G.R. No. 123169 November 4, 1996 Petitioner's argument is simple and to the point.

Citing Section 74 (b) of

Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code,
DANILO E. PARAS, petitioner, which states that "no recall shall take place within one (1) year from the
vs. date of the official's assumption to office or one (1) year immediately
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent. preceding a regular local election", petitioner insists that the scheduled
January 13, 1996 recall election is now barred as the Sangguniang
RESOLUTION Kabataan (SK) election was set by Republic Act No. 7808 on the first
Monday of May 1996, and every three years thereafter. In support
thereof, petitioner cites Associated Labor Union v. Letrondo-Montejo, 237
SCRA 621, where the Court considered the SK election as a regular local
election. Petitioner maintains that as the SK election is a regular local
FRANCISCO, J.: election, hence no recall election can be had for barely four months
separate the SK election from the recall election. We do not agree.
Petitioner Danilo E. Paras is the incumbent Punong Barangay of Pula,
Cabanatuan City who won during the last regular barangay election in The subject provision of the Local Government Code provides:
1994. A petition for his recall as Punong Barangay was filed by the
registered voters of the barangay. Acting on the petition for recall, public
Sec. 74. Limitations on Recall. — (a) Any elective local
respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) resolved to approve
official may be the subject of a recall election only once
the petition, scheduled the petition signing on October 14, 1995, and set
during his term of office for loss of confidence.
the recall election on November 13,
1995.1 At least 29.30% of the registered voters signed the petition, well
above the 25% requirement provided by law. The COMELEC, however, (b) No recall shall take place within one (1) year from the
deferred the recall election in view of petitioner's opposition. On date of the official's assumption to office or one (1) year
December 6, 1995, the COMELEC set anew the recall election, this time immediately preceding a regular local election.
on December 16, 1995. To prevent the holding of the recall election,
petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City a [Emphasis added]
petition for injunction, docketed as SP Civil Action No. 2254-AF, with the
trial court issuing a temporary restraining order. After conducting a It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be
summary hearing, the trial court lifted the restraining order, dismissed the interpreted with reference to the context, i.e., that every part of the statute
petition and required petitioner and his counsel to explain why they must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to
should not be cited for contempt for misrepresenting that the barangay the general intent of the whole enactment.4 The evident intent of Section
recall election was without COMELEC approval.2 74 is to subject an elective local official to recall election once during his
term of office. Paragraph (b) construed together with paragraph (a)
In a resolution dated January 5, 1996, the COMELEC, for the third time, merely designates the period when such elective local official may be
re-scheduled the recall election an January 13, 1996; hence, the instant subject of a recall election, that is, during the second year of his term of
petition for certiorari with urgent prayer for injunction. On January 12, office. Thus, subscribing to petitioner's interpretation of the phrase regular
1996, the Court issued a temporary restraining order and required the local election to include the SK election will unduly circumscribe the novel
Office of the Solicitor General, in behalf of public respondent, to comment provision of the Local Government Code on recall, a mode of removal of
on the petition. In view of the Office of the Solicitor General's public officers by initiation of the people before the end of his term. And if
manifestation maintaining an opinion adverse to that of the COMELEC, the SK election which is set by R.A No. 7808 to be held every three years
the latter through its law department filed the required comment. from May 1996 were to be deemed within the purview of the phrase
Petitioner thereafter filed a reply.3 "regular local election", as erroneously insisted by petitioner, then no
recall election can be conducted rendering inutile the recall provision of
the Local Government Code.
In the interpretation of a statute, the Court should start with the Nevertheless, recall at this time is no longer possible because of the
assumption that the legislature intended to enact an effective law, and the limitation stated under Section 74 (b) of the Code considering that the
legislature is not presumed to have done a vain thing in the enactment of next regular election involving the barangay office concerned is barely
a statute.5 An interpretation should, if possible, be avoided under which a seven (7) months away, the same having been scheduled on May 1997. 9
statute or provision being construed is defeated, or as otherwise
expressed, nullified, destroyed, emasculated, repealed, explained away, ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby dismissed for having become
or rendered insignificant, meaningless, inoperative or nugatory.6 moot and academic. The temporary restraining order issued by the Court
on January 12, 1996, enjoining the recall election should be as it is
It is likewise a basic precept in statutory construction that a statute should hereby made permanent.
be interpreted in harmony with the Constitution.7 Thus, the interpretation
of Section 74 of the Local Government Code, specifically paragraph (b) SO ORDERED.
thereof, should not be in conflict with the Constitutional mandate of
Section 3 of Article X of the Constitution to "enact a local government Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug,
code which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local Kapunan, Mendoza, Hermosisima, Jr., Panganiban and Torres, Jr., JJ.,
government structure instituted through a system of decentralization concur.
with effective mechanism of recall, initiative, and referendum . . . ."

Moreover, petitioner's too literal interpretation of the law leads to

absurdity which we cannot countenance. Thus, in a case, the Court made
the following admonition:

We admonish against a too-literal reading of the law as

this is apt to constrict rather than fulfill its purpose and
defeat the intention of its authors. That intention is usually Separate Opinions
found not in "the letter that killeth but in the spirit that
vivifieth". . .8

The spirit, rather than the letter of a law determines its

DAVIDE, JR., J., concurring:
construction; hence, a statute, as in this case, must be read
according to its spirit and intent.
I concur with Mr. Justice Ricardo J. Francisco in his ponencia.
Finally, recall election is potentially disruptive of the normal working of the
local government unit necessitating additional expenses, hence the However, I wish to add another reason as to why the SK election cannot
prohibition against the conduct of recall election one year immediately be considered a "regular local election" for purposes of recall under
preceding the regular local election. The proscription is due to the Section 74 of the Local Government Code of 1991.
proximity of the next regular election for the office of the local elective
official concerned. The electorate could choose the official's replacement The term "regular local election" must be confined to the regular election
in the said election who certainly has a longer tenure in office than a of elective local officials, as distinguished from the regular election of
successor elected through a recall election. It would, therefore, be more national officials. The elective national officials are the President, Vice-
in keeping with the intent of the recall provision of the Code to President, Senators and Congressmen. The elective local officials are
construe regular local election as one referring to an election where the Provincial Governors, Vice-Governors of provinces, Mayors and Vice-
office held by the local elective official sought to be recalled will be Mayors of cities and municipalities, Members of the Sanggunians of
contested and be filled by the electorate. provinces, cities and municipalities, punong barangays and members of
the sangguniang barangays, and the elective regional officials of the
Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao. These are the only local right of suffrage under Article V of the Constitution, who are likewise
elective officials deemed recognized by Section 2(2) of Article IX-C of the registered voters of the barangay. This shows further that the SK election
Constitution, which provides: is not a regular local election for purposes of recall under Section 74 of
the Local Government Code.
Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the
following powers and functions:

xxx xxx xxx Separate Opinions

(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests DAVIDE, JR., J., concurring:
relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all
elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and I concur with Mr. Justice Ricardo J. Francisco in his ponencia.
appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective
municipal officials decided by trial courts of general However, I wish to add another reason as to why the SK election cannot
jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials be considered a "regular local election" for purposes of recall under
decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction. Section 74 of the Local Government Code of 1991.

