U.S.

District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas

Northern Division

Don Hamrick, pro se (Non-State Actor) )

5860 Wilburn Road )
Wilburn, Arkansas 72179 ) Case No. 1:06cv0044
)
-v- )
)
United Nations, et al )
New York, NY 10017 )

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR

WRIT OF REPLEVIN & WRIT OF ARREST ON AFFIDAVIT OF REPLEVIN
UNDER RULE 64, FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
-OR-
PLAINTIFF’S NOTICE OF INTENT IN MAKING CITIZEN’S ARREST WITH
THE ASSISTANCE OF THE U.S. MARSHALS SERVICE
IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE
OF JUDGE GEORGE HOWARD AND THE COURT CLERK FOR FELONY
EXTORTION, 18 U.S.C. § 872 OF THE COURT’S $350 FILING FEE
FROM A U.S. SEAMEN AS CIVIL PLAINTIFF IN VIOLATION OF THE
SEAMEN’S SUIT LAW, 28 U.S.C. § 1916,
A STAND-ALONE STATUTORY RIGHT OF EXEMPTION
FREE OF THE ARBITRARY CONDITION OF
IN FORMA PAUPERIS APPLICATION

A Writ of Replevin is a prejudgment process ordering the seizure or attachment of

alleged illegally taken or wrongfully withheld property to be held in the U.S. Marshal’s
custody or that of another designated official, under order and supervision of the court, until
the court determines otherwise. This type of writ is commonly used to take property from an
individual wrongfully in possession of it and return it to its rightful owner.

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 PROCLAMATION & DECLARATION OF
AN ACT OF REPOSSESSION OF FREEDOM AND
A REPOSSESSION OF A TENTH AMENDMENT POWER
RESERVED TO THE PEOPLE AS DETERMINED BY NEW CASE LAW
“FED UP!” “PLAINTIFF IS NOW DEMANDING JUSTICE!
Having endured 4 years, 8 months of obstruction of justice by the federal judiciary and by
the U.S. Department of Justice by every dirty trick of the federal bench and bar to deny my
Second Amendment case from proceeding to trial when the subject matter and the merits of my
case demand a jury trial, in an act of Constitutional self-defense and in defiance of the United
States Government’s attempt to take Tenth Amendment powers Reserved to the People by unjust
and abusive means of the political, legislative, and regulatory process, and by belligerently denying
all available statutory, regulatory, and judicial remedies guaranteed to me under the right to
petition clause of the First Amendment, and by the consequences of Government Action and
Inaction, having rendered me a citizen without effective rights, relegating me to the status
equivalent to that of a slave in violation of Abraham Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation, and
the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendment, though I be a white male of age 51, and having been
harassed by the U.S. Government with criminal investigations for acting in defense of my rights
under the Bill of Rights, and by authority of the U.S. Supreme Court case law in Massachusetts
and Goldstein, I, being a Citizen of the United States under the Fourteenth Amendment, and as a
Member of “the People” under the Tenth Amendment, and acting as a “Private Attorney General”
with a Civil RICO Act case for the Second Amendment as established in my previous pleadings,
do hereby proclaim that I now reclaim, and take back my status as a free citizen of the United
States, and further taking back certain powers reserved to The People under the Tenth
Amendment.
I, under the aforesaid status as a free citizen of the United States, do proclaim and declare
that I now have a GREATER STANDING to “FORCE federal agencies of the United States
Government [NOT by armed or physical force but by Force of their Oath of Office, demanding
compulsive obedience to their allegiance to defending the U.S. Constitution and the Bill of Rights
against all enemies, foreign and domestic under threat of Citizen’s Arrest for offenses against my
constitutional rights, duties, and powers with attending assistance of any federal law enforcement
agent as is appropriate and affirmed by a federal judge through a Warrant of Citizen’s Arrest as the
procedures may or may not require, as a means of last resort when all available remedies of
criminal procedure have been exhausted and/or denied by federal law enforcement agencies to the
neglect, degradation, or obstruction of justice.] the U.S. Marshals Service, the BATFE, the U.S.
Coast Guard, the U.S. Department of Justice, the FBI, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security,
the TSA, and 40 other federal agencies through this civil litigation to develop policies and
procedures and to force said federal agencies to adequately train and supervise their subordinates
to fulfill their constitutional obligations in regard to “The People’s” Second Amendment rights
under Parker, and Emerson, and under the U.S. Department of Justice August 24, 2004
MEMORANDUM OPINION finding that the Second Amendment is an individual right regardless of
membership in a militia.
This Proclamation extends to the Federal Court issuing a Court Order, if necessary,
compelling such obedience to the U.S. Constitution and the Bill of Rights in the interest of justice.

