty
under RA 9480.

2. The validity of the WDL hinges on the validity if the FLD issued by the CIR, which must be
within the prescriptive period of the three years or the period agreed upon in the waiver/s of
statute of limitations. Hence it is important to determine at this point whether the waivers
executed by La Flor were valid.

The petitioner rightly and timely filed an appeal with the CTA assailing the validity of the
WDL upon its availment of the tax amnesty of it’s assessed IT and VAT deficiencies under RA
9480. It subsequent filing of the application and the payment of the corresponding amnesty
tax under RA 9480 operate as suspensive and resolutory conditions which vested La Flor
with immunities and privileges under RA 9480 and finally settled La Flor’s IT and VAT
deficiencies for taxable year 1999 respectively, The CTA has jurisdiction over the petition for
review filed by petitioner a Flor questioning the validity of the undated WDL issued by the
BIR after its availment of the Tax Amnesty Program under RA 9480.

CARLET, ESTELLA MARIZ (Civil Law)

LUISITO PULIDO VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 220149, July 27, 2021.
Hernando, J.
FACTS:
Pulido and Rowena U. Baleda were charged with bigamy. Pulido married his teacher Nora S.
Arcon in 1983 and had a child in 1984. In 2007, Pulido stopped going home and admitted to having
an affair with Baleda. They got married in 1995 and indicated Pulido’s civil status as single. Arcon
charged them with bigamy in 2007. Pulido claimed both marriages were null and void, while Baleda
claimed she only knew of Pulido’s prior marriage in April 2007 and filed a petition to annul her
marriage with Pulido. The RTC declared their marriage null and void for being bigamous. The trial
court convicted Pulido of bigamy and acquitted Baleda. The RTC dismissed Pulido’s claim that both
his marriages are void and upheld the validity of his marriage with Arcon.
ISSUES:
Page | 26
 (a) Whether Article 40 has retroactive application on marriages contracted prior to the
effectively of the Family Code
(b) Whether the subsequent declaration of the nullity of the first and second marriages
constitutes a valid defense in bigamy

RULING:
a) Yes. Article 40 has retroactive application on marriages contracted prior to the effectivity of
the Family Code but only for the purpose of remarriage, as the parties are not permitted to
judge for themselves the nullity of their marriage. In other words, in order to remarry, a
judicial declaration of nullity is required for prior marriages contracted before the effectively
of the Family Code. Without a judicial declaration of absolute nullity of the first marriage
having been obtained, the second marriage is rendered void ab initio even though the first
marriage is also considered void ab initio. The only basis for establishing the validity of the
second marriage is the judicial decree of nullity of the first marriage. nn a criminal
prosecution for bigamy, the parties may still raise the defence of a void ab initio marriage
even without obtaining a judicial declaration of absolute nullity if the first marriage was
celebrated before the effectively of the Family Code. Such is still governed by the rulings in
Mendoza, Aragon and Odayat which are more in line with the rule that procedural rules are
only given retroactive effect insofar as they do not prejudice or impair vested or acquired
rights.

b) Yes. The SC ruled in this wise: “After a careful consideration, this Court is constrained to
abandon our earlier rulings that a judicial declaration of absolute nullity of the first, and/or
second marriages cannot be raised as a defense by the accused in a criminal prosecution for
bigamy. We hold that a judicial declaration of absolute nullity is not necessary to prove a
void ab initio prior and subsequent marriages in a bigamy case. Consequently, a judicial
declaration of absolute nullity of the first and/or second marriages presented by the accused
in the prosecution for bigamy is a valid defense, irrespective of the time within which they are
secured.”
Being inexistent under the eyes of the law, the nullity of a void marriage can be maintained
in any proceeding in which the fact of marriage may be material, either direct or collateral, in
any civil court between any parties at any time, whether before or after the death of either or
both the spouses. A void marriage is ipso facto void without need of any judicial declaration
of nullity; the only recognized exception under existing law is Article 40 of the Family Code
where a marriage void ab initio is deemed valid for purposes of remarriage, hence
necessitating a judicial declaration of nullity before one can contract a subsequent marriage.

CARLET, ESTELLA MARIZ (Labor Law)

JR HAULING SERVICES VS. GAVINO L. SOLAMO

G.R. No. 214294, September 30, 2020.
Hernando, J.

Page | 27
FACTS:
This case stemmed from a complaint for illegal dismissal and underpayment/ non-payment
of salaries/ wages, 13th month pay, holiday pay, rest day pay, Service Incentive Leave (SIL) pay, with
prayer for reinstatement and payment of full back wages and attorney’s fees, filed by the
respondents and Sofronio V. Acoba, who eventually withdrew his complaint during the pendency of
the case before the Labor Arbiter, against petitioner JR Hauling Services and its manager, Oscar
Mapue. JR Hauling is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of hauling and delivery of
broiler chickens to its clients such as Magnolia Corporation and San Miguel Foods, Inc. (SMFI).
Respondents are former drivers/ helpers of JR Hauling.

ISSUE: Whether there is substantial evidence to prove that respondents were validly dismissed form
employment and Whether they are entitled to their claim for payment of salary differentials.
RULING:
The Petition is partly granted. Respondents Gavino L. Solamo, Ramil Herusalem, Armando
Parungai, Rafael Caparos Jr., Noriel Solamo, Alfredo Salangsang, Mark Parungao, and Dean V.
Calvo are hereby declared to have been dismissed for cause. The failure of the petitioner JR Hauling
Services to comply with procedural due process requirements, it is ordered to pay the respondents
the sum of Php30, 000.00 each by way of nominal damages.
JR Hauling Services is held liable to pay respondents salary differentials subject to applicable
prescriptive periods. Respondents Oscar Mapue is dropped as party- respondents there being no
showing that he acted in bad faith or with malice. The case is remanded to the Labor Arbiter for the
re-computation of respondent’s salary differentials subject to applicable prescriptive periods.

CARLET, ESTELLA MARIZ (Criminal Law)

CICL XXX, CICL YYY, JONATHAN SOLINA Y ALIAS “JUN-JUN”,

“4 AND JED BARBA Y APOLONIO ALIAS “JED”, VS. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. NO. 230964, March 2, 2022.
Hernando, J.
FACTS:
That on or about the 1st day of January 2010 in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named
accused [CICL XXX], a minor, 17 years old, but acting with discernment conspiring together,
confederating with CHRISTOPHER PUYO AND JAYJAY NARAG and mutually helping one another,
did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously[,] with intent to kill, attack, assault and
employ personal violence upon the person of one GLENN REDOQUERIO by then and there mauling
him and hitting him in the head with a piece of stone, thereby inflicting upon him serious and grave
wounds, the offender thus performing all the acts of execution that would produce the crime of
homicide as a consequence but which nevertheless did not produce it by reason or cause
independent of the will of the perpetrator, that is, by the timely and able medical attendance
rendered to said GLENN REDOQUERIO, to the damage and prejudice of the said offended party.
During the arraignment, CICL XXX pleaded not guilty. Trial ensued.

ISSUES:
Page | 28
 1. Whether the CA erred din convicting CICL XXX despite the prosecution’s failure to show
that he acted with discernment.
2. Whether the CA erred in convicting CICL XXX for Frustrated
Homicide without proof of the extent of the injuries sustained by Redoquerio.
RULING:
1. Yes, The appeal is meritorious. The Court acquits CICL XXX for the crime of Frustrated
Homicide.
In questioning his conviction, CICL XXX argues that because he was only seventeen (17)
years old at the time he supposedly committed the crime, then he is presumed to have acted
without discernment, and that it was the burden of the prosecution to prove otherwise. CICL
XXX then argues that the prosecution was unable to discharge its burden. The argument is
meritorious.
Both the RTC and the CA erred in convicting CICL XXX, as they both equated "intent to kill"
— which was admittedly established through the evidence presented by the prosecution — with
acting with discernment, which, on the contrary, was not proved.
2. Yes, assuming that CICL XXX had acted with discernment, the RTC and the CA still erred in
convicting him for Frustrated Homicide.
To successfully prosecute the crime of homicide, the following elements must be proved
beyond reasonable doubt: (1) that a person was killed; (2) that the accused killed that person
without any justifying circumstance; (3) that the accused had the intention to kill, which is
presumed; and (4) that the killing was not attended by any of the qualifying circumstances of
murder, or by that of parricide or infanticide. Moreover, the offender is said to have performed
all the acts of execution if the wound inflicted on the victim is mortal and could cause the death
of the victim without medical intervention or attendance.
The essential elements of a frustrated felony are as follows: (1) the offender performs all the
acts of execution; (2) all the acts performed would produce the felony as a consequence; (3) but
the felony is not produced; and (4) by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator.
In affirming the conviction of CICL XXX for Frustrated Homicide, the CA noted — without
citing its basis — that "the injuries sustained by private complainant would have caused his
death, if not for the timely medical attention he received." A perusal of the records, however,
reveals that the extent of the injuries sustained by Redoquerio was not fully established. The
medical records of Redoquerio were admitted into evidence only through the testimony of
Luague, the Administrative Officer 1 of East Avenue Medical Center who had custody of the
medical records. However, as he was not a medical doctor, both parties stipulated that Luague
could not: (1) "testify as to the nature and gravity of the wound sustained by the private
complainant"; and (2) "testify whether or not the alleged wound sustained by the private
complainant is fatal in nature."
There is no testimonial evidence on record explaining to the Court the medical findings which
would have established the nature and extent of the injuries that Redoquerio sustained. Article
101 of the RPC, however, provides that the foregoing liability of CICL XXX's parents is subject to
the defense that they acted without fault or negligence. Thus, the civil aspect of this case is
remanded to the trial court, and it is ordered to implead CICL XXX's parents for reception of
evidence on their fault or negligence.

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CARLET, ESTELLA MARIZ (Remedial Law)

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS.

MARIA CRISTINA P. SERGIO AND JULIUS LACANILAO
G.R. No. 240053, October 9, 2019.
Hernando, J.
FACTS: 
Cristina and Julius recruited Mary Jan Veloso as house help in Malaysia, however, upon
arriving it was found out that there was no available job and was offered a vacation to Indonesia.
They provided her a luggage that was found out to have heroin in the airport. Mary Jane Veloso was
convicted of drug trafficking and sentenced to death by the Indonesian Government. Pending fire
execution, the illegal recruiters and traffickers namely, Cristina and Julius who recruited her were
apprehended and placed under police custody.
On her basis of her affidavit, the Philippine Government requested the Indonesian
Government to suspend the scheduled execution of Mary Jane and that her testimony is vital in the
prosecution of Cristina and Julius.
ISSUE: Can Mary Jane Veloso who was convicted of Drug trafficking and sentenced to death by the
Indonesian Government and presently confined thereat, testify by way of deposition?
RULING:
Yes. Nowhere in the present Rules on Criminal Procedure does it state how a deposition, of a
prosecution witness who is at the same time convicted of a grave offense by final judgment and
imprisoned in a foreign jurisdiction, may be taken to perpetuate the testimony of such witness. The
Rules, in particular, are silent as to how to take a testimony of a witness who is unable to testify in
open court because he is imprisoned in another country.
Verily, in light of the unusual circumstances surrounding the instant case, the Court sees no
reason not to apply suppletory the provisions of Rule 23 of the Rules on Civil Procedure in the
interest of substantial justice and fairness. Hence, the taking of testimony of Mary Jane through a
deposition by written interrogatories is in order.

CARLET, ESTELLA MARIZ (Legal Ethics)

AA TOTAL LEARNING CENTER FOR YOUNG ACHIVERS INC.

VS. ATTY. PATRICK A. CARONAN
A.C. No. 12418, March 10, 2020.
Hernando, J.
Facts:
Sometime in 2012, respondent Caronan and Solly Cruz offered to sell to complainant Reyes a
parcel of land located in J.P. Rizal St. Ususan, Taguig City (subject property) and claimed that they
were representatives of Maricel A. Atanacio (Atanacio), the registered owner of the subject property.
Finding the property suitable for AA's future campus, Reyes became interested in the subject
property and went along with Caronan, conducted an ocular inspection of the same. Caronan

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briefly introduced Reyes to Atanacio. On March 9, 2012, Caronan asked Reyes to meet him and
Atanacio to discuss and finalize the final purchase price of the subject property. During the
scheduled meeting, Caronan advised Reyes that Atanacio will no longer be joining them and that he
authorized him to finalize the purchase price on her behalf.
Another meeting set by Caronan in Metrobank- Fort Santiago for the signing of Deed of
Absolute Sale with a 50% initial payment of the purchase price. At the meeting place, Caronan
informed that Atanacio will not be joining them and that he already signed the Deed of Absolute
Sale. The deed presented to Reyes is already completed with its signature and a Memorandum of
Agreement (MOA) with its terms and condition of the sale.
On April 13, 2012, Reyes was notified that the money was already negotiated by Atanacio at
Metrobank- Taytay Branch. Caronan promised to deliver the title under AA’s name on the first week
of June 2012. He assured that the transfer will not be a problem since he know the Registrar of
Deeds of Taguig. Caronan gave updates and provided reasons for the delay in transfer; in July
2012, Caronan could no longer be reached
Upon hearing the news from Reyes, he denied the participation, she disowned signing any
Deed of Absolute Sale and catergorically denied authorizing Caronan to negotiate in her behald the
sale of her property. She contends that she never received a single centavo from the transaction.
Reyes immediately sought advice from the legal counsel and accomplished a letter demanding to
return the Seven Million Seven Hundrer Thousand Pesos (Php7, 700,000.00) but still the demand
letter disregarded.
Reyes eventually learned that aside from the misrepresentations employed by Caronan in the
execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale and MOA, he also employed fraudulent machinations in
negotiating in his favor the Metrobank Manager's check amounting to Seven Million Pesos
(P7,000,000.00). In her Sinumpaang Salaysay dated August 22, 2012, Tanon admitted that she
impersonated Atanacio upon the instruction of Caronan. Complainants likewise learned that
Caronan's real name is "Richard A. Caronan" and he assumed the identity of his brother, Patrick A.
Caronan, used his school credentials to obtain a law degree. It was also later found out that the real
Patrick A. Caronan filed a disbarment case against the respondent. A criminal complaint for
violation of the Anti-Alias Law was likewise filed by AA against Carona.
Finally, Reyes, representing AA, filed before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) the instant Verified Complaint against Caronan accusing him
of gross misconduct. The complaint alleged that the actuations of Caronan constituted grave
transgressions of the solemn oath of a lawyer and violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility warranting his permanent disbarment. He alleged that in 2012, he was detained in
PNP CIDG-NCR Camp Crame for trumped up charges of illegal possession of firearms and
explosives filed by the Spouses Reyes. He claimed that the Spouses Reyes confiscated five (5)
Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) covering properties in Nueva Ecija which were jointly owned by
him and his wife.
The "identity" issue, maintained that the disbarment case filed by Patrick A. Caronan was a
mere reiteration of the complaint filed against him by Joseph G. Agtarap, wherein the Supreme
Court already exonerated the charges. With regards to his identity, it was already settled and
cannot be re-litigated upon on the basis of res judicata. The respondent moved for the dismissal of
the instant disbarment for lack of merit or in the alternative, for the proceedings to be held in
abeyance pending resolution of the same issues in the criminal cases filed against him by
complainant Reyes.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Caronan should be disbarred and his name stricken off the Roll
of Attorneys.

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RULING:
Considering the foregoing, there is no need to resolve the merits of the case and determine if
“Atty. Patrick Caronan” is guilty of the violations charged against him. With the investigations
conducted by the Integrated bar of the Philippines (IBP), it is cleary that respondent is not and
never was a member of the bar. . Hence, the penalty of disbarment is not available to him. Besides,
AA and Reyes's prayer that respondent be forever barred from the law practice and his name
stricken off the Roll of Attorneys was already imposed upon respondent as among his penalties in
A.C. No. 11316. It is only fitting to stress once again that the practice of law is not a right but a
privilege bestowed by the State only on those who possess and continue to possess, the
qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege.
It was also take the opportunity to reiterate that administrative cases against lawyers belong
to a class of their own, distinct from and may proceed independently of civil and criminal cases.
There is no prejudicial question not proscription that will prevent it from proceeding. Double
jeopardy or In Pari Delicto are also not available as defenses as to bar the disciplinary proceedings
against an erring lawyer. It should be noted that it can be initiated motu proprio by the Supreme
Court or the IBP and even without a complaint and can proceed regardless of lack of interest of the
complainants, if the facts proven so warrant. The privilege to practice the legal profession is not a
permanent right and may be taken away if one falls short of the requirements imposed by law and
to practice the legal profession is not a permanent right and may be taken away if one falls short of
the requirements imposed by law.

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DIZON, JIRAH (Political Law)

CORONA RE RETIREMENT
A.M. No. 20-07-10-SC. January 12, 2021.
Hernando, J.
DOCTRINE:
Section 5(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution mandates that the party-list system shall compose
twenty percent (20%) of the total membership in the House of Representatives. But the matter on how
party-lists should qualify for a seat is left to the wisdom of the legislature. The BANAT formula mirrors
the textual progression of Section 11(b) of the law. The formula withstood the test of time and the
Court is offered no cogent reason to depart therefrom.
FACTS: 
Before the court is the supplication for the grant of post-employment and survivorship
benefits of Ma. Cristina Roco Corona, as the spouse of former CJ Renato Corona. CJ Corona put
into office on May 12, 2010. A year later, Articles of Impeachment were filed against him. CJ Corona
was indicted by the House of Representatives under Section 2 Article 6 of the 1987 Constitution, on
the alleged grounds of betrayal of public trust, culpable violation of the Constitution, and graft and
corruption.
Among those charged against him were partiality in cases involving the Arroyo
administration, being a midnight appointment as chief justice, failure to disclose his SALN (as
required by Section 17 Article 11 of the 1987 Constitution), and failure to account for the Judiciary
Development Fund (JDF) and Special Allowance for the Judiciary (SAJ). CJ Corona was impeached
on May 29, 2012. While the criminal and civil charges were still being tried, CJ Corona died on April
29, 2016. Thus, the criminal charges for graft and corruption were dismissed.  Following this, Mrs.
Corona sent the letter to the Supreme Court on July 13, 2020, asking to void the Senate judgment
for insufficiency of evidence and violation of Section 14 Article 8 of the Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether Mrs. Corona should be accorded retirement benefits, other gratuities and
survivorship pension as the spouse of the late CJ Corona despite the latter’s ouster by
impeachment
RULING: 
Petition is granted. The sole effect of impeachment is the removal from office and
disqualification from holding any public office. Citing cases from the American Jurisprudence
(where the law on impeachment in the country is heavily based on) there is mutual exclusivity of
impeachment proceedings and court trial.
Impeachment is not crafted to mete out punishment. It is made to secure the state against
gross political misdemeanors. As such, it does not touch the person or property, but only divests
him of his political capacity.
No legally actionable liability attaches to the public officer by a mere judgment of
impeachment against him or her, and thus lies the necessity for a separate conviction for charges
that must be properly filed with courts of law.

DIZON, JIRAH (Commercial Law)

METROPLEX BERHAD VS. SINOPHIL CORPORATION

Page | 33
 G.R. No. 208281, June 28, 2021.
Hernando, J.
DOCTRINES:
1. Section 38 of the Corporation Code clearly lists down the requirements for a corporation to
decrease its capital stock.
A corporation can only decrease its capital stock if the following are present:
a. Approval by a majority vote of the board of directors;
b. Written notice of the proposed diminution of the capital stock, and of the time and
place of a stockholders' meeting duly called for the purpose, addressed to each
stockholder at his place of residence;
c. 2/3 of the outstanding capital stock voting favorably at the said stockholders'
meeting;
d. Certificate in duplicate, signed by majority of the directors and countersigned by the
chairman and secretary of the stockholders' meeting stating that legal requirements
have been complied with;
e. Prior approval of the SEC; and
f. Effects do not prejudice the rights of corporate creditors.
2. Pursuant to Section 38, the scope of the SEC's determination of the legality of the decrease in
authorized capital stock is confined only to the determination of whether the corporation
submitted the requisite authentic documents to support the diminution. Simply, the SEC's
function here is purely administrative in nature.
3. SEC is not vested by law with any power to interpret contracts and interfere in the
determination of the rights between and among a corporation's stockholders. Neither can the
SEC adjudicate on the contractual relations among these same stockholders.
4. The "business judgment rule" simply means that “the SEC and the courts are barred from
intruding into business judgments of corporations, when the same are made in good faith.”
5. For third persons or parties outside the corporation like the SEC to interfere to the decrease
of the capital stock without reasonable ground is a violation of the "business judgment rule"
which states that:
[C]ontracts intra vires entered into by the board of directors are binding upon the corporation
and courts will not interfere unless such contracts are so unconscionable and oppressive as to amount
to wanton destruction to the rights of the minority, as when plaintiffs aver that the defendants
(members of the board), have concluded a transaction among themselves as will result in serious
injury to the plaintiffs stockholders.
FACTS:
In August 1998, Sinophil entered into a Share Swap Agreement (Swap Agreement) with
Metroplex and Paxell. Under the Swap Agreement, Metroplex and Paxell would transfer 40% of their
shareholdings in Legend International Resorts Limited (Legend) for a combined 35.5% stake in
Sinophil. Sinophil and Belle executed a Memorandum of Agreement (Unwinding Agreement) with
Metroplex and Paxell rescinding the 1998 Swap Agreement. After the execution of the Unwinding
Agreement, Metroplex and Paxell were unable to return 1.87 billion of the Sinophil shares while
another two billion Sinophil shares remained pledged by Metroplex in favor of International
Exchange Bank and Asian Bank. The shareholders of Sinophil voted for the reduction of Sinophil's
authorized capital stock.

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 On March 28, 2006, the CRMD and the CFD approved the first amendment of the Articles of
Incorporation of Sinophil, reducing its authorized capital stock by 1.87 billion shares. The following
day, the approval of the reduction of Sinophil's authorized capital stock was disclosed to the
Philippine Stock Exchange, Inc. (PSE). The shareholders of Sinophil again approved the proposal of
the Board of Directors to reduce its authorized capital stock by another one billion shares. The
CRMD and the CFD approved the second amendment of the Articles of Incorporation of Sinophil
which further reduced its authorized capital stock by one billion shares. On June 30, 2008, the
approval of the reduction of Sinophil's authorized capital stock was likewise disclosed to the PSE.
Petitioners Yaw Chee Cheow (Yaw), Metroplex and Paxell filed a Petition for Review Ad
Cautelam Ex Abundanti before the SEC assailing the approval by the CRMD and the CFD of the
amendments by Sinophil of its Articles of Incorporation. The SEC found that the decrease in capital
stock complied with the requirements imposed by the Corporation Code, particularly Section 38. It
held that the equal or unequal reduction of a corporation's capital stock is a matter solely between
the stockholders and cannot be enjoined either by the courts or the creditors. Moreover, the SEC
found no basis to grant the prayer for the issuance of a cease and desist order. Petitioners failed to
raise valid grounds for its issuance. The Commission held that a cease and desist order could not
be ultimately issued because the grave and irreparable danger to the investing public that
petitioners fear is not present in the case. On appeal, the CA upheld the findings of the SEC in toto.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the decrease in respondent Sinophil's capital stock was legal and the public
respondent SEC's approval thereof was proper.
2. Whether the SEC has the ministerial duty to approve the decrease of a corporation's
authorized capital stock.
RULING:
1. YES, the decrease in respondent Sinophil's capital stock was legal and that the public
respondent SEC's approval thereof was proper.
The list of requirements under Section 38 is altogether different from the list of legal
requirements presented by petitioners. In short, petitioners plainly did not comply with the law. The
Court agrees with the appellate court when it held that there is no validity nor legal basis to the
allegation that prior approval of all the stockholders is required for the reduction in capital stock.
Here, a judicious perusal of the records of the case reveals that Sinophil submitted to the SEC
the following documents in support of its application for the decrease of its authorized capital stock
and in full compliance with the requirements laid down under Section 38:
1. Certificate of Decrease of Capital Stock;
2. Director's Certificate;
3. Amended Articles of Incorporation;
4. Audited Financial Statements as of the last fiscal year stamped
and received by the Bureau of Internal Revenue and the SEC (as
of December 31, 2004 and 2007);
5. Long Form Audit Report of the Audited Financial Statements (as
of December 31, 2004 and 2007);
1. List of Creditors (Schedule of Liabilities as of December 31,
2004 and 2007), as certified by the Accountant;
7. Written consent of Creditors;
8. Notice of Decrease of Capital; and
9. Affidavits of Publication of the Notice of Decrease of Capital.

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 Three stockholders' meeting were likewise held on February 18, 2002, June 3, 2005 and
June 21, 2007 where the stockholders voted for the reduction of the corporation's authorized
capital stock.
2. YES, SEC only has the ministerial duty to approve the decrease of a corporation's authorized
capital stock. After a corporation faithfully complies with the requirements laid down in Section 38,
the SEC has nothing more to do other than approve the same. Petitioners' allegation that it is the
SEC that should determine the parties' rights under the contracts executed, particularly the Swap
Agreement, the Unwinding Agreement, and the general proxy, has no basis. To stress, the SEC's
only function here was to determine the corporation's compliance with the formal requirements
under Section 38 of Corporation Code.

DIZON, JIRAH (Taxation Law)

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. GLORIA F. TUYAY

G.R. No. 206579, December 1, 2021.
Hernando, J.
DOCTRINE:
Under Section 8(e) of RA 9480, only those with pending criminal cases in court for tax evasion
and other criminal offenses under the NIRC, and the felonies of frauds, illegal exactions and
transactions, and malversation of public funds and property, under Chapters III and IV of Title VII of
the Revised Penal Code, are excluded from availing the tax amnesty.
FACTS:
Respondent Tuyay is the Registered owner of Glo Herbal Trading and Manufacturing engaged
in the business of manufacturing, selling, and distributing the herbal concoction, Glo-herbal. BIR
issued a letter of Authority (LOA) authorizing the BIR officers to examine the books of accounts of
Glo Herbal Trading and Manufacturing for taxable years 2000-2002 as it allegedly sold millions of
its product during the said years. However, Tuyay failed to submit the book of account required by
the BIR. Thus, the revenue officers had to use the expenditure method to reconstruct the
undeclared income and deficiency taxes.
Later, the BIR issued assessment notices against Tuyay for deficiency income tax and VAT
for the taxable years. The BIR filed with the DOJ a criminal complaint for violation of Sections 254
and 255 of the NIRC. Thus, the Information against Tuyay were filed with the CTA. Tuyay moved to
dismiss the case against her on the ground that she was immune from criminal liability in view of
her availment of the tax amnesty under RA No. 9480. Petitioner opposed the motion contending
that Tuyay was disqualified to avail of the tax amnesty because under the IRR of 9480, the tax
amnesty does not extend to those with pending criminal cases.
ISSUE: Whether Tuyay was disqualified to avail of the tax amnesty.
RULING:
No, Tuyay was not disqualified to avail of the tax amnesty. Having availed of the tax amnesty
and having fully complied with all its requirements and conditions is entitled to the immunities and
privileges conferred by RA 9480, which includes the immunity from criminal liability under the
NIRC. Here, there is no dispute that Tuyay availed of the tax amnesty under RA 9480 and complied
with all the requirements. In fact, during the pre-trial hearing, petitioner admitted that Tuyay’s
application for tax amnesty was approved and that her payment of taxes was accepted by the BIR.

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 The Court finds that Tuyay was not disqualified to avail of the tax amnesty because at the
time she availed of it on there was no pending criminal case against her before any court as it was
only in October 2009 that the criminal cases were filed against her with the CTA. And even though
there was already a pending criminal case complaint against her before the DOJ on June 3, 2005,
such fact cannot disqualify her from availing of the tax amnesty because this is not included in the
list of exceptions under Section 8 of RA 9480.

DIZON, JIRAH (Civil Law)

PNTC COLLEGES, INC. VS. TIME REALTY, INC.

