Seguridad

5/5/23, 20:51 Una encuesta de servicios de seguridad, ataques y aplicaciones para redes vehiculares ad hoc (VANET) - PMC
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Sensores (Basilea). 2019 agosto; 19(16): 3589. PMCID: PMC6720296

Published online 2019 Aug 17. doi: 10.3390/s19163589 PMID: 31426550
A Survey of Security Services, Attacks, and Applications for Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks
(VANETs)
Muhammad Sameer Sheikh,1,2 Jun Liang,2,* and Wensong Wang3
Abstract
Vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs) are an emerging type of mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) with
robust applications in intelligent traffic management systems. VANET has drawn significant attention from
the wireless communication research community and has become one of the most prominent research
fields in intelligent transportation system (ITS) because of the potential to provide road safety and precau‐
tionary measures for the drivers and passengers. In this survey, we discussed the basic overview of the
VANET from the architecture, communication methods, standards, characteristics, and VANET security
services. Second, we presented the threats and attacks and the recent state-of-the-art methods of the
VANET security services. Then, we comprehensively reviewed the authentication schemes that can protect
vehicular networks from malicious nodes and fake messages. Third, we discussed the latest simulation
tools and the performance of the authentication schemes in terms of simulation tools, which was followed
by the VANET applications. Lastly, we identified the open research challenges and gave future research di‐
rections. In sum, this survey fills the gap of existing surveys and summarizes the latest research develop‐
ment. All the security attacks in VANETs and their related countermeasures are discussed with respect to
ensuring secure communication. The authentication schemes and comprehensive applications were intro‐
duced and analyzed in detail. In addition, open research challenges and future research directions were
issued.
Keywords: vehicular ad hoc network (VANET), intelligent transportation system (ITS), security threats
and attacks, privacy-preserving authentication, cryptography
1. Introduction
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6720296/ 1/51
In recent years, the new development and enhancement in intelligent transportation systems (ITSs) have
gained significant attention from both industry and research communities. The ITS contributes the major
part in terms of providing road safety, improving traffic flow, and offering entertainment services on vehi‐
cles [1]. The automotive industry realizes the need for the vehicles to be connected with the wireless com‐
munication system, which enables communication between vehicles and between vehicles and infrastructu‐
re. Such communication can significantly increase traffic safety and optimize the traffic flow [2]. It can also
broaden the vehicle recognition events, which, at present, cannot be detected by available electronic sen‐
sors and loop detectors. Therefore, embedded sensors have been introduced in which traffic information
such as driving behaviors, traffic flow parameters, and driving conditions can be shared with nearby vehi‐
cles by developing networks, which are named Vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs) [3].
VANET is a type of mobile ad hoc network (MANET) with road routes, which aim to provide traffic safety,
improve traffic flow, and enhance the driving experiences. It relies on transportation authorities for registe‐
ring and managing the roadside units (RSUs) and onboard units (OBUs) [4]. An OBU is installed in every
vehicle as a transmitter to communicate with other vehicles on the road, while RSUs are installed along the
street with network devices. RSUs are used to communicate with the infrastructure and contain network
devices for dedicated short-range communication (DSRC) [5]. VANETs are classified into two categories:
vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) and vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) communications [6]. In the V2V, vehicles can
communicate with each other in order to exchange traffic-related information. In the V2I, vehicles can di‐
rectly communicate with the infrastructure to exchange traffic information.
In recent years, significant development and advances in vehicular technology have provide many resour‐
ces such as storage devices, radio network, robust computational power, and different kinds of vehicle sen‐
sors. Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) are the robust technology for the Internet of Things (IoT) and sig‐
nificantly applied in ITS. In this technology, sensors are fixed on the roadside to identify the traffic situa‐
tions and deliver the traffic-related information to vehicles such as collision warning, lane-changing war‐
ning, and more. This traffic information can significantly enhance the traffic and road safety and improve
driving experiences. In the ITS context, WSNs can be regarded as an additional element in which they can
cooperate with the vehicular network, i.e., VANETs. This integration between vehicular ad hoc and wire‐
less sensor networks forms a hybrid network, termed VANET-WSN [7]. As the number of real-time ap‐
plications is increased, the quality of service (QoS) for the VANET-WSN has become a prominent research
area in the wireless communication technology. Estimation of bandwidth has greater importance for net‐
work QoS assurance, which can optimize the channel capacity, channel allocation, network routing, band‐
width allocation, and more [7].
IoT is one of the most prominent research fields in wireless communication technology. It is embedded
with electronic devices such as sensors to communicate with other hardware devices via the Internet. In
IoT technology, security remains a challenging issue, which seeks to protect the hardware devices and net‐
work in the IoT system [8]. The IoT technology is being applied in the self-driving vehicles (SDV) for au‐
tomated and connected vehicles and microgrids energy resources systems. In the microgrid system, all dis‐
tributed energy resources combine together to provide a better energy solution. The IoT microgrid system
depends on the supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA), and the integration of domains can in‐
crease the chances of possible cyber-attacks, which may attack the SCADA control management system
and limit the functionality of hardware devices [8]. The low-cost adaptive monitoring technique has been
introduced for IoT devices, which can monitor the intensity and data through the network. In this techni‐
que, the energy consumption and data volume are significantly minimized [9,10], which can enable IoT de‐
vices for maintaining a battery for a long time and alleviate data consumption services [10].
The mobile cloud computing (MCC) system is the robust technology in which the drivers can use a mobile
phone device to connect the cloud through the Internet. The MCC combines the technology and resources
to monitor and identify the traffic safety by processing the sensor data using different mobile architecture
systems. However, the computing devices in the MCC have some limitations such as battery power con‐
sumption, resources, and more [11].
Challenges and benefits in the ITS have motivated researchers to introduce and promote the vehicular
cloud computing (VCC) [12]. The VCC is a new technology, which takes advantage of the cloud compu‐
ting to offer better services and improve the driving experience of VANET drivers. It aims to provide the
services to the drivers, improve traffic flow, reduce traffic congestion, accident, and ensure the usage of
real-time software and infrastructure with the QoS [13]. Specifically, the VCC can be the platform for the
convergence of ITS and computing and storage capabilities of the MCC. Moreover, the VCC can incorpo‐
rate the features of ITS, WSN, and MCC for providing better road safety, improving driving conditions,
and securing traffic management systems [14]. The self-driving vehicles and advanced assistance applica‐
tion used for highly automated driving will depend on the V2X communication technology, which are em‐
powered by fog and edge computations [15]. Such computations could enhance the VANET mechanism
and take the Internet of Vehicles (IoV) to the next level. In the fog computing, the key management techni‐
que has drawn great attention due to its characteristic and reliability for providing a secure channel. This
technique can be used in VANETs to form a fog system in terms of roadside units (RSUs) such as edge
routers, intelligent traffic lights, and more [16].
VANETs have drawn significant attention from the research community due to offering excellent ap‐
plications in the intelligent traffic management systems. Robust schemes for implementing the ITS, VA‐
NETs, and MANETs are quite different in terms of high node mobility, network architecture, and an unre‐
liable channel. The high mobility and volatility in VANETs are vulnerable to the internal and external net‐
work attacks [17]. These attacks raise several challenges in order to design secure VANETs: security, pri‐
vacy, and trust [17].
VANETs face many security challenges and issues in terms of authentication and privacy issues
[18,19,20,21,22], and untrustworthy vehicles raise many security and communication issues [23]. In VA‐
NETs, the entire communication is an open access environment that makes VANETs more vulnerable to
the attacks. Thus, the attacker can modify, intercept, inject, and delete the messages. For example, the at‐
tacker can get access to the traffic messages, which are used to guide the vehicles on the road. If the attac‐
ker alters these messages, it is possible to spread false information on the road and cause traffic conges‐
tions, traffic incidents, accidents, and hazards.
