Fire Strategy

London Underground - Sellar
PADDINGTON SQUARE LU
STATION BAKERLOO LINE
STATION UPGRADE
Detailed Design Fire Strategy
PBLSU-WSP-FRS-B071_Z-STR-FE-0002 REV P04

JANUARY 2021 CONFIDENTIAL
PADDINGTON SQUARE LU STATION

BAKERLOO LINE STATION UPGRADE
TYPE OF DOCUMENT (VERSION) CONFIDENTIAL
PROJECT NO. 70056323

DOCUMENT NO. PBLSU-WSP-FRS-B071_Z-STR-FE-0002 REV P04
DATE: JANUARY 2021
CONFIDENTIAL
PADDINGTON SQUARE LU STATION

BAKERLOO LINE STATION UPGRADE
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Submission Submission Submission approval
Date 15/05/20 01/10/20 04/12/20 29/01/2021
Prepared by Ally Mamgain Ally Mamgain Ally Mamgain Ally Mamgain
2021.01.29
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Checked by Gerrard O’Neil Gerrard O’Neil Gerrard O’Neil Gerrard O’Neil

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Date: 2021.01.29 11:24:18
Authorised by Nishani Sakizlis Nishani Sakizlis Nishani Sakizlis Nishani

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(UKNXS011) Date: 2021.02.01 11:58:47
Project number 70056323 70056323 70056323 70056323
Report number PBLSU-WSP-FRS- PBLSU-WSP- PBLSU-WSP-FRS- PBLSU-WSP-

B071_Z-STR-FE- FRS-B071_Z- B071_Z-STR-FE- FRS-B071_Z-
0002 REV P01 STR-FE-0002 0002 REV P03 STR-FE-0002
REV P02 REV P04
File reference PBLSU-WSP-FRS- PBLSU-WSP- PBLSU-WSP-FRS- PBLSU-WSP-

B071_Z-STR-FE- FRS-B071_Z- B071_Z-STR-FE- FRS-B071_Z-
0002 REV P01 STR-FE-0002 0002 REV P03 STR-FE-0002
REV P02 REV P04
PADDINGTON SQUARE LU STATION BAKERLOO LINE STATION UPGRADE CONFIDENTIAL | WSP

Project No.: 70056323 | Our Ref No.: PBLSU-WSP-FRS-B071_Z-STR-FE-0002 REV P04 JANUARY 2021
CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1
ACRONYMS 4
PROJECT DESCRIPTION 5
SCOPE 7
CONSTRUCTION DESIGN AND MANAGEMENT REGULATIONS:2015 (CDM) 9
FIRE RISK ASSESSMENT 10
INTRODUCTION 11
GENERAL 11
BACKGROUND 11
STATION DESCRIPTION 13
GENERAL 13
STATION OPERATOR 15
FIRE SAFETY DESIGN GUIDANCE 16
LEGISLATION AND STANDARDS 16

RISK BASED APPROACH AND FIRE ENGINEERED SOLUTIONS 16
KEY STAKEHOLDERS AND CONSULTATION PROCESS 18
IDENTIFICATION OF THE KEY STAKEHOLDERS 18
OBJECTIVES 19
FIRE SAFETY OBJECTIVES 19
DESIGN FIRE SCENARIOS 21

GENERAL 21
TRAIN ON FIRE IN STATION SCENARIO 21
FIRE WITHIN THE STATION STRUCTURE SCENARIO 21
STATION EVACUATION 22
DESCRIPTION OF ESCAPE ROUTES 22

MEANS OF ESCAPE FOR PERSONS WITH REDUCED MOBILITY 26
EVACUATION ASSESSMENT 28
TRAIN FREQUENCY AND SERVICE HEADWAY 29
ROLLING STOCK INFORMATION AND CRUSH LOAD CAPACITY 29
STATION EVACUATION FLOW RATES AND TRAVEL SPEEDS 29
FIRE SCENARIOS FOR DETERMINING ESCAPE CAPACITY 29
BUSIEST PLATFORM AND DIRECTION OF TRAVEL 30
EVACUATION TIMES 30
SIZING OF ESCAPE ROUTES 34
DOORS ON ESCAPE ROUTES 34

TRAVEL DISTANCES FOR PADDINGTON SQUARE STATION 35
ESCAPE ROUTES – GENERAL PROVISION 37
DOORS 37
FINAL EXITS 37
EMERGENCY LIGHTING 38
ESCAPE SIGNAGE 38
BACK-UP POWER 38
COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS AND PROCEDURES 39
INTERNAL FIRE SPREAD 40
FIRE COMPARTMENTATION 40
FIRE STOPPING, FIRE DAMPERS AND CAVITY BARRIERS 41
MATERIALS OF CONSTRUCTION 44
LINING MATERIALS 45

EXTERNAL FIRE SPREAD 46
FIRE DETECTION AND ALARM 47
GENERAL 47
GREY LINK 49
STAIR PRESSURISATION 49
MAGNETIC DOOR RELEASE 49
MATERIALS TO BE USED 50
FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEMS 51
SPRINKLER SYSTEM 51
GENERAL NOTE 51
DETAILS OF EQUIPMENT 52
PORTABLE FIRE SUPPRESSION 53
FIRE FIGHTING ACCESS AND FACILITIES 54
VEHICLE ACCESS TO STATION 54

INTERNAL FIREFIGHTING ACCESS 58
HYDRANT SYSTEM 59
EXTERNAL HYDRANTS 60
RENDEZVOUS POINT 60
FIRE MANAGEMENT AND EMERGENCY PLANNING 61
GENERAL 61
MAINTENANCE PROCEDURES 61
STAFF DUTIES 61
STAFF TRAINING 61
APPENDICES 62
APPENDIX A MEANS OF ESCAPE 62

APPENDIX B TRAVEL DISTANCES 72

APPENDIX C COMPARTMENTATION 80
APPENDIX D SIGNAGE 89
APPENDIX E EVACUATION CALCULATIONS 98
APPENDIX F FIRE DETECTION AND ALARM: CAUSE AND EFFECT MATRIX 102
APPENDIX G FIRE SUPPRESSION AND HYDRANT PROVISION 103
APPENDIX I FIRE DRAWING REFERENCES 115
APPENDIX J EXTRACT FROM THE PROPOSED ADDITIONS TO THE LUL “MINIMUM
REQUIREMENTS” IN THE LEASE (PROVIDED BY LUL) 117
APPENDIX K MALL STRATEGY DDN RE TICKET HALL MEANS OF ESCAPE 118
TABLES
Table 1 - Concessions and exemptions required by the proposed design 3
Table 2 – Three-hour boarder and alighters figures for 2041 + 35% 28
Table 3 - Evacuation loads Southbound AM and PM 31
Table 4 - Capacity of Protected Routes from the Platform (Station fire scenario) 33
Table 5: Fire Resistance Ratings 40
Table 6 – Rooms/areas and type of PFE required. 53
Table 7 – Sprinkler pipe losses calculations 103
Table 8 – Hydrant pipe losses calculations 104

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This report presents the Detailed Design Fire Strategy for Paddington
Bakerloo Line London Underground Station. It outlines the fire safety
design requirements for the redevelopment of the Bakerloo Line Ticket
Hall and access and egress routes as part of the Paddington Square
development. The key aspects of the strategy are summarised below.
The fire safety design has been undertaken primarily with the reference
to the following documents:
 The Fire Precautions (Sub-Surface Railway Stations) (England)
Regulations 2009
 BS 9999:2017 - Code of Practice for Fire Safety in the Design,
Management and Use of Buildings
 TfL S1080 A3 the application of fire safety engineering principles to
TfL premises.
 TFL LU Category 1 Suite of Fire Safety Standards, 1081 to 1086
 TfL Category 1 Standard S1371 A6 Station Planning
The Bakerloo Line at Paddington consists of a northbound and a southbound line, which are currently
linked by a cross passage at the existing escalator barrel. A similar cross passage exists at the yet to be
commissioned Bakerloo Link Tunnel entrance. A third cross passage is to be provided at the southern end
of the platform, from which the entrance to the new firefighting shaft will be accessed. This latter cross
passage shall not have cross passage doors at entrance to the platform.
The station consists of 4 levels. The Platform level sits below an extended plant room level, which itself sits
below an extended Ticket Hall which opens into a shopping mall at level B1 of the new Paddington Square
development. This level also contains newly extended plant room areas. The firefighting shaft, which also
acts as a passenger escape route, extends up to the concourse level, which is above the Ticket Hall level.
The entrance to this shaft represents the only external façade of the station at surface level.
The station interfaces with: the new Paddington Crossrail Station via the Bakerloo Link Tunnel; the new
oversite development at the ticket hall entrance and firefighting shaft entrance; and the Paddington Train
Station and London Underground District and Circle Line via a passage to the Lawn Ticket Hall. A further
existing passageway from the Ticket Hall to the Network Rail Station is removed in the final design.
The designated means of escape in a fire emergency shall be via the new firefighting shaft to street level,
and the escalator barrel/fire door leading to the shopping mall at B1 (Ticket Hall level see Figure 3).
The piston effect caused by passing tube trains, abetted by a lack of tunnel ventilation, requires that
existing cross passage doors at platform level be left open in so far as reasonably practicable.
• The cross-passage door on the fire incident side of the escalator barrel shall close on simultaneous
detection of smoke both at that door and in the escalator barrel adit.
• The non-incident side shall close only on local activation by staff.
It is assumed that closure of the cross-passage doors on the fire-incident side shall provide a place of
relative safety within the escalator barrel.

London Underground - Sellar Page 1 of 118
A place of relative safety is thus assumed to exist within the existing escalator barrel on closure of a cross-
passage door.
The fire safety design considers the following scenarios as required in TfL S1080 A3:
 A train on fire at the platform; and
 A fire within the station structure.
Escape capacity is designed in accordance with this document.
 Escalators are used as a means of escape
 There is one fire protected escape stair serving the platforms
 An evacuation lift is provided for the evacuation of persons with reduced mobility (PRM)
 No mechanical smoke extract is proposed for the station platforms or Ticket Hall.
The public areas of the station are primary circulation routes for passengers, and contain limited fire load
and limited ignition sources.
 The firefighting shaft shall be provided with a firefighting lift, a damp falling main in the protected lobby,
and a stair serving each floor served by the lift. A PRM evacuation lift shall also be housed within the
shaft. The shaft shall be pressurised with a Class B pressurisation system as the shaft is used both by
firefighters and as a means of escape.
 Back of House areas of the station shall be separated from public areas by 1 hr fire resisting
construction.
 An L5/M detection and alarm system will be provided in public areas of the station, while an L1 system
shall be provided in back of house areas. These shall be in accordance with BS 5839 Part 1: 2017 and
TfL S1082.
 The Station Operations Room (SOR) shall remain in its existing location, with no provision made for a
new SOR as this station is part of an integrated station.
 There is currently not a compliant provision of hydrants at platform level (insufficient number for required
coverage). It is not within the scope of this development to extend the provision of hydrant outlets,
however, the existing outlet at platform level shall be upgraded to a twin outlet. A concession is required
for the deviation from compliant hydrant provision at platform level.
 The station is provided with a damp falling main, with a four-way breeching inlet (clearly singed and
located within a box) at concourse level accessible to fire fighters. The damp falling main shall connect
with the existing main to provide continuity of hydrant provision for the existing system, provided that the
existing pipes conditions are found to be fit for purpose.
 A fire safety management plan shall be developed by TfL to outline the emergency procedures for the
station.
 A fire suppression system is provided which will link to remaining elements of the existing system. This
system will be fed from a new street main, which shall serve a new valve set in a newly created sprinkler
valve control room.
 An exemption from the requirements of the Fire Precautions (Sub-surface Railway Stations) (England)
Regulations: 2009 (SSRR), to provide suppression, will be required for electrical switch rooms.
TfL S1089 clarifies the SSRR interpretation and mitigations required for exemption of suppression for
electrical rooms as agreed between TfL and LFB. LV switch rooms should not require exemption, while
provision of dry type transformers will be sufficient for granting exemption subject to provision of
compartmentation and automatic detection. Exemption is required for the new Transformer room.
 A concession is required for the non-compliant escape times from platform level to a place of relative
safety
 A concession is required for the width of the new firefighter’s stair below Ticket Hall Level.

 A concession is required for the lack of resting places in the new firefighting stair.
Requirement Regulation/Standard Exemption/Concession Authority
Provide automatic fire

The Fire Precautions (Sub Exemption LFB
suppression in electrical surface Railway Stations)
switch rooms. (England) Regulations 2009
Width of fire fighter’s stair

TfL LU S1080 A3 3.14.4.3.3 Concession TfL LU
to be less than required
2.0 m below ticket hall
level
Lack of resting places for

TfL LU S1080 A3 3.14.5.4.1 b Concession TfL LU
evacuees on fire fighter’s
stair.
Existing non-compliant
TfL LU S1082 A2 3.2.2.2 Concession TfL LU
hydrant coverage on
platforms
TfL S1080 A3 3.14.1.1
Non-compliant evacuation Concession TfL LU
times from incident and
non-incident platforms to
a place of relative safety
Table 1 - Concessions and exemptions required by the proposed design

ACRONYMS
Acronym Description
TfL Transport for London
LU London Underground
PRM Persons with Restricted Mobility
SPSG Station Capacity Planning and Guidance
CDM Construction (Design & Management) Regulations: 2015
RRO Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005
SSRR Fire Precautions (Sub-surface Railway Stations) (England) Regulations: 2015
PPM Persons per meter per minute
ASD Aspirating Smoke Detection
CIE Fire Control and Indicating Equipment Panel
DCP Damper Control Panel
HVAC Heating Ventilation Air Conditioning
I/O Input / Output
MCP Manual Call Points
MIOU Multi Input/Output Unit
PA/VA Public Address / Voice Alarm
PCB Printed Circuit Board
PSU Board Supply Unit
Power
SCADA Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
SOR Station Operations Room
UTS Underground Ticketing System
VFD Vacuum Fluorescent Display

PROJECT DESCRIPTION
Extension of the Paddington Bakerloo Ticket Hall as part of the Paddington Square development will
significantly improve normal access and egress from the station, provide step free access to platform
levels, and provide a new firefighting shaft with a firefighting lift.
Paddington Square is to be located in London Borough of Westminster adjacent to Paddington Station. The
development will be on a site created by the demolition of the Royal Mail Group sorting office on London
Street, the Post Office building on Praed Street and the wall dividing London Street and Arrivals Road. The
Mercure Hotel, Hilton Hotel, Paddington Station and St Mary’s Hospital are adjacent to the development
site.
Figure 1 - The development site and existing buildings in close proximity.
The existing Bakerloo Line station is not compliant with current TfL London Underground Standards with
respects to fire safety. Currently, there is a single means of escape from the platform level, via an escalator
barrel which contains two escalators and a fixed stair. From here, a single narrow stair leads to Praed
Street, a passageway leads to the Lawn Ticket Hall, and a further passageway leads back to the NWR
Paddington Station.
The Paddington Square LU development will provide extension and refurbishment of the ticket hall, and
redesign/allocation of existing and new plant spaces. The existing stair egress from the Ticket Hall to Praed
Street will be removed, with the Ticket Hall entrance relocated to within a retail mall at one level below the
entrance to Paddington Network Rail Station from Arrivals Road (Ticket Hall level is Level B1 of the mall).
Provision of step free access; a secondary means of escape from platform level for ambulant and PRM
(complying with the requirements of TfL1080 A3), and improvement in emergency egress times, have been
prioritised as part of the station layout development.
Due to the proximity of the adjacent Mercure Hotel, a mains sewer, and the running tunnels for the
Bakerloo Line, it is not physically possible to provide a secondary means of escape from the Bakerloo Line
platforms which meets the minimum of 2 m width requirement in the TfL 1080 A3 3.14.4.3.3. Nor is it
possible to provide the required resting areas on alternate landings. Concessions from LU are required for
these.

A further constraint on development of new egress provision is the requirement by London Underground
and Crossrail that the Bakerloo Link Tunnel (BLT) cannot be designated as a means of escape. The BLT
connection prevents provision of an escape route from the north end of the platforms.
INTERFACE WITH MALL
The final exit for the principle means of escape in the case of fire, is into another demise, at shopping mall
level. This is an unconventional arrangement for a TfL LU station.
To ensure that this means of escape remains safe for escaping passengers, the lease agreement will
contain a number of provisions to protect the rights of TfL LU to confirm that their escape route between
Ticket Hall and street level remains safe throughout the lifetime of the building.
 TfL LU staff shall have a right to patrol an area defined in the lease to ensure that the escape route
remains unobstructed and available at all times
 The escape route is maintained to the standards required by TfL LU for their own escape routes
 The escape route has provision of emergency lighting to the standard required by TfL LU
 Maintenance of escalators, lighting and other life safety services along this escape route is to a schedule
as agreed with TfL LU.
 The Mall Level B1 (into which the Ticket Hall evacuates, and which provides the secondary means of
escape from basement level) has a restricted fire load. This shall be in compliance with the proposed
additions to the LUL Minimum Requirements in the lease, as provided in Appendix J.
 No additional fire load shall be added to the circulation area of the mall without prior agreement of TfL
LU Fire Engineers.
 A DDN is provided to show that in the event of a retail mall unit fire, no smoke shall enter or compromise
the escape route from the station. This DDN (appended as Appendix J) describes the CFD modelling
results from two worst case retail fires.
 The Fire Strategy for the Mall building reflects the above provisions.
With regards to the above, a section from the Lease Agreement (as supplied by LUL) is provided in
Appendix J.

SCOPE
The scope of works is to address the redevelopment of the London Underground Bakerloo Line Ticket Hall
and plant areas, as part of the Paddington Square development to improve the worsening capacity issues
at the Bakerloo Line Station over the last two decades.
The Ticket Hall will interface with: Paddington Crossrail Station via the escalator barrel, platforms, and
Bakerloo Link Tunnel; The NwR Paddington station via the Lawn Ticket Hall; the district and circle lines via
the Lawn Ticket Hall; and the oversite development shopping mall within which the main entrance/exit is
sited.
Figure 2 - Isometric showing interphases with BLL Ticket Hall (on TfL Compliance Fire Plan)
The fire strategy addresses life safety of occupants within the station, and access facilities for the fire and
rescue services. In addition, some of the fire safety features, such as compartmentation, contribute towards
property protection and business continuity.
This report considers the occurrence of a single fire event only; multiple, simultaneous outbreaks of fire are
not considered. Simultaneous fire events in the two demises (station and mall) are not considered. The
strategy does not address a terrorist or multiple arson events.
The Paddington Square development is considered to be functionally independent and separate from the
Bakerloo Line Station, and has independent fire and rescue services access and fire safety systems.
Therefore, this fire strategy only considers the fire separation between the Bakerloo Line Station and the
Paddington Square development. The fire strategy for the Paddington Square development is not within the
scope of this report. However, the fire strategy for the development is considered where it provides the final
means of escape from the Bakerloo Line Ticket Hall to street level.

Figure 3 - Levels within station
NOTE: Concourse Level is street level at Arrivals Road

CONSTRUCTION DESIGN AND MANAGEMENT REGULATIONS:2015
(CDM)
Projects undertaken in the UK are subject to the requirements of the Construction (Design and
Management) Regulations (CDM).
This report outlines the strategy for meeting the functional and performance requirements for fire safety in
the finished Bakerloo Line Station.
Any recommendations or conclusions which specify materials, products or forms of construction shall have
been assessed in accordance with CDM Regulations 9 and 11 (duties for designers). If these involve
significant residual risks, or health and safety critical assumptions, this information shall be made available
to the Principal Designer.
Where the architect or other consultants use the standards put forward in this report to specify works, they
are understood to be competent in alerting the Client, Principal Designer, Contractors and Building
Occupier of CDM issues.