A regular election, whether national or local, can only refer to an election The term "regular local election" must be confined to the regular election
participated in by those who possess the right of suffrage, are not of elective local officials, as distinguished from the regular election of
otherwise disqualified by law, and who are registered voters. One of the national officials. The elective national officials are the President, Vice-
requirements for the exercise of suffrage under Section 1, Article V of the President, Senators and Congressmen. The elective local officials are
Constitution is that the person must be at least 18 years of age, and one Provincial Governors, Vice-Governors of provinces, Mayors and Vice-
requisite before he can vote is that he be a registered voter pursuant to Mayors of cities and municipalities, Members of the Sanggunians of
the rules on registration prescribed in the Omnibus Election Code provinces, cities and municipalities, punong barangays and members of
(Section 113-118). the sangguniang barangays, and the elective regional officials of the
Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao. These are the only local
Under the law, the SK includes the youth with ages ranging from 15 to 21 elective officials deemed recognized by Section 2(2) of Article IX-C of the
(Sec. 424, Local Government Code of 1991). Accordingly, they include Constitution, which provides:
many who are not qualified to vote in a regular election, viz., those from
ages 15 to less than 18. In no manner then may SK elections be Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the
considered a regular election (whether national or local). following powers and functions:

Indeed the Sangguniang Kabataan is nothing more than a youth xxx xxx xxx
organization, and although fully recognized in the Local Government
Code and vested with certain powers and functions, its elective officials
(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests
have not attained the status of local elective officials. So, in Mercado
relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all
vs. Board of Election Supervisors (243 SCRA 422 [1995]), this Court
elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and
ruled that although the SK Chairman is an ex-officio member of
appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective
the sangguniang barangay — an elective body — that fact does not make
municipal officials decided by trial courts of general
him "an elective barangay official," since the law specifically provides who
jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials
comprise the elective officials of the sangguniang barangay, viz.,
decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction.
the punong barangay and the seven (7) regular sangguniang
barangay members elected at large by those qualified to exercise the
A regular election, whether national or local, can only refer to an election 4 Aisporna v. Court of Appeals, 113 SCRA 464, 467.
participated in by those who possess the right of suffrage, are not
otherwise disqualified by law, and who are registered voters. One of the 5 Asturias Sugar Central, Inc. v. Commissioner of Customs, 29
requirements for the exercise of suffrage under Section 1, Article V of the SCRA 617, 627.
Constitution is that the person must be at least 18 years of age, and one
requisite before he can vote is that he be a registered voter pursuant to 6 Id. at p. 628.
the rules on registration prescribed in the Omnibus Election Code
(Section 113-118).
7 PLDT v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 90 Phil. 674.
Under the law, the SK includes the youth with ages ranging from 15 to 21
8 People v. Salas, 143 SCRA 163, 167.
(Sec. 424, Local Government Code of 1991). Accordingly, they include
many who are not qualified to vote in a regular election, viz., those from
ages 15 to less than 18. In no manner then may SK elections be 9 Petition, p. 3; Rollo, p. 5; See: Evardorne v. COMELEC, 204
considered a regular election (whether national or local). SCRA 464.

Indeed the Sangguniang Kabataan is nothing more than a youth

organization, and although fully recognized in the Local Government
Code and vested with certain powers and functions, its elective officials
have not attained the status of local elective officials. So, in Mercado
vs. Board of Election Supervisors (243 SCRA 422 [1995]), this Court
ruled that although the SK Chairman is an ex-officio member of
the sangguniang barangay — an elective body — that fact does not make
him "an elective barangay official," since the law specifically provides who
comprise the elective officials of the sangguniang barangay, viz.,
the punong barangay and the seven (7) regular sangguniang
barangay members elected at large by those qualified to exercise the
right of suffrage under Article V of the Constitution, who are likewise
registered voters of the barangay. This shows further that the SK election
is not a regular local election for purposes of recall under Section 74 of
the Local Government Code.

Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Bellosillo, Vitug and Mendoza, JJ.,

concur.

Footnotes

1 COMELEC Resolution No. 95-3345, September 5, 1995.

2 RTC, Cabanatuan City, Order dated December 20, 1995; Rollo,

p. 28.

3 Rollo, pp. 64-66.

 [G.R. No. L-28771. March 31, 1971.] marriage on March 28. 1962. She is therefore his widow. As provided in
the Civil Code, she is entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the
CORNELIA MATABUENA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PETRONILA plaintiff, as the surviving sister to the other half.
CERVANTES, Defendant-Appellee.

Alegre, Roces, Salazar & Sañez, for Plaintiff-Appellant. DECISION

Fernando Gerona, Jr., for Defendant-Appellee.

FERNANDO, J.:

SYLLABUS
A question of first impression is before this Court in this litigation. We are
called upon to decide whether the ban on a donation between the spouses
1. CIVIL LAW; PROPERTY RELATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE; during a marriage applies to a common-law relationship. 1 The plaintiff,
DONATIONS BY REASON OF MARRIAGE; PROHIBITION AGAINST now appellant Cornelia Matabuena, a sister to the deceased Felix
DONATION BETWEEN SPOUSES DURING MARRIAGE; APPLICABLE TO Matabuena, maintains that a donation made while he was living maritally
COMMON LAW RELATIONSHIP. — While Art. 133 of the Civil Code without benefit of marriage to defendant, now appellee Petronila
considers as void a "donation between the spouses during the marriage", Cervantes, was void. Defendant would uphold its validity. The lower court,
policy considerations of the most exigent character as well as the dictates after noting that it was made at a time before defendant was married to
of morality require that the same prohibition should apply to a common- the donor, sustained the latter’s stand. Hence this appeal. The question, as
law relationship. A 1954 Court of Appeals decision Buenaventura v. noted, is novel in character, this Court not having had as yet the
Bautista, (50 O.G. 3679) interpreting a similar provision of the old Civil opportunity of ruling on it. A 1954 decision of the Court of Appeals,
Code speaks unequivocally. If the policy of the law is, in the language of Buenaventura v. Bautista, 2 by the then Justice J. B. L. Reyes, who was
the opinion of the then Justice J.B.L. Reyes of that Court, "to prohibit appointed to this Court later that year, is indicative of the appropriate
donations in favor of the other consort and his descendants because of response that should be given. The conclusion reached therein is that a
fear of undue and improper pressure and influence upon the donor, a donation between common-law spouses falls within the prohibition and is
prejudice deeply rooted in our ancient law; ’porque no se engañen "null and void as contrary to public policy." 3 Such a view merits fully the
despojandose el uno al otro por amor que han de consuno,’ [according to] acceptance of this Court. The decision must be reversed.
the Partidas (Part. IV, Tit. Xl, LAW IV), reiterating the rationale ’Ne
mutuato amore invicem spoliarentur’ of the Pandects (Bk 24, Tit. I, De In the decision of November 23, 1965, the lower court, after stating that in
donat, inter virum et uxorem); then there is every reason to apply the plaintiff’s complaint alleging absolute ownership of the parcel of land in
same prohibitive policy to persons living together as husband and wife question, she specifically raised the question that the donation made by
without benefit of nuptials. For it is not to be doubted that assent to such Felix Matabuena to defendant Petronila Cervantes was null and void under
irregular connection for thirty years bespeaks greater influence of one the aforesaid article of the Civil Code and that defendant on the other
party over the other, so that the danger that the law seeks to avoid is hand did assert ownership precisely because such a donation was made in
correspondingly increased. Moreover, as already pointed out by Ulpian (in 1956 and her marriage to the deceased did not take place until 1962,
his lib. 32 ad Sabinum, fr. 1), it would not be just that such donations noted that when the case was called for trial on November 19, 1965, there
should subsist lest the condition of those who incurred guilt should turn was stipulation of facts which it quoted. 4 Thus: "The plaintiff and the
out to be better. So long as marriage remains the cornerstone of our defendant assisted by their respective counsels, jointly agree and
family law, reason and morality alike demand that the disabilities attached stipulate: (1) That the deceased Felix Matabuena owned the property in
to marriage should likewise attach to concubinage. question; (2) That said Felix Matabuena executed a Deed of Donation inter
vivos in favor of Defendant, Petronila Cervantes over the parcel of land in
2. ID.; SUCCESSION; INTESTATE SUCCESSION; SURVIVING SPOUSE; question on February 20, 1956, which same donation was accepted by
RULE WHERE A SISTER SURVIVES WITH THE WIDOW. — The lack of defendant; (3) That the donation of the land to the defendant which took
validity of the donation made b~ the deceased to defendant Petronila effect immediately was made during the common law relationship as
Cervantes does not necessarily result in plaintiff having exclusive right to husband and wife between the defendant-done and the now deceased
the disputed property. Prior to the death of Felix Matabuena, the donor and later said donor and done were married on March 28, 1962; (4)
relationship between him and the defendant was legitimated by their That the deceased Felix Matabuena died intestate on September 13, 1962;
(5) That the plaintiff claims the property by reason of being the only sister disabilities would be attended with benefits. Certainly a legal norm should
and nearest collateral relative of the deceased by virtue of an affidavit of not be susceptible to such a reproach. If there is ever any occasion where
self-adjudication executed by her in 1962 and had the land declared in her the principle of statutory construction that what is within the spirit of the
name and paid the estate and inheritance taxes thereon’" 5 law is as much a part of it as what is written, this is it. Otherwise the basic
purpose discernible in such codal provision would not be attained.
The judgment of the lower court on the above facts was adverse to Whatever omission may be apparent in an interpretation purely literal of
plaintiff. It reasoned out thus: "A donation under the terms of Article 133 the language used must be remedied by an adherence to its avowed
of the Civil Code is void if made between the spouses during the marriage. objective. In the language of Justice Pablo: "El espiritu que informa la ley
When the donation was made by Felix Matabuena in favor of the defendant debe ser la luz que ha de guiar a los tribunales en la aplicación de sus
on February 20, 1956, Petronila Cervantes and Felix Matabuena were not disposiciones.’’ 10
yet married. At that time they were not spouses. They became spouses
only when they married on March 28, 1962, six years after the deed of 3. The lack of validity of the donation made by the deceased to defendant
donation had been executed." 6 Petronila Cervantes does not necessarily result in plaintiff having exclusive
right to the disputed property. Prior to the death of Felix Matabuena, the
We reach a different conclusion. While Art. 133 of the Civil Code considers relationship between him and the defendant was legitimated by their
as void a "donation between the spouses during the marriage," policy marriage on March 28, 1962. She is therefore his widow. As provided for in
considerations of the most exigent character as well as the dictates of the Civil Code, she is entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the
morality require that the same prohibition should apply to a common-law plaintiff, as the surviving sister, to the other half. 11
relationship. We reverse.
WHEREFORE, the lower court decision of November 23, 1965 dismissing
1. As announced at the outset of this opinion, a 1954 Court of Appeals the complaint with costs is reversed. The questioned donation is declared
decision, Buenaventura v. Bautista, 7 interpreting a similar provision of the void, with the rights of plaintiff and defendant as pro indiviso heirs to the
old Civil Code 8 speaks unequivocally. If the policy of the law is, in the property in question recognized. The case is remanded to the lower court
language of the opinion of the then Justice J.B.L. Reyes of that Court, "to for its appropriate disposition in accordance with the above opinion.
prohibit donations in favor of the other consort and his descendants Without pronouncement as to costs.
because of fear of undue and improper pressure and influence upon the
donor, a prejudice deeply rooted in our ancient law; ’porque no se Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro,
engañen despojandose el uno al otro por amor que han de consuno Barredo, Villamor and Makasiar, JJ., concur.
[according to] the Partidas (Part IV, Tit. XI, LAW IV), reiterating the
rationale ’Ne mutuato amore invicem spoliarentur’ of the Pandects (Bk. 24, Teehankee, J, took no part.
Tit. 1, De donat, inter virum et uxorem); then there is every reason to
apply the same prohibitive policy to persons living together as husband
and wife without the benefit of nuptials. For it is not to be doubted that
assent to such irregular connection for thirty years bespeaks greater
influence of one party over the other, so that the danger that the law
seeks to avoid is correspondingly increased. Moreover, as already pointed
out by Ulpian (in his lib. 32 ad Sabinum, fr. 1), ’it would not be just that
such donations should subsist, lest the condition of those who incurred
guilt should turn out to be better.’ So long as marriage remains the
cornerstone of our family law, reason and morality alike demand that the
disabilities attached to marriage should likewise attach to concubinage." 9