To effectively apply the VANETs in the wireless communication technology, the security and privacy is‐
sues must be handled efficiently by designing a sophisticated algorithm, which can tackle all kinds of th‐
reats and attacks. To address these issues, several research studies have proposed the related authentication
and privacy schemes. Some methods of them utilize the public key infrastructure (PKI) scheme to authenti‐
cate vehicles, which contains the digital signature of the certification authority (CA) and vehicles public
keys. While the vehicles and RSUs require a large amount of computational time and memory to process
and verify these certificates [2,24,25]. These schemes create more robust solutions by verifying signatures
of each vehicle. It causes two problems [21]. First, it cannot verify all signatures in limited time due to less
power in OBU. Second, each message contains signatures and certificates, which may increase the packet
size and then subsequently increase the transmission overhead.
The rest of this survey paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the relevant surveys referring to
VANETs’ security and privacy challenges as well as the authentication techniques. We explain the over‐
view of VANETs in Section 3. Section 4 presents the security services of VANETs and their threats and at‐
tacks. Section 5 presents the recent state-of-the-art methods of VANETs’ security services and privacy-pre‐
serving authentication schemes. Simulation tools and applications of the VANETs are discussed in Section
6 and Section 7, respectively. Section 8 presents the open research challenges in VANETs. Lastly, Section 9
concludes the review.
2. Relevant Surveys
Many surveys on the security services and privacy schemes for VANETs have been reported. They mainly
focus on the different aspects of vehicular communication, standardization, and security services. However,
this survey comprehensively covers the VANETs security services, threats, attacks, recent state-of-the-art
methods, privacy-preserving authentication schemes, applications, and open research challenges. Hartens‐
tein and Laberteaux [26] presented a tutorial survey in terms of communication and networking aspects of
VANETs. This survey covers the potential applications and their requirements by using the communication
platform. Then, they discussed the design challenges for VANETs and identified security and privacy cha‐
llenges in VANETs. Lastly, they discussed existing research challenges in VANETs. In Reference [27], Lin
et al. presented a survey on VANETs’ security. In this survey, the authors reviewed the standardization pro‐
cess of VANETs in terms of security services. Then, they identified two issues, i.e., certificate revocation
and privacy-preserving, which required a sophisticated mechanism in order to make the standards practical.
In Reference [28], Isaac et al. presented a survey in which they comprehensively discussed the threats and
attacks in VANETs and their related countermeasure. Riley et al. [29] presented a survey on existing aut‐
hentication solutions for VANETs in which they classified the authentication schemes based on some spe‐
cific criteria, and compared the advantages and disadvantages of these schemes in different conditions. Ka‐
ragiannis et al. [30] presented a survey on vehicular networks by discussing the basic characteristics, ap‐
plications, challenges, and their proposed solutions. In Reference [31], Al-kahtani launched a survey on
different security attacks in VANETs. This survey discussed the existing security attacks and their related
countermeasure. Then, they analyzed and discussed possible future attacks and some future research direc‐
tions. Zeadally et al. [18] presented a survey on wireless access standards of VANETs and discussed the
deployment of VANET technology in the U.S., Japan, and European countries. Then, the authors identified
some VANETs’ simulation tools and discussed their advantages and disadvantages. Lastly, they discussed
some open research challenges that the researcher faced for deploying VANETs’ technologies.
In Reference [1], Nidhal et al. launched a survey on the VANET communication architecture, outlined the
security and privacy challenges, and classified them in terms of cryptography schemes. Additionally, Al-
Sultan et al. [32] presented a survey on the VANET architecture, and outlined simulation tools to simulate
VANET protocols and its applications. Vijayalakshmi et al. [33] reviewed some security and authentication
techniques for VANETs along with the various kinds of routing protocols to provide secure and efficient
communication in VANETs, respectively. In Reference [34], Sharef et al. presented the routing characteris‐
tics and challenges in VANETs, which is applicable for designing various kinds of routing protocols. Ri‐
chard et al. [17] presented a survey on the security issues and challenges of VANETs along with the secu‐
rity requirements, threats, and different kinds of architecture, which were proposed to resolve the security
issues. Qu et al. [19] presented the general secure process and outlined the authentication methods involved
in these processes. Additionally, the authors performed a detailed survey on authentication algorithms, then
reviewed the privacy-preserving techniques, and discussed the trade-off between security and privacy.
Azees et al. [35] presented the basic architecture, characteristics, and security challenges of VANETs.
Then, they discussed the attacks on security services along with the possible solutions to ensure secure
communication in VANETs. Hasrouny et al. [4] presented the recent development of VANET security cha‐
llenges and related solutions. This survey outlines the characteristics, challenges, and security requirements
in VANETs. Then, the authors discussed the security attacks and their related solutions, and then compared
them based on well-known security criteria in VANETs. Kerrache et al. [36] presented a comprehensive
survey on trust management for vehicular networks. They discussed the existing trust models along with
the comparison between cryptography and trust schemes. Then, they indicated some critical conditions in
which existing trust models cannot perform well, and also discussed their possible solutions.
Manvi and Tangade [37] presented the authentication schemes to provide secured communication in VA‐
NETs. This survey discussed the authentication schemes in three categories, i.e., cryptography technique,
message verification, and digital signatures techniques. Lastly, the authors identified the open research cha‐
llenges in the VANET authentication. Sakiz and Sen [38] presented a survey on the attacks and its possible
detection mechanism. The attacks are described and classify with their effectiveness, and the solutions to
deal with these attacks are discussed with their merits and demerits. Rahim et al. [39] presented a survey
on the social aware applications of vehicular social networks (VSNs), data dissemination, and mobility mo‐
deling. Then, they discussed the system recommendation, cloud computing, and future research directions.
Boualouche et al. [40] launched a comprehensive survey on pseudonym changing strategies for VANETs.
Then, they discussed and compared these strategies based on some relevant criteria. Lastly, the authors
identified some open research challenges and future research directions. Sharma and Ajay [41] presented
an intrusion detection systems (IDSs) and security mechanisms in the vehicular network, i.e., VANETs and
VANET cloud. This survey outlines the brief introduction of IDSs and discussed their related schemes in
detail. Then, they outline the open research challenges in IDS and identify future research directions.
In Reference [42], Wang et al. presented a survey on vehicle-to-everything (V2X) application requirements
and outlines the need of testing challenges along with the brief discussion on testing methods of V2X com‐
munication in terms of the architectural point of view. In Reference [43], Sewalker and Seitz have discus‐
sed the design parameters of the vehicle-to-pedestrian (V2P) system, and outlined the existing V2P sche‐
mes for safety applications and their design considerations, along with the integration challenges of vulne‐
rable road users (VRUs) with the V2X system. Zhaojun et al. [44] discussed the recent developments in
vehicular networks and outlined the security and privacy issues. This survey discussed the basic architectu‐
re and characteristics in VANETs. Then, they discussed the security services along with threats and at‐
tacks. Second, the authors described the security and privacy issues along with the trust models in VA‐
NETs. Ikram et al. [45] launched a survey on authentication and privacy schemes for VANETs in which the
authors discussed and classified the security mechanism of these schemes. Then, they indicated some open
research issues and security challenges in VANETs.
The above surveys comprehensively cover the VANET architecture and security challenges. However, this
survey focuses on the VANET security services and authentication schemes in detail. First, we discuss the
VANET security services. Second, we present each security service of VANETs in terms of threats and at‐
tacks along with the recent state-of-the-art methods that indicate the existing issues of VANET security
and its solutions, whereas the authors in References [36,37,44,45] did not cover these. Furthermore, we
comprehensively cover the authentication schemes in detail, while most of the surveys did not cover the
authentication schemes except Reference [44], which explained the authentication schemes in detail. Third,
the latest simulation tools and the performance of the authentication schemes in terms of simulation tools
were discussed, which was followed by the VANET applications, while most of the surveys did not discuss
the simulation tools and its utilization on the authentication schemes along with the VANET applications.
Lastly, we identified some open research challenges in VANETs that the researcher may face while conduc‐
ting the research in order to deploy VANET technologies and services efficiently, while most of the pre‐
viously mentioned surveys did not discuss the existing research challenges in VANETs. In addition to open
research issues, we also identified some possible solutions to deal with these issues along with the future
research directions.