FIRE RISK ASSESSMENT
The Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005 (RRO) places a general duty of fire safety care on
employers, occupiers and owners of certain premises and requires them to provide and maintain adequate
fire precautions.
According to the RRO, a responsible person must take general fire precautions on the premises, as far as
is reasonably practicable, to ensure the safety of its occupants as well as those in immediate vicinity of the
premises who may be at risk in the event of a fire. In a workplace the Responsible Person is the employer
and any other person who may have control of the premises.
The responsible person must carry out an appropriate assessment of the risks to determine the general fire
precautions required. The risk assessment should be carried out in accordance with guidance produced by
the Department for Communities and Local Government – Fire Safety Risk Assessment, Transport
premises and facilities for railway stations. The risk assessment must be regularly reviewed and kept up to
date and the responsible person must make any changes that are required as a result of the review.
When requested, the significant findings of the fire risk assessment must be presented to the Fire and
Rescue Authority, to demonstrate compliance with the requirements of the RRO.
This fire strategy document forms the first stage of the fire risk assessment process and details the key fire
safety design objectives and provisions within the station. This fire strategy forms part of the fire safety
information, as required by the RRO, and should be handed to the Responsible Person.

INTRODUCTION
GENERAL
The Fire Safety Strategy is a necessary part of the design process purposed to demonstrate how works
done on the premises result in fire risks being retained as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP) and
compliant with fire-related legislation.
The strategy has been prepared to provide assistance to the design team in the fire safety design of the
project. It will also aid in gaining the approval for the station upgrade design from London Underground (the
station operator and infrastructure manager) and the London Fire Brigade.
To improve the worsening capacity issues at the Bakerloo line Ticket Hall of the Paddington station, an
enlarged Ticket Hall and improved access and egress routes are to be relocated within the new Paddington
Square development.
BACKGROUND
The current design proposal is derived from a Consented Scheme which had attained planning consent.
Both Crossrail and TfL have confirmed that the Bakerloo Link Tunnel cannot be considered a means of
escape from platform level.
Due to a lack of tunnel ventilation, and under advice from TfL, it is not preferable to consider immediate
automatic closure of all cross-passage doors at platform level during a fire scenario. There shall be local
door side detection and detection in the escalator barrel adit. Simultaneous detection at both shall close
only the doors with local detection of smoke or heat. Should smoke travel around the platforms to enter the
escalator barrel from the non-incident platform, then that side too shall close by local detection, thus
completing fire separation.
This means that the escalator barrel can be considered a place of relative safety on closure of the fire
doors on the fire affected platforms.
There is insufficient safe holding area off a platform of fire origin to accommodate all passengers who
would be required safe haven. Given this situation, while it is possible to improve station evacuation times,
it is not possible to meet the requirements of TfL S1080 A3 for evacuation from the incident platform in 4
minutes, and to a place of relative safety within 6 minutes. Improvement is made in so far as is possible, on
the understanding that a concession from the TfL S1080 A3 requirement will be needed.
At the request of TfL London Underground, considerable effort was made to ascertain whether an
additional fire separated means of escape could be designed, which would lead from the Ticket Hall directly
to the street, without passing through another demise, in full compliance with S1080 A3.
Four further options were considered; however, these were shown to be either prohibitively expensive to
the project, or unlikely to gain the planning consent as had been awarded to the current design proposal
(Paddington Square LUL Emergency Egress from Ticket Hall Options 0-4). The current design, which
involves escape from the Ticket Hall into the Paddington Square mall prior to accessing street level, is
unconventional, but does meet with known current legislation, and is considered to be the only remaining,
and best available design option. As it does not meet LU Fire Engineering requirements for compliance with
TfL S1080 A3, this escape route requires that a legal agreement be agreed between TfL and the building
owners/occupiers which allows that nothing will be placed within the mall which will negatively affect the
safety of persons egressing from the London Underground Ticket Hall.

TfL’s project requirement is that the design year, for means of escapes calculations, is 2041 with a 35%
uplift in passenger flow.

STATION DESCRIPTION
GENERAL
Paddington London Underground station comprises of the Bakerloo line (Northbound and Southbound) and
the District & Circle line (Eastbound and Westbound). Access to the station (shown in Figure 2) is:
 via Paddington Station “Lawn” (Ticket Hall B), from where the passengers can walk towards either line.
 from Praed Street via Ticket Hall A, enabling direct access to the District & Circle Line platforms.
 from Praed Street via Ticket Hall C enabling direct access to the Bakerloo line platforms
The development site
Figure 4 - Access and egress point for Ticket Hall A and C.
Current Bakerloo Line emergency egress from platform level is via an escalator barrel consisting of two 1.0
m wide escalators and a 1.2 m wide fixed stair. This barrel exits to the Ticket Hall, from where passengers
escape via a flight of stairs up to Praed Street. This escalator barrel is currently the single means of escape
from platform level. The exit passageways from the Ticket Hall to the Lawn Ticket Hall and back via the
Network Rail station are not designated means of escape.
In the proposed Paddington Square LU development, the existing stair egress from the Ticket Hall to Praed
Street is removed, with the Ticket Hall entrance relocated to within a shopping mall. However, the Bakerloo
line platforms will continue to be served by the existing escalator barrel. The passageway to the Lawn
Ticket Hall will remain, but the passageway to Paddington Network Rail Station will be removed.
The redesigned layout provides for a new firefighting shaft to be located behind the current escalator barrel.
In this new shaft, an additional / escape firefighting stair will be provided for the Bakerloo line platforms.
This new 1.5 m wide stair will also provide a second means of escape, from the Northbound and
Southbound platforms directly to a place of ultimate safety at street level. As it does not meet the TfL LU
S1080 A3 3.14.4.3.3 requirement for a 2 m minimum width on escape stairs, a concession from TfL is

required. A concession will also be required for the TfL LU S1080 A3 3.14.4.4.1 b) requirement for a resting
place at alternate landings.
The new stair increases in width to 2 m at Ticket Hall level, as there is sufficient space to meet the TfL LU
S1080 A3 requirement.
The new shaft shall contain the new step free access route for both platforms (accessible from Ticket Hall),
step free access lift, firefighting lift, and damp falling main. The escape route at firefighter’s access level
(street level) is 500mm wider than the 2.0 m minimum escape requirement, thus allowing for firefighter
access on the escape route.
The fire doors at platform level shall close on local detection so that the escalator barrel is considered a
place of relative safety. As there is insufficient evacuation capacity from the incident platform in 4 minutes,
and to a place of relative safety in six minutes, a concession against the escape times provided in TfL
S1080 A3: 3.14.1.1 a) and b) will be required.
A concession is also required against the time to a place of relative safety in a station fire scenario
The current escalator barrel is not to be altered, meaning that evacuees will exit into the Ticket Hall. It is
proposed to provide a 2.4 m wide fire exit beside the main mall exit which will allow free flow of evacuees
from the Ticket Hall into the main Paddington Square development.
The area into which the Ticket Hall exits is largely open to air and is provided with sufficient stair and
escalator width to allow free flow of evacuees from the Ticket Hall to concourse level in the open air.
The Station Operations Room (SOR) shall remain in its existing location, with no provision made for a new
SOR.

STATION OPERATOR
The entire station premises at the Paddington Square LU development will be managed by TfL London
Underground as the single station operator. TfL London Underground are the designated station
Infrastructure Manager (IM) for the Paddington Station, hence, they are responsible for the maintenance of
the station premises and assets.
The station operator, TfL London Underground, will be responsible for developing an operational plan for
the station.

FIRE SAFETY DESIGN GUIDANCE
LEGISLATION AND STANDARDS

The fire strategy for the Paddington Square station has been undertaken primarily with reference to the
following documents:
 The Fire Precautions (Sub-surface Railway Stations) (England) Regulations 2009
 The Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005
 BS 9999:2017 - Code of Practice for Fire Safety in the Design, Management and Use of Buildings;
 BS 7974:2019 - The Application of Fire Safety Engineering Principles to the Design of Buildings – Code
of Practice; together with supporting published documents.
 BS EN 13501-1:2018 – Fire Classification of Construction Products and Building Elements –
Classification using data from reaction to fire tests;
 London Underground, Category 1 suite of Fire Safety Standards, including but not exclusively:
• S1080: The application of fire safety engineering principles to TfL premises. (Version A3, Dated 2019)
• 1-081: Design and installation of fire protection systems and compartmentation measures. (Version
A2, Dated March 2011 includes Written Notice 01313 and 01319)
• 1-082: Active fire protection systems and portable fire equipment. (Version A2, Dated March 2011)
• 1-083: Passive fire protection systems. (Version A2, dated March 2011)
• 1-084: Maintenance of fire protection systems and fire compartmentation measures. (Version A4,
dated March 2011)
• S1085: Fire safety performance of materials – Stations and Tunnel Infrastructure. (Version A4,
December 2015)
• S1086: Fire safety classification of stations and shafts. (Version A6, dated August 2018)
• 1-087: Fire Prevention and Protection – Emergency Do Not Enter Signs (Issue A1, August 2014)
• S1088: Managing changes to stations and shafts fire precautions (Issue A2, dated August 2018)
• S1089: Application of The Fire Precautions (Sub-Surface Stations) Regulations (Issue A1, April 2020)
• 1-371 London Underground Station Capacity Planning (SPSG), (Version A7)
 London Underground, Category 2 suite of Fire Safety Standards
 LU Fire Engineering Guidance Notices
 LU Fire Guidance Manuals:
• G0100: Providing for Fire Safety - process and management (Issue A1, 2016)
• G0101: Fire suppression and fire fighting systems (Issue A1, 2016)
• G0102: Fire systems - passive fire protection (Issue A1, 2016)
• G0103: Fire detection and alarm systems (Issue A1, 2016)
 Railway Safety Principles and Guidance (RSPG), Part 2 Section B, guidance on stations (dated 1996)
RISK BASED APPROACH AND FIRE ENGINEERED SOLUTIONS

Risk evaluation is a fundamental principle in the proposed fire safety design. Key areas where such an
approach is essential are in relation to:
 Means of escape
 Fire brigade access
 Limiting of fire and smoke spread

The Fire Life Design Principles shall be established in accordance with the principles set in BS 7974:2019
Application of fire safety engineering principles to the design of buildings.

KEY STAKEHOLDERS AND CONSULTATION PROCESS
IDENTIFICATION OF THE KEY STAKEHOLDERS

The primary stakeholders for the Paddington Square works include:
 Transport for London, London Underground
 The London Fire Brigade
 Great Western Development Ltd

OBJECTIVES
FIRE SAFETY OBJECTIVES

The primary objectives of this fire strategy are to ensure that:
 In an event of a fire, the passengers (including PRM) and staff within the station can reach a place of
relative safety away from the vicinity of the fire and then go on to reach an ultimate place of safety.
 Fire-fighters can reach a fire quickly and safely, together with their equipment.
 Fire life safety risks should be reduced to a level which is considered As Low as Reasonably Practicable
(ALARP).
In addressing the fire safety provisions, the following will be considered:

 Legislation and Standards;
 Design Fire Scenarios;
 Fire Emergency Evacuation including PRM;
 Smoke Ventilation;
 Fire Fighter Access and Facilities;
 Fire Safety Systems such as detection and automatic fire suppression;
 Control of Fire Spread (e.g. compartmentation/separation and structural fire resistance);
 Fire resistance of materials and ‘Reaction to Fire Properties’ to prevent surface spread of flame; and
 Fire Safety Management Policy (Controls and Procedures to support the strategy).
To achieve the above objectives the proposed fire strategy and station design should meet the following:
a) Provide a means of escape in the event of a fire:
b) This shall consider a credible, accidental, single fire event anywhere in the station.
c) Provide adequate means of escape before the conditions become untenable (this includes provisions for
PRM evacuation).
d) Stairs and escalators will be used for means of escape from the platforms. Evacuation lift will be used for
the evacuation of PRM.
e) Provide a means of early fire detection to facilitate the early evacuation of people at risk:
f) Provide a means of raising an alarm.
g) Facilitate a process of a managed station evacuation.
h) Enable early firefighting intervention.
i) Limit the extent of fire spread within the station: fire spread is limited by fire separation and/or provision
of automatic fire suppression as appropriate, to protect the means of escape, but also to minimise
property damage and business interruption.
j) Limit the extent of smoke spread within the station: smoke spread is limited to the incident zone to
protect the means of escape and to minimise the property damage, business and operational
interruption.
k) Minimise the risk of fire spread to and from the retail mall
l) By identifying the premise boundary lines and providing fire separation and/or fire suppression
necessary to limit the risk of fire spread.
m) Provide facilities for the fire-fighting service:
n) By providing fire-fighting vehicles access and designated fire-fighting access routes within the station.
o) By providing water to facilitate fire-fighting operations.

p) Reduce the likelihood of a fire at the station and its consequential impact on the environment to as low
as reasonably practicable.
q) Consider the impact and extent of fire safety management required on future occupiers of the station
building.

DESIGN FIRE SCENARIOS
GENERAL
The station evacuation, assessment is carried out in accordance with TfL Category 1 S1080 A3 The
application of fire safety engineering principles to TfL premises, which instructs that the following two fire
scenarios be considered in the safety design of stations:
 Train on fire in station;
TRAIN ON FIRE IN STATION SCENARIO

In the event of a train on fire in station scenario, the evacuation load (platform and train loads) shall be
cleared from the immediate area (the incident platform) within 4 minutes and shall reach a relative place of
safety from all platforms within six minutes.
The evacuation capacity of the means of escape (e.g. number of escalators, widths of passageways and
stairways) through the station from each platform shall be calculated.
This scenario assumes that the train on fire in the station is the one at the busiest platform or busiest
common route serving from adjoining platforms – this is one with the greatest total number of passengers
on the train plus the passengers on the platform.
To calculate the evacuation load in a train on fire scenario, the number of passengers to be evacuated shall
be the number of passengers on the train on fire, after a gap in the service of one cancelled train plus the
number of people waiting for that train. In current calculations the practical crush load of the train was used
as a worst-case scenario.
FIRE WITHIN THE STATION STRUCTURE SCENARIO

In the event of a fire within the station structure, it shall be assumed that the fire is in the most capacious of
the two routes through the station and that the entire evacuation load from the platforms shall be via the
other route.
The normal train service shall be assumed at each platform apart from the busiest platform where it is
assumed that there has been a delay of one headway.
As a worst-case scenario, all passengers within the station shall be assumed to be on platforms at the start
of the evacuation.
The affected passenger evacuation load shall be calculated by taking the sum of the boarding and alighting
loads on each platform apart from the busiest platform where this number is doubled due to delay of one
headway.

STATION EVACUATION
The Paddington Square Bakerloo Line Station shall adopt a simultaneous evacuation strategy. The entire
station will be evacuated in the event of a fire anywhere within the station. This simultaneous evacuation is
considered to extend to the District and Circle Lines, so that the passageway to the Lawn Ticket Hall
cannot be defined as an escape route. The following sections describe the escape routes for the
passengers including persons with restricted mobility (PRM).
DESCRIPTION OF ESCAPE ROUTES

Platform Escape Routes
In the event of a fire at Platform level, escape is provided via the existing escalator barrel and the new
stairs. PRM will evacuate using the new lift within the firefighting shaft.
Passengers towards the North end of the incident platform will evacuate horizontally along the platform,
then via the cross-passage doors to the escalator barrel, vertically up to the ticket hall level via stair and
escalator, and then horizontally through the Ticket Hall to a fire exit beside the main use the shopping mall
entrance. From there, passengers will traverse the mall to the adjacent escalators and escape to street
level (See Figure 6 and Figure 25).
Passengers towards the South end of the incident platform will evacuate via the new stair which will lead
them directly to an exit passageway to concourse level. The passageway leading to the new stairs provides
a safe holding area for the passengers waiting to go up the stairs.
Some passengers on the incident platform will move to the non-incident platform while others will remain in
the holding area as they wait to go up the escalator barrel and the new stairs.
Escape via the escalator barrel
The escalator barrel consists of two escalators and one fixed stair. However, only one escalator with a
width of 1 m, and the fixed stair with a 1.2 m width will be used for evacuation. The circulation area
adjacent to the escalator barrel provides a holding area as the passengers wait to go up. The escalator
barrel leads to the ticket hall level from where the passengers can exit the station either using the new stair
or the Shopping Mall entrance.
Escape via the new stairs
Given the spatial limitations, the width of the new stair from platform level to ticket hall level is limited to 1.5
m in width. This width increases to 2m from the ticket hall level up to street level. At platform level, the
passageway leading to the new stair provides a safe holding area (relative place or safety)
Passengers escaping via the new stairs can discharge directly outside at street level.

