Conservation Practice and Policy

Six Common Mistakes in Conservation Priority Setting

EDWARD T. GAME,∗ PETER KAREIVA,† AND HUGH P. POSSINGHAM‡
∗
Conservation Science, The Nature Conservancy, 245 Riverside Drive, West End, QLD 4101, Australia, email egame@tnc.org
†Conservation Science, The Nature Conservancy, 4722 Latona Avenue NE, Seattle, WA 98105, U.S.A.
‡Centre of Excellence for Environmental Decisions, University of Queensland, St. Lucia, QLD 4072, Australia

Abstract: A vast number of prioritization schemes have been developed to help conservation navigate tough
decisions about the allocation of finite resources. However, the application of quantitative approaches to
setting priorities in conservation frequently includes mistakes that can undermine their authors’ intention
to be more rigorous and scientific in the way priorities are established and resources allocated. Drawing
on well-established principles of decision science, we highlight 6 mistakes commonly associated with setting
priorities for conservation: not acknowledging conservation plans are prioritizations; trying to solve an ill-
defined problem; not prioritizing actions; arbitrariness; hidden value judgments; and not acknowledging risk
of failure. We explain these mistakes and offer a path to help conservation planners avoid making the same
mistakes in future prioritizations.

Keywords: Conservation Action Planning, conservation planning, decision science, measurement theory,
operations research, prioritization

Seis Errores Comunes en la Definición de Prioridades de Conservación

Resumen: Se ha desarrollado un vasto número de esquemas de priorización para ayudar a que la con-
servación navegue entre decisiones difı́ciles en cuanto a la asignación de recursos finitos. Sin embargo,
la aplicación de métodos cuantitativos para la definición de prioridades en la conservación frecuentemente
incluye errores que pueden socavar la intención de sus autores de ser más rigurosos y cientı́ficos en la manera
en que se establecen las prioridades y se asignan los recursos. Con base en los bien establecidos principios
de la ciencia de la decisión, resaltamos seis errores comúnmente asociados con la definición de prioridades
para la conservación: no reconocer que los planes de conservación son priorizaciones; tratar de resolver un
problema mal definido; no priorizar acciones; arbitrariedad; juicios de valor ocultos y no reconocer el riesgo
de fracasar. Explicamos estos errores y ofrecemos un camino para que planificadores de la conservación no
cometan los mismos errores en priorizaciones futuras.

Palabras Clave: ciencia de la decisión, investigación de operaciones, Planificación de Acciones de Conser-

vación, planificación de la conservación, priorización, teorı́a de medidas

Introduction ray of conservation decisions, including prioritizing lo-

cations to establish protected areas, species to conserve,
Finite conservation resources and large environmental actions to conserve a species, and actions to address a
problems mean society is faced with tough choices; particular threat. A quick glance at recent conservation
every good thing we do is another good thing we do text books or journal issues reveals that prioritization
not (Gilbert 2011). To help make these tough choices, has become one of the principal pillars of conservation
many conservation–prioritization schemes have been de- science. For example, a Web of Science search with the
veloped (Kirkpatrick 1983; Brooks et al. 2006; Wilson keywords “conservation” and “prioritization” contained
et al. 2006). Prioritization schemes inform a wide ar- 193 relevant publications between January 2010 and

Paper submitted August 15, 2012; revised manuscript accepted November 19, 2012.
480
Conservation Biology, Volume 27, No. 3, 480–485

