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 Kremlin intended to signal its belief
Putin’s Foreign that the truce will hold even without a
PUTIN’S RUSSIA

significant Russian military presence.

Policy The cease-fire represents the second
time that the Russians and the Americans
have unexpectedly and successful coop-
The Quest to Restore erated in Syria, where the civil war has
Russia’s Rightful Place pitted Moscow (which acts as the pri-
mary protector and patron of Syrian
Fyodor Lukyanov President Bashar al-Assad) against
Washington (which has called for an

I
n February, Moscow and Washington end to Assad’s rule). In 2013, Russia
issued a joint statement announcing and the United States agreed on a plan
the terms of a “cessation of hostilities” to eliminate Syria’s chemical weapons,
in Syria—a truce agreed to by major with the Assad regime’s assent. Few
world powers, regional players, and most believed that arrangement would work
of the participants in the Syrian civil war. either, but it did.
Given the fierce mutual recriminations These moments of cooperation high-
that have become typical of U.S.-Russian light the fact that, although the world
relations in recent years, the tone of order has changed beyond recognition
the statement suggested a surprising during the past 25 years and is no longer
degree of common cause. “The United defined by a rivalry between two com-
States of America and the Russian peting superpowers, it remains the case
Federation . . . [are] seeking to achieve that when an acute international crisis
a peaceful settlement of the Syrian breaks out, Russia and the United States
crisis with full respect for the funda- are often the only actors able to resolve
mental role of the United Nations,” it. Rising powers, international institutions,
the statement began. It went on to and regional organizations frequently
declare that the two countries are “fully cannot do anything—or don’t want to.
determined to provide their strongest What is more, despite Moscow’s and
support to end the Syrian conflict.” Washington’s expressions of hostility
What is even more surprising is that and contempt for each other, when it
the truce has mostly held, according to the comes to shared interests and common
un, even though many experts predicted threats, the two powers are still able to
its rapid failure. Indeed, when Russia work reasonably well together.
declared in March that it would begin And yet, it’s important to note that
to pull out most of the forces it had these types of constructive interactions
deployed to Syria since last fall, the on discrete issues have not changed
the overall relationship, which remains
FYODOR LUKYANOV is Editor in Chief of troubled. Even as it worked with Russia
Russia in Global Affairs, Chair of the Presidium on the truce, the United States continued
of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, to enforce the sanctions it had placed
and a Research Professor at the National
Research University Higher School of Econom- on Russia in response to the 2014 annexa-
ics, in Moscow. tion of Crimea, and a high-level U.S.

30 f o r e i g n a f fa i r s
 Putin’s Foreign Policy

Treasury official recently accused democracy was not a continuation of

Russian President Vladimir Putin of Russian statehood, but its ultimate
personal corruption. collapse,” Putin said. “They were
The era of bipolar confrontation mistaken.” In other words: the West
ended a long time ago. But the unipolar thought that Russia would forever
moment of U.S. dominance that began going forward play a fundamentally
in 1991 is gone, too. A new, multipolar diminished role in the world. Putin
world has brought more uncertainty into and many other Russians begged to differ.
international affairs. Both Russia and In the wake of the 2014 Russian
the United States are struggling to define reclamation of Crimea and the launch
their proper roles in the world. But one of Russia’s direct military intervention
thing that each side feels certain about in Syria last year, Western analysts
is that the other side has overstepped. have frequently derided Russia as a
The tension between them stems not “revisionist” power that seeks to alter
merely from events in Syria and Ukraine the agreed-on post–Cold War consen-
but also from a continuing disagreement sus. But in Moscow’s view, Russia has
about what the collapse of the Soviet merely been responding to temporary
Union meant for the world order. For revisions that the West itself has tried
Americans and other Westerners, the to make permanent. No genuine world
legacy of the Soviet downfall is simple: order existed at the end of the twenti-
the United States won the Cold War and eth century, and attempts to impose
has taken its rightful place as the world’s U.S. hegemony have slowly eroded
sole superpower, whereas post-Soviet the principles of the previous world
Russia has failed to integrate itself as a order, which was based on the balance
regional power in the Washington-led of power, respect for sovereignty, non­
postwar liberal international order. interference in other states’ internal
Russians, of course, see things differently. affairs, and the need to obtain the un
In their view, Russia’s subordinate Security Council’s approval before
position is the illegitimate result of a using military force.
never-ending U.S. campaign to keep By taking action in Ukraine and Syria,
Russia down and prevent it from Russia has made clear its intention to
regaining its proper status. restore its status as a major international
In his annual address to the Russian player. What remains unclear is how long
legislature in 2005, Putin famously it will be able to maintain its recent gains.
described the disappearance of the
Soviet Union as a “major geopolitical NO WORLD ORDER
disaster.” That phrase accurately captures In January 1992, a month after the official
the sense of loss that many Russians dissolution of the Soviet Union, U.S.
associate with the post-Soviet era. But President George H. W. Bush announced
a less often noted line in that speech in his State of the Union address: “By
conveys the equally crucial belief that the grace of God, America won the
the West misinterpreted the end of the Cold War.” Bush put as fine a point as
Cold War. “Many thought or seemed possible on it: “The Cold War didn’t
to think at the time that our young ‘end’—it was won.”