Figure 5 – Overview of escape routes at Platform level

Figure 6 - Escape routes through Ticket Hall

Evacuation via the Fire Exit to Shopping Mall
The new entrance to the station is within a shopping mall. In the event of a fire in the station, fire separation
between the two demises shall be through the provision of a 2-hour fire rated fire curtain assembly. The
Station Ticket Hall and the shopping mall are two separate demises which require this degree of
separation. The fire shutter is not required as part of the fire strategy for the Mall demise, so that full control
and ownership shall be with TfL.
The primary evacuation route from the station is via the manual push bar doors opening into the Mall, near
to the Mall demise PRM lift. However, the immediate evacuation is likely to be through the main station
entrance rather than via this fire door as the fire curtain assembly will not close unless under staff
intervention or local smoke detection. The Lease Agreement confirms that Mall management will ensure
that the escape route from the station is kept clear of pedestrian traffic on receipt of a first knock signal from
the station detection system.
In the event of a first knock activation within the LUL demise, the specified Mall PRM lift will return to the
Concourse Level and its doors will open. This lift will now be out of service and cannot be used until the fire
alert is resolved. This will remove the potential for persons coming down into the flow of passengers
evacuating from the station. Mall staff, having been warned on the Mall fire panel of a first knock indication
in the LUL demise, shall clear persons waiting for the PRM lift at the Mall B1 Level.
A further evacuation route from the station via the shopping mall is from Basement Level via Stair 7,
3DR13. This escape route is primarily used by staff escaping from the BoH area at Basement level. Mall
management shall ensure that this exit is kept clear of any obstructions. The onwards escape route from
this door is protected and assured by the Lease Agreement arrangements as per the main station exit.
The Fire Curtain Barrier Assembly shall be operated by local smoke detection or manual activation by
London Underground staff. The shutter shall move to its fail-safe position in a controlled manner when
consumable primary and auxiliary power sources are removed. Operation shall be by a gravity fail safe
system, in a controlled manner in accordance with BS EN 8514-1 Annex G.
On initiation the fire curtain will descend to its operational position at a speed to be determined in
consultation with LU Fire Engineers, but between 0.06ms-1 and 0.15ms-1.
The weight of the bottom bar shall be selected to ensure positive operation when subjected to pressure or
wind load. This load to be determined in cooperation with LU Fire Engineer (anticipated to be 11ms-1which
is the maximum allowable air velocity in the station).
The current proposed model shall have a fire rating for Integrity of 2 hrs. As the boundary to a fire
compartment between demises, the requirement would normally include for Insulation. There is no fire
curtain assembly currently on the British or European market which provides the level of insulation which
would be specified. Fire curtains, as non-permanent features, are not manufactured or tested to an
insulation rating, instead they are tested to BS EN standards for radiance. This radiance rating is provided
to protect escape routes. For further details on the fire curtain Technical Note: Paddington Square Ticket
Hall Fire Curtain Assembly, PBLSU-WSP-FRS-B071_Z-SPE-FE-0003, should be referred to.
The shutter shall comply with:
 TfL S1085
 BS EN 8524-1
 BS EN 1634-1 2008
 BS EN 1634-3 2004

 BS EN 1363-1: 2012
 BS EN 1363-2 1999
 BS 5234-2
 BS EN 14600
 BS EN 13501-2
 BS EN ISO 1716
 BS EN 13501-1+A1
 BS EN ISO 14184-1
 BS EN 12101 10
 BS ISO 21927 9
 Machinery Directive (2006/42/EC)
On dropping of the fire shutters, passengers escaping from the station will be in a place of relative safety,
en route to a place of ultimate safety.
Back of House
Back-of-house areas at Basement Level shall evacuate via the new stair directly to a place of ultimate
safety at concourse level. A secondary means of escape stair is provided. This stair leads to a fire exit
beside the main entrance. Onwards escape from here is via the mall demise, to the escalator barrel and up
to ultimate safety at concourse level. This will then exit into the Shopping Mall. The escape route is then
protected as per the description provided in the FINAL EXITS section below.
Back-of-house areas (i.e. 2.001 Ventilation exhaust plenum and 2.002 Ventilation supply plenum) at Ticket
Hall level will evacuate either using the fire exit beside the Shopping Mall entrance, or a secondary means
of escape cat ladder directly to open air at concourse level. Staff in the Back-of-house areas (i.e. 3.001
Ventilation supply plenum and 3.002 Stair pressurisation/air release fan plantroom) at the Lower Ticket Hall
level can use cat ladder 2 as the secondary means of escape to evacuate via the Upper Ticket Hall level
escape routes.
MEANS OF ESCAPE FOR PERSONS WITH REDUCED MOBILITY

Evacuation Lift
Paddington Square Station is fully accessible with step-free access provided to the Northbound and
Southbound platforms. This is via an over site development (OSD) controlled PRM access lift, from the
upper levels of the oversite development to Ticket Hall level (Mall B1), and from there horizontal access to
the station. Within the station a PRM access lift is available from Ticket Hall level to Platform level.
The evacuation strategy for PRM is based on lift evacuation. There is one designated PRM evacuation lift
and one firefighting lift with the functionality of an evacuation lift. This lift may be used for the evacuation of
PRM prior to the arrival of the fire and rescue services. Both lifts can also be used for firefighting access. If
one lift is out of commission, the other can fulfil the necessary functions of a PRM evacuation lift and a
firefighting lift. This will be in accordance with the recommendations detailed in BS 9999:2017, Annex G,
G.2.1. The lift shall be operated under the control of station staff trained and authorized to use the lift.
The evacuation lift shall be used routinely as a passenger lift from normal passenger access levels.
The lift shall be designed and installed in accordance with the relevant provisions in BS EN 81-20 and BS
EN 81-70

The lift is situated within a fire rated enclosure, which has an associated stair. The lift will discharge into a
protected lobby, with ramp, which provides a protected route immediately to the outside.
The lift at the firefighter’s access level shall be provided with a switch clearly marked “Evacuation Lift”.
The lift shall have a primary power supply obtained from a sub-main circuit dedicated to that lift and
independent of any other circuit. The primary power supply and a secondary power supply shall be in
accordance with BS 9999:2017 Annex G.2.2
The cables transmitting the secondary supply shall be separated from those for the primary supply by fire
rated construction and shall be in accordance with BS 8519.
On confirmation of a fire, the evacuation lifts will isolate all car and landing call controls and return to the
uppermost level which provides access for firefighters from street level, where they shall park with doors
open.
Master Staff Override Panels (SOPs) shall be provided at the new Ticket Hall level (i.e. ticket barrier level).
Auxiliary SOPs shall be provided at the existing ticket hall level and platform level.
Staff Interface Panels (SIPs) shall be provided at the ticket hall level.
For further details on SOPs and SIPs please refer to Conceptual Design Statement – Lifts,
KONLULPSCDS002.
The firefighting lift is located within a fire protected shaft and is approached from a firefighting lobby. The
firefighting shaft is pressurised (Class B system) to prevent the ingress of smoke.
PRM at the lower Ticket Hall level shall be able to evacuate on level ground via the main entrance, or via
the PRM lift. PRM at the upper Ticket Hall level shall be able to evacuate via the PRM lift. PRM at platform
level shall evacuate via the lift.
It is anticipated that PRM shall self-evacuate to the refuge points by following the escape signage provided.
In accordance with BS 9999, section G.2.3, for the adequate management of the evacuation lifts, a
sufficient number of competent staff should be designated and be capable of carrying out the necessary
duties quickly and efficiently at all times during which the building is occupied. PRM shall self-evacuate
from the lifts to a place of ultimate safety; this is then a managed self-evacuation.
Refuge
A refuge point shall be provided within the protected lobbies associated with the evacuation lift, excepting
the final exit level. This clearly marked point shall be in a minimum of 1400 mm x 900 mm.
The refuge point shall be sited such that the flow of other passengers evacuating is not disrupted.
Emergency Voice Communication

An emergency voice communication system conforming to BS 5839-9: 2011 should be provided. This
should consist of a Type B outstation which communicates with a master station located in the Station
Control Room.
A TfL London Underground approved Public Help Point may be placed at the refuge in lieu of the above
described communication system.

EVACUATION ASSESSMENT
This section provides an overview of the evacuation assessment carried out for Paddington Bakerloo Line
Station to determine the evacuation loads and the minimum escape capacity required to achieve the
evacuation time criteria.
The evacuation assessment is focused on the evacuation of persons in the station and does not envisage a
simultaneous evacuation of the shopping mall.
STATION DESIGN AND YEAR OF UPLIFT
The station design year for pedestrian flow calculations is 2041.
Figures for calculating the passenger loads are based on figures provided by London Underground for
2041 plus an uplift of 35%.
Passenger Loads
Passenger data used for the evacuation calculations is based on the figures shown in Table 2, provided by
London Underground.
North Bound South Bound
Boarder Alighters Boarder Alighters
2041
AM 2694 11304 13699 7597
3hr
PM 5548 13872 13699 7567
2041+35%
AM 3637 15261 18494 10256
3hr
PM 7490 18728 18494 10216
AM 1637 6867 8322 4615

1hr
PM 3071 7678 7583 4189
AM 442 1854 2247 1246

15 mins
PM 798 1996 1971 1089
AM 177 742 899 498

5 min
PM 319 799 789 436
AM 35 148 180 100

1 min
PM 64 160 158 87
Headway AM 78 326 395 219

(2.2min) PM 141 351 347 192
Table 2 – Three-hour boarder and alighters figures for 2041 + 35%

In the AM 3-hour peak period, the Southbound platform is the busiest with a total of 21,296 passengers for
the 2041 base data (or 28,750 passengers for 2041 data plus a 35% uplift), as shown in Table 2 above.

In the PM 3-hour peak period, the Southbound platform is the busiest with a total of 21,266 passengers for
the 2041 base data (or 28,710 passengers for 2041 data plus 35% uplift), as shown in Table 2 above.
Conversion Factors
To convert the passenger forecast data for the 3-hour peak periods into 1-minute periods, the following
conversion factors are to be applied as per Section 3.2.2 of LU Station Planning Standard, 1-371:
 AM peak hour: 0.45
 AM peak 15 minutes: 0.27
 PM peak hour: 0.41
 PM peak 15 minutes: 0.26
TRAIN FREQUENCY AND SERVICE HEADWAY

The frequency of the trains serving the Bakerloo Line platforms at Paddington Square Station is 27 trains
per hour. This train frequency applies for both the AM and PM peak periods.
The service headway between the trains arriving at the platforms is then 2.2 minutes.
ROLLING STOCK INFORMATION AND CRUSH LOAD CAPACITY

For station evacuation purposes, a crush loaded train shall be a 7-car train carrying 874 people. This forms
the basis for the station evacuation assessment to determine the required escape capacity. When train
stock changes in future, there may be increased capacity which would increase evacuation times. The
evacuation analysis would require to be recalculated at that time.
STATION EVACUATION FLOW RATES AND TRAVEL SPEEDS

Flow Rates
The flow rates are adopted from Section 3.14.1.11 of the TfL S1080 A3, as stated below:
 Flow rate through horizontal egress elements (e.g. doors and corridors): 80 people per minute per metre
width.
 Flow rate on stairs: 56 people per minute per metre width. Based on SPSG the width is measured
between the innermost part of the handrails.
 Flow rate on working escalators and passenger conveyors: 120 people per minute per metre width.
 Flow rate through UTS gates; 50 people per gate per minute.
Travel Speeds
As per section 3.14.4.3.3 of TfL S1080 A3:
 The horizontal travel speed is taken to be 38m per minute.
 The vertical travel speed is taken to be 12m vertically per minute.
FIRE SCENARIOS FOR DETERMINING ESCAPE CAPACITY

In accordance with TfL LU S1080 A3 two fire scenarios are assumed:
 Train on fire in station; and

Train Fire
In the event of a train on fire at the station, the number of passengers to be evacuated (evacuation load) is
taken to be the total of:
 Passengers on a crush loaded train (874 passengers), assumed to be on fire at the busiest platform.
 Passengers waiting to board a train, assuming one missed headway in the busiest direction of travel.
 Passengers waiting to board a train in the opposite direction (assuming no delay).
 Passengers alighting train service in the opposite direction (assuming no delay).
For a fire on a train it is assumed that all station exits are available for evacuation.
Fire in the station Structure
In the event of a fire within the Station structure, the number of passengers is taken to be the total of:
 Passengers waiting to board a train and those alighting in the busiest service direction, assuming one
missed headway.
 Passengers waiting to board a train and those alighting in the opposite service direction, assuming no
delay.
In accordance with TfL S1080 A3, escape capacity from the station platform calculations considers a fire
which blocks the most capacious exit route; the remaining alternative exits are then designed to
accommodate the evacuation load.
BUSIEST PLATFORM AND DIRECTION OF TRAVEL

Based on the passenger load figures provided by London Underground, the Southbound platform
represents both the busiest AM peak and PM peak.
EVACUATION TIMES
As per the TfL S1080 A3, for a train fire scenario, the evacuation load (train and station occupants) shall be
cleared from the immediate incident platform within 4 minutes and reach a fire-protected route within 6
minutes.
For a fire within the station structure, the affected passenger load shall reach a fire-protected route within 6
minutes.
Passengers are assumed to be in a place of relative safety once they pass through the cross-passage door
from the incident platform to the new stair passageway. It is anticipated that the doors at the bottom of the
existing escalator barrel shall close on local detection, so that on closure, the existing escalator barrel may
be considered a place of relative safety in a station fire scenario.
Evacuation Loads
Table 3 below summarises the evacuation loads for the train on fire and station fire scenarios in the AM
and PM peaks, based on the passenger demand data with an uplift of 35%.
To assess the escape capacity of the cross-passages, escalator barrel and the new stair, the highest
evacuation load for each fire scenario has been used. (See Appendix E for the evacuation calculation
table).

Scenario Peak Period Busiest Direction Evacuation Load
AM Southbound 2069
Train Fire
PM Southbound 2060
Fire within AM Southbound 1634

Station PM Southbound 1569
Table 3 - Evacuation loads Southbound AM and PM

The highest evacuation load is for a train fire scenario is 2069 passengers AM Southbound
The highest evacuation load for a station fire scenario is 1634 passengers AM Southbound
As previously discussed, the time to clear the incident platform is considered as the time to enter the
platform cross-passages. Hence, the required evacuation capacity from the platforms is governed by the
width of cross-passages and these are sized for passenger day-to-day movement and exceed the minimum
required width for escape capacity.
Evacuating using Escalators
At Platform level one escalator barrel, consisting of two escalators, provides vertical circulation between
platform and the ticket hall. As per TfL S1080 A3, the following assumptions have been made:
 One escalator, in the least capacious section of the busiest escalator route within the station, shall be
unavailable even as a fixed stairway. (This allows for maintenance works, failure, etc.)
 Escalators continue to run in the same direction as before the emergency occurred.
All escalators are designed to be 1m wide.
The fixed stair in the escalator barrel is 1.2 m wide, with a capacity of 67.2 ppm.
In the train fire scenario, one escalator within the escalator barrel is available for escape. This corresponds
to an evacuation capacity of 120 ppm from the platform level via the escalator.
Passengers escaping using the escalator barrel will then evacuate either via the Ticket Hall and fire door
beside the main entrance.
In a station fire scenario, the most capacious route through the station (escalator barrel) is assumed to be
unavailable due to a fire and is therefore discounted.
Evacuation via new Stairs
At platform level, the new staircase is required to sit between the Bakerloo running tunnels.
The piles supporting the staircase core are positioned as close to the running tunnels as is safe practice.
The staircase core is further constrained by the position of the existing LU switch room which prevents
relocation further west and away from the Mercure hotel.
At ticket hall level, the staircase is constrained by the position of the existing basement of the Mercure
Hotel. The piled wall is constructed as close to the basement wall as can be practically achieved.
Considering the above constraints, the maximum width of the stair that can be provided at platform level is
1.5 m. This is below the minimum escape width requirement of 2.0 m and will thus require a concession
from TfL.

Train Fire Scenario
It is assumed that in the event of a train on fire at the platform, all station exits are available. Passengers
are assumed to have cleared the incident platform once they enter the platform cross-passages.
Passengers in the northernmost carriage do not have access to a place of relative safety. This is an
existing situation not made worse by the current project. This scenario is beyond the scope of the project.
Appendix E of this report provides the calculations for the train fire scenarios.
The narrowest elements along the escape routes are the cross-passages which have been used to
calculate the time taken to clear the platform.
It is assumed that persons shall evacuate the incident platform by utilising the vertical escape routes, and
by finding early safe holding areas on the non-incident platform, in the adit of the escalator barrel,
passageway to the new stair, and in the cross passages to the new stair and BLL Tunnel (these areas are
considered safe holding areas).
 The capacity of these areas is 775 persons at 0.49m2 per person
 The occupancy of the non-incident platform is 404 persons (already using the safe area)
 The remaining available safe holding area for incident platform passengers is 371 persons
 Number requiring safe holding area from the incident platform 580
 Therefore, number remaining on incident platform after 4 minutes is 209 persons
The time taken for the last person to clear the platform and reach the cross-passage is 4.8 minutes, which
is not compliant with compliant with TfL S1080 A3 4.0-minute requirement but is an improvement on the
current evacuation time. A concession will be required.
Time to clear the non-incident platform to a place of relative safety is 7.6 minutes. This evacuation time is
not compliant with TfL S1080 A3, 6.0-minute requirement and will need a concession from TfL.
The time to clear the platform area to the escalator barrel in the current Station is circa 10.3 minutes in a
Train on fire scenario. The proposed design is a significant improvement on the existing design.
Station Fire Scenario

The most capacious exit is discounted. The largest evacuation load in the event of a station fire is 1634
passengers in the AM peak (1230 Northbound and 404 Southbound).
At Platform level, the escalator barrel provides the greatest exit capacity and is discounted in this scenario.
Hence, the only remaining escape route, the new stair, should be designed to provide sufficient capacity for
the highest evacuation load for station fire of 1634 passengers.
The passageway to the new stair is a 1 hr fire protected route and is protected by a 1hr rated fire door. This
area is regarded as a place of relative safety.

Minimum number
Protected Routes Width (m) Capacity
assumed available
Holding capacity
passage to new 1 2.4 168 persons
stair
New Stair 1 1.5 84 ppm
Total capacity within protected routes over 6 minutes 672 persons
Table 4 - Capacity of Protected Routes from the Platform (Station fire scenario)
The platform clearance time is 17.5 minutes to a place of relative safety This does not comply with TfL
S1080 A3 requirements. A concession from the TfL S1080 requirement will be needed.
This time is a significant improvement on the existing situation in which there remains only evacuation by
train in a station fire scenario, after the escalator barrel is discounted
.

SIZING OF ESCAPE ROUTES
DOORS ON ESCAPE ROUTES

The width of doors used for means of escape is determined using the methodology describes in TfL S1080
A3. The doors are provided in accordance with BS EN 1125.
TfL S1080 A3 3.14.1.11 adopts a flow rate which recognises that the flow of passengers along horizontal
egress routes is faster than that along vertical egress routes. The flow rate along the escape route should
not decrease in the direction of escape to prevent any attenuation of flow from occurring. It assumes a flow
rate of 56 people per minute per metre width through stairs (measured between the handrails).
 Therefore, for the 1m escalator and 1.2m fixed stair in the escalator barrel, the cross-passage doors
leading to this should be a minimum of (120 + (1.2*56))/80 = 2.34 m wide. Ample width to meet the
vertical exit capacity is provided in these cross passages.
 The cross-passage doors leading to the 1.5 m new stair should be at least = 56/80 x 1.5 = 1.05 m wide.
A minimum width of 2 m will be provided as per TfL S1080 A3 requirements.
 From ticket hall level to street level, the width of the new stair is 2 m. Hence, the width of the door at
street level from where the persons using the new stair escape from should be at least = (56*2/80) x 2 =
1.4 m wide. A minimum width of 2 m will be provided as per TfL S1080 A3 requirements.
 The exit capacity of the escalator barrel is 187 ppm so that a width of 187/80 = 2.33 m is required for the
fire door exit to the mall. The exit provided is 2.4 m.
Flow rates along egress routes is maintained. All doors on public escape routes open in the direction of
escape.
Cross passage doors shall be held open in the normal condition, and shall close on activation by local
detection, a local key switch or a manual switch/panel located in the SOR.
Corridors leading from the new stairs to final exit are increased in width to 2.0m to meet the minimum width
as provided in TfL 1080 A3 for escape, plus an additional 500 mm for firefighter’s access. The corridor
width shall be 2.5 m
Number of UTS Gates
For the UTS gates, the SPSG assumes a flow rate of 50 people per gate per minute.
The LU Ticket Hall has one escalator running in the upwards direction and one 1.2 m fixed stair. This
corresponds to a potential evacuation flow of 187 people per minute.
Therefore, a minimum of 4 UTS gates are required at the Ticket Hall (the gates are to automatically open in
the event of a confirmed fire anywhere in the station). The existing design provides more than 4 UTS gates
and thus satisfies the design requirement.

TRAVEL DISTANCES FOR PADDINGTON SQUARE STATION
Back of House Areas
Persons likely to be in back of house areas are assumed to be awake and unfamiliar with the area as they
may be external contractors.
Travel distances shall be in accordance with BS 9999: 2017 Table 11 for a B2 risk profile.
 Two-way travel 33 m direct; 50 m actual
 One-way travel 13 m direct; 20 m actual
Direct travel distance is considered to be 2/3 of the actual travel distance and is used when the layout of
the room is unknown.
Actual travel distance is used where the layout of the room is indicated, and in corridors which are
considered free from obstruction. A change in layout from the earlier stage of design has provided that the
actual travel distance for the Plenum Chamber at concourse level is now 16.8m, as shown in Figure 7. The
travel distance is less than 20m and is therefore compliant.
In the unlikely event of a fire in the Plenum Chamber a degree of mitigation for smoke build up is provided
as a portion of the smoke emitted would be naturally vented. The Plenum Chamber roof is open to
atmosphere via the perforated risers in the steps in the above ground realm.

Figure 7 - Travel distance for the Plenum Chamber
Travel distances within the station Back of House areas are shown in Appendix B.