C 2013 Society for Conservation Biology
DOI: 10.1111/cobi.12051
Game et al. 481

December 2011. It is important to appreciate there is information to help people reach better decisions. Al-
a well-established scientific field that addresses the set- though none of the terms above are inaccurate, we be-
ting of priorities, that is decision science or operations lieve the widespread failure to either recognize or ac-
research. These fields of science are a blend of applied knowledge conservation plans or assessments as resource
mathematics, economics, philosophy, and psychology prioritizations diminishes the utility of the work and pre-
(Keeney 1982; Bell et al. 1988). Decision science aims cipitates a number of the mistakes highlighted below.
to help people make the best decision in pursuit of a The most immediate and significant consequence of this
stated objective, particularly in situations that are highly mistake is that analyses are not framed to answer a spe-
complex or uncertain—common characteristics of con- cific resource-allocation problem (mistake 2) and have
servation problems. Decision science together with op- outcomes that tend to ignore resource requirements and
erations research represents an extensive body of theory, availability.
methods, and tools that underpin much decision making Avoiding this mistake requires acknowledging that
in engineering, health, economics, and the military. Con- conservation prioritizations are ultimately intended to
servation is a relative newcomer to the field of decision have resource-allocation consequences, and by being ex-
science. plicit about what these resources and consequences are.
The burgeoning literature and application of quantita- The acceptability of any prioritization can be improved by
tive priority setting in conservation demonstrates a desire ensuring that the motivations of decision makers, includ-
for the field to become more rigorous and scientific. This ing political realities, are reflected in the problem framing
is a good sign for conservation. Unfortunately, it is our ex- (see mistake 2). Neither solution guarantees that priori-
perience that the application of quantitative approaches tizations will be enthusiastically embraced by decision
to setting priorities in conservation frequently includes makers, but this should not stop conservation planners
mistakes that can undermine their authors’ intention to from providing the best advice possible.
be more rigorous and scientific in the way priorities are
established and resources allocated. Here, we highlight
Mistake 2: Trying to Solve an Ill-Defined Problem
6 critical mistakes associated with setting priorities for
conservation. These are mistakes we have commonly It is common in conservation to frame a priority-
seen both, in practice while working with NGOs and gov- setting exercise with a statement about efficient use of
ernment agencies, and in the conservation–prioritization resources—that is of course the goal of formal analyses
literature. Our goal is to explain these mistakes, without aimed at setting priorities. However, too often in con-
delving deeply into math or philosophy, and offer ways servation these general statements are as far as problem
to avoid these mistakes in future prioritizations. Conser- framing goes. The most basic principles of decision sci-
vation has too few resources for its daunting challenges ence are that to set priorities one has to have a clear
to be misapplying or not taking advantage of decision objective function (what is being maximized or mini-
science. mized), have a well-defined set of actions from which
a subset will be chosen as priorities, have a model of
system behavior so that one can relate actions to their
Mistake 1: Not Acknowledging Conservation Plans contributions toward meeting the objectives, and include
are Prioritizations
resource constraints. Conservation problems are typically
Scientists conducting conservation prioritizations (here- complex, and there will be varying emphasis on each of
after conservation planners) are not generally the same these elements. If they are not clearly defined, there is
people making conservation decisions. The separation of no basis for prioritization and there can be no claims
these roles can lead to reluctance on behalf of conserva- of efficient resource use. In our collective experience,
tion planners to explicitly frame analyses as resource pri- a poor definition of the problem or no definition of the
oritizations, preferring instead more neutral terms such problem is the most common mistake made in conserva-
as conservation assessment or decision-support tool. In tion priority setting.
our experience, this reluctance frequently stems from a Conservation planners often have trouble explicitly
belief (or knowledge) that decision makers will be un- defining prioritization problems because the objectives
supportive of plans that appear to reduce flexibility in relevant to the decision have not been clearly articu-
their decision making or make potential actions harder lated. Many conservation initiatives seek to, for example,
to justify. maintain ecosystem function, but this could mean simply
But what is a conservation plan if not a delineation of maintaining function within a given area or it could imply
priorities? If the aim of analyses is to inform resource- using the area to maintain the function of a wider ecosys-
allocation decisions at any level, it is a prioritization. tem. Precision is important because priorities are likely
Whether it is framed as prioritization, decision support, to be different depending on which of these 2 interpre-
planning, analysis, or assessment, the principal function tations better reflects the actual desired outcome (e.g.,
of these exercises is synthesizing and communicating Game et al. 2008a). Problem framing in conservation

