Regional Electricity Trade in Asean
Regional Electricity Trade in Asean
Regional Electricity Trade in Asean
trade in ASEAN
The road ahead to an integrated
and greener electricity future
October 2022
www.pwc.com/sg
Contents
Executive summary 3
Annex A 21
Executive summary
South East Asia’s increasing demand for electricity An integrated ASEAN power grid is expected to bring
along with the region’s commitment to decarbonise about significant benefits such as reduced cost and the
means a need to rethink how the region can come ability to pool various renewable sources from countries
together to achieve optimal electrification and with endowment advantages and supply to countries
decarbonisation goals. with significantly less resources. In addition, having an
integrated power grid will allow countries to balance
ASEAN currently does not have an integrated electricity their power loads more efficiently by drawing required
market. Each country’s electricity market is managed power from sources across the region. An integrated
and regulated individually by countries, and power grid would have more diversified and stable
interconnection between national grids are limited. power sources. Hence, a plant failure would be less
Power generation projects are also largely intended to likely to significantly affect power supply across the
meet domestic market demand. region and the reserve margins can be minimised
resulting in overall optimisation of resources and costs.
There is significant potential for development of cross-
border electricity trade, and eventually development of a We consider key areas of focus for electricity imports
regional electricity market. Cross-border transmission is and exports projects.
not new to ASEAN, with at least 27 such links currently
existing between ASEAN countries.
1 2 3 4 5
Technical Development of Political will Environmental and Financial feasibility
long-term policy social impact
perspective /
market structure
1 2 3 4 5
• Diverse power • Clear guidelines • Political support, • E&S risks of new • Political risk,
systems require and principles for trust, and generation and curtailment risk,
increased cross-border cooperation for transmission asset ownership
technical electricity planning new transmission risk
• Proposed new
harmonisation projects
• Revisions to developments • Stranded assets
national regulations • Consistent should follow
• Clear cross-
intergovernmental international
• Structure and border trading
collaboration standards
ownership of the framework
framework
cross-border
• Potential support
transmission links • Incentives to
from multilateral
invest in and build
• Interaction of banks
grid connectors
renewable energy
exports and NDC
targets
In our previous “Energy Transition Readiness in Indonesia is aiming for an unconditional reduction target
Southeast Asia” thought leadership publication, we of 29% and conditional reduction target up to 41% of the
assessed the levels of readiness for energy transition of BAU scenario by 20306. Through the roadmap for
the Southeast Asia countries based on six key criteria, transition to Net-Zero Emission, Indonesia aims to
including energy accessibility, energy reliability, energy develop more renewable energy and reduce the use of
affordability, energy sustainability, energy smartness, coal-fired plants by up to 16.2 GW via the ADB Energy
and energy trading, which outlined the steps that each Transition Scheme7.
country is taking in their movement towards renewable
energy. Under energy trading, we focused on the Vietnam unconditionally committed to reduce GHG
opportunities and challenges in the development of the emissions by 9% by 2030 below BAU levels, with a
ASEAN Power Grid. In this piece, we explore the current conditional target of reducing GHG emissions by 27%
electricity trade in Southeast Asia and challenges below BAU based on international support8. While the
relating to regional trade of renewable energy. draft Power Development Plan 8 and Politburo’s
Resolution No. 55 supports the uptake of renewables,
Countries have committed to decarbonise the development of coal is expected to continue, with
coal capacity expected to double to over 40GW by
In 2020, the ASEAN region’s GHG emissions from the 20309.
power sector reached 668 Mton CO2e1. Coal, the
biggest contributor of GHG emissions, contributed 72% Malaysia has set an unconditional target for 45% of
while natural gas and oil contributed 26% and 2% carbon intensity reduction by 203010. Like Thailand,
respectively. In the region, the five largest contributors Malaysia has also set out an LT-LEDS which is
of GHG (Greenhouse Gas) emissions were Indonesia, expected to be finalised by end of 202211.
Vietnam, Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines. With
the growing GHG emissions, ASEAN has become one
of the most vulnerable regions to climate change, with
half of the ASEAN countries ranking in the top 20 of the
world’s countries most affected by extreme weather
events2.