3. Basic Overview of VANETs
Since 1980, the VANETs, which are ad hoc network infrastructures, grew abruptly, in which vehicles were
connected through wireless communication [46]. Recently, VANETs are used to enhance traffic safety, im‐
prove traffic flow, reduce traffic congestion, and enhance driving experiences [47]. Figure 1 shows the basic
model diagram of VANETs, which consists of three components such as roadside unit (RSU), onboard unit
(OBU), and trusted authority (TA). First, we discuss the VANET architecture, i.e., RSU, OBU, and TA. Se‐
cond, we discuss the communication methods in VANETs, which is followed by the VANET standards.
Lastly, we explain the VANET characteristics.
Figure 1
VANET model diagram.
3.1. VANET Architecture
Generally, the communication between vehicles and RSU is done via the wireless technology called wire‐
less access in the vehicular environment (WAVE). WAVE communication ensures the safety of passengers
by updating vehicle information and traffic flow. It enhances the pedestrian and driver safety. It also impro‐
ves the traffic flow and efficiency of the traffic management system. The VANET comprises of several units
such as OBU, RSU, and TA. Specifically, the RSU typically host an application that is used to communica‐
te with other network devices, and OBU was mounted in each vehicle to collect the vehicle useful informa‐
tion such as speed, acceleration, fuel, and more. Then, the information is forwarded to the nearby vehicles
through a wireless network. All roadside unit (RSU) interconnected with each other is also connected to
TA via a wired network. Additionally, TA is the head among all components, which is responsible for
maintaining the VANETs [35].
Roadside Unit: The RSUs are computing devices, which is fixed alongside of the road or in specified
location such as: parking area or at the intersection [32]. It is used to provide local connectivity to the
passing vehicles. The RSUs consists of network devices for dedicated short range communication
(DSRC) based on IEEE 802.11p radio technology. Specifically, RSUs can also be used to communicate
with other network devices within the other infrastructure networks [32].
Onboard Unit: An OBU is a GPS-based tracking device that is usually equipped in every vehicle to
sharing vehicle information to RSUs and other OBUs. OBU consists of many electronics components
such as: resource command processor (RCP), sensor devices, the user interface, and read/write storage
for retrieving storage information. The main function of OBU is to connects with RSU or other OBUs
through wireless link of IEEE 802.11p [48], and is responsible to communicate with other OBUs or
RSUs in the form of messages. Moreover, OBU take input power from the car battery, and each vehicle
consists of a sensor type global positioning system (GPS), an event data recorder (EDR), and forward
and backward sensors, which are used to provide input to OBU [35].
Trusted Authority: TA is responsible for managing the entire VANET system such as registering the
RSUs, OBUs, and the vehicle users. Moreover, it has the responsibility to ensure the security
management of VANETs by verifying the vehicle authentication, user ID and OBU ID in order to avoid
harm to any vehicle. The TA utilizes a high amount of power with large memory size and can also
reveal OBU ID and details in case of any malicious message or suspicious behavior [49]. In additional
to these, TA has the mechanism to identify the attackers as well.
3.2. Communication Methods
The ITS is consistently focused on providing secure communication to improve the traffic flow, road safety,
and also overcome the traffic congestion by utilizing different networking techniques such as MANETs and
VANETs.
V2X communications play an important role in the ITS to improve the traffic efficiency, traffic safety, and
enhance driving experiences by providing real-time and highly reliable information such as collision war‐
ning, road bottlenecks information, traffic congestions warning, emergency situations, and other transporta‐
tion services [50]. V2X communication can exchange the information between V2V, V2I, and vehicle to
pedestrians (V2P), as shown in Figure 1.
In V2V communication, the transmission medium is characterized by a high transmission rate and short la‐
tency [4,51]. In the V2V, a vehicle can broadcast useful information such as emergency braking, collision
detection, and traffic conditions among each other. The V2I is used to transmit useful information between
vehicles and network infrastructures. In this domain, the vehicle developed a connection with RSUs to ex‐
change information with other networks such as the Internet. Furthermore, due to communication with the
infrastructure, the V2I require large bandwidth than V2V but is less vulnerable to attacks [52].
Recently, C-V2X technology was introduced. It is a unified connectivity platform that aims to support V2X
communications [53]. The C-V2X is developed within the third generation partnership project (3GPP) and
regarded as the robust communication technology that can accomplish V2X communications [54]. It con‐
nects each vehicle and enables the cooperative intelligent transport systems (C-ITS) that reduce the traffic
congestion and enhance traffic efficiency [55].
In the year 2016, 3GPP released its first version to support V2X communications, and the standards are re‐
ferred as LTE-V, long-term evolution (LTE), and C-V2X [56]. LTE possess robust benefits in V2I commu‐
nication because of its high data rate, large coverage, and penetration rate [57]. However, in V2V commu‐
nication, LTE faces many challenging issues due to lack of its centralized structure and limited services to
support V2V communication [57]. The VANET communication is further classified into four categories
[58], which are shown below.
Warning Propagation Message: If there is any crucial situation where the message is required to send to
a specific vehicle or to a group of vehicles. For example, if there is any accident or collision, then a
warning message should be sent to the vehicles that are on the way to avoid traffic jams and increase
traffic safety. To deal with this issue, a new routing algorithm is required, which can be used to send the
warning messages to the destination [58].
V2V Group Communication: In the V2V communication domain, only vehicles that are sharing some
of the same features can take part in this communication [58]. This includes vehicles with the same
brand or vehicles sharing the same location in the time interval.
Vehicle Beaconing: Periodically sent, the beacon messages all vehicles, which are nearby and RSUs.
These messages contain the speed, velocity, and acceleration of the sending vehicle.
Infrastructure to Vehicle Warning: To improve the traffic flow and road safety, warning messages are
broadcast from the infrastructure via RSUs to all vehicles within its vicinity when a possible accident or
collision is detected, especially in the curve route, intersections, or with a narrow road.
3.3. VANET Standards
VANET standardization affects all layers of the open system interconnection (OSI) model, which is used as
a communication tool and includes all necessary features of all the layers [1]. The dedicated short range
(DSRC) communication, WAVE, and IEEE 802.11p are used to designate the full standard of communica‐
tion protocol to deal with VANETs.
Dedicated Short Range Communication (DSRC): DSRC is a wireless communication technology tool
that permits vehicles to communicate with each other in ITS or other infrastructure such as V2V and
V2I. In 1999, the Federal communication commission (FCC) allocated the band from 5.850 to 5.925
GHz, with a spectrum of 75 MHz for DSRC [59,60]. As shown in Figure 2, the spectrum of 75 MHz
DSRC is sectioned into seven channels, and starts from Ch 172 to Ch 184. The Ch 178 is the control
channel that can support the safety power applications [60]. The other six channels such as 172, 174,
176, 180, 182, and 184 are the service channel (SCH). The Ch 172 and Ch 184 are used for high power
and public safety messages [60], while other channels can be used to send both as a safety and non-
safety messages.
Figure 2
Channel diagram of dedicated short range communication (DSRC).
WAVE: According to the IEEE published materials for the latest ITS standards [61], the WAVE IEEE
1609 describes an architecture, mechanism, sets of protocols, and interface, which are used to develop
communication in the VANET environment, i.e., V2V and V2I communications [1]. Figure 3 shows the
different standards of the WAVE architecture and its integration with the open system interconnection
(OSI) model.
Figure 3
Wireless access in vehicular environments (WAVE) architecture.
IEEE 802.11p: After introducing the IEEE 1609 standards, the IEEE extended the family of IEEE
802.11 protocols by adding a new member 802.11p, which is used to facilitate the vehicular
communication network [1]. This is in compliance with the dedicated short range communication
(DSRC) band.
3.4. VANET Characteristics
VANETs are the wireless networks in which nodes are fixed on the roadside units or the high mobility
vehicles. It is highly dynamic, reliable, and offers multiple services, but with limited access to the network
infrastructure. VANETs have a unique characteristic as compared to MANETs, and these characteristics
are very important for security and privacy aspects in VANETs. These VANET characteristics are discus‐
sed below.