Conservation Biology
Volume 27, No. 3, 2013
482 Priority-Setting Mistakes

also suffers from poor articulation of the constraints on conducted by (or for) government agencies with the ex-
decisions, especially the extent to which prior decisions press purpose of identifying sites for new or expanded
and existing commitments affect future actions. In fair- protected areas (e.g., Game et al. 2011). Protected-area
ness to conservation planners, there is often reluctance establishment is an action; it has clearly identifiable costs
on the part of decision makers to explicitly acknowledge and factors associated with it that are likely to promote or
the preferences and constraints that affect their deci- hinder it. However, at least an equal number of prioritiza-
sions. We believe decision makers should be encouraged tions are conducted without explicit statements of the ac-
to do so. As with mistake 1, we suspect the deeper cause tions associated with the priorities. The typical argument
of this mistake is that conservation planners are rarely made in response to the suggestion that priorities need to
the same people who allocate money or commit organi- reflect actions is that locations or species can be priorities
zations to action; hence, they are operating in a decision because action needs to be taken for their conservation,
vacuum. but the best action cannot sensibly be determined a pri-
The best way we can imagine overcoming obstacles to ori. Fair enough, but subsequent planning to determine
good problem framing is for planners to work in close the best action requires resources. Thus, determining the
partnership with decision makers from the very outset of best action for these locations or species is an action in
any prioritization exercise. We recognize, however, that and of itself. Prioritizing locations or species for which to
conservation plans are often undertaken by organizations conduct further analyses and make subsequent decisions
or communities that are not in a position to partner about resource allocation should consider things such
with those responsible for making resource-allocation as the actions that can be taken, how effective possible
decisions, and yet they hope to influence these deci- actions are, other resources being dedicated to finding so-
sions. Even where this is the case, prioritization exercises lutions for that species, habitat, or location, and resources
can still be greatly strengthened by framing problems as likely to be available for that location or species.
realistically as possible and by ensuring the objectives This mistake is commonly precipitated by committing
included accurately reflect community and stakeholder mistake 1 or 2. If one has not thought clearly about the
values (Gregory 2000). Together, these 2 elements will problem, there is a good chance one has not thought
make it more challenging for decision making to dismiss clearly about what it means to be a priority. There is
the resource-allocation consequences. also no doubt that understanding the set of available ac-
tions and their costs and benefits is more intensive and
challenging than simply prioritizing a list of locations or
Mistake 3: Not Prioritizing Actions
species. Generation of such lists usually requires little
Conservation planners use prioritization where there are critical thought. However, it is widely acknowledged in
options in how resources might be used. Most conserva- decision science that developing a good list of options
tion planners would be comfortable saying that they are from which to choose lies at the heart of good prioriti-
prioritizing species, habitats, or locations. We argue that zation (Edwards 1990). Other than clearly defining the
only actions can be legitimately prioritized. As outlined prioritization problem, the most effective remedy we
in mistake 1, prioritization is about resource-allocation have seen for this mistake is for conservation-planning
decisions. Places, species, and habitats do not use the exercises to dedicate time explicitly to canvasing experts,
resources of conservation organizations and agencies— stakeholders, and decisions makers about potential ac-
actions use resources. What a prioritization tells us is that tions that could be taken. A good check to see how well
some action associated with a location or species is a this has been accomplished is to ask, if a species, habitat,
priority. Failing to acknowledge this from the outset is a or location is selected as a priority, would it be clear what
recipe for inefficiency. Without being clear about actions, actions to take?
planners cannot confidently estimate how a given option
might contribute to meeting objectives or the expected
Mistake 4: Arbitrariness
cost of the option, both of which are critical elements
of any prioritization. Lists of priority species or locations Conservation planners must routinely conduct prioriti-
without identification of associated actions are a good zations with less data than they would like and often
diagnostic symptom of this mistake. without direct data on the variables they are most con-
Prioritizing actions does not mean ignoring places or cerned with, such as habitat condition. Because simple
species; it means understanding what one is going to surrogate measures do not always exist (or are not viewed
do at those places or for those species, and prioritiz- as satisfactory), conservation prioritizations typically in-
ing these combinations of places or species and action tegrate data on a number of variables from a variety of
(e.g., Wilson et al. 2007; Joseph et al. 2009; Carwardine sources, including in many cases much expert judge-
et al. 2012; Moore & Runge 2012). Quite often conserva- ment. A common approach in such circumstances is to
tion planners prioritize actions without necessarily being classify variables of interest, such as the level of threat
aware of doing so. Consider, for example, prioritizations to a species or habitat, with a constructed scale. For