1ASEAN Centre for Energy (2022). Moving Beyond the NDCs: ASEAN Pathways to a Net-zero Emissions Power Sector in 2050, https://aseanenergy.org/moving-
beyond-the-ndcs-asean-pathways-to-a-net-zero-emissions-power-sector-in-2050/
2ASEAN Centre for Energy (2020). Climate Change Highlights in ASEAN, https://accept.aseanenergy.org/wp-
content/uploads/2020/03/Factsheet_Climate_Change_Highlights_in_ASEAN.pdf
3UNFCCC (2022). NDC Registry, https://unfccc.int/NDCREG
4UNFCCC (2022). Thailand’s Updated Nationally Determined Contribution, https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/NDC/2022-06/Thailand%20Updated%20NDC.pdf
5Climate Action Tracker (2021). Thailand Climate Policies and Action, https://climateactiontracker.org/countries/thailand/policies-action/
6UNFCCC (2022). Indonesia’s Updated Nationally Determined Contribution, https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/NDC/2022-
06/Updated%20NDC%20Indonesia%202021%20-%20corrected%20version.pdf
7Energy Transition Partnership (2022). ASEAN Outlook for Zero Carbon Energy, https://www.energytransitionpartnership.org/resource/asean-outlook-for-zero-carbon-
energy/
8UNFCCC (2022). Vietnam’s Updated Nationally Determined Contribution, https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/NDC/2022-06/Viet%20Nam_NDC_2020_Eng.pdf
9Climate Action Tracker (2021). Vietnam Climate Policies and Action, https://climateactiontracker.org/countries/vietnam/policies-action/
10UNFCCC (2022). Malaysia’s Updated Nationally Determined Contribution, https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/NDC/2022-
06/Malaysia%20NDC%20Updated%20Submission%20to%20UNFCCC%20July%202021%20final.pdf
11New Straits Times (2021). Malaysia Intends to Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emission by 45% by 2030, https://www.nst.com.my/news/nation/2021/10/735618/msia-
intends-reduce-greenhouse-gas-emission-45-pct-2030
Singapore intends to peak emissions at 65 MtCO2e Laos has set an unconditional target for 60% GHG
around 2030, which allows it to achieve 36% reduction in emission reductions compared to baseline scenario16.
emissions intensity from 2005 levels12. Transformations Renewable energy was a key focus in achieving the
in industry, economy and society through greater use of target as Laos aims to install 13GW of hydropower. If
renewable energy and greater energy efficiency, international support is provided, Laos is targeting to
adoption of advanced low-carbon technologies, and install 1GW of solar and wind, and 300MW of biomass17.
effective international collaboration were the three During the COP26, 8 out of 10 ASEAN countries have
thrusts set out by the government to facilitate announced their net zero target, with the earliest in 2050
Singapore’s low-carbon transition13. and the latest in 206518.
Cambodia has set an emissions reduction target of Given that the major ASEAN countries have ambitious
41.7% by 2030 compared to BAU14. Through its Long- GHG emission reduction targets, a developed electricity
Term Strategy for Carbon Neutrality, Cambodia has put export-import market in the ASEAN region becomes
in place a variety of mitigations which specifically target increasingly relevant. This could aid ASEAN member
the agriculture, forestry, energy, transportation, industrial countries to more efficiently achieve their NDC targets
processes and product use, and waste sector15. by 2030 and speed their movement towards net zero.
https://www.nccs.gov.sg/media/press-release/singapores-enhanced-nationally-determined-contribution-and-long-term-low-emissions-development-strategy
14UNFCCC (2022). Cambodia’s Updated Nationally Determined Contribution,
https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/NDC/2022-06/20201231_NDC_Update_Cambodia.pdf
15Cambodia National Council for Sustainable Development (2021). Cambodia’s Long-Term Strategy for Carbon Neutrality,
https://ncsd.moe.gov.kh/resources/document/cambodia-LTS4CN-En
16UNFCCC (2022). Laos’ Updated Nationally Determined Contribution, https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/NDC/2022-
06/NDC%202020%20of%20Lao%20PDR%20%28English%29%2C%2009%20April%202021%20%281%29.pdf
17Enerdata (2022). Lao PDR Commits to Net-zero Emissions by 2050, https://www.enerdata.net/publications/daily-energy-news/lao-pdr-commits-net-zero-emissions-
2050.html
18Energy Transition Partnership (2022). ASEAN Outlook for Zero Carbon Energy, https://www.energytransitionpartnership.org/resource/asean-outlook-for-zero-
carbon-energy/
Countries in ASEAN produced 1,056 TWh of electricity in 202019 with 283 GW of installed capacity20. Around 76% of
all ASEAN’s power generation comes from coal- and natural gas-fired power facilities.
