CADAJAS vs PEOPLE

FACTS: Petitioner, who was then 24 years old, met the victim, AAA, who was only
14 years old, in the canteen where he works. Their relationship started when the
younger sibling of AAA told petitioner that AAA had a crush on him. Petitioner tried
to evade AAA, but the latter started to stalk him. Later, AAA sent petitioner a request
in his Facebook Messenger, which he accepted. The petitioner and AAA would then
exchange messages on Facebook Messenger and after some time, petitioner courted
AAA for two weeks, until they became sweethearts on April 2, 2016.

Sometime in June 2016, BBB, the mother of AAA, learned of their relationship. She
discovered the relationship because AAA would borrow her cellphone to access the
latter's Facebook account.8 Her mother was thus able to read their messages whenever
AAA would forget to log out her account. BBB disapproved of their relationship
because AAA was still too young. However, petitioner and AAA ignored her
admonishment.

Sometime in October 2016, BBB was disheartened when she read that petitioner was
sexually luring her daughter to meet with him in a motel. She confronted petitioner
and told him to stay away because AAA was still a minor.

At around 5:30 in the morning of November 18, 2016, BBB was shocked when she
read the conversation between petitioner and AAA. She found that petitioner was
coaxing her daughter to send him photos of the latter's breast and vagina. AAA
relented and sent petitioner the photos he was asking. When AAA learned that her
mother read their conversation, she rushed to a computer shop to delete her messages.
BBB, however, was able to force her to open petitioner's Facebook messenger
account to get a copy of their conversation.

On the part of the petitioner, he admitted sending AAA the messages "oo ready ako sa
ganyan" and "sige hubad." He, however, denied having sent AAA, photos of his
private part. On November 17, 2016, AAA asked petitioner to delete their messages
from his account. He even told her "bakit kasi hindi ka pa nagtitino, hayan tuloy
nakita ng mama mo." On the same day, petitioner broke up with AAA because her
mother did not like him.

Petitioner later learned from his co-workers that two (2) criminal cases were filed
against him. He was charged for violation of Section 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610 and for
child pornography as defined and penalized under Section 4(c)(2) of R.A. No. 10175
in relation to Sections 4(a), 3(b) and (c)(5) of R.A. No. 9775. The two (2)
informations that were filed against petitioner on December 27, 2016.

Petitioner entered a plea of not guilty to both charges during arraignment.16

After trial, the RTC acquitted petitioner of the charge for violation of Section 10(a) of
R.A. No. 7610, but found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Section
4(c)(2) of R.A. No. 10175 in relation to Sections 4(a), 3(b) and (c)(5) of R.A. No.
9775. As such, petitioner was sentenced to reclusion temporal and to pay a fine of
P1,000,000.00.17
According to the RTC, petitioner was aware that AAA was still a minor when he
obstinately prodded the latter to send him photos of her private parts. This is an
explicit sexual activity, a lascivious conduct, which the minor victim, AAA, could not
have done were it not for the persistent inducement of the petitioner.18 Moreover,
petitioner's violation of R.A. No. 9775 is a malum prohibitum.19 As such, his claim
that he was in a relationship with AAA finds no relevance.
On the other hand, the RTC dismissed the charge against petitioner for violation of
Section 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610 holding that AAA is a city lass who was no longer
innocent of the ways of the world. She herself attested that she was not affected by
what happened. As such, the RTC ruled that the protective mantle of R.A. No. 7610 is
wanting.20 Thus, the RTC disposed the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
In Criminal Case No. 215-V-17, finding accused CHRISTIAN CADAJAS y CABIAS
NOT GUILTY and is hereby acquitted. The prosecution failed to prove beyond cavil
of doubt all the elements of the offense as charged.
In Criminal Case No. 216-V-17, finding accused CHRISTIAN
CADAJAS y CABIAS GUILTY of violation of Sections 4(a) and 3(b) and (c)(5) of
RA 9775 and he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion temporal and to
pay a FINE of One Million Pesos.