Conservation Biology
Volume 27, No. 3, 2013
Game et al. 483

example, in assessing conservation priority of different Table 1. Example of a look-up table illustrating how assessments of
habitat patches a conservation planner might score the the size and context of habitat patches should be combined to deter-
mine an overall priority rank (taken from a prioritization process 2 of
disturbance to areas on a scale of 1–7. Constructed scales the authors were involved with).
can even be based on simple linguistic interpretations
(e.g., threat classified as high, medium, or low), which are Size
then subsequently converted to numerical values (e.g.,
Context very good good fair poor
high, 3; medium, 2; low, 1).
The scores assigned to these variables are essentially Very good VG VG G G
arbitrary—there is no objective reason why a relatively Good VG G F F
undisturbed habitat should be given a score of 4 rather Fair G F P P
Poor F F P P
than 5 for example. What these constructed scales typi-
cally represent is a set of ordinal numbers that indicate, Abbreviations: VG, very good; G, good; F, fair; P, poor.
for example, a score of 2 is better than a score of 1 and
worse than a score of 3. If one restricts interpretation
of such scales to simple ordinal representations between mal training in modeling. However, this ease of creation
alternatives (e.g., alternative X is better than alternative Y can lead to error.
for variable Z), then the arbitrary nature of the numbers Rules and look-up tables reflect the values, beliefs, as-
is not problematic. However, ordinal numbers do not sumptions, biases, and risk tolerances of their creators.
convey how much better 2 is than 1; thus, constructed For example, Table 1 (taken from a prioritization pro-
ordinal scales are a problem when one treats them as a cess 2 of the authors were subsequently involved with)
set of regular numbers to be used in prioritization arith- shows how assessments of the size and context of habitat
metic (e.g., adding 2 or more variables together). For in- patches should be combined to determine overall priority
stance, to help rank the conservation priority of different rank. In this case, a fair for size and a fair for context
habitats, The Nature Conservancy’s Conservation Action result in an overall score of poor. Logically, one might
Planning (CAP) process (and the conservation-planning expect this to yield an overall score of fair, but the rules
software Miradi) combines measures of their size, con- in the table could reflect the planner’s belief that there
dition, and landscape context with the following scale: is an interaction between these variables that further re-
very good, 4; good, 3.5; fair, 2.5; poor, 1. The overall rank duces the conservation importance of the habitat patch
is the arithmetic mean of these 3 categories. Consider 2 at low scores or, alternatively, the planner’s assessment
habitats, A and B. Habitat A receives 3 scores of fair, that addressing a fair score for either size or context of
whereas habitat B receives 2 scores of good and one of a patch might be possible but addressing both factors
poor. On the basis of the arithmetic mean, habitat B (8) would be unrealistic. One cannot be sure. Similarly, a
ranks above habitat A (7.5). If one adjusted the choice of poor for size and a very good for context results in an
scale such that good was worth 3 rather than 3.5, habitat overall score of good, whereas a poor for context and a
A (7.5) ranks above habitat B (7). As Wolman (2006) very good for size results in an overall score of fair. Again,
eloquently puts it, the “truth or falsity of results derived one cannot be sure whether this means the conservation
from measurements should not depend on a fortuitous planner believes context should have more effect on pri-
choice of scale.” ority than size, addressing context is more feasible than
An easy way to check whether a prioritization result is addressing size, or why this assessment of effect is limited
likely to be meaningful and not arbitrary is to go back to to this combination of scores. Interpreting these values
the underlying data. In the example above, a habitat rated and judgements becomes a daunting prospect when the
very good (score of 4) must be unambiguously considered look-up tables contain 3 or more variables.
4 times better than a habitat rated poor (1) because this The principal issue here is not the questionable math
is how it is being treated when the arithmetic mean is (discussed in mistake 4), but that these judgements are
calculated. This mistake is best avoided by estimating not transparent and therefore not open to critique. Quan-
variables of interest on natural scales wherever possible. titative prioritizations are intended to reduce bias and
promote objectivity or at least to be explicit about as-
sumptions, bias, and their effects so that assumptions and
Mistake 5: Hidden Value Judgements
the resulting priorities can be effectively contested by
Many conservation planners have an intuitive sense that interested parties. Many involved in decision-making phi-
variables do not affect priority equally, linearly, or in- losophy consider contestability the formative property
dependently. A common response to this realization is of a defensible prioritization process (Burgman 2005).
to establish a set of rules for combining variables, often Rather than promoting transparency, planning methods
presented in a look-up table. Look-up tables are alluring that include, for example, look-up tables and combina-
because they are an easy way to combine variables and torial rules actually obfuscate the reasons behind the
because they can be developed by personnel without for- prioritizations by burying a series of value judgements