May/June 2016 31
Fyodor Lukyanov

Russian officials have never made so intervention to put pressure on states

clear a statement about what, exactly, that resisted the new order, such as
happened from their point of view. Saddam Hussein’s Iraq.
Their assessments have ranged from Soon thereafter, nato expanded
“we won” (the Russian people over- eastward, mainly by absorbing coun-
came a repressive communist system) tries that had previously formed a
to “we lost” (the Russians allowed a buffer zone around Russia. For centu-
great country to collapse). But Russian ries, Russian security strategy has been
leaders have all agreed on one thing: built on defense: expanding the space
the “new world order” that emerged around the core to avoid being caught
after 1991 was nothing like the one off-guard. As a country of plains, Russia
envisioned by Mikhail Gorbachev and has experienced devastating invasions
other reform-minded Soviet leaders as more than once; the Kremlin has long
a way to prevent the worst possible seen reinforcing “strategic depth” as
outcomes of the Cold War. Through- the only way to guarantee its survival.
out the late 1980s, Gorbachev and his But in the midst of economic collapse
cohort believed that the best way out and political disorder in the immediate
of the Cold War would be to agree on post-Soviet era, Russia could do little
new rules for global governance. The in response to eu consolidation and
end of the arms race, the reunification nato expansion.
of Germany, and the adoption of the The West misinterpreted Russia’s
Charter of Paris for a New Europe inaction. As Ivan Krastev and Mark
aimed to reduce confrontation and Leonard observed last year in these pages,
forge a partnership between the rival Western powers “mistook Moscow’s
blocs in the East and the West. failure to block the post–Cold War
But the disintegration of the Soviet order as support for it.” Beginning in
Union rendered that paradigm obsolete. 1994, long before Putin appeared on the
A “new world order” no longer meant national political stage, Russian Presi-
an arrangement between equals; it dent Boris Yeltsin repeatedly expressed
meant the triumph of Western prin- deep dissatisfaction with what he and
ciples and influence. And so in the many Russians saw as Western arrogance.
1990s, the Western powers started an Washington, however, viewed such
ambitious experiment to bring a consid- criticism from Russia as little more than
erable part of the world over to what a reflexive expression of an outmoded
they considered “the right side of imperial mentality, mostly intended for
history.” The project began in Europe, domestic consumption.
where the transformations were From the Russian point of view, a
mainly peaceful and led to the emer- critical turning point came when nato
gence and rapid expansion of the eu. intervened in the Kosovo war in 1999.
But the U.S.-led 1990–91 Gulf War Many Russians—even strong advocates
introduced a new dynamic: without of liberal reform—were appalled by
the constraints of superpower rivalry, nato’s bombing raids against Serbia,
the Western powers seemed to feel a European country with close ties to
emboldened to use direct military Moscow, which were intended to force

32 f o r e i g n a f fa i r s
 Putin’s Foreign Policy

Bad old days: during an attempted coup against Mikhail Gorbachev, August 1991
the Serbs to capitulate in their fight VICTORS AND SPOILS
against Kosovar separatists. The success As the United States flexed its muscles
of that effort—which also led directly and nato became a more formidable
to the downfall of the Serbian leader organization, Russia found itself in a
Slobodan Milosevic the following strange position. It was the successor
year—seemed to set a new precedent to a superpower, with almost all of the
and provide a new template. Since Soviet Union’s formal attributes, but
2001, nato or its leading member at the same time, it had to overcome a
states have initiated military operations systemic decline while depending on
in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya. All the mercy (and financial support) of its
three campaigns led to various forms former foes. For the first dozen or so
of regime change and, in the case of years of the post-Soviet era, Western
D I MA TA N I N / AF P / G E T T Y I MAG ES