THE UNITED STATES, complainant-appellee,

vs.
MARCOSA PEÑALOSA and ENRIQUE RODRIGUEZ, defendants-appellants.

Article 475 of the prevailing Penal Code provides as follows:

Any minor who shall contract marriage without the consent of his or her parents or of
the persons who for such purpose stand in their stead shall be punished with prision
correccional in its minimum and medium degrees.

The accused were convicted in the lower court for the violation of this article, it
appearing from the evidence adduced that the accused, Marcosa Peñalosa, was not 21
years of age on the 3rd day of May, 1901, when she married the codefendant, and that
she contracted the marriage without the consent of her father.

Should the judgment appealed from be affirmed if the woman was in fact less than 21
years of age, without taking into consideration what was her belief concerning her
age? Many instances can be called to mind in which there may exist an error in good
faith concerning this point. A man who is about to marry and is ignorant of his exact
age seeks and obtains a certified copy of the registry of his baptism. From this it
appears that he was born twenty-one years before the 1st day of June, let us say. He
marries on the 15th day of June. It develops later that the person who took the copy of
the registry of baptism read July as June, and as a matter of fact the man in question
did not complete his twenty-one years until the 1st day of July, fifteen days after his
marriage. Can such a one be convicted of a violation of article 475? It would seem
that this case is included within those of the article. He was in fact a minor when he
married, and he married without the consent of his parents. It is true that so far as the
parent is concerned the offense has been committed, but can the same be said with
reference to the State in the absence of a voluntary violation of the law? Article 1 of
the Code does not contain the word "with malice" that are to be found in the Code of
1822; nevertheless Pacheco, the eminent commentator, has said that those words are
included in the word "voluntary" (El Codigo Penal Concordado y Comentado, Vol. I,
folio 74, third edition); and he states positively that crime can not exist without intent.

Other commentators, without being in entire conformity with Pacheco, nevertheless

are agreed up to a certain point. Groizard says: "Such is the general rule; so it is
ordinarily." (Codigo Penal de 1870, Vol. I, folio 37.) Viada says that "in the majority
of cases, in the absence of intent there has been no crime; but that there can exist in
some cases the latter without the former." (Vol. I, Codigo Penal Reformado de 1870,
folio 16.) Silvela says: "In effect if suffices to remember the first article, which states
that where there is no intent there is no crime, ... in order to assert without fear or
mistake that in our Code the substance of a crime does not exist if there is not a deed,
an act which falls within the sphere of ethics, if there is not a moral wrong." (Vol. 2,
Derecho Penal, folio 169.)

The theory that the absence of the words "with malice" in the prevailing Code has this
effect is supported by the provisions of article 568 which says: "He who by reckless
negligence commits an act which would constitute a grave crime if malice were
present shall be punished," etc.

The Supreme Court in several successive sentences has followed the same doctrine:
"It is indispensable that this (action) in order to constitute a crime should carry with it
all the malice which the volition and intention to cause the evil which may be the
object of the said crime suppose. (Judgment of May 31, 1882.)

In a cause for falsity the facts involved were that the defendant had married "before
the municipal judge of the pueblo of Rubete without other ceremony than the simple
manifestation and expression of his wishes and those of the woman Leonor with
whom he married before said municipal judge; that relying upon that, on account of
his ignorance and lack of instruction, on the 27th of June, 1882, and the 5th of April,
1884, in the municipal court of the pueblo of Polopos he registered as legitimate
children his sons, Jose and Emilio the offspring of the illicit union of the defendant
and Leonor Gonzalez." For the crime of falsity committed by reckless negligence the
Criminal Audiencia of Albunol condemned the said defendant to the penalty of four
months and one day of arresto mayor. The Supreme Court annulled said sentence
"considering that whatever might be the civil effects of the registration of his three
sons entered by the accused in the Civil and Parochial Registers, it can not partake of
the nature of a crime for lack of the necessary element of volition or intent to offend,
essential to every punishable act or omission; neither did he act with negligence."
(Judgment of March 16, 1892.)
In a cause prosecuted against the Chinese Sy-Ticco and against Don Guillermo
Partier, in the court of Quiapo, for falsification of trade-marks, the Criminal Chamber
of the Audiencia of Manila condemned the Chinaman to two years and some months
of presidio correccional, and Partier to one year and some months of similar
imprisonment. A writ of error was sued out in the name of Partier. The Supreme
Court annulled this sentence, "considering that the moral element of the crime, or, in
other words, existence or nonexistence of intent and malice in the commission of an
act designated and punished by the law as criminal is essentially a question of fact for
the exclusive judgment and determination of the trial court."