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 AFFIDAVIT OF REPLEVIN

TO JUDGE GEORGE HOWARD

U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

CASE LAW ON CIVIL RICO:

The object of civil RICO is thus not merely to compensate victims but to
turn them into prosecutors, "private attorneys general," dedicated
to eliminating racketeering activity. 1 Id., at 187 (citing Malley-Duff ,
483 U. S., at 151 ) (civil RICO specifically has a "further purpose [of]
encouraging potential private plaintiffs diligently to investigate").
The provision for treble damages is accordingly justified by the
expected benefit of suppressing racketeering activity, an object
pursued the sooner the better. Rottella v. Wood 528 U.S. 549 (2000),
147 F.3d 438.

PRIVATE ATTORNEY GENERAL:

Citing Pamela S. Karlan, DISARMING THE PRIVATE ATTORNEY GENERAL, University of Illinois
Law Review, [Vol. 2003, No. 1, pp. 183-209] introduction and conclusion:

In Disarming the Private Attorney General, Professor Karlan describes how the
Supreme Court has created a significant regulationremedy gap by critically
undercutting one of the primary mechanisms Congress has used for enforcing civil
rights: the private attorney general. Professor Karlan identifies a series of techniques
the Court has used to strip private individuals of their ability to enforce civil rights
laws. On the one hand, the Court has expanded the scope of sovereign immunity
under a new “Eleventeenth” Amendment jurisprudence and the scope of compelled
arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act. On the other hand, the Court has
contracted the availability of implied rights of action and attorney’s fees. The overall
effect of the Court’s decisions is to severely restrict enforcement of basic
antidiscrimination requirements.
Conclusion
The overriding theme that links together the Supreme Court’s decisions on a range
of issues—from the scope of Eleventh Amendment immunity to the scope of
congressional power under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, and from when
to find implied rights of action to when to award attorney’s fees—can be stated quite
simply: The current Court is creating an ever-greater regulation-remedy gap. It has
left Congress free to regulate a wide range of subjects, but it is engaged in a form of

1
This objective of encouraging prompt litigation to combat racketeering is the most obvious answer to
Rotella's argument that the injury and pattern discovery rule should be adopted because "RICO is to be read
broadly" and " `liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes,' " Sedima , S. P. R. L. v. Imrex Co. ,
473 U. S. 479, 497-498 (1985) (quoting Pub. L. 91-452, §904(a), 84 Stat. 947).

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 court stripping that reduces the possibilities for judicial enforcement of statutory
commands. Thus, I would argue that a “virulent variety of freewheeling
interventionism lies at the core of [the Court’s] devices of restraint.” 2
The Congress and Supreme Court of an earlier era constructed the institution of the
private attorney general because they recognized that, without private attorneys
general, it would be impossible to realize some of our most fundamental
constitutional and political values. The current Court seems bent on dismantling this
centerpiece of the Second Reconstruction. For all its invocations of Marbury’s
declaration that it “is emphatically the province and the duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is,” 3 the current Court seems to have forgotten
Marbury’s equally important acknowledgment—that “the government of the United
States has been emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of men,” but
“will certainly cease to deserve this high appellation, if the laws furnish no remedy for
the violation of a vested legal right.” 4 When the law furnishes no remedy because
the Supreme Court has cast out the remedies that the political branches have tried to
provide, then the courts threaten to become the most dangerous branch “to the
political rights of the Constitution,” 5 and not the least.

SEAMEN’S SUIT LAW 28 U.S.C. § 1916:

“In all courts of the United States, seamen may institute and prosecute suits and
appeals in their own names and for their own benefit for wages or salvage or the
enforcement of laws enacted for their health or safety without prepaying fees or
costs or furnishing security therefor.”