High Mobility: High mobility nodes are the main features of VANETs, which have high mobility as
compared to MANETs. VANETs are different from other types of ad hoc networks in which nodes can
move in random directions, which makes it difficult to estimate their location and network topology,
because the vehicles are limited to the road direction, traffic lights, and to respond to other nearby
vehicles. In the past, several research studies have explored this special feature [62,63,64]. According to
the references [18,65], the high mobility of nodes reduces the communication time between the nodes
in the network.
Wireless Communication: The nodes connection and data communication are exchanged through a
wireless medium. Therefore, it is necessary to develop a secure communication during transmission [4].
Dynamic Network Topology: The topology of VANETs is not constant and can change rapidly due to
the high mobility of vehicles. Therefore, it makes VANETs more vulnerable to attacks and difficult to
recognize the suspect vehicles.
Driver Safety: VANETs can improve driver safety, enhances passenger comforts, and improves the
traffic flow. The main advantage of VANETs is that vehicles can communicate directly. Therefore, it
allows the number of applications, which required directly to communicate between nodes to other
networks such as RSUs or OBUs.
Limitation of Transmission Power: The transmission power is very constrained in the WAVE, which
ranges from 0 to 28.8 dBm and was limited to the distance up to 1 Km. Thus, the limited power
transmission resulted in limiting the coverage distance of VANETs [66,67].
Network Strength: The strength of the network in VANETs depends on the flow of the traffic on the
street, in case of traffic jams it can be very high, and low when there is no traffic on the road.
Large Network: The network can be larger in downtown areas, highways, and also the entry and exit
point of the city [64,68].
Volatility: In VANETs, the connections between two nodes are usually developed due to their mobility.
Each vehicle has high mobility, so it is possible that the connection among the vehicles can be lost and
may remain active within a few wireless hops [44] that makes difficult to ensure the personal security in
VANETs.
4. VANETs Security and Attacks
4.1. VANET Security Services
Recently, MANETs introduce a new security concern, which was considered an important issue for the re‐
searcher to deal with the safety purpose such as fewer central points, mobility, insufficient wireless connec‐
tivity, and driver issue [69]. In VANETs, the security ensures that the transferred messages are not injected
or altered by attackers. Additionally, the driver is responsible to inform the traffic conditions accurately
within the limited time frame. The VANET is more sensitive to the attacks because of its distinctive cha‐
racteristics. Specifically, security challenges should be addressed properly. Otherwise, it will lead toward
creating many constraints for securing communication in VANETs [4].
In the VANET security, it is necessary to mention the requirements that the system should be in-line with
the appropriate network operation. Unable to fulfill these requirements may lead to possible threats or at‐
tacks in VANETs. The main security requirements are categorized into five main domains such as availabi‐
lity, confidentiality, authentication, data integrity, and non-repudiation [2,70]. Figure 4 shows the security
services as well as their threats and attacks. These security services are discussed in this section.
Availability: Availability is the most important part of security services due to its direct relationship
with all safety applications. The main responsibility of availability is managing functionality, and its
security must ensure that the network and other applications must remain functional in case of faulty or
malicious conditions [71].
Confidentiality: Based on certificates and shared public keys, confidentiality ensures that the designated
receiver have access to the data while outside nodes may not be able to get access to that data until
confidential data was received by the designated user.
Authentication: Authentication plays a vital role in VANET. It prevents the VANET against suspected
entities in the network. It is important to have the related information of the transmission mode such as
user identification and sender address. Authentication have the right to control the authorization level of
vehicles, and it can also prevent Sybil attacks by assigning individual identity to each vehicle [17].
Data Integrity: It ensures that the message content is not altered during the communication process. In
VANETs, data integrity can be ensured by using the public key infrastructure and cryptography
revocation process [36].
Non-Repudiation: It ensures that, in case of the dispute sender, the receiver of the message does not
refuse to engage in transmission and reception [72,73].
Figure 4
VANET security services.
4.2. Security Threats and Attacks in VANETs
VANETs are more sensitive to attacks because of inherent characteristics such as high mobility with fre‐
quent disconnection. The network topology of VANETs changes very rapidly due to the high mobility of
vehicles. While the nodes are moving at a maximum speed of 20 m/s in MANET simulations, the speeds
of the vehicles in VANETs are much faster than this speed limit. Therefore, a communication link breakage
between vehicles frequently occurs in the vehicular network. More specifically, the links between vehicles
traveling in opposite directions are only limited for a few seconds that lead to frequent disconnection of the
vehicular network, and the vehicles can only communicate with each other for a very limited time. Then,
the vehicles did not see each other again. Therefore, it makes VANETs more vulnerable to attacks and diffi‐
cult to recognize the suspect vehicles.
As the safety messages broadcast in an open access environment, the entire communication in VANETs
disturbs when the attacker injects, modifies, or intercepts the messages in VANETs. It makes VANETs
more vulnerable to attack because the attacker may fill bogus information in the transmitted message. The‐
se challenges expose VANETs to various kinds of dangerous attacks.
In VANETs, the attacker has an intention to disturb the entire network for his own interest. In VANETs, the
attackers are classified into four categories [2]. (i) Insider vs. outsider attackers: the insider attackers is the
authenticated user with deep knowledge of the network configuration, while the outside attackers are not
authenticated users, with limited capability to attack the network than insider attackers, (ii) active vs. passi‐
ve attackers: active attackers either generate fake messages or do not transmit received messages, while
passive attackers did not engage in the communication, (iii) malicious vs. rational attackers: the main aim
of malicious attackers to destroy other nodes on the network without obtaining any personal benefits, while
the attackers attacked the network to obtain personal benefits, and (iv) local vs. extended attackers: in local
attackers, the attackers used limited resources on specific vehicles, while extended attackers exploit full re‐
sources to control several networks.
In particular, in order to provide secure communication in VANETs, a significant knowledge of threats and
attacks is necessary to tackle all security challenges. In this section, we discuss the threats and attacks on
each security service in VANETs.
4.2.1. Attack on Availability
Availability of information is a very important part of the VANET system, in case a lack of the availability
feature may reduce the efficiency of VANETs [73]. In this section, we will explain the threats and attacks
on the availability in VANETs.
Denial of Service (DOS) Attacks: DOS is one of the most common attacks in VANETs, which occur by
the internal or external vehicles performing the attacks in the VANET network [18]. The attacker
jamming the communication between vehicles and effectively blocking every possible way of action.
This attack can be performed by many attackers concurrently in a distributed way, called distributed
denial of service (DDoS) [74].
Jamming Attack: In this attack, the attacker disturbs the communication channel in VANETs by using a
heavily powered signal with equivalent frequency [75]. This is the most dangerous attack for safety
applications, because it does not follow the valid safety alert. For any successful jamming attack, by
performing an action, the jammer can block the useful signal within the same time of the occurrence of
an event.
Malware Attack: The attack can be penetrated into the system through the software components, which
are used to operate the OBUs and RSUs [31,65]. If the malware attack occurred in VANETs, that may
lead to malfunctioning of the other components of the VANET system.
Broadcast Tampering Attack: In this attack, untrustworthy vehicles can replicate the same messages by
modifying the message or generate and insert a new message information in the VANETs while
behaving as a transmit node for inter-vehicle communication [36]. Therefore, this may lead to hide the
correct safety messages to dedicated users, which may be the reason for dangerous accidents.
Blackhole Attack: This is the main attack that targets availability in ad hoc networks, and also exists in
VANETs. This attack is usually caused by a registered VANET user. The suspected node receives the
packets from the network but it declines the contribution in the networking operation. This may disrupt
the routing table and prevents an important message to the recipients due to the malicious node, which
pretends to contribute in the non-practical event [1,18,31].
Grayhole Attack: It is the variant of the blackhole attack. It occurs when untrustworthy vehicles select
some of the data packets to forward and dropping the other packet without being tracked [36].
Greedy Behavior Attack: This attack is normally on the functionality of the message authentication
code (MAC), when the malicious vehicle misuses the MAC protocol to increase the large amount of
bandwidth, which costs other users. This resulted in overload traffic and causes a collision on the
transmission channel, which can produce a delay in the legitimate services of the registered user [76].