Considering that the act charged against the accused, Guillermo Partier, of having
printed in his lithographic establishment the trade-mark of the cigarette packages of
the Insular factory by virtue of a supposed order of the owner of said factory, to
whose injury the Chinaman Abelardo Zacarias Sy-Ticco ordered him to do the said
fraudulent printing, can not be considered (from the facts declared proved in the final
sentence of acquittal of the Court of First Instance, accepted in its entirety and without
any addition by the Appellate Court) as constituting intentional participation or
cooperation in deed of falsification and defraudation committed by the former, since it
does not appear in any part of the sentence that Partier was in connivance with Sy-
Ticco nor that he had any reason to suspect the true character of him who, styling
himself the representative of Señor Santa Marina, the owner of the La Insular factory,
gave him the order to print the trade-mark of this factory on the packages, which were
to be used to hold cigarettes. (Judgment of December 30, 1896.)

The judgment of October 4, 1893, is of the same tenor. It is not necessary to hold in
this action that no crime mentioned in the Code can exist without intent. It suffices for
the present to decide, as we do decide, that one can not be convicted under article 475
when by reason of a mistake of fact there does not exist the intention to commit the
crime.

It remains for us to apply this principle to the facts of the present case. The defendant
has stated that she believed that she was born in 1879; that so her parents had given
her to understand ever since her tenderest age; that she had not asked them concerning
her age because her father had given her to so understand since her childhood. Her
father was present in the court room as the complaining witness. If his daughter was
deviating from the truth it would have been an easy matter for him to have testified
denying the truth of what she had stated. It is evident that he was interested in the
conviction of his daughter, and the fact that the complaining witness did not
contradict her obliges us to accept as true the statements of the witness. Being true,
they disclose that she acted under a mistake of fact; that there was no intention on her
part to commit the crime provided for and punished the article 475.

As for the husband, it has been proved that two days before the marriage was
celebrated he received a letter from the woman in which she said that she was 21
years of age. This letter the defendant showed to the clergyman who married them.
The woman when the marriage ceremony was performed took an oath before the
clergyman, in the presence of her husband, that she was 21 years of age. The
defendant testifies that he had no suspicion that the woman was a minor. This
statement has not been contradicted and we consider that it suffices to demonstrate
that the defendant acted under a mistake of fact, and in conformity with the principle
laid down in this opinion he has not been guilty of a violation of article 475 in
connection with article 13, No. 3, nor in any other manner.

The conviction of the defendants in accordance with article 568, together with article
29 of General Orders, No. 58, has not been prayed for, and even if it had been we do
not consider the evidence sufficient to sustain a conviction in accordance with this
article. Her husband has the right to accept the sworn statement of the woman. The
only person whom she could ask for information was her father, and he had told her
age repeatedly.

For the reasons above set forth the sentence of the lower court is reversed with
reference to both defendants, acquitting them freely with costs of suit de oficio.

PEOPLE v. GUILLEN G.R. No. L-1477, EN BANC, January 18, 1950, PER
CURIAM
Under Article 4 of the RPC, criminal liability is incurred by any person committing a
felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he
intended. In criminal negligence, the injury caused to another should be unintentional,
it being simply the incident of another act performed without malice. In order that an
act may be qualified as imprudence it is necessary that neither malice nor intention to
cause injury should intervene; where such intention exists, the act should be qualified
by the felony it has produced even though it may not have been the intention of the
actor to cause an evil of such gravity as that produced. A deliberate intent to do an
unlawful act is essentially inconsistent with the idea of reckless imprudence. Where
such unlawful act is wilfully done, a mistake in the identity of the intended victim
cannot be considered as reckless imprudence.

