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Were the Master, officers, and ratings involved with cargo operations, familiar with
the functions of the vessel’s cargo transfer Emergency Shut Down (ESD) systems, and
was the equipment in good working order, regularly inspected, tested and maintained?
Short Question Text
Cargo transfer Emergency Shut Down (ESD)
Vessel Types
LPG, LNG
ROVIQ Sequence
Bridge, Cargo Control Room, Main Deck, Cargo Manifold, Interview - Deck Rating
Publications
IMO: IGC Code
SIGTTO: ESD Systems 2nd Edition 2021
Objective
To ensure that crewmembers can respond effectively to an emergency situation during cargo transfer
operations in accordance with the shipboard emergency plan.
Industry Guidance
ESD is an important safety system, and it should always be active when there is any cargo on the ship. The ESD
system should only be switched off for short periods of time for necessary maintenance. It may be inhibited
temporarily for testing, but this should be for the minimum duration possible.
If the design of a safety system or ESD system leads the operator to switch it off unintentionally or inappropriately
then the reason for this should be thoroughly investigated. This should include whether the design of the system can
be adjusted to reduce the risk of this occurring again.
The ESD system should be designed to clearly indicate when it is inhibited or switched off and it should not permit
cargo transfer operations in these conditions.
Cargo control systems should be designed to not permit cargo transfer operations unless the ESD system and ship
shore link (SSL) are connected and active. The status of the ESD and SSL systems should be clearly visible in the
cargo control room (CCR). Ship and terminal operators should ensure that all relevant safety systems, including ESD
and SSL systems, are fully operational and active during cargo transfer operations
The requirements of the IGC Code are prescriptive in nature and the scope of the safety functions it covers may be
sufficient for most gas carriers. However, for some designs of gas carriers, additional safety functions may be
advisable. It is important to review the need for additional safety functions in a structured manner and follow industry
standard best practice.
Human factors should also be considered and potential dangers such as alarm flooding should be avoided. Any
change to the alarm system on the ship should be carried out using the principles of the alarm management lifecycle
in IEC 626829 . Any changes to the alarm system should only be made by undergoing a documented process that
involves a full hazard and operability (HAZOP) study and a management of change process.
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Chapter 13 of the IGC Code requires automation systems to be designed, installed and tested in accordance with
recognised standards, with particular reference to IEC 60092-504. This provides guidance on the requirements for
documentation, maintenance and testing.
Safety systems should be designed to ensure that it is practical to test all parts of the system. Operation and
maintenance documentation should provide clear guidance on how to test the safety system and the required
intervals for this to ensure that the safety system is maintained in operational condition.
The IGC Code (18.6.2 and 18.10.5) requires cargo ESD and alarm systems to be tested before cargo transfer. This is
typically carried out as part of pre-arrival tests, in the 24 hours before berthing. The SSL is tested after connection as
part of pre-transfer tests.
TMSA KPI 6.1.2 requires that procedures for pre-operational tests and checks of cargo and bunkering equipment are
in place for all vessel types within the fleet. Tests and checks of equipment may include:
7. The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key
shipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various
tasks involved should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.
18.10.1.1 A cargo emergency shutdown system shall be fitted to stop cargo flow in the event of an emergency, either
internally within the ship, or during cargo transfer to ship or shore. The design of the ESD system shall avoid the
potential generation of surge pressures within cargo transfer pipe work (see 18.10.2.1.4).
18.10.1.5 A functional flow chart of the ESD system and related systems shall be provided in the cargo control station
and on the navigation bridge.
18.10.2.1.3 ESD valves in liquid piping systems shall close fully and smoothly within 30 s of actuation. Information
about the closure time of the valves and their operating characteristics shall be available on board, and the closing
time shall be verifiable and repeatable.
18.10.3.1 As a minimum, the ESD system shall be capable of manual operation by a single control on the bridge and
either in the control position required by 13.1.2 or the cargo control room, if installed, and no less than two locations
in the cargo area.
18.10.3.2 The ESD system shall be automatically activated on detection of a fire on the weather decks of the cargo
area and/or cargo machinery spaces. As a minimum, the method of detection used on the weather decks shall cover
the liquid and vapour domes of the cargo tanks, the cargo manifolds and areas where liquid piping is dismantled
regularly. Detection may be by means of fusible elements designed to melt at temperatures between 98°C and
104°C, or by area fire detection methods.
18.10.3.3 Cargo machinery that is running shall be stopped by activation of the ESD system in accordance with the
cause and effect matrix in table 18.1.