Spamming Attack: In this attack, a numerous amount of spam messages are injected by the attacker
such as advertisements in the VANET system, which causes collisions by utilizing more bandwidth
[18,65].
4.2.2. Attack on Confidentiality
By using the certificates and by sharing the public keys to all exchange messages, confidentiality guaran‐
tees that the messages can be encrypted, where only designated vehicles can get access. Therefore, the
vehicles that are outside the nodes cannot understand private and confidential information among the vehi‐
cles. Confidentiality is guaranteed through cryptographic solutions. In this section, we will discuss the
common threats on confidentiality.
Eavesdropping Attack: Eavesdropping is very common in wireless communication technology, such as

MANETs and VANETs. The aim of this attack is to get the confidential information from the protected
data. Therefore, by this attack, secret details can be disclosed with non-registered users, such as stealing
user identity and data location, which may be used to track the vehicles.
Traffic Analysis Attack: This is one of the dangerous attacks that threatens confidentiality. In this attack,
after listening to a message transmission, the attacker then analyzes its frequency and tries to extract
and gather the maximum useful information.
Man-in-the-Middle Attack: It can take place in the middle of V2V communication to check closely and
alter the messages. The attacker can get the access and control the entire V2V communication, but the
communication entities think that they can communicate with each other directly in private [77].
Social Attack: The social attack is used to divert the attention of the driver. The attacker sends out
immoral and unethical messages to the drivers. The aim of attackers is to get the reaction of the drivers
after they received this type of immoral messages. Therefore, it affects the driving experience and
performance of the vehicle in the VANET system [78].
4.2.3. Attack on Authentication
Authentication is an important part in the VANET system, which is used to protect against the attacks be‐
cause of the malicious nodes entering the system. The authentication is responsible for protecting VANETs
from internal and external attacks [79]. This section highlights the threats and attacks on authentication in
VANETs.
Sybil Attack: It is first discussed by Reference [80]. This is a most dangerous attack in which the node
can produce many fake identities to disrupt the normal mode of operations of the VANETs by
broadcasting multiple messages using fake IDs. The attacker can manipulate other vehicle behavior, and
receive a vehicle system where the messages are transmitted from the different vehicles. Therefore, they
feel there is congestion on the road and they are enforced to alter their paths and leave the road clear.
Tunneling Attack: It is similar to the wormhole attack [18]. The attacker uses the same network to
initiate the private conversation, and the attackers join two far-away parts in VANETs by utilizing an
extra communication channel named a tunnel. Therefore, the nodes, which are very far-away from each
other, can communicate as neighbors.
GPS Spoofing: In this attack, the attacker uses the trick to create a false GPS location information and
did not reveal the correct position to dodge the vehicles that may think it is available in some other
location [81].
Node Impersonation Attack: This attack takes place when an attacker successfully guesses the valid ID
of the registered users in the VANETs [31].
Free-Riding Attack: This attack is very common and is initiated by an active malicious user by making
false authentication efforts while being associated with a cooperative message authentication. In this
attack, the malicious user may take advantage of other user’s authentication contributions without
having its own. This type of behavior is called a free-riding attack. This attack may raise a serious threat
to cooperative message authentication [82].
Replay Attack: It is a very common attack, which is also known as a playback attack. This attack occurs
when valid data are fraudulently transmitted or cause a delay to produce an unauthorized and malicious
effect. In order to tackle this attack, the VANET must require enough of a time source with larger cache
memory, which are used to compare the received messages.
Key and/or Certificate Replication Attack: This attack is caused by the utilization of duplicate keys
and/or certificates of other vehicles as a proof of authentication to create uncertainty, which makes the
situation worse for traffic authorities to identity the vehicle. Specifically, the aim of this attack is to
create confusion for trusted authorities (TAs) especially in case of any dispute.
Message Tampering: It is a very common attack, in which the attacker can alter the exchanged messages
in V2V or V2I communication.
Masquerading Attack: The attacker uses false IDs to act as another vehicle. This attack occurs when one
user did not show his own identity and pretends to be a different user to legally obtain unauthorized
access.
4.2.4. Attack on Data Integrity
The data integrity ensures that the exchanged data do not alter during the transmission. In this section, we
will discuss the common threats to data integrity.
Masquerading Attack: The attacker enters in the VANET system by registered user ID and passwords
and tried to broadcast false messages, which appeared to come from the registered node [83].
Replay Attack: The attacker aims to repeat or delay transmission fraudulently by having a valid data and
inject beacon and messages received before the VANET network continuously, which may cause
difficulty for traffic authority to identify the vehicles in case of the emergency [84,85].
Message Tampering Attack: As the name of the attack indicated, this attack normally occurs when the
attacker modifies or alters recent message data to be transmitted [86]. For instance, if the route is
congested then, the attacker alters the data to clear the road. This can influence the users to alter their
driving paths.
Illusion Attack: This attack receives data from antennas and collects malicious data from sensors, which
generate traffic warning messages by using an existing road condition that may create illusion to the
vehicles nearby [87]. The illusion attack may be caused by vehicle accidents and traffic congestion and
also minimizes the performance of the VANET system by utilizing undesirable bandwidth.
4.2.5. Attack on Non-Repudiation
It ensures that the sender and receiver of messages cannot deny the transmitted and received messages in
case of a dispute.
Repudiation Attack: This attack occurs when an attacker denies to engage in the activity of sending and
receiving messages in case of any dispute [35].
5. Research Work on Security Services and Privacy-Preserving Authentication
In vehicular networks, authentication, security, and privacy are leveraged to develop trust among V2V and
V2I communications. Utilizing suitable authentication schemes enables a trusted authority to easily iden‐
tify malicious users and fake messages in order to provide secure communication in VANETs. In this con‐
text, several research studies have been proposed to be related to authentication, security, and privacy sche‐
mes, which aims to protect VANETs from malicious users, fake messages, and unregistered entities, and
tackle all kind of threats and attacks. Several of these schemes utilize cryptography techniques such as
symmetric cryptography and asymmetric cryptography to authenticate messages in terms of signing and
verifying messages. In this section, we first discuss the recent state-of-the-art methods of VANET security
services. Second, we present the authentication schemes in terms of cryptography and signature in detail,
as shown in Figure 5.
Figure 5
Authentication scheme classification in vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs).
5.1. Research Work on Availability
In recent years, an intense amount of research work has been done, which enhanced the performance of
availability services by introducing new protocols. In this section, we will explain the robust existing met‐
hods, which have been used to enhance the performance of availability in VANETs.
Kitani et al. [88] presented a new method named as a message ferrying, which is used to improve the mes‐
sage circulation in less populated areas. This method utilized buses to obtain maximum traffic information
from vehicles such as location, fuel, and acceleration in their vicinity and then gathered information and
forwarded the collected information to the neighboring vehicles. The proposed method was implemented
on the NETSTREAM traffic simulator and then compared the information propagation efficiency with ot‐
her competent methods. In the proposed method, the author did not mention the detail performance para‐
meters, which were involved, and the study was limited to a low density area.
Okamoto and Ishihara [89] introduced a method of information sharing for location-dependent data, which
are generated by vehicles using a pull and push method to balance the message delivery and the traffic data
assigning the populated area as a message storage area (APAM) scheme. This method is limited to deliver
the reliable information based on the pull and push method, but may incur a large amount of computational
charges.
Akila and Iswarya [90] introduced an effective data replication technique to manage data access application
in VANETs such as location, fuel, and acceleration. Due to a large number of vehicle mobility and change
in network topology, which lead to an increase in the parameter changes and cause frequent disconnections.
If disconnections happen frequently, then vehicles will not be able to communicate and share data with
each other. Specifically, the data replication is used to improve the performance of data access in a distribu‐
ted system. Since the vehicles contain less storage, they cannot replicate heavy mp4 files or some short du‐
ration video clips. This problem is significantly improved by generating the request to the vehicles in a pla‐
toon to give some part of their buffers to reproduce data while sharing the same platoon and data among
other vehicles. In case a vehicle wants to leave a platoon, it transfers its buffered data to other vehicles prior
to leaving a platoon. Therefore, the other vehicles have an access to the data after it leaves. This method
has limitations because vehicles frequently leaving and entering a platoon may require a large amount of
computational time and incur computational charges.