In throwing hand grenade at the President with the intention of killing him, Guillen
acted with malice. He stated that he performed the act voluntarily; that his purpose
was to kill the President, but that it did not make any difference to him if there were
some people around the President when he hurled that bomb.

FACTS: On the night of March 10, 1947, a popular meeting was held by the Liberal
Party at Plaza Miranda in Quiapo, attended by big crowd, President Manuel Roxas,
and his family, and prominent government politicians. As President Roxas was
closing his speech, Guillen threw one of the two hand grenades towards the president
with the intent of killing the latter however, General Castañeda saw the grenade. Gen.
Castañeda thrn kicked the grenade away from the platform were the president was to
the open space, covered the president with his body, and shouted to the crowd to lie
down. The grenade exploded in the middle of a group of persons standing close to the
platform. Fragments of the grenade seriously injured 4 persons and Simeon Valera
who died the following day as a result of the mortal wounds. Guillen was arrested and
was later on charged with the crime of murder for the death of Valera and multiple
frustrated murder of the 4 victims injured.
The defense argued that Guillen should not be held guilty of murder for the death of
Valera and the complex crime of murder and multiple frustrated murder, but instead
should be guilty only of homicide through reckless imprudence (death of Valera) and
less serious physical injuries (4 injured victims). It was revealed that the reason
behind Guillen’s plan of assassinating the president was because he was disappointed
in President Roxas for his alleged failure to redeem the pledges and fulfill the
promises made by him during the presidential election campaign; and his
disappointment was aggravated when, according to him, President Roxas, instead of
looking after the interest of his country, sponsored and campaigned for the approval
of the so-called "parity" measure. Hence he determined to assassinate the President.

ISSUE: Whether or not Guillen should be held guilty of homicide through reckless
imprudence and less serious physical injuries instead of the crimes he was found
guilty by the lower court. (NO)

RULING: In throwing hand grenade at the President with the intention of killing him,
Guillen acted with malice. He is therefore liable for all the consequences of his
wrongful act; for in accordance with Article 4 of the RPC, criminal liability is
incurred by any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done
be different from that which he intended. In criminal negligence, the injury caused to
another should be unintentional, it being simply the incident of another act performed
without malice. In order that an act may be qualified as imprudence it is necessary
that neither malice nor intention to cause injury should intervene; where such
intention exists, the act should be qualified by the felony it has produced even though
it may not have been the intention of the actor to cause an evil of such gravity as that
produced. A deliberate intent to do an unlawful act is essentially inconsistent with the
idea of reckless imprudence. Where such unlawful act is wilfully done, a mistake in
the identity of the intended victim cannot be considered as reckless imprudence.
Guillen’s testimony supports the Court’s conclusion. He stated that he performed the
act voluntarily; that his purpose was to kill the President, but that it did not make any
difference to him if there were some people around the President when he hurled that
bomb, because the killing of those who surrounded the President was tantamount to
killing the President, in view of the fact that those persons, being loyal to the
President, were identified with the latter. In other words, although it was not his main
intention to kill the persons surrounding the President, he felt no compunction in
killing them also in order to attain his main purpose of killing the President. The
killing of Simeon Varela was attended by the qualifying circumstance of treachery.
Treachery may be properly considered, even when the victim of the attack was not the
one whom the defendant intended to kill, if it appears from the evidence that neither
of the two persons could in any manner put up defense against the attack, or become
aware of it.