G.R. No. 219698, September 27, 2021.
Hernando, J.
DOCTRINE:
Jurisprudence holds that there is unjust enrichment when a person unjustly retains a benefit to
the loss of another, or when a person retains money or property of another against the fundamental
principles of jμstice, equity and good conscience. The statutory basis for the principle of unjust
enrichment is Article 22 of the Civil Code which provides that '[e]very person who through an act of
performance by another or any other means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the
expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him.
The principle of unjust enrichment under Article 22 of the Civil Code requires to conditions:
1. that a person is benefited without a valid basis or justification, and
2. that such benefit is derived at another’s expense or damage.
There is no unjust enrichment when the person who will benefit has a valid claim to such benefit.
FACTS:
PNTC Colleges, Inc. (PNTC) and Time Realty, Inc. (Time Realty) entered into a Contract of
Lease for the latter’s property in Sampaloc Manila from 2005 – 2007. While the term of the lease
ended on December 31, 2005 the contract was impliedly renewed on a monthly basis after the said
date. Eventually, Time Realty notified PNTC of its (Time Realty) intent not to extend the lease
effective April 2007. It gave PNTC the option to either extend the lease only until April 2007 or
transfer to the second floor of the same building. PNTC informed time Realty of its decision to
terminate its lease which would take effect at the end of April 2007.
Sometime in April 2007, PNTC commenced the transfer of its operations to its new site in
Intramuros, Manila. However, Time Realty alleged that PNTC did so without settling its (PNTC’s)
outstanding rentals and services (electricity and water), plus interest/surcharges. Hence, Time
Realty ordered PNTC to cease its moving out operations, then retained the remaining properties of
PNTC in its premises. Time Realty averred that its retention of PNTC’s properties as security was in
accordance with Paragraph 23 of the Contract of lease:
Breach of Default
xxx should LESSEE violate any or all said conditions xxx LESSEEE hereby irrevocably
empowers LESSOR xxx to take inventory and possession of whatever equipment, furniture, articles,
merchandise, appliances, etc. found therein xxx
PNTC filed a Complaint for Delivery of Personal Properties with Damages. Time Realty filed an
Answer with Counterclaim arguing that PNTC started vacating the leased premises absent a formal
notice and without paying its remaining obligations.
Page | 37
ISSUE: Whether the unjust enrichment will result if Time Realty’s counterclaim would be granted.
RULING:
NO, unjust enrichment will not result if Time Realty’s counterclaim will be granted. Contrary to the
claim of PNTC and the findings of the RTC, there would be no unjust enrichment to speak of, as
Time Realty withheld the properties pursuant to Paragraph 23 of the Contract of Lease, a provision
which PNTC knowingly agreed to. In other words, Time Realty retained the said properties as
security to compel PNTC to pay and not to unduly enrich itself.

DIZON, JIRAH (Labor Law)

ARIEL M. REYES VS. RURAL BANK OF SAN RAFAEL (BULACAN)

G.R. No. 230597, March 23, 2022.
Hernando, J.
DOCTRINES:
In labor cases, strict adherence to the technical rules of procedure is not required. However,
this liberal policy should still be subject to rules of reason and fairplay. The liberality of procedural
rules is qualified by two requirements:
1. a party should adequately explain any delay in the submission of evidence; and
2. a party should sufficiently prove the allegations sought to be proven.
The reason for these requirements is that the liberal application of the rules before quasi-
judicial agencies cannot be used to perpetuate injustice and hamper the just resolution of the case.
Neither is the rule on liberal construction a license to disregard the rules of procedure. It must be
noted however, that protection to labor and resolution of doubts in favor of labor cannot be pursued to
the point of deliberately committing a miscarriage of justice. The right to obtain justice is enjoyed by
all members of society, rich or poor, worker or manager, alien or citizen. Justice belongs to everyone. It
is not to be blinded or immobilized by the fact of one' s being economically underprivileged.
The measures embedded in our legal system which accord specific protection to labor stems
from the reality that normally, the laborer stands on unequal footing as opposed to an employer. As
an additional aid therefore, a liberal interpretation of the technical rules of procedure may be allowed
if only to further bridge the gap between an employee and an employer.
FACTS:
Respondent Rural Bank of San Rafael (Bulacan) Inc. (RBSR) while respondents Veneracion
et. al. are RBSR’s Board of Directors. Sometime in 2012, several stockholders of RBSR complained
about the discrepancies in the amounts of the purchase price of stock subscriptions appearing in
the original receipts as against the duplicate copies issued by the bank. These involved several
millions of pesos collected from stockholders.
Upon RBSR’s investigation, it was discovered that in the original receipts given to the
stockholders, the stated price of shares ranged from P250.00 to P275.00, but in the duplicate
copies retained by RBSR, only Pl 00.00 was indicated. The original receipts contained signatures of
President Cruz while the duplicates were signed by either Treasury Head Bognot or Branch
Manager Eusebio.
Thus, in compliance with the Manual of Regulations for Banks mandating the prompt report
of anomalies to the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP), RBSR's Board of Directors approved a Report
on Crimes and Losses and directed Ariel Reyes (Petitioner) - as Compliance Officer - to certify the
Page | 38
same. However, Ariel refused to certify the report, reasoning that no independent investigation was
conducted, and that he cannot completely validate the same for lack of material data and evidence,
and that he was being pressured to certify the report.
Afterwards, Ariel claimed that instead of furnishing him the hard copies of the reports and its
original attachments to enable him to verify and certify the same, RBSR issued him two show cause
orders and put him on preventive suspension for neglect of duty. Meanwhile, RBSR contended that
several administrative hearings were scheduled to hear Ariel’s side, but all were ignored.
Ariel, together with Bognot and Eusebio (complainants) - who were principally accused of
theft/misappropriation of funds in connection with the anomaly - filed a Complaint against
respondents for illegal suspension and money claims. An Amended Complaint was subsequently
filed to include illegal dismissal, in view of their eventual dismissal from work.
ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in affirming the NLRC Decision which reversed the ruling of the Labor
Arbiter applying the principle of liberal application of the procedural rules notwithstanding it was
not made an issue in the proceedings before the LA
RULING:
The CA erred in affirming the NLRC Decision. Respondents were not denied due process. A
liberal interpretation of the procedural rules was not warranted. Based on the Labor Arbiter’s
undisputed findings, it appears that respondents have unjustifiably missed at least two settings:
that on June 4, 2013, and that on June 19, 2013. The respondents failed to appear on June 4, but
their counsel and representative appeared much earlier than the scheduled date of hearing and
secured a photocopy of the amended complaint.
To stress, respondents missed the hearing on June 19, 2013 despite having been directed
prior by the arbiter to attend. Moreover, it must be noted that respondents, at this point in time,
have already obtained a copy of the amended complaint which would have enabled them to
intelligently respond. Section 3 of the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure (2011 NLRC Rules) provides
that “within two (2) days from receipt of a complaint or amended complaint, the Labor Arbiter shall
issue the required summons”.
While it may be true that the arbiter failed to issue summons, such circumstance cannot
operate as a denial of respondents' right to due process because the fact remains that respondents
have already obtained a copy of the amended complaint, and have been duly notified of the June
19, 2013 hearing. Given the circumstances in the present case, the issuance of the summons would
have been a mere superfluity since again, respondents have already obtained a copy of the amended
complaint and notified of the upcoming hearing date.
We take note of the fact that from the date the respondents obtained a copy of the amended
complaint in early June 2013, up to the promulgation of the arbiter's Decision on February
24,2014, there was no initiative made by them to demand their day in court, so to speak. In the
Court's view, this cavalier attitude exhibited by respondents reeks of negligence and disrespect to
duly instituted authorities and rules of procedures, either of which this Court can ever tolerate.
Respondents in the present case are not entitled to be accorded a liberal interpretation of the
rules; the same being primarily granted for the employee's favor, and not the employer. In certain
cases, of course, a liberal approach to the rules may be had even if it favors the employer. Such
allowance, however, must be measured against standards stricter than that imposed against the
worker, and only in compelling and justified cases where the employer will definitely suffer injustice
should such liberal interpretation be disallowed. Unfortunately for respondents, this is not the
situation in the present case.

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 The findings of fact of both LA and NLRC reveal that first, respondents were able to earlier
secure copy of the amended complaint; second, respondents were absent during the June 4, 2013
and June 19, 2013 hearings; and third, respondents’ absences were unexplained. Respondents
failed to explain and justify their non-participation in the proceedings before the arbiter thus, the
application of a more liberal policy is unwarranted.

DIZON, JIRAH (Criminal Law)

EDWIN TALABIS VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 214647, March 4, 2020
Hernando, J.
DOCTRINE:
For voluntary surrender to be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance, the following elements must
be present, to wit:
1. the accused has not been actually arrested;
2. the accused surrenders himself to a person in authority or the latter's agent; and
3. the surrender is voluntary. The essence of voluntary surrender is spontaneity and the
intent of the accused to give himself up and submit himself to the authorities, either
because he acknowledges his guilt or he wishes to save the authorities the trouble and
expense that may be incurred for his search and capture
Failure to assert issues and arguments "within a reasonable time" warrants a
presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned or declined to
assert it.
FACTS:
Leonora Edoc (Leonora) and Rhoda E. Bay-An (Rhoda) filed a Joint Affidavit-Complaint
against petitioner and Arsebino before the Office of Provincial Prosecutor Felix T. Cabading of La
Trinidad, Benguet. After preliminary investigation, petitioner and Arsebino were charged with the
crime of violation of Section 68 of PD 705 otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code of the
Philippines. After trial on the merits, the RTC found petitioner and Arsebino guilty as charged.
Petitioner and Arsebino filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the RTC in its
December 1, 2009 Order. The CA affirmed with the MODIFICATION that appellant Edwin Talabis is
hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of six (6) years of prision
correccional as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor as maximum.
Petitioner, thus sought reconsideration of the January 16, 2014 Decision of the CA. In his
Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner imputed error on the CA for its failure to appreciate two
mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender and old age in modifying and imposing the proper
penalty against him. The CA denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration racionating in this wise:
“An exhaustive review of the record and the Decision rendered by this Court revealed that x x x the
two (2) mitigating circumstances mentioned in the instant motion were never raised by the
appellant during his trial as part of his defense. There is, thus, no compelling reason to modify,
reverse, or set aside the assailed Decision.” Undeterred, the petitioner filed the instant petition.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner is entitled to the mitigating circumstances of old age and of voluntary
surrender.
RULING:

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 Petitioner is not entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. Petitioner
filed his motion for reconsideration of the January 16, 2014 Decision of the CA where, for the first
time, he brought to the attention of the CA the mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender and
old age for the purpose of modifying and imposing the proper penalty against him. As his motion for
reconsideration was denied, petitioner now imputes fault on the CA for not appreciating the two
mitigating circumstances in his favor.
The CA was correct in refusing to take cognizance of the belatedly raised issue of whether or
not petitioner is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. It is well-settled that
no question will be entertained on appeal unless it has been raised in the proceedings below.
"Points of law, theories, issues and arguments not brought to the attention of the lower court x x x
need not be considered by a reviewing court, as they cannot be raised for the first time at that late
stage. Basic considerations of fairness and due process impel this rule."
Thus, if such mitigating circumstances were considered by the CA, or this Court for that
matter, the prosecution would be denied due process as it would have been denied the opportunity
to present evidence to disprove that petitioner did surrender spontaneously and voluntarily to the
authorities. In any event, issues raised for the first time on appeal are barred by estoppel. Failure to
assert issues and arguments "within a reasonable time" warrants a presumption that the party
entitled to assert it either has abandoned or declined to assert it. Accordingly, the supposed failure
on the part of the CA to appreciate the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender in
petitioner's favor cannot now be raised as an assignment of error in the present petition.

DIZON, JIRAH (Remedial Law)

ARMANDO H. DE JESUS VS. INTER-ORIENT MARITIME

ENTERPRISES, INC.
G.R. No. 203478, June 23, 2021.
Hernando, J.
DOCTRINE:
Rules of procedure are merely tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. If the
application of the Rules would tend to frustrate rather than to promote justice, it is always within our
power to suspend the rules or except a particular case from their operation. Law and jurisprudence
grant to courts the prerogative to relax compliance with the procedural rules, even the most
mandatory in character, mindful of the duty to reconcile the need to put an end to litigation speedily
and the parties' right to an opportunity to be heard.
FACTS:
De Jesus worked as a seafarer of Inter-Orient Maritime Enterprises, Inc. (Inter-Orient) for 20
years. On July 4, 2005, De Jesus executed another employment contract with Inter-Orient for nine
months. On his seventh month on board the vessel, he felt severe chest pains and had difficulty
breathing. He was admitted at a hospital in Egypt and was diagnosed with Acute Extensive
Myocardial Infraction.
He went back to the Philippines and was declared unfit for physical work. He underwent
examination and it was confirmed that he had myocardial infarction and that he must undergo
rehabilitation and continuous medication. He went to the office of Inter-Orient and inquired about
his unpaid salaries and was told that he needed to sign a quitclaim before his salaries could be
released. Due to exhaustion and desperation brought about by his medical condition, he signed the
quitclaim. De Jesus received US$5,749.00 upon signing documents for the processing and release
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of his bonuses and allowances. Among said documents were complaint form for non-payment of
wages, overtime pay, and sick leave and a pro-forma motion to dismiss. De Jesu then, filed a
complaint before the NLRC for disability benefits and sickness allowance under the POEA-Standard
Employment Contract (POEA-SEC) and for moral and exemplary damages.
Inter-Orient filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of res judicata in view of the previous
dismissal of the similar complaint earlier filed by De Jesus against Inter-Orient. In addition, Inter-
Orient pointed out that De Jesus had already executed a quitclaim and release in the prior
complaint. The Labor Arbiter denied the motion to dismiss by Inter-Orient on the ground that De
Jesus signed the release and quitclaim without the aid of a counsel and the consideration contained
therein was unconscionable. Further, he found as irregular the filing on the same day of the
complaint and motion to dismiss. On appeal, the NLRC reversed and set aside the ruling of the
Labor Arbiter and held that De Jesus' illness was not work-related. De Jesus, thus, filed a petition
for certiorari before CA, but it was dismissed outright based purely on procedural and technical
grounds.
ISSUE: Whether the outright dismissal of the case based on procedural defects alone was proper
RULING:
No, the outright dismissal of the case based on procedural defects alone was not proper since
there is a substantial compliance to formal requisites. Time and again, this Court has held that a
strict and rigid application of technicalities must be avoided if it tends to frustrate rather than
promote substantial justice. As held in Sta. Ana v. Spouses Carpo:
Rules of procedure are merely tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. If the
application of the Rules would tend to frustrate rather than to promote justice, it is always within
our power to suspend the rules or except a particular case from their operation. Law and
jurisprudence grant to courts the prerogative to relax compliance with the procedural rules, even
the most mandatory in character, mindful of the duty to reconcile the need to put an end to
litigation speedily and the parties' right to an opportunity to be heard.
Contrary to the findings of the appellate court, De Jesus attached a Certified True Copy
(original stamped) of the NLRC Decision and only the Resolution denying his Motion for
Reconsideration was a photocopy of the Certified True Copy of the issuance. The photocopied
Resolution nonetheless bears the notation "Certified True Copy" as that found in the attached NLRC
Decision. As to the alleged defect in the Affidavit of Service in the Petition for Certiorari, although he
failed to attach the registry receipt as proof of service to NLRC, he nonetheless indicated the registry
receipt no. in the affidavit.
Moreover, a second perusal of the Motion for Reconsideration with Manifestation filed by the
De Jesus before the appellate court would show that there was a genuine attempt to rectify the
procedural infirmities in the petition.
He subsequently submitted several supporting documents together with the motion, to wit:
photocopy of the issuances of the NLRC with photocopy stamp of CTC; original Affidavit of Service
indicating the Registry Receipt No., Certification from Atty. Tayurang stating that the Verification
and Certification of Non Forum Shopping was signed before him by the petitioner exhibiting his SSS
ID and Seaman's Book, copies of the identification card, Notarial Commission of Atty. Tayurang
including the Order granting his notarial commission; and Affidavit of Merit fully explaining the
reason for the formal infirmities. These, taken together, should be considered as substantial
compliance, enough to support the reinstatement of the Petition for Certiorari filed by the petitioner.
In addition, De Jesus submitted before the Court additional supporting documents that
essentially satisfy the lacking requirements in the Petition for Certiorari.

Page | 42
 Ultimately, this Court finds it proper to decide the case based on the merits and brush aside
the technicalities considering the substantial compliance of the petitioner with the formal
requirements set out by the rules.

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DIZON, JIRAH (Legal Ethics)

VILLAMOR VS. ATTY. JUMAO-AS

A.C. No. 8111, December 9, 2020.
Hernando, J.
DOCTRINE:
Canon 15 — A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and
transactions with his client.
Rule 15.03 — A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
FACTS:
Atty. Jumao-as organized a lending corporation for Villamor. He arranged for a loan for such
lending Corp from a certain Yu. Later Atty Jumao-as put up a single proprietorship lending
company for Yu and told collectors of Villamor's Corp to turn over their collections to Yu's company
because of Villamor's loan from Yu. Then atty, Jumao-as sent demand letter to Villamor for
payment of her company's dent to Yu. Villamor filed admin case against Atty. Jumao-as.
Villamor averred in her complaint with the IBP that Jumao-as convinced her to establish a
lending company and even facilitated securing a loan for P500,000 as additional capital. The IBPs
recommendation that atty Jumao-as be suspended from the practice of law for two years.
ISSUES: Whether Atty Jumao-as violated Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility in his dealing with complainant Adelita Villamor.
RULING:
The SC found Atty, Jumao-as GUILTY of violating Canon 15, Rule 15,03 Code of Professional
Responsibility. (for conflict of interest after he was found to have caused the establishment of two
competing lending firms without full disclosure to the parties involved).
He is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years and WARNED
that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

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DOMINGO, PRINCESS (Political Law)

MELVIN G. SAN FELIX VS. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

G.R. No. 198404, October 14, 2019
Hernando, J.
SUBJECT: Authority of the civil service commission to investigate anomalies in examinations;
dishonesty.
FACTS:
On March 8, 2001, the CSC Regional Office No. 6 of Iloilo City charged petitioner San Felix
with dishonesty for allegedly conspiring with and allowing another person to take, in his behalf, the
Police Officer I Examination held on March 29, 1998. The CSC noted that the picture and the
signature of San Felix in the application form and the seat plan were not identical with those found
in petitioner's Personal Data Sheet (PDS). Thus, the CSC Regional Office No. 6 arrived at the
conclusion that San Felix conspired with another person by allowing the latter to impersonate him
and take the examination in his behalf, indicating in all the pertinent documents the personal
circumstances of San Felix and writing his name and affixing his signature therein.
In his Answer, petitioner denied having conspired with another person to impersonate him
and take in his behalf the Police Officer I Examination on March 29, 1998. He insisted that he
personally took the said examination. He explained that the disparity in the pictures in his
application form and in the seat plan with those in the PDS might be due to a mix-up or that his
picture was interchanged or replaced with another person's picture.
Petitioner argues that although the CSC was formerly vested with authority to administer the
qualifying entrance examinations for police officers, the same was withdrawn with the enactment of
R.A. No. 8551 which took effect on March 6, 1998 and mandated the NPC to administer both the
entrance and promotional examinations for police officers.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CSC has jurisdiction to investigate his case?
RULING:
The CSC has the authority and jurisdiction to investigate anomalies and irregularities in the
civil service examinations and to impose the necessary and appropriate sanctions. The Constitution
grants to the CSC administration over the entire civil service. As defined, the civil service embraces
every branch, agency, subdivision, and instrumentality of the government, including every
government-owned or controlled corporation. Section 91 of R.A. No. 6975 or the Department of
Interior and Local Government Act of 1990 provides that the "Civil Service Law and its implementing
rules and regulations shall apply to all personnel of the Department," to which herein petitioner
belongs.
The evidence clearly shows that petitioner stated in his PDS that he has Police Officer I
eligibility when the records show that he cheated on the March 29, 1998 examinations administered
by the CSC by allowing another person take the said examination in his behalf. Petitioner stated in
his PDS that he passed the Police Officer I Examination knowing fully well that it was not true
because he did not take the said exam. As an aspirant for a police officer position, he has a legal
obligation to disclose the truth regarding his personal circumstances in the PDS, which is a
requirement for his employment.
In Villordon v. Avila, this Court held: This Court has already ruled in the past that
willful concealment of facts in the PDS constitutes mental dishonesty amounting to

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 misconduct. Likewise, making a false statement in one's PDS amounts to dishonesty and
falsification of an official document.
Dishonesty has been defined as "intentionally making a false statement on any
material fact." Dishonesty evinces "a disposition to lie, cheat, deceive or defraud;
untrustworthiness; lack of integrity, lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of
fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray."
Petitioner cannot justify his dishonest act on the fact that the CSC already lost its authority
to administer the March 29, 1998 Police Officer I examinations because he cannot be considered to
have acted in good faith in the first place. Petitioner's act of passing off in his PDS that he has
hurdled successfully the Police Officer I examinations constituted malice on his part thereby
negating any assertion of good faith. Neither can petitioner argue that his appointment was a
permanent one which entitled him to security of tenure. A perusal of his appointment showed that
the same was subject to the verification of his civil service eligibility which in this case, he evidently
has none.

DOMINGO, PRINCESS (Commercial Law)

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. HEREDEROS DE CIRIACO

CHUNACO DISTELERIA INCORPORADA
G.R. No. 200863, October 14, 2020
Hernando, J.
SUBJECT: Absence of Twin Certifications and Tax Declarations or Realty Tax Payments
FACTS:
HCCDI, a domestic corporation, applied for land registration of Lot No. 3246 with the MTC of
Guinobatan, Albay. HCCDI claimed ownership and actual possession of Lot No. 3246, with an area
of 71,667 square meters (sqm), and an assessed value of P56,930.00, on the ground of its
continuous, adverse, public, and uninterrupted possession in the concept of an owner since 1976
by virtue of a Deed of Assignment executed by the heirs of Ciriaco Chunaco (Heirs of Chunaco) who,
in turn, had been in continuous, adverse, public, and uninterrupted possession of the subject lot in
the concept of an owner since 1945 or earlier. HCCDI attached the following documents in its
application: (a) Tracing Cloth of Lot No. 3246;(b) Technical Description of Lot No. 3246; and (c)
Certificate in Lieu of the Lost Surveyor's Certificate.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic), through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), opposed HCCDI's application and alleged that neither HCCDI nor its predecessors-in-
interest, the Heirs of Chunaco, had been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of the subject lot for a period of not less than 30 years. Lot No. 3246 has not been
classified as alienable and disposable land of the public domain for at least 30 years prior to the
filing of the subject application. Moreover, the muniments of title and/or the tax declarations and
tax payment receipts of HCCDI, if any, attached to or alleged in the application for land registration,
did not constitute as competent and sufficient evidence of a bona fide acquisition of the subject lot
or of its open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession, and occupation thereof, in the
concept of an owner, for a period of not less than 30 years. Lastly, the claim of ownership in fee
simple on the basis of a Spanish title or grant can no longer be availed of by HCCDI because it
failed to file an appropriate application for registration within six months from February 16, 1976,
as required by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 892.

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 The Land Management Office (LMO) of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR), Region V, Rawis, Legazpi City, through Land Investigator Anastacia L. Abaroa
(Abaroa), conducted an ocular inspection and submitted a Report in compliance with the MTC's
January 29, 2004 Order. As per the LMO's Report, the subject property is within the alienable and
disposable zone as classified on March 30, 1926 and outside of the forest zone or forest reserve or
unclassified public forest, existing civil or military reservation, or watershed or other establishment
reservation. Also, the subject lot has never been forfeited in favor of the government for non-
payment of taxes nor confiscated as bond in connection with any civil or criminal case.
The ocular inspection conducted by Abaroa showed that the subject property located about
six kilometers away from the poblacion, is a coconut plantation occupied and/or possessed by
HCCDI. It does not encroach upon an established watershed, river bed, or riverbank protection,
creek, right of way, park site or any area devoted to general public use such as, public roads, plaza,
canals, streets, etc., or devoted to public service such as, town walls or fortresses. Lastly, the
subject property is covered by: (a) survey plan Ap-05-005158 which was approved by the Director of
Lands/Regional Land Director/Land Registration Commission and re-approved by the Bureau of
Lands on April 11, 2003 in view of P.D. No. 239 dated July 9, 1973; and (b) Tax Declaration No.
2002-05-028-00872 as payment for real property taxes in 2004.
Moreover, a Certification issued by the DENR, Region V, Legazpi City states that based on its
records, Lot No. 3246 was surveyed for Ciriaco Chunaco. The subject lot or any portion thereof is
not identical to any kind of previously approved isolated survey. Subsequently, the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the DENR, Legazpi City issued a
Certification stating that it cannot ascertain whether Lot No. 3246 was covered by any kind of
public land application or was issued a patent or title due to the fire in February 1992 which
destroyed its records.
ISSUES:
1. Does Lot No. 3246 form part of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain?
2. Has respondent HCCDI sufficiently proven that it has been in open, continuous, exclusive
possession and occupation of the subject lot since June 12, 1945 or earlier?
3. Is respondent HCCDI prohibited from owning lands pursuant to Section 11, Article XIV of
the 1973 Constitution; Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution; and the ruling of this
Court in the Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court?
RULING:
HCCDI needed to prove that: (1) the land forms part of the alienable and disposable land of
the public domain; and (2) it, by itself or through its predecessors-in-interest, had been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land under a bona
fide claim of ownership from June 12, 1945 or earlier. Lot No. 3246 forms part of the alienable and
disposable land of the public domain.
Under the Regalian Doctrine, all the lands of the public domain belong to the State, and that
the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership in land and charged with the conservation
of such patrimony. Thus, all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership
are presumed to belong to the State.
Lands of the public domain are classified under Section 3, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution into (1) agricultural, (2) forest or timber, (3) mineral lands, and (4) national parks. The
1987 Philippine Constitution also provides that "agricultural lands of the public domain may be
further classified by law according to the uses to which they may be devoted."

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 Evidently, HCCDI did not present: (a) a copy of the original classification approved by the
DENR Secretary or the President and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official
records; and (b) a certificate of land classification status issued by the CENRO or PENRO and
approved by the DENR Secretary. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the trial court rendered its
decision on the application prior to June 26, 2008, the date of promulgation of TA.N Properties. In
this case, HCCDI cannot be required to comply with the strict rules laid down in TA.N. Properties,
Inc. as it had no opportunity to comply with its twin certifications requirement.
Applying Vega and Serrano, We find that despite the absence of a certification by the CENRO
and a certified true copy of the original classification by the DENR Secretary or the President,
HCCDI substantially complied with the requirement to show that the subject property is indeed
alienable and disposable based on the evidence on record. HCCDI failed to prove its and its
predecessors-in-interest's possession and occupation of Lot No. 3246 under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
While we hold that Lot No. 3246 is part of alienable and disposable land of the public
domain, HCCDI's application must fail due to non-compliance with Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529
which requires the applicant and its predecessors-in-interest to prove that they have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession, and occupation of the land under a bona fide claim
of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier. In this case, HCCDI and its predecessors-in-interest
admittedly have been in possession of the subject lot only from 1980, which is the earliest date of
the tax declaration presented by HCCDI. Although it claims that it possessed the subject lot
through its predecessors-in-interest since 1943 as testified to by Leonides and Alekos, the tax
declarations belie the same. While belated declaration of a property for taxation purposes does not
necessarily negate the fact of possession, tax declarations or realty tax payments of property are,
nevertheless, good indicia of possession in the concept of an owner, for no one in his right mind
would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or, at least constructive possession.
HCCDI, as a corporation, cannot apply for registration of the land of the public domain. The
evidence on record reveals that HCCDI acquired Lot No. 3246 through a Deed of Assignment
executed by the Heirs of Chunaco in favor of HCCDI on August 13, 1976. To reiterate, both HCCDI
and its predecessors-in-interest have not shown to have been, as of date, in open, continuous, and
adverse possession of Lot No. 3246 for 30 years since June 12, 1945 or earlier. In other words,
when HCCDI acquired Lot No. 3246 through a Deed of Assignment, the subject property was not yet
private. Thus, the prohibition against private corporation acquiring alienable land of the public
domain under the 1973 Constitution applies.
In sum, HCCDI failed to prove that its predecessors-in-interest had already acquired a vested
right to a judicial confirmation of title by virtue of their open, continuous, and adverse possession in
the concept of an owner for at least 30 years since June 12, 1945 or earlier. More importantly,
HCCDI, as a private corporation, cannot apply for the registration of Lot No. 3246 in its name due
to the prohibition under the 1973 Constitution. Hence, its application for registration of Lot No.
3246 must necessarily fail.