Park and Lee [91] introduced an effective method to enhance the data accessibility in VANETs by utilizing
the data replica of the RSU. In this approach, selection of the data item is made by using the data access
pattern and driving pattern, which must be reproduced in the RSUs. Then, the reproduced data are sent di‐
rectly to the surrounding vehicle without involving communication with RSUs. The main drawback of this
approach is, if the data size is larger, then the data replication process may require a large amount of time
to handle the replication process.
5.2. Research Work on Confidentiality
In recent years, several methods have been proposed for confidentiality to ensure the safety of data, which
contain some useful information from non-registered users in the VANET system. Additionally, it ensured
secure communication through a cryptographic solution. In this section, we will explain the existing met‐
hods for confidentiality in the VANETs.
Sun et al. [92] introduced a new security system by protecting the confidentiality of sensitive information
using shared key encryptions. The aim of the proposed technique is to ensure that the confidential informa‐
tion of the registered users and tracking of vehicles is completed legitimately, which can be done by inte‐
grating the new security requirements and design the sophisticated VANET security system against non-
authorized users. However, the confidentiality messages are very crucial where vehicles get the useful data
from the Internet and RSUs.
Lu et al. [93] introduced a dynamic privacy-preserving key management method referred to as DIKE,
which is used to achieve and improve the confidentiality of data in location-based services (LBSs) in the
VANET system. In order to control the eavesdropping attack, the confidentiality must be well maintained
and protect the service contents from these kinds of attacks. In this method, if a user does not engage in the
VANET system, then the user may not join the current VANET system, which does not have access to the
current LBS content. To gain the confidentiality in an LBS session, all vehicle users that joined are reques‐
ted to share a secure session key. That session can be used to encrypt service contents.
5.3. Research Work on Data Integrity
To protect the integrity of the sending message, digital signatures are generated and attached to the mes‐
sages [94]. In recent years, few studies indicate the accurate and reliable information for preserving data in‐
tegrity in the VANET system. This section will explain the existing methods for data integrity in the
VANETs.
The main problem occurs when an inaccessible receiving location generates many current packets and for‐
warding protocols inefficiently in VANETs. To solve this problem, Reference [95] introduced a STAP ap‐
proach to acquire the receiver’s location privacy preservation in VANETs. By using the concept vehicles,
always travel to the busy places and downtown area such as the shopping mall, busy street, etc. In order to
achieve data integrity, they deploy RSUs at the main social spot to form a social tier with them. First, the
sender computes message authentication code (MAC) and attaches the generated code to the message befo‐
re sending to the receiver. Once the message is received, in order to obtain integrity, the receiver uses the
key session to check MAC. This method is limited to only the busiest place and, due to traffic congestion,
this algorithm may consume large memory.
Lin and Li [82] introduced an efficient cooperative authentication technique for the VANETs system. This
technique is used to shorten the authentication overhead on individual vehicles and to reduce the delay. To
block the various attacks, this method uses a token method to control and manage the authentication wor‐
kload. When the vehicle passes the RSUs, the vehicle can get the evidence token from trusted authority
(TA). Therefore, this token indicates that the vehicle contributed in cooperative authentication before. This
method comprises of the large computational algorithm to control the authentication issue.
Lin et al. [96] introduced a group signature and identity-based signature (GSIS) method, which is used to
develop secure privacy preserving the protocol based on the group signature and identity-based signature
schemes. In case of a dispute, the proposed method protocol can also be used to trace each vehicle, but ID
of the sending message need to be disclosed by TA.
5.4. Research Work on Non-Repudiation
Li et al. [97] introduced a novel framework with conditional privacy-preservation and repudiation (ACPN)
for VANETs. This method utilized public key cryptography (PKC) to obtain non-repudiation of vehicles by
ensuring third parties to obtain real identities of vehicles. The identity-based signature (IBS) and ID-based
online/offline signature (IBOOS) schemes are utilized for the authentication between V2V and a vehicle to
road side unit (V2R). This method significantly reduced the computational cost. However, the handling of
managing certificates is complex due to IBS and ID-based online/offline (IBOOS) authentication schemes.
5.5. Requirements of Autheticaion
In VANETs, authentication can be done by two ways. First, at the level of the node, called node authentica‐
tion. Second, at the level of the message level, it is called message authentication. Verifying the message
integrity plays an important role for improving the VANET security system. Therefore, message authenti‐
cation was regarded as a key parameter in the VANETs [98].
In order to provide secure communication in VANETs, there are some requirements of authentication,
which must be satisfied, are listed below.
Computational and Communication Overhead: The number of cryptographic operations performed by a

vehicle or trusted authority for verifying an authentication request must be minimized. For example, the
time required to process a digital signature in authentication must be controlled.
Utilization of Bandwidth: The bandwidth utilization is very important in the authentication and must be
utilized properly in bytes per second (bps) to handle a request for an authentication such as exchanging
cryptographic secret keys and credentials.
Scalability: The process of the authentication is scalable, which can handle multiple network operations
and communications.
Time Response: The time that is needed to respond for an authentication mechanism must be reduced.
Powerful Authentication: The authentication schemes must have a good capability to prevent VANETs
from attacks.
5.6. Privacy-Preserving Authentication
Privacy means everyone has the right to keep the information confidential and decide whether or not to
share any information with others. Specifically, privacy is a system that is used to protect the sensitive and
confidential information of the vehicles or passengers from the attackers. The privacy of vehicles should be
considered an important issue in the VANET system. Lately, an intense amount of research studies have
been done in security and privacy services in the VANET system, which ensures vehicle safety and impro‐
ves the traffic flow. Anonymous authentication is one of the most well-known approaches. Most of the re‐
cent existing works are relying on a pseudonym-based approach, which can be used to protect the privacy
and security of the vehicle users. By utilizing the pseudonym-based approaches, users can get better and
more robust privacy preservation. To control privacy attacks, the trusted authority need to change pseu‐
donyms frequently. The privacy is further categorized into two types: (i) privacy of user and (ii) user loca‐
tion privacy.
Privacy of User Protection: It is used to prevent the personal information of users from malicious users
or attackers.
User Location Protection: Meant to protect user’s information such as vehicle location at a certain time
and route information.
The aim of authentication schemes is to identify the malicious nodes and bogus messages. Thus, it provi‐
des security in VANETs. Regarding authentication schemes, several research studies have been proposed,
which ensure the secured communication in VANETs. These schemes utilized different cryptography tech‐
niques for signing and verifying the messages. In this paper, we discussed the authentication schemes in
terms of cryptography and signature in detail, as shown in Figure 5. Cryptograph-based authentication
schemes are categorized into symmetric cryptography (Hash Function and timed efficient stream loss-tole‐
rant authentication (TESLA)), asymmetric cryptography (PKI certificate and ECDSA), and identity-based
cryptography. Signature-based authentication schemes are separated into identity-based signature, certifica‐
teless signature, and group signature. The classification of authentication schemes in each category are dis‐
cussed in terms of analysis and their related works.
5.6.1. Symmetric Cryptography Scheme
This authentication-based cryptography is also called private-key cryptography. This scheme utilizes a
message authentication code (MAC) to authenticate the messages. By using a shared secret key, sender can
generate MAC for each message, and also all nodes in an anonymity set verify the MAC attached with the
messages by using that key. Symmetric cryptography is fastest and obtains robust computational efficiency
because of a single key. To achieve a high level of reliability and privacy, Choi et al. [99] introduced a new
method, which can produce high efficiency of privacy by combing symmetric authentication with the short
pseudonyms in VANETs. In this method, to generate short-lived pseudonyms, authority need to send the
different ID and seed value to each vehicle. Additionally, RSU is capable of verification for MACs because
it can share keys with vehicles.