2. It is hardly necessary to add that even in the absence of the above

pronouncement, any other conclusion cannot stand the test of scrutiny. It
would be to indict the framers of the Civil Code for a failure to apply a
laudable rule to a situation which in its essentials cannot be distinguished.
Moreover, if it is at all to be differentiated, the policy of the law which
embodies a deeply-rooted notion of what is just and what is right would be
nullified if such irregular relationship instead of being visited with
 [G.R. No. L-8639. March 23, 1956.]
DECISION
In the Matter of the Adoption of the Minors Pablo Vasquez Ernesto
Vasquez, Maria Lourdes Vasquez and Elizabeth Prasnik. LEOPOLDO
PRASNIK, Petitioner-Appellee, v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
oppositor-appellant.

Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Federico V. Sian for

appellant. Leopoldo Prasnik filed before the Court of First Instance of Rizal a petition
seeking to adopt Pablo Vasquez, Ernesto Vasquez, Maria Lourdes Vasquez
Carlos P. Paras for appellee. and Elizabeth Prasnik who are the minor children of Paz Vasquez. He
claims that they are also his children but without the benefit of marriage
SYLLABUS and he desires to adopt them to promote their best interest and well-
being. Since at the hearing of the petition petitioner acknowledged that
1. ADOPTION; NATURAL CHILDREN, WHETHER RECOGNIZED OR NOT MAY they are his natural children, the Solicitor General opposed the petition on
BE ADOPTED. — Article 338 of the new Civil Code evidently intends to the plea that he could not legally adopt them for the reason that Article
allow adoption of a natural child whether the child be recognized or not. If 338 of the new Civil Code which allows a natural child to be adopted by his
the intention were to allow adoption only to unrecognized children, then natural father refers only to a child who has not been acknowledged as
said article would be of no useful purpose because such children could natural child. At first the court upheld the opposition but, on a motion for
have been validly adopted even without it. This is so because a natural reconsideration, the court reconsidered its decision and granted the
child not recognized has no right whatever and being considered legally a petition. Hence this appeal.
total stranger to his parents, he may be adopted under Article 337. The
same cannot be said with regard to an acknowledged natural child Leopoldo Prasnik was formerly married to one Catherine Prasnik but their
because, his filiation having already been established, his adoption cannot marriage was dissolved by virtue of a decree of divorce issued on
be made under the general principles governing adoption. There is December 12, 1947 by the Circuit Court of Miami, Dade Country, Florida,
therefore need of an express provision allowing the adoption of an U.S.A. Thereafter, he and Paz Vasquez lived together as husband and wife
acknowledged natural child as an exception to the rule and that is what is without the benefit of marriage and out of this relation four children were
contemplated in Article 338. born who are the minors he is now seeking to adopt. He claims that it is
his intention to marry Paz Vasquez as soon as he is granted Philippine
2. ID.; ID.; PROHIBITION AGAINST PERSON WHO HAS ALREADY citizenship for which he has already applied and in the meantime he wants
ACKNOWLEDGED NATURAL CHILD TO ADOPT; TO WHOM APPLICABLE. — to adopt them in order that no one of his relatives abroad could share in
The prohibition against a person who has an acknowledged natural child to his inheritance. He averred that he had no child with his former wife and
adopt, provided in Article 335 of the new Civil Code, refers to the adoption acknowledged said minors as his natural children.
of a minor by a person who has already an acknowledged natural child and
it does not refer to the adoption of his own children even if he has Article 338 of the new Civil Code provides that a natural child may be
acknowledged them as his natural children. adopted by his natural father or mother. The Solicitor General interprets
this provision in the sense that in order that a natural child may be
3. ID.; ID.; NECESSITY OF ADOPTING ACKNOWLEDGED NATURAL adopted by his natural father or mother there should not mediate between
CHILDREN; EFFECT OF. — It may be contended that the adoption of an them an acknowledgment of the status of natural child by the father or
acknowledged natural child is unnecessary because there already exists mother as otherwise the adoption would be repugnant to Article 335 of the
between the father and the children the relation of paternity and filiation same Code which denies adoption to one who has an acknowledged
which is precisely the purpose which adoption seeks to accomplish through natural child. And since petitioner has expressly admitted in open court
legal fiction. But it should be borne in mind that the rights of an that the minors subject of this proceeding are his natural children, he is
acknowledged natural child are much less than those of a legitimate child therefore disqualified to adopt under the law.
and it is indeed to the great advantage of the latter if he be given, even
through legal fiction, a legitimate trend which considers adoption as an act We do not agree to this interpretation. Apparently, Article 338 above
not merely to establish the relation of paternity and filiation but one which adverted to merely refers to the adoption of a natural child and not to one
may give the child a legitimate status. who has already been recognized, but there is nothing therein which would
prohibit the adoption of an acknowledged natural child even if the law does and his main desire is to give a legitimate status to his four natural
not expressly say so. The reason for the silence of the law is obvious. That children. This attitude, far from being opposed, should be encouraged. This
law evidently intends to allow adoption whether the child be recognized or is in keeping with the modern trend of the law concerning adoption (In re
not. If the intention were to allow adoption only to unrecognized children, Havagord’s Estate, supra).
as contended, then the provision of Article 338 would be of no useful
purpose because such children could have been validly adopted even The decision appealed from is affirmed, without pronouncement as to
without it. And we say so because a natural child not recognized has no costs.
right whatever 1 and being considered legally a total stranger to his
parents, he may be adopted under Article 337. The same cannot be said Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, A., Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.
with regard to an acknowledged natural child because, his filiation having B. L. and Endencia, JJ., concur.
already been established, his adoption cannot be made under the general
principles governing adoption (2 Manresa 5th ed., 80). There is therefore
need of an express provision allowing the adoption of an acknowledged
natural child as an exception to the rule and that is what is contemplated
in the article we are considering.