Conservation Biology
Volume 27, No. 3, 2013
484 Priority-Setting Mistakes

and assumptions beneath a numerical veneer. Such a use determine priority. We know of no situation where this
of numbers simply formalizes unacknowledged bias and is logical.
endows the process with a false credibility. Instead of There are at least 2 contributing factors to the absence
using a flawed prioritization process, it would be better or poor treatment of risk in conservation prioritization.
to acknowledge that priorities are based on individual First, there is often strong reticence to acknowledge that
intuition, bias and all. Donors and the public can then conservation actions might fail, especially where the pri-
judge whether they are comfortable for their resources oritization has a partial advocacy role or those involved
to be prioritized this way. Our experience has been that have an interest in the implementation of a particular ac-
when value judgements and intuition are made transpar- tion (Redford & Taber 2000). Second, psychologists have
ent, they are likely to be challenged. repeatedly demonstrated that most people find it very
A prioritization conducted by The Nature Conservancy challenging to rationally incorporate risks and probabili-
to help make decisions about establishing new conserva- ties into their judgements (Plous 1993). In prioritization
tion projects in Africa provides a good illustration of how the simplest and most logical way of acknowledging risk
this mistake can be addressed. Staff involved in the plan and its effects on the likelihood of conservation success is
believed that, from The Nature Conservancy’s perspec- almost always through expressing these as probabilities
tive, the relative conservation priority of each country (e.g., Game et al. 2008b; Joseph et al. 2009).
was affected by the distinctiveness of the biological di-
versity, extent of land clearing, level of fragmentation of
A Path Forward
the remaining habitat, extent of the existing protected-
area network, and quality of governance in the country. People use quantitative prioritization approaches in con-
To make value judgements about these variables trans- servation because they want to do things better. There
parent, one of us (E.T.G.) asked employees involved to is logic behind most of the prioritization systems used in
sketch functions that reflected their belief about how conservation; generally speaking they are moving in the
each variable related to conservation priority. Having a right direction. However, by committing one or more of
strong preference for conserving less-fragmented habitat, the mistakes described above, a large number of priority-
for example, is perfectly legitimate, but this preference setting exercises violate key principles of good, defensi-
should be clearly distinguished from a scientific assess- ble decision support. As well as leading to poor resource
ment of the effects of habitat fragmentation on conser- allocation decisions, prioritizations that contain these
vation outcomes (Failing & Gregory 2003; Wilhere et al. mistakes can obfuscate the reasons behind decisions and
2012). These sketched functions were then turned into give the prioritization a false credibility. This point is
mathematical expressions and used as part of a return- worth belaboring because priority-setting exercises are
on-investment prioritization process. Although drawing commonly presented as the principle science behind con-
heavily on the experience, opinions, and values of the em- servation decisions. Public confidence requires credibil-
ployees involved, the prioritization did so in an explicit ity (Wilhere et al. 2012). Objective treatment of empirical
fashion that made it possible to identify and contest these phenomena is a scientist’s stock-in-trade and the source
beliefs. of scientists’ authority. It is perfectly legitimate for opin-
ions and value judgements to affect resource- allocation
decisions—especially in a field such as conservation—
Mistake 6: Not Acknowledging Risk of Failure
but they should be clearly distinguished from scientific
Nearly all conservation actions have a chance of failure. evidence.
For example, if a conservation action involves eradicating The field of decision science has provided information
a pest, this action often fails (technical failure). Similarly, and tools to ensure that prioritizations deliver objective,
some actions may fail because the people implementing defensible, and ultimately efficient conservation deci-
the action fail (poor management) or because sociopolit- sions (e.g., Keeney & Raiffa 1993; Gregory et al. 2012).
ical forces thwart the action (e.g., loss of community sup- The mistakes highlighted here reflect either an absence
port, change of government interest). Failure due to poor of understanding or commitment to decision science. In
management can generally be mitigated, but stochastic addition to the specific antidotes we mentioned with
events that lead to project failure are unavoidable (e.g., each mistake, we believe the quality and usefulness of
Game et al. 2008b). The probability that a conservation conservation priority setting can be improved by broader
action will fail substantially affects the expected costs recognition that conservation planners act as both mod-
and benefits of that action, and yet this risk of failure is elers and decision analysts and need to be trained in the
more often than not completely absent from conservation science and philosophy of these disciplines. We hope
prioritizations. Although some assessment of risk may be that highlighting these common mistakes in conservation
implicit in conservation plans that rate or score options priority setting will encourage conservation planners to
on the basis of feasibility or ease of implementation, these learn more about decision science and the principles that
scores are typically added to scores for other variables to underpin their own work.