EXTORTION BY OFFICERS OR EMPLOYEES OF THE UNITED STATES,

18 U.S. CODE § 872.
Whoever, being an officer, or employee of the United States or any department or
agency thereof, or representing himself to be or assuming to act as such, under color
or pretense of office or employment commits or attempts an act of extortion, shall be
fined under this title or imprisoned not more than three years, or both; but if the
amount so extorted or demanded does not exceed $1,000, he shall be fined under
this title or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.

2
Gunther, supra note 6, at 25. The quoted text summarizes Gunther’s assessment of Alexander M.
Bickel’s article, The Passive Virtues.

3
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).

4
Marbury, 5 U.S. at 163.

5
THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 3, at 465.

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EXTORTION IS DEFINED AS:
"The obtaining of property from another induced by wrongful use of actual or
threatened force, violence, or fear, or under color of official right." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY - 6th Edition

AFFIRMATION OF REPLEVIN (See Exhibit 3):

(1) Description of the property claimed: $350 filing fee of the Court.

(2) Its actual value is $350. The amount in damages for extorting the filing fee is
indeterminable by the Plaintiff.

(3) The Plaintiff is the rightful owner of that money and he is entitled to immediate
reimbursement of that money.

(4) Judge George Howard and the Court wrongfully extorted the Court’s filing fee from the
Plaintiff under color of official right, in violation of the black-letter reading of the Seamen’s Suit
Law, according to the best knowledge, information, and belief of the affiant plaintiff.

(5) The $350 was not for a tax or fine against the plaintiff, or under any order or judgment
of a court against him or her, or seized under an execution or attachment against his or her
property.

(6) That the plaintiff's cause of action has accrued on September 11, 2006, well within the
three year limit.

PRESUMPTIONS IN GENERAL IN CIVIL ACTIONS AND PROCEEDINGS, Rule 301. Federal

Rules of Evidence
In all civil actions and proceedings not otherwise provided for by Act of Congress or
by these rules, a presumption imposes on the party against whom it is
directed the burden of going forward with evidence to rebut or meet the
presumption, but does not shift to such party the burden of proof in the sense of
the risk of nonpersuasion, which remains throughout the trial upon the party on
whom it was originally cast.

PLAINTIFF’S PRESUMPTIONS:
(1) Exhibit 1 and Exhibit 6 are construed to be or includes the “federal right” to make a
citizen’s arrest of Judge George Howard and the Court Clerk for felony extortion, 18
U.S. Code § 872 of the Court’s filing fee in violation of the Seamen’ Suit Law, 28 U.S.C.

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 § 1916, aided by Exhibit 2, Arkansas Code 16-81-106(d). AUTHORITY TO ARREST and
DC CODE § 23-582 ARRESTS WITHOUT WARRANT BY OTHER PERSONS.

(2) The procedure for Citizen’s Arrest to be employed by the Plaintiff will be the standard
procedure commonly done at the local law enforcement level but assisted by a U.S.
Marshal or Deputy U.S. Marshal, see EXHIBIT 2, ARKANSAS CODE 16-81-106(g)(4)
AUTHORITY TO ARREST, and ARKANSAS CODE 16-81-107 PROCEDURES OF ARREST.

(3) Replevin is perhaps my last available remedy to rectify the Court’s extortion of the $350
before it becomes necessary to make the Citizen’s Arrests in the event that the Eighth
Circuit denies my appeal for Rule Nisi on the Seaman’s Suit Law. This is the classic
push coming to shove situation in the constitutional fight to restore the balance of power
under the Tenth Amendment, albeit at the minimal level of litigation in defense of a
Seaman’s statutory right to the exemption of filing fees and court costs that Judge
George Howard and the Court Clerk has unlawfully denied. See EXHIBIT 3 ARKANSAS
CODE 18-60-809. REPLEVIN and ARKANSAS CODE18-60-810. AFFIDAVIT FOR REPLEVIN.