DOMINGO, PRINCESS (Taxation Law)

HEDCOR SIBULAN, INC. VS. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL

REVENUE
G.R. No. 202093, September 15, 2021.
Hernando, J.
Page | 48
SUBJECT: Judicial Claim
FACTS:
Petitioner Hedcor Sibulan, Inc. (Petitioner), a duly registered domestic corporation engaged in
the business of hydroelectric power generation and subsequent sale of power generation to Davao
Light and Power Company, Inc. (DLPCI), filed its Original Quarterly VAT Return for the 2nd Quarter
of 2008 with BIR. Two years later, it filed an amended Quarterly VAT Return for the same period.
After two days, on June 25, 2010, the petitioner also filed a written application for the refund
or issuance of a tax credit certificate (TCC) and an administrative claim for tax credit/ refund as to
the unutilized input VAT on purchases of goods and services attributable to zero-rated sales for the
2nd quarter of 2008.
After just four days or on June 29, 2010, pending resolution of such administrative claim,
the petitioner filed a petition for review before the CTA Third Division (judicial claim) seeking the
refund or the issuance of a TCC in its favor for the unutilized input VAT for purposes of suspending
the running of the 2-year prescriptive period for the filing of claims for refunds.
Respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue sought the dismissal of the petition for
(1) being prematurely filed considering that only 4 days had lapsed from the filing of the
administrative claim allegedly disregarding the prescribed period of 120 days for the CIR to
rule on the claim under the National Internal Revenue Code and Revenue Regulations No.
16-2005, as amended, and
(2) failure of petitioner to exhaust administrative remedies.
ISSUE: Whether or not the judicial claim was prematurely filed?
RULING:
No, the petitioner’s judicial claim was not prematurely filed. Material to this case is Section
112 (C) of the NIRC which states that,

SEC. 112. Refunds or Tax Credits of Input Tax. —

(C) Period within which Refund or Tax Credit of Input Taxes shall be Made. — In
proper cases, the Commissioner shall grant a refund or issue the tax credit certificate
for creditable input taxes within one hundred twenty (120)days from the date of
submission of complete documents in support of the application filed in accordance
with Subsection (A) hereof.
In case of full or partial denial of the claim for tax refund or tax credit, or the failure
on the part of the Commissioner to act on the application within the period prescribed above,
the taxpayer affected may, within thirty (30) days from the receipt of the decision
denying the claim or after the expiration of the one hundred twenty-day period, appeal
the decision or the unacted claim with the Court of Tax Appeals.
The Supreme Court clarified that under this provision, the CIR has 120 days from date of
submission of complete documents to rule on an administrative claim of a taxpayer and ONLY upon
the expiration of such period or upon denial of the administrative claim should the taxpayer file a
judicial claim by filing an appeal before the CTA within 30 days from receipt of decision or such
expiration. This 120-day period is considered as mandatory and jurisdictional, hence, should be
strictly observed in order for the judicial claim to prosper and not be dismissed EXCEPT when (1)
the CIR, through a specific ruling, misleads a particular taxpayer to prematurely file a judicial claim
with the CTA, or (2) the CIR issued a general interpretative rule in accordance with Section 4 of the
Page | 49
Tax Code, which misleads ALL taxpayers into prematurely filing judicial claims with the CTA. When
any of these two exceptions exist, the CIR is no longer allowed to question the CTA’s assumption of
jurisdiction over the claim due to the setting in of equitable estopped expressly authorized under
Section 246 of the Tax Code.
For the resolution of the case at bar, it must be considered that there exists BIR Ruling
No.DA-489-03 issued on December 10, 2003, which provides that a taxpayer-claimant may seek
judicial relief with the CTA by filing a petition for review without waiting for the 120-day period to
lapse. Such BIR Ruling was only invalidated on October 6, 2010, through the ruling in the case of
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Aichi Forging Co. of Asia, Inc. wherein the mandatory nature
of the 120-day period was emphasized by the Supreme Court. Since the administrative claim was
filed on June 25, 2010, and the judicial claim was filed on June 29, 2010, it is clear that the
judicial claim is still under the effect of the said BIR Ruling, hence, falling under the second
exception. Therefore, Petitioner’s judicial claim was not prematurely filed.

DOMINGO, PRINCESS (Civil Law)

FATIMA GONZALES-ASDALA VS. METROPOLITAN BANK AND

TRUST COMPANY
G.R. No. 257982, February 22, 2023.
Hernando, J.
SUBJECT: Mortgage redemption insurance taken by wife alone does not extinguish the loan
obligation and does not release the mortgage over a presumed conjugal property upon the death of
her husband.
FACTS:
In June 2022, petitioner Fatima Gonzales-Asdala and her husband, Wynne B. Asdala,
applied for a loan with Metrobank in the amount of Php1,500,000.00 to finance the renovation of
their house built on a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. (TCT) 3777659 and
registered in the name of “Wynne B. Asdala, married to Fatima G. Asdala”. On July 22, 2002,
petitioner and her husband executed three (3) sets of Promissory Notes in favor of the bank,
corresponding to the release of the proceeds of their loan in three (3) tranches. All Promissory Notes
contained the same terms and conditions, including procurement of a Mortgage Redemption
Insurance (MRI) by the mortgagor, in case the bank would so require. As security of the loan,
petitioner and her husband were required to constitute a Real Estate Mortgage on the subject land.
On November 26, 2002, the bank sent the Spouses a Letter thanking them for their
transaction and informing them that the first annual MRI premium, amounting to Php6,884.10,
had to be paid on July 24, 2003. In the years that followed, petitioner alleged that she and her
husband were periodically billed for MRI premiums, but no receipts were issued, and neither was a
policy released in their favor. The only proof of payment of the MRI premiums was a debit memo
issued by Metrobank to petitioner’s husband.
On March 24, 2008, petitioner’s husband, Wynne, died. Petitioner notified Metrobank of his
death and requested for immediate discharge of the mortgage on account of the fact that the MRI
premiums were paid by her husband during his lifetime. However, Metrobank denied the request
and averred that the documents for the procurement of the MRI were signed by petitioner only,
thus, was issued only in her name. The bank also showed that the payment of the insurance
premiums was sourced from the savings account under the name of petitioner alone. On July 1,

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2008, petitioner received a letter with an attached Statement of Account, demanding payment for
two months unpaid amortization in the amount of Php41,315.14, inclusive of penalty charges.
Petitioner then filed a Complaint for Specific Performance, Injunction and Damages with
Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction against the bank claiming, in
essence, that the proceeds of the MRI should be applied to the loan since her husband’s death
activated the insurer’s commitment, and that the property offered as security for the loan was her
husband’s exclusive property, thus, he alone was the mortgagor in the Real Estate Mortgage and
consequently, the insured under the MRI. Metrobank’s position is that the MRI was applied for and
taken on the life of petitioner, therefore, the death of her husband did not operate to extinguish the
loan or the mortgage. The trial court dismissed petitioner’s Complaint which was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals.
ISSUE: Whether the parcel of land subject of the real estate mortgage is conjugal and whether
petitioner’s husband was the insured under the subject MRI.
RULING:
The Supreme Court held that there is a presumption that the property mortgaged by the
spouses as a security of their loan is presumed conjugal property considering that the only evidence
adduced is the TCT, which showed that the same was issued in 1988, seven years after petitioner
and her husband’s marriage in 1981. No other evidence was presented to prove that the same is a
paraphernal property of the husband. The Court held:
“Since petitioner failed to present strict proof of her husband’s exclusive ownership over the
property, Metrobank, the lower courts, and this Court, cannot be faulted for relying on the TCT,
the sole document presented by petitioner. After all, the question on whether petitioner was
able to adduce proof to overthrow the presumption of conjugality is a factual issue best
addressed by the trial court. It cannot be over-emphasized that factual determinations of the
trial courts, especially when confirmed by the appellate court, are accorded great weight by the
Court and, as a rule, will not be disturbed on appeal, except for the most compelling reasons.”
On the main issue, the Supreme Court that the property over which the mortgage was
constituted being presumed as conjugal, both the petitioner and her husband were mortgagors for
whose benefit an MRI can be made. The Court held that the trial court and the appellate court were
correct in finding that petitioner, as co-mortgagor, could secure an MRI on her life alone without a
similar action by her husband, her co-mortgagor. The Court held that being the sole mortgagor in
the MRI, she is the only party to the contract and the death of her husband did not cede to
Metrobank the rights and interests in the insurance contract for the reason that her husband was
not a party to the contract. Thus, the appellate court correctly held that the proceeds under the MRI
cannot be applied to the loan upon the death of petitioner’s husband because he was not the
borrower insured under the MRI.

DOMINGO, PRINCESS (Labor Law)

JOSE R. DELA TORRE VS. TWINSTAR PROFESSIONAL

PROTECTIVE SERVICES, INC.
G.R. No. 222992, June 23, 2021
Hernando, J.
SUBJECT: Stubborn Unwillingness to Return to Work

Page | 51
FACTS:
In October 1988, the petitioner was employed as a security guard by respondent Twinstar
Professional Protective Services, Inc. (Twinstar). He was deployed at the Las Haciendas in Tarlac
City and was paid a daily wage of P240.00. Sometime in January 2011, the petitioner sought
assistance from the program of a certain Mr. Tulfo to complain about the underpayment of his
salaries. On January 24, 2011, Commander Cesario Guhilde directed the petitioner to report to
Twinstar's office in Quezon City. Upon reporting to the office the next day, he was informed by
Twinstar's administrative officer that he was being placed on floating status.
Petitioner alleged that he was on floating status for more than six (6) months which
prompted him to file a complaint for illegal dismissal and underpayment/non-payment of certain
salaries and benefits on August 23, 2011, against Twinstar.
ISSUE: Was Jose constructively dismissed from employment?
RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. Jurisprudence teaches that there is constructive
dismissal when an employer’s act of clear discrimination, insensibility or disdain becomes so
unbearable on the part of the employee so as to foreclose any choice on his part except to resign
from such employment. It exists where there is involuntary resignation because of the harsh, hostile
and unfavorable conditions set by the employer. The standard for constructive dismissal is “whether
a reasonable person in the employee’s position would have felt compelled to give up his employment
under the circumstances.”
However, the Court emphasized that “not every inconvenience, disruption, difficulty, or
disadvantage that an employee must endure sustains a finding of constructive dismissal.” What is
vital is the weighing of the evidence presented and a consideration of whether, given the totality of
circumstances, the employer acted fairly in exercising a prerogative.
In the present case, the Court found that Jose failed that he was constructively dismissed by
Twinstar. According to the Court, Jose never presented any evidence, aside from his self-serving
allegations, that he was forced to be on floating status for more than six (6) months without being
given new assignment by Twinstar.
On the other hand, the Court found that Twinstar was able to establish that Jose went on
absence without leave on or about January 21, 2011 and that it had subsequently sent several
notices directing Jose to report for work. The Court also found that Twinstar’s duty officer vainly
tried to contact Jose by calling him and sending text messages. Also Twinstar’s field inspector
attempted to deliver a company letter on June 8, 2011 but Jose refused to receive the same.
Furthermore, the Court discovered that Jose himself admitted declining the assignment offered to
him by Twinstar within six (6) months from the time he was placed on floating status in the hearing
dated October 18, 2011 before the Office of the Labor Arbiter. According to the Court, Jose’s flimsy
claim that he did not understand the question of the Office of the Labor Arbiter and the Minutes of
the said hearing, as both were in the English language, would seem like a desperate attempt to
feign ignorance in order to retract such statements. The Court stated that Jose had all the
opportunity to request the Office of the Labor Arbiter to translate the question and the Minutes to a
language he understood, but he chose not to. The Court pointed out that Jose himself indicated in
his bio-data that English is one of the languages he can speak and write.
For the Court, the totality of circumstances led it to conclude that no constructive dismissal
happened. Instead, the circumstances revealed Jose’s stubborn unwillingness to return to work
despite being required by Twinstar to report to work multiple times within six (6) months from
January 21, 2011. Thus, this Court ruled that Twinstar had just cause to terminate Jose’s
employment.
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DOMINGO, PRINCESS (Criminal Law)

FERNANDO PANTE Y RANGASA VS. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 218969, January 18, 2021.
Hernando, J.

SUBJECT: Finder, Theft

FACTS:
Sometime in December 2004, a certain Dawson Word lost his bundle of money of around
$4,550 and P27,000.00 when he alighted from his vehicle upon arriving home. The following
morning, a bakery worker noticed a bundle of money lying on the ground near Word’s car.
Meanwhile, one of Pante’s co-accused who was riding his bike outside also noticed the bundle of
money and picked it up. That same morning, Word realized that his money was missing. He did not
find the same despite a thorough search. With the help of his landlord, Word learned that Pante’s
minor co-accused picked up the bundled money near his car. Word then sought the help of the
police in the recovery of his money. Upon investigation, it was found that Pante’s minor co-accused
was indeed the finder of the money.
The police headed to the residence of the minor and found the bundle of money. The accused
minor likewise admitted finding the same and sharing the money with his cousin, also a minor, and
to Pante. Portion of the money and the things bought with Word’s money were returned to Word.
And all the persons who shared the money were all prosecuted for the crime of theft against Word.
The RTC found all three accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of theft.
Aggrieved, Pante appealed the judgment before the CA, but the latter upheld the ruling of the RTC.
Discontented with the CA’s resolution, Pante brought the case to the SC arguing among others that
there was no unlawful taking of the money on his part because the finder of the lost money was his
co-accused and not himself. Not knowing where it came from, he averred that he did not have any
intent to take money belonging to another.
ISSUE: Whether the petitioner is not guilty of the crime charged.
RULING:
The Petition is unmeritorious. Under Article 308, par. 2 (1) of the RPC (Revised Penal Code),
theft is also committed by one’s failure to deliver lost property to its owner or local authorities. In
this kind of theft, it is essential to prove: 1) the finding of lost property; 2) the failure of the finder to
deliver the same to the local authorities or its owner.
In the case at bar, both the trial court and the appellate court found that the prosecution
witnesses were able to prove that Word lost his bundled money after alighting from his car, and
such fact was corroborated by the prosecution witness who testified that he positively saw the
accused minor pick up the bundle of money under Word’s car. Anent Pante’s argument that he
cannot be convicted for theft because he is not the finder of the lost property, the SC was not
persuaded.
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 The question of whether criminal appropriation of found property can be committed by a
person other than the one by whom the property is first found has been lengthily discussed and
answered in an older case which in sum states: “One who receives property from the finder thereof
assumes, in legal contemplation, by voluntary substitution, as to the property and the owner, the
relation occupied by the finder, placing himself in the finder’s stead. In such a case, whether the
person taking the property is guilty must be determined on the same principles that govern in the
case of the actual finder.”
In fine, a “finder” under Article 308, par. 2 (1) of the RPC is not only limited to the actual
finder of the lost property, since the gist of the offense is the furtive taking and misappropriation of
the property found. The rationale for the “finder in law” concept is not difficult to fathom. It is
precisely to protect the owner of the lost property in the event the lost property is transferred from
one individual to another and to prevent the “finder in law” from escaping liability by claiming that
he was not the actual finder thereof but was merely entrusted custody thereof by someone who had
no intention to appropriate the same.
DOMINGO, PRINCESS (Remedial Law)

EDISON PRIETO AND FEDERICO RONDAL, JR. VS. ERLINDA

CAJIMAT
G.R. No. 214898, June 08, 2020
Hernando, J.
FACTS:
On January 14, 2003, at around 7:40 in the evening, petitioner Rondal, Jr. was driving a red
Yamaha tricycle with plate number BT 9799 along the southbound lane of the national highway of
Barangay 2 Garreta, Badoc, Ilocos Norte. Thereafter, petitioner Rondal, Jr. overtook two tricycles in
front of him and occupied the northbound lane which resulted in a head-on collision with a black
Yamaha "chop-chop" motorcycle which was driven by Narciso Cajimat III (Cajimat III). As a result,
Cajimat III suffered a fractured skull which caused his instantaneous death.
A criminal case for Reckless Imprudence resulting in Homicide was filed against petitioner
Rondal, Jr. before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Badoc-Pinili, Badoc, Ilocos Norte
docketed as Criminal Case No. 2730-B. Meanwhile, the mother of deceased Cajimat III, respondent
Erlinda, filed a separate civil action for damages before the RTC against petitioners Rondal, Jr. and
Prieto, the registered owner of the red Yamaha tricycle.
Respondent Erlinda posited that at the time of the incident, petitioner Rondal, Jr. did not
have a driver's license and was intoxicated. She pointed out that the direct, immediate, and
proximate cause of the collision was petitioner Rondal, Jr.'s gross negligence in managing, driving,
and operating the red Yamaha tricycle. Thus, respondent Erlinda prayed for the pay ment of the
burial and miscellaneous expenses she incurred in the total amount of P200,000.00, attorney's
fees, moral damages, and exemplary damages.
On the other hand, petitioners opined that petitioner Rondal, Jr. had been careful and
prudent while driving the red Yamaha tricycle at a moderate speed. They further alleged that
petitioner Rondal, Jr. took and drove the said tricycle without petitioner Prieto's consent and
authority. They likewise contended that the collision was caused by deceased Cajimat III's own
negligence, recklessness, and imprudence by driving an unregistered and unlighted "chop-chop"
motorcycle at full speed.

Page | 54
 After pre-trial, trial on the merits ensued. Respondent Erlinda presented the testimony of
Senior Police Officer 1 Proceso Villa (SPO1 Villa), the responding officer who investigated the
vehicular collision. On the other hand, petitioners presented their testimonies as evidence.
Meanwhile, on May 21, 2008, the MCTC rendered a Decision finding petitioner Rondal, Jr. guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of Reckless Imprudence resulting in Homicide, which fact was admitted
by both parties.
ISSUE: Whether or not the proximate cause of Cajimat III's demise is due to his own negligence?
RULING:
Petitioners are raising a question of fact, that is, whether there were indeed headlights and
blinkers in deceased Cajimat III's motorcycle which would allegedly make him negligent in driving
his motorcycle in the national highway during nighttime and thus absolve the petitioners from any
liability on the injury caused to the deceased. The issue raised by petitioners is clearly a question of
fact which requires a review of the evidence presented. It is well-settled that this Court is not a trier
of facts, and it is not its function to examine, review, or evaluate the evidence all over again. As a
matter of sound practice and procedure, the Court defers and accords finality to the factual findings
of trial courts.
A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court should cover only
questions of law. However, the rule admits of exceptions, which includes, but not limited to: (1)
where the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, and conjectures; (2)
where the inference made is manifestly mistaken; (3) where there is grave abuse of discretion; (4)
where the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; and (5) the findings of fact are premised
on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by evidence on record. Petitioners failed to show
that this case falls under any of the exceptions. Hence, this Court finds no justifiable reason to
deviate from the findings of the RTC and the CA that no sufficient evidence was presented by
petitioners to prove that indeed Cajimat III's motorcycle had no headlight and blinkers during the
mishap.
The findings of fact made by a trial court are accorded the highest degree of respect by an
appellate tribunal and, absent a clear disregard of the evidence before it that can otherwise affect
the results of the case, those findings should not simply be ignored. Absent any clear showing of
abuse, arbitrariness, or capriciousness committed on the part of the lower court, its findings of
facts are binding and conclusive upon the Court.
DOMINGO, PRINCESS (Legal Ethics)

HERNANDO PETELO VS. ATTY. SOCRATES RIVERA

A.C. No. 10408, October 16, 2019.
Hernando, J.
Facts:
This administrative complaint stemmed from the alleged unauthorized filing by respondent
Atty. Socrates Rivera (Atty. Rivera) of a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Real Estate Mortgage,
Promissory Note, Certificate of Sale and Foreclosure Proceedings in Connection with TCT No. 455311
with Damages before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 150, captioned as Fe
Mojica Petelo, represented by her Attorney-in-Fact Hernando M Petelo, plaintiff, versus Emme,
Bartolome Ramirez, World Partners Bank, and as Necessary Parties, the Register of Deeds, Makati
City and the Assessor's Office, Makati City, defendants, and docketed thereat as Civil Case No. 13-
580.

Page | 55
 Petelo narrated that sometime in 2011, his sister, Fe, who was based in the United States of
America, designated him as Attorney-in-Fact to enter into a Joint Venture Agreement with Red
Dragon Builders Corporation for the construction of a townhouse on the lot owned by Fe, located at
Brgy. Palanan, Makati City and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 455711.
Complainant claimed that Jessie and Fatima Manalansan, the owners of Red Dragon Builders
Corporation, inveigled him into surrendering to them the original copy of TCT No. 455711 which
they eventually used as collateral for the Php8 million loan they contracted with World Partners
Bank without the knowledge and consent of Petelo. According to Petelo, the Spouses Manalansan
superimposed the name of a certain Emmer B. Ramirez to make it appear that he was the duly
constituted attorney-in-fact of Fe in the Special Power of Attorney instead of Petelo. When the
Spouses Manalansan failed to pay the monthly amortizations, World Partners Bank instituted
foreclosure proceedings against the mortgage. During the auction sale, World Partners Bank
emerged as the highest bidder and was issued a certificate of sale over TCT No. 455711.
When Petelo got wind of the foregoing transactions, he instructed his daughter to secure a
certified true copy of TCT No. 455711 from the Register of Deeds of Makati City. To his surprise, he
learned that an entry of lis pendens pertaining to Civil Case No. 13-580 for Declaration of Nullity of
Real Estate Mortgage, Promissory Note, Certificate of Sale and Foreclosure Proceedings in Connection
with TCT No. 455311 with Damages before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 150, was
annotated at the back of the title. Upon further investigation with the RTC, Petelo found out that
the civil complaint was filed by respondent Atty. Rivera purportedly on Petelo's and Fe's behalf.
Ruling:
The Court adopts the findings and recommendation of the IBP there being reasonable
grounds to hold him administratively liable. Indeed, Atty. Rivera's flip-flopping version deserves no
credence at all. What is apparent in his narration is that he was indeed the one who filed the
subject civil suit by allowing somebody to use his signature and other details in the preparation of
pleadings and filing the same before the court. As correctly pointed out by Petelo, Atty. Rivera's act
of allowing persons other than himself to use his signature in signing papers and pleadings, in
effect, allowed non-lawyers to practice law. Worse, he failed to display or even manifest any zeal or
eagerness to unearth the truth behind the events which led to his involvement in the filing of the
unauthorized civil suit, much less to rectify the situation. Although he claimed that the signatures
were forgeries, there was nary a display of willingness on his part to pursue any legal action against
the alleged forgers. On the contrary, he openly admitted his association with a disbarred lawyer and
their ongoing agreement to allow the latter to use his signature and "details" in the preparation of
pleadings. By so doing, Atty. Rivera not only willingly allowed a non-lawyer to practice law; worse,
he allowed one to continue to practice law notwithstanding that this Court already stripped him of
his license to practice law.
Clearly, the foregoing acts of Atty. Rivera constituted violations of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, particularly Rule 9.01, Canon 9, Rule 1.10, Canon 1 and Rule 10.01, Canon 10,
which read:
Rule 9.01, Canon 9: A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of
any task which by law may only be performed by a member of the Bar in good standing.
Rule 1.1 0, Canon 1: A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
Rule 10.0 1, Canon 10: A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any
in court; now shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.
Atty. Rivera abused the privilege that is only personal to him when he allowed another who
has no license to practice law, to sign pleadings and to file a suit before the court using his
signature and "details." By allowing a non-lawyer to sign and submit pleadings before the court,
Atty. Rivera made a mockery of the law practice which is deeply imbued with public interest; he
Page | 56
totally ignored the fact that his act of filing a suit will have a corresponding impact and effect on the
society, particularly on the life and property rights of the person or persons he wittingly involved in
the litigation, in this case, Fe and Petelo. Atty. Rivera's cavalier act of allowing someone to use to his
signature and his "details" in the complaint have concomitant and significant effects on the property
rights of Fe and Petelo.
We find the recommendation of the IBP to suspend Atty. Rivera from the practice of law for a
period of one (1) year warranted by the circumstances of the case. In Tapay v. Bancolo, the Court
similarly imposed the penalty of suspension of one (1) year to the respondent-lawyer therein who
was found to have authorized or delegated to his secretary the signing of the pleadings for filing
before the courts.

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FELIPE, JEMARD (Political Law)

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. JORGE CASTILLO

G.R. No. 190453. February 26, 2020
Hernando, J.
FACTS:
On September 5, 1980, the Solicitor General filed a Complaint for Expropriation against
respondents Jorge Castillo, Sofia Solis Achacoso, Alipio Fernandez, Sr., Emiliana Fernandez,
Casimera Fernandez, Concepcion Fernandez, Benjamin Fernandez, Juana Galvan, Estela Corpuz
Fernandez, and Germana Suarez, co-owners of a 11,585 sq. meter property in Dagupan City. Sofia
and Alipio opposed the valuation made by the petitioner, as it was based on a 1974 tax declaration
rather than the current fair market value for 1980. Respondents Benjamin and Estela conceded
that the petitioner has sovereign political power to condemn private property for public use but
denied possession and claimed that under P.D. No. 76, the basis for computing just compensation
for private property should be the current and fair market value declared by the owner. During the
pendency of the case before the trial court, respondent Alipio died and was substituted by his
spouse Fredesvinda F. Vda. De Fernandez and his eleven (11) children.
Respondent Benjamin filed an Ex Parte Motion to Dismiss, claiming that petitioner RP had
not pursued the case for six years and had not deposited the fair market value. The case was
dismissed due to lack of interest. However, petitioner RP filed a Motion to Revive and Set the Case
for Hearing, identifying the heirs of respondents Jorge and Cornelia Caguioa and the spouses Juana
Galvan and Venancio Manaois. The RTC issued an Order reinstating the case. The parties were
ordered to file pre-trial briefs, but only petitioner RP filed a pre-trial brief. The petitioner also filed
an Amended Complaint, alleging that Dagupan City National High School had been in continuous
possession of the property since 1947 and had a market value of fifty centavos per sqm.
Petitioner RP presented Perla T. Cornel (Perla), principal of the school, Engineer Alfredo
Tangco, and Primitivo Castillo, one of the heirs of Jorge, as witnesses. On the other hand,
respondents did not present any witnesses. The RTC rendered its Decision dismissing the Amended
Complaint and ordering petitioner RP to restore the possession of the subject property with a total
area of 2,000 sqm to the respondents. Aggrieved, petitioner RP filed an appeal with the CA which
the CA reversed and set aside the RTC Decision.
ISSUE: What is the reckoning date of the computation of just compensation: (a) date of taking in
1947; (b) date of the filing of the original Complaint in 1980; or (c) date of filing of the Amended
Complaint in 1989?
RULING:
As correctly observed by the CA, other than the testimonial evidence of Perla, no other
evidence was presented by the petitioner RP to establish that the taking of the subject property was
in 1947. On the other hand, the evidence of the respondents, that is, the tax declaration, clearly
shows that until the year 1990, they religiously paid the real property tax of the subject property
which means that they were not dispossessed of the use thereof. Thus, we find no error in the
appreciation of facts by the CA.
As between the filing of the original Complaint and Amended Complaint, we rule that the
computation of just compensation should be reckoned from the time of the filing of the original
Complaint, that is, on September 5, 1980. Evidently, there was no actual taking in this case prior to
the filing of the Complaint, thus, the time of taking should be reckoned from the filing of the
Complaint. Hence, the value of the property at the time of filing of the original Complaint on
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September 5, 1980, and not the filing of the Amended Complaint in 1989, should be considered in
determining the just compensation due to the respondents.