Conservation Biology
Volume 27, No. 3, 2013
Game et al. 485

Acknowledgments Game, E. T., E. McDonald-Madden, M. L. Puotinen, and H. P. Poss-

ingham. 2008a. Should we protect the strong or the weak? Risk,
resilience and the selection of marine protected areas. Conservation
The ideas and content of this paper have benefited enor- Biology 22:1619–1629.
mously from discussion with E. McDonald-Madden, M. Game, E. T., M. Watts, S. Wooldridge, and H. Possingham. 2008b. Plan-
Runge and T. Tear. The manuscript was also improved ning for persistence in marine reserves: a question of catastrophic
by comments from L. Maguire and an anonymous re- importance. Ecological Applications 18:670–680.
viewer. Readers who attended the International Congress Gilbert, D. 2011. Buried by bad decisions. Nature 474:275–
277.
for Conservation Biology meeting in December 2011 may Gregory, R. 2000. Using stakeholder values to make smarter environ-
have heard Lynn Maguire’s talk titled Improving Multicri- mental decisions. Enviornment 42:34–44.
teria Rating Systems for Setting Conservation Priorities, Gregory, R., L. Failing, M. Harstone, G. Long, T. McDaniels, and D.
in which she made many of the same points that we Ohlson. 2012. Structured decision making: a practical guide to en-
make here. We were not aware of her work on this topic vironmental management choices. Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford, United
Kingdom.
when we prepared our paper, and vice versa, and we are Joseph, L. N., R. F. Maloney, and H. P. Possingham. 2009. Optimal alloca-
pleased by this convergence of opinion about problems tion of resources among threatened species: a project prioritization
and remedies. protocol. Conservation Biology 23:328–338.
Keeney, R. L. 1982. Decision analysis: an overview. Operations Research
30:803–838.
Literature Cited Keeney, R. L. and H. Raiffa. 1993. Decisions with multiple objectives:
preferences and value tradeoffs. Cambridge University Press, Cam-
Bell, D. E., H. Raiffa, and A. Tversky, editors. 1988. Decision making: bridge, United Kingdom.
descriptive, normative, and prescriptive interactions. Cambridge Kirkpatrick, J. B. 1983. An iterative method for establishing priorities
University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom. for the selection of nature reserves: an example from Tasmania.
Brooks, T. M., R. A. Mittermeier, G. A. B. Da Fonseca, J. Gerlach, M. Biological Conservation 25:127–134.
Hoffman, J. F. Lamoreux, C. G. Mittermeier, J. D. Pilgrim, and A. Moore, J. L., and M. C. Runge. 2012. Combining structured decision
S. L. Rodrigues. 2006. Global biodiversity conservation priorities. making and value-of-information analyses to identify robust manage-
Science 313:58–61. ment strategies. Conservation Biology 26:810–820.
Burgman, M. A. 2005. Risks and decisions for conservation and envi- Plous, S. 1993. The psychology of judgment and decision making.
ronmental management. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, McGraw-Hill, New York.
United Kingdom. Redford, K. H., and S. Taber. 2000. Writing the wrongs: developing
Carwardine, J., T. O’Connor, S. Legge, B. Mackey, H. P. Possingham, and a safe-fail culture in conservation. Conservation Biology 14:1567–
T. G. Martin. 2012. Prioritizing threat management for biodiversity 1568.
conservation. Conservation Letters 5:196–204. Wilhere, G. F., L. A. Maguire, J. M. Scott, J. L. Rachlow, D. D. Goble, and
Edwards, W. 1990. Unfinished tasks: a research agenda for behavioural L. K. Svancara. 2012. Conflation of values and science: response to
decision theory. Pages 44–65 in R. M. Hogarth, editor. Insights in Noss et al. Conservation Biology 26:943–944.
decision making. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago. Wilson, K. A., M. F. McBride, M. Bode, and H. P. Possingham.
Failing, L., and R. Gregory. 2003. Ten common mistakes in designing 2006. Prioritizing global conservation efforts. Nature 440:337–
biodiversity indicators for forest policy. Journal of Environmental 340.
Management 68:121–132. Wilson, K. A., et al. 2007. Conserving biodiversity efficiently:
Game, E. T., G. Lipsett-Moore, E. Saxon, N. Peterson, and S. Shep- what to do, where, and when. Plos Biology 5:e223. doi:10.
pard. 2011. Incorporating climate change adaptation into na- 1371/journal.pbio.0050223
tional conservation assessments. Global Change Biology 17:3150– Wolman, A. G. 2006. Measurement and meaningfulness in conservation
3160. science. Conservation Biology 20:1626–1634.

Conservation Biology
Volume 27, No. 3, 2013