ESCAPE ROUTES – GENERAL PROVISION
DOORS
The door leaf of a doorway or exit should, where reasonably practicable, be hung to open in the direction of
escape. The door should always open in the direction of escape from rooms that have an occupant
capacity of more than 60. However, if there is a high fire risk with a potential for a rapid-fire growth, the
doors must open in the direction of escape regardless of the number of occupants.
Doors shall have the same fire rating as the wall in which they are installed, with an additional smoke rating
for all non-lift doors. (FD60s; FD120s)
Doors, including self-closing devices (excluding lift landing doors) protecting openings in refuges or
enclosures to lifts shall be FD60S (tested to BS 476-22) or E60Sa (to BS EN 13501-2).
Lift landing doors shall be FD60 (tested to BS 476-22) or E60 (to BS EN 13501-2 or BS EN 8158).
Doors shall have vision panels where doors on escape routes subdivide corridors or where doors swing
both ways. (BS9999:2017 15.6.5).
All fire doors are to be held open on an automatic release mechanism in accordance with BS EN 1155 or
BS 5839-3, and shall have the appropriate fire safety sign at eye level conforming to BS ISO 3864-1. Even
with doors closed people trying to escape will still be able to open doors and pass through. Due to the
piston effect issues in this station, the cross-passage door leading from platforms to the new protected
corridor and lift/stair should have two magnetic door holders per leaf (one top and one bottom).
FINAL EXITS
Final exits should be apparent to the persons who may need to use them and must remain free from
obstacles at all times. The exits should be sited such that they are clear of any risk from fire or smoke in a
basement (such as the outlets to basement smoke vents, or from openings to transformer chambers,
refuse chambers, boiler rooms, etc).
It is proposed that the escape route from the Ticket Hall shall be via another demise, which is not normal
practice. This route, while not ideal, has been shown to be the most practicable route from this space. To
ensure that this means of escape remains safe for escaping passengers, the lease agreement will contain
a number of provisions to protect the rights of TfL LU to confirm that their escape route between Ticket Hall
and street level remains safe throughout the lifetime of the building.
TfL LU staff shall have a right to patrol an area defined in the lease, between Ticket Hall and street level, to
ensure that the escape route remains unobstructed and available at all times
 The escape route is maintained to the standards required by TfL LU for their own escape routes
 The escape route has provision of emergency lighting to the standard required by TfL LU
 Maintenance of escalators, lighting and other life safety services along this escape route is to a schedule
as agreed with TfL LU.
 The Mall Level B1 (into which the Ticket Hall evacuates) has a restricted fire load, with only materials of
limited combustibility within proximity to the escape route.
 No additional fire load shall be added to the circulation area of the mall without prior agreement of TfL
LU Fire Engineers.

A DDN (PAD-WSP-DDN-FI-0006-P01) has been provided to show that in the event of a retail mall unit fire,
no smoke shall enter or compromise the escape route from the station. This Technical Note shall describe
the CFD modelling results from two worst case retail fires.
The Fire Strategy for the Mall building shall reflect these provisions.
EMERGENCY LIGHTING
Emergency lighting provides the following functions:
 Emergency escape lighting provides illumination of escape routes and signs to assist the occupant in
evacuating the premises;
 Emergency safety lighting provides lighting for moving about safely when the occupant do not need to
evacuate the premises immediately;
 Standby lighting powered by an alternative power supply provides sufficient lighting to operate the
premises normally in the event of a total failure of the main power supply.
Suitable lighting shall be provided to ensure the safe movement of persons along escape routes to place of
relative or ultimate safety. Emergency escape lighting shall be provided in accordance with BS 5266-1, BS
EN 1838 and LU 1-066 standards.
ESCAPE SIGNAGE
Clearly visible and unambiguous signage is significant for speedy escape, especially in building where a
majority of the occupants might be unfamiliar with the building layout.
Escape signage is provided in accordance with BS 5499-1 on all escape routes and at all emergency exits.
Emergency Do Not Enter (EDNE) signs shall be provided in accordance with S1087. EDNE shall be
located at each of the exit(s) to warn passengers to not enter a station during an emergency evacuation.
The functionality of DNE and associated modification to the panel in the SOR shall be provided by the
Stage 5 installer.
BACK-UP POWER
The back-up power is in the form of an Off-Line Battery Inverter (OLBI), located at Basement level.
All lifts will be provided with dual power (A and B power supplies).
If one power supply fails, the system will switch to the alternative power supply. This is to ensure that the
station systems continue to operate in the event of a primary power supply failure, for life safety purposes.
The secondary supply will have sufficient capacity to keep the following in operation:
 Escalators used for means of escape;
 Smoke control and pressurisation relief dampers;
 Normal lighting and other services within the firefighting shaft;
 The fire service communications system;
 The emergency voice communications system;
 The PA/VA system;
 Any powered ventilation or pressurisation system which operates in conjunction with the operational use
of the firefighting shaft;

Additionally, battery back-up is required to support the emergency lighting for a period of 3 hours and
communications equipment for a period of 4 hours. Fire alarm panels are provided with their own battery
back-up.
COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS AND PROCEDURES

The general principles of the station communications systems can be summarised as follows:
 The SOR is the command centre during an emergency; it will receive all information from the fire safety
systems along with the CCTV, public address and staff communication systems. The room is protected
as a compartment. The SOR should be accessed via a protected route direct from street or via the
firefighting shaft. The existing SOR is accessed from the Praed St entrance and is not within the Ticket
Hall which is within the scope of this document. It is not proposed to upgrade the SOR as part of the
current project. This does not reduce the level of safety from the existing design.
 Messages to station occupants and passengers will be broadcasted using the public address and voice
alarm system.
 Help points will be provided at strategic locations throughout the station.
 Staff should be trained to ensure the right information is communicated effectively to all parties including
the fire and rescue service on arrival;

INTERNAL FIRE SPREAD
FIRE COMPARTMENTATION
The architectural plans should be referred to for detailed compartmentation plan. The key
compartmentation principles are as follows:
 All public areas are to be separated from non-public areas by fire resisting construction achieving 60
minutes fire resistance;
 Back-of-house plant rooms are to be enclosed in a minimum of 60-minutes fire resisting construction;
 Air pressurisation system plant rooms are to be enclosed in 120 minutes fire resisting construction
 Firefighting shafts are to be enclosed in 120-minutes fire resisting construction. Internal walls may be 60-
minute construction
 Transformer rooms are to be enclosed in 120 minutes fire resisting construction
 All floors are assumed to be compartment floors, rated to 120 minutes.
 Separation of the station from the adjoining mall demise shall be 120-minute fire rated construction.
 Any room, if there are S1085 non-compliant materials inside, then 60-minute fire rating is required to
allow concession from S1085.
Table 5 provides the fire resistance rating in terms of load bearing capacity, integrity and insulation for fire
separating walls or floors when tested to the relevant parts of BS 476: E&I only if non-load bearing as noted
in TfL LU S1083 A2 paragraph 3.5.1.
Fire Resisting Separation Fire Rating

Protected Corridor 60 minutes REI
Separation between Back-of-House and Public Areas 60 minutes REI
Separation between Floor Levels 120 minutes REI
Separation between Station and OSD 120 minutes REI
Firefighting Core (Outside) 120 minutes REI
Firefighting Core (Internal) 60 minutes REI
Plant rooms excl. Transformer Rooms, PFR and LEER 60 minutes REI
Transformer rooms 120 minutes REI
LEER 120 minutes REI
Station Stores 60 minutes REI
Pressurisation Fan Room 120 minutes REI

Communication Equipment Room 60 minutes REI
Emergency Switch and Battery Rooms 60 minutes REI
Cleaner Equipment Store 60 minutes REI
Bin Store 60 minutes REI

Cleaner Equipment Store 60 minutes REI
Table 5: Fire Resistance Ratings

FIRE STOPPING, FIRE DAMPERS AND CAVITY BARRIERS
Fire stopping details should be installed as per LUL G0102 A1, Fire systems – passive fire protection. Any
deviations should be agreed with TfL LU and supported by test evidence.
Concealed spaces or cavities in the construction are closed with cavity barriers in accordance with BS
9999, Section 33.3.
All concealed spaces or cavities shall be sub-divided with a 30-minute fire-resisting barrier at maximum
intervals of 20m in any direction in accordance with LU 1-083 rev A2 2011.
Fire separation between the wall cavity and the Ticket Hall public area ceiling cavity has been provided.
Front-of-House ceiling cavities more than 800mm in depth are provided with point detection.
Back-of-House ceiling cavities do not extend more than 20m in length in any direction and are less than
800mm in depth. Hence, they do not require either cavity barriers or detection.
Cavities exceeding 20m in length are extensive cavities. There are three extensive cavities at the
Paddington Station.
Figure 8 shows the extensive cavity at Basement level measuring 24.4m. Figure 9 shows the extensive
cavity at Lower Ticket Hall Level measuring 21.6m.
The positioning of cavity barriers along the cavities is hampered by the positioning of drainage channels
within the cavities. The outer walls of the cavities may be subject to water leakage, which then gathers in
the drainage channels. These drainage channels cannot be blocked. Due to damp conditions and the
impossibility of placing full height cavity barriers it is considered impracticable to put in place fully compliant
cavity barriers. It is prudent to ensure that there is limited risk of fire within the cavity.
There is no fire load within these cavities, no services within or passing through and no ignition sources.
The inner and outer surfaces of the cavities are constructed from non-combustible materials and the
inspection hatches are fire rated to the same rating as the wall. The internal walls have a minimum 1-hour
fire rated blockwork construction. The possibility of ignition is very low, with minimal potential for further fire
growth.
The risk posed is considered ALARP.

Figure 8 - Extensive cavity measuring 24.4m in length at Basement level.
Figure 9 - Extensive cavity measuring 21.6m in length at Ticket Hall level.

Figure 10 shows the extensive cavity at Upper Ticket Hall Level measuring 34.8m. Although this cavity
measures significantly over 20m in length, it does not bypass any compartment walls as the inner wall is
always fire rated. There are no fire load and ignition sources in proximity to this extensive cavity. The inner
and outer surfaces of the cavity are constructed from non-combustible materials and the inspection hatches
have fire rated doors. Hence, the possibility of a fire occurring is unlikely. Any impact of this extensive
cavity is further mitigated by the inner walls with 60-minute fire rated blockwork construction. Hence, the
risk posed is considered ALARP.
Figure 10 - Extensive cavity measuring 34.8m in length at Upper Ticket Hall level.

All risers passing through compartment floors shall be fire rated to the same period of fire resistance as the
floor through which they pass. This ensures that the fire compartmentation between floors is maintained
and limits the extensive fire spread throughout the station.
The floors at the Paddington station have a 2-hour fire resistance. Hence, all risers in this station are
enclosed within a 2-hour fire resistant construction with the doors to the risers having a 2-hour fire rating.
In accordance with BS9999, services within risers which open into the firefighting shaft shall all serve the
firefighting shaft. The MEP design has been rationalised such that all risers with doors that open into the
firefighting shaft now only contain services that serve the shaft and comply with BS9999.
Where ductwork penetrates compartment walls or floors, fire rated ductwork, dampers or fire stopping are
provided as appropriate to maintain compartmentation.
In accordance with LU design Cat 1 Standard 1-081, dampers should be activated by smoke detection in
situations where the ductwork breaches the compartmentation that has been provided for the purposes of
life safety.
MATERIALS OF CONSTRUCTION
Materials used within the station must comply with the following:
 LU Standard 1-085 A3 Fire Safety Performance of Materials; and
 The Fire Precautions (Sub-Surface Railway Stations) (England) Regulations 2009.
The Fire Precautions (Sub-surface Railway Stations) (England) Regulations 2009 states that “Materials
used in internal construction of premises
8-(1) Any material which is used in the construction of an internal wall or ceiling in any public area must be of
limited combustibility”.
A material is considered to be of limited combustibility if it meets the fire performance requirements as

listed in Table 1 of Guidance Note 3: Fire safety on sub-surface railway stations
TfL S1085 Requirements
Toxic Fumes: All materials used in London Underground premises must meet requirements for Toxic Fume
Emission. This shall be evidenced as described in LU S1085 rev A4 2015 3.1 Toxic fume Emission – All
Products.
Combustibility: All public facing vertical walls and ceiling surfaces shall meet the requirements of:
 Class B-s1, d0 when tested in accordance with BS EN 13501-1
 Index of performance (l) not exceeding 12 and sub-index (l1) not exceeding 6 when tested to BS 476:
part 6 and class 1 to BS 476: Part 7.
All vertical and horizontal prone surfaces other than walls and ceilings should meet the requirements in
9.1.7 or alternatively, meet the tests as described in TfL S1085 rev A4 2015 Table 1 Combustibility
requirements for surfaces other than walls and ceiling.
Vertical and ceiling surfaces shall meet the requirements of TfL S1085 rev A4 2015 Table 2
Flooring surfaces to comply with the combustibility requirements of:
 Class Bfl as specified in BS EN 13501-1 or
 BS476: Part 7, class 2

Flooring surfaces to comply with the smoke emission requirements as detailed in TfL S1085 rev A4 2015
Table 2
A concession will be sought where the materials proposed are not in compliance with the LU S1085 A4.
Such concessions will only be sought when there are no compliant materials fit for purpose. The contractor
will be responsible for the submission of any concession applications to TfL in relation to alternative
materials used.
All elements of structure which separate the Station demise from the mall demise are to be fire rated for a
minimum of 120 minutes for load bearing and integrity (BS 9999:2017 Table 23).
LINING MATERIALS
Subsurface Regulations Requirements
The subsurface regulations require that materials applied to the surface of an internal wall or ceiling should:
 “adequately resist the spread of flame over the surface; and
 have if ignited either a rate of heat release or a rate of fire growth, which is reasonable in the
circumstances.”
A material can be considered compliant with the above if it meets the requirements as detailed in Table 3
of the SSRR.

EXTERNAL FIRE SPREAD
The station has only a firefighting shaft at street level. This is considered to be sterile and does not present
a risk of external fire spread.
The main station entrance is within a covered shopping mall, at more than 6 m distant from any opposing
retail unit. This does not pose a risk of external fire spread.

FIRE DETECTION AND ALARM
GENERAL
This section gives a brief overview of the Fire Detection and Alarm system. For more details on the system,
please refer to the Fire Detection and Alarm Technical Specification, PBLSU-WSP-FRS-B071_Z-SPE-FE-
0002.
A category L1 detection and alarm system shall be provided in Back of House areas, with a Category L5+M
provided in public areas. This to be in accordance with BS 5839: Fire Detection and Alarm Systems for
Buildings Part 1: 2017.
In accordance with BS 5839, automatic fire detection is not provided in rooms 1.004 (Plenum chamber),
2.002 (Ventilation supply plenum) and 3.001 due to significant air flow within these voids.
The fire detection and alarm system will be an analogue addressable detection system incorporating
manual call points, multi-sensor detectors, beacons input/output devices, aspiration systems and damper
control systems.
The main fire control panel (MFCP) will be located in the lobby outside Consolidation Room 3.010 in the
Lower Ticket Hall Level. The MFCP will monitor and control all analogue addressable loops within the
protected areas. There will be two active loops on each system.
In addition to the above, the station will be provided with a voice alarm system to all areas in accordance
with BS 5839-8. An additional fire alarm panel will be located at entrance to the firefighting access shaft.
Manual call points are provided in all back-of-house areas and public areas including platform, basement
levels and ticket hall.
Public Areas: Automatic fire detection is not required in public areas, where a strict regime of materials
control is applied. However, multi-sensor detectors will be provided adjacent to cross passage fire doors
and shutter at main entrance, which are held open during normal operations. The doors/shutter will be
automatically released should both detectors be activated. This will prevent smoke from any train or
platform related incident spreading into the ticket hall and a fire from the ticket hall entering the mall area
(and vice versa) respectively. Cross passage doors shall also be operable by a local key switch and a
manual switch/panel in the Station Operation Room. All Passenger Help Points will be in accordance with
LU Standards and include manual alarm call points. The manual call points within the Ticket Hall area have
been kept to a minimum.
Ceiling voids over 800 mm in depth shall be provided with point detection. These devices shall be placed
such that they are maintainable from access hatches located directly beneath each device. Distribution of
these ceiling void devices is limited to the lower ticket hall level.
Non-public areas: All non-public areas are to be fitted with automatic multi-sensor detection of Type L1
coverage. This detection will be provided in service areas, offices, mechanical plant rooms (including
escalator machinery spaces), electrical plant rooms, and any other accessible non-public areas. Manual
call points will also be installed in these areas.
A summary of the detection provisions is outlined below:
• Multi-sensor detection is provided in all non-public areas of the station to an L1 category;

• Aspirating smoke detection system is provided at the top of all lift shafts (further detailed in PBLSU-
WSP-FRS-B071_Z-SPE-FE-0002);
• Local multi-sensor detection, and sounder/flashing beacons are provided within the vicinity of
normally held open self-closing fire resisting doors to automatically close the doors upon smoke
detection. These doors are operable by local key switch, and a manual switch/panel in the SOR.
• Local multi-sensor detection is provided within the vicinity of the fire curtain at the main entrance to
automatically close the doors upon smoke detection. Manual closure of this curtain will also be
available to staff.
• The lift lobbies at Lower Ticket Hall Level and Upper Ticket Hall Level are provided with automatic
door closures.
• In the event of a confirmed fire activation (second/double knock scenario) within the LUL demise,
the specified PRM lift will return to the upper level and its doors will open. This lift will now be out of
service and cannot be used for fire evacuation until the fire alert is resolved.
In accordance with the LU Standard 1-082 for fire protection systems and portable fire equipment; a staged
alarm procedure will be adopted.
• Stage 1 – Acknowledgement Period
On activation of a single device, the fire detection system will commence an acknowledgement period.
The Inspector Sands message will be broadcast and there will be a period of time to allow staff to
acknowledge the alert at the fire alarm panel.
• Stage 2 – Investigation Period
Following acknowledgement of the alert, the fire detection system will commence an investigation
period, during which station staff are given a time period to investigate the cause. Where the
investigation period indicates a false alarm the fire alarm control panel may be reset by station staff.
• Stage 3 – Evacuation
The fire detection system will initiate full evacuation mode on simultaneous activation of a second
device, or in the event that a fire alert is not acknowledged within the prescribed time, or the
investigation period has lapsed before the fire alarm panel is reset.
The time period will be 2 minutes for acknowledgement and 5 minutes for investigation. These time periods
will be adopted as part of the fire alarm cause and effects. A high-level cause and effect matrix is included
in Appendix F.
On confirmed evacuation of the station:
• The lifts will home to the street (concourse, firefighters access) level;
• Ticket gates will automatically open.
A public address/voice alarm system will be provided throughout the station, designed in accordance with
BS 5839 Part 8- 2013. Alarm will be given by means of a pre-recorded evacuation message within all areas
(research has shown that direct public address announcements results in a much shorter pre-movement
and evacuation time as well as an increased response time in comparison to fire alarm sounders).
On receipt of any single stage alarm the fire control panel will operate the first stage PA/VA Alert message.