FELIPE, JEMARD (Commercial Law)

MAGNA READY MIX CONCRETE CORPORATION VS. ANDERSEN

BJORNSTAD KANE JACOBS, INC.
G.R. No. 196158. January 20, 2021
Hernando, J.
FACTS:
The case arose from a complaint filed by ANDERSEN against MAGNA, a Philippine
corporation. ANDERSEN alleged that MAGNA was not doing business in the Philippines or licensed
to do business there. The complaint alleged that MAGNA had ordered form design and drawing
development for a precast plant and PIC double tee design in 1996. MAGNA issued a purchase
order and executed an Agreement for Professional Services in November 1996, which promised
compensation for MAGNA's services. In February 1997, MAGNA requested ANDERSEN to prepare a
preliminary design for their Ecocentrum Garage Project. ANDERSEN delivered the designs, but
MAGNA made partial payments but left an unpaid balance of $60,786.59 for precast plant
inspection, PIC double tee form design, plant development design, and Ecocentrum Garage
preliminary design for bidding. ANDERSEN filed a complaint against MAGNA for refusing to pay the
balance, claiming that MAGNA acted maliciously, fraudulently, and in bad faith. MAGNA argued
that ANDERSEN did not provide any inspection or consultation services and that their claims had
no basis. They also claimed they could not be liable for the PIC double tee design, plant
development design, and Ecocentrum Garage preliminary design, as they were not delivered.
MAGNA sought moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees in its compulsory counterclaim.
Gene Lim, MAGNA's general manager, testified that the services provided by ANDERSEN
were not for MAGNA's benefit but for business development, due diligence, and feasibility studies
for the creation of Structural Pre-cast Inc. (SPI). SPI was a corporation that Bharat Soli,
ANDERSEN's principal owner, and Lim had planned to incorporate for their business venture.
However, SPI was not formally incorporated due to the Asian Financial Crisis. MAGNA filed a
Motion to Dismiss with a Motion to Cancel Hearing, claiming that ANDERSEN had previously filed a
case against another Philippine corporation. MAGNA claimed that the earlier case covered different
transactions but involved the same Ecocentrum design drawing. MAGNA asserted that ANDERSEN
was doing business in the Philippines but without the necessary license, and filed a motion to
dismiss. The RTC denied MAGNA's motion to dismiss, stating that it was already estopped from
challenging ANDERSEN's personality after acknowledging it through a contract. The trial continued.
ISSUE: Whether ANDERSEN has the legal capacity to sue in the Philippines.
RULING:
ANDERSEN's act of entering into a contract with MAGNA does not fall into the category of
isolated transactions. The contract clearly shows that ANDERSEN was to render professional
services to MAGNA for a fee. These professional services included the following: (1) providing master
plant site layout and plant design; (2) providing plant operation procedures and organization
matrix; (3) providing plant management and production staff training; (4) providing plant
construction and operation start-up services; and (5) providing consultation services for developing
a precast plant program. It is clear then that ANDERSEN, in entering into that contract with

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MAGNA, was performing acts that were in progressive pursuit of its business purpose, which, as
found by the RTC, involved consultation and design services.
Though it was a single transaction, ANDERSEN's act of entering into a contract with MAGNA
constitutes doing business in the Philippines. It cannot be considered as an isolated transaction
because the act is related to ANDERSEN's specific business purpose. Thus, in doing business
without a license, ANDERSEN had no legal capacity to sue in the Philippines.
However, the Court agrees that MAGNA is already estopped from challenging ANDERSEN's
legal capacity to sue. The doctrine of estoppel states that the other contracting party may no longer
challenge the foreign corporation's personality after acknowledging the same by entering into a
contract with it. This principle is applied in order to "prevent a person (or another corporation)
contracting with a foreign corporation from later taking advantage of its noncompliance with the
statutes, chiefly in cases where such person has received the benefits of the contract."
In this case, MAGNA is already estopped from challenging ANDERSEN's legal capacity to sue
due to its prior dealing with the latter, that is, entering into a contract with it. As ruled by the
courts below, there was a perfected and binding contract between the parties. By such a contract,
MAGNA effectively acknowledged ANDERSEN's personality. MAGNA's allegation that it only
discovered during the trial that ANDERSEN was doing business in the Philippines without a license,
is therefore irrelevant. Moreover, MAGNA had already benefited from the contract because as found
by the lower and appellate courts, ANDERSEN indeed rendered services to MAGNA pursuant to
their contract and even prior thereto.

FELIPE, JEMARD (Taxation Law)

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE VS. PHILEX MINING

CORPORATION
G.R. No. 218057. January 18, 2021
Hernando, J.
FACTS:
Philex is a domestic corporation engaged in the mining business, including the exploration
and operation of mine properties and the commercial production and marketing of mine products.
Philex filed its original Quarterly VAT Return for the fourth quarter of 2009. Subsequently, it filed
an amended Quarterly VAT Return for its total zero-rated sales of P2,680,497,020.60, importation
of goods of P93,018,475.00 with input tax of P11,162,217.00, and purchases of services of
P132,944,084.17 with input tax of P15,953,290.10. Pursuant to Section 4.112-1 of Revenue
Regulations (RR) No. 16-2005, Philex filed its claim for refund/tax credit with the One Stop Shop
(OSS) Center of the Department of Finance per Claim Information Sheet No. 49813 in the amount of
P27,115,507.10. The CIR failed to act on Philex's administrative claim for refund which prompted
Philex to file a Petition for Review with the CTA. Trial ensued and the case was submitted for
decision after the submission of Philex's Memorandum and the CIR's Memorandum. Respondent is
ordered to refund in favor of petitioner the amount of P18,610,568.32, representing its utilized and
excess input VAT attributable to its zero-rated sales for the fourth quarter of 2009. Subsequently,
the CTA Second Division denied the CIR's Motion for Partial Reconsideration in a Resolution.
Aggrieved, the CIR elevated the case to the CTA En Banc. However, in its decision, the CTA En Banc
denied the CIR's Petition for Review.

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ISSUE: Whether or not the CTA En Banc erred in affirming the CTA Second Division's Decision
which ruled that Philex is entitled to a tax refund in the amount of P18,610,568.32, representing its
unutilized and excess input VAT attributable to its zero-rated sales for the fourth quarter of 2009.
RULING:
It is settled that this Court is not a trier of facts. Moreover, factual questions should not be
entertained in petitions for review filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Besides, there is no
cogent reason to depart from the CTA En Banc's finding that Philex's zero-rated sales, which were
supported by financial invoices dated outside the period of claim, were actually generated during
the period of claim in view of the provisional invoices and bills of lading during the latter period.
In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Philex Mining Corporation which had similar factual
antecedents and raised the same issues as the case at bench, We held that the CIR's other
assertions that "Philex failed to prove that its input taxes are attributable to zero-rated sales; that
its buyer received the goods sold; and that the sales invoices presented are within the period
covered in the refund claim" are allegations that relate to the substantiation of the claim for refund.
Here, the CTA Second Division commissioned an Independent Certified Public Accountant
(ICPA) who found, after examining Philex's voluminous documents, that its claim for refund was
well-founded. The CTA En Banc likewise saw no reason to deviate from the findings of the ICPA and
the CTA Second Division in partially granting Philex's refund "as the same is supported by pieces of
evidence, which prove Philex's compliance with the requirements for refund of its claimed input tax
attributable to zero-rated sales for the fourth quarter of taxable year 2009."

FELIPE, JEMARD (Civil Law)

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. JOSEPHINE PONCE-

PILAPIL
G.R. No. 219185. November 25, 2020
Hernando, J.
FACTS:
Josephine, a 44-year-old married housewife from Yati, Lilo-an, Cebu, filed a petition in
support of her husband, Agapito, who left her without any information about his whereabouts in
November 2000. Agapito, who was from Ormoc City and had a growing cyst in his right jaw, was
introduced to Josephine by a neighbor. Josephine's parents were deceased from a calamity in the
1990s. After Agapito's disappearance, Josephine sought help from his only surviving relative, Lydia
Bueno Pilapil, but was met with no information. She also sought help from their friends, but all
answered in the negative.Josephine believes that her husband Agapito is already dead, as over six
years have lapsed without any information on his whereabouts. She filed the petition to declare her
husband Agapito presumptively dead so she can remarry.
Marites Longakit Toong, a 44-year-old public school teacher and resident of Yati, Lilo-an,
Cebu, testified that she is a childhood friend and neighbor of Josephine and knows Agapito, who
disappeared in November 2000. She attempted to help Josephine find Agapito, but they still lack
knowledge on his whereabouts. Toong even hand-carried a letter from Josephine to Lydia Bueno
Pilapil, who also told her she does not know where Agapito was.

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 The RTC declared Agapito as presumptively dead, pursuant to Article 41 of the Family Code,
in relation to Article 253 of the Civil Code. Josephine was found to have established the fact that
Agapito has been absent for six years with his whereabouts unknown. The Republic of the
Philippines (Republic), through the Office of the Solicitor General(OSG), elevated its cause to the
appellate court through a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The CA ruled
against the Republic.
ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC and in
affirming the RTC Order that granted Josephine's petition for declaration of presumptive death of
Agapito, her husband.
RULING:
First, her personal knowledge of a growing cyst on Agapito's jaw does not produce an
inevitable conclusion that the latter was already suffering from some terminal illness prior to his
disappearance. No medical document or expert testimony on Agapito's physical ailment was
submitted by Josephine for the courts' assessment to prove such circumstance.
Second, while Josephine attempted to find Agapito, her supposed informers and their
information were unreliable. The "friends" whom Josephine allegedly contacted were unnamed. The
letters written by Josephine and Agapito's sister, Lydia Bueno Pilapil (Lydia), were never presented
as evidence before the court. Lydia did not even take the witness stand to testify to the veracity of
the contents of her purported letter as alleged by Josephine. Marites Longakit Toong (Marites),
Josephine's letter-courier to Lydia, did appear as a witness before the trial court; however, the truth
behind Marites' statements that Lydia had told her of Agapito's absence remain hearsay and
unconfirmed.
Third, Josephine could have resorted to police assistance in seeking out her husband. While
the act of seeking investigative aid from authorities will not automatically secure a positive
conclusion of a "diligent search," official documents could still have been procured to attest that she
had assiduously investigated the disappearance of Agapito. Josephine never did so. This further
weakened the seriousness of her efforts to find her missing husband and blurred the possibility of
the latter's death. Withal, the pieces of evidence on record were too bare and self-serving. Mere
allegation is not proof. Moreover, Josephine's acts fail to convince the Court that she indeed went
out of her way to locate Agapito, and her search for Agapito's whereabouts cannot be said to have
been diligently and exhaustively conducted. In all, Josephine's efforts were just too flimsy to serve
as concrete basis of a well-founded belief that Agapito is indeed dead. A declaration of presumptive
death must be predicated upon a well-founded fact of death.
The fact that the absent spouse is merely missing, no matter how certain and undisputed,
will never yield a judicial presumption of the absent spouse's death. Josephine in this case only
successfully established that the whereabouts of Agapito are indeterminable. As circumstances that
definitely suggest Agapito's death remain to be seen, the Court cannot consider Josephine's civil
status as that of a widow.

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FELIPE, JEMARD (Labor Law)

SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION VS. ROSARIO A.GOMEZ

G.R. No. 200815. August 24, 2020
Hernando, J.
FACTS:
C2K, a courier and delivery services corporation, entered into a business relationship with
SMC in January 2001. The relationship initially went smoothly, but C2K faced difficulties in
collecting service fees. C2K's former manager, Daniel Tamayo, formed another courier services
group, Starnec, which used fake C2K receipts to collect fees. C2K claimed that Gomez's intervention
allowed Tamayo's group to transact business with SMC. SMC conducted an investigation, and
C2K's President, Edwin Figuracion, allegedly claimed Gomez was collecting a 25% commission from
C2K's total payments.
An audit revealed Gomez was involved in anomalies causing significant losses to SMC. SMC
conducted an administrative investigation and hearing, and Gomez presented evidence and
witnesses to disprove the charges. Gomez was found guilty of fraud against SMC and receiving
bribes through commissions. SMC issued a Notice of Termination of Services to Gomez, prompting
her to file a case for illegal dismissal with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).
The Labor Arbiter held that Gomez's employment was invalidly terminated. Aggrieved, Gomez
appealed to the NLRC. In its decision, the NLRC reversed and set aside the findings of the Labor
Arbiter and held that Gomez was illegally terminated. the CA dismissed the petition and upheld the
findings of the NLRC. The CA pointed out that "Gomez's dismissal on the ground of fraud and loss
of trust and confidence was not founded on clearly established facts.
ISSUE: Whether or not Gomez's termination from service was valid, legal, and effective.
RULING:
The requisites for dismissal on the ground of loss of trust and confidence are: "1) the
employee concerned must be holding a position of trust and confidence; (2) there must be an act
that would justify the loss of trust and confidence; and (3) such loss of trust relates to the
employee's performance of duties."
The Court finds that Gomez indeed occupied a position of trust and confidence, as defined by
law and jurisprudence, since she was entrusted with SMC's property, in particular its mail matter
which included weighing and determining volumes of documents to be shipped. Thus, she was
routinely charged with custody of SMC's mail matter. In addition, The Court finds that SMC
likewise substantially proved the second requisite (i.e. there must be an act that would justify the
loss of trust and confidence).
In this case, the Court finds that Gomez willfully, intentionally, knowingly, purposely, and
without justifiable excuse disregarded SMC's rules and regulations in the workplace. The Court
notes that it was through Gomez's intervention that Starnec Tamayo's group) was able to transact
business with SMC, wherein Starnec used fake receipts and collected the fees pertaining to C2K.
Gomez, as the used factor in SMC's Mailing Department, should have known or noticed said fake
receipts since she had previously transacted with C2K. Moreover, The Court gives credence to the
claim of C2K's President, Figuration, in his affidavit that Gomez had been collecting 25%
commission from the total payment received by C2K. This was corroborated by SMC's audit findings
where it was discovered that Gomez's anomalies caused tremendous losses to SMC. Furthermore,
SMC conducted its investigation which resulted in Gomez being found guilty of committing fraud

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against SMC and of receiving bribes through commissions in connection with the performance of
her function. In view of the foregoing, The Court finds that Gomez was validly terminated on the
ground of loss of trust and confidence.

FELIPE, JEMARD (Criminal Law)

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. FLOR PUEYO ALIAS

TITO FLONG
G.R. No. 192327. February 26, 2020
Hernando, J.

FACTS:
AAA, born on March 15, 1991, lived in a compound in Parañaque City with her neighbor,
Pueyo, who was accused of assaulting her. On November 4, 1997, AAA was playing with her
younger brother and two other playmates when Pueyo attacked her with a welding rod. AAA cried in
pain and saw her private part bleeding. Her mother, BBB, noticed the bleeding and brought AAA to
Dr. Ramos' clinic. Dr. Ramos found AAA with a bleeding wound on her vagina, but he desisted
further examination and put sterile gauze on her vagina. He instructed BBB to take AAA to PGH or
Ospital ng Maynila. A medical examination revealed hymenal laceration at 11 o'clock position, fresh
hymenal laceration at 6 o'clock position, and posterior fourchette extending to perineum, bleeding
from laceration sites. The prosecution also imputed the expenses for medical treatment and job loss
of AAA's father due to the filing of the case.
In his defense, Pueyo denied the accusations against him, admitting to welding works near
AAA's children's playing area on November 4, 1997. He claimed he never touched AAA's private
organ and that the allegations were false.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty of rape by sexual assault.
RULING:
Yes. Successful prosecutions for statutory rape charges falling under Article 266-A(2) rely on
only two requisites: (1) the victim is a child, male or female, under 12 years of age, and (2)that the
accused inserted any instrument or object into the genital or anal orifice of the victim. In relation to
Section 5(b) of RA 7610, the apparent circumstances fit squarely as sexual assault: AAA, 6 years
young at the time of the incident, received a penetrating blow onto her vagina that almost extended
to her anus by a welding rod wielded by Pueyo. The severity of the genital injury inflicted upon AAA
cannot be more telling of Pueyo's abusive intent. AAA's consent to Pueyo's vile act holds no
relevance here - it is settled that a child consent is immaterial because of his or her presumed
incapacity of discerning evil from good.
All told, the acts of Pueyo have been shown to fall within the punitive purview of rape by
sexual assault under Article 266-A(2) of the RPC in relation to Section 5(b) of RA 7610. The similar
case of People v. Tulagan dictates the indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years, ten (10) months,
and twenty-one (21) days of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to fifteen(15) years, six (6) months,
and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal, as maximum, as the correct penalty therefor.

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FELIPE, JEMARD (Remedial Law)

MRS. CONSOLACION V. TIÑA VS. STA. CLARA ESTATE, INC.

G.R. No. 239979. February 17, 2020
Hernando, J.
FACTS:
The controversy revolves around a 231-square-meter lot along Creek I in Bacolod City, where
the petitioner and her husband have been occupying the property for over 55 years. The petitioner
presented documents such as Engr. Jose F. Falsis' 1st Indorsement, a Certification of Arturo V.
Parreño, and a Miscellaneous Sales Application filed in 1986. The application was approved by the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) on December 10, 1997. The
respondent, Sta. Clara Estate, Inc., alleged that the property is covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. T-28629, registered under its name. The City Assessor of Bacolod denied the change
in the property's appraisal under Patent Application No. (CENRO V-8)2, claiming that the property
is within or is a portion of Sta. Clara Estate, Inc.'s property, identified as Creek 1, (LRC) Psd-39596,
and covered by TCT No. T-28629 issued on June 11, 1965. The respondent claimed that the
petitioner is illegally occupying a portion of their property.
In 1999, the respondent filed a Complaint for ejectment against the contested property,
Creek I. The petitioner filed a Complaint for cancellation of title with damages and reliefs in 2000.
The respondent argued that Creek I was a public dominion property and could not be legally
registered under its name. The ejectment case proceeded ahead of the Civil Case No. 00-11133. On
May 9, 2002, the MTCC rendered a Decision in favor of the respondent.
The MTCC ruled that respondent is the registered owner of Creek I, introducing
improvements during the development of the Sta. Clara Subdivision. The RTC of Bacolod City
affirmed the decision in 2003, and the Court of Appeals upheld the RTC's judgment. The appellate
court ruled that respondent had the right to possess the disputed tract of land, as the registered
owner and party who had established prior possession. The court ejectment of the petitioner was
upheld in a resolution in 2015. A motion for reconsideration was denied, but the court issued a
corresponding Entry of Judgment.
The RTC of Bacolod City dismissed the case in 2017 due to the pronouncement that Ogumod
Creek or Creek I belongs to the respondent. The petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but
was denied. They appealed, arguing that the RTC prematurely terminated proceedings and
dismissed the Complaint for cancellation of title due to a ruling on ownership in a related ejectment
case. The petitioner argues that the ruling contradicts established law and jurisprudence, which
states that ownership determination is ancillary to resolving possession issues.
ISSUE: whether petitioner is the proper party to file the suit for cancellation of title should be raised
in the main case. The RTC should be afforded the opportunity to rule on this issue. The only issue
to be resolved, at this point, is the propriety of the dismissal by the trial court.
RULING:
The Court noted that the petitioner directly appealed to this Court via a Rule 45 petition, in
relation to Rule 41 of the Rules of Court on an alleged pure question of law. It is recognized under
Rule 45 that an appeal from the trial court's decision may be undertaken through a petition for
review on certiorari directly filed with the Court where only questions of law are raised or involved. A
question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, while

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there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. For a
question to be one of law, its resolution must not involve an examination of the probative value of
the evidence presented by the litigants, but must rely solely on what the law provides on the given
set of facts. If the facts are disputed or if the issues require an examination of the evidence, the
question posed is one of fact. The test, therefore, is not the appellation given to a question by the
party raising it, but whether the appellate court can resolve the issue without examining or
evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of law; otherwise, it is a question of fact.
In the ejectment case, the issue of ownership over Creek I was resolved in favor of
respondent. In an ejectment case, questions as to the validity of the title cannot be resolved
definitively. A separate action to directly attack the validity of the title must be filed, as was in fact
filed by petitioner, to fully thresh out as to who possesses a valid title over the subject property.

FELIPE, JEMARD (Legal Ethics)

EDITHA M. FRANCIA VS. ATTY. QUIRINO SAGARIO

A.C. No. 10938. October 08, 2019
Hernando, J.
FACTS:
Sometime in 2009, the complainant contracted the services of Atty. Sagario to handle the
annulment of her marriage to her husband, Jose Francia. Atty. Sagario agreed to represent her for a
total fee of PhP70,000.00. The complainant paid Atty. Sagario an initial payment of PhP 30,000.00
on December 14, 2009 for which the latter issued an acknowledgment receipt. Subsequently, the
complainant again paid Atty. Sagario PhP 20,000.00 upon the latter's assurance that he would soon
file the petition for annulment of her marriage. Atty. Sagario again issued a written acknowledgment
for the said payment. The complainant paid another PhP 7,000.00 to Atty. Sagario did not issue any
receipt this time reasoning that the amount would be used as filing fees and representation
expenses for the sheriff. After receipt of a total sum of PhP 57,000.00 from the complainant, Atty.
Sagario avoided her phone calls and cancelled their appointments. Atty. Sagario limited his
communication with the complainant through text messages only. Despite several demands, Atty.
Sagario did not file the petition. After six months had lapsed without Atty. Sagario having filed
anything in court, the complainant asked him to return the total amount she had paid. In response,
Atty. Sagario promised to return the money he received from the complainant but failed to do so
despite several repeated demands. Consequently, the complainant filed a small claims case against
Atty. Sagario before Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Quezon City.
Atty. Sagario failed to appear in any of the scheduled hearings before the MeTC despite
service of summons and notice of hearing. Thus, the MeTC ordered Atty. Sagario to pay
complainant the amount of PhP 50,000.00 with interest. Notwithstanding the MeTC's Decision
ordering him to return the amount he received from complainant, Atty. Sagario has yet to pay
complainant the amount adjudged. Complainant was compelled to bring the matter before the IBP.
Investigating Commissioner Salvador B. Belaro, Jr. recommended that Atty. Sagario be suspended
from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years.

RULING:
The highly fiduciary nature of an attorney-client relationship imposes upon the lawyer the
duty to account for the money received from his/her client. A lawyer's failure to return upon
demand the money he/she received from his/her client gives rise to the presumption that he/she
has appropriated the same for his/her own use. An attorney-client relationship requires utmost
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good faith, loyalty, and fidelity on the part of the lawyer. In this case, Atty. Sagario clearly fell short
of the demands required of him as a member of the Bar. Moreover, Atty. Sagario did not bother to
submit his response to the complaint before the MeTC in the small claims action filed against him.
To make matters worse, Atty. Sagario did not even appear during the scheduled mandatory
conference or file any responsive pleading before the IBP despite due notice. Atty. Sagario's failure
or refusal to answer the complaint against him and to appear at the mandatory hearings before the
MeTC and the IBP are manifestations of his stubborn, disobedient, and disrespectful attitude
toward lawful orders of the court and illustrate his willful disregard for his oath of office.
Having established his administrative liability, the Court now determines the proper penalty
to be imposed upon Atty Sagario. In similar cases where a lawyer neglects his/her clients case
despite receipt of legal fees and fails to return the latter's money despite demand, the court imposed
the penalty of suspension from the practice of law.
In Rollon v. Naraval, the Court imposed the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for
two (2) years for the lawyer's failure to render any legal service despite receipt of legal fees. In view
of the foregoing, the Court sustains the recommendation of the IBP that Atty. Sagario be meted the
penalty of suspension from the practice of law for two (2) years.

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LLACUNA, MELROSE (Political Law)

CSC VS. BERAY, ET.AL.

G.R. No. 191946, December 10, 2019
Hernando, J.
FACTS:
Respondent Beray was the Chief of the Subsidiary and Revenue Section of the Department of
Public Works and Highways (DPWH) whose duty, among others, was to supervise the recording and
control of the Notice of Cash Allocation issued by the Department of Budget and Management for
the cash requirements of the Office. He was also vested with authority to sign for the chief
accountant's Requests for Obligation and Allotment (ROAs), and Disbursement Vouchers (DVs) for
payment of supplies, materials, furniture and equipment in amounts not exceeding P200,000.00.
On the other hand, Espina and Tadeo were both Accountant III assigned at the Bookkeeping
Section. Their duties included controlling the allotment releases, recording of accounting entries in
Box B of the DV, maintaining Project Cost Sheets of project assignments, and preparing the Journal
and Analysis of Obligation.
Sometime in January 2002, the DPWH issued Department Order No. 15 (DO 15), series of
2002, creating a committee to investigate newspaper reports on alleged illegal disbursements of
funds and non-observance of procedures on emergency purchases/repairs of the DPWH-owned
motor vehicles in 2001. The anomalies involved more than 7,000 transactions in the total amount of
P139,000,000.00 paid by the concerned Office. Pursuant to DO 15, the Investigating Committee
designated the Internal Audit Service Department of the DPWH as the Technical Working Group
tasked to investigate the alleged irregularities in the repair of motor vehicles of the DPWH Central
Office for Calendar Year 2001.
As a result, a Complaint-Affidavit4 was filed on July 12, 2002 against several employees of
the DPWH Central Office including Beray, Espina, and Tadeo. The complaint arose from anomalous
transactions involving the alleged emergency repair of a Nissan Pick-up with plate number TAG
211. Beray approved the reimbursement of the emergency repair and purchases of spare parts of
vehicle TAG 211 even when the spare parts enumerated on the four Requisition for Supplies and
Equipment forms (RSEs) cannot be considered as emergency in nature. He certified the propriety of
the expenditures and completeness of supporting documents. He also signed the portion for the
Department Chief Accountant and Recommending Approval of the voucher even if the funds used
for the four vouchers were charged against the Capital Outlay Fund (300-34) which cannot be used
for emergency repairs and purchases of spare parts. It was also discovered that Beray signed ROAs
for amounts exceeding P200,000.00 and the Vouchers of the Certificate of Availability of Funds for
payment of emergency purchases/repairs without the prior approval of higher authorities.
Tadeo, on the other hand, charged the amount of P24,550.00 for the repair of service vehicle
TAG 211 (one DV) against Capital Outlay for Roads, Bridges and Highways for ADB-PMO Projects in
violation of Section 20 of the General Appropriations Act (GAA). Similarly, Espina improperly
charged the expenses for the emergency repair of service vehicle TAG 211 (three DVs) against
Capital Outlay for Roads Bridges and Highways for Rural Road Projects in violation of Section 20 of
the General Provisions of the GAA.7
Thus, Beray, Espina, and Tadeo, together with other employees, were formally charged with
dishonesty, grave misconduct, gross neglect of duty, and conduct prejudicial to the interest of the
service, and violations of the following: (a) Civil Service Law; (b) Section 3(e)(g) of Republic Act (RA)
No. 3019, as amended; (c) Section 20 of the General Provisions of the GAA; (d) Section 9 of the
Special Provision of the GAA; (e) Memorandum of the Secretary on the Guidelines on Purchases of
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Spare Parts and repair vehicles dated July 19, 1997; (f) DO No. 33, Series of 1988 of RA No. 6770,
as amended by RA No. 3018; (g) Commission on Audit (COA) Circular 85-55 A, Series of 1985, and;
(h) COA Circular 76-41, Series of 1976, on splitting of RSE, Purchase Orders (POs), vouchers and
payrolls. They were likewise preventively suspended from work for a period of 90 days and were
required to submit their respective a period of 90 days and were required to submit their respective
answers to the charges against them. The DPWH Secretary then created a Hearing Committee to
determine the liability of the erring employees and for the imposition of proper penalty, if any.
ISSUE:
(a) Whether or not Beray's acts constituted simple neglect of duty, and;
(b) Whether or not Espina and Tadeo committed inefficiency in the performance of their
official duties.
RULING:
(a) YES. Gross neglect of duty or gross negligence pertains to "negligence characterized by the
want of even slight care, or by acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to
act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with a conscious indifference to the
consequences, insofar as other persons may be affected. It is the omission of that care
[which] even inattentive and thoughtless men never fail to give to their own property.  In cases
involving public officials, there is gross negligence when a breach of duty is flagrant and
palpable.
On the other hand, simple neglect of duty is "the failure of an employee or official to give
proper attention to a task expected of him or her, signifying a 'disregard of a duty resulting from
carelessness or indifference.
In finding Beray merely liable for simple neglect of duty, the CA held that he did not exceed
his authority when he signed the ROA containing a summary of various DVs which, if assessed
individually, did not exceed P200,000.00. The CA found Beray liable only for approving the ROA
containing alterations without any counter-signature of the requesting authority.
This Court disagrees. A thorough review of the records shows that Beray is guilty not of
simple neglect of duty but of gross neglect of duty, a grave offense punishable by dismissal even for
the first offense. It is the responsibility of Beray to supervise his subordinates and to make sure
that they perform their respective functions in accordance with the law. As Chief of the Subsidiary
and Revenue Section of the DPWH, his function, among others, is to supervise the recording and
control of the Notice of Cash Allocation issued by the DBM for the cash requirements of the Office.
Further, he exercised a delegated authority to sign, on behalf of the Chief Accountant, payment of
supplies, materials, furniture and equipment not exceeding P200,000.00.
In the case at bench, the amount stated in the ROA was altered from P24,980.00 to
P269,350.00. Interestingly, there were no countersignatures affixed to the ROA. The apparent
absence of the countersignature in the ROA should have caught the attention of Beray and led him
to be more cautious to its approval. Beray should have made the necessary inquiry to determine the
grounds for the alteration and the author thereof instead of merely relying on his subordinates. To
stress, he should have personally examined the truth and authenticity of the amount indicated
therein, who made the alteration, and the reason for the alteration. He should have affixed his
signature only after checking the completeness and propriety of the same.
We are not convinced of Beray's defense that the ROA had been duly approved by his
subordinates in the regular performance of their functions. The absence of the counter-signature is
an indicium that the employees who were responsible for its assessment were remiss in their duty.
Besides, as a public official holding a supervisory position, Beray should not heavily depend on the
acts committed by his subordinates. His position vested upon him a discretionary power to examine
the documents being brought to his desk for approval and ensure that these were duly
accomplished in accordance with law and office policies.
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 More importantly, the nature of Beray's position requires that he should be meticulous in the
approval of disbursement of public funds and to be more circumspect in examining the documents
for his approval. He should have exercised utmost care before affixing his signature for approval of
the ROA which contained alterations. While the amount involved is not humungous compared to
other government transactions, the fact still remains that taxpayers' money was spent and at the
expense of the government.26 Indeed, a "public office is a public trust and public officers and
employees must at all times be accountable to the people.
On the issue of whether Beray exceeded his delegated authority when he signed the ROA
amounting to P269,350.00, the Court answers in the affirmative. As held by the CSC, the DPWH
DO 42 series of 1988 and other amendatory DOs were clear that his authority to sign or certify
section B of the ROA in behalf of the Chief Accountant is limited only to amounts involving payment
of and for expenses P200,000.00 and below.
Beray's contention that the amount in the questioned ROA was a lump sum of various DVs is
of no moment. As aptly observed by the DPWH and the CSC, his authority is limited to signing
ROAs not exceeding P200,000.00.
Moreover, Beray's act of approving the reimbursement to be charged against the Engineering
and Administrative Overhead under Fund 102 which resulted in the subsequent issuance of
Certification of Availability of Funds is violative of the directive of then DPWH Secretary Gregorio
Vigilar. Under the DPWH Office Memorandum dated July 31, 1997, reimbursements to be charged
against 0.5% or 0.25% Engineering Overhead Allocation of the Central Offices need to be approved
by the higher authorities. Here, Beray failed to secure the approval of the higher authorities when
he assented that the reimbursement be charge against the Engineering and Administrative
Overhead.
In maintaining his innocence, Beray argued that the DPWH Memorandum did not specifically
identify the higher authorities whose prior approval were needed to be secured. It is noteworthy that
the Memorandum was in effect since 1997. As such, if there as any ambiguity to the same, it was
his duty as well as the other officers to seek clarification as to who are these higher authorities
being referred to in the Memorandum. Regrettably, Beray failed to prove that he exerted any diligent
effort to determine the appropriate higher authority.
What Beray simply posited was that he believed that it was enough to get the approval of the
Assistant Director of the Bureau of Equipment (BOE) whom he contemplated as the higher
authority referred to in the Memorandum. However, there is dearth of evidence that the said
position can be considered as the higher authority and that his/her approval was sufficient to allow
the reimbursements in the ROA be charged against the Engineering Overhead Allocation. Hence,
Beray's bare assertion and unsubstantiated allegations have no probative value.
The Court agrees with the findings of the CSC that Beray should be meted the severe penalty of
dismissal from service. He is guilty of gross neglect of duty as he miserably failed to efficiently and
effectively discharge his functions and obligations. His acts of heavily depending on his
subordinates without carefully examining the documents presented to him for disbursement of
funds clearly exhibit his flagrant and culpable unwillingness to perform his official duties with the
exactitude required of him.
(b) YES. Espina and Tadeo failed to make a detailed accounting of the expenses incurred for
emergency repairs of the various service vehicles. On the contrary, the summary seemed to
mask the absence of supporting documents, like the corresponding required ROA, for other
requests of disbursement of funds. The CA is correct that every requisition must be
accompanied by such request. It thus follows that a ROA must be made for each DV with
respect to a specific request for disbursement of funds. In fact, although National Budget
Circular No. 440 dated January 30, 1995 was issued to adopt a simplified fund release
system in the government, it did not encourage the lumping up of DVs which was allegedly
practice in the DPWH. Expediency in the performance of duty should not be resorted to in
exchange for transparency and accuracy of accounting of public funds.
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 It is even more interesting that the alterations made in the ROA to include additional claims
for emergency repairs were not originally requested by the requesting authority, BOE Assistant
Director Florendo Arias. In fact, during the investigation, he testified that there were no alterations
in the ROA at the time he affixed his signature thereto.
Further, Espina and Tadeo were remiss in their duties when they failed to observe the
Memorandum dated July 31, 1997 issue by then DWPH Secretary Vigilar. To reiterate, Beray,
Espina and Tadeo should have clarified the higher authorities being referred to in the Memorandum
whose approval is required for the reimbursement. Further, they likewise failed to show sufficient
proof that the Assistant Director of the BOE is a higher authority contemplated in the
Memorandum.
Espina and Tadeo nevertheless aver that the acts imputed against them have already been
resolved in the two Resolutions of the Secretary of the DPWH with respect to the administrative
cases against heir co-employees, Norma Villarmino, Violeta Anar and Teresita de Vera. Notably,
however, the findings of the DPWH Secretary in the said resolutions did not affect in any manner
the case against Espina and Tadeo as these involved different parties. Also, the respondents in the
said resolutions held public positions different from Espina and Tadeo. It thus necessarily follows
that their functions and duties also varied from the respondents therein. More importantly, as
correctly reasoned by the CSC, the findings of the DPWH Secretary who performs quasi-judicial
functions although given weight are not binding before this Court.