The Solicitor General, in his opposition to the petition, invokes Article 335
of the new Civil Code which provides that a person who has an
acknowledged natural child cannot adopt and considering that petitioner
has acknowledged the minors in question as his children, he contends that
he is disqualified from adopting them under that article. We believe that
the Solicitor General has not made a correct interpretation of that article
for he is confusing the children of the person adopting with the minors to
be adopted. A cursory reading of said article would reveal that the
prohibition merely refers to the adoption of a minor by a person who has
already an acknowledged natural child and it does not refer to the
adoption of his own children even if he has acknowledged them as his
natural children.

It may be contended that the adoption of an acknowledged natural child is

unnecessary because there already exists between the father and the child
the relation of paternity and filiation which is precisely the purpose which
adoption seeks to accomplish through legal fiction. But it should be borne
in mind that the rights of an acknowledged natural child are much less
than those of a legitimate child and it is indeed to the great advantage of
the latter if he be given, even through legal fiction, a legitimate status.
And this view is in keeping with the modern trend of adoption statutes
which have been adopted precisely to encourage adoption (In re
Havagord’s Estate, 34 S. D. 131, 147 N. W. 378). Under this modern
trend, adoption is deemed not merely an act to establish the relation of
paternity and filiation but one which may give the child a legitimate status.
It is in this sense that adoption is now defined as "a juridical act which
creates between two persons a relationship similar to that which results
from legitimate paternity and filiation" (4 Valverde, 473).

The cases cited by the Solicitor General are not in point. 2 In said cases
the petitioners had legitimate children of their own and so their petitions
were denied. They are indeed disqualified from adopting under the law. In
the present case however, petitioner does not have any legitimate children
G.R. No. L-68709 July 19, 1985 presently hold notwithstanding the filing of their
certificates of candidacy.
NAPOLEON E. SANCIANGCO, petitioner,
vs. (2) Governors, mayors, members of the various
THE HONORABLE JOSE A. ROÑO Minister, Ministry of Local sanggunians or barangay officials shall, upon filing
Government; THE SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD OF OZAMIZ CITY; certificate of candidacy be considered on forced leave of
THE HONORABLE BENJAMIN A. FUENTES, Vice Mayor of Ozamiz absence from office. (Emphasis supplied)
City and Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Ozamiz City; THE HONORABLE ANTONIO G. CABALLERO, JESUS Petitioner was elected Barangay Captain of Barangay Sta. Cruz, Ozamiz
S. ANONAT, MANUEL T. CORTES, IRENE S. LUANSING, REMEDIOS City, in the May 17, 1982 Barangay elections. Later, he was elected
J. RAMIRO, DOMINADOR B. BORJE, FILOMENO L. ROMERO, President of the Association of Barangay Councils (ABC) of Ozamiz City
FLORENCIO L. GARCIA, and HARRY S. OAMINAL Members, by the Board of Directors of the said Association. As the President of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Ozamiz City, respondents. Association, petitioner was appointed by the President of the Philippines
as a member of the City's Sangguniang Panlungsod.
Abraham F. Sarmiento and Mariano Sarmiento for petitioner.
On March 27, 1984, petitioner filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the
The Solicitor General for respondents. May 14, 1984 Batasan Pambansa elections for Misamis Occidental under
the banner of the Mindanao Alliance. He was not successful in the said
election.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.: Invoking Section 13(2), Article 5 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 697 (supra),
petitioner informed respondent Vice-Mayor Benjamin A. Fuentes,
The sole issue for determination in this Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, that he was resuming
and mandamus with Preliminary Injunction and/or Restraining Order is his duties as member of that body. The matter was elevated to
whether or not an appointive member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, respondent Minister of Local Government Jose A. Rono who ruled that
who ran for the position of Mambabatas Pambansa in the elections of since petitioner is an appointive official, he is deemed to have resigned
May 14, 1984, should be considered as resigned or on forced leave of from his appointive position upon the filing of his Certificate of Candidacy.
absence upon the filing of his Certificate of Candidacy. The resolution of
the controversy hinges on the construction to be given to Section 13 of Petitioner impugns said ruling on the ground that since Section 13(2) of
Batas Pambansa Blg, 697, which provides as follows: Batasan Pambansa Blg. 697 makes no distinction between elective and
appointive officials, the legislative intent is clear that even appointive
Sec. 13. Effects of filing of certificate of candidacy. Barangay officials are deemed also covered by the said provision.