In addition to fire alarm sounders, flashing beacons will be used to supplement the fire alarms sounders
and PA/VA in areas of high ambient noise, and at cross passage fire doors.
Sounders/beacons will be provided in the vicinity of fire doors held open on an electromagnetic system.
The volume of the sounders is such that they are only heard locally and do not impact the PA/VA away
from the fire doors.
Two-way communication points are provided within the PRM refuge areas to ensure passengers are able
to request assistance.
GREY LINK
The Station fire control panel and the Mall fire control panel will be linked such that a fire output signal from
the Station fire control panel is sent to the Mall fire control panel and vice versa. The grey link will inform
one demise of a fire in the other demise. Upon receiving any single stage alarm notification, the Mall
management would be aware of a potential evacuation from the Station enabling them to action any
management activities required to ensure that the escape routes from the TfL LU Station are unobstructed.
In the event of a first knock activation within the LUL demise, the specified Mall PRM lift will return to the
Concourse Level and its doors will open. This lift will now be out of service and cannot be used until the fire
alert is resolved. This will remove the potential for persons coming down into the flow of passengers
evacuating from the station. Mall staff, having been warned on the Mall fire panel of a first knock indication
in the LUL demise, shall clear persons waiting for the PRM lift at the Mall B1 Level.
In the event of a first detection in the Mall, the station will be informed enabling them to investigate whether
they should engage any proactive management protocols.
STAIR PRESSURISATION
The firefighting shaft is provided with a pressurisation system. This is designed in accordance BS 12101-
06, to Classification B.
A pressurisation override switch shall be provided in Lobby 1.002 at Concourse Level, which is considered
the appropriate location. An additional stair pressurisation override has been requested by TfL LU to be
located in the SOR. For further details, the Fire Detection and Alarm Technical Specification, PBLSU-WSP-
FRS-B071_Z-SPE-FE-0002, should be referred to.
The back of house escape-only stair from basement level is not pressurised.
MAGNETIC DOOR RELEASE

All fire doors have a Magnetic Door Release (MDR) system installed. Multi-sensor detectors and flashing
beacons and sounders are installed on either side of the fire doors. If these detectors go into alarm, the fire
doors will automatically close. The flashing beacons and sounders will also operate to warn persons of the
closing fire doors.
The passage door leading to the shaft introduced at Platform level contains two sets of MDRs due to the
increased pressure on it caused by the movement of trains. Each door leaf contains one MDR at the top
and one at the bottom to keep the cross-passage door open in a non-fire situation.

MDR release is an automatic operation following actuation of local detection. A 30 second delay should be
allowed for in the programming. This shall be done through software by the Stage 5 installer.
MATERIALS TO BE USED
The fire detection system includes:
 4 Loop Fire Detection Control Panels
 Cables FT 120
 Cable containment, junction boxes, fixings and labels
 Addressable Multi Detectors
 Addressable Flashing Beacons
 Addressable Sounders Bases
 Standard Device Bases
 Addressable Manual Call Points
 Damper Control Panel
 Aspiration Detection
Note: Layouts shown are indicative only and need to be finally designed by a LPS 1040 approved
company.

FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEMS
SPRINKLER SYSTEM
The new town’s main connection installed under the enabling works package will be terminated within the
area allocated for the final position of the new Sprinkler Valve Chamber (SVC) (2.016).
The final detailed scheme will commence from this termination point of the new town’s main within the new
SVC.
The town’s main will be extended to supply a new Wet system control valve set.
This 150mm diameter set will feed via a new main supply routed through the ticket hall to connect to the
existing system covering the protections of the escalators and machine chambers.
This will connect to the existing main at a point outside the entrance to the UMC in room 2/152 (2.013).
Separate distribution pipework routed through the ticket hall to supply sprinkler heads to various rooms as
indicated on the drawings. Each room would have a flow switch and monitored isolating valve on the room
supply interfaced with the fire alarm system. Sprinkler heads in store rooms to be fitted with guards.
The control valve set to be fitted with alarm switches as indicated on the relevant drawing.
These alarms together with any monitored valves to be indicated on the station fire alarm system.
All sprinkler pipework including all bracket components to be fireproof lagged providing a 1-hour rating
when such pipework is routed through a non-sprinkler protected area.
Any false ceiling voids over 800mm in depth within sprinkler protected rooms to have additional protection
provided within the voids.
The systems to be designed in accordance with BS EN 12845 to Ordinary Hazard Group 3 standard.
Layouts shown on the associated drawings are indicative only and need to be finally designed, co-
ordinated and detailed by a LPS 1048 approved company in accordance with TfL Standard 1.081
paragraph 3.3.
All pipework to be Heavy quality galvanised joined by screwed or grooved fittings.
All sprinkler heads to be 68 degree rated fast response type. All sprinkler heads to be fitted with propriety
guards.
Note: Layouts shown are indicative only and need to be finally designed by a LPS 1048 approved
company.
GENERAL NOTE
All sprinkler and hydrant pipe work to be sleeved and fire stopped where it passes through walls, floors,
partitions etc.
Pipework identification tape in accordance with BS 1710 to be fitted to all pipework including directional
arrows and name of service
.

DETAILS OF EQUIPMENT
 Recessed Inlet Cabinet
 Recessed Outlet Cabinet
 2 -hour cabinet shroud
 Four -way Breeching Inlet
 PRV Outlet Valve
 Detail of Top-up Tank arrangement
 Pipe fitting details
 Sprinkler Alarm Valve
 Non-return Valve
 Monitored Gate valve
 Monitored Butterfly valve
 Flow Switch
 Pressure Switch
 Flow test Meter
 1hour fire lagging
 Pipe marking tape

PORTABLE FIRE SUPPRESSION
Portable fire suppression shall be provided in accordance with:
BS 5306: Part 8
 TfL 1-081 Design of fire protection systems and compartmentation measures.
 TfL 1-082 Active fire protection systems and portable equipment.
 TfL G0101 A1 Fire Suppression and firefighting systems: Section 4.2
Portable Fire Extinguishers (PFE) for use in LU premises should be manufactured and tested in
accordance with BS EN 3. This standard and BS EN 2 classifies extinguishers in accordance with the fire
risk to which they are suite.
Worked examples are given in BS 5306: Part 8, to enable extinguisher provision to be calculated. Under
normal circumstances the provision of extinguishers is made for mixed general fire risk, and a simpler
method of calculating the necessary provision is used, see below.
Requirements for the provision of PFE in LU premises are detailed in LU Cat 2 Standard S2101. This
standard requires that only PFE containing; Water, Aqueous Film Forming Foam (AFFF), or Carbon
Dioxide (CO2) should be used.
Extinguishers containing AFFF, deal very effectively with both Class A and Class B fires, and are preferred,
in most circumstances, to those containing water only. Carbon Dioxide is for use on Electrical type risks.
All extinguishers shall be of the cartridge type only (i.e. not stored pressure type). All extinguishers for LU
use should be capable of meeting the requirements of the electrical conductivity test specified in BS EN 3,
this minimises the risk of injury to the user should the firefighting stream accidentally come into contact with
live electrical equipment.
For most purposes 9 Litre AFFF, and 2 kg CO2, will be the correct sizes of extinguisher, however other
sizes may be required according to the risk, and user needs. The distribution of extinguishers in the area of
the station under the scope of the current project is as follows.
Rooms/Areas AFFF (9 litres) CO2

Switch Room 1 x 5kg
Relay Room 1 1 x 2kg
Platforms (each cabinet) 2 1 x 2kg
Transformer Room 1 x 5kg
CER 1 x 5kg
Store (flammable) 1 1 x 2kg
Plant Room 1 1 x 2kg
Upper Ticket Hall 2
Lower Ticket Hall 2
Ventilation Plant 1 x 2kg
Table 6 – Rooms/areas and type of PFE required.

The distribution of AFFF and CO2 extinguishers is provided in Appendix H.

FIRE FIGHTING ACCESS AND FACILITIES
VEHICLE ACCESS TO STATION

The closest Fire station to the Bakerloo Line Ticket Hall is Paddington Fire Station. The route between the
two is shown in Figure 11 below.
In accordance with BS 9999: 2017, Fire and Rescue Service vehicle access for a pumping appliance shall
be within 18m of, and within sight of, a suitable entrance giving access to the main and in sight of the
breeching inlet.
The station is provided with one firefighting shaft which consist of a firefighting lift, stair and lobby. Access to
the firefighting shaft is from Praed Street, see Figure 11 below.
Figure 11: Route of the fire services from Paddington Fire Station to Paddington Square station.

RVP
Figure 12: Vehicle and Personnel Access to firefighting shaft at ground level.

Figure 13: location of RVP at Praed Street.

Figure 14: Vehicle and Personnel Access to the firefighting shaft at concourse level.

INTERNAL FIREFIGHTING ACCESS
The following figure shows the location of the firefighting shaft which consists of the firefighting stair,
firefighting lift and lobby.
To prevent the storage of materials in this area, prohibitive signage will be provided within the lobby and lift
area. Good housekeeping and training should ensure that escape routes are maintained free from
obstructions.
Services that are not associated with the firefighting shaft shall not penetrate through it. Demountable
Durasteel, with a 2-hour fire rating, has been used in the soffit above the doors to the lift lobby at Upper
Ticket Hall level, as shown in Figure 15, to compartment out services which would otherwise pass through.
The demountable Durasteel shall be recertified every time it is taken down for maintenance and shall be
reinstalled by an approved installer.
Figure 15 – Demountable Durasteel is used in the soffit above the doors to the lift lobby at Upper
Ticket Hall level as shown highlighted in red.
In the new firefighting access, a repeater panel, an emergency microphone and a pressurisation override
switch will be provided.
It is recommended that the keybox which would aid in opening the door at street level to access the
firefighting lift, is kept in the firefighters plans box.

Figure 16: Firefighting shaft at Ticket Hall level.
HYDRANT SYSTEM
A new charged dry dropping main will be provided to replace the existing wet hydrant system currently
supplied by a town’s main.
A four-way breeching inlet shall be positioned at concourse level under the new escalators adjacent to the
ventilation supply room 2.002.
From this point the main supply drops within the lower level of the ventilation supply room immediately
below, at Upper Ticket Hall Level. It is then routed along the corridor and/or plant rooms area to pass into
the existing ticket hall area.
A branch passes across the ticket hall in front of the existing escalators, fitted with a monitored isolating
valve and left in readiness to connect to the existing supply into the UMC entrance (2/152) 2.014 feeding
the existing outlet valve at Ticket Hall Level and the platform outlet valves, at an appropriate time. The
existing pipework to be inspected and tested prior to be coupled to the new works. Should any of this
existing pipework leak or found to be deteriorating then this should be replaced. The main continues into
the Ticket Hall fitted with a further monitored isolating valve. A branch is taken off to the right into the
Cleaners Store 2.009 to drop to below into 3.005 to an outlet valve at low level facing into the new Ticket
Hall 3.018 and rise to an outlet valve at concourse level in the plenum chamber 1.004 facing into corridor
1.002.
All outlet valves recessed into walls to be mounted in a suitably fire rated outlet box.
The main continues across the Ticket Hall to Riser 2 adjacent to lift lobby 2.021, drops to an outlet valve
facing into the lift lobby mounted in a suitably fire rated outlet box, and continues dropping to high level
below within the lift lobby 4.002 at basement level.
A small top-up tank is positioned at high level in Plenum Chamber 1.004 and a supply connected into the
main at upper ticket hall level adjacent to the cleaners Store 2.009 (Water supply to this tank by others.) All
pipework situated in Plenum Chamber 1.004 and room 2.002 to be trace heated and lagged (power
supplies to these by others).

At high level within the basement lift lobby 4.002 the supply splits one to pass into riser 2 and drop to
platform level below, and two into stair 1 - 4.001 to drop to an outlet valve at low level facing into the lift
lobby 4.002 within a suitably fire rated outlet box. The drop from above in riser 2 drops to low level at
platform level to a valve outlet mounted within a suitably fire rated outlet box facing into the passageway
5.003. All existing outlet valves at ticket hall and platform levels to be changed to PR type and all new
valves to be of the PR type. AAV’s to be provided in strategic locations throughout the system.
The hydrant system to be designed in accordance with BS9990 and LU Standard 1.082.
All pipework to be Heavy quality galvanised joined by screwed or grooved fittings.
EXTERNAL HYDRANTS
External hydrants are available within 90m of the vehicle access points.
A new hydrant fitted at the top of Arrivals Road during construction phase, shall be retained in the permeant
design.
RENDEZVOUS POINT
Rendezvous point shall remain at the entrance to the District and Circle Line on Praed Street. An
emergency pack, with contents in compliance with BS9999:2017 Annex O shall be kept in a readily
accessible box at that entrance.

FIRE MANAGEMENT AND EMERGENCY PLANNING
GENERAL
LU will be the operator of the station. The LU SOR is located at the LU Ticket Hall.
A management procedure is required that will include responses to fires, the rendezvous point, fire incident
procedures for staff and procedures for the evacuation of all passengers.
MAINTENANCE PROCEDURES
All active and passive fire safety features require systematic checks, servicing and testing as required by
the relevant TfL LU Standards and British Standards. The management systems must ensure that any
changes which affect the fire safety features of the premises are properly recorded and agreed with the
authorities.
Maintained records should include:
 A comprehensive set of drawings/fire plans;
 The predetermined response plan;
 As-built drawings of active and passive fire safety features;
 Staff training records;
 Service and maintenance records.
STAFF DUTIES
There should be a sufficient number of competent staff on duty at all times to complete the following actions
if a fire is suspected or discovered:
 Direct passengers to safe evacuation routes;
 Assist with the evacuation of PRMs;
 Coordinate with the fire and rescue service and other third parties involved. This includes meeting and
briefing the senior fire officer;
 Provide the senior fire officer with drawings showing the location of fire safety features;
 Check all public areas are vacated;
 Any other actions that are required in the fire response plan.
STAFF TRAINING
The Fire Precautions (Sub-Surface Railway Stations) (England) Regulations 2009, require that all staff are
aware of the fire safety features provided and the response actions expected of them if a fire alarm is
activated or a fire is discovered.

APPENDICES
APPENDIX A MEANS OF ESCAPE
Figure 17 – Overview of the potential escape routes from platform level.

Figure 18 - Means of Escape Platform Level 1 of 2

Figure 19 - Means of Escape Platform Level 2 of 2

Figure 20 - Means of escape plant room level

Figure 21 - MoE BoH Ticket Hall Lower Level 1 of 2

Figure 22 - Means of Escape Ticket Hall Lower Level 2 of 2

Figure 23 - Primary and secondary MoE: BoH at Upper Ticket Hall Level 1 of 2

Figure 24 - Escape route via fire door to mall escalators Upper Ticket Hall 2 of 2

Figure 25 - Final exits from new stair and BoH secondary means of escape

Figure 26 - Means of escape to street level from new stair and PRM lift

APPENDIX B TRAVEL DISTANCES
Figure 27 - Travel distances platform level 1 of 2

Figure 28 - Travel Distances Platform Level 2 of 2

Figure 29 - Travel Distances Plant Room Level

Figure 30 - Travel Distances Lower Ticket Hall Level 1 of 2

Figure 31 - Travel Distances Lower Ticket Hall Level 2 of 2

Figure 32 - Travel Distances Upper Ticket Hall Level 1 of 2

Figure 33 - Travel Distances Upper Ticket Hall Level 2 of 2

Figure 34 - Travel Distances final exit level from new stair

APPENDIX C COMPARTMENTATION
Figure 35 - Final Exit from Protected Corridor (Fire fighters Access) and secondary means of escape

Figure 36 - Firefighting shaft at street level

Figure 37 - Compartmentation Ticket Hall Upper Level 1 of 2

Figure 38 - Compartmentation Ticket Hall Upper Level 2 of 2

Figure 39 - Compartmentation Lower Ticket Hall Level 1 of 2

Figure 40 - Compartmentation Ticket Hall Lower Level 2 of 2

Figure 41 - Compartmentation Basement Level

Figure 42 - Compartmentation at Platform Level 1 of 2

Figure 43 - Compartmentation at Platform Level 2 of 2

APPENDIX D SIGNAGE
Figure 44 - Exit signs at Concourse Level Sheet 1 of 2

Figure 45 - Signage Street Level Egress and firefighters’ access

Figure 46 - Signage Ticket Hall Upper Level 1 of 2

Figure 47 – Signage Upper Ticket Hall Level 2 of 2

Figure 48 - Signage Ticket Hall Lower Level 1 of 2

Figure 49 - Signage Ticket Hall Lower Level 2 of 2

Figure 50 - Signage Basement Level

Figure 51 - Signage Platform Level 1 of 2

Figure 52 - Signage at Platform 2 of 2

APPENDIX E EVACUATION CALCULATIONS
North Bound South Bound

Boarder Alighters Boarder Alighters
2041
AM 2694 11304 13699 7597
3hr
PM 5548 13872 13699 7567
2041+35%
AM 3637 15261 18494 10256
3hr
PM 7490 18728 18494 10216
AM 1637 6867 8322 4615

1hr
PM 3071 7678 7583 4189
AM 442 1854 2247 1246

15 mins
PM 798 1996 1971 1089
AM 177 742 899 498

5 min
PM 319 799 789 436
AM 35 148 180 100

1 min
PM 64 160 158 87
Headway AM 78 326 395 219

(2.2min) PM 141 351 347 192 `
Crush Load Trains per Hour Headway

874 27 2.2

Evacuation Load
Train Fire Station Fire
Platform Load (CL+ 2B) 2(B+A)

AM 1030 808
North bound
PM 1155 984
AM 1665 1230
South bound
PM 1568 1077
Station Load (CL+ 2B)+(a+b) 2(B+A)+(a+b)

AM 1644 1423
North bound
PM 1694 1522
AM 2069 1634
South bound
PM 2060 1569
Train Fire (T.F) Station Fire (S.F)

Lines Platforms Northbound Southbound Total Worst case Lines Platforms Northbound Southbound Total Worst case
Northbound 1030 615 1644 Northbound 808 615 1423
AM 2069 AM 1634
Southbound 404 1665 2069 Southbound 404 1230 1634
Northbound 1155 539 1694 Northbound 984 539 1522

PM 2060 PM 1569
Southbound 492 1568 2060 Southbound 492 1077 1569

TRAIN ON FIRE SCENARIO
Stair Escalator Ratio 4 min Capacity

Escalator Barrel 67 120 0.69 748
Ratio 0.36 0.64
New Stair 84 0.31 336
Time
Time to
to Time to Time to
Time Personal place
Exit clear Distance walk clear
Provided width Escape to travel of
Escape element Capacity People the to Exit the incident
(m) (pp/exit/min) clear speed relative
(pp/m/min) exit (m) distance platform
(min) (m/min) safety
(min) (min)
(min)
(min)
Incident Platform 1665
Escalator Barrel 1149
New Stair 516
Platform 38 65.0 1.7
Cross passage doors to
existing barrel 4 80 320 1149 3.6 38 13.0 0.3
Existing Escalator 1 120 120 480 4.0
Existing stair 1.2 56 67.2 269 4.0
Cross passage doors to new

stair 2.4 80 192 516 2.7
New stair 1.5 56 84 336 4.0 4.8 7.6
Non incident areas 8.4 80 672 371 0.6
Remaining on incident 1 x 1.5 m + 1.2 m stair + 1
platform escalator 271 271 209 0.8
From non-incident Areas 6 80 480 775
Existing Escalator 1 120 120 343 2.9 12 12.0 1.0
Existing stair 1.2 56 67.2 192 2.9 12 12.0 1.0
New stairs 1.5 56 84 240 2.9 12 14.4 1.2
Holding capacity at 0.49 m2 pp Persons

BLL Passage 87
New Stair Passage 54
Total 142
Occupancy non-incident platform 404
Available occupancy in non-incident areas 371
Capacities: non-incident areas People

Non-incident Platform capacity 634
BLL passage 87
Cross passage (new stair) 54

FIRE IN THE STATION STRUCTURE SCENARIO
Time to Personal Time to Time to

Exit Time to Distance
Provided width Escape clear travel walk the clear the
Escape element Capacity People clear to Exit
(m) (pp/exit/min) the exit speed distance platform
(pp/m/min) (min) (m)
(min) (m/min) (min) (min)
Southbound Platform 1230
Northbound Platform 404
Platform 38 93 2.4
Cross passage doors to new stair 4.8 80 384 1634 4.3
17.5
Passageway to new stair 2.4 80 192 1466 7.6
New stair 1.5 56 84 1466 17.5
New passageway 38 24.4 0.6
Note: persons are assumed to be in a place of relative safety when they have passed through the fire doors into the protected passageway leading to the new stair.