LLACUNA, MELROSE (Commercial Law)

BPI VS. CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 197593, October 12, 2020
Hernando, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner BPI and respondent Citibank, N.A. (Citibank) are both members of the Clearing
House established and supervised by the CBP. Both banks maintained demand deposit balances
with the CBP for their clearing transactions with other commercial banks coursed through the said
clearing facilities.
On January 28, 1982, BPI Laoag City Branch discovered outstanding discrepancies in its
inter-bank reconciliation statements in CBP in the amount of P9 million. Hence, on February 9,
1982, petitioner BPI filed a letter-complaint before the CBP on the latter's irregular charging of its
demand deposit account in the amount of P9 million.5 It also requested CBP to conduct the
necessary investigation of the matter. In addition, both CBP and petitioner BPI agreed to refer the
matter to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to conduct a separate investigation.6
The results of the NBI Investigation Report7 showed that an organized criminal syndicate
using a scheme known as "pilferage scheme" committed the bank fraud in the following manner: (a)
the infiltration of the Clearing Division of the CBP with the connivance of some personnel of the
CBP Clearing House; (b) the pilferage of "out-of-town" checks; (c) the tampering of vital banking
documents, such as clearing manifests and clearing statements; (d) the opening of Current
Accounts by members of the syndicate with the BPI Laoag City Branch and Citibank, Greenhills
Branch in Mandaluyong City; and (e) the withdrawal of funds through checks deposited with
Citibank and drawn against BPI.
It was further disclosed that on October 14, 1981, two accounts were opened at BPI Laoag
City Branch and another at Citibank Greenhills Branch.8 A Savings Account in BPI Laoag City
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Branch was opened by Mariano Bustamante (Bustamante) with an initial deposit of P3,000.00,
P2,000.00 of which was in check and P1,000.00 in cash.9 On the same day, Bustamante also
opened a Current Account with the BPI Laoag City Branch with an initial deposit of P1,000 with
which he was given a checkbook.10 On the other hand, Marcelo Desiderio (Desiderio) opened a
Current Account under Magna Management Consultant (MMC) with Citibank Greenhills Branch
with an initial deposit of P10,000.00 and with Rolando San Pedro as the authorized signatory or
owner of the account.11
Thereafter, Citibank Greenhills Branch received by way of deposit to the Current Account of
MMC various checks drawn against BPI Laoag City Branch: (a) two checks dated October 9 and 15,
1981 in the amounts of P498,719.70 and P501,260.30, respectively, deposited on October 16, 1981;
(b) two checks dated October 26 and 28, 1981 in the total amount of P3 million deposited on
October 30, 1981; and (c) various checks in the total amount of PS million deposited on November
20, 1981. All these checks were sent by Citibank Greenhills Branch to the CBP Clearing House for
clearing purposes.
Upon arrival of the checks at the CBP Clearing House, Manuel Valentino (Valentino), CBP's
Bookkeeper, with the assistance of Janitor-Messenger Jesus Estacio (Estacio), intercepted and
pilfered the BPI Laoag City Branch checks, and tampered the clearing envelope. They reduced the
amounts appearing on the clearing manifest, the BPI clearing statement and the CBP manifest to
conceal the fact that the BPI Laoag City Branch checks showing the original amounts were
deposited with Citibank Greenhills Branch.13 Thereafter, the altered CBP manifest and clearing
statement, together with the clearing envelope which contained the checks intended for BPI Laoag
City Branch but without the pilfered checks deposited with the Citibank Greenhills Branch in the
account of MMC and drawn against Bustamante's BPI Laoag City Branch account, were forwarded
to CBP Laoag Clearing Center.
As a standard operating procedure, the CBP Laoag Clearing Center forwarded the said
documents to the drawee bank, BPI Laoag City Branch, which would then process the same by
either honoring or dishonoring the checks received by it. However, BPI Laoag City Branch could
neither honor nor dishonor the pilfered checks as they were not included in the clearing envelope or
in the tampered CBP manifest and clearing statement. BPI Laoag City Branch was not given the
chance to dishonor the pilfered checks as they were not presented for payment. Thereafter, upon
receipt of the original clearing manifest from CBP Laoag Clearing Center with BPI's
acknowledgement, Valentino added back the amount of the pilfered checks so that the original
manifest would tally with all the records in CBP.
On the other hand, the sending bank, Citibank Greenhills Branch, did not receive any notice
of dishonor within the period provided under the CBP regulations, thus, it presumed that the
checks deposited in MMC's Current Account had been presented in due course to the drawee bank,
BPI Laoag City Branch, and were consequently honored by the latter. Thereafter, Citibank
Greenhills Branch allowed the withdrawal of the checks in the total amount of P9 million.
As a result of the aforesaid fraud committed against petitioner BPI, Desiderio and Estacio,
together with other personalities, were convicted of three (3) counts of Estafa thru Falsification of
Public Documents by the Sandiganbayan (SB). On the other hand, Valentino was discharged and
utilized as the main witness for the prosecution.17
In addition, Carlito Bondoc, the former Assistant Manager of Citibank Greenhills Branch and
Rogelio Vicente (Vicente), Assistant Manager of BPI Laoag City Branch, were charged as co-
conspirators in the bank fraud against petitioner BPI. However, the case against Vicente was
dismissed without prejudice by the SB after Valentino recanted his earlier statement implicating
Vicente and for insufficiency of evidence to support his conviction.18

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 Thereafter, petitioner BPI requested CBP, through a letter dated June 15, 1982, to credit
back to its demand deposit account the amount of P9 million with interest.19 However, CBP
credited only the amount of P4.5 million to BPI's demand deposit account.20 Despite several
requests made by BPI, CBP refused to credit back the remaining amount of P4.5 million plus
interest.21 Hence, on January 21, 1988, petitioner BPI filed a complaint for sum of money against
CBP.
In its Answer, CBP denied any liability to BPI and demanded the latter to return the P4.5
million it earlier credited to BPI as the said amount was allegedly held under a "suspense account"
pending the final outcome of the NBI investigation. CBP likewise filed a third-party complaint
against Citibank for the latter's negligence which caused the perpetration of the fraud.24 Citibank,
on its part, denied any negligence in the supervision of its employees.25 CBP further alleged, in its
Amended Answer,26 that the fraud could not have been committed without the connivance and
collusion of certain employees of both petitioner BPI and respondent Citibank.
ISSUE: Whether or not CBP may be sued on its governmental and/or proprietary function
RULING:
YES. CBP is a corporate body performing governmental functions. Operating a clearing house
facility for regional checks is within CBP's governmental functions and duties as the central
monetary authority. One of the generally accepted principles of international law, which we have
adopted in our Constitution under Article XVI, Section 3 is the principle that a state may not be
sued without its consent, which principle is also embodied in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions.
However, state immunity may be waived expressly or impliedly. Express consent may be embodied
in a general or special law. On the other hand, consent is implied when the state enters into a
contract or it itself commences litigation.
In the case of government agencies, the question of its suability depends on whether it is
incorporated or unincorporated. An incorporated agency has a Charter of its own with a separate
juridical personality while an unincorporated agency has none. In addition, the Charter of an
incorporated agency shall explicitly provide that it has waived its immunity from suit by granting it
with the authority to sue and be sued. This applies regardless of whether its functions are
governmental or proprietary in nature.
Indubitably, the CBP, which was created under RA 265 as amended by Presidential Decree
No. 72 (PD 72), is a government corporation with separate juridical personality and not a mere
agency of the government. Specifically, Sections 1 and 4 of RA 265, as amended, provided for the
creation of the CBP, a corporate body with certain corporate powers which include the authority to
sue and be sued. Its main function is to administer the monetary, banking and credit system of the
Philippines which is primarily governmental in nature. It has the following duties: (a) to primarily
maintain internal and external monetary stability in the Philippines, and to preserve the
international value of the peso and the convertibility of the peso into other freely convertible
currencies; and (b) to foster monetary, credit and exchange conditions conducive to a balanced and
sustainable growth of the economy.
Undoubtedly, the function of the CBP as the central monetary authority is a purely
governmental function. Prior to its creation, the supervision of banks, banking and currency, and
the administration of laws relating to coinage and currency of the Philippines was lodged with the
Bureau of Treasury under the immediate supervision of the Executive Bureau (EB).

LLACUNA, MELROSE (Taxation Law)

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 LUMAUAN VS. COA
G.R. No. 218304, December 9, 2020
Hernando, J.

FACTS:
Petitioner Ninia P. Lumauan (Lumauan) was the Acting General Manager of Metropolitan
Tuguegarao Water District (MTWD),4 a government-owned and controlled corporation (GOCC)
created pursuant to Presidential Decree (PD) No. 198 or the Provincial Water Utilities Act of 1973,
as amended by Republic Act (RA) No. 9286.
In 2009, the Board of Directors of MTWD issued Board Resolution Nos. 2009-00535 and
2009-0122,6 approving the payment of accrued Cost of Living Allowance (COLA) to qualified MTWD
employees for calendar years (CYs) 1992 to 1997 in the aggregate amount of P1,689,750.00.7
However, after post-audit, Supervising Auditor Floricen T. Unida and Audit Team Leader Basilisa T.
Garcia issued Notice of Disallowance No. 10-003-101-(09),8 disallowing the payment of
P1,689,750.00 for lack of legal basis specifically since the COLA was already deemed integrated into
the basic salary of the employees pursuant to Section 129 of RA No. 6758, otherwise known as the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989, and the Department of Budget and
Management (DBM) Corporate Compensation Circular (CCC) No. 10.10 Held liable under the Notice
of Disallowance were petitioner; Ms. Visitacion M. Rimando (Rimando), Division Manager-
Administrative; Ms. Marcela Siddayao (Siddayao), Cashier; and the employees of MTWD, as
payees.11
Petitioner appealed the disallowance to the COA Regional Director,12 citing the ruling of the
Court in Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) Employees Hired After July 1, 1989 v. Commission on
Audit,13 where the rights of the PPA employees to claim COLA and amelioration allowance until
March 16, 1999 were upheld.
ISSUE: Whether or not the officers and employees of PWD may receive COLA and other fringe
benefits for the period of 1992 to 1999.
RULING:
NO. As early as Philippine International Trading Corporation v. [COA], the Court held that
the nullification of DBM-CCC No. 10 in De Jesus does not affect the validity of R.A. No. 6758, to wit:
There is no merit in the claim of PITC that R.A. No. 6758, particularly Section 12 thereof is
void because DBM-Corporate Compensation Circular No. 10, its implementing rules, was
nullified in the case of De Jesus v. [COA], for lack of publication. The basis of COA in
disallowing the grant of SFI was Section 12 of R.A. No. 6758 and not DBM-CCC No. 10.
Moreover, the nullity of DBM-CCC No. 10, will not affect the validity of R.A. No. 6758. It is a
cardinal rule in statutory construction that statutory provisions control the rules and
regulations which may be issued pursuant thereto. Such rules and regulations must be
consistent with and must not defeat the purpose of the statute. The validity of R.A. No. 6758
should not be made to depend on the validity of its implementing rules.
In NAPOCOR Employees Consolidated Union v. National Power-Corporation, the Court
reiterated that while DBM-CCC No. 10 was nullified in De Jesus, there is nothing in that decision
suggesting or intimating the suspension of the effectivity of R.A. No. 6758 pending the publication
of DBM-CCC No. 10 in the Official Gazette.

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 In MIA, the Court emphasized that R.A. No. 6758 deems all allowances and benefits received
by government officials and employees as incorporated in the standardized salary, unless excluded
by law or an issuance by the DBM. The integration of the benefits and allowances is by legal fiction.
It was also discussed therein that "[o]ther than those specifically enumerated in [Sec] 12,
non-integrated allowances, incentives, or benefits, may still be identified and granted to government
employees. This is categorically allowed in [R.A.] No. 6758. This is also in line with the President's
power of control over executive departments, bureaus, and offices. These allowances, however,
cannot be granted indiscriminately. Otherwise, the purpose and mandate of [R.A.] No. 6758 will be
defeated."
More recently, in Zamboanga City Water District v. [COA] (ZCWD), it was declared by the
Court that, in accordance with the MIA ruling, the COLA and Amelioration Allowance (AA) are
already deemed integrated in the standardized salary, particularly, in local water districts.
Verily, the Court has consistently held that Sec. 12 of R.A. No. 6758 is valid and self-
executory even without the implementing rules of DBM-CCC No. 10. The said provision clearly
states that all allowances and benefits received by government officials and employees are deemed
integrated in their salaries. As applied in this case, the COLA, medical, food gift, and rice
allowances are deemed integrated in the salaries of the PWD officers and employees. Petitioners
could not cite any specific implementing rule, stating that these are non-integrated allowances.
Thus, the general rule of integration shall apply.41 (Citations omitted.)
Petitioner's reliance on the pronouncement of the Court in Philippine Ports Authority (PPA)
Employees Hired After July 1, 1989 v. Commission on Audit, reiterated in Metropolitan Waterworks
and Sewerage System v. Bautista, that employees of GOCC, whether incumbent or not, are entitled
to COLA from 1989 to 1999, is misplaced.
The Court in Maritime Industry Authority (MIA) v. Commission on Audit42 already clarified
that the ruling in Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) Employees Hired After July 1, 1989 v.
Commission on Audit only distinguished the benefits that may be received by government
employees hired before and after the effectivity of RA 6758. In fact, in Republic v. Judge Cortez, the
Court made it clear that Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) Employees Hired After July 1, 1989 v.
Commission on Audit "only applies if the compensation package of those hired before the effectivity
of Republic Act No. 6758 actually decreased; or in case of those hired after, if they received a lesser
compensation package as a result of the deduction of COLA." Such is not the situation in the
instant case.
In view of the foregoing, the Court finds no grave abuse of discretion on the part of
respondent COA-CP in disallowing the payment of accrued COLA for CYs 1992 to 1997.

LLACUNA, MELROSE (Civil Law)

RIVO VS. RIVO

G.R. No. 210780, January 25, 2023
Hernando, J.
FACTS:
Edward N. Rivo (petitioner) and Dolores S. Rivo (respondent) were officemates when they
started dating in 1978 and got married on January 19, 1979 in a civil ceremony. On March 14,
1979, they celebrated their church wedding. Prior to their marriage, respondent begot a child with

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her former lover. Petitioner accepted respondent's son and treated him as his own son. On the other
hand, petitioner and respondent have three children.
On April 26, 2005, petitioner filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against
respondent. Petitioner alleged that respondent was psychologically incapable of assuming the
essential obligations of marriage, and the incapacity existed at the time of the celebration of the
marriage although he discovered it only after their marriage. During their marriage, petitioner
observed that respondent gave priority to her work and devoted little time with petitioner and their
children. Even on Sundays, respondent would tend to her family's grocery store rather than spend
time with her family. Respondent was always too tired and unconcerned about her physical
appearance. Most of the time, she went to bed without cleaning herself thus, petitioner did not have
the urge to be intimate with her.
In addition, petitioner noticed that respondent was unfair to her children. She showed more
care and love towards Eduardo and Eugene while she often mistreated Jorel. This prompted
petitioner to take custody of Jorel after they separated. However, petitioner admitted that he was
partly responsible for the failure of their marriage. He revealed that he had two extra-marital affairs
and even sired two children with her second mistress, Perla. In 1989, petitioner abandoned his
family and did not disclose his whereabouts for two years. On January 20, 2005, petitioner sought
professional help from a clinical psychologist, Dr. Natividad Dayan (Dr. Dayan). After the interview
conducted by Dr. Dayan upon petitioner, the physician concluded that petitioner is suffering from a
Narcissistic Personality Disorder.
On the other hand, Dr. Dayan opined that respondent is encumbered with a Compulsive
Personality Disorder based on the collated information provided by petitioner. Moreover, their
marriage was marked with a Partner Relational Problem. Dr. Dayan emarked that the parties would
continue to experience misery and psychological distress if they remain married to each other.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appellate court committed reversible error when it reversed the trial
court's decision granting the petition for declaration of nullity of petitioner's marriage with
respondent.
RULING:
NO. In the recent case of Tan-Anda! v. Anda! (Tan-Andal), 25 the Court en bane introduced a
nuanced interpretation of what constitutes psychological incapacity in order to address the rigid
application of the Molina guidelines. The Court came up with a new set of parameters, which either
retained, abandoned, or amended for the purpose the Molina guidelines, that will aid in the
interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code.
In light of the Court's definitive declaration that psychological incapacity need not be proven
by expert opinion, We cannot sustain petitioner's excessive reliance on the expert opinions of
Doctors Dayan and De Guzman, as conclusive proof that he is truly incognitive of the essential
covenants of marriage, in the absence of clear and convincing evidence of its existence.
Tan-Anda! emphasized that the psychological incapacity must be shown to have been
existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage, and is caused by a durable aspect of one's
personality structure, one that was formed before the parties married.
Here, based on the narrative of events offered by respondent and Marlene, it is undeniable
that petitioner was a faithful and loving husband to respondent and a responsible parent to his
children before he met his present partner, Perla. Their marriage was blissful, and their family life
was peaceful and harmonious until petitioner started philandering.
However, it is noteworthy that after petitioner's first extra-marital affair, he exerted efforts to
reconcile with respondent and reunite with his family. It was only in the second instance of

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infidelity where petitioner got too involved with Perla that eventually led him to abandon their
conjugal dwelling. Thus, by petitioner's own statements and admissions in his petition and in his
testimony in court, he has displayed full knowledge and understanding of his obligations and has,
in fact, committed positive acts towards building and sustaining a family. This exhibits his genuine
awareness of his marital obligations, which clearly negated his claim of juridically antecedent
psychological incapacity.
We likewise agree with the CA that petitioner failed to establish respondent's alleged
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature.

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LLACUNA, MELROSE (Labor Law)

VILLOLA VS. UNITED PHILIPPINE LINES

G.R. No. 230047, October 09, 2019
Hernando, J.
FACTS:
The case stemmed from a complaint for illegal dismissal, underpayment of salaries, non-
payment of Service Incentive Leave (SIL) pay and separation pay, and claims for moral and
exemplary damages and attorney's fees filed by Villola against respondents United Philippine Lines
Inc. (UPL), and its President, Mr. Fernandino T. Lising (Lising).
On April 1, 2010, Villola was employed by UPL as its Information Technology (IT) and
Communications Manager. Prior to his engagement with UPL, Villola worked as Technical Support
and System Engineer/Operations Manager of 24/7 International Corporation and Quarkdata, Inc.,
respectively. 24/7 International Corporation and Quarkdata, Inc. are affiliate companies of UPL, all
of which belong to the Lising Group of Companies.
For his part, Villola alleged that on March 31, 2010, he met with Lising to discuss proposed
adjustments to his salary as IT and Communications Manager. Villola asserted that Lising agreed to
pay him a monthly salary of PhP 40,000.00 starting April 1, 2010. Both parties later agreed that
Villola will be paid a monthly salary of PhP 20,000.00, and an additional PhP 15,000.00 per month,
the cumulative amount thereof to be released only at the end of the calendar year. Villola's
additional salary of PhP 15,000.00 per month, however, remained unpaid until his separation from
employment with UPL.
On May 15, 2013, Villola discussed with the officers of UPL the creation of a new software
system. The parties agreed that as soon as the software system is implemented, Villola will organize
a business unit which will execute the encoding, scanning and indexing of all UPL documents.
However, on May 31, 2013, Villola received an e-mail message from Mr. Joey G. Consunji
(Consunji), General Manager of UPL, supposedly requiring Villola to submit to management a
written resignation letter7 indicating therein the effectivity date of his resignation, i.e., June 1,
2013. Villola, on his part, did not comply with said directive and continued reporting for work until
July 2013. Meanwhile, Villola sent e-mails to Lising demanding for payment of his unpaid salaries,
allowances, and professional fees. Villola's demands, however, remained unheeded.8
Thereafter, on October 11, 2014, UPL released a Memorandum9 informing UPL employees of
the fact of Villola's termination of employment from UPL effective June 1, 2013. Concomitantly, the
same memorandum directed security personnel to deny Villola entry from the company premises.
Respondents, on the other hand, claimed that on April 1, 2010, Villola was hired by UPL as
IT Officer. Almost a year after his hiring, Villola was assigned as IT and Communications Manager.
His duties and responsibilities included, among others, help desk administration, systems
administration and implementation of the CORE program (CORE), a repository of all information
gathered from applicants, crew and former crew of UPL. UPL initially outsourced the
implementation of the CORE to HelpDesk, an IT consultant. The administration and
implementation of the CORE was later transferred to Villola.
During the first quarter of 2013, UPL observed that Villola was unable to implement the CORE
despite budget allotment therefor for two years. In this respect, UPL had to engage the services of
HelpDesk. UPL found that HelpDesk was otherwise able to: (a) implement the CORE; and (b)
perform other IT-related services for UPL – key functions of Villola as IT and Communications

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Manager. These IT-related services of UPL were thus being performed by both HelpDesk and Villola
himself.
Meanwhile, aside from rendering work for UPL, Villola was also engaged as trainer for a UPL affiliate
for the latter's Anti-Piracy Awareness Program. UPL tolerated Villola's engagement as trainer,
although training classes detracted him from his core duties and responsibilities as IT and
Communications Manager of UPL.
Considering the foregoing premises, Consunji, in a meeting with Villola sometime in May 2013,
informed the latter that management may have to declare his position as redundant to which Villola
agreed. This notwithstanding, Consunji inquired from Villola if he is otherwise interested to work as
a consultant for a scanning project covering UPL documents, which will involve crewing and finance
documentation to be utilized by another company, SVI. Considering that Villola relayed his interest
to take on the consultancy work for the said scanning project, Consunji requested Villola to submit
to UPL his quotation for the scanning services for crewing and finance documentation.
Notably, Consunji and Villola also agreed that instead of terminating Villola's employment
with UPL on the ground of redundancy, he will simply voluntarily cease his employment with the
company. Villola was then instructed by Consunji to formalize his resignation from UPL by
furnishing management his written resignation letter, which, however, Villola failed to produce
despite follow-ups from UPL officers. Significantly, Villola stopped reporting for work starting June
2013. Villola, however, continued to render part-time work during the period from June to July
2013 as trainer in the Anti-Piracy Awareness Program of a UPL affiliate, which were conducted at
the company premises of UPL. On June 27, 2013, Villola, under the name of "DRD Technology
Solutions," submitted to Consunji his proposal for the scanning project. The scanning project,
however, did not materialize.
Thereafter, on September 30, 2014, Villola filed against herein respondents a complaint15 for
illegal dismissal and payment of other money claims as well as claims for moral and exemplary
damages and attorney's fees.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court of appeals gravely erred in reversing the finding of the national
labor relations sixth division and finding that the petitioner was not illegally dismissed.
RULING:
Villola contends that if he indeed resigned from service, it was respondents themselves who
forced him to resign as evidenced by Consunji's e-mail dated May 31, 2013, which, as discussed,
necessitated Villola to present a resignation letter to UPL management.
We agree, however, with the Court of Appeals and respondents that Consunji's e-mail should
be treated as a mere follow-up on management's request for Villola's resignation letter and proposal
for the scanning project as earlier agreed upon by them. On this point, the fact that UPL continued
to deal with Villola – by requesting from him his quotation and proposal for the scanning project,
supports the finding that management remained cordial with Villola, which thus belies the
contention that respondents utilized such force to elicit a resignation, much less to effect a
termination. Villola was even allowed to enter the company premises of UPL at certain instances
where he would render part-¬time work as trainer for an affiliate company of UPL. This belies any
indication that undue force was exerted by respondents upon Villola.
Villola, on the other hand, failed to show any evidence that he was coerced or forced by
respondents to resign from UPL. It is a well-settled rule that bare allegations of threat or force do
not constitute substantial evidence to support a finding of forced resignation.45 Thus, absent any
extant and clear proof of the alleged force Villola allegedly received from respondents that led him to
sever his employment relations with UPL, it can be concluded that Villola resigned voluntarily.