(4) In accordance with ARKANSAS CODE 5-2-603 EXECUTION OF PUBLIC DUTY (see EXHIBIT
5) I am justified to pursue Replevin and Citizen’s Arrest because I reasonably believe
Replevin and/or Citizen’s Arrest are required and authorized by comparative implication
of the November 9, 2006 Court Order of Judge Frank D. Whitney of the U.S. District
Court in Charlotte, North Carolina, in an unrelated civil case (No. 3:04-cv-0344-W),
acknowledging and recognizing the Seamen’s Suit Law stating, in part: “If the Plaintiff
elects to exercise his appeal rights, the Court finds that 28 U.S.C. § 1916 waives the
requirement of prepayment of docket fees or furnishing security therefor, and the Clerk
of the Court is so instructed.”

(5) The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia is another court that acknowledged
and recognized the Seamen’s Suit Law in the Second Amendment cases that I filed in
that court from 2002 to 2005. However, the DC Circuit and the U.S. Supreme Court
coerced payment of their respective filing fees in clear and convincing violation of the
Seamen’s Suit Law. Success in Replevin or Citizen’s Arrest for extortion in the present
case before the U.S. District Court in Little Rock will provide vindication of my rights
under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. PROCEEDINGS IN VINDICATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS.

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 (6) If my Second Amendment case proceeds to trial I will have the opportunity to cause the
State of Arkansas to investigation federal gun control laws and legislation as well as state
gun control laws and legislation with the purposes of revision or repeal, streamlining
firearms laws to be more in line with National Open Carry Handgun, (see EXHIBIT 5,
ARKANSAS CODE 25-21-103. INVESTIGATION OF FEDERAL LEGISLATION ON REQUEST OF
SENATORS OR REPRESENTATIVES, stating, “The [Arkansas] Attorney General shall also
make any reasonable or appropriate investigation or study of any existing or proposed
federal legislation to determine its effect upon the state and its citizens whenever he is
requested so to do by any of this state's Senators or Representatives in Congress and
report the result of such investigation or study.”

PLAINTIFF’S DEMAND FOR ONE OF TWO REMEDIES

Therefore, with the aforesaid Affidavit for Replevin and the aforesaid Motion for Writ of
Replevin and Writ of Arrest on Affidavit of Replevin, I hereby demand the return of my $350 filing
fee. Denial of my Motion for Replevin and/or Writ of Arrest on Affidavit of Replevin as a justified
remedies I will be left with one other alternative, Citizen’s Arrest as a means of last resort in the
event the Eight Circuit denies my appeal for the return of the $350 filing fee.

Don Hamrick, Plaintiff, pro se

5860 Wilburn Road
Wilburn, Arkansas 72179

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 EXHIBIT 1.

FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

RULE 64. SEIZURE OF PERSON OR PROPERTY
“At the commencement of and during the course of an action, all
remedies providing for seizure of person or property for the
purpose of securing satisfaction of the judgment ultimately to be
entered in the action are available under the circumstances and in the
manner provided by the law of the state in which the district court is
held, existing at the time the remedy is sought, subject to the following
qualifications:
(1) any existing statute of the United States governs
to the extent to which it is applicable;
(2) the action in which any of the foregoing remedies
is used shall be commenced and prosecuted or, if
removed from a state court, shall be prosecuted after
removal, pursuant to these rules.
The remedies thus available include arrest, attachment,
garnishment, replevin, sequestration, and other corresponding or
equivalent remedies, however designated and regardless of
whether by state procedure the remedy is ancillary to an
action or must be obtained by an independent action.”

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 EXHIBIT 2.

CITIZEN’S ARREST
ARKANSAS CODE
TITLE 16. PRACTICE, PROCEDURE, AND COURTS.
SUBTITLE 6. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE GENERALLY.
Arkansas Code 16-81-106. Authority to arrest.

ARKANSAS CODE 16-81-106(d) A private person may make

an arrest where he or she has reasonable grounds for
believing that the person arrested has committed a felony.
ARKANSAS CODE 16-81-106(g) The following persons employed as full-time law
enforcement officers by the federal, state, county, or municipal government, who
are empowered to effect an arrest with or without warrant for violations of
the United States Code and who are authorized to carry firearms in the
performance of their duties, shall be empowered to act as officers for the arrest of
offenders against the laws of this state and shall enjoy the same immunity, if any, to
the same extent and under the same circumstances as certified state law
enforcement officers:
(1) Federal Bureau of Investigation special agents;
(2) United States Secret Service special agents;
(3) United States Citizenship and Immigration Services special agents, investigators,
and patrol officers;