(1) Any person holding a public appointive office or There is no question that petitioner holds a public appointive position. He
position, including active officers and members of the was appointed by the President as a member of the City's Sangguniang
Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Integrated Panlungsod by virtue of his having been elected President of the
National Police, as well as officials and employees of Association of Barangay Councils. This was pursuant to Section 3,
government-owned and government-controlled paragraph 1 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 51 (An Act Providing for the elective
corporations and their subsidiaries, shall ipso facto cease or Appointive Positions in Various Local Governments and for Other
in office or position as of the time he filed his certificate of Purposes), which provides that:
candidacy: Provided, however, that the Prime Minister,
the Deputy Prime Minister, the Members of the Cabinet, Sec. 3. Cities. —There shall be in each city such elective
and the Deputy Ministers shall continue in the offices they local officials as provided in their respective charters,
 including the city mayor, the city vice-mayor, and appointive positions in section 13(l) under the all-encompassing clause
the elective members of the sangguniang panglungsod, reading "any person holding public appointive office or position," is clear.
all of whom shall be elected by the qualified voters in the It is a rule of statutory construction that "when the language of a particular
city. In addition thereto, there shall be appointive section of a statute admits of more than one construction, that
sangguniang panglungsod members consisting of the construction which gives effect to the evident purpose and object sought
president of the city association of barangay councils, the to be attained by the enactment of the statute as a whole, must be
president of the city federation of the kabataang followed." 1
barangay, and one representative each from the
agricultural and industrial labor sectors who shall be A statute's clauses and phrases should not be taken as
appointed by, the president (Prime Minister) whenever, as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and
determined by the sangguniang panglungsod, said every part thereof must be considered in fixing the
sectors are of sufficient number in the city to warrant meaning of any of its parts. 2
representation. (emphasis supplied)
The legislative intent to cover public appointive officials in subsection (1),
The appointive character of petitioner's position was reiterated in Section and officials mentioned in subsection (2) which should be construed to
173 of the Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337), reading as follows: refer to local elective officials, can be gleaned from the proceedings of
the Batasan Pambansa recorded as follows:
Sec 173. Composition and Compensation. — (1) the
sangguniang panlungsod, as the legislative body of the Mr. Valdez: ... May I go to paragraph 2 of
city, shall be composed of the vice-mayor, as presiding Sec. 16, Mr. Speaker which says:
officer, the elected sangguniang panlungsod members,
and the members who may be appointed by the President Any local elective officials, including an
of the Philippines consisting of the presidents of the elected barangay official shall ipso facto
Katipunan panglungsod ng mga barangay and the cease in his office or position as at the
Kabataang barangay, city federation. (Emphasis supplied) time he filed his certificate of candidacy,
unless otherwise provided by law. (later
Since petitioner is unquestionably an appointive member of the amended and is now Subsection 2 of sec.
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Ozamiz City, he is deemed to have ipso 13)
facto ceased to be such member when he filed his certificate of
candidacy for the May 14, 1984 Batasan elections. Now, do the words 'local
elective official' refer to the
Petitioner avers, however, that the fact that he is merely an appointive office or to an incumbent
member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Ozamiz City "is really of no who has been elected, not
moment since subsection 2, Section 13. B.P. 697, makes no distinction appointed?
between elective and appointive officials, and at any rate, legislative
intent makes clear that appointive officials are deemed covered by the Mr. Albano. Paragraph 2 covers elective
provision. official; paragraph I covers appointive
officials. So, if he is an appointive local
Although it may be that Section 13(2), B.P. Blg. 697, admits of more than official he would fall under paragraph (1)
one construction, taking into consideration the nature of the positions of because it says: 'Any person holding
the officials enumerated therein, namely, governors, mayors, members of appointive office or position.' It does not
the various sanggunians or barangay officials, the legislative intent to distinguish if it is appointive or elective
distinguish between elective positions in section 13(2), as contrasted to position.
Mr. Valdez. In other words, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Albano. No. Mr. Speaker, I will call the
do I get the distinguished sponsor Gentleman's attention to paragraph 1: Any
correctly that an appointed mayor but person holding a public appointive office
holding an elective position is not within or position ... I presume and I assume that
the comprehension of this section or this the office in the barangay council is still
paragraph? contemplated in the words 'appointive
office.'
Mr. Albano. No, Mr. Speaker, that would
refer to paragraph 2. What maybe the Mr. Valdez. Under paragraph l?
Gentleman's contemplation is: Suppose a
person is appointed to the position of a Mr. Albano. Yes, Mr. Speaker. 3 (Emphasis
mayor, will he be covered under supplied)
paragraph 1 and should be cease to hold
office upon filing his Certificate of Nor do we perceive any violation of the equal protection clause, as
Candidacy? petitioner contends, since Section 13 of B.P. Blg. 697 applies alike to all
persons subject to such legislation under like circumstances and
Mr. Valdez. Yes. conditions. Neither can petitioner justifiably contend that he was removed
from office without due process of law since it was of his own choice that
Mr. Albano. I would say, yes, he would fall he ran for a seat in the Batasan Pambansa. The consequence that
under paragraph 1. But if he is an elective followed his unsuccessful attempt at the elections arose from law.
local official he would fall under paragraph
2. It goes without saying that although petitioner, by filing his certificate of
candidacy for the Batasan Pambansa ceased, ipso facto, to be an
Mr. Valdez. In other words, this is a appointive member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, he remains an
description of the mode and manner by elective Barangay Captain from which position he may be considered as
which the occupant is brought to the having been on "forced leave of absence." He also continues as
office. President of the Association of Barangay Councils but will need a
reappointment by the President, as member of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Ozamiz City as the law speaks of "members who may be
Mr. Albano. Yes.
appointed by the President."
Mr. Valdez. ... not the description of the
WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of
office itself.
respondent officials, the Writs prayed for are denied, and this Petition is
hereby ordered dismissed. No costs.
Mr. Albano. No, Mr. Speaker.
SO ORDERED.
Mr. Valdez. I see. Now we come to the
other portion which refers to elected
Fernando, C.J., Makasiar, Abad Santos, Plana, Escolin, Relova,
barangay official. Why is it that the
Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.
provision isolates the nature of the official
of the barangay who had been elected,
not appointed, is he supposed to be within Aquino and Concepcion, Jr., took no part.
the purview of paragraph 2?
 There is no question petitioner is an elected baranggay official. He was
elected barangay captain of his barangay. He was furthermore elected
Separate Opinions President of the Association of Barangay Councils (ABC) of Ozamis City,
and as such, he was entitled to be appointed, ex-oficio, as he was in fact
appointed by the President as member of the sangguniang panglunsod.
The appointment became functus oficio upon its exercise and petitioner's
assumption of the office.
TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:
Under Section 13(2) of B.P. Blg. 697 governing the 1984 election for the
There is no question petitioner is an elected baranggay official. He was Batasan Pambansa, petitioner as member of the said sanggunian should
elected barangay captain of his barangay. He was furthermore elected be considered as having gone "on forced leave of absence from office"
President of the Association of Barangay Councils (ABC) of Ozamis City, upon his filing of his certificate of candidacy and running (unsuccessfully)
and as such, he was entitled to be appointed, ex-oficio, as he was in fact for a seat to the Batasan Pambansa, like similarly situated governors and
appointed by the President as member of the sangguniang panglunsod. mayors. The letter and spirit of the Act support petitioner's position. As
The appointment became functus oficio upon its exercise and petitioner's the decision itself points out, he rightfully remains as barangay captain
assumption of the office. and president of the ABC. As president of the ABC, petitioner should be
held as merely having been on forced leave of absence from the ex oficio
Under Section 13(2) of B.P. Blg. 697 governing the 1984 election for the position of sangguniang member to which he held an appointment. He
Batasan Pambansa, petitioner as member of the said sanggunian should has correctly submitted that the law makes no distinction between
be considered as having gone "on forced leave of absence from office" elective or appointive sanggunian members. The basic position of
upon his filing of his certificate of candidacy and running (unsuccessfully) barangay captain and ABC president held by him are essentially elective.
for a seat to the Batasan Pambansa, like similarly situated governors and He cannot fall under Section 13(l) of the Act which refers to purely
mayors. The letter and spirit of the Act support petitioner's position. As appointive officials, including active officers and members of the Armed
the decision itself points out, he rightfully remains as barangay captain Forces of the Philippines and officials and employees of government-
and president of the ABC. As president of the ABC, petitioner should be owned and controlled corporations, under the statutory construction rule
held as merely having been on forced leave of absence from the ex oficio of noscitur a sociis.
position of sangguniang member to which he held an appointment. He
has correctly submitted that the law makes no distinction between
elective or appointive sanggunian members. The basic position of
barangay captain and ABC president held by him are essentially elective.
He cannot fall under Section 13(l) of the Act which refers to purely
appointive officials, including active officers and members of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines and officials and employees of government-
owned and controlled corporations, under the statutory construction rule
of noscitur a sociis.