Source: US EIA
As ASEAN faces depleting energy reserves coupled with exponential growth in electricity demand, renewable energy
is expected to be a solution to meet the energy demand. The percentage of solar and wind power production, out of
all electricity production in ASEAN, has grown from 0.70% in 2016 to 1.73% in 2020. ASEAN countries –
predominant among them Laos and Malaysia (Sarawak) – have long developed their hydropower resources; in total,
16.5% of ASEAN’s total output is generated from hydropower. Laos’ hydropower production as of 2020 is 170%
more than its domestic consumption of electricity, and it exports up to 78% of its generation.
However, renewable generation in ASEAN still has a long way to go. We see countries such as Denmark having
50% wind power in their generation mix21. Variable renewable energy formed 23% of California’s generation mix in
2020, and all renewables formed 33% of its energy mix22. On average, countries in ASEAN have 14% renewable
energy in their generation mix23.
The renewable energy capacity installed today does not tell the full story of the technical potential of each country.
The technical potential of renewable production is set out in the chart below based on our analysis.
Source: PwC analysis based on ASEAN Centre for Energy and National Renewable Energy Laboratory
Legend
GW <1 1 to 4 4 to 7 7 to 15 15 to 25 > 25
total-system-electric-generation/2020
23IRENA (2022). Renewable energy Outlook for ASEAN: Towards a Regional Energy Transition (2nd Edition), https://irena.org/publications/2022/Sep/Renewable-
Energy-Outlook-for-ASEAN-2nd-edition
Countries have unequal natural resource Singapore is maximising its solar deployment and is on
endowments, and this is challenging for track to achieve its target of 1.5 GWp by 2025 and at
least 2 GWp by 2030. However, its solar potential is the
countries without easy access to smallest in ASEAN due to it being land constrained.
renewable energy development Hence, solar will likely constitute only about 3% of the
country’s total electricity demand in 2030.
Most countries in ASEAN have high technical potential
for solar and wind development. For countries which have significant technical potential
in more than one area, they can develop renewable
Vietnam has been able to exploit its solar potential with energy for their domestic needs as well as exports.
its feed-in-tariff regime implemented. Other countries
such as Thailand, Myanmar, Indonesia and Philippines However, integration of increasing proportion of variable
also have high variable renewable energy potential, in renewable energy into electricity grids will require
solar or wind, but are lagging behind Vietnam in their significant investment into grid strengthening, and
progress. deployment of battery electric storage systems, control
systems and smart grids to ensure secure and reliable
On the other hand, other countries in ASEAN have electricity supply. In addition, widening control areas
limited or non-diversified renewable energy resources. through interlinking of national grids to create a regional
Countries like Brunei and Malaysia have more limited grid will also play a role in integrating variable renewable
sources of renewable energy. Brunei only has high energy in ASEAN.
technical potential in solar, and while Malaysia has both
solar and hydropower potential, most of Malaysia’s
hydropower resources are located on Borneo.
Countries in ASEAN are exporting and importing electricity regularly, although quantities
for now are still small. Countries in ASEAN generate 1,053 TWh of electricity annually, and export 36 TWh of
the generated electricity to other ASEAN countries. These flows tend to be bilateral and unidirectional – between
two countries, where one country exports and the other imports.
Laos Laos aims to be called “the battery of Southeast Asia” by developing its
hydroelectric power sector. Laos has significantly more generation technical capacity
Generation 39 Export 30 compared to its domestic consumption needs. Laos currently exports up to 78% of its
Import Domestic generation. A surplus of generation capacity has been developed to provide stable,
1 Consumption
10 cleaner baseload electricity in the surrounding region. There has also been willingness
from the private sector to sponsor and participate in these development projects, as well
as early efforts by development organisations to assist in technical studies and provide
Units of diagrams in annual TWh guarantees and loans. For such projects to be scaled for regional trade, proper
(2018-2020 average) evaluation from an environmental and social impact assessment perspective is essential.
Vietnam Exports
Vietnam and Thailand export around 1% of their generated electricity.
2
Both export on a limited basis to surrounding countries. Vietnam exports its
Generation excess hydropower in the South to Cambodia, especially in recent years with
222
local drought in Cambodia affecting its domestic hydropower supply.
Thailand used to export electricity to Laos during the dry season, before
2015. Since 2016, several large hydropower projects have come online in
Domestic
Laos, and now Thailand no longer exports to Laos. It still retains energy
Consumption
223
exchange transmission lines with Laos that facilitate electricity transmission
between Laos’ multiple grids.
