The Republic
The Republic
The Republic
Concept of Justice
Peter Emmanuel A. Mara
3
Eva Brann, The Music of the Republic: Essays on Socrates’
Conversations and Plato’s Writings, (Philadelphia:Paul Dry Books, 2004), p.
249.
4
Republic Book 2, 369
5
Republic Book 4, 435D. Cf. Charles H. Kahn “The Meaning of `Justice'
and the Theory of Forms” in JSTOR
<http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022362X%2819721005%2969%3A%
3C567%3ATMO%60AT%3E2.0.CO%3B2-D> (Date Accessed: September 28,
2007), p. 571.
6
Hans Kelsen “Platonic Justice” in JSTOR
<http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=00141704 %28193
804%2948%3A3%3C367%3APJ%3E2.0.CO%3 B2-O> (Date Accessed:
September 28, 2007), p. 393.
discussion of justice as it is seen first in the state and the
individual, which is the pattern of this exposition as well
7
Republic Book 2, 370.
8
Cf. Republic Book 1 352 – 353.
Citizens, we shall say to them in our tale, you are brothers, but
God has framed you differently. Some of you have the power to
command, and in the composition of these he has mingled gold,
wherefore he has the greatest honour; others he has made of
silver, to be auxiliaries; others again who are to be husbandmen
and craftsmen he has composed brass and iron. 9
This should not be taken literally which may mean that there
is a chemical substance infused by God in us at birth. Instead, it
should be understood as abilities being given as a nature to the
citizens by the Divine. Plato wants to base class distinctions on
ability instead of birth (or heredity). 10 Which brings us to the
notion of three social class: the ruler, auxiliaries, and the
merchant. To derive this distinction of classes, the ability must be
the criterion. The ruler is defined by his ability to command; the
auxiliaries, by his ability to provide aid to whatever the ruler
commands; and the merchant (husbandmen and craftsmen) by
his ability to provide the basic needs of every citizen. Citizens
work according to the nature endowed to them in birth. One’s
nature is the basis of one’s occupation. Therefore, in doing
fulfilling one single task, he is only actualizing the nature (ability)
that is inherent in him.
9
Republic Book 3, 415.
10
Nickolas Pappas, Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Plato and the
Republic, (London and New York, 2003), p. 75.
11
William Boyd, An Introduction to the Republic of Plato, (London:
George Allen & Unwin, 1962), p. 41.
constitution of the human individual and his abilities? The true
justice in the city is derived when we also understand the
constitution of the individual for it is the basis of the state.
The rational principle ought to be wise and has the care of the
whole soul, [and also] to rule; the spirit [ought] to be the subject
and ally [of reason]… And these two thus nurtured and educated,
and having learned truly to know their own functions, will rule
over the concupiscent, which in each of us is the largest part of
the soul and by nature most insatiable of gain: over this they will
keep guard… 14
Plato suggests that each of the virtues have their own character
and goal to pursue. The basis of this characterization is the very
object of each faculty that makes it function. Dahl explains it in
this way, “Plato takes the three parts of the soul to have their own
appropriate objects of desire for wealth along with desires for
food, drink and sex [appetite]. Spirit includes not only anger, but
also desires for honor and political success. Reason provides a
person with desires for knowledge and truth.”15 Therefore, reason
must possess wisdom; spirit, courage; and appetite/concupiscent,
temperance. Plato has an extensive explanation on each of these,
he says,
14
Republic Book 4, 441 – 442.
15
Norman O. Dahl. “Plato's Defense of Justice” in JSTOR
<http://links.jstor.org/sici?
sici=00318205%28199112%2951%3A4%3C809%3APDOJ%3E2.0.CO%3B2-
M> (Date Accessed: September 28, 2007), p. 819.
desire are equally agreed that reason ought to rule, and do not
rebel. 16
16
Republic Book 4, 442
17
Dahl, op. cit., p. 810.
18
Republic Book 4, 443.
Plato has established the justice in the individual as the
epitome of all paradigms of justice, more specifically the justice in
the state. Justice is merely focused on the inner workings of the
human individual with the harmonious interrelatedness of the
three faculties. Although, Plato acknowledges the fact that there
is a dominant virtue and faculty present in every individual,
however he also said that no man is devoid of all of these three
virtues, which also presupposes an absence of the other two
faculties in man. Nobody is altogether devoid of any virtues. Even
the worker must have a wisdom and courage of a kind. Thus
justice implies not merely the faithful performance of citizen
duties but the regulation of the elements of the soul in view of the
business life. 19 The well-regulated soul becomes wise when its
reason rules, courageous when its spiritual part acts bravely,
temperate when all three parts accepts the rule of reason. 20 Plato
is speaking of the justice as equated with harmony and regulation
of the soul. The just man possesses a harmonious soul. Harmony
in the soul is to be able to endow the task of each faculty to be in
their own position, not transgressing other’s job. More
importantly, there is no conflict and confusion that arise in the
psychic structure of the soul. Justice applies to persons in virtue of
their harmonious souls, and derivatively to actions that promote
harmony of the soul. 21 Furthermore, the person with a full
understanding of the nature of justice will be moved to act justly
because doing so is something good in itself, 22 and it is both
symptom and contributing causes of justice in the soul, unjust
ones are both symptoms and causes of injustice.23 From just
actions we can directly discuss the justice in the state because
19
Boyd, op. cit., p. 44.
20
Pappas, op. cit., p. 87.
21
Dahl, op. cit., p. 831.
22
Ibid., p. 829.
23
Pappas, op. cit., p. 88.
these actions are the vehicle of the individual to perform his
duties as a citizen of the state.
Seeing then, I said, that there are three distinct classes, any
medling of one with another is the greatest harm to the state,
and may be most justly termed evil-doing… [However], when the
trader, the auxiliary, and the guardian each do their own
business, that is justice, and will make the city just. 24
26
Pappas, op. cit., p. 81.