Separate Opinions

TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:

 CONTRARY TO LAW.

G.R. No. L-39419 April 12, 1982 The facts, 4 as found by the respondent Court of Appeals are quoted
hereunder:
MAPALAD AISPORNA, petitioner,
vs. IT RESULTING: That there is no debate that since 7
THE COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE March, 1969 and as of 21 June, 1969, appellant's
PHILIPPINES, respondents. husband, Rodolfo S. Aisporna was duly licensed by
Insurance Commission as agent to Perla Compania de
Seguros, with license to expire on 30 June, 1970, Exh. C;
on that date, at Cabanatuan City, Personal Accident
Policy, Exh. D was issued by Perla thru its author
DE CASTRO, J.: representative, Rodolfo S. Aisporna, for a period of twelve
(12) months with beneficiary as Ana M. Isidro, and for
In this petition for certiorari, petitioner-accused Aisporna seeks the P5,000.00; apparently, insured died by violence during
reversal of the decision dated August 14, 1974 1 in CA-G.R. No. 13243-CR lifetime of policy, and for reasons not explained in record,
entitled "People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee, vs. Mapalad Aisporna, present information was filed by Fiscal, with assistance of
defendant-appellant" of respondent Court of Appeals affirming the judgment private prosecutor, charging wife of Rodolfo with violation
of the City Court of Cabanatuan 2 rendered on August 2, 1971 which found of Sec. 189 of Insurance Law for having, wilfully,
the petitioner guilty for having violated Section 189 of the Insurance Act (Act
unlawfully, and feloniously acted, "as agent in the
No. 2427, as amended) and sentenced her to pay a fine of P500.00 with
solicitation for insurance by soliciting therefore the
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
application of one Eugenio S. Isidro for and in behalf of
Perla Compaña de Seguros, ... without said accused
Petitioner Aisporna was charged in the City Court of Cabanatuan for having first secured a certificate of authority to act as such
violation of Section 189 of the Insurance Act on November 21, 1970 in an agent from the office of the Insurance Commission,
information 3 which reads as follows: Republic of the Philippines."
That on or before the 21st day of June, 1969, in the City and in the trial, People presented evidence that was
of Cabanatuan, Republic of the Philippines, and within the hardly disputed, that aforementioned policy was issued
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named with active participation of appellant wife of Rodolfo,
accused, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and against which appellant in her defense sought to show
feloniously act as agent in the solicitation or procurement that being the wife of true agent, Rodolfo, she naturally
of an application for insurance by soliciting therefor the helped him in his work, as clerk, and that policy was
application of one Eugenio S. Isidro, for and in behalf of merely a renewal and was issued because Isidro had
Perla Compania de Seguros, Inc., a duly organized called by telephone to renew, and at that time, her
insurance company, registered under the laws of the husband, Rodolfo, was absent and so she left a note on
Republic of the Philippines, resulting in the issuance of a top of her husband's desk to renew ...
Broad Personal Accident Policy No. 28PI-RSA 0001 in the
amount not exceeding FIVE THOUSAND PESOS
Consequently, the trial court found herein petitioner guilty as charged. On
(P5,000.00) dated June 21, 1969, without said accused
appeal, the trial court's decision was affirmed by the respondent appellate
having first secured a certificate of authority to act as such
court finding the petitioner guilty of a violation of the first paragraph of
agent from the office of the Insurance Commissioner,
Section 189 of the Insurance Act. Hence, this present recourse was filed
Republic of the Philippines.
on October 22, 1974. 5
In its resolution of October 28, 1974, 6 this Court resolved, without giving shall have first procured from the Insurance
due course to this instant petition, to require the respondent to comment on Commissioner a certificate of authority to act as an agent
the aforesaid petition. In the comment 7 filed on December 20, 1974, the of such company as hereinafter provided. No person shall
respondent, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, submitted that act as agent, sub-agent, or broker in the solicitation of
petitioner may not be considered as having violated Section 189 of the procurement of applications for insurance, or receive for
Insurance Act. 8 On April 3, 1975, petitioner submitted his Brief 9 while the services in obtaining new insurance, any commission or
Solicitor General, on behalf of the respondent, filed a manifestation 10 in lieu other compensation from any insurance company doing
of a Brief on May 3, 1975 reiterating his stand that the petitioner has not business in the Philippine Islands, or agent thereof,
violated Section 189 of the Insurance Act. without first procuring a certificate of authority so to act
from the Insurance Commissioner, which must be
In seeking reversal of the judgment of conviction, petitioner assigns the renewed annually on the first day of January, or within six
following errors 11 allegedly committed by the appellate court: months thereafter. Such certificate shall be issued by the
Insurance Commissioner only upon the written application
1. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN of persons desiring such authority, such application being
FINDING THAT RECEIPT OF COMPENSATION IS NOT approved and countersigned by the company such person
AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF THE CRIME DEFINED desires to represent, and shall be upon a form approved
BY THE FIRST PARAGRAPH OF SECTION 189 OF THE by the Insurance Commissioner, giving such information
INSURANCE ACT. as he may require. The Insurance Commissioner shall
have the right to refuse to issue or renew and to revoke
2. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN any such certificate in his discretion. No such certificate
GIVING DUE WEIGHT TO EXHIBITS F, F-1, TO F-17, shall be valid, however, in any event after the first day of
INCLUSIVE SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH July of the year following the issuing of such certificate.
PETITIONER'S GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. Renewal certificates may be issued upon the application
of the company.
3. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
NOT ACQUITTING HEREIN PETITIONER. Any person who for compensation solicits or obtains
insurance on behalf of any insurance company, or
We find the petition meritorious. transmits for a person other than himself an application
for a policy of insurance to or from such company or
The main issue raised is whether or not a person can be convicted of offers or assumes to act in the negotiating of such
having violated the first paragraph of Section 189 of the Insurance Act insurance, shall be an insurance agent within the intent of
without reference to the second paragraph of the same section. In other this section, and shall thereby become liable to all the
words, it is necessary to determine whether or not the agent mentioned in duties, requirements, liabilities, and penalties to which an
the first paragraph of the aforesaid section is governed by the definition of agent of such company is subject.
an insurance agent found on its second paragraph.
Any person or company violating the provisions of this
The pertinent provision of Section 189 of the Insurance Act reads as section shall be fined in the sum of five hundred pesos.
follows: On the conviction of any person acting as agent, sub-
agent, or broker, of the commission of any offense
connected with the business of insurance, the Insurance
No insurance company doing business within the Commissioner shall immediately revoke the certificate of
Philippine Islands, nor any agent thereof, shall pay any authority issued to him and no such certificate shall
commission or other compensation to any person for thereafter be issued to such convicted person.
services in obtaining new insurance, unless such person
A careful perusal of the above-quoted provision shows that the first the 2nd but under the 1st paragraph of Sec. 189 wherein
paragraph thereof prohibits a person from acting as agent, sub-agent or it is provided that,
broker in the solicitation or procurement of applications for insurance
without first procuring a certificate of authority so to act from the No person shall act as agent, sub-agent,
Insurance Commissioner, while its second paragraph defines who is an or broker, in the solicitation or
insurance agent within the intent of this section and, finally, the third procurement of applications for insurance,
paragraph thereof prescribes the penalty to be imposed for its violation. or receive for services in obtaining new
insurance any commission or other
The respondent appellate court ruled that the petitioner is prosecuted not compensation from any insurance
under the second paragraph of Section 189 of the aforesaid Act but company doing business in the Philippine
under its first paragraph. Thus — Island, or agent thereof, without first
procuring a certificate of authority to act
... it can no longer be denied that it was appellant's most from the insurance commissioner, which
active endeavors that resulted in issuance of policy to must be renewed annually on the first day
Isidro, she was there and then acting as agent, and of January, or within six months thereafter.
received the pay thereof — her defense that she was only
acting as helper of her husband can no longer be therefore, there was no technical defect in the wording of
sustained, neither her point that she received no the charge, so that Errors 2 and 4 must be overruled. 12
compensation for issuance of the policy because
From the above-mentioned ruling, the respondent appellate court seems to
any person who for compensation solicits imply that the definition of an insurance agent under the second paragraph of
or obtains insurance on behalf of any Section 189 is not applicable to the insurance agent mentioned in the first
insurance company or transmits for a paragraph. Parenthetically, the respondent court concludes that under the
person other than himself an application second paragraph of Section 189, a person is an insurance agent if he
for a policy of insurance to or from such solicits and obtains an insurance for compensation, but, in its first paragraph,
company or offers or assumes to act in there is no necessity that a person solicits an insurance for compensation in
the negotiating of such insurance, shall be order to be called an insurance agent.
an insurance agent within the intent of this
section, and shall thereby become liable We find this to be a reversible error. As correctly pointed out by the
to all the duties, requirements, liabilities, Solicitor General, the definition of an insurance agent as found in the
and penalties, to which an agent of such second paragraph of Section 189 is intended to define the word "agent"
company is subject. paragraph 2, Sec. mentioned in the first and second paragraphs of the aforesaid section.
189, Insurance Law, More significantly, in its second paragraph, it is explicitly provided that the
definition of an insurance agent is within the intent of Section 189. Hence
now it is true that information does not even allege that —
she had obtained the insurance,
Any person who for compensation ... shall be
for compensation an insurance agent within the intent of this section, ...