Import
3
Myanmar exports electricity from the 240MW Dapien-126 and 600MW Shweli-127 Myanmar
Exports
hydropower projects to China. China and Myanmar have been strengthening their power 1
cooperation as part of the Belt and Road Initiative and to support the backbone grid of the Generation 24 Domestic
Consumption
China-Myanmar Economic Corridor. 23
https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/3153342/china-ramps-electricity-imports-north-korea-russia-myanmar
27Power Technology (2021). Shweli I, Myanmar, https://www.power-technology.com/marketdata/shweli-i-myanmar/
The countries around Laos – Thailand, Vietnam and Cambodia, all import electricity from Laos. In Borneo, Indonesia
imports small amounts of hydropower from Sarawak. Laos reimports electricity from Thailand for purposes of energy
transfer between its grids.
Chart 3: Percentage of exports, imports vs. generated energy in ASEAN countries (Averaged 2018-2020
figures)
Indonesia
Export Import
Vietnam
Thailand
Malaysia
Philippines
Singapore
Laos
Myanmar
Cambodia
Brunei
-100% -80% -60% -40% -20% 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Source: PwC analysis based on IEA, Government information, US EIA, Enerdata
Note: Figures for Singapore’s electricity imports are as of July 2022
Thailand Cambodia Cambodia and Thailand are the two main energy importers
Generation 8 (going by percentage of their overall energy consumed). As
Export 2 Domestic
Import Consumption shown in Chart 3, energy imports on average form 26% of
3 11
Cambodia’s total electricity consumption, due to local water
Generation
177
shortages in Cambodia which impact its domestic hydropower
generation. Similarly, Thailand imports 13% of its electricity use,
to help meet its expected increase in domestic demand, and to
Domestic Units of diagrams in
expand its energy security28, as part of Thailand’s strategy to
Consumption
202 annual TWh promote diverse energy sources29.
Import
27 (2018-2020 average)
Singapore recently started importing electricity through its import trials, one of Singapore
which was the 100MW Lao PDR-Thailand-Malaysia-Singapore Power Integration Project
(LTMS-PIP) on 23 June 2022. In 2021, the Singapore government announced Singapore’s Generation
50.93
Domestic
Consumption
plans to import up to 4 GW of electricity by 2035, which would constitute around 30% of 51
Singapore’s electricity supply in 2035. Import
0.07
28Greater Mekong Subregion (2022). Lao PDR Ramps Up Electricity Exports to Vietnam, https://greatermekong.org/lao-pdr-ramps-
electricity-exports-viet-nam.
29Stimson (2022). Alternative Development Pathways for Thailand’s Sustainable Electricity Trade with Laos,
https://www.stimson.org/2022/alternative-development-pathways-for-thailands-sustainable-electricity-trade-with-laos/
Most of these cross-border electricity trade projects have some form of bilateral Government involvement. Projects
are also kickstarted with heavy private sector and development agency involvement. Projects can also be pure
private sector projects, which gain permitting and licenses in both countries.
Bilateral Nam Theun 2: Hydropower export from EDFI (40%), EGCO (35%), LHSE 1,070 MW 2010 USD 1.45 billion
(Hydropower) Laos to Thailand (25%) capex
Nam Ngum 2: Hydropower export from CK Power Public (28.5%), EDL 615 MW 2013 USD 832 million
Laos to Thailand (25%), RATCH Group (25%) capex
Nam Ngum 3: Hydropower export from Nam Ngum 3 Power Company EDL 440 MW 2014 USD 780 million
Laos to Thailand (20%), CSE (55%), EGATi (25%) capex
Coal Hong Sa Mine Lignite-fired Power Plant Banpu Power (40%), RH 1,878 MW 2015 USD 3.71 billion
and Mine: Thermal power export from Laos International (Singapore) capex (includes
to Thailand (subsidiary of RATCH Group) power plant and
(40%), LHSE (20%) mine)
Boualapha Coal Fired Power Plant and Lanexang Property and Power, 2,000 MW Est. NA
BOT Transmission Line Facilities: Thermal Power Line Engineering, 2024
power export from Laos to Vietnam Shanghai Electric
Kaluem: Thermal power export from Laos Xekong Thermal Power Plant 1,800 MW Est. USD 3-4 billion
to Cambodia Company Limited, subsidiary of 2025 capex (includes
Phonesack Group power plant and
transmission line)
Lamam: Thermal power export from Laos TSBP Sekong Power and Mineral 600-700 Est. > USD 1 billion
to Cambodia Company Limited MW 2025 capex
Wind Monsoon Wind Power Plant - Tanh My: IEAD (Impact Energy Asia 600 MW Est. USD 930 million
Wind power export from Laos to Vietnam Development), a partnership 2025 capex
between Impact Wind Investment
(55%) and BCPG (45%)
Definitions
EDFI = Electricite de France International
EGCO = Electricity Generating Public Company of Thailand
LHSE = Lao Holding State Enterprise
CSE = Charoen Sekong Energy Company
EGATi = EGAT International Company
Grid infrastructure is a physical limitation In Asia, efforts have been ongoing to develop a
to increased trade regionally connected grid since 1997, led by ASEAN and
other regional bodies together with member country
governments. To date, initiatives to establish shared
Electricity exports and imports require fixed infrastructure grids are still in development.