(4) United States Marshals Service deputies;

(5) Drug Enforcement Administration special agents;
(6) United States postal inspectors;
(7) United States Customs and Border Protection special agents, inspectors, and
patrol officers;
(8) United States General Services Administration special agents;
(9) United States Department of Agriculture special agents;
(10) Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives special agents;
(11) Internal Revenue Service special agents and inspectors;
(12) Certified law enforcement officers of the United States Department of the
Interior, National Park Service, and the United States Fish and Wildlife Service;
(13) Members of federal, state, county, municipal, and prosecuting attorneys' drug
task forces; and
(14) Certified law enforcement officers of the United States Department of Agriculture, Forest Service.

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 ARKANSAS CODE 16-81-107. PROCEDURES OF ARREST.

(a) An arrest is made by placing the person of the defendant in restraint or by his or
her submitting to the custody of the person making the arrest.
(b) No unnecessary force or violence shall be used in making the arrest.
(c) To make an arrest, a law enforcement officer may break open the door of a
house in which the defendant may be after having demanded admittance and
explained the purpose for which admittance is desired.
(d) A law enforcement officer making an arrest may summon orally as many
persons as he or she deems necessary to aid him or her in making the arrest, and all
persons failing without reasonable excuse to obey the summons shall be guilty of
Class C misdemeanors.
(e) The person making the arrest shall:
(1) Inform the person about to be arrested of the intention to arrest
him or her and the offense for which he or she is to be arrested; and
(2) If acting under a warrant of arrest, give information of the
warrant and show the warrant if required.
(f) The law enforcement officer making an arrest in obedience to a warrant shall
proceed with the defendant as directed by the warrant.
History. Crim. Code, §§ 36-40, 42; C. & M. Dig., §§ 2907-2912; Pope's Dig., §§
3723-3728; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-412 - 43-414, 43-415 - 43-417; Acts 2005, No.
1994, § 412.

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 EXHIBIT 3.
ARKANSAS CODE
TITLE 18. PROPERTY
SUBTITLE 5. CIVIL ACTIONS
CHAPTER 60. MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS RELATING TO PROPERTY
SUBCHAPTER 8.
RECOVERY OF PERSONAL PROPERTY AND REPLEVIN

ARKANSAS CODE 18-60-809. REPLEVIN

The plaintiff in an action to recover the possession of specific personal property, at the
commencement of the action or at any time before judgment, may claim the immediate delivery of
the property, as provided in §§ 18-60-810 - 18-60-822.
History. Civil Code, § 202; C. & M. Dig., § 8639; Pope's Dig., § 11372; A.S.A. 1947, § 34-2101.

ARKANSAS CODE18-60-810. AFFIDAVIT FOR REPLEVIN.

(a) An order for the delivery of property to the plaintiff shall be made by the clerk when there is filed
in his or her office an affidavit of the plaintiff, or of someone in his or her behalf, showing:
(1) A particular description of the property claimed;
(2) Its actual value and the damages which the affiant believes the plaintiff ought to
recover for the detention thereof;
(3) That the plaintiff is the owner of the property or has a special ownership or
interest therein, stating the facts in relation thereto, and that he or she is entitled to
the immediate possession of the property;
(4) That the property is wrongfully detained by the defendant, with the alleged
cause of the detention thereof, according to the best knowledge, information, and
belief of the affiant;
(5) That it has not been taken for a tax or fine against the plaintiff, or under any
order or judgment of a court against him or her, or seized under an execution or
attachment against his or her property, or, if so seized, that it is by statute exempt
from seizure;
(6) That the plaintiff's cause of action has accrued within three (3) years; and
(7) When the action is brought to recover property taken under an execution, the
fact of the taking and the nature of the process under which it was done.
(b) When the delivery of several articles of property is claimed, the affidavit must state the value of
each.
History. Civil Code, §§ 203, 204; Acts 1871, No. 48, § 1 [203], p. 219; 1887, No. 29, § 1, p. 31; C.
& M. Dig., §§ 8640, 8641; Pope's Dig., §§ 11373, 11374; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 34-2102, 34-2103.

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 EXHIBIT 4.