Xi et al. [100] proposed a random key-set based authentication to maintain user privacy by using a zero-
trust policy without having trust of central authority with a user policy. In this method, the anonymity is
improved by using independent keys for authentication at neighboring RSUs, and also identifying attackers
and key revocation, which have been considered in terms of a practical application. This method is better
but requires a large amount of computational cost to handle a zero-trust policy. As we know that, symme‐
tric cryptography-based authentication consists of two major issues. First, the key management system in
VANETs is very weak, which can elevate the communication overhead and storage. Second, this technique
has a lack of non-repudiation. Therefore, it is difficult to provide authentication to each vehicle.
Vijaykumar et al. [101] designed a TA to facilitate online services to the customers via VANETs. Therefo‐
re, it is vital that the exchanged communication between the TA and VANETs preserving the confidentia‐
lity and authentication of messages. Besides that, a dual authentication and key management technique are
used to provide a secure transmission of data in the vehicular network. A dual authentication technique of‐
fers sufficient security to the vehicle, which can efficiently intercept the malicious vehicles to enter in the
VANETs.
Lin et al. [102] introduced a time-efficient and secure vehicular (TSVC) method with privacy preservation.
This method is used to significantly reduce the packet consumption without limiting the security require‐
ments. The authentication of the packet is done by a MAC tag, which is attached to each packet. However,
it required a fast hash operation to verify each packet. By using this method, the packet overhead is minimi‐
zed by reducing the signature overhead and its verification latency. The bandwidth utilization decreases
with the decline in the number of packets. Rhim et al. [103] introduced an efficient method for a MAC-ba‐
sed message authentication scheme, but this method cannot tackle and secure against the replay attack and
requires a sophisticated algorithm, which was proposed by Taeho et al. [104] by utilizing an improved
MAC authentication scheme for the VANETs’ system. Zhang et al. [105] presented a new method to aut‐
henticate a message by using the roadside unit aided message authentication (RAISE) technique. In this ap‐
proach, RSU verifies the authentication of messages, which are transmitted from vehicles to notify the re‐
sults back to vehicles. Instead of verifying the message through a traditional PKI-based scheme, they used
the concept of each safety message attached with a MAC. This was generated by the sender by using the
secret key and RSU. Then RSU is responsible to verify MACs and circulate the outcomes of message aut‐
henticity to other vehicles within their range.
Hash Function-Based Authentication Schemes
The next category of symmetric cryptography is a hash function, which is responsible to examine the mes‐
sage integrity without any encryption of the message. The message is an input in the hash function, which
can generate a fixed string referred to as the hash value. In order to ensure the message integrity, the hash
value must be attached with a sending message. Chuang et al. [106] introduced a decentralized-based light‐
weight authentication scheme named as TEAM (trust-extended authentication mechanism). This technique
uses the concept of transitive trust relation, but the amount of cryptographic in TEAM is less than compa‐
red with other existing methods because it only utilizes XOR and the hash function during the authentica‐
tion process.
Chim et al. [107] introduced a method, which discussed the security and privacy issues of V2V in VA‐
NETs. This scheme utilizes one-way hash function and a secret key between vehicle and RSU. Therefore,
this methodology can resolve the privacy issue, which may occur during communication. Vighnesh et al.
[108] introduced a novel sender authentication technique for enhancing VANET security by using hash
chaining and the authentication code to authenticate the vehicle. This method ensures that the secure com‐
munication between the vehicle and RSU. Confidential data is encrypted through the master key. Before
sending packets to the authentication center, the RSU attaches its identity, which can eliminate the possibi‐
lity of rogue RSU abusing the VANET network. He and Wen [109] presented a method that addresses the
problem of the DOS attack against signature-based authentication. To tackle the DOS attack, the pre-aut‐
hentication can be done before signature verification. In this method, the pre-authentication using the one-
way hash chain cannot be classified as a full authentication scheme.
TESLA-Based Authentication Schemes
The symmetric cryptography is further extended to time the efficient stream loss-tolerant authentication
(TESLA). In this approach, first, the sender computes MAC using a known key and attaches a MAC to
each sending message, and the receiving messages are buffered without authentication at the receiving
part. The main disadvantage of TESLA is that the advance synchronization of the clock at receiving side is
required with the clock at the sending side. Additionally, TESLA is vulnerable to the DOS attack in terms
of memory, which is caused by unregistered vehicles that utilize receiver memory with fake messages
[37,110].
Jahanian et al. [111] introduced a TESLA-based technique. In this technique, the timed method checking
the approach based on the timed color Petri model is used to design and verify TESLA. Lately, the resear‐
chers have found that the two factors that need to be analyzed first include security efficiency and the per‐
centage of successful attack. Studer et al. [112] introduced a modified form of TESLA, which is known as
TESLA++, and it provides the same broadcast authentication, which is computationally efficient since
TESLA with less memory consumption presented a method to effectively verify the newly RSUs and
OBUs, which were encountered during communication. The goal of TESLA++ is to control memory DOS
attacks, which can be obtained by receivers’ self-generated MAC. This may be lower down the memory re‐
quirements for authentication. However, TESLA does not offer multiple hops authentication and non-repu‐
diation [37].
5.6.2. Asymmetric Cryptography Scheme
The next authentication scheme in VANETs is referred to as asymmetric cryptography, which is also called
public key cryptography. This technique can be used for encrypting and decrypting a message to ensure the
security of data in the major communication network. Specifically, the asymmetry can be used to encrypt a
message, which can be done either by using a public key or by generating a digital signature. Normally, a
private key is only used for decrypting an encrypted message and for verifying a digitally-signed message.
Asymmetric cryptography is further classified as a public key infrastructure (PKI) certificate and elliptic
curve digital signature (ECDSA) based authentication.
Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Schemes
Most of the vehicles contain public or private key for pseudonymous communication. In order to achieve a
secure and reliable way, the public key certificates are the best methods that are used in public key infras‐
tructure (PKI) to authenticate vehicles. It contains the digital signature of the certification authority (CA)
and vehicle key for authentication [44]. The CA is the centralized management unit, which is responsible
to certify nodes, keys, etc. Furthermore, it can also authenticate the vehicles in V2V communication. Every
vehicle needs to be register with the CA database before officially join the VANET system. The vehicle can
communicate with CA in two ways either directly, such as offline registration or via RSU as an indirect on‐
line registration. Raya et al. [113] introduced a new method, which utilizes the anonymous public keys to
provide privacy. The anonymous keys must be changed in the way that the receiver will not be able to track
the vehicle owner key. The main demerits are that it required a large amount of storage and memory and
also requires a huge amount of certificate revocation list (CRL) checks, since using a large number of
anonymous keys. Therefore, it may be the reason for the DOS attack due to a large amount of computatio‐
nal overhead.
Calandriello et al. [114] introduced a robust pseudonym-based authentication method to reduce the secu‐
rity overhead but keeps maintaining the robustness of traffic safety. This scheme alleviates the limitations
of a pseudonym by using the combination of the baseline pseudonym and group signature, which can gene‐
rate its own pseudonym on-the-fly and self-certification [37]. Additionally, it minimizes the requirements
of handling the pseudonym in authentication. In Reference [115], Wasef and Shen introduced an expedite
message authentication protocol (EMAP) method, which adopts public key infrastructure (PKI) and certifi‐
cate revocation lists (CRLs) for their security. In this scheme, EMAP for VANETs replaced the lengthy
process of CRL by an effective revocation process. This process uses a keyed hash message authentication
code (HMAC) in EMAP. The purpose of the key is used to calculate HMAC and is shared only among
non-revoked OBUs to safely share and update the secret key. Due to the message verification delay, which
resulted in a significantly reduced message loss ratio in EMAP, as compared with the conventional
authentication.
Reference [116] proposed a new scheme in which vehicles generate a request to CAs for short-term pseu‐
donyms during specific intervals. To reduce the communication overhead with CAs, Reference [117] intro‐
duced the self-issuance scheme to enable the vehicle to generate pseudonyms independently. Rongxing et
al. [118] introduced a new method for effective pseudonyms changing at the social spot (PCS) for privacy
of location, by determining several vehicles gathered on specific spots such as an intersection or the par‐
king area. It utilizes anonymity size as a privacy metric (ASS) and, if ASS reaches the threshold, then the
pseudonyms are changed simultaneously. However, it cannot perform well in a low density.