APPENDIX F FIRE DETECTION AND ALARM: CAUSE AND EFFECT MATRIX
Effect Legend
X - Activate
Cause
Fire Panel Indicators Buzzer & LED notification
Platform level PRM Passageway doors close

G - Ground
Seek and search 4 minute timer activated
Stair pressurisation fans start (full speed)

Fire Alarm Audible & Visual Alarms
MCC,s (Plant Control) ASSUMED
Lower Ticket Hall level doors close

Critical cooling LEER (Shutdown)
Critical cooling OLBI (shutdown)

Send grey link to Network Rail
Security interfaces (RELEASE)

E - Evacuate
Damper control panel signal

Critical cooling comms Room
Lift 1 Upper Ticket Hall level
Upper Hall level doors close

Lift 2 Upper Ticket Hall level
Send grey link to Retail Mall
Flashing beacons activate
Third party system links

Inspector sands intitated
Staire pressuriation (off)

Lift 1 to Concourse level
Upper ticket hall areas
Lower ticket hall areas
Basement Plant areas

Lift 2 Concourse level
Smoke door contol

Critical cooling CER
I - Isolate
Retail Fire Curtain

Full evacuation
Platform level
System fault
Lift Control
- No Action
MCC1
MCC2
MCC3
Spare
Callpoint/Sensor/HSSD System Activated 1st Knock
Upper Ticket Hall (Public Area) P x x x x
Lower Ticket Hall ( Public Area) P x x x
Upper Ticket Hall (Back of house) P x x x x x x X
Lower Ticket Hall ( Back of house ) P x x x x x x X
Basement level Plantroom P x x x x x x x
Basement Level Transformer room P x E G G x x x x x
Upper (Back of house) LEER room P x x x
OLBI room Basement level P x E G G x x
Upper Ticket Hall (Back of house) CER room P x x x
Lower Ticket Hall ( Back of house ) Comms room P x x x
Escalator chamber P x E G G x x x x x x x x
Upper Ticket Hall lift lobby P x x x x x x x
Lower Ticket Hall lift lobby P x x x x x x x
Platform lobby passageway P x x x x x x x x
Callpoint/Sensor/HSSD System Activated 2nd Knock

Upper Ticket Hall (Public Area) P x x x E G G x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
Lower Ticket Hall ( Public Area) P x x x E G G x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
Upper Ticket Hall (Back of house) P E G G x
Lower Ticket Hall ( Back of house ) P E G G x
Basement Level Plantroom P x x E G G x x x x x x x x
Basement Level Transformer room P x x G G x x x x x x x x
Basement Level (Back of house) LEER room P x x x E G G x x
Basement level OLBI room P x x G G x x x x x x x x x
Upper Ticket Hall (Back of house) CER room P x x x E G G x x x
Lower Ticket Hall ( Back of house ) Comms room P x x x E G G x x x
Escalator chamber P x x G G x x x x x x x x
Upper Ticket Hall concourse lift lobby P x x E x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
Lower Ticket Hall concourse Lift Lobby P x x E x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
Platform lobby passageway P x x E G G x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
Seek and Search timer

Automatic detection not accepted x x x E G G x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
Automatic detection accepted P x x
Seek and search timer expired P x x x E G G x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
LIFT SHAFTS & RISER DETECTION

Lift No 1 Smoke Detector Activated P x E G G x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
Lift No 2 Smoke Detector Activated P x E G G x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
Detection within Vertical Riser Activated P x x E G G x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
Manual overide switches

Manual door override Upper Ticket hall P x x
Manual door override Lower Ticket hall P x x
Manual door override Platform corridor P x x
Manual override Upper Ticket hall fire curtain P x x
Manual override Stair pressurisation P I x Note: If the local manual override switch (at Concourse
level) is activated, then the secondary override switch (in
Secondary manual override stair pressurisation (SOR) P x the SOR) will not operate.
Sprinkler Activation
System Activated P x x x E G G x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
System Tamper P x
User Activity
Maintenance P I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I
Weekly Test P I I I
System Fault
System fault P x
Doo

APPENDIX G FIRE SUPPRESSION AND HYDRANT PROVISION
Statement of distribution pipe losses between the various design points and the installation valves
System: Wet Sprinkler system – Flow rate 1000L/min
Hazard Group: Ordinary Group 3
Contract Name: Paddington Square Upgrade
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Run of distribution pipe from Pipe Pipe No of Equiv. Total Pressure loss at design flow rate
valves to design point dia. length bends length
length Pipe Static head Difference
and
losses gain
tees
mm m m m mbar mbar mbar
Basement - Storeroom 150 26 4 8 34 34
4.010
100 8 1 6 14 56
80 43 8 13 56 896
986
600 386
Ticket Hall Upper Level - 150 26 4 8 34 34

Cleaners Store 2.009
100 8 1 6 14 56
90
0 90
Ticket Hall Upper Level 150 26 4 8 34 34

Connection to existing
station protection supply
existing room 2.014
34 0 34
Table 7 – Sprinkler pipe losses calculations

Statement of distribution pipe losses between the inlet and outlet hydrant valves
System: Dry Fire Hydrant Main – Flow rates 1500 & 750 L/min
Contract Name: Paddington Square Upgrade
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Run of distribution pipe from Breeching inlet at Pipe Pipe No of bends Equiv. Total length Pressure loss at design flow rate
Concourse Level to outlet valve dia. length and tees
length Flow Loss Static head Difference
gain
Ticket Hall – Upper Level 150 53 20 40 93 1500 93
Connection to existing system - existing room
2.014
93 200
-107
Ticket Hall Upper Level: Lobby 2.021 150 58 23 53 111 1500 111
100 3 4 11 14 750 42
153
400 -247
Ticket Hall Lower Level: Lobby 3.017 150 67 26 75 142 1500 142
100 3 2 8 11 750 33
175 700 -525
Concourse Level - Stair 2 150 67 26 75 142 1500 142
100 8 1 2 10 750 30
65 3 3 3 11 750 286
458
0 458
Basement Level: Lobby – 4.002 150 65 26 75 140 1500 140
100 18 6 15 33 750 99
239 1000 -761
Platform Level: Lobby – 5.002 150 65 26 75 140 750 140

100 21 6 15 36 750 108
248 1300 -1052
Table 8 – Hydrant pipe losses calculations

Figure 53 - Hydrant coverage at concourse level

Figure 54 - Hydrant coverage at Upper Ticket Hall Level

Figure 55 - Hydrant coverage at Lower Ticket Hall Level

Figure 56 - Hydrant coverage at basement level

Figure 57 - Hydrant coverage (60 m) at platform level from new and refurbished hydrants

Appendix H PORTABLE FIRE SUPPRESSION
Figure 58 – Portable Fire Extinguisher Concourse Level

Figure 59 – Portable Fire Extinguisher Upper Ticket Hall Level 1 of 2

Figure 60 – Portable Fire Extinguisher Upper Ticket Hall Level 2 of 2

Figure 61 – Portable Fire Extinguisher Lower Ticket Hall Level 2 of 2

Figure 62 – Portable Fire Extinguisher Basement Level

APPENDIX I FIRE DRAWING REFERENCES
Drawing Number Title Revision
PBLSU-WSP-FRS-B071_1-DRG-FE-00001 Fire Alarm Concourse Level Plan Latest

Sheet 1 of 2 Revision
PBLSU-WSP-FRS-B071_1-DRG-FE-00002 Fire Alarm Concourse Level Plan Latest

PBLSU-WSP-FRS-B071_2-DRG-FE-00004 Fire Alarm Ticket Hall Upper Level Latest

PBLSU-WSP-FRS-B071_2-DRG-FE-00005 Fire Alarm Ticket Hall Upper Level Latest

PBLSU-WSP-FRS-B071_3-DRG-FE-00003 Fire Alarm Ticket Hall Lower Level Latest

PBLSU-WSP-FRS-B071_3-DRG-FE-00004 Fire Alarm Ticket Hall Lower Level Latest

PBLSU-WSP-FRS-B071_4-DRG-FE-00002 Fire Alarm Basement Level Sheet 1 Latest

Revision
PBLSU-WSP-FRS-B071_5-DRG-FE-00001 Fire Alarm Platform Level Plan Latest

PBLSU-WSP-FRS-B071_5-DRG-FE-00002 Fire Alarm Platform Level Plan Latest

PBLSU-WSP-FRS-B071_Z-DRG-FE-00002 Fire Detection & Alarm Schematic Latest

Loop 1 Sheet 1 of 2 Revision
PBLSU-WSP-FRS-B071_Z-DRG-FE-00003 Fire Detection & Alarm Schematic Latest

Loop 1 Sheet 2 of 2 Revision
PBLSU-WSP-FRS-B071_Z-DRG-FE-30003 Cause and Effect Matrix Latest

Revision
PBLSU-WSP-FRS-B071_Z-DRG-FE-00001 Paddington Bakerloo Line Station Latest

Upgrade Fire Alarm Damper Control Revision
Schematic
PBLSU-WSP-FRS-B071_Z-DRG-FE-30001 Systemwide Fire Detection Latest

Standard Details Revision
PBLSU-WSP-FRS-B071_Z-DRG-FE-30002 Special Fireman’s Override 3 Latest

Position Key Switch Details Revision
PBLSU-WSP-FRS-B071_1-DRG-FE-00003 Fire Suppression System Latest

Concourse Level Plan Sheet 1 of 2 Revision
PBLSU-WSP-FRS-B071_1-DRG-FE-00004 Fire Suppression System Latest

Concourse Level Plan Sheet 2 of 2 Revision

PBLSU-WSP-FRS-B071_2-DRG-FE-00002 Fire Suppression System Ticket Latest
Hall–Upper Level Plan Sheet 1 of 2 Revision

Hall–Upper Level Plan Sheet 2 of 2 Revision

Hall–Upper Level Plan Sprinkler Revision
Valve Room Detail

Hall–Lower Level Plan Revision
PBLSU-WSP-FRS-B071_4-DRG-FE-00001 Fire Suppression System Basement Latest

Level Plan Revision
PBLSU-WSP-FRS-B071_5-DRG-FE-00003 Fire Suppression System Platform Latest

Level Plan Revision
PBLSU-WSP-FRS-B071_Z-DRG-FE-00009 Charged (Dry) Hydrant System Latest

Schematic Revision
PBLSU-WSP-FRS-B071_Z-DRG-FE-00010 Sprinkler System Schematic Latest

Revision

APPENDIX J EXTRACT FROM THE PROPOSED ADDITIONS TO THE LUL
“MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS” IN THE LEASE (PROVIDED BY LUL)

APPENDIX K MALL STRATEGY DDN RE TICKET HALL MEANS OF
ESCAPE

PAD-WSP-DDN-FI-0006-P01
Paddington Sq – Retail Mall design considerations
TO Design Team FROM WSP Fire
DATE 04 November 2019 CONFIDENTIALITY Confidential
PREPARED Lucia Picon REVIEWED Nelson Morgado
INTRODUCTION
The Paddington Square development will include a two-storey retail mall below the street level. This
technical note is intended to summarise the discussions/agreements that have taken place during the
design process of the retail mall of the Paddington Square development and its interface with LU and
provides a synopsis of the Retail Mall considerations for future reference as follows:
1. LU interface
2. Sprinkler protection coverage
LU INTERFACE
The entrance route to LU station is provided via escalators/stairs from open public realm at concourse level
entrance to reach the ticket hall at B1 level.
Figure 1 and Figure 2 show the proposed entrance to LU station.
Figure 1: 3D view showing the entrance to LU station from the open public realm.
www.wsp.com
Figure 2: 3D view showing the escalators at B1 level connecting to the open public realm.
To accommodate LU requirements the proposed entrance/egress route contains design provisions within
the Retail Mall fire strategy. The following sections summarise the requirements and provisions of the Retail
Mall with regards to satisfying LU.
ESCAPE ROUTE FROM LU

The retail mall fire strategy is based on the premise that the common parts of the mall will not be
significantly affected by smoke for a fire condition in one of the retail units at both concourse and B1 levels.
Therefore, the mall remains a tenable main escape route for the retail mall serving as LU access/egress
from the Ticketing Hall.
Ensuring the mall egress route is available for a fire condition within the retail mall is a requirement of the
retail mall fire strategy which follows Building Regulation Guidance and meets with Building Control
approval. The smoke venting strategy is based on a dedicated mechanical smoke extraction system for
each unit.
Whilst there is a design aspiration to maintain a sterile mall at B1 level to accommodate LU standards, it is
expected that certain features such as illuminated display/sign boards etc. will be present in the mall and
will introduce an element of fire load to the mall, albeit it is suggested that such features are not deemed to
present a significant risk. The entrance route to LU the Ticketing Hall (up to the line of the demise) is
considered part of the open Public Realm space due to its direct openness to outside over a large volume
of weather covered spaces (this is illustrated in Figure 3).
The mall at concourse level is defined as a natural cross ventilated circulation space containing limited fire
load and where any pop-ups, small kiosks are considered they will be located only at Concourse level and
will need to be fully justified to the satisfaction of the Approving Authorities under the RRO (Regulatory
Reform (Fire Safety) Order) once the building is occupied. Some of the principle design elements to
consider in any such design are;
• Constructed of materials with limited fire load
• Limited risks of ignition, fire growth/heat release rate
• Located so the unit does not encroach on escape route widths on either side (minimum of 3m clear
width maintained along the retail unit’s shopfronts
• Separated from each other by the appropriate distance to limit the risk of fire spread
• Located below a ceiling to ensure full sprinkler coverage
• Have a robust management strategy with provision of localised fire extinguishers and trained staff to
deal with any minor fire incident
It is not permitted to place Christmas trees / pop-up stalls, kiosks in B1 Ticketing Hall level, unless a risk
assessment is carried out to the approval of LU and Building Control.
Figure 3: Opening to open air Public Realm
The entrance route to LU Ticket Hall (up to the line of the demise) is considered part of the open Public
Realm space due to its direct openness to outside over a large volume of weather covered spaces. See
Figure 4 below.
Figure 4 Part of the retail mall is connected to outside
CFD STUDY
As part of the Retail Mall fire strategy a CFD study was carried out to demonstrate that the mall escape
route from LU ticket hall via the retail mall is kept clear smoke if a fire breaks out within the deemed worst-
case fire incident in retail unit 15, adjacent to the egress route. Figure 5 shows the location of retail unit 15.
Figure 5: Fire locations

Visibility results after 1000s (fire within retail unit 15) are shown in Figure 6.
Longitudinal Section along mall Transverse Section thru unit 15
Plane 2m above ticket level Plane 2m above concourse level

Figure 6: Visibility distance for unit 15 fire scenario at B1 level with 2.4m door height
Subsequent meetings with LU resulted in an additional fire scenario being considered and a CFD study for
retail unit 2 (shown in Figure 5) was carried out with the following visibility results;
Longitudinal Section along mall Transverse Section thru unit
Plane 2m above ticket level Plane 2m above concourse level

Figure 7: Visibility distance for unit 2 fire scenario at B1 level with 2.4m door height
The CFD study results show that tenable conditions are expected in the retail mall and therefore the
entrance/egress route from LU station in the event of fire within a retail unit.
Note: A standalone CFD report has been produced for the benefit of LU to accommodate their request to
consider a fire in retail unit 02.
EXIT CAPACITY REQUIRED BY LU

The exit capacity required by LU fire strategy, for egress via the Ticketing Hall to outside at concourse
level, has been provided and quantified as one 1200mm stair and one escalator. This suggests that the
clear route from the double exit door to the bottom of the stair/escalator at B1 level is the designated area
within the mall where the LU requirements apply. Figure 8 demarcates highlighted in red the proposed area
where the limitations apply.
Figure 8: Escape from LU through the mall
EVACUATION PROCEDURES
The simultaneous evacuation of the LU station and Retail mall is not a required fire evacuation scenario
and as such is not considered in the fire strategy design; the spaces are fire separated by a 120 minutes
fire rated curtain line at B1 level, hence considered as separate fire compartments and different entities
under separate management and evacuation methodologies.
The fire alarm strategy for the Concourse and B1 levels is defined in the fire strategy as simultaneous,
albeit this will be done only on a genuine “double knock” fire detection activation condition.
Given that the Retail mall will be a managed space the illustrated evacuation matrix is considered in the fire
strategy to ensure unnecessary disruption for minor incidents and only evacuate on a confirmed fire
condition when deemed necessary. The fire strategy also highlights the requirement for management level
in section 17 of the fire strategy report. Evacuation procedures will need to be put in place once the building
is occupied under RRO (Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order) enforcements.
Figure 9: Fire activation and alarm sequence
SEPARATION BETWEEN LU DEMISE AND THE RETAIL MALL

It is acknowledged that the Retail Mall and LU spaces whilst with a shared access/egress route, each fall
under two distinct entities required to follow separate Regulatory fire safety standards and are under
separate management. From an operational point of view both entities are also defined as separate
buildings with a common access/egress route which is required to be available at all times.
It is also acknowledged that the designated access/egress route illustrated in Figure 8 will be a clear and
unobstructed route and if any furnishings or digital signage is required to the space this will be subject to
LU review and approval.
A fire curtain is required by LU to achieve 120 minutes fire separation between the two demises at B1 level.
This fire curtain is not considered a requirement in terms of the Retail Mall fire strategy and as such the
automatic activation and control of the curtain is also solely for LU. The Retail Mall fire detection system will
provide an interface alert signal to LU, but activation of the fire curtain is not under the control of the Retail
Mall detection system interface matrix.
Note: the omission of sprinkler protection from front of house escape routes is not a LU
requirement. The text will be updated to reflect this in the future revision of the technical
note: PAD-WSP-DDN-FI-0006-P01, Paddington Sq – Retail Mall design considerations.
MALL CEILING REQUIREMENTS

The retail mall fire strategy considers a requirement for linings to the mall to achieve a National Class 0 or
B-s3-d2 European classification to comply with Building Regulations.
LU restrict the ceilings in the route of access/egress to be of non-combustible material and as such timber
ceilings are not permitted in these areas. Therefore, non-combustible materials are proposed along LU
access route via the retail mall at concourse and B1 levels.
Stretched ceiling
It is proposed to provide a stretched ceiling with an aluminium perimeter bulkhead to areas of the retail mall
at B1 level and concourse level. Figure 10 shows the proposed locations:
Figure 10: Stretched ceiling locations
The proposed material achieves B-s1-d0 European classification and therefore meets Building Regulations
requirements. As shown in Figure 10, the proposed stretched ceiling at B1 level is located at the
designated area where LU requirements are considered. However, WSP consider that the proposals are
acceptable based on the following:
• No fire load is expected as it is a circulation space used as egress/access to LU station.
• As fire load is restricted the risk of fire would not occur directly below the stretched ceiling to cause
ignition of the material.
• In the unlikely event of the proposed material igniting, the thickness of the material would cause to
burn through rapidly and not significant enough to cause fire to spread to the adjacent Class 0
ceiling
OMISSION OF SPRINKLERS ALONG THE LU ESCAPE ROUTE