to be built on a point-to-point basis30. With global and
regional push for renewable energy, opening up new However, there is continuous progress towards
transmission to connect the multitude of new sources is developing cross border transmission links to export and
crucial for users to access the future green generation. import electricity. As of 2022, there are 27 export links in
As current grids are mostly built and upgraded by grid ASEAN. 16 of these transmission links are more than
owners rather than electricity generators, centralised and 115 kV and allow for larger energy transfers.
timely planning is required to ensure that upgrades occur
in sync with generation and that the grid/ transmission Land transmission links
owners are incentivised to do so.
In total, Laos has 20 connection points with its
Countries such as Cambodia, Thailand and Vietnam neighbours, see Chart 4 below. The links are
have existing connections to other countries in ASEAN, predominantly to Thailand, but recently new links to
this allows for energy exports, and the project Cambodia and Vietnam are being developed.
arrangements can be precedents for future transmission
line and energy project developments. Of these export links, Laos-Thailand have the largest
number of cross-border transmission links. There are
For other countries such as Myanmar, Indonesia and two kinds of links: first, 115kV power exchange links,
Philippines which have strong solar or wind potential, where power is exported and reimported to another grid
developing cross border transmission projects in these in Laos, due to poor connectivity between Laos’ grids.
countries might require more regulatory and policy The energy exchanges between the grids are facilitated
issues to be worked out as they do not have any ASEAN by direct interaction of the grid operators (e.g. the 5
cross-border transmission precedents. It is not very interconnection points between Laos and Thailand,
clear whether Indonesia’s government policy and facilitated by EGAT and EDL). Second, export links or
regulations currently support electricity export, although foreign IPP links, which directly import a specific
industry players have been proposing changes to project’s generation to the importing country’s grid, e.g.
support development of some proposed renewable EGAT imports power under a PPA, directly from the IPP
energy projects in border regions. which is generating in Laos31.
Due to geographical features, countries in ASEAN may Other countries in ASEAN have limited export links to
have limitations on domestic grid connectivity between their neighbours. Peninsular Malaysia, for instance, is
production and demand, e.g. Malaysia has its connected at two points, to the north with Thailand, and
hydropower resources located on Borneo, which is not to the south with Singapore. There have been
connected by land to Peninsular Malaysia. For these discussions within the ASEAN Power Grid group of
reasons, these countries have potential interest in interconnection between Peninsular Malaysia and
renewable energy imports. Sarawak, however, this was designated by the group as
a later-stage priority in the list of potential cross border
Singapore is also looking beyond its shores to access transmission links to develop32, and to date no
low-carbon energy. Currently, the Singapore announcements on further progress have been made.
government is working towards importing 4GW of low-
carbon electricity by 2035, which will form 30% of
Singapore’s electricity supply in 2035, as part of
Singapore’s efforts to enhance energy security by
diversifying energy supply sources.
https://www.unescap.org/sites/default/files/Mr.%20Sabar%20Md%20%20Hashim%20-%20Malaysia%20Presentation.pdf
Land transmission links (cont’d) Some upcoming projects such as the Request for
Proposals by EMA33, to import 4GW electricity to
There is presently one instance of multilateral cross- Singapore by 2035, will be pathfinders in establishing
border transmission in ASEAN, the LTMS-PIP pilot. The more regional connectivity with potentially new
multilateral electricity transmission is intended to import transmission subsea cable links.
a fixed capacity of 100 MW to Singapore, from Laos,
wheeled through Thailand and Malaysia. This is The electricity imports are likely to be from multiple
wheeled using existing transmission infrastructure. sources; and as Singapore is connected only to
Malaysia by land, it is likely that there will be other
Thus far, all the links constructed have been land subsea cable connections, or more multilateral wheeling
transmission links. ASEAN has a more challenging arrangements established through this initiative for
geography compared to Western Europe and other electricity import.
regional electricity markets, with islands and separated
land masses which will need subsea cables to make Towards greater grid integration in ASEAN
cross border transmission connections.