Iraq and Libya, the deterioration of leaders assumed that Russia would
the state. respond to its predicament by becoming
In this sense, it is not only nato’s part of what can be referred to as “wider
expansion that has alarmed Russia but Europe”: a theoretical space that featured
also nato’s transformation. Western the eu and nato at its core but that
arguments that nato is a purely defen- also incorporated countries that were
sive alliance ring hollow: it is now a not members of those organizations by
fighting group, which it was not during encouraging them to voluntarily adopt
the Cold War. the norms and regulations associated

May/June 2016 33
Fyodor Lukyanov

with membership. In other words, change not only the world order but
Russia was offered a limited niche also the internal orders of individual
inside Europe’s expanding architecture. countries however they saw fit. The
Unlike Gorbachev’s concept of a com- concepts of “democracy promotion” and
mon European home where the Soviet “transformational diplomacy” pursued
Union would be a co-designer of a by the George W. Bush administration
new world order, Moscow instead had conditioned interstate relations on altering
to give up its global aspirations and any system of government that did not
agree to obey rules it had played no part match Washington’s understanding of
in devising. European Commission democracy.
President Romano Prodi expressed this
formula best in 2002: Russia would share THE IRON FIST
with the eu “everything but institutions.” In the immediate post-9/11 era, the
In plain terms, this meant that Russia United States was riding high. But in
would adopt eu rules and regulations more recent years, the order designed
but would not be able to influence their by Washington and its allies in the
development. 1990s has come under severe strain.
For quite a while, Moscow essentially The many U.S. failures in the Middle
accepted this proposition, making only East, the 2008 global financial crisis
minimal efforts to expand its global role. and the subsequent recession, mount-
But neither Russian elites nor ordinary ing economic and political crises in the
Russians ever accepted the image of their eu, and the growing power of China
country as a mere regional power. And made Russia even more reluctant to fit
the early years of the Putin era saw the itself into the Western-led international
recovery of the Russian economy—driven system. What is more, although the
to a great extent by rising energy prices West was experiencing growing diffi-
but also by Putin’s success in reestablish- culties steering its own course, it never
ing a functioning state—with a conse- lost its desire to expand—pressuring
quent increase in Russia’s international Ukraine, for example, to align itself
influence. Suddenly, Russia was no longer more closely with the eu even as the
a supplicant; it was a critical emerging union appeared to be on the brink of
market and an engine of global growth. profound decay. The Russian leadership
Meanwhile, it became difficult to came to the conclusion that Western
accept the Western project of building expansionism could be reversed only
a liberal order as a benign phenomenon with an “iron fist,” as the Russian
when a series of so-called color revolu- political scientist Sergey Karaganov
tions in the former Soviet space, cheered put it in 2011.
on (at the very least) by Washington, The February 2014 ouster of Ukrainian
undermined governments that had roots President Viktor Yanukovych by pro-
in the Soviet era and reasonably good Western forces was, in a sense, the final
relations with Moscow. In Russia’s opin- straw for Russia. Moscow’s operation
ion, the United States and its allies had in Crimea was a response to the eu’s
convinced themselves that they had the and nato’s persistent eastward expansion
right, as moral and political victors, to during the post–Cold War period.

34 f o r e i g n a f fa i r s
 Putin’s Foreign Policy

Moscow rejected the further extension The Kremlin may have outmaneuvered
of Western influence into the former its Western rivals in some ways during
Soviet space in the most decisive way the crises in Ukraine and Syria, but it
possible—with the use of military force. still faces the more difficult long-term
Russians had always viewed Crimea as challenge of finding a credible role in the
the most humiliating loss of all the new, multipolar environment. In recent
territories left outside of Russia after years, Russia has shown considerable
the disintegration of the Soviet Union. skill in exploiting the West’s missteps,
Crimea has long been a symbol of a but Moscow’s failure to develop a
post-Soviet unwillingness to fight for coherent economic strategy threatens
Russia’s proper status. The return of the long-term sustainability of its
the peninsula righted that perceived newly restored status.
historical wrong, and Moscow’s ongoing As Moscow has struggled to remedy
involvement in the crisis in Ukraine has what it considers to be the unfair out-
made the already remote prospect of come of the Cold War, the world has
Ukrainian membership in nato even changed dramatically. Relations between
more unlikely and has made it impos- Russia and the United States no longer
sible to imagine Ukraine joining the eu top the international agenda, as they
anytime soon. did 30 years ago. Russia’s attitude toward
The Kremlin has clearly concluded the European project is not as impor-
that in order to defend its interests close tant as it was in the past. The eu will
to Russia’s borders, it must play globally. likely go through painful transforma-
So having drawn a line in Ukraine, tions in the years to come, but mostly
Russia decided that the next place to put not on account of any actions Moscow
down the iron fist would be Syria. The does or does not take.
Syrian intervention was aimed not only Russia has also seen its influence
at strengthening Assad’s position but wane on its southern frontier. Histori-
also at forcing the United States to deal cally, Moscow has viewed Central Asia
with Moscow on a more equal footing. as a chessboard and has seen itself as
Putin’s decision to begin pulling Russian one of the players in the Great Game
forces out of Syria in March did not for influence. But in recent years, the
represent a reversal; rather, it was a sign game has changed. China has poured
of the strategy’s success. Moscow had massive amounts of money into its Silk
demonstrated its military prowess and Road Economic Belt infrastructure project
changed the dynamics of the conflict and is emerging as the biggest player in
but had avoided being tied down in a the region. This presents both a chal-
Syrian quagmire. lenge and an opportunity for Moscow,
but more than anything, it serves as a
IDENTITY CRISIS reminder that Russia has yet to find its
There is no doubt that during the past place in what the Kremlin refers to as
few years, Moscow has achieved some “wider Eurasia.”
successes in its quest to regain interna- Simply put, when it comes to its role
tional stature. But it’s difficult to say in the world, Russia is in the throes of
whether these gains will prove lasting. an identity crisis. It has neither fully