Guillen attempted to kill President Roxas by throwing a hand grenade at him with the
intention to kill him, thereby commencing the commission of a felony by overt acts,
but he did not succeed in assassinating him "by reason of some cause or accidents
other than his own spontaneous desistance” thus qualifying the injuries caused on the
four other persons already named as merely attempted and not frustrated murder.
In this connection, it should be stated that, although there is abundant proof that, in
violation of the provisions of article 148 of the Revised Penal Code, the accused
Guillen has committed among others the offense of assault upon a person in authority.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee, vs. GINES

ALBURQUERQUE Y SANCHEZ, defendant-appellant. G.R. No. 38773,
SECOND DIVISION

In his testimony the appellant emphatically affirmed that he only wanted to inflict a
wound that would leave a permanent scar on the face of the deceased, or one that
would compel him to remain in the hospital for a week or two but never intended to
kill him, because then it would frustrate his plan of compelling him to marry or, at
least, support his daughter. The appellant had stated this intention in some of his
letters to the deceased by way of a threat to induce him to accept his proposal for the
benefit of his daughter. That the act of the appellant is stabbing the deceased resulted
in the fatal wound at the base of his neck, was due solely to the fact hereinbefore
mentioned that appellant did not have control of his right arm on account of paralysis
and the blow, although intended for the face, landed at the base of the neck.
FACTS: The appellant herein, who is a widower of fifty-five years of age and father
of nine living children, has been suffering from partial paralysis form some time,
walks dragging one leg and has lost control of the movement of his right arm. He has
been unable to work since he suffered the stroke of paralysis. Among the daughters
living with Maria, one named Pilar became acquainted and had intimate relations later
with the deceased Manuel Osma about the end of the year 1928. It was then that the
appellant became acquainted with the deceased who frequently visited Pilar in his
house. The relations between Pilar and the deceased culminated in Pilar's giving birth
to a child. The appellant did not know that his daughter's relations with the deceased
had gone to such extremes, that he had to be deceived with the information that she
had gone to her godfather's house in Singalong, when in fact she had been taken to the
Chinese Hospital for delivery. The appellant learned the truth only when Pilar
returned home with her child. The appellant was in such a mood when he presented
himself one day at the office where the deceased worked and asked leave of the
manager thereof to speak to Osma. They both went downstairs. What happened later,
nobody witnessed. But the undisputed fact is that on that occasion the appellant
inflicted a wound at the base of the neck of the deceased, causing his death. After
excluding the improbable portions thereof, the court infers from the testimony of the
appellant that he proposed to said deceased to marry his daughter and that, upon
hearing that the latter refused to do so, he whipped out his penknife. Upon seeing the
appellant's attitude, the deceased tried to seize him by the neck whereupon the said
appellant stabbed him on the face with the said penknife. Due to his lack of control of
the movement of his arm, the weapon landed on the base of the neck of the deceased.

ISSUE: Whether or not appellant is guilty considering the crime committed was
different from what was intended (YES)

RULING: The trial court found that the appellant did not intend to cause so grave an
injury as the death of the deceased. The Court finds that this conclusion is supported
by the evidence. In his testimony the appellant emphatically affirmed that he only
wanted to inflict a wound that would leave a permanent scar on the face of the
deceased, or one that would compel him to remain in the hospital for a week or two
but never intended to kill him, because then it would frustrate his plan of compelling
him to marry or, at least, support his daughter. The appellant had stated this intention
in some of his letters to the deceased by way of a threat to induce him to accept his
proposal for the benefit of his daughter. That the act of the appellant is stabbing the
deceased resulted in the fatal wound at the base of his neck, was due solely to the fact
hereinbefore mentioned that appellant did not have control of his right arm on account
of paralysis and the blow, although intended for the face, landed at the base of the
neck. Therefore, the mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to cause so grave an
injury as the death of the deceased as well as those of his having voluntarily
surrendered himself to the authorities, and acted under the influence of passion and
obfuscation, should be taken into consideration in favor of the appellant. The defense
likewise claims that, at all events, article 49 of the Revised Penal Code, which refers
to cases where the crime committed is different from that intended by the accused,
should be applied herein. This article is a reproduction of article 64 of the old Code
and has been interpreted as applicable only in cases where the crime committed
befalls a different person (decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain of October 20,
1897, and June 28, 1899), which is not the case herein.