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 It bears emphasis at this point that Villola was no ordinary employee with limited
understanding, as in fact, he was holding a managerial position such that he would not be easily
maneuvered or coerced to resign against his will. The case of Vicente v. Court of Appeals46 is
instructive:
Moreover, we note that petitioner is holding a managerial position with a salary of
P27,000.00 a month.ℒαwρhi ৷ Hence, she is not an ordinary employee with limited understanding
such that she would be easily maneuvered or coerced to resign against her will. Thus, we find no
compelling reason to disturb the findings and conclusions of the Court of Appeals that petitioner
voluntarily resigned and was not constructively dismissed by respondent.
As shown above, the pieces of evidence of this case show that Villola was not dismissed by
UPL. Villola's own actions manifested that he freely and voluntarily chose to resign from UPL and
work for the latter as an independent consultant. Moreover, Villola failed to show evidence that he
was coerced or forced by UPL to resign in any way, or that he was dismissed at all.

LLACUNA, MELROSE (Criminal Law)

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ADDIN

G.R. No. 223682, October 9, 2019
Hernando, J.
FACTS:
Accused-appellant Onni Addin y Maddan (Addin) is appealing his conviction for the sale of
dangerous drugs, arguing that since the chain of custody has been broken, his conviction should be
overturned. The forensic chemist in-charge, PSI May Andrea Bonifacio (PSI Bonifacio), after receipt
of the request and the seized sachet, conducted an examination and found that the specimen tested
positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.9 She then sealed the specimen in
a plastic, marked it with her initials, then turned it over to Sherlyn Almeda Santos, the evidence
custodian, for safekeeping.
In his Counter-Affidavit, Addin denied the allegations against him. He claimed that he was in
front of a sari-sari store to buy some things when suddenly he saw several men being pursued by
police officers in civilian clothes. Thereafter, the police returned after failing to arrest the man they
were pursuing. To his utter surprise, the police arrested him and showed him the illegal drugs.
Addin denied any involvement in illegal drug activities, insisting instead that he was engaged in the
business of selling vegetables and of operating a videoke outlet. Lanilyn Jomdani15 and Rahma
Ibrahim16corroborated Addin's version in their respective Affidavits dated March 30, 2010.
Argie Alsree Amahit (Amahit) also testified that Addin was with him at the sari-sari store and
that the police officers arrested the latter when they were not able to arrest their target.17
Additionally, he asserted that the police officers did not say anything while they were arresting
Addin. Corroborating Amahit's narrative, Addin denied ever being involved in illegal drugs.19 He
averred that after he was arrested, he was brought to a basketball court then made to board a
vehicle bound for Camp Karingal and while thereat, he was made to sit on a chair where nobody
was allowed to approach or talk to him. He was then directly brought to jail.20 He insisted that
there was no buy-bust operation at the time.
On cross-examination, Addin reiterated that the police officers did not inform him why he
was arrested. He admitted that there was an investigation a day after his detention but the reason

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for his arrest was not disclosed to him.23 He likewise confirmed that his photographs and the
confiscated items were taken during the said investigation.
ISSUE: Whether or not the conviction of Addin was proper.

RULING:
YES. Section 5, Article II of RA 9165 provides that to successfully prosecute the offense of
sale of illegal drugs, the following elements must be satisfied: (1) the identity of the buyer and the
seller, the object of the sale, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the
payment therefor." In a buy-bust operation, the receipt by the poseur-buyer of the dangerous drug
and the corresponding receipt by the seller of the marked money consummate the illegal sale of
dangerous drugs. In the instant case, the elements for the illegal sale of dangerous drugs are
present. The testimonies of the police officers, coupled with the documentary and object evidence,
demonstrated that Addin was caught selling shabu to PO2 Diomampo who acted as the poseur-
buyer. Addin's receipt of the marked PhP 500.00 bill consummated the sale of the illegal drug.
Hence, based on the evidence, the sale was consummated and the confiscated item, the corpus
delicti, was presented in court to prove the same.
Moreover, this Court finds that Addin failed show proof that the police officers was compared
the buy-bust team were impelled by ill motives to implicate Addin or were performing their official
duties. Ergo, on this aspect, the testimonies of the police officers deserve credit. However, We note
that the police officers failed to observe the procedure in relation to the seizure and custody of
dangerous drugs or the chain of custody; which is found in Section 21(1), Article II of RA 9165,
prior to its amendment by RA 10640,54 since the transaction in this case transpired on March 16,
2010.

LLACUNA, MELROSE (Remedial Law)

CIR VS. STANDARD INSURANCE CO

G.R. No. 219340, April 18, 2021
Hernando, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner CIR is the head of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), a government agency
tasked with the power and duty of assessing and collecting all national internal revenue taxes, fees,
and charges among others. Respondent Standard Insurance is a domestic corporation duly
organized and existing under Philippine laws and engaged in the business of non-life insurance.
On February 13, 2014, respondent received from the BIR a Preliminary Assessment Notice
(PAN) regarding its liability amounting to P377,038,679.55 arising from a deficiency in the payment
of documentary stamp taxes (DST) for taxable year 2011. Standard Insurance contested the PAN
but the CIR nonetheless sent it a formal letter of demand. Although respondent requested
reconsideration, it received on December 4, 2014 the Final Decision on Disputed Assessment
(FDDA) dated November 25, 2014, declaring its liability for the DST deficiency, including interest
and compromise penalty, totaling P418,830,567.46.

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 On December 11, 2014, it sought reconsideration of the FDDA, and objected to the tax
imposed pursuant to Section 184 of the NIRC as violative of the constitutional limitations on
taxation. Meanwhile, respondent also received a demand for the payment of its deficiency income
tax, value-added tax (VAT), premium tax, DST, expanded withholding tax, and fringe benefit tax for
taxable year 2012 which respondent protested in its letter dated December 10, 2014 on the ground
that the VAT rate and DST rate imposed on premiums charged on non-life property insurance
pursuant to Sections 108 and 184 of the NIRC are violative of the constitutional limitations on
taxation. Respondent also received a demand for payment of deficiency DST for taxable year 2013.
On December 19, 2014, Standard Insurance commenced Civil Case No. 14-1330 in the RTC
with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and a writ of preliminary injunction
(WPI) for the judicial determination of the constitutionality of Sections 108 and 184 of the NIRC with
respect to the taxes charged against the non-life insurance companies.
In its Petition, the respondent contended that the facts of the case must be appreciated in
light of the effectivity of Republic Act No. 10001 (RA 10001) entitled An Act Reducing the Taxes on
Life Insurance Policies, whereby the tax rate for life insurance premiums was reduced from 5% to
2%; and the pendency of deliberations on House Bill 3235, whereby an equal treatment for both life
and non-life companies was being sought as a response to the supposed inequality generated by the
enactment of RA 10001.
ISSUE: Whether the RTC had the jurisdiction to take cognizance of respondent's petition for
declaratory relief and issue injunctive relief against the implementation of Sections 108 and 184 of
the NIRC.
RULING:
NO. The RTC acted without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the Petition for Declaratory
Relief and issuing an injunction against the collection of taxes. To begin with, Commonwealth Act
No. 55 (CA 55) provides that petitions for declaratory relief do not apply to cases where a taxpayer
questions his liability for the payment of any tax under any law administered by the BIR.
The Court has previously clarified that CA 55 has not been repealed by another statute and
remains to be good law. Thus, the courts have no jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory relief
against the imposition of tax liability or validity of tax assessments. More importantly, a principle
deeply embedded in our jurisprudence is that taxes being the lifeblood of the government should be
collected promptly, without unnecessary hindrance or delay. In line with this principle, Section 218
of the NIRC40 expressly provides that no court shall have the authority to grant an injunction to
restrain the collection of any national internal revenue tax, fee or charge imposed by the code. An
exception to this rule, provided under Section 11 of RA 112541, obtains only when in the opinion of
the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) the collection thereof may jeopardize the interest of the government
and/or the taxpayer.
In the instant case, it is undisputed that respondent only proceeded with its petition after
receiving tax assessments from the BIR and after various requests for reconsideration, where it
notably already raised the alleged unconstitutionality of Sections 108 and 184 of the NIRC as a
ground to contest the tax assessment against respondent. However, instead of appealing the
assessments in the proper forum, respondent filed with the RTC the Petition for Declaratory Relief
with a prayer for issuance of a TRO and WPI to enjoin the implementation of the aforementioned
provisions while the said petition is pending.
In reality, respondent's Petition for Declaratory Relief is utilized as a vehicle to assail and
prevent the enforcement of the tax assessments by alleging the supposed unconstitutionality of
Sections 108 and 184 of the NIRC. On this basis, the RTC should have dismissed respondent's
petition for lack of jurisdiction.
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 Thus, we reiterate our statement in the assailed Decision that the RTC acted without
jurisdiction in not only taking cognizance of respondent's petition, but in issuing an injunction
enjoining the BIR from proceeding with the implementation or enforcement of Sections 108 and 184
of the NIRC against respondent.

LLACUNA, MELROSE (Legal Ethics)

VALMONTE VS. QUESADA

A.C. No. 12487, December 4, 2019
Hernando, J.
FACTS:
Complainant alleged that she the wife of Marcelo A. Valmonte, Jr.; that her husband
was charged with murder of her brother, Manalo Estalilla (Manolo); that the murder case,
docketed as Crim. Case No. 4573-BG, entitled People of the Philippines v. Marcelo A.
Valmonte, Jr., was raffled to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bauang, La Union, Branch
33; that in March 2014, respondent entered his appearance in the said case as private
prosecutor on behalf of the common-law wife of Manalo; that respondent filed several
pleadings in the said case; and that complainant later learned that respondent entered his
appearance and filed pleadings in court while he was serving his suspension from the
practice of law. Despite due notice, respondent failed to file a comment and to appear
during the mandatory conference before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).
After considering the evidence presented by complainant, the Investigating
Commissioner of the IBP submitted his Report and Recommendation4 dated June 30, 2017
recommending that respondent be meted the penalty of suspension for another year from
the practice of law for his unauthorized practice of law. Finding the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner fully supported by the evidence on
record and the applicable laws and jurisprudence, the Board of Governors of the IBP, on
June 28, 2018, resolved to adopt the same.
ISSUE: Whether or not the IBP erred in suspending respondent from the practice of law for
one year.
RULING:
The Court affirms the findings of the IBP, but with modifications as to its
recommendations.
On December 2, 2013, the Court promulgated a Resolution in the case of Dagala
suspending respondent from the practice of law for a period of one year effective from the
date of his receipt of the said Resolution for failing to exercise the required diligence in
handling the labor case of his client.6 In the absence of any contrary evidence, a letter duly
directed and mailed is presumed to have been received in the regular course of mail.7 Here,
respondent is presumed to have duly received the said Resolution.
In March 2014, or three months after the promulgation of the Resolution suspending
him from the practice of law, respondent filed pleadings before the RTC of Bauang, La
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Union. Respondent's acts of signing and filing of pleadings for his client in Crim. Case No.
4573-BG months after the promulgation of the Resolution are clear proofs that he practiced
law during the period of his suspension. And as aptly found by the IBP, respondent's
unauthorized practice of law is considered a willful disobedience to lawful order of the
court, which under Section 27,11 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is a ground for
disbarment or suspension.
As to the penalty imposed, a review of recent jurisprudence reveals that the Court
has consistently impose an additional suspension of six months on lawyers who continue
to practice law despite their suspension. Respondent's acts of signing and filing of
pleadings for his client in Crim. Case No. 4573-BG months after the promulgation of the
Resolution are clear proofs that he practiced law during the period of his suspension. And
as aptly found by the IBP, respondent's unauthorized practice of law is considered a willful
disobedience to lawful order of the court, which under Section 27,11 Rule 138 of the Rules
of Court is a ground for disbarment or suspension.
As to the penalty imposed, a review of recent jurisprudence reveals that the Court
has consistently impose an additional suspension of six months on lawyers who continue
to practice law despite their suspension.
However, considering that the Court had already imposed upon respondent the
ultimate penalty of disbarment for his gross misconduct and willful disobedience of the
lawful orders of the court in an earlier complaint for disbarment filed against him in
Zarcilla v. Quesada, Jr., the penalty of additional six months suspension from the practice
of law can no longer be imposed upon him. The reason is obvious: "[o]nce a lawyer is
disbarred, there is no penalty that could be imposed regarding his privilege to practice law."
But while the Court can no longer impose the penalty upon the disbarred lawyer, it
can still give the corresponding penalty only for the sole purpose of recording it in his
personal file with the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC), which should be taken into
consideration in the event that the disbarred lawyer subsequently files a petition to lift his
disbarment.
In addition, the Court may also impose a fine16 upon a disbarred lawyer found to
have committed an offense prior to his/her disbarment as the Court does not lose its
exclusive jurisdiction over other offenses committed by a disbarred lawyer while he/she
was still a member of the Law Profession. In fact, by imposing a fine, the Court is able "to
assert its authority and competence to discipline all acts and actuations committed by the
members of the Legal Profession.

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LLAMAS, JOCELYN (Political Law)

MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY VS. CITY OF MUNTINLUPA AND

NELIA A. BARLIS
G.R No. 198529, February 09, 2021
Hernando, J.
PRINCIPLE:
For an ordinance to be valid though, it must not only be within the corporate powers of
the LGU to enact and must be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, it should
also conform to the following requirements: (1) not contrary to the Constitution or any statute;
(2) not unfair or oppressive; (3) not partial or discriminatory; (4) not prohibit but may regulate
trade; (5) general and consistent with public policy; and (6) not unreasonable.
FACTS:
Meralco is a public utility corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine
laws. Pursuant to RA 9209, the statute granting its franchise, Meralco is enfranchised to
construct, operate and maintain a distribution system for the conveyance of electricity in
the cities and municipalities in the National Capital Region, among others.
On the flip side, the City of Muntinlupa is a local government unit that has been
converted from a municipality into a highly urbanized city by virtue of RA 7926.
Respondent Nelia A. Barlis (Barlis) was the City Treasurer of Muntinlupa at the time
Meralco was assessed to pay a franchise tax.
On January 1, 1994, MO 93-35 or the Revenue Code of the Municipality of
Muntinlupa took effect. Section 257 thereof imposed a franchise tax on private persons or
corporations operating public utilities within its territorial jurisdiction at the rate of 50% of
1% of the gross annual receipts of the preceding calendar year.
Subsequently, RA 7926 was enacted and approved on March 1, 1995 which
converted the Municipality of Muntinlupa into a highly urbanized city, now the City of
Muntinlupa. Section 56 of the transitory and final provisions of RA 7926 adopted all
existing municipal ordinances of the Municipality of Muntinlupa as of March 1, 1995, and
shall all continue to take effect within Muntinlupa as of March 1, 1995, and shall all
continue to take effect within the City of Muntinlupa unless its sangguniang panglungsod
enacts an ordinance providing otherwise.
On June 28, 1999, Barlis sent a letter to Meralco demanding payment of the
franchise tax it owed to Muntinlupa City from 1992 to 1999 pursuant to Section 25 of MO
93-35 and paragraph 7 of the Bureau of Local Government Finance Circular No. 20-98.
Barlis likewise requested for Meralco's certified statement of gross sales/receipts for the
years 1992 to 1999 that would support the computation of the franchise tax due.
On July 14, 1999, Meralco requested for the deferment of the submission of its
statement of gross sales/receipts, and for a copy of MO 93-35. It also mentioned that its
representatives had amicably discussed the matter with Barlis on July 13, 1999, and that

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the May 5, 1999 Decision of this Court in Manila Electric Company v. Province of Laguna is
still pending reconsideration.
Meralco likewise ignored the August 21, 2001 and the September 27, 2001 demand
letters for payment of the franchise tax for the years 1994 to 2000 on the premise that the
City of Muntinlupa, then a municipality, did not have the power and authority to impose
and collect a franchise tax. Pursuant to Section 142 in relation to Sections 134, 137 and
151 of RA 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991, the power and authority to impose
and collect a franchise tax lies with the provinces and cities.
Meralco thus instituted a Petition With Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction
before the RTC of Pasig City, Branch 67 to declare Section 25 of MO 93-35 as null and void
for being contrary to law, unjust and confiscatory, and to enjoin the City of Muntinlupa
from demanding the submission of its certified statement of gross sales/receipts for the
computation of the franchise tax.
City of Muntinlupa mainly argued that Section 137 of RA 7160 and Articles 227 and
237 of its Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) allow the imposition of a franchise tax
by a local government unit. The RTC declared the implementation of Section 25 of
Municipal Ordinance No. 93-35 otherwise known as the revenue code of the Municipality of
Muntinlupa null and void ab initio for being ultra vires and contrary to law; CA reversed
thus the instant petition.
ISSUE: Whether Section 25 of Municipal Ordinance No. 93-35 of the then Municipality of
Muntinlupa imposing a franchise tax which was declared void ab initio for being ultra vires
and contrary to the LGC was cured by Section 56 of RA 79226 converting the Municipality
of Muntinlupa into highly urbanized city.
RULING:
Section 25 of MO No. 93-35 is null and void for being ultra vires. For an ordinance to
be valid though, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the LGU to enact and
must be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, it should also conform to the
following requirements: (1) not contrary to the Constitution or any statute; (2) not unfair or
oppressive; (3) not partial or discriminatory; (4) not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5)
general and consistent with public policy; and (6) not unreasonable.31
Legaspi v. City of Cebu explains the two tests in determining the validity of an
ordinance, i.e., the Formal Test and the Substantive Test.33 The Formal Test requires the
determination of whether the ordinance was enacted within the corporate powers of the
LGU, and whether the same was passed pursuant to the procedure laid down by law.
Meanwhile, the Substantive Test primarily assesses the reasonableness and fairness of the
ordinance and significantly its compliance with the Constitution and existing statutes.
As correctly ruled by the RTC and the CA, MO 93-35, particularly Section 25 thereof,
has failed to meet the requirements of a valid ordinance. Applying the Formal Test, the
passage of the subject ordinance was beyond the corporate powers of the then Municipality
of Muntinlupa, hence, ultra vires.
Based on the Substantive Test, Section 25 of MO 93-35 deviated from the express
provision of RA 7160. While ordinances, just like other laws and statutes, enjoy the
presumption of validity, they may be struck down and set aside when their invalidity or
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unreasonableness is evident on the face or has been established in evidence.34 In this
case, Section 25 of MO 93-35 was evidently passed beyond the powers of a municipality in
clear contravention of RA 7160.

LLAMAS, JOCELYN (Commercial Law)

MARIA LEA JANE I. GESOLGON AND MARIE STEPHANIE N.

SANTOS VS. CYBERONE PH., INC., MACIEJ MIKRUT, AND
BENJAMIN JUSON
G.R. No. 210741, October 14, 2020
Hernando, J.
PRINCIPLE:
The doctrine of piercing the corporate veil applies only in three basic instances, namely: (a)
when the separate distinct corporate personality defeats public convenience, as when the corporate
fiction is used as a vehicle for the evasion of an existing obligation; (b) in fraud cases, or when the
corporate entity is used to justify a wrong, protect a fraud, or defend a crime; or (c) is used in alter ego
cases, i.e., where a corporation is essentially a farce, since it is a mere alter ego or business conduit
of a person, or where the corporation is so organized and controlled and its affairs conducted as to
make it merely an instrumentality, agency, conduit or adjunct of another corporation.
FACTS:
Petitioners Maria Lea Jane I. Gesolgon and Marie Stephanie N. Santos alleged that they were
hired on March 3, 2008 and April 5, 2008 respectively, by respondent Maciej Mikrut, the chief
executive officer of both respondents CyberOne AU and CyberOne PH, as part-time home-based
remote customer service representatives of CyberOne Pty. Ltd. (CyberOne AU), an Australian
company. Later, they became full-time and permanent employees of CyberOne AU and were
eventually promoted as supervisors.
Sometime in October 2009, Mikrut asked them to become dummy directors and/or
incorporators of CyberOne PH to which they agreed. Consequently, they were promoted as
managers with increased benefits. Their salary increases were made to appear as paid for by
CyberOne PH.On March 30, 2011, they were notified by CyberOne AU of their dismissal through
furlough notifications placing their employment on hold in view of the company’s cost-cutting
measure. Thus, they filed a complaint against respondents Cyberone PH Inc., Maciej Mikrut and
CyberOne AU for illegal dismissal and money claims.
The Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the ruling of the National Labor Relations Commission
which applied the doctrine of piercing the corporate veils of CyberOne AU and CyberOne Ph.
ISSUE: Whether CA erred in reversing the decision of NLRC
RULING:
No, CA did not err in reversing its decision and dismissing the case. While it is true that
CyberOne AU owns majority of the shares of CyberOne PH, this, nonetheless, does not warrant the
conclusion that CyberOne PH is a mere conduit of CyberOne AU. The doctrine of piercing the
corporate veil applies only in three basic instances, namely: (a) when the separate distinct corporate
personality defeats public convenience, as when the corporate fiction is used as a vehicle for the
evasion of an existing obligation; (b) in fraud cases, or when the corporate entity is used to justify a

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wrong, protect a fraud, or defend a crime; or (c) is used in alter ego cases, i.e., where a corporation
is essentially a farce, since it is a mere alter ego or business conduit of a person, or where the
corporation is so organized and controlled and its affairs conducted as to make it merely an
instrumentality, agency, conduit or adjunct of another corporation.

We find that the application of the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil is unwarranted in
the present case. First, no evidence was presented to prove that CyberOne PH was organized for the
purpose of defeating public convenience or evading an existing obligation. Second, petitioners failed
to allege any fraudulent acts committed by CyberOne PH in order to justify a wrong, protect a fraud,
or defend a crime. And lastly, the mere fact that CyberOne PH’s major stockholders are CyberOne
AU and respondent Mikrut does not prove that CyberOne PH was organized and controlled and its
affairs conducted in a manner that made it merely an instrumentality, agency, conduit or adjunct of
CyberOne AU. In order to disregard the separate corporate personality of a corporation, the
wrongdoing must be clearly and convincingly established.

LLAMAS, JOCELYN (Taxation Law)

BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE VS. SAMUEL B. CAGANG,

G.R No. 230104, March 16, 2022
Hernando, J.
PRINCIPLE:
Tax amnesty refers to the "absolute waiver by a sovereign of its right to collect taxes and power
to impose penalties on persons or entities guilty of violating a tax law. Tax amnesty aims to grant a
general reprieve to tax evaders who wish to come clean by giving them an opportunity to straighten
out their records." Simply put, it partakes of an absolute relinquishment by the government of its right
to collect what is due it and to give tax evaders who wish to relent a chance to start with a clean
slate.
FACTS:
Samuel B. Cagang is a treasurer while Romulo M. Paredes is the President of CEDCO Inc.
The said company was assessed by the BIR for deficiency taxes by the BIR: (a) income tax; (b)
Value-added tax (VAT); (c) expanded withholding tax; and (d) withholding tax on compensation for
taxable years 2000 and 2001. CEDCO, through Cagang, as Director for Administration and
Finance, went through the proper appeal process with the BIR. However, BIR still issued a Final
Decision on Disputed Assessment (FDDA) dated September 28, 2007, which denied CEDCO’s
protest.
On November 28, 2007, CEDCO availed of the tax amnesty under Republic Act No. 9480. The
amnesty granted by the law covered “all national internal revenue taxes for the taxable year 2005
and prior years, with or without assessments duly issued therefor, and that have remained unpaid
as of December 31, 2005 xxx.” CEDCO properly filed its tax amnesty payment from and paid the
amnesty tax.
In a collection letter, the BIR directed CEDCO to pay its tax liabilities based on the FDDA.
Due to CEDCO’s failure to settle its tax obligations, a complaint-affidavit dated August 14, 2009
was filed against Cagang and Paredes for violation of Sec. 255 of the NIRC. In the said complaint-
affidavit, Cagang and Paredes, in their official capacities as CEDCO’s treasurer and president

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respectively, were charged with the alleged willful failure to pay CEDCO’s deficiency taxes for
taxable years 2000 and 2001.
ISSUE: Whether CEDCO is entitled to avail of the tax amnesty under RA 9480.
HELD:
Yes, CEDCO is entitled to tax amnesty on their income tax and VAT but not with respect to
its withholding tax liabilities.

In 2007, Congress enacted RA 9480, which granted a tax amnesty covering "all national
internal revenue taxes for the taxable year 2005 and prior years, with or without assessments duly
issued therefor, that have remained unpaid as of December 31, 2005." These national internal
revenue taxes include (a) income tax; (b) VAT; (c) estate tax; (d) excise tax; (e) donor's tax; (f)
documentary stamp tax; (g) capital gains tax; and (h) other percentage taxes.
Pursuant to Section 6 of RA 9480, those who availed themselves of the benefits of the law
became "immune from the payment of taxes, as well as additions thereto, and the appurtenant civil,
criminal or administrative penalties under the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997, as
amended, arising from the failure to pay any and all internal revenue taxes for taxable year 2005
and prior years."
Samuel B. Cagang is a treasurer while Romulo M. Paredes is the president of CEDCO Inc.
Said company was assessed by the BIR for deficiency taxes by the BIR (a) income tax; (b) Value-
Added Tax (VAT); (c) expanded withholding tax; and (d) withholding tax on compensation for taxable
years 2000 and 2001. CEDCO, through Cagang, as Director for Administration & Finance, went
through the proper appeal process with the BIR. However, BIR still issued a Final Decision on
However, RA 9480 is not without exceptions. Section 8 of the said law enumerates those
persons and cases that are not covered by the law, viz.:
Section 8. Exceptions. — The tax amnesty provided in Section 5 hereof shall not
extend to the following persons or cases existing as of the effectivity of RA 9480:
(a) Withholding agents with respect to their withholding tax liabilities;
(b) Those with pending cases falling under the jurisdiction of the Presidential
Commission on Good Government;
(c) Those with pending cases involving unexplained or unlawfully acquired wealth,
revenue or income under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act;
(d) Those with pending cases filed in court involving violation of the Anti-Money
Laundering Law;
(e) Those with pending criminal cases for tax evasion and other criminal offenses
under Chapter II of Title X of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997, as
amended, and the felonies of frauds, illegal exactions and transactions, and
malversation of public funds and property under Chapters III and IV of Title VII of the
Revised Penal Code; and
(f) Tax cases subject of final and executory judgment by the courts.
A tax amnesty, much like a tax exemption, is never favored or presumed in law. The grant of
a tax amnesty, similar to a tax exemption, must be construed strictly against the taxpayer and
liberally in favor of the taxing authority. Here, the Court finds that the tax amnesty under RA 9480
does not extend to CEDCO with respect to its existing withholding tax liabilities, as explicitly
provided in the said law.
However, with respect to the deficiency taxes pertaining to CEDCO's income tax and VAT for
taxable years for 2000 and 2001, the Court finds that CEDCO is entitled or qualified to avail of the

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tax amnesty considering that it had submitted the necessary documents and complied with the
requirements under RA 9480, which the BIR does not dispute.