As part of LU requirements, the provision of sprinkler protection to the front of house (F.O.H) escape routes
is not permitted. Therefore, it is proposed to omit sprinklers along the access/egress route from LU to the
public realm space.
Omitting sprinkler protection to part of the retail mall creates a deviation to the sprinkler protection rules as
explained below.
The design approach of the Retail Mall does not include for mall smoke ventilation mainly due to ceiling
height constrains and as such the mall relies on the natural ventilation vertical opening to outside and the
fire strategy design approach considers smoke extraction to each of the retail units which reduces the risk
of smoke entering the mall. With this design approach sprinkler protection is deemed required to the mall to
allow the required operational flexibility and design resilience for how the mall will be used when the
building is occupied.
The Building Regulation Guidance requires that sprinkler protection be provided in accordance with BS EN
12485. The certification of these systems is required prior to building occupation and is provided by the
specialist contractor who is obligated to follow BS 12845.
BS EN 12845 does not permit omission of sprinklers to parts of the levels below a sprinkler protected
building unless these spaces are fully fire enclosed in 60 minutes fire compartments. It is not feasible in this
instance to create 60 minutes fire separation between the mall and retail units and therefore sprinkler
protection will be provided to the mall at concourse and B1 level.
However, it is proposed to request the approval from Building Control to omit sprinklers from the designated
mall access/egress route for LU as illustrated in Figure 13 and Figure 14 below on the basis that these
spaces will be kept clear and contain limited fire load or localised elements such as digital displays for
operational purposes etc.
The omission of sprinkler protection to the areas highlighted (low risk spaces) can be deemed to be minor
non-compliance by the specialist sprinkler contractor and be subject to agreement from Building Control.
Figure 11 shows a 3D-view of the vertical opening to outside created walkways and escalators.
Figure 11: 3-D view of LU entrance/egress

Figure 12 and Figure 13 show the areas where the sprinklers are omitted:
Figure 12: Unsprinklered areas at Concourse level

Figure 13: Unsprinklered areas at B1 level
ENTRANCE DOORS HEIGHT

A smoke control system is provided for each retail unit. The extract value rates for each unit maintain a
smoke clear layer of 2.5m at B1 level and 2.2m at concourse level. Therefore, the door heights should not
exceed 2.1m for the concourse level and 2.4m at B1 level/ of the tenant fire strategy
FALSE CEILING
In order to allow the smoke extract system to perform as per the design intent it is necessary to create a
smoke reservoir and prevent smoke spilling into the mall. The suspended ceiling in each retail unit will need
to be at least 25% ‘open’ to allow smoke to rise through the ceiling, into the void from where it can be
extracted. The details of the openings in the ceiling will be provided by the fit-out teams but could take the
form of slots, coffers or other types of perforations, which ensure an even distribution of the openings is
achieved.
INTAKE AIR DUCTWORK TO THE RETAIL UNIT AT RETAIL MALL
As part of the shell-and-core, an enclosure to the landlord ventilation system is provided as shown below.
Once tenants provide the fit-out, they will be able to connect the landlord opening or remove the landlord
enclosure and provide a damper in the ductwork at the connection point.
Figure 14: Intake air ductwork connection within the retail units.
PADDINGTON SQUARE LU
Emergency Egress from Ticket Hall Options 0 - 4
CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1
1. INTRODUCTION 2
2. EXISTING MEANS OF ESCAPE 3
3. OPTION 0 AS FEASIBILITY REPORT OPTION 5A 4
4. OPTION “1” EVACUATION CORRIDOR WITHIN RETAIL SPACE 6
5. OPTION “2” EVACUATION CORRIDOR WITHIN LUL DEMISE 10
6. OPTION “3” EVACUATION VIA EXISTING PRAED STREET CORRIDOR 14
7. OPTION “4” EVACUATION VIA MECHANICAL LIFT 17
8. PLANNING CONTEXT 24
9. BUDGET ESTIMATE 25
10. CONCLUSION 26
11. APPENDIX A – DDN EMERGENCY EGRESS TICKET HALL & PLANT ROOM 27
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This document has been prepared to provide LUL with further substantiation that the Feasibility Report
Option 5a design and associated LU fire strategy provides the optimum solution reducing associated
risks to ALARP when considered within the constraints of the development and against alternative
layouts and escape strategy options.
The Bakerloo Line station has not been significantly enhanced since its opening in 1913 and a number
of previous schemes to ameliorate the worsening capacity issues have been proposed over the last
two decades, however these proposals have been hampered by the physical constraints of the site
such as LU infrastructure issues including running tunnels, escalator barrel, main sewer, existing
services, road network, adjacent buildings and main line Paddington Station including Arrivals Road.
This report seeks to demonstrate that the scheme now being progressed provides the optimum
solution within the constraints for an extension to the existing ticket hall in an extremely space
restricted environment.
The Feasibility Report Option 5a design provides for significant improvements including:
· Congestion relief at peak hours
· Improves station operation
· Provides step free access from street to platforms
· Improves evacuation provision during emergency situations
· Optimises passenger flows and improves on passenger journey times
· Improves wayfinding of customers and improves cross-flows
· Provides new dedicated means of escape from platform
· Improves Customer experience
· Provides PRM evacuation from platform level.
The details are contained in the Feasibility Report Option 5a design for Paddington Square London
Underground Bakerloo Line which includes for designated means of escape, in a fire emergency, from
the newly extended Ticket Hall through the retail mall for passengers.
Despite the design and fire strategy contained in the above report, London Underground Fire
Engineers have expressed concern at proposals to provide a means of escape from the ticket hall
which passes through another demise. Whilst recognising these concerns it should be noted that this
provision is compliant with standards and guidance on providing a means of escape and provides the
safest and best solution in the context of the highly complex consented scheme. Access through and
across this demise is also governed by lease arrangements securing LUL rights.
As an existing station, there is very limited scope underground for bringing new exits to the surface.
There are spatial restrictions caused by the new fire-fighters shaft, the Mercure Hotel basement, and
a retaining wall. There are further restrictions as to where such an exit might breach the surface due
to the requirement to keep Arrivals Road permanently available for emergency vehicle and
maintenance access for Paddington Station and the Hilton Hotel. Similar vehicular restrictions apply
to the area around the Mercure Hotel.
As well as the existing Feasibility Design Report 5A design (Option 0), this report provides further
consideration of 4 options.
For option 0 it is considered the risks associated with the proposed exits are ALARP. A further 4
options have also been considered (1-4) and are included within this review. Each of these options
carry significant cost and planning permission noncompliance, without reducing the risk to passengers
in a station fire.
A commentary on the Planning context and the associated impacts of the 4 options has been included
in this document. It concludes that after carefully considering all the options (0-4), option 0, evacuation
via the shopping mall, provides the most viable and effective means of escape from the Bakerloo Line
Ticket Hall.
Options 1-4 would be perceived by Westminster City Council (WCC) as a ‘retrograde’ step in terms of
the quality of the public realm. The public realm was considered a fundamental public benefit of the
approved development, meaning any change will be sensitive and closely scrutinised by WCC, and
they are very keen to maintain to maximum permeability and pedestrian flow throughout the
development.
The options all involve addition of structures in relatively sensitive areas where pedestrian flow is likely
to be high as people move into/through the site and to/from the underground station and retail mall.
Any additional structures or intrusions into the public realm would therefore be very likely to be resisted
by WCC.
LUL have been granted a 999yr lease (virtual freehold) of the new ticket hall which includes all relevant
access provisions required for operations, maintenance, and emergencies including fire. The lease
includes escape routes which form a right of way over the public realm or retained premises to give
appropriate ability to maintain safe operations at all times.
A summary of the anticipated CAPEX and OPEX costs associated with the various options discussed
has also been provided. This includes an estimated value loss of circa [£7.8M] reported against
Options 1 and 2.
In considering the additional 4 options it should be clear that the numbers considered for evacuation
are the numbers of persons who can enter the Ticket Hall per minute from the escalator barrel
(187ppm). All others are considered to escape safely via the new stair. This is identical for each option
and identical to Option 0. This report confirms that the route to safety for these 187 ppm under option
0 is direct, immediate, substantially the most cost-effective option, and meets with planning consent.
Option 1 – will carry a minimum CAPEX cost of £1,400,000 including the provision for a new lift.
However, there is a significant loss of value of circa £7,800,000. Additionally, LUL will have to carry
out calculations associated with their own potential costs.
Option 2 – will carry a minimum CAPEX cost of £825,000. There is a significant loss of value of circa
£7,800,000. Additionally, LUL will have to carry out calculations associated with their own potential
costs.
Option 3 – will carry a minimum CAPEX costs of circa £700,000. This would include costs to modify
the existing structure, associated MEP and structural works at surface. The cost associated with
relocating new plant and equipment currently allocated within this space and the associated design
fees have yet to be assessed and are therefore excluded due to lack of information. Additionally, LUL
will have to carry out calculations associated with their own potential costs.
Option 4 – will carry a minimum CAPEX costs of £950,000. This would include costs to modify the
existing structure, associated MEP and structural works at surface. The cost associated with
relocating new plant and equipment currently allocated within this space and the associated design
fees have yet to be assessed and are therefore excluded due to lack of information. Additionally, LUL
will have to carry out calculations associated with their own potential costs.
We believe that Option 0 continues to offer the safest practical solution within the context of the
constraining environment and given the key constraints of neighbouring structure, planning consent
and viability we believe the alternative Options 1-4 remain are unviable and would deliver a retrograde
step in relation to fire safety.
Site Constraints Plan – Overview

1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 PURPOSE OF DESIGN NOTE

This report details 5 Options in total, Options 0, 1, 2, 3 & 4. Option 0 is the development’s current
proposal for evacuation and Options 1 & 2 have been suggested by LUL Fire Engineer. Each of the
Options have been described together with the perceived issues / constraints which must be
considered for the lifecycle of the scheme alongside Time, Cost and Quality. These elements have
been considered to determine whether an alternative option is reasonably practicable.
A detailed report relating to Option 0 (Evacuation via third party – shopping mall) is already in
circulation and should be used when considering all options. (Appendix 1) PAD-WSP-DDN-STN-FI-
0004 Emergency Egress from Plantroom & Ticket Hall.
It should be noted that in addition to planning and funding approval requirements, if any of the Options
1-4 were pursued a period for redesign and associated design approvals would be required. This is
very likely to impact the overall project including key durations through to the planned start on site in
February 2020. There has currently been no assessment of the associated cost including fees that
would be incurred as a consequence – costs assessments provided below cover value and capital
expenditure only.
2 EXISTING MEANS OF ESCAPE
The Bakerloo ticket hall currently has three access / egress points. 2/202 passage way leads to the
lawn ticket hall, 1/602 passage and stairs lead to Praed Street entrance / exit, and 2/201 leads to
stairs 1/601which exit into the network rail Paddington station concourse. Each of these passage ways
could in the event of an evacuation be utilised for egress.
Current egress from platform level is via a single escalator barrel containing two 1.0m wide escalators
and a 1.2m wide stair.
The current design depends upon a single escalator barrel, with evacuation by train in a Station Fire
scenario, a non-compliant platform escape time in a train on fire at the platform scenario, and no step
free access or PRM evacuation route.
3 OPTION “0” ESCAPE VIA THE MALL
3.1 GENERAL
Escape from platform level requires that 187 ppm exit via the escalator barrel into the ticket hall.
3.2 ROUTE
This option provides an egress route from the station Ticket Hall via the mall (which is not enclosed
or shut), rather than direct to surface level.
The main entrance will be closed by a fire shutter in the event of a fire. Emergency exit will be via a
fire door to the side of this shutter. The fire door will be 2.4m wide, with an exit capacity of 192 ppm.
All passengers leaving the escalator barrel will flow freely through the fire door to open air. Of the
means of escape options considered this route offers the shortest time route to a place of relative
safety.
The mall escalators as shown below are situated immediately outside the proposed fire door and are
open to the external environment. LUL have legal access rights of this area.
3.3 EVACUATION THROUGH THIRD PARTY LAND

There are no specific laws, or standards which prohibit escape through third party property.
BS9999:2017 16.3.1. States that “In mixed-use buildings, means of escape for each occupancy
characteristic category…should be provided separately. Where this is not possible, the impact on the
safe evacuation for occupants of category B and C should be assessed and appropriate measures
installed.” It should be noted that under the existing station arrangements the 3rd Party Network Rail
concourse is a normal means of access and egress for the Ticket Hall.
It should also be noted that there are examples on the LUL network of escape over third party land,
including over NR concourses at Marylebone and Euston and over a shopping mall at Fulham
Broadway and High Street Kensington.
3.4 PLANNING CONTEXT

The Option 0 Escape is the basis on which planning permission has been granted by WCC. No issues
or concerns have been raised with this approach through the planning discussions, nor are there any
planning conditions or obligations relating to this. To deliver this approach does not require any further
approval from WCC and would be compliant with the planning permission.
Option 0 does not require any additional structures for fire escape to be provided at street / public
realm level, which enables delivery of an open and ‘clutter-free’ public realm as envisaged by the
planning permission. This has been welcomed throughout the planning process as a significant public
benefit and a core component of the proposed development. The proposed public realm is described
in the WCC Committee Report as: “significant public realm improvements to Paddington”.
It is notable that this public realm provision has also been welcomed by local and statutory
stakeholders as a major benefit.
3.5 RETAIL MALL CONSIDERATIONS

The station will potentially be impacted by a fire in the retail mall which may require the station to
close.
In mitigation against this potential impact, the retail mall is designed to have no fire load within the
mall concourse, including a requirement that there be no kiosks.
The retail units will all be provided with individual mechanical smoke extract which shall operate
independent of any requirement for smoke extract in the mall concourse area.
The concourse area will be sprinklered so as to minimise the size of any potential fire within this area.
There remains the possibility that sprinklers may be removed from the area approximating to the
escape route from the station should this be required by TfL.
The retail mall does not require a fire shutter as part of its fire strategy, so that the fire shutter will be
under the complete control of the station.
A suitable grey link will be provided to provided information at the earliest time of any alarm in the
Retail Mall demise.
3.6 COST CONTEXT

As the base solution there are no additional costs associated with this option.
Option 0 Plans
4 OPTION “1” EVACUATION CORRIDOR WITHIN RETAIL SPACE
4.1 GENERAL
4.2 ROUTE
This option considers a new LUL dedicated fire rated corridor in front of the shopping mall step free
access lift. This option has several issues which impact on the scheme as identified within the
Feasibility Design Report number PAD-WSP-ML-00-RP-DM-0001(P03). Exit from the ticket hall into
the new corridor is via the 2.4m fire door adjacent to the fire curtain.
The pinch point within the corridor is 2.0m wide, which has an exit capacity of 160ppm, 27ppm would
be required to use the new stair in order to maintain a steady flow through the station. This does not
comply with TfL S1371 requirements to maintain at least two separate escape routes through the
station. Alternatively, the evacuation time will be increased elevating risk to passengers.

The introduction of an additional exit door structure would be required at concourse level (within the
public realm) in order to provide a compliant headroom height above the stairs within the corridor. This
would require a formal amendment to the planning permission. Given the highly visible nature of this,
and the fact it is situated in a sensitive part of the public realm, it is highly likely this would require a
Minor Material (‘Section 73’) Amendment (MMA) involving re-consultation on the application and a
Deed of Variation to the S106 Legal Agreement. This would therefore take a significant amount of
time to progress and would likely need to be referred to the Council’s Planning Committee for approval.
Furthermore, the new MMA application would provide another potential opportunity for legal challenge
of the permission. Notwithstanding the process issues described above, the evacuation corridor would
involve the creation of additional structure impinging into the public realm and is therefore likely to be
resisted by WCC. The structure cuts across a key area of pedestrian movement to/from the retail mall
which would be a significant concern. It also impairs the line of sight into the retail mall and LUL
Station, which is a key benefit of the open public realm. This option would be inconsistent with the
design and public realm principles which have informed the development of the scheme design to
date, and which have been supported by WCC and other stakeholders. We anticipate that this option
would very likely be refused by WCC.
4.4 COST CONTEXT

There would be impact to the prospective retail development opportunities due to the loss of at least
two retail units as a consequence of creating the staircase and opening at concourse level. This
intervention would be in perpetuity and over the lifetime of the building. This would result in an
anticipated loss of commercial space at both Ticket Hall and Concourse level of 157.6sqm. which
represents an approx. loss of NIA 1,650 ft2 – equating to a value loss of circa £7,800,000. The
introduction of the corridor at Ticket Hall level blocks the current lift position and would therefore
require an alternative lift for access to concourse and street level. If step-free is to be maintained a
new lift / new lift location would be required. A budget allowance of £500,000 should be considered to
cover this requirement. The costs of creating the corridor etc including alterations to services are
minimally £900,000 and together with the provision of a new lift an overall CAPEX of £1.4 million.
There would be an additional OPEX cost associated with managing and maintaining this new structure
and associated assets.
The corridor (within the shopping mall demise) would have to be leased to LUL any cost associated
with thus must be assessed by LUL. The current lease and framework agreements would require
revisions to accommodate this change – timescales and costs associated with this renegotiation have
not currently been assessed but could be significant.
Viability
It should be noted that the changes associated with this option will breach our financing agreements.
In the current market it is very difficult to secure debt finance to develop speculative buildings such as
this therefore there is a significant risk that this option will halt the overall project and delivery of the
station improvements.
4.5 OTHER KEY CONSTRAINTS & IMPACTS

· Will compromise the intended position of breeching inlet and running of dry falling main.
· Route is not as direct as Option “0” to mall escalators is longer and less intuitive.
· Potential for general public using lift from shopping mall entering the area when station being
evacuated.
· Width of corridor is constrained by adjacent development.
This 2m wide route will accommodate 160ppm and would therefore require the other 27ppm to
use the New staircase on the other side of the gate line to the south of this corridor. It would be
non-compliant with the S1371 requirements for two separate escape routes through the station.
This route would cause confusion / congestion during an evacuation in the ticket hall.
· No step free access lift to the shopping mall if station is closed. Therefore, an alternative lift for the
mall will be required.
Plans indicating Option 1
2m Pinch point
5 OPTION “2” EVACUATION CORRIDOR WITHIN LUL DEMISE
5.1 GENERAL
5.2 ROUTE
This option comprises a new fire rated corridor within the LUL demise with the loss of the allocated
place of safety adjacent to the gate line, staff toilet area, and electrical cupboard. These rooms and
areas will need to be relocated elsewhere within the proposed footprint.
The pinch point within the corridor is 2.0m wide, which has an exit capacity of 160ppm, 27ppm would
be required to use the new stair in order to maintain a steady flow through the station. This does not
comply with TfL S1371 requirements to maintain at least two separate escape routes through the
station. Alternatively, the evacuation time will be increased elevating risk to passengers. Introduction
of Structure at Concourse – Urban Realm Area
· through the station. This route would cause confusion / congestion during an evacuation in the
ticket hall.
· Corridor would mean a loss of commercial space at both Ticket hall and Concourse Area
(157.6sqm’s)

The introduction of an additional exit door structure would be required at concourse level (within the
public realm) in order to provide a compliant headroom height above the stairs within the corridor. This
would require a formal amendment to the planning permission. Given the highly visible nature of this
and the fact it is situated in a sensitive part of the public realm, it is highly likely this would require a
Minor Material (‘Section 73’) Amendment (MMA) involving re-consultation on the application and a
Deed of Variation to the S106 Legal Agreement. This would therefore take a significant amount of
time to progress and would likely need to be referred to the Council’s Planning Committee for approval.
of the permission.
Notwithstanding the process issues described above, the evacuation corridor would involve the
creation of additional structure impinging into the public realm and is therefore likely to be resisted by
WCC. The structure cuts across a key area of pedestrian movement to/from the retail mall which
would be a significant concern. It also impairs the line of sight into the retail mall and LUL Station,
which is a key benefit of the open public realm. This option would be inconsistent with the design and
public realm principles which have informed the development of the scheme design to date, and which
have been supported by WCC and other stakeholders.
5.4 COST CONTEXT

There would be impact to the prospective retail development opportunities due to the loss of at least
two retail units as a consequence of creating the staircase and opening at concourse level. This
intervention would be in perpetuity and over the lifetime of the building. This would result in an
anticipated loss of commercial space at both Ticket Hall and Concourse level of 157.6sqm. which
represents an approx. loss of NIA 1,650 ft2 – equating to a value loss of circa £7,800,000.
There would be an additional OPEX cost associated with managing and maintaining this new structure
and associated assets.
The minimum CAPEX cost for providing the new corridors and alterations to services is similar to
Option 1 without the requirement of a new lift and is considered to be minimally £825,000.
The corridor (within the shopping mall demise) would have to be leased to LUL any cost associated
with thus must be assessed by LUL. The current lease and framework agreements would require
renegotiation to accommodate this change – timescales and costs associated with this renegotiation
have not currently been assessed but could be significant
Viability

· Corridor removes place of safety for station staff, staff toilet and electrical cupboard all of which
will require relocation elsewhere with potential impact to other areas.
· Access to MEP riser will be within the corridor.
· Additional structure and services for LUL to maintain.
· Route is not as direct as Option “0”
Plans Indicating Option 2
2m Pinch point
6 OPTION “3” EVACUATION VIA EXISTING PRAED STREET
CORRIDOR.
6.1 GENERAL
6.2 ROUTE
This route considers the utilisation of the existing Praed Street corridor, stairs and exit as the dedicated
means of escape. The stairs within this corridor are 2.1m wide, with an exit capacity of 117ppm.
In an evacuation scenario 117ppm will be able to flow freely from the ticket hall via the Praed street
exit to a place of ultimate safety. This will leave a build-up of 70ppm within the ticket hall. This will
create an increase in the evacuation time and therefore a less safe option than option 0. Twenty eight
ppm could be accommodated in the 2.0m wide new stair (this will not be compliant with TfL S1371 as
above). However, this would still leave a build-up of 42 ppm within the ticket hall and an increase in
evacuation time. Risk is increased in this option whether the new stair is used or not.
The existing staircase width does not accommodate the numbers exiting from the escalator barrel.
The existing design does not provide sufficient exit capacity in a fire scenario.
The entrance is very close to the new stair so that escape is partially in the same direction.