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18.10.3.4 The ESD control system shall be configured so as to enable the high-level testing required in 13.3.5 to be
carried out in a safe and controlled manner. For the purpose of the testing, cargo pumps may be operated while the
overflow control system is overridden. Procedures for level alarm testing and re-setting of the ESD system after
completion of the high-level alarm testing shall be included in the operation manual required by 18.2.1.
Cargo emergency shutdown and alarm systems involved in cargo transfer shall be checked and tested before cargo
handling operations begin
18.2.1 The ship shall be provided with copies of suitably detailed cargo system operation manuals approved by the
Administration such that trained personnel can safely operate the ship with due regard to the hazards and properties
of the cargoes that are permitted to be carried.
18.2.2 The content of the manuals shall include, but not be limited to:
Inspection Guidance
The vessel operator should have developed procedures for the operation, inspection, maintenance and testing of the
vessel’s cargo transfer emergency shutdown (ESD) systems which defined:
The Cargo System Operation Manual may form part of these procedures.
The Master and officers should be familiar with the ESD systems installed on their vessel, and its initiators, which
may include:
• Emergency push-buttons.
• Fire detection on deck or in a compressor house.
• High levels in cargo tanks.
• A signal from a ship/shore link.
• Loss of motive power to ESD valves.
• Main electric power failure (blackout).
• Tank level alarm override.
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• Fuel gas compressors.
• Reliquefication plant including condensate return pumps if fitted.
• Gas combustion unit.
• ESD valves.
• Signal to ship/shore link.
Fusible plugs may be used for the required fire detection on deck. Fusible elements should not be painted over as
this might affect the temperature at which they will operate.
Ratings should be familiar with the location of the manual ESD system controls and the circumstances in which they
should be activated.
• Sight, and where necessary review, the company procedures that defined the operation, inspection,
maintenance and testing of the vessel’s cargo transfer emergency shutdown (ESD) systems.
• Sight and review the checklists used to test the ESD system before the most recent cargo operation.
• Sight and review the checklists used to verify the timing and sequencing of ESD system functions.
• If necessary, review the records of inspections, maintenance and tests carried out contained within the
planned maintenance system.
• Review the functional flowcharts (cause-effect) for the ESD system.
• Inspect the means of fire detection on the weather deck i.e. fusible plugs or area fire detection.
• Inspect the emergency push buttons on the bridge, in the cargo control room and on deck.
• Inspect an ESD manifold valve and verify that the connection between the ESD valve position indicator and
the ESD valve actuator is intact
Expected Evidence
• The company procedures for the operation, inspection, maintenance and testing of the vessel’s ESD
systems.
• The checklist used to conduct the pre-arrival tests on the ESD system prior to the previous cargo transfer
operation.
• The checklist used to verify the timing and sequencing of the ESD system functions.
• Records of the inspection, maintenance and testing of the vessel’s ESD systems.
• Functional flowcharts (cause-effect) for the cargo ESD system.
• The Cargo System Operation Manual(s), describing the ESD systems.
• There were no company procedures for the operation, inspection, maintenance and testing of the vessel’s
cargo ESD systems.
• The Master, officers and ratings involved in cargo operations were not familiar with the vessel’s ESD
systems at a depth relevant to their seniority.
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• A functional flowchart (cause-effect) of the ESD systems was not posted in the cargo control room and on
the bridge.
• The status of the ESD and ship/shore link (SSL) systems was not clearly visible in the cargo control room
(CCR).
• Area fire detection on the weather deck, if fitted, was not fully functional.
• Fusible elements were painted over.
• Access to the emergency push buttons was obstructed, or they were not ready for immediate use.
• The Cargo System Operation Manual did not describe the ESD system.
• The Cargo System Operation Manual did not contain procedures for re-setting of the ESD system after
completion of high-level alarm testing.
• There were no records of checks and tests of the ESD systems before cargo handling operations began.
• There were no records of checks to verify the timing and sequencing of the ESD system functions.
• Information about the closure time of the ESD valves and their operating characteristics was not available on
board,
• Records of inspections, maintenance and tests carried out were incomplete.
• The accompanying officer was not familiar with:
o The purpose, operation and testing of the ESD systems.
o The functional flowcharts (cause-effect) for the ESD system.
o The ESD valve closing timings.
o The circumstances in which any part of the ESD may be inhibited, the person who may authorise
the inhibiting and the controls in place to ensure that the ESD system is reinstated immediately
after the need to inhibit is over.
• An interviewed rating, involved as part of the cargo watch, was unfamiliar with the location of the ESD
system manual controls and/or the circumstances in which manual activation of the ESD should take place.
• Inspection of the ESD systems indicated that actions recorded in the planned maintenance system had not
in fact taken place.
• The ESD systems were defective in any respect.
• Company procedures did not include a contingency plan for the circumstances where the ESD link system, if
fitted, was not available.
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