May/June 2016 35
 integrated into the liberal order nor built
its own viable alternative. That explains
why the Kremlin has in some ways
adopted the Soviet model—eschewing
the communist ideology, of course, but
embracing a direct challenge to the
West, not only in Russia’s core security
areas but far afield, as well. To accom-
pany this shift, the Russian leadership
has encouraged the idea that the Soviet
disintegration was merely the first step
in a long Western campaign to achieve
total dominance, which went on to
encompass the military interventions
in Yugoslavia, Iraq, and Libya and the
color revolutions in post-Soviet coun-
tries—and which will perhaps culminate
in a future attempt to pursue regime
change in Russia itself. This deep-rooted
view is based on the conviction that the
West not only seeks to continue geo­
political expansion in its classical form
but also wants to make everyone do
things its way, by persuasion and
example when possible, but by force
when necessary.
Even if one accepts that view of
Western intentions, however, there is
not much Moscow can do to counter
the trend by military means only.
Influence in the globalized world is
increasingly determined by economic
strength, of which Russia has little,
especially now that energy prices are
falling. Economic weakness can be
cloaked by military power or skillful
diplomacy, but only for a short time.

ANGRY, OR FOCUSING?
Putin and most of those who are run-
ning the country today believe that the
Soviet collapse was hastened by pere­
stroika, the political reform initiated
by Gorbachev in the late 1980s. They

36
 Putin’s Foreign Policy

dread a recurrence of the instability that and Russian capacities will grow. That
accompanied that reform and perceive could inspire a sharper focus on domes-
as a threat anything and anyone that tic needs—but it could also provoke
might make it harder to govern. But even more risky gambling abroad.
the Kremlin would do well to recall “Russia is not angry; it is focusing.”
one of the most important lessons of So goes a frequently repeated Russian
perestroika. Gorbachev had ambitious aphorism, coined in 1856 by the foreign
plans to create a profoundly different minister of the Russian empire, Alexander
relationship with the West and the rest Gorchakov, after Russia had lowered
of the world. This agenda, which the its international profile in the wake of
Kremlin dubbed “new political think- its defeat in the Crimean War. The
ing,” was initially quite popular domes- situation today is in some ways the
tically and was well received abroad as opposite: Russia has regained Crimea,
well. But as Gorbachev struggled and has enhanced its international status,
ultimately failed to restart the Soviet and feels confident when it comes to
economy, “new political thinking” came foreign affairs. But the need to focus is
to be seen as an effort to compensate no less urgent—this time on economic
for—or distract attention from—rapid development. Merely getting angry
socioeconomic decline by concentrat- will accomplish little.∂
ing on foreign policy. That strategy
didn’t work then, and it’s not likely to
work now.
It’s doubtful that the Kremlin
will make any significant moves on
the Russian economy before 2018,
when the next presidential election
will take place, in order to avoid any
problems that could complicate Putin’s
expected reelection. Russia’s economy
is struggling but hardly in free fall;
the country should be able to muddle
through for another two years. But the
economic agenda will inevitably rise to
the fore after the election, because at
that point, the existing model will be
close to exhausted.
Turbulence will almost certainly
continue to roil the international
system after the 2018 election, of
course, so the Kremlin might still find
opportunities to intensify Russia’s
activity on the world stage. But with-
out a much stronger economic base,
the gap between Russian ambitions

May/June 2016 37