which is the gist of the offense in Section 189 of the Patently, the definition of an insurance agent under the second paragraph
Insurance Law in its 2nd paragraph, but what appellant holds true with respect to the agent mentioned in the other two
apparently overlooks is that she is prosecuted not under paragraphs of the said section. The second paragraph of Section 189 is a
definition and interpretative clause intended to qualify the term "agent"
mentioned in both the first and third paragraphs of the aforesaid section.
Applying the definition of an insurance agent in the second paragraph to having been omitted, a conviction of the accused could not be sustained. It is
the agent mentioned in the first and second paragraphs would give well-settled in Our jurisprudence that to warrant conviction, every element of
harmony to the aforesaid three paragraphs of Section 189. Legislative the crime must be alleged and proved. 20
intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole.
The particular words, clauses and phrases should not be studied as After going over the records of this case, We are fully convinced, as the
detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part of the Solicitor General maintains, that accused did not violate Section 189 of
statute must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts and in the Insurance Act.
order to produce harmonious whole. 13 A statute must be so construed as
to harmonize and give effect to all its provisions whenever possible. 14 The WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is reversed and the accused
meaning of the law, it must be borne in mind, is not to be extracted from any is acquitted of the crime charged, with costs de oficio.
single part, portion or section or from isolated words and phrases, clauses or
sentences but from a general consideration or view of the act as a
whole. 15 Every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the
SO ORDERED.
context. This means that every part of the statute must be considered
together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the Teehankee (Acting C.J.,) Makasiar, De Castro, Fernandez, Guerrero and
whole enactment, not separately and independently. 16 More importantly, the Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.
doctrine of associated words (Noscitur a Sociis) provides that where a
particular word or phrase in a statement is ambiguous in itself or is equally Plana, J., took no part.
susceptible of various meanings, its true meaning may be made clear and
specific by considering the company in which it is found or with which it is
associated. 17

Considering that the definition of an insurance agent as found in the second

paragraph is also applicable to the agent mentioned in the first paragraph, to
receive a compensation by the agent is an essential element for a violation of
the first paragraph of the aforesaid section. The appellate court has
established ultimately that the petitioner-accused did not receive any
compensation for the issuance of the insurance policy of Eugenio Isidro.
Nevertheless, the accused was convicted by the appellate court for,
according to the latter, the receipt of compensation for issuing an insurance
policy is not an essential element for a violation of the first paragraph of
Section 189 of the Insurance Act.

We rule otherwise. Under the Texas Penal Code 1911, Article 689,
making it a misdemeanor for any person for direct or indirect
compensation to solicit insurance without a certificate of authority to act
as an insurance agent, an information, failing to allege that the solicitor
was to receive compensation either directly or indirectly, charges no
offense. 18 In the case of Bolen vs. Stake, 19 the provision of Section 3750,
Snyder's Compiled Laws of Oklahoma 1909 is intended to penalize persons
only who acted as insurance solicitors without license, and while acting in
such capacity negotiated and concluded insurance contracts for
compensation. It must be noted that the information, in the case at bar, does
not allege that the negotiation of an insurance contracts by the accused with
Eugenio Isidro was one for compensation. This allegation is essential, and