The above transmission links consist of a mix of private
Subsea cable transmission and public sector investments in electricity export
projects. The number of transmission links are growing,
Subsea cable cross-border transmission is an and there is potential for significantly more cross-border
increasingly important subject in ASEAN. The nature of transmission to take shape.
subsea cable transmission links is different from
overhead transmission links, as it involves a different set Greater integration of the transmission network in the
of stakeholders and permitting approvals. Other subsea region would benefit stakeholders by enabling investors
cabling challenges for investors are the higher costs, to seek the lowest available LCOE regionally and
environmental approvals, regulatory and policy allowing countries to plan investments in generation
approvals, and the less understood risks of the cross- more efficiently. There are diversification benefits to
border transmission cable investment which may lead to expanding connectivity as this can help manage reserve
more difficulty with financing. Most importantly, due to margin on a regional basis and hence optimise overall
the high capex cost and lack of precedents in many system costs.
countries for regional connectivity, discussions of asset
ownership and potential sharing of use among various
users becomes an essential part of the conversation.
2. to take advantage of the complementary fuel mix in each of the four countries.
In contrast to the top-down EU approach to market integration, the development of the Nordic power market
took place on an incremental and voluntary basis, driven by the utilities themselves.
Another key difference is that the regulation of the Nord Pool is based on principles agreed upon unanimously
by the respective national governments for rules designed by the European Commission.
Generation supply35
Having traded electricity in a common electricity market for 30 years, to date the Nordic and Baltic region
countries generate ~420 TWh annually. In 2018-2020, these countries export 78.5 TWh and additionally import
81.5 TWh. The variation is large across countries. In contrast, ASEAN generates 1,053 TWh annually, and
exports 3.42% of its electricity generation which amounts to 36 TWh.
Chart 5: Generation quantities and import-export flows of Nordic and Baltic countries (Averaged 2018-2020
figures)
Sweden
Norway
Denmark
Finland
Lithuania
Latvia
Estonia
34Energy Studies Institute (2016). Connecting ASEAN through the Power Grid: Next Steps, http://www.asean-aemi.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/06/AEMI-ACEF2016-ConnectingASEANPolicyBrief-PhilipAndrewsSpeed.pdf.
35Nord Pool Group (2022). Market Members, https://www.nordpoolgroup.com/en/the-power-market/The-market-members/
In Norway almost all power is generated by hydro power while Sweden and Finland have a mixture of hydro,
nuclear and thermal power (steam driven). Denmark uses predominantly thermal power, but wind power is
becoming increasingly important. In Estonia and Lithuania, there is mostly thermal driven power. Bidirectional
flows around countries like Denmark illustrate the role of interconnectors in balancing variable wind power,
alongside local flexibility. In dry years, Nordic countries become more dependent on the import of power from
other countries: Russia, Estonia, Netherlands, Poland and Germany.
In the Nordic region, interconnectors join countries across land and sea, while a common Nordic spot market
ensures efficient trade across subnational price zones. This cooperation increases security of supply, lowers
system costs and facilitates the integration of renewables. This supports the security, affordability and greenness
of the Nordic electricity system 36.
Chart 6: Generation quantities and import-export flows of ASEAN countries (Averaged 2018-2020 figures)
Indonesia
Vietnam
Thailand
Malaysia
Phillipines
Singapore
Laos
Myanmar
Cambodia
Brunei
36Nordic Energy Research (2018). 10 Insights into the Nordic Energy System, https://www.nordicenergy.org/wordpress/wp-
content/uploads/2018/06/10-Insights-A4.pdf
Two main regional initiatives are broad umbrellas for discussions between ASEAN countries - GMS Cooperation
Framework and HAPUA. The ASEAN Centre for Energy, multilaterals and other development organisations are also
key long-standing participants in developing ASEAN’s regional grid connectivity.