SALUD VILLANUEVA VDA. DE BATACLAN and the minors NORMA,

LUZVIMINDA, ELENITA, OSCAR and ALFREDO BATACLAN, represented
by their Natural guardian, SALUD VILLANUEVA VDA. DE BATACLAN,
plaintiffs-appellants, vs. MARIANO MEDINA, defendant-appellant G.R. No. L-
10126, October 22, 1957, EN BANC, J.MONTEMAYOR

[Proximate cause] is 'that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence,

unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which
the result would not have occurred In the present case and under the circumstances
obtaining in the same, the Court does not hesitate to hold that the proximate cause of
the death of Bataclan was the overturning of the bus, this for the reason that when the
vehicle turned not only on its side but completely on its back, the leaking of the
gasoline from the tank was not unnatural or unexpected.the coming of the men with
the torch was to be expected and was a natural sequence of the overturning of the
bus, the trapping of some of its passengers and the call for outside help.

FACTS: Shortly after midnight, bus No. 30 of the Medina Transportation, operated by
its owner, defendant Mariano Medina, under a certificate of public convenience, left
the town of Amadeo, Cavite, on its way to Pasay City. At about 2 :00 o'clock that
same morning, while the bus was running within the jurisdiction of Imus, Cavite, one
of the front tires burst and the vehicle began to zig-zag until it fell into a canal or ditch
on the right side of the road and turned turtle. After half an hour, came about ten men,
one of them carrying a lighted torch made of bamboo with a wick on one end,
evidently fueled with petroleum. These men presumably approached the overturned
bus, and almost immediately, a fierce fire started, burning and all but consuming the
bus, including the four passengers trapped inside it. It would appear that as the bus
overturned, gasoline began to leak and escape from the gasoline tank on the side of
the chassis, spreading over and permeating the body of the bus and the ground under
and around it, and that the lighted torch brought by one of the men who answered the
call for help set it on fire That same day, the charred bodies of the four doomed
passengers inside the bus were removed and duly identified, specially that of Juan
Bataclan. By reason of his death, his widow, Salud Villanueva, in her name and in
behalf of her five minor children, brought the present suit to recover from Mariano
Medina compensatory, moral, and exemplary damages and attorney's fees . The Court
of First Instance awarded damages to the plaintiff only for the physical injuries
suffered by Bataclan opining tat the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan was not
the overturning of the bus, but rather, the fire that burned the bus.

ISSUE: Whether the fire is the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan

RULING: NO. A satisfactory definition of proximate cause is found in Volume 38,

pages 695-696 of American Jurisprudence, cited by plaintiffs-appellants in their brief.
It is as follows: ". . . 'that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken
by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result
would not have occurred.' And more comprehensively, 'the proximate legal cause is
that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events
in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a
close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain
immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which
first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event
should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to
expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might
probably result therefrom." In the present case and under the circumstances obtaining
in the same, the Court does not hesitate to hold that the proximate cause of the death
of Bataclan was the overturning of the bus, this for the reason that when the vehicle
turned not only on its side but completely on its back, the leaking of the gasoline from
the tank was not unnatural or unexpected; that the coming of the men with a lighted
torch was in response to the call for help, made not only by the passengers, but most
probably, by the driver and the conductor themselves, and that because it was very
dark (about 2:30 in the morning), the rescuers had to carry a light with them; and
coming as they did from a rural area where lanterns and flashlights were not available,
they had to use a torch, the most handy and available; and what was more natural than
that said rescuers should innocently approach the overturned vehicle to extend the aid
and effect the rescue requested from them. In other words, the coming of the men
with the torch was to be expected and was a natural sequence of the overturning of the
bus, the trapping of some of its passengers and the call for outside help. What is more,
the burning of the bus can also in part be attributed to the negligence of the carrier,
through its driver and its conductor. According to the witnesses, the driver and the
conductor were on the road walking back and forth. They, or at least, the driver
should and must have known that in the position in which the overturned bus was,
gasoline could and must have leaked from the gasoline tank and soaked the area in
and around the bus, this aside from the fact that gasoline when spilled, specially over
a large area, can be smelt and detected even from a distance, and yet neither the driver
nor the conductor would appear to have cautioned or taken steps to warn the rescuers
not to bring the lighted torch too near the bus.