LLAMAS, JOCELYN (Civil Law)

SPS. BELINDA LIU AND HSI PIN LIU VS. MARCELINA ESPINOSA,
ET. AL.
G.R No. 238513, July 31, 2019
Hernando, J.
PRINCIPLE:
Unlawful detainer is a summary action for the recovery of possession of real property. This
action may be filed by a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any
land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold
possession by virtue of any contract, express or implied.
FACTS:
Petitioner Belinda Y. Liu owns a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. 146-2010008891in Barangay Centro, Agdao, Davao City. Petitioner Hsi Pin Liu is her husband.
They acquired said land from their predecessor-in-interest who, in turn, merely tolerated the
occupation of the property by respondents Marcelina Espinosa, Mary Ann M. Estrada, Archie
Asumbrado, Inesita Asumbrado, Loreta Tutor, Elias Penas, Benita Abantao, Basiliza Martizano,
Arman Paras, Miguelito M. Antega, Joventino Cahulogan, and Tito Tubac. The latter are the present
occupants of the land.
After title was transferred to the petitioners, they likewise tolerated the presence of the respondents
upon the understanding that they will peacefully vacate the land once the petitioners' need to use
the same arises. When petitioners' demands to vacate the property were made, however, the latest
of which was on February 12, 2013, the respondents refused to comply.
On November 11, 2014,8 the MTCC rendered judgment in favor of petitioners. It declared
them as the rightful possessors of the property and directed the respondents to vacate the subject
land and to tum the same over to the petitioners. Further, respondents were ordered to pay the
petitioners PhP 20,000.00 as attorney's fees, as well as reasonable rental fee for the use of the
subject property in the amount of PhP 5,000.00 per month with 6% interest per annum, computed
from August 6, 2013, the date the ejectment suit was filed, until the respondents vacate the
property.
Respondents thus filed an Appeal with the RTC, Branch 17, Davao City, from the MTCC
Decision, where they asserted that: (1) the MTCC had no jurisdiction to entertain the action because
it failed to take into consideration that the defendants were in possession of the land in the concept
of an owner, and not by tolerance of the plaintiffs nor of their predecessors-in-interest; (2) they were
entitled to the possession and occupation of the land because they had been in possession of the
same in the concept of an owner for more than twenty years and they introduced valuable
improvements therein; (3) they have priority in rights to apply for title of their respective lots
because Original Certificate of Title No. 38 and its derivative titles were declared null and void by
the Court of Appeals; and ( 4) they were harassed and were thus entitled to the damages and reliefs
that they prayed for in their counter-claim. Moreover, respondent Joveniano Gorduiz, Sr. asserted
that the MTCC committed a gross and blatant error when it declared the petitioners as the rightful

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possessors of the property and that the defendants' possession and/or occupation was one of
unlawful detainer.
The Court of Appeals granted the respondents' petition in its October 23, 2017 Decision and
reversed the findings of the RTC. It held that petitioners were unable to sufficiently prove the
presence of tolerance of respondents' occupation from the start of their possession of the subject
property. Also, plaintiffs failed to adduce evidence that would have shown when the respondents
entered the property or who gave them the permission to do the same. Thus, the Court of Appeals
found that the petitioners' bare claim of tolerance could not sustain their action for unlawful
detainer.
ISSUE: Whether this unlawful detainer case is independent of any claim of ownership by any of the
parties involved
RULING:
The Court fully sustains both the MTCC and the RTC findings that the foregoing requisites
have been sufficiently established in the case at bar. This occupation became illegal when
respondents refused to heed petitioners' express and clear demands to vacate the subject property,
the last of which was dated February 12, 2013.

It is evidently clear that the complaint for unlawful detainer, filed on August 6, 2013, was
made within one year from the time the last formal demand to vacate was made. Further, it should
be pointed out that respondents would not have made an offer to purchase the subject land from
petitioners had they been truly in possession of the property in the concept of an owner. Their claim
is thus negated by the fact that the subject land is registered in the name of the petitioners.
It is settled that a Torrens title is evidence of an indefeasible title to property in favor of the
person in whose name the title appears. It is conclusive evidence with respect to the ownership of
the land described therein. Hence, petitioners as the titleholders are entitled to all the attributes of
ownership of the property including possession. Even then, the respondents' claim of possession of
the property in the concept of an owner is a collateral issue that may not be decided upon in a case
for unlawful detainer. To stress, the only issue to be resolved in an unlawful detainer case is
physical or material possession of the property involved, independent of any claim of ownership by
any of the parties involved. Thus, the Court finds that the appellate court gravely erred when it
reversed the findings of the RTC. Petitioners clearly possess superior rights over the possession of
the property as the registered owners thereof, and all the elements of unlawful detainer were
sufficiently proven in the case at bar.

LLAMAS, JOCELYN (Labor Law)

ARTURO BERNAL VS. ROBERTO CUIZON

G.R No. 184452, February 12, 2020
Hernando, J.
PRINCIPLE:
Loss of trust and confidence as a valid ground for dismissal is premised on the fact that the
employee holds a position whose functions may only be performed by someone who enjoys the trust
and confidence of the management. Such employee bears a greater burden of trustworthiness than

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ordinary workers, and the betrayal of the trust reposed is the essence of the loss of trust and
confidence that becomes the basis for the employee's dismissal.
FACTS:
Roberto Cuizon, employee of Luthansa Tecknik was terminated on August 16, 2005 for loss
of trust and confidence in his ability to perform his duties as MA2 Duty Manager. The company
claimed that the loss of trust and confidence was brought by Cuizon’s violations and blatant
disregard of the company standards in the workplace. Two of these violations were committed in the
course of two separate incidents, specifically, the willful concealment of the accidental light up of
PAL aircraft EL BZE and Cuizon’s failure to observe the safety guidelines and precautions with
respect to aircraft towing, which caused damages to PAL.
In Cuizon’s defense, he asserted that the company illegally dismissed him arguing that he
was being singled-out to events prior to the accidental light-up and towing incidents. He explained
that prior to the foregoing incidents, an anonymous letter was circulated, which was addressed to
LTP’s President and CEO, Andreas Heimer, and to some of the LTP’s officers. The letter was
allegedly criticizing Loquellano’s handling of the company in Cebu and his other alleged
culpabilities, which are inimical to LTP’s interest. In the same letter, Cuizon was being praised for
his work ethic and named as the better person to hold the position of MA2 Manager than
Loquellano. Loquellano suspected Cuizon as the sender of the anonymous letter. As a result, Cuizon
received a cold treatment from his direct superior, Loquellano.

On November 7, 205, Cuizon filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against the company. The
complaint was dismissed by the Labor Arbiter. On appeal, the NationalLabor Relations Commission
held that there was no illegal dismissal in respect to Cuizon. The Court of Appeals set aside the
decision of the NLRC and denied the Motion for Reconsideration by the company. Hence, the
petition.
ISSUE: Whether Cuizon was validly terminated on the ground of gross negligence
RULING:
No, Cuizon was not validly terminated on the ground of gross negligence. “Neglect of duty, as
a ground for dismissal, must be both gross and habitual. In Casco, We pronounced that:
Gross negligence implies a want or absence of or a failure to exercise slight care of
diligence, or the entire absence of care. It evinces a thoughtless disregard of
consequences without exerting any effort to avoid them. Habitual neglect implies
repeated failure to perform one’s duties for a period of time, depending upon the
circumstances.
In termination cases, the employer bears the burden of proving that the employee’s dismissal
was for a valid and authorized cause. Consequently, the failure of the employer to prove that the
dismissal was valid, would mean that the dismissal was unjustified, thus illegal.
We find that the petitioner failed to discharge the burden. First, petitioners miserably failed to show
that Cuizon did not exercise even a slight care of diligence which caused the grounding of and
damage to the aircraft during the towing operation. Moreover, petitioners failed to prove that it is
Cuizon’s act that directly or solely caused the grounding of and damage to the aircraft during the
towing incident.
Secondly, we find that petitioners failed to prove that Cuizon was negligent in his job when he
allegedly concealed the accidental light-up incident or allegedly provided false information thereon.

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On the contrary, we find that he performed his task in accordance with the rules and procedures of
LTP.
Considering Cuizon’s untainted 32 years of service, this Court finds that it is incongruous for him
to deliberately act recklessly on his job, especially his employer’s line of business involved the lives
and safety of airline passengers. Furthermore, the CA found, and this Court agrees, that
reinstatement is no longer feasible, and this separation pay in lieu of reinstatement is in order. All
monetary awards granted shall earn legal interest at the rate of 6% per annum from date of finality
of this decision until full satisfaction.

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LLAMAS, JOCELYN (Criminal Law)

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. FLORENTINO LABUGUEN Y

FRANCISCO ALIAS "TINONG," AND ROMEO ZUÑIGA Y PILARTA
G.R. No. 223103, February 24, 2020
Hernando, J.
PRINCIPLE:
Robbery with homicide exists when a homicide is committed either by reason, or on occasion,
of the robbery. To sustain a conviction for robbery with homicide, the prosecution must prove the
following elements: (1) the taking of personal property belonging to another(2) with intent to gain; (3)
with the use of violence or intimidation against a person; and (4) on the occasion or by reason of the
robbery, the crime of homicide, as used in the generic sense, was committed.
FACTS:
On 3 January 2002 at about 7:30 in the evening, while spouses Manuel Padre and Nenita
Padre and their two daughters, Rhoda and Rachel, were having dinner at their home at Villaruz,
Delfin Albano, Isabela, five (5) men suddenly barged in, one holding a firearm and one with a
bonnet with a hole showing the eyes only. Labuguen, entered first and pulled Rachel into the
comfort room (CR), together with her mother Nenita and sister Rhoda, who in turn were pulled by
Macalinao and by an unidentified man respectively. Manuel, on the other hand, was brought to the
store by an unidentified man. Nenita was then brought to the Padre's store while Rhoda and Rachel
were left in the comfort room. A few minutes later, Labuguen brought Rachel out of the comfort
room and she saw Zuniga, standing by the door of the store and Macalinao, standing guard at the
CR door and holding a gun. Upon reaching the dining area, Labuguen stabbed Rachel with a small
knife on the left breast and then Macalinao hit her on the forehead with the butt of a gun, causing
her to fall down. Then Labuguen strangled her and as she could not remove his hands off her neck,
she played dead. As soon as Labuguen stood up and left, together with the other perpetrators, she
immediately ran for help to their neighbor Patricio Respicio (Respicio), who, together with Alex
Rodriguez, brought her to the hospital. At the hospital, she learned from her relatives that her
parents and sister died on the night of 3 January 2002. Dr. Gambalan treated her serious injury on
the left chest and less serious wounds on the head and abrasions on the neck.
Meanwhile, after Manuel closed the store and returned to the house, Zuniga, upon the
instruction of Joel Albano (Albano), hit [Manuel hard] on the forehead, causing the latter to fall. Eric
Madday, one of the five men and who also used to work for Manuel Padre, boxed Nenita on the
abdomen and when Zuniga saw the chopping knife, he stabbed her at the back. On the other hand,
Rudy Macalinao shot Rhoda when she tried to run away. On the belief that all members of the
Padre family were dead. the group proceeded to Albano's house, where Zuniga learned that they got
the money from the Padre family. He saw Albano [give] a bundle of money to Rudy Macalinao. He
left Delfin Albano, [sic] in Isabela and went into hiding in Gerona, Tarlac on 7 January 2002.
Upon learning of the incident from Kagawad Alex Rodriguez, the police investigators went to
the hospital on 4 January 2002 and interviewed Rachel, who identified two of the perpetrators -
Labuguen, who happen[ed] to be Padre family's longtime neighbor and who used to work for them,
and Macalinao, also one of the victims' helpers. At that time, she purposely withheld the name of
Romeo Zuniga, one of Padre's longtime customers, as she wanted him to reveal his companions.
From the hospital, the police proceeded to the crime scene, where they found Manuel's body near

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the store, Nenita's body was recovered inside the store while that of Rhoda was located inside the
house. Rachel was released from the hospital on 12 January 2002.
Labuguen was apprehended by the police on 4 January 2002. The blood-stained jacket he
was wearing during the custodial investigation was submitted for serological examination at the
PNP Crime Laborarory at Camp Crame. The blood taken from Labuguen's jacket tested positive for
human blood group A. As to Zuniga, Rachel decided to reveal his identity as one of the five men who
robbed and killed her parents and sister Rhoda to Fiscal Dalpig and later to Fiscal Torio. RTC and
CA found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide.
ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in not considering in favor of appellant Zuniga the exempting
circumstance of "irresistible force and/or uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury.
RULING:
The contention fails to persuade. To avail of this exempting circumstance, the evidence must
establish: (1) the existence of an uncontrollable fear; (2) that the fear must be real and imminent;
and (3) the fear of an injury is greater than or at least equal to that committed. A threat of future
injury is insufficient. The compulsion must be of such a character as to leave no opportunity for the
accused to escape.
As correctly found by the RTC and the CA, Zuñiga is not entitled to avail of this exempting
circumstance. As noted by the CA, the malefactors had a well-hatched plan to commit the crime of
robbery with homicide and that Zuñiga was not only well-aware of every detail thereof but likewise
actively participated in its commission. As the CA found: "Verily, there was no genuine, imminent,
and reasonable threat to his life and his family as he was an active participant in the commission of
the crime charged. He acted on his own free will and was not under the impulse of an
uncontrollable fear as he claims.
Moreover, as correctly argued by the Office of the Solicitor General, Zuñiga had every
opportunity to escape while they were passing through the cornfields on their way to the Padre's
house. However, he did not avail of the said chance. He did not perform any overt act to dissociate
or detach himself from the conspiracy to commit the felony and prevent the commission thereof.

LLAMAS, JOCELYN (Remedial Law)

SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM VS. MANUEL F. SENO, JR., GEMMA

S. SENO, AND FERNANDO S. GORROSPE
G.R. No. 183478, February 10, 2020
Hernando, J.
PRINCIPLE:
It is a settled rule that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. This Court is not a trier of facts. Hence, it will not entertain
questions of facts as it is bound by the findings of fact made by the CA when supported by
substantial evidence. There are, however, exceptions to the rule wherein the Court may pass upon
and review the findings of fact by the CA.
FACTS:
Respondents are members of the Board of Directors of JMA Transport Services Corporation
(JMA Transport), a domestic corporation and a duly covered member of SSS with Identification No.
03-9077846-6.
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 Sometime in 2000, SSS filed an Affidavit-Complaint against respondents together with Ruth
De Leon (De Leon), Celso Librando (Librando), and Edgar Froyalde (Froyalde), in their capacities as
JMA Transport's Board of Directors before the Prosecutor's Office of Muntinlupa City for failure to
remit the social security (SS) contributions of their employees in violation of Section 22(a) in relation
to Sections 22(d) and 28€ and (f) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 1161, as amended by R.A. No. 8282,
otherwise known as the "Social Security Act of 1997."
In its complaint, SSS averred that after inspecting the account of JMA Transport, it discovered that
the company was delinquent in its payment of contributions for the period September 1997 to July
1999. As of August 31, 1999, the amount due was P838,488.13 inclusive of the 3% penalty per
month.
As a result thereof, a Letter of Introduction dated December 16, 1998 was served to JMA
Transport to monitor its compliance with the Social Security Act of 1997 and to inspect its SSS
records. This was followed by a Billing Letter dated August 25, 1999 and a Demand Letter18 dated
September 16, 1999 informing the company of its outstanding obligation and demanding to pay it
within 10 days from receipt of the demand. However, JMA Transport failed to settle its obligations
which prompted SSS to file the said Complaint before the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of
Muntinlupa City.
During the preliminary investigation, respondents proposed to pay in installment JMA
Transport's outstanding obligation. Manuel issued 24 postdated checks in the total amount of
P609,370.50 as payment of JMA Transport's obligation inclusive of the penalty charges. SSS, in
turn, accepted the postdated checks. Thus, the Complaint was provisionally withdrawn in view of
the settlement between the parties.
However, when two of the postdated checks were dishonored by the drawee-bank, SSS
notified JMA Transport to replace the said checks and to pay its obligation. However, the company
did not heed the demand
After the preliminary investigation, the OCP, through Assistant City Prosecutor (ACP) Elisa
Sarmiento-Flores, found probable cause against respondents, Librando and Froyalde, for the
complained violations. As a result thereof, the corresponding Information was filed against them
before the trial court and the case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 05-853 Meantime, aggrieved
with the OCP's findings, respondents promptly filed a Petition for Review before the Department of
Justice (DOJ).
In its January 31, 2006 Resolution, the DOJ reversed the findings of the investigating
prosecutor and ordered the withdrawal of the Information. In its May and September orders, RTC
remanded the case to DOJ for reinvestigation for the purpose of receiving respondents'
controverting evidence with respect to the Franchise Verifications. CA reversed the decision and
grants respondents' petition on the basis that the trial court gravely abused its discretion in issuing
the assailed May and September Orders.
ISSUE: Whether the CA committed a reversible error when it ruled that the RTC gravely abused its
discretion in the issuance of the assailed May and September Orders.
RULING:
The Court finds the petition partly meritorious. It is a settled rule that only questions of law
may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. This Court
is not a trier of facts. Hence, it will not entertain questions of facts as it is bound by the findings of
fact made by the CA when supported by substantial evidence.
There are, however, exceptions to the rule wherein the Court may pass upon and review the
findings of fact by the CA. These instances are enumerated in Medina v. Asistio, Jr., to wit:

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 (1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or
conjectures; (2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible; (3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) When the judgment is
based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) When the findings of fact are conflicting; (6)
When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case
and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) The
findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) When the
findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are
based; (9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main
and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and (10) The finding of fact of
the Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of evidence and is
contradicted by the evidence on record.
The instant case falls under the exceptions since the findings of the Court of Appeals are
contrary to those of the RTC, and is based on the supposed absence of evidence, i.e., the Franchise
Verifications, but is contracted by the evidence on record. True, the issues of whether the Franchise
Verifications were indeed attached to the Reply-Affidavit filed by SSS so as to prove that JMA
Transport was still in operation after 1999, and whether the RTC gravely abused its discretion in
directing the prosecution to conduct reinvestigation for the purpose of admitting respondents'
controverting evidence against the same are both factual in nature. The Court observes that the
findings of the CA were premised mainly on the Franchise Verifications which were allegedly not
found in the records. However, upon our review of the records, We find that the said Franchise
Verifications were actually appended to the Reply of SSS contrary to the observation of the appellate
court.43 Hence, it is only proper to give due course to the instant petition.

LLAMAS, JOCELYN (Legal Ethics)

RUBEN A. ANDAYA VS. ATTY. EMMANUEL ALADIN A. TUMANDA

A.C. No. 12209, February 18, 2020Hernando, J.
PRINCIPLE:
Lawyers, as guardians of the law, are mandated to obey and respect the laws of the land and
to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. They should at all times, whether in their
public or private life, "conduct themselves in a manner that reflects the values and norms of the legal
profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility." Thus they should not engage in
any unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct.
FACTS:
On July 16, 2008, respondent borrowed from complainant the amount of Five Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00).3 In exchange for the said amount and in order to convince
complainant to part with his money, respondent issued a post-dated check4 of the same amount
dated July 31, 2008. However, when complainant deposited the check with the bank, it was
dishonored for the reason that the account was closed. Thus, complainant, through counsel, sent a
demand letter5 to respondent. To appease complainant, respondent offered as payment his
Mercedes Benz, and accordingly, executed a Deed of Absolute Sale6 over the same in favor of
complainant. Respondent, however, failed to give complainant the original copy pf the Certificate of
Registration of the car on the pretext that he forgot to bring the same. Respondent likewise did not
turn over the physical possession of the car because he allegedly still needed it for his business
ventures. Complainant, however, later found out that respondent sold the same car to a certain
John Edwin G. Felizardo.7 Thus, complainant sent another demand letter to respondent,8 and
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thereafter, filed criminal complaints for Estafa and violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. (BP) 22 against
him.9
Despite due notice, respondent failed to file an answer and to attend the mandatory
conference before the IBP. In his August 26, 2015 Report and Recommendation,10 the Investigating
Commissioner of the IBP found respondent guilty of violating Canon 1 of the CPR for issuing a
worthless check. Thus, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year with a stem warning that a repetition
of the s me offense will be dealt with more severely.
RULING:
The Court adopts the findings and recommendation of the IBP.
Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the CPR state:
CANON 1— A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE
LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 — A Lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
CANON 7 — A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF
THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.
Rule 7.03 — A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law, nor shall he whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to
the discredit of the legal profession.
Lawyers, as guardians of the law, are mandated to obey and respect the laws of the land and
to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. They should at all times, whether in their
public or private life, "conduct themselves in a manner that reflects the values and norms of the
legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility."15 Thus they should not
engage in any unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct.
Issuance of a worthless check
In this case, respondent obtained a loan from complainant in the amount of P500,000.00
and in exchange thereof issued a worthless check to complainant. This fact alone is a ground for
disciplinary action as it constitutes gross misconduct. It indicates his unfitness for the trust and
confidence reposed upon him and his lack of personal honesty and good moral character rendering
him unworthy of public confidence
The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interests of the parties
directly involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the community at large. The
mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public. The
harmful practice of putting valueless commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a thousandfold,
can very well pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually
hurt the welfare of society and the public interest.
Respondent, as a lawyer, should know that issuing a worthless check is a violation of BP 22
for which he may be disciplined under Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court, which provides
that:
Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. — A
member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court
for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which
he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience of any lawful order of

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a superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without
authority so to do.
Aside from issuing a worthless check, respondent has acted in utmost bad faith when he sold
to another person the Mercedes Benz he previously sold to complainant as full payment for the loan
obligation. Such act is a clear violation of the CPR. It is a deceitful conduct that shows his lack of
honesty and good moral character.

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OASAN, FREDELYN (Political Law)

MERLINA R. DIAZ VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 213875, July 15, 2020
Hernando, J.
FACTS:
On April 27, 2012, on the basis of the application filed by and examination under oath of
applicant Police Officer 2 Pio P. Avila, RTC Judge Agripino Morga, Presiding Judge of San Pablo
City, Branch 32, issued Search Warrant No. 97.
In support of PO2 Avila's application, an informant, a certain Jericho S. Labrador, submitted
to Judge Morga two sketches of the house of petitioner in Gitna, Brgy. Cuyab, San Pedro, Laguna.
The first sketch of Labrador depicted a floor plan of a studio-type apartment with an anteroom
where the entrance gate of the property was located. The second sketch depicted three buildings
along Gitna, one of which was marked with a large "X" enclosed in a square that supposedly
identified petitioner's house.
Pursuant to the search warrant, members of the San Pedro Police Station searched the house
of petitioner. Approximately nine grams of shabu were then found in and seized from the premises.
Petitioner was immediately arrested and detained by the members of the searching team for her
alleged violation of Section 11 of Republic Act No. 9165 (R.A. No. 9165), or the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
Immediately after the search and petitioner's arrest, the following information was uncovered
from petitioner: (1) that the complete address of her residence is No. 972, Gitna, Brgy. Cuyab, San
Pedro, Laguna; and (2) that the house located at No. 972, Gitna, Brgy. Cuyab, San Pedro, Laguna
was divided into five separate units each occupied by petitioner and her four siblings, namely,
Nomer (Leomer) R. Diaz, Edwin R. Diaz, Flordeliza R. Diaz, and Leonora Diaz Nesola (Leonora), and
their respective families.
Thereafter, on May 2, 2012, Inquest Proceedings were conducted by Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor Clarence R. Gaite. On the same day, an Information for Violation of Section 11 of R.A.
No. 9165, docketed as Criminal Case No. 12-8358-SPL, was filed before the RTC of San Pablo City,
Laguna, Branch 93, against petitioner.
On May 22, 2012, petitioner filed before the RTC of San Pablo City, Laguna, Branch 32, a
Motion to Quash Search Warrant No. 97 on the ground that the same was in the nature of a general
warrant which failed to describe with particularity the place to be searched. Particularly, petitioner
averred in her motion that: (a) house number 972 did not appear in her home address as stated in
the search warrant; and (b) the search warrant failed to distinguish petitioner's unit, which was the
place intended to be searched, from the other units or rooms representing the four other
households inside the house located in Gitna, Brgy. Cuyab, San Pedro, Laguna.
On May 25, 2012, the RTC of San Pablo City, Laguna, Branch 32, issued an Order
forwarding the motion to the RTC of San Pedro, Laguna, Branch 93, for resolution. On March 1,
2013, the prosecution filed its objection to the Motion to Quash averring that the search warrant is
presumed regular unless and until petitioner presents evidence to prove otherwise.
In an Order dated July 16, 2013, the RTC of San Pedro, Laguna, Branch 93, denied
petitioner's motion for lack of merit considering that the description of the place as stated in the
search warrant was sufficient. The Court finds the description of the place as stated in the warrant

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sufficient as the officer with warrant can with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place
intended to be searched. Unconvinced, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA.
In its May 12, 2014 Decision, the CA dismissed the Petition and ruled that the search
warrant did not partake of the nature of a general warrant as it sufficiently described with
particularity the place to be searched stated therein. The CA explained that the police officers who
served the warrant and conducted the search of petitioner's residence were able to identify the
building where she actually resided notwithstanding the fact that the search warrant did not
specifically indicate house number 972. Petitioner sought reconsideration of the CA's May 12, 2014
Decision of the CA, which was, however, denied by the appellate court in its August 11, 2014
Resolution.
ISSUE: Whether or not Search Warrant No. 97 is a general warrant for failing to describe the place
to be searched with sufficient particularity.

RULING:
The petition is denied. The requirements of a valid search warrant are laid down in Article III,
Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution and in Rule 126, Section 428 of the Rules Court, viz.: "(1)
probable cause is present; (2) such probable cause must be determined personally by the judge; (3)
the judge must examine, in writing and under oath or affirmation, the complainant and the
witnesses he or she may produce; (4) the applicant and the witnesses testify on the facts personally
known to them; and (5) the warrant specifically describes the place to be searched and the things to
be seized." The absence of any of these requisites will cause the downright nullification of the search
warrant.
There is no question that the search warrant was issued after a judicial determination of
probable cause.
Notably, it is well-entrenched in our jurisprudence that a description of a place to be
searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can ascertain and identify with reasonable effort
the place intended, and distinguish it from other places in the community. Hence, "a designation
that points out the place to be searched to the exclusion of all others, and on inquiry unerringly
leads the peace officers to it, satisfies the constitutional requirement of definiteness."
Simply put, the test of whether the requirement of definiteness or particularity has been met
is whether the description of the place to be searched under the warrant is sufficient and
descriptive enough to prevent a search of other premises located within the surrounding area or
community. A "place" may refer to a single building or structure, or a house or residence, such as in
the case at bar.
The search warrant in the instant case clearly complied with the foregoing standard since it
particularly described the place to be searched, which is petitioner's "house at Gitna, Brgy. Cuyab,
San Pedro, Laguna." The subject search warrant sufficiently described the place to be searched with
clear indication that the same was intended to authorize a search of the entire house of petitioner,
albeit confined to the area of her house, to the exclusion of the other two structures or buildings
similarly located along the street of Gitna. Simply put, the constitutional requirement of
definiteness has been met.
The Court finds that the omission of the warrant to (a) indicate that the place to be searched
contained five rooms which were separately occupied by petitioner and her siblings; and (b) confine
the search to petitioner's unit is inconsequential and, therefore, does not affect the warrant's
validity for the following reasons: (1) The units where petitioner and her siblings lived all form an
integral part of the house, which was sufficiently described with particularity under warrant. (2)

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Even Assuming the ambiguity in the interior description of the place to be searched, such finding,
which only emerged after the warrant was issued, has no bearing on its validity or invalidity. It has
been held that the requirement of particularity as to the things to be seized does not require
technical accuracy in the description of the property to be seized. The same principle must be held
in the case at bench. It would be unreasonable to expect PO2 Avila, or an informant, to have
existence knowledge of the interior set-up or floor plan of petitioner’s house.
OASAN, FREDELYN (Commercial Law)

MULTI-WARE MANUFACTURING VS. CIBELES INSURANCE

CORPORATION, WESTERN GUARANTY CORPORATION, and
ERNESTY SY, doing business under the name and style "PAN
OCEANIC INSURANCE SERVICES”.
G.R. No. 230528, February 1, 2021
Hernando, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner Multi-Ware Manufacturing Corporation (Multi-Ware) is a domestic
corporation engaged in the manufacture of various plastic products. On December 14,
1999, petitioner took out Fire Policy Insurance No. 50-118320 from respondent Western
Guaranty Corporation (Western Guaranty) in the amount of P10,000,000.00. The properties
insured were the pieces of machinery and equipment, tools, spare parts and accessories
stored at Buildings 1 and 2, PTA Compound, No. 26 Isidro Francisco Street, Malinta,
Valenzuela, Metro Manila.
On February 20, 2000, petitioner secured another fire insurance policy, this time
from respondent Cibeles Insurance Corporation (Cibeles Insurance) under Fire Insurance
Policy No. 80-43032 for P7,000,000.00, covering the pieces of machinery and equipment,
tools, spare parts and accessories excluding mould, and stocks of manufactured goods
and/or goods still in process, raw materials and supplies found in the PTA Central
Warehouse Compound, Building 1, No. 26 Isidro Francisco Street, Brgy. Vicente Reales,
Dalandan, Valenzuela, Metro Manila.
Subsequently, petitioner obtained from Prudential Guarantee Corp. (Prudential
Guarantee) Fire Insurance Policy Nos. FLMLAY 00000174NA and FLMLAY 00000284NA
covering the same machinery and equipment located at Building 1, PTA Compound, No. 26
Francisco St., Malinta, Valenzuela, Metro Manila.
On April 21, 2000, a fire broke out in the PTA Compound causing damage and loss
on the properties of petitioner covered by the fire insurance policies. Consequently,
petitioner filed insurance claims with respondents Cibeles Insurance and Western
Guaranty, but these were denied on the ground of Multi-Ware's violation of Policy Condition
Nos. 3, on non-disclosure of co-insurance; 15, on fraudulent claims; and 21, on arson.
Its insurance claims for payment having been denied by Cibeles Insurance and Western
Guaranty, petitioner filed separate civil actions against these insurance companies before
the RTC of Manila. These cases were eventually consolidated for trial.