Diagram 7: The two leading regional initiatives for ASEAN grid integration
GMS Cooperation Framework was established in 1992 with the Heads of Governments of the 6 member countries.
There are three tiers of discussion:
• Leaders’ Summit (held every 3 years with heads of governments)
• Ministerial conference
• Working group in priority sectors.
The Regional Power Trade Coordination Committee (RPTCC) meets annually to discuss the current development
status of regional power integration.
HAPUA
HAPUA was formed in 1981 with the country representatives of power utilities forming its council, and is the
Specialised Energy Body (SEB) in-charge of the ASEAN Power Grid (APG) which is a priority project. ASEAN has
been working towards regional electricity interconnectivity through an ASEAN Power Grid (APG) since 1997. The
development of the APG was planned to commence with cross-border bilateral connections and to subsequently
expand to greater levels of multilateral integration. The ASEAN Plan of Action for Energy Cooperation 2016–2025
(ASEAN Centre for Energy, 2020a) is the current document that sets objectives for moving towards regional
connectivity. It prioritises the expansion of multilateral power trade as part of the ASEAN Economic Community
2025 agenda. ASEAN as a region has a target of integrating 23% share of renewable energy in electricity supply
and 35% share in installed power capacity by 202537.
37IRENA (2022). Renewable Energy Outlook for ASEAN: Towards a Regional Energy Transition (2nd Edition),
https://irena.org/publications/2022/Sep/Renewable-Energy-Outlook-for-ASEAN-2nd-edition
ACE is an intergovernmental organisation representing the 10 ASEAN Member States’ interests in the energy
sector. ACE serves as a catalyst for the economic growth and development of the ASEAN region through initiating,
coordinating, and facilitating national as well as joint and collective activities on energy.
ACE was established as an organisation that operates with the capacity to conclude agreements with states, local or
international organisations and be a party to legal proceedings. These functions and decisions are governed by a
council, comprising the comprising the leaders from the ministry of energy from 10 countries, which determines the
policy direction for the Centre.
“
Since the establishment of electricity interconnection arrangements through the ASEAN Power Grid
(APG) under the ASEAN Vision 2020 adopted in the Second ASEAN Informal Summit in Kuala Lumpur
25 years ago, ASEAN has already built 7,720 MW of cross-border interconnections. Expanding from
bilateral to multilateral, around 32.8 GWh of electricity was traded between Laos and Malaysia through
Thailand under the Lao-Thailand-Malaysia Power Integration Project (LTM PIP) during 2018-2021.
The snail’s pace of progress may be seen from the outside. Still, harmonising regulatory, technical issues
or commercial regimes between the countries is never an overnight work—especially where the
government-funded projects have primarily invested in transmission infrastructure through the State-
Owned Enterprises (SOE).
The ASEAN Interconnection Masterplan Study (AIMS) III, a recent study by the ASEAN Centre for
Energy (ACE) and HAPUA which was endorsed by the 10 ASEAN Ministers on Energy, estimated that
with increasing shares of variable renewable energy in ASEAN, multilateral power trade could benefit the
ASEAN Member States in terms of both increased system security and economic efficiency due to
resource sharing. By 2040, ASEAN will require 24,385 MW of interconnection capacity with an
investment of around USD 771 billion.
The successful commencement of the Lao PDR-Thailand-Malaysia-Singapore Power Integration Project
(LTMS-PIP) on 23 June 2022 using existing interconnections, marking a historic milestone in the region
as it is the first multilateral cross-border electricity trade involving four countries. As of 31 July 2022, 72
GWh of electricity has been traded. It is a showcase of the strong commitment from the governments to
advance multilateral power trade in ASEAN.
However, escalating this effort requires strong private sector support, considering the required
investment. International best practice shows that the suitable business models for privately financed
transmission grids are through long-term contracts through concession or BOOT (built, own, operate and
transfer) scheme.
The governments' continuous efforts at the national and regional level are expected to increase the level
of confidence in the private sector to mitigate the risks in enabling the investment environment in terms of
permitting, transparency, tax regime, macroeconomy, and political risk, among others.
In support of the ASEAN governments, the ASEAN Centre for Energy (ACE) and HAPUA are introducing
the interconnection screening methodologies to help ASEAN identify high-priority cross-border
interconnections and facilitate the conduct of pre-feasibility and detailed feasibility studies for project
development with the support of the various development partners, which we expect can attract more
interest and investment from the private sector.