ARKANSAS CODE
SUBCHAPTER 6. JUSTIFICATION
ARKANSAS CODE 5-2-603. EXECUTION OF PUBLIC DUTY.
(b) The justification afforded by this section applies if the actor
reasonably believes his or her conduct is required or authorized:
(1) By the judgment or direction of a competent
court or tribunal or in the lawful execution of legal
process, notwithstanding lack of jurisdiction of the court or
tribunal or defect in the legal process; or

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 EXHIBIT 5.

ARKANSAS CODE
TITLE 25. STATE GOVERNMENT

CHAPTER 21. UNIFORM LAW TO OPPOSE

FEDERAL ENCROACHMENT ON STATE RIGHTS
ARKANSAS CODE 25-21-101. STUDY OF EXISTING FEDERAL
LEGISLATION.

In order to secure concerted action among the states to oppose federal

encroachments upon the state powers, and to expedite the proper execution
of the responsibility of the government in the war effort, it shall be the duty of
the Attorney General to cooperate with the attorneys general of other
cooperating states in making a study of existing federal legislation to
determine whether, by the establishment of federal bureaus, boards, or
commissions, or otherwise, such legislation has resulted in objectionable or
harmful encroachments upon the normal field of state functions and powers,
and, except during the war and insofar as the legislation is reasonably related
to the conduct of the war to call to the attention of this state's Senators and
Representatives in Congress all legislation which, in his opinion, is
objectionable or harmful in this respect. He shall also furnish each such
Senator and Representative a written statement of the reasons for his belief
that such legislation is objectionable or harmful to the state, together with his
suggestions for appropriate congressional legislation to remedy same.
History. Acts 1943, No. 166, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 5-401.

ARKANSAS CODE 25-21-102. STUDY OF PROPOSED FEDERAL

LEGISLATION.
It shall also be the duty of the Attorney General to likewise cooperate with
such other attorneys general in making studies and examinations of all now
pending or hereafter proposed congressional legislation to determine whether
the same may result in federal encroachments into the normal field of state
legislation or state functions, or whether same is harmful or beneficial to the
interests of the state or its citizens, and to advise the Senators and
Representatives in writing of his opinion and views with respect thereto,
together with his reasons therefor; and to suggest any amendments to any
such pending or proposed legislation which the Attorney General deems
appropriate or necessary to protect the interests of the state and its citizens.
History. Acts 1943, No. 166, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 5-402.

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 ARKANSAS CODE 25-21-103. INVESTIGATION OF FEDERAL
LEGISLATION ON REQUEST OF SENATORS OR REPRESENTATIVES.
The Attorney General shall also make any reasonable or appropriate
investigation or study of any existing or proposed federal legislation to
determine its effect upon the state and its citizens whenever he is requested
so to do by any of this state's Senators or Representatives in Congress and
report the result of such investigation or study.
History. Acts 1943, No. 166, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 5-403.

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 EXHIBIT 6.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA OFFICIAL CODE 2001 EDITION

DIVISION IV. CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE AND PRISONERS.
TITLE 23. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE.
CHAPTER 5. WARRANTS AND ARRESTS.
SUBCHAPTER V. ARREST WITHOUT WARRANT.
§ 23-582. ARRESTS WITHOUT WARRANT BY OTHER PERSONS.
(b) A private person may arrest another --
(1) who he has probable cause to believe is committing in
his presence --
(A) a felony; or
(B) an offense enumerated in section 23-581(a)(2); or
(2) in aid of a law enforcement officer or special policeman,
or other person authorized by law to make an arrest.
(c) Any person making an arrest pursuant to this section shall
deliver the person arrested to a law enforcement officer without
unreasonable delay.
(July 29, 1970, 84 Stat. 630, Pub. L. 91-358, title II, § 210(a); Apr. 30,
1988, D.C. Law 7-104, § 7(e), 35 DCR 147.)

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 CERTIFICATION

A copy of the above was emailed to Richard Pence, Defense Counsel and to the U.S.
Marshals Service at about 4:20 AM, Wednesday, April 4, 2007 and mailed later that same
day to Defense Counsel.

Don Hamrick, Plaintiff, pro se

5860 Wilburn Road
Wilburn, Arkansas 72179

Cc: U.S. Marshals Service (to refute or confirm my Presumptions on Citizen’s Arrest)

16