As for Options 1 and 2, the introduction of additional structure into the public realm, particularly where
it is freestanding in an otherwise open area at the entrance to the site, is likely to be contentious with
WCC. The introduction of an additional structure at street level (within the public realm) require a
formal amendment to the planning permission. Given the highly visible nature of this and the fact it is
situated in a sensitive part of the public realm, it is highly likely this would require a Minor Material
(‘Section 73’) Amendment (MMA) involving re-consultation on the application and a Deed of Variation
to the S106 Legal Agreement. This would therefore take a significant amount of time to progress and
would likely need to be referred to the Council’s Planning Committee for approval. Furthermore, the
new MMA application would provide another potential opportunity for legal challenge of the
permission.
Notwithstanding the process issues described above, the additional structure in this location would
significantly alter the nature of the public realm at the entrance to the site and is therefore likely to be
resisted by WCC. The structure cuts across a key area of pedestrian movement to/from Praed Street
which would be a significant concern. More generally, this option would be inconsistent with the design
and public realm principles which have informed the development of the scheme design to date, and
which have been supported by WCC and other stakeholders. In particular, significant benefit of the
scheme design is the removal of the existing retaining wall and congested Bakerloo Line entrance on
Praed Street. This option would effectively re-instate an element of this unwelcome feature and
therefore be seen as a ‘retrograde’ step from the current planning permission. Requires introduction
of secure structure at street level contrary to current planning.
· This will require amendment of the agreed planning consent and submit to Westminster City
Council for Consent (which may be not be granted and or challenged)
· Structure in the middle of Urban Realm Area
· Area Around structure will need a form of segregation to eliminate obstructions
6.4 COST CONTEXT

An initial assessment of the additional capital costs has valued the works at circa £700,000. This
would include costs to modify the existing structure, associated MEP and structural works at
surface. The cost associated with relocating new plant and equipment currently allocated within
this space and the associated design fees have yet to be assessed and are therefore excluded
due to lack of information. Likewise, the lifetime OPEX costs associated with maintaining both
above and below ground structures and associated MEP has not be assessed or included.
Viability
It should be noted that the changes associated with this option will breach our financing
agreements. In the current market it is very difficult to secure debt finance to develop speculative
buildings such as this therefore there is a significant risk that this option will halt the overall project
and delivery of the station improvements.

· Additional Lighting around structure (external)
· Additional services required for corridor (Lighting, CCTV, PA, Fire, etc)
· Impact to proposed plantroom in area
· Relocate plantroom area elsewhere to house condensers if possible.
· Potential for crowding in location of Sprinkler Valve Plant Room which could impede the
emergency services
6.5.1. Plans indicating Option 3
7 OPTION “4” EVACUATION VIA EXISTING PRAED STREET
CORRIDOR MECHANICAL LIFT.
7.1 GENERAL
7.2 ROUTE
This route considers the utilisation of the existing Praed Street corridor as the dedicated means of
escape. It would exit at street level via a mechanically operated lift stair. This form of evacuation is
used as a means of escape on other developments but will be novel to London Underground. This
option is complex and will require product approval together with substantial civil alterations.
In an evacuation scenario 117ppm will be able to flow freely from the ticket hall via the Praed street
exit to a place of ultimate safety. This will leave a build-up of 70ppm within the ticket hall. This will
create an increase in the evacuation time and therefore a less safe option than option 0. Twenty eight
ppm could be accommodated in the 2.0m wide new stair. (this will not be compliant with TfL S1371
as above). However, this would still leave a build-up of 42 ppm within the ticket hall and an increase
in evacuation time. Risk is increased in this option whether the new stair is used or not.

As for Options 1, 2, and 3 the introduction of additional structure into the public realm, particularly
where it is freestanding in an otherwise open area at the entrance to the site, is likely to be contentious
with WCC.
The introduction of an additional structure and secured area at street level (within the public realm)
will require a formal amendment to the planning permission. Given the highly visible nature of this and
the fact it is situated in a sensitive part of the public realm, it is highly likely this would require a Minor
Material (‘Section 73’) Amendment (MMA) involving re-consultation on the application and a Deed of
Variation to the S106 Legal Agreement. This would therefore take a significant amount of time to
progress and would likely need to be referred to the Council’s Planning Committee for approval.
of the permission.
In addition to the issues outlined above, it should be noted that WCC’s expectation is that the
building and public realm has now been developed to an advanced stage of design following grant
of planning permission in 2017. At this stage, they may therefore be reluctant to introduce further
changes which have quite significant implications for design and use of the public realm and could
be seen to diminish one of the key public benefits of the scheme previously approved.
· Amend the Agreed Planning Consent and submit to Westminster City Council for Consent (which
may be not be granted and or challenged)
· Impact to Urban Realm, secured area required (bollards or similar)
· Impact to Urban Realm whilst in operation and testing
· Planning support to emphasise the impact this option on the urban realm intention.
7.4 COST CONTEXT

TfL product approval required. This mechanical hydraulic stair will require designing so that all
elements are compatible with TfL LU S1085 requirements. Any non-compliant components would
require an appropriate materials risk assessment and concession. This will take considerable time
and is not guaranteed to be accepted.
The machine will be a bespoke piece of equipment. Preliminary cost of est. £250,000 but this will be
subject to investigation as specialist kit.
An initial assessment of the additional capital costs has valued the works at circa £975,000 (including
the stair). This would include costs to modify the existing structure, associated MEP and structural
works at surface. The cost associated with relocating new plant and equipment currently allocated
within this space and the associated design fees have yet to be assessed and are therefore excluded.
Likewise, the lifetime OPEX costs associated with maintaining both above and below ground
structures and associated MEP has not be assessed or included. It is anticipated that the hydraulic-
lift would additionally be subject to regular inspection and testing – associated costs have yet to be
assessed or included
Viability
7.5 FIRE ENGINEERING CONTEXT

Failure of the mechanism during a Ticket Hall fire scenario would result in a large number of
passengers being stranded in an extended dead end. Requires failure to safety (which potentially
creates a security problem) and manual override which may increase evacuation duration. This is not
an intuitive exit door and a major argument against would be compliance.

· Increased number of services (Electrical, Mechanical, Fire, Comms, etc)
· Width of useable stair will be no wider than current stair and will therefore not meet the exit flow
from the escalator barrel.
· Additional services required for corridor (Lighting, CCTV, PA, Fire etc)
· Additional assets for LUL to maintain
· Impact to proposed plantroom in area
· Relocate plantroom area elsewhere to house condensers.
Potential for crowding in location of Sprinkler Valve Plant Room which could impede the emergency
services
Plans indicating Option 4

8 PLANNING SUMMARY
The following statement has been provided by Gerald Eve to provide the planning background and
context within which the 4 Options would be considered by the planning authority:
· All of the options, albeit to slightly varying degrees, involve extrusions, additional structure or
secured areas introduced into the public realm. These are also in relatively sensitive areas
where pedestrian flow is likely to be quite high as people move into/through the site and to/from
the underground station and retail mall. From previous discussion on scheme amendments
we are aware that WCC have a keen interest in pedestrian flow and movement and are seeking
to maintain a ‘clutter-free’ public realm which enables this. The creation of an open public realm
has been one of the key public benefits since the early consideration of the proposals and the
principle of this has informed the design development throughout. For previous scheme
amendments (with much smaller implications than these) we have had to submit thorough
analysis to demonstrate that they would have no impact on pedestrian movement. Clearly
these options would present a significant issue in this respect and we expect that WCC would
consider them to be a ‘retrograde’ step in terms of the quality of the public realm, contrary to
the principles that were embedded in the original planning approval.
.
· In terms of process, all the Options 1-4 would likely require a Minor Material Amendment
application. This would have a determination period of up to 16 weeks and would likely be
referred to the Council’s Planning Committee which is an additional risk. The amendment
application would also require re-consultation with local and statutory consultees.
Notwithstanding the issues outlined above in the event any of the options were progressed, WCC
would seek to understand why this level of change, which has quite significant implications for design
and use of the public realm, is only being realised and addressed now despite the fact that the detailed
design has been in place and reviewed by both Sellar and TfL/LUL over several years.
9 COMMERCIAL SUMMARY
The following initial budget estimates have been provided by the Gardiner & Theobald cost team.
These estimates have been based on limited design information and should be considered as order
of magnitude budget estimates only and subject to further verification:
Option 1 CAPEX £1.4 million £7.8M (value loss)
Option 2 CAPEX £825,000 £7.8 (value loss)
Option 3 CAPEX £700,000 (OPEX tbc)
Option 4 CAPEX £975,000 (OPEX tbc)
The above costs are exclusive of OH&P, Preliminaries, Design and Procurement Risk Fees, VAT, all
associated OPEX, adaption of dry falling main, re-provision of lost space, bomb blast protection.
There is currently no allowance for any associated programme impact and associated costs including
potential delay to project completion and the scheme opening date. This is currently hard to quantify
however estimated to be well in excess of £10 million
At present £250k allowed for the lift in option 4. This will require research as it is a specialist item and
will require back rams etc. in case of main failure.
10 CONCLUSION
All of the Options noted above are able to provide a means of escape, however the viability of each
option differs by the constraints imposed by the nature of the existing station geography which in turn,
depending in the option, will impact the development.
Options 1- 4 impact the proposed development significantly with discipline designs being reworked in
detail to assess the validity and impact not only in terms of Quality, Time and Cost but to the viability
of the development. These options would also impose more responsibility on London Underground
with additional assets owned or leased to London Underground, additional assets for London
Underground to maintain and upgrade when necessary thus increasing the whole life costs for this
station.
The development as it stands currently meets Westminster City Council’s Public Realm Strategy
Principles, meeting The Westminster Code a set of ten rules and has Planning Consent. Options 1 –
4 would require in some way impact on these rules and necessitate minor material amendment to the
planning permission which is a potentially time consuming process. This would represent a potentially
significant risk, and we anticipate that the principle of additional structures in the public realm would
be resisted by WCC. It is contrary to design and public realm principles which have been developed
with WCC over several years of pre-application discussion, and which were strongly welcomed by
officers and stakeholders.
Options 1 and 2 are costed to figures in excess of 7million pounds which creates a significant risk to
the project. Neither of these options significantly decreases risk to life safety and thus cannot be
considered the ALARP solution.
Options 3 and 4 are costed at figures up to 1 million pounds, with no appreciable reduction in risk to
life safety for this investment. Additionally, option 3 and 4 are unlikely to win planning consent which
would have serious programme implications.
Upon careful consideration of all the Options 0-4 detailed above it is still believed that Option 0,
evacuation via the shopping mall, provides the most viable and effective secondary means of escape
from the Bakerloo Line Ticket Hall in the event of an evacuation. The specific details surrounding this
Option have already been documented and issued to all parties. For further reference please see
Document PAD-WSP-DDN-STN-FI-0004 Emergency Egress from Plantroom & Ticket Hall.
WSP House
70 Chancery Lane
London
WC2A 1AF
wsp.com
CONFIDENTIAL
Project: PADDINGTON SQUARE LU BAKERLOO LINE STATION UPGRADE
Document title: Detailed Design Fire Strategy
Document number: PBLSU-WSP-FRS-B071_Z-STR-FE-0002 REV P04
Design Compliance Declaration
Signature Date
Prepared by Ally Mamgain 29/01/2021
Project Fire Engineer
Approved by I endorse this deliverable as the designated technical authority for the relevant
engineering discipline and am accredited to do so.
<Name>
Accredited Assurer
Approved by I confirm that this deliverable meets the requirements of the relevant Pathway Product
Description and that all consultation comments have been addressed to the satisfaction
of consultees.
<Name>
Project Manager
Document History
Revision Date Summary of changes
P01 15/05/2020 Detailed Design Submission
P04 29/01/2021 Issued for Approval

Table of Contents
1 Design and Project Team Declaration ........................................................................... 2
2 Project Engineer Endorsement ....................................................................................... 3
In support of the Railway and Other Guided Transport Systems (Safety) Regulations
2006 and LU Category 1 Standard S1538 Assurance
1 Design and Project Team Declaration

The works to be delivered by this project have been designed in accordance with LU
requirements, standards and Railway Safety Principles and Guidance (apart from
agreed deviations), and meet the relevant regulations and standards (except for
agreed concessions). I hold evidence demonstrating this.
I confirm that this project meets the requirements for assurance documentation
specified in LU Category 1 Standard S1538 Assurance
I confirm that sufficient evidence has been provided to assure me that the safety and
technical risks associated with the project works have been identified and adequately
mitigated.
Signature Date
<Name>
Project Manager
Signature Date
<Name>
Project Engineer [or other

competent person with a
project wide understanding]
Revision: Page 2 of 3 Date: 05/07/2012

2 Project Engineer Endorsement
I confirm that all relevant Accredited Assurers, whose assets are affected by this
project, have endorsed this Compliance Declaration of “No Objection”
I confirm that this project has been designed in accordance with applicable LU
standards (except for agreed concessions), Railway Safety Principles and Guidance
(except for agreed deviations), and other relevant standards. There is auditable
documentary evidence demonstrating this design, agreed concessions and deviations.
Signature Date
<Name>
Lead Project Engineer
Revision: Page 3 of 3 Date: 05/07/2012

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London Underground - Sellar

PBLSU-WSP-FRS-B071_Z-STR-FE-0002 REV P04

PADDINGTON SQUARE LU STATION

TYPE OF DOCUMENT (VERSION) CONFIDENTIAL

PROJECT NO. 70056323

DATE: JANUARY 2021

PADDINGTON SQUARE LU STATION

Issue/revision Revision P01 Revision P02 Revision P03 Revision P04

Remarks Detailed Design Detailed Design Detailed Design Issued for

Date 15/05/20 01/10/20 04/12/20 29/01/2021

Prepared by Ally Mamgain Ally Mamgain Ally Mamgain Ally Mamgain

Checked by Gerrard O’Neil Gerrard O’Neil Gerrard O’Neil Gerrard O’Neil

Authorised by Nishani Sakizlis Nishani Sakizlis Nishani Sakizlis Nishani

Sakizlis, Digitally signed by Sakizlis,

Project number 70056323 70056323 70056323 70056323

Report number PBLSU-WSP-FRS- PBLSU-WSP- PBLSU-WSP-FRS- PBLSU-WSP-

File reference PBLSU-WSP-FRS- PBLSU-WSP- PBLSU-WSP-FRS- PBLSU-WSP-

PADDINGTON SQUARE LU STATION BAKERLOO LINE STATION UPGRADE CONFIDENTIAL | WSP

CONSTRUCTION DESIGN AND MANAGEMENT REGULATIONS:2015 (CDM) 9

FIRE RISK ASSESSMENT 10

FIRE SAFETY DESIGN GUIDANCE 16

LEGISLATION AND STANDARDS 16

KEY STAKEHOLDERS AND CONSULTATION PROCESS 18

IDENTIFICATION OF THE KEY STAKEHOLDERS 18

FIRE SAFETY OBJECTIVES 19

DESIGN FIRE SCENARIOS 21

PADDINGTON SQUARE LU STATION BAKERLOO LINE STATION UPGRADE CONFIDENTIAL | WSP

DESCRIPTION OF ESCAPE ROUTES 22

SIZING OF ESCAPE ROUTES 34

DOORS ON ESCAPE ROUTES 34

ESCAPE ROUTES – GENERAL PROVISION 37

INTERNAL FIRE SPREAD 40

PADDINGTON SQUARE LU STATION BAKERLOO LINE STATION UPGRADE CONFIDENTIAL | WSP

FIRE DETECTION AND ALARM 47

FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEMS 51

PORTABLE FIRE SUPPRESSION 53

FIRE FIGHTING ACCESS AND FACILITIES 54

VEHICLE ACCESS TO STATION 54

FIRE MANAGEMENT AND EMERGENCY PLANNING 61

APPENDIX A MEANS OF ESCAPE 62

PADDINGTON SQUARE LU STATION BAKERLOO LINE STATION UPGRADE CONFIDENTIAL | WSP

PADDINGTON SQUARE LU STATION BAKERLOO LINE STATION UPGRADE CONFIDENTIAL | WSP

PADDINGTON SQUARE LU STATION BAKERLOO LINE STATION UPGRADE CONFIDENTIAL | WSP

PADDINGTON SQUARE LU STATION BAKERLOO LINE STATION UPGRADE CONFIDENTIAL | WSP

Requirement Regulation/Standard Exemption/Concession Authority

Provide automatic fire

Width of fire fighter’s stair

Lack of resting places for

Table 1 - Concessions and exemptions required by the proposed design

PADDINGTON SQUARE LU STATION BAKERLOO LINE STATION UPGRADE CONFIDENTIAL | WSP

PADDINGTON SQUARE LU STATION BAKERLOO LINE STATION UPGRADE CONFIDENTIAL | WSP

Figure 1 - The development site and existing buildings in close proximity.

PADDINGTON SQUARE LU STATION BAKERLOO LINE STATION UPGRADE CONFIDENTIAL | WSP

INTERFACE WITH MALL

PADDINGTON SQUARE LU STATION BAKERLOO LINE STATION UPGRADE CONFIDENTIAL | WSP

PADDINGTON SQUARE LU STATION BAKERLOO LINE STATION UPGRADE CONFIDENTIAL | WSP

PADDINGTON SQUARE LU STATION BAKERLOO LINE STATION UPGRADE CONFIDENTIAL | WSP

PADDINGTON SQUARE LU STATION BAKERLOO LINE STATION UPGRADE CONFIDENTIAL | WSP

PADDINGTON SQUARE LU STATION BAKERLOO LINE STATION UPGRADE CONFIDENTIAL | WSP

PADDINGTON SQUARE LU STATION BAKERLOO LINE STATION UPGRADE CONFIDENTIAL | WSP