Beni Suryadi
”
Manager, ASEAN Centre of Energy
Other agencies such as JICA, USAID, AFD, World Bank, as well as ADB are involved in cross-border trade projects
in the ASEAN region in various forms.
Key benefits of developing more cross- and distribution38. Hence, for trade of electricity across
border renewable energy in ASEAN: multiple borders in ASEAN, increased technical
harmonisation and operational procedures for the power
Given this different renewable energy mix potential in systems may be required.
different countries in ASEAN, there are three key
reasons to develop more cross border electricity Development of long-term policy perspective /
projects. market structure:
• For governments, the key benefit of a regional grid The electricity policies in the region will need to
would be the economies of scale as they can incorporate a long-term vision rather than a trade-by-
harness the technical potential of the renewable trade perspective. Clear guidelines and principles will be
source for supply locally as well as regionally, and needed to support the design of regional generation
hence benefit locally from overall lower LCOE. capacity, demand management, the types of market in
Governments can also optimise the plans for local operation, how the electricity would be supplied, how
transmission upgrades by using renewable energies transmission grids should look and operate, cross-
with differing load profiles to complement each other, border licencing, non-discriminatory access to networks,
and ensuring that there is an appropriate mix of competition in generation, and import tariffs39.
renewables in the overall capacity mix. The impact of
variable renewables on load balancing can also be Current cross-border transmission links require offtake
minimised with co-development of other baseload and transmission arrangements to be individually
renewables and widening control areas. discussed, rather than a common framework being
made available to project developers for transmission
• For investors, they can produce at scale where it is across select countries. There may be a need for a
cheap and feasible, and sell where the demand is central power coordinator who can synchronise cross-
higher. An integrated grid expands the possibilities grid operations, address the structure and ownership,
for investors and leads to a greater number of and cost and benefit sharing mechanisms.
potential bankable projects.
The interaction of export of renewable energy towards
• For consumers, the lower cost of electricity should in the Nationally determined contribution (NDC) targets of
the long-run lead to lower electricity prices, if each country will also play a key role in countries more
balanced correctly against increased cross-border actively participating in electricity trade.
transmission investment cost.
Technical:
ASEAN’s power systems are diverse in their standards,
specifications, and protocols for electricity transmission
https://www.cliffordcap.sg/resources/ck/files/IA%20Article%20-%20Cross-
border%20energy%20importation%20project%20A%20Singapore%20perspective%20(CCPL)%20-%20vF.pdf
The bilateral / multilateral cross border trade of Plentiful long-term capital is waiting for bankable
electricity needs strong political support as this, if infrastructure projects in the region. Hence the
properly done, would help build the renewable energy developer and Governments have to work through
ecosystem in exporting countries. This ecosystem bankability issues that may be relevant for export
should also help the exporting country to progress projects like political risk, curtailment risk, asset
towards their own decarbonisation targets. However, ownership risk for cross-border assets etc40. Multilateral
political trust between the countries in the region is banks are keen to support regional integration and
important to progress this in the right direction. energy transition, especially if done with E&S
safeguards.
Development of consistent intergovernmental
collaboration framework for infrastructure planning and Private financiers are concerned about transmission
permitting will make grid expansions across the border assets as once they are built, they are non-moveable,
(including subsea cable) less problematic, but changes and any impact to supply or offtake will result in the
to make the process more streamlined will certainly be asset not being used. In extreme cases, this may lead to
necessary. stranded assets.
In addition, mechanisms to improve incentives to invest Without a clear cross-border electricity trading
in and build grid connections at local, national and framework, private sector developers are unable to plan
regional scales are also required. for regional electricity infrastructure, instead they are
focused on country level investment opportunities and
Environmental and social (E&S) impact: constraints. With a clear cross-border trading
framework, developers will be able to plan for local and
Generation as well as transmission (including subsea cross border transmission upgrades, mix of renewables
cable) projects often have E&S risks, such as relocation, in the overall generation capacity mix of more than one
water and air pollution, resettlement, impact on aquatic country, storage of electricity for energy security etc.
resources and biodiversity, impact on livelihoods (e.g. Investors will deploy their capital efficiently to produce
fisheries), etc. Proposed cross-border interconnections where it is cheap and feasible and sell where the
may open the way for new power plants and subsea demand is higher ideally resulting in lower electricity
cabling which should follow the E&S requirements as prices for consumers in the region in the long run.
per international standards.
Saumya Rao
Director, Deals Infrastructure
+65 9987 8750
Saumya.rao@pwc.com
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