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ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner violated Policy Condition No. 3 or the "other insurance
clause" uniformly contained in the subject insurance contracts resulting to avoidance of the
said policies.

RULING:
The Court denied the petition for lack of merit.
Policy Condition No. 3 is clear that it obligates petitioner, as insured, to notify the
insurer of any insurance effected to cover the insured items which involve any of its
property or stocks in trade, goods in process and/or inventories and that non-disclosure by
the insured of other insurance policies obtained covering these items would result in the
forfeiture of all the benefits under the policy. To be regarded as a violation of Policy
Condition No. 3, the other existing but undisclosed policies must be upon the same matter
and with the same interest and risk.
The records of this case show that petitioner obtained fire insurance policies from
Cibeles Insurance simultaneously with Western Guaranty and Prudential Guarantee
covering the same matter and the same risk, i.e., the policies uniformly cover fire losses of
petitioner's machinery and equipment. Although Policy Condition No. 3 does not specifically
state "machinery and equipment" as among the subject of disclosure, it is apparent that the
disclosure extends to pieces of machinery and equipment as well since Policy Condition No.
3 speaks of disclosure of other insurance obtained covering "any of the property".
The word "property" is a generic term. Hence, it could include machinery and
equipment which are assets susceptible of being insured. Inasmuch as machinery and
equipment are included under the term "property", petitioner must give notice to the
insurer of any other fire insurance policies on said machinery and equipment. As
established during trial, petitioner did not notify Cibeles Insurance and Western Guaranty
that it had procured other fire insurance policies covering its property consisting of the
same machinery and equipment. Consequently, the insurers could validly deny the
insurance claim of petitioner for violation of Policy Condition No. 3.
It is apparent that Policy Condition No. 3, or the "other insurance clause", was
violated since petitioner failed to notify the insurers of the fire insurance policies it
procured from the different insurers covering the same subject and interest. Petitioner
utterly failed to disprove the RTC's reasonable conclusion that the machinery and
equipment covered by all the fire insurance policies were identical considering that all these
properties were located in the same building inside the PTA Compound. It is significant to
note that aside from its bare allegations, petitioner did not adduce adequate proof to show
that the buildings and/or warehouses referred to in each of the policies pertain to distinct
and separate structures inside the PTA Compound.
Since the policy procured by petitioner from Cibeles Insurance covered the same
subject and interest as that covered by the policies issued by Western Guaranty and
Prudential Guarantee, the existence of other insurance policies referred to under Policy
Page | 103
Condition No. 3 is undeniable. The non-disclosure of these policies to the insurers was fatal
to petitioner's right to recover on the insurance policies.

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OASAN, FREDELYN (Taxation Law)

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. BENEDICTA MALLARI AND

CHI WEI-NENG
G.R. No. 197164, December 04, 2019
Hernando, J.
FACTS:
BIR filed a criminal complaint against Benedicta Mallari and Chi Wei-Neng, President and
General Manager, respectively, of Topsun Int’l., Inc. for violation of Section 255 in relation to
Sections 253 and 256 of the NIRC before the OCP of Manila. due to outstanding VAT deficiency for
the months of January to June 2000 which Topsun failed and refused to pay its outstanding
obligations despite several demands and the service of the Warrant of Distraint and/or Levy BIR
filed a criminal complaint against Benedicta Mallari and Chi Wei-Neng, President and General
Manager, respectively, of Topsun Int’l., Inc. for violation of Section 255 in relation to Sections 253
and 256 of the NIRC before the OCP of Manila. due to outstanding VAT deficiency for the months of
January to June 2000 which Topsun failed and refused to pay its outstanding obligations despite
several demands and the service of the Warrant of Distraint and/or Levy.
An Information was soon filed for violation of Section 255 in relation to Sections 253 and 256
of the NIRC and was filed before the CTA First Division. In its Resolution dated October 7, 2009, the
CTA First Division observed that in the DOJ Resolution dated August 7, 2009, Mallari and Wei-
Neng were charged with failure to pay overdue “deficiency VAT” in the amount of ₱3,827,564.64 and
“compromise penalty” of ₱25,000.00. However, the Information stated that they failed to pay
“deficiency income tax” in the said amounts. Further, the CTA First Division noted that the
recommendation for the criminal prosecution or the filing of the information for violation of the Tax
Code was without the written approval of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. This approval
should have been secured pursuant to Sections 220 and 221 of the NIRC, as amended, in relation
to Section 2, Rule 9 of the Revised Rules of the CTA. Lastly, the motion to adopt the allegations
contained in the Counter-Affidavit of Mallari, and the Reply to the Counter-Affidavit and its Annexes
were not attached to the Information. Thus, the CTA ordered ACP Mendoza to make the necessary
formal corrections in the Information ang to submit the necessary documents that are lacking.
In its Resolution dated October 7, 2009, the CTA First Division observed that in the DOJ
Resolution dated August 7, 2009, Mallari and Wei-Neng were charged with failure to pay overdue
“deficiency VAT” in the amount of ₱3,827,564.64 and “compromise penalty” of ₱25,000.00.
However, the Information stated that they failed to pay “deficiency income tax” in the said amounts.
Further, the CTA First Division noted that the recommendation for the criminal prosecution or the
filing of the information for violation of the Tax Code was without the written approval of the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue. This approval should have been secured pursuant to Sections
220 and 221 of the NIRC, as amended, in relation to Section 2, Rule 9 of the Revised Rules of the
CTA. Lastly, the motion to adopt the allegations contained in the Counter-Affidavit of Mallari, and
the Reply to the Counter-Affidavit and its Annexes were not attached to the Information. Thus, the
CTA ordered ACP Mendoza to make the necessary formal corrections in the Information and to
submit the necessary documents that are lacking.
By way of compliance, ACP Mendoza submitted the following: (a) the Amended Information;
(b) a certified true copy of RDAO No. 2-2007 dated March 1, 2007 of Commissioner Jose Mario C.
Bunag of the BIR in lieu of the written approval of the CIR with respect to the filing of the present
information; (c) the “Motion to Adopt Allegations Contained in Counter-Affidavit of[Benedicta]
Mallari”; and (d) the “Reply to Counter-Affidavit” and its annexes.
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 The CTA First Division issued another Resolution noting that ACP Mendoza still failed to
attach the CIR’s recommendation for criminal prosecution of Mallari and Wei-Neng, among others.
As such, it ordered the submission of the required recommendation in accordance with the NIRC.
However, ACP Mendoza, in his Compliance with Manifestation, maintained that the authority of
Regional Director Misajon is already sufficient pursuant to RDAO No. 2-2007 which authorizes
Regional Directors to approve and sign approval and referral letters to authorize the institution of
criminal actions for the National Office of the BIR as required by Section 220 of the NIRC including
the filing of information before the courts.
In its Resolution dated December 14, 2009, the CTA First Division dismissed the criminal
complaint for failure of ACP Mendoza to obey a lawful order of the court, i.e., to submit a certified
true copy of the Memorandum of the CIR authorizing Regional Director Misajon to prosecute and
conduct proceedings.
ACP Mendoza received the said CTA First Division Resolution on January 13, 2010. Hence,
on January 18, 2010, the special counsels/prosecutors of the BIR Manila filed their Entry of
Appearance with Leave to Admit Attached Motion for Reconsideration.
In its Resolution dated March 17, 2010, however, the CTA Special First Division denied the
MR due to late filing. It observed that based on the records, the BIR received its December 14,
2009Resolution on December 17, 2009, while the Office of the City Prosecutor received the same on
December 21, 2009; hence, the prosecution had until January 4, 2010 and January 5, 2010,
respectively, to file the Motion for Reconsideration. Regrettably, the prosecution filed its Motion for
Reconsideration only on January 18, 2010 or 14 days late beyond the prescribed 15-dayperiod for
filing the same.
BIR filed a criminal complaint against Benedicta Mallari and Chi Wei-Neng, President and
General Manager, respectively, of Topsun Int’l., Inc. for violation of Section 255 in relation to
Sections 253 and 256 of the NIRC before the OCP of Manila. due to outstanding VAT deficiency for
the months of January to June 2000 which Topsun failed and refused to pay its outstanding
obligations despite several demands and the service of the Warrant of Distraint and/or Levy
ISSUE: Whether or not the Resolution dated December 14, 2009 has already become final.
RULING:
Yes, the Resolution dated December 14, 2009 has already become final.
A perusal of the records shows that the BIR Main Office and the Office of the City Prosecutor
received the Notice of the December 14, 2009 Resolution of the CTA First Division on December 17,
2009 and December 21, 2009, respectively. From the date of receipt, petitioner only had until
January 4, 2010 and January 5, 2010, respectively, to file its Motion for Reconsideration.
Petitioner, however, filed its motion only on January 18, 2010 or 14 days beyond the prescribed
period. Thus, we find no cogent reason to depart from the findings of the CTA Special First Division,
which was affirmed by the CTA En Banc, that petitioner filed its Motion for Reconsideration beyond
the 15-day reglementary period.
Consequently, petitioner's failure to duly file on time a Motion for Reconsideration of the CTA
First Division’s December 14, 2009 Resolution resulted in losing its right to assail the CTA First
Division’s judgment before this Court. This is in accordance with the basic rule that a party who
fails to question an adverse decision by not filing the proper remedy within the period prescribed by
law for the purpose loses the right to do so. As laid down in Barrio Fiesta Restaurant v. Beronia: For
purposes of determining its timeliness, a motion for reconsideration may properly be treated as an
appeal. As a step to allow an inferior court to correct itself before review by a higher court, a motion
for reconsideration must necessarily be filed within the period to appeal. When filed beyond such
period, the motion for reconsideration ipso facto forecloses the right to appeal.
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OASAN, FREDELYN (Civil Law)

BANCO DE ORO UNIBANK, INC. (NOW BDO UNIBANK, INC.) VS.

EDGARDO C. YPIL, SR., CEBU SUREWAY TRADING
CORPORATION, AND LEOPOLDO KHO
G.R. No. 212024. October 12, 2020.
Hernando, J.
FACTS:
Kho, representing Cebu Sureway Trading Corporation (CSTC), offered a proposal to
respondent Ypil to invest in the Prudentialife Plan – Millionaires in Business scheme. Kho was able
to solicit the total amount of P300,000.00 from Ypil. Later Ypil opted to get a refund, Ypil sent a
letter and made several oral demands but to no avail. Subsequently, Ypil’s lawyer sent a demand
letter but it was never answered.
Ypil thus filed a Complaint for Specific Performance with Attachment, Damages and
Attorney’s fees against CSTC and Kho before the RTC. The RTC granted Ypil’s prayer for the ex-
parte issuance of an attachment order. Afterwards, the trial court issued a Writ of Preliminary
Attachment.
Sheriff Guaren issued a Notice of Garnishment of the amount of P300,000.00 plus lawful
expenses from the accounts of CSTC and/or Kho addressed to the BDO Unibank, Inc. North
Mandaue Branch. BDO received the said notice on the same day. Yet, BDO, through its North
Mandaue Branch Head Polloso, replied that CSTC and/or Kho have no available garnishable funds.

The RTC discovered that BDO already debited from CSTC’s savings and current accounts
some amounts to offset its (CSTC’s) outstanding obligation with BDO under a loan agreement. In
view of this, the trial court issued an order directing BDO to show cause why it should not be held
guilty of indirect contempt for debiting the money from the accounts of CSTC and Kho which was
under custodia legis.
BDO averred that since CSTC defaulted in its obligations to BDO as embodied in a Credit
Agreement and Promissory Note, its entire obligation immediately became due and demandable
without need of demand or notice. It asserted that since BDO and CSTC were creditors and debtors
of each other, legal compensation already took effect.
CSTC and Kho then filed their Comment stating that the provisions of the Promissory Note
should not affect third parties and court processes such as garnishment. Moreover, they averred
that legal compensation cannot take effect because CSTC’s loan was not yet due and demandable.
Subsequently, Ypil filed his Memorandum insisting that the trial court acquired jurisdiction over
BDO which in turn became a forced intervenor upon receipt of the Notice of garnishment. Withal,
he posited that the subject deposit was brought into custodia legis which BDO cannot debit in its
favor.
The RTC directed the petitioner, BDO Unibank, Inc. to guarantee the availability of the
garnished amount of P300,000.00 from the account of respondent Cebu Sureway Trading
Corporation (CSTC), represented by respondent Leopoldo Kho, The Court of Appeals affirmed this
order.
ISSUE: Whether or not legal compensation took place ipso jure as between BDO and CSTC when
CSTC defaulted in its obligations to BDO.
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RULING:
CSTC’s debt cannot be considered as due and liquidated, thereby legal compensation did not
take place by operation of law.
It is settled that compensation is a mode of extinguishing to the concurrent amount the
debts of persons who in their own right are creditors and debtors of each other. The object of
compensation is the prevention of unnecessary suits and payments thru the mutual extinction by
operation of law of concurring debts. The said mode of payment is encapsulated in Article 1279 of
the Civil Code.
In relation to this, Article 1290 of the Civil Code states that when all the requisites mentioned
in Article 1279 are present, compensation takes effect by operation of law, and extinguishes both
debts to the concurrent amount, even though the creditors and debtors are not aware of the
compensation. Relevantly, this is BDO’s main contention.
The flaw in BDO’s argument is its failure to specify the date when CSTC actually defaulted in
its obligation or particularly pinpoint which installment it failed to pay. BDO merely revealed that
CSTC owed it the amount of P3,823,000.00 without presenting a detailed computation or proof
thereof except for the Promissory Note. Although CSTC and Kho did not question the computation
made by BDO, the fact remains that the actual date of default was not disclosed and verified with
corroborating preponderant proof.
Thus, CSTC’s indebtedness cannot be considered as due and liquidated. It should be
emphasized that a claim is liquidated when the amount and time of payment is fixed. If
acknowledged by the debtor, although not in writing, the claim must be treated as liquidated. In
this case, the time of default and the amount due were not specific and particular. Without this
information, a simple arithmetic computation cannot possibly be done without risking errors
especially with regard to the application of interest and penalties. Similarly, despite CSTC’s failure
to contest BDO’s computation, its debt still cannot be considered as liquidated. Further
confirmation is necessary in order to treat CSTC’s debt as due, demandable and liquidated, which
BDO unfortunately did not bother to elaborate on.
As regards respondent’s claim that there exists a controversy commenced by a third person
thereby negating legal compensation from taking place, BDO insists that this did not bar the legal
compensation from taking place by operation of law since CSTC’s default happened even before it
was served the Notice of Garnishment. Again, CSTC and Kho did not challenge this allegation.
Nonetheless, given the Court’s finding that CSTC’s debt cannot be considered as due and
liquidated, thereby legal compensation did not take place by operation of law, it follows that the
Notice of Garnishment served as proof of an existing controversy commenced by a third person,
particularly Ypil, which likewise negated the application of legal compensation.

OASAN, FREDELYN (Labor Law)

TELUS INTERNATIONAL PHILIPPINES, INC. and MICHAEL SY

VS. HARVEY DE GUZMAN.
G.R. No. 202676. December 4, 2019.
Hernando, J.

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FACTS:
Telus asserted that it first hired respondent Harvey De Guzman, sometime in September
2004, as inbound sales associate. His last post prior to the controversy was senior quality analyst
for DELL after point of Sale. On August 2, 2008 Telus received an escalation complaint from Flores,
charging De Guzman of disrespect and ridicule towards a person. The escalation complaint alleged
that on July 31, 2008, Flores while in the process of checking the work progress of all the agents to
determine if coaching was required to improve their performance, sent a chat message to QA
directing them to do coaching. She said “QA are tons of avails, do your coaching” De Guzman who
was among the QAs who received the message replied “That is good, you can now do your huddle
for your team.” Flores was offended when the other QAs exited the conversation and by De
Guzman’s reply as she felt that he was implying that she has no time for her team. Later on she
chanced upon the conversation between De Guzman and a fellow agent, which De Guzman made
disrespectful remarks against her. Acting on the complaint of Flores, Telus issued a due process
form to De Guzman on charges insulting or showing discourtesy, disrespect or arrogance towards
superiors or co team members and abusive behaviour language which is outside the bounds of
morality in violation of disorderly conduct of Telus Code of Conduct. De Guzman was placed on
preventive suspension and was directed to submit a written explanation to answer the charges on
or before August 7, 2008 to which the latter complied and submitted his written explanation.
Telus conducted an administrative hearing on the matter, upon termination of the
investigation, Telus found de Guzman not liable for the offenses charged and did not impose any
disciplinary sanction against him. De Guzman’s preventive suspension was lifted and he was fully
compensated during the period. Telus however decided to remove de Guzman from his current
designation and transfer him to another practice. Telus sent De Guzman a request for profile
interview which De Guzman deemed not to attend, and Telus sent De Guzman a return to work
order on October 13, 2008, and found out that De Guzman filed for constructive dismissal with the
NLRC.
ISSUE: Whether or not De Guzman is constructively dismissed.
RULING:
YES. The Court held in the affirmative.
Constructive dismissal exists where there is cessation of work, because continued
employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable, or unlike as an offer involving a demotion in
rank or a diminution in pay and other benefits. Aptly called a dismissal in disguise or amounting to
dismissal but made to appear as if it were not. In case of a constructive dismissal, the employer has
the burden of proving that the transfer and demotion of an employee are for valid and legitimate
grounds such as genuine business necessity. Particularly, for a transfer not to be considered a
constructive dismissal, the employer must be able to show that such transfer is not unreasonable,
inconvenient or prejudicial to the employee. Nor does it involve demotion in rank or a diminution of
his salaries, privileges and other benefits. In the instant case, after finding petitioner is not liable for
the offense charged, respondents did not immediately reinstated petitioner to his former position.
Second, private respondents informed petitioner that he was being transferred to a new account
and directed to report to the Telus branch office at Market Market Taguig City. However, after a few
hours, respondents asked the petitioner to just go home and wait since they needed time to search
for his account. While waiting for the promised new account. Petitioner was compelled to utilize his
leave credits. Third after his leave credits were consume, private respondents placed the petitioner
on a floating status. It bears that after one month from his exoneration and new account. Finally,
respondents required petitioner to under a profile interview supposedly to determine which account
would he best fit.

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 The conclusion is clear that Telus fostered a working environment that was hostile,
discriminatory, unreasonable and inequitable that naturally compelled De Guzman to give up his
employment thereat to avoid the difficulties he had to face just to keep his employment. The actions
of Telus show that De Guzman was actually subsequently penalized with much graver consequence
than the supposed preventive suspension he had undergone.

OASAN, FREDELYN (Criminal Law)

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ADONIS CABALES

G.R. No. 213831, September 25, 2019
Hernando, J.
FACTS:
The RTC and CA convicted the accused for the crime of rape.
On January 16, 2005, at around 3 o’clock in the afternoon, 13-year old AAA was sleeping in
a bedroom inside their house when she was woken up by Cabales’ kidd on her face. Cabales is
AAA’s uncle, being the husband of BBB’s sister. AAA bolted upright and tried to push Cabales
away. Cabales, however, held her hand and pointed a fan knife at her neck, and warned her not to
shout out or move. He proceeded to remove AAA’s jogging pants and panty, undressed himself, and
inserted his penis into her vagina. Cabales ignored AAA’s pleas for him to stop and instead made a
push-and-pull movements inside her for ten minutes. After he was done, Cabales threatened AAA
not to tell anybody, and left. Immediately thereafter, one Noel Maguib, the husband of BBB’s cousin
who at that time was tending their eggplant garden, knocked at their door and asked for water.
When AAA opened the door, Maguib asked AAA what she and Cabales were doing. She initially
denied but Maguib told her that he saw the sexual act and advised her to tell her parents about it.
With Maguib’s assistance. AAA’s family learned about the incident. AAA stated that she would never
have reported it to her parents were it not for Maguib witnessing her and Cabales having sexual
intercourse.
ISSUE: Whether or not the prosecution failed to prove Cabales’ guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
RULING:
NO. The arguments notwithstanding, Cabales’ guilt has already been established beyond
reasonable doubt. There is a great premium accorded to a victim of rape, as it is usually the victim
alone who can testify on the forced sexual intercourse. If the victim’s testimony meets the test of
credibility, the accused can justifiably be convicted on the basis of her lone testimony. Here, AAA
categorically pointed to Cabales as the perpetrator of rape and laid out her accusations with overt
clarity. The inconsistencies alleged are deemed minor details that can be overlooked. The Court
accord due respect to the factual findings and appreciation thereof by the trial court as it had the
opportunity to observe the witnesses’ demeanor and hear their testimonies at the first instance,
much more as the CA affirmed the trial court’s judgment of conviction in all its substantial respects.

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OASAN, FREDELYN (Remedial Law)

PASCUAL PURISIMA, JR., LEONARDO PURISIMA, EUFRATA

PURISIMA, AND ESTELITA DAGUIO VS. MACARIA PURISIMA
AND SPOUSES ERLINDA AND DANIEL MEDRANO
G.R. No. 213831, G.R. No. 200484, November 18, 2020
Hernando, J
FACTS:
Pascual Purisima Sr. owned a lot located at Tuao, Cagayan. However, sometime in1960, he
sold portions of the aforesaid property to Macaria Purisima and the Spouses Erlinda and Daniel
Medrano to answer for his medical bills. At the time of the sale, the whole lot was not yet titled but
it was surveyed for patent application under Purisima Sr.’s name. Banking on mutual trust, the
survey as well as the sale was not recorded by the parties.
The heirs of Pascual Sr. later on executed an Extrajudicial settlement of Estate of Deceased,
Pascual Purisima and Sale over the unregistered property of their father which included the sale of
the properties apportioned to the respondents Macaria Purisima and Spouses Medrano. A free
patent was then granted under the name of “Heirs of Pascual Sr” and consequently the free patent
was registered with the Registry of Deeds of Tuao, Cagayan and Original Certificate of Title was
issued in favor of the heirs. The free patent covered the whole of Lot 71, including the portions sold
to the respondents.
Upon learning of the inclusion of their land in the extrajudicial settlement,
respondents repeatedly requested Purisima Jr. to surrender the OCT in order to annotate to
the extrajudicial settlement, register the subdivision plan and finally secure their own titles
covering their respective lots. However, petitioners ignored respondents’ pleas and
countered that there was no sale that transpired and the amount given by the respondents were a
form of financial help due tot heir father’s sickness Upon learning of the inclusion of their
land in the extrajudicial settlement, respondents repeatedly requested Purisima Jr. to
surrender the OCT in order to annotate to the extrajudicial settlement, register the
subdivision plan and finally secure their own titles covering their respective lots. However,
petitioners ignored respondents’ pleas and countered that there was no sale that transpired
and the amount given by the respondents were a form of financial help due tot heir father’s
sickness
ISSUE: Whether or not the Statute of Frauds is applicable in this case.
RULING:
No. The Supreme court held that the Statute of Frauds is not applicable in the case at bar.
The Statute of Frauds affects merely the enforceability of the contract. As explained by the Court in
the case of Inigo v. Estate of Adriana Maloto, Article 1403 (2) (e) of the Civil Code provides that a
verbal contract for the sale of real property is unenforceable, unless ratified. For such contract
offends the Statute of Frauds. But long accepted and well-settled is the rule that the Statute of
Frauds is applicable only to executory contracts-not to contracts either totally or partially
performed. It matters not that neither the receipt for the consideration nor the sale itself was in
writing. Because oral evidence of the alleged consummated sale of the land is not forbidden by the
Statute of Frauds and may not be excluded in court.

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 In this case, the 1960 oral sale was already fully consummated as evidenced by the 1978
Extrajudicial Settlement of Deceased, Pascual Purisima, Sr. and Sale which was undisputed and
acknowledged by the petitioners themselves, and as established by the pieces of evidence
presented by respondents.
Verily, a contract of sale, whether oral or written, is classified as consensual contract, which
means that the same is perfected by mere consent and no particular form is required for its validity.
The 1960 oral sale thus stands and all its consequences under the law are thus binding to the
parties and their successors-in-interest. Consequently, the transfer of the properties to the
respondents arising from the 1960 sale by Purisima Sr. of the apportioned properties effectively
vested ownership to the respondents from that time.
OASAN, FREDELYN (Legal Ethics)

CLARA R. ICK, RUBY ELINBERGSSON AND TERESITA EDOSADA

VS. ATTY. ALLAN S. AMAZONA
A.C. No. 12375, February 26, 2020
Hernando, J
FACTS:
Complainants alleged that on March 9, 2016, respondent notarized a letter dated March 7,
2016 signed by a certain Michelle B. Lotho (Lotho), Director and Auditor of South Forbes Phuket
Mansions Homeowners Association, Inc., addressed to Loiue A. Odiamar, Head of the Homeowners
Association Franchising Unit, Dencris Business Center in Calamba City. According to
complainants, this letter was used to facilitate the registration of South Forbes Phuket Mansions
Homeowners Association, Inc. Complainants averred that the said letter falsely stated that most
buyers of the subdivision lots were out of the country and as such, it was highly improbable to
secure their signatures. Complainants claimed that respondent knew that such assertion was
untrue because he was in constant communication with the residents of South Forbes Phuket
Mansions, including complainants.
Complainants further claimed that the list of members with corresponding
signatures attached to the March 7, 2016 letter was also false, since it referred to their attendance
during a meeting for a property manager held on December 3, 2015, and not for a homeowners
meeting for the registration of the homeowners' association when in fact there was none.
In his Report and Recommendation dated January 12, 2017, Investigating Commissioner
Jose Villanueva Cabrera recommended the dismissal of the administrative complaint against
respondent for lack of merit.
Commissioner Cabrera opined that the mere act of notarizing the March 7, 2016 letter is not
in itself a violation of the Notarial Rules since respondent merely attested to the fact that Lotho has
personally appeared before him and subscribed to the truth of the contents of the said letter.
Commissioner Cabrera stated that the truth or falsity of the allegations in the said letter is the sole
responsibility of affiant Lotho and does not extend to the respondent as notary public. In its
January 26, 2017 Resolution, the IBP Board of Governors resolved to adopt the findings of fact and
recommendation of Commissioner Cabrera in dismissing the complaint.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent violated the Notarial Rules.
RULING:
NO. The Court agrees with the recommendation of the IBP and finds that the dismissal of the
complaint is in order. Every person is presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. Settled is the
rule that in disbarment proceedings, the complainant must satisfactorily establish the allegations of
Page | 112
his or her complaint through substantial evidence. Mere allegations without proof are disregarded
considering the gravity of the penalty prayed for. Charges based on mere suspicion and speculation
cannot be given credence.
The Court agrees with the IBP that the complained act does not constitute any violation of
the Rules of Court, the Notarial Rules, nor the Code of Professional Responsibility.  Respondent
merely performed his duty when he attested to the fact that Lotho personally appeared and signed
the said letter before him. The Court agree with the IBP that the truth or falsity of the contents of
the letter is the responsibility of the affiant Lotho and not of the respondent, especially since no
substantial evidence was presented to prove that he knowingly notarized a false document. The
Court finds that the complainants failed to establish through substantial evidence a cause for
disciplinary action against the respondent.

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