In the year 2010, Schuab et al. [119] proposed a new approach that does not depend on the pseudonyms-
identity mapping to achieve accountability but instead, resolution information is embed with V-token pseu‐
donym certificates. In this scheme, by using the V-token approach, each vehicle carries its own resolution
information, which can provide a scalability advantage. The main challenge is the revocation of the pseu‐
donym certificate, which may limit the scalability in the VANET. In case, if the vehicle long-term certifica‐
te is revoked, then the vehicle cannot obtain a new pseudonym from CAs. In recent years, few studies have
been proposed on the CRLs’ distribution methods [120,121]. These methods are unable to stop the revoked
vehicle from continuously communicating in VANETs until and unless all the pseudonyms become inacti‐
ve. The drawbacks of checking the CRL process make it unreliable to authenticate a large number of mes‐
sages under the specific period in VANETs [122].
Azees et al. [123] introduced an effective anonymous authentication with a conditional privacy (EAAP)
scheme to avoid a malicious vehicle from entering in the VANETs. This scheme is used to track mecha‐
nism and track vehicles or RSUs that create disturbance to VANETs. Recently, bilinear pairing was intro‐
duced in which the TA in EAAP is not required to keep the anonymous certificate of the vehicles and
RSUs [124]. Additionally, the TA has the right to cancel the anonymity of a disobedient vehicle and reveal
their identity in a group. Then, the revoked identity added to the identity revocation list (IRL) was managed
under the supervision of TA.
Elliptic Curve Digital Signature (ECDSA) Based Authentication Schemes
The next part of asymmetric cryptography is an ECDSA authentication scheme, which is an analogue type
of digital signature dependent on the elliptical curve cryptography [125]. Manvi et al. [126] introduced an
ECDSA-based message authentication scheme in VANET. This technique utilizes a secure hash algorithm
(SHA) by the sending vehicle to generate a private and public key, and also create a hash of the message by
using SHA. At the receiving part, the received message is decrypted by using the public key. Kalkundri et
al. [127] presented a new technique, which utilizes the ECDSA algorithm to obtain message authentication.
Furthermore, it can also provide security in terms of the point-to-point (p2p) mechanism to obtain authen‐
tication in VANETs. The combination of p2p and ECDSA along with VANETs can improve the efficiency
of the algorithm and also minimizes the message delay. Smitha et al. [128] proposed a new method, a clas‐
sification of the critical safety message, and provided an adaptive way to authenticate the message based on
the Merkle tree and ECDSA. This scheme discussed the DOS, man in the middle, and phishing attacks.
Furthermore, this approach can increase the message authentication delay.
5.6.3. Identity-Based Cryptography Schemes
The identity-based cryptography (IBC) is similar to the asymmetric cryptography, in which the user public
key can be obtained from their ID information such as user location, telephone number, email address, and
more. In order to authenticate the message, the IBC authentication schemes did not utilize PKI certificates.
Thus, it significantly reduced the communication overhead and managed overhead of CRLs.
In Reference [129], Shim proposed an efficient conditional privacy-preserving authentication (CPAS) sche‐
me. This scheme utilized pseudo-IBS in order to obtain secure communication in V2I. In this scheme, the
RSU is able to verify the large amount of received messages simultaneously, which significantly reduced
the large amount of computational time and also reduced the memory space. In Reference [92], Sun et al.
proposed a VANET security system to obtain the vehicle’s privacy by utilizing an identity-based crypto‐
graphy system. In this scheme, an authentication is accomplished without needing a certificate. Since the
proposed scheme did not uses certificates, it consumes less memory space, and the message and compu‐
tational overheads are reduced, as compared to other methods. In Reference [130], Bhavesh et al. introdu‐
ced an authentication with multiple levels of the anonymity (AMLA) protocol by utilizing pseudonyms and
identity-based signature (IBS) scheme. In this approach, the AMLA protocol significantly reduced the mes‐
sage overhead as compared to other PKI methods. Li et al. [97] proposed a public key cryptography techni‐
que to generate the pseudonym. In this scheme, the identity-based signature (IBS) and ID-based online/of‐
fline signature (IBOOS) schemes are utilized for the authentication between V2V and vehicle to road side
unit (V2R). These schemes provide authentication, privacy-preservation, and non-repudiation. However,
the handling of managing certificates is complex in IBS and IBOOS authentication schemes.
5.6.4. Identity-Based Signature Schemes
The identity-based signature (IBS) uses node identifiers in terms of the public key and sign messages with
the private key generated from the identifiers [131]. In IBS, the private key generator (PKG) is used as a
trusted authority for generating and assigning the private key. Recently, new identity-based signcryption
(IBSC) has been introduced by utilizing bilinear pairing, which required strict analysis of security based on
robust security modeling without considering a random oracle background, which can indicate that the
IBSC is considered a reliable method [132].
The IBS has the four-step process: setup, key extraction, signature signing, and verification, as follows.
Setup: PKG evaluates the master key and public parameters. Then, PKG discloses these parameters to
all vehicles publicly in the VANET.
Key Extraction: PKG uses the vehicles ID and master ID to compute a private key. Then the PKG sends
these private keys to communicate with the vehicle through a secure channel.
Signing Signature: Signature SIG can be generated by using a private key by assuming a message M,
and timestamp T.
Verification: This algorithm is used to find out whether signature SIG is valid or not by having these
parameters such as identity, signature, and message.
To overcome the computational overhead in the IBS scheme for VANETs, Lu et al. [133] proposed a novel
authentication framework with adaptive privacy using an ID-based online/offline authentication (IBOOS)
technique. In Reference [134], Zhang et al. introduced an identity-based technique for signature hierarchi‐
cal aggregation and batch verification. In this approach, identity-based signatures are generated from diffe‐
rent vehicles, which can be aggregated and verified in a batch, and the message collector is used to re-ag‐
gregate the aggregated signatures. This scheme significantly reduced the large computational process of
certification verification by utilizing the identity-based vehicles and RSUs. In 2001, a new hash-sign-
switch method has been proposed based on the trapdoor hash function. In this scheme, the signing process
is efficiently divided into the online and offline phases. Due to a good pairing process, the efficiency of this
method is better than the IBS scheme. However, the requirement of memory storage space makes IBOOS
unsuitable for VANETs [135]. In the verification, the IBS eliminates the requirement of certificates, which
can be used in the verifications of public keys. Thus, it did not need to be distributed as public keys, which
are related to certificates [44]. Specifically, only PKG knows the private keys in VANETs because it is ge‐
nerated by PKG in IBS, which may generate an escrow problem. To overcome this problem, in the year of
2017, Zhang et al. [136] introduced an efficient technique to authenticate the vehicle protocol named as a
distributed aggregate privacy-preserving authentication (DAPPA), which is based on multiple trusted aut‐
horities with the IBS technique.
In Reference [137], Zhang introduced a novel approach based on a new security tool named as one-time
identify-based authenticated asymmetric group key to develop cryptography mix-zone (CMIX) against ea‐
vesdropping. In 2018, Zhang et al. [138] introduced a secure privacy-preserving communication scheme
for establishing vehicle cloud (VC) and data broadcasting in the VC. In this approach, a group of vehicle,
which are located near VANETs, are used to develop a secure and dynamic VC. Therefore, it enables all
the vehicle resources to be integrated and exchanged data securely, and any cloud user can process their
data securely once the VC is formed.
Figure 6 illustrates the diagram of DAPPA, in which the RSU consists of a large communication range, as
compared with the vehicles. Each RSU consists of an initial key pair and a corresponding certificate, which
is issued by the trusted authority [44]. Every vehicle contains the secret to develop secure channels with
RSUs, and every vehicle generates a request to RSUs when entering into the communication range to share
its private key. The vehicle utilizes the shares for each message to generate a one-time private key and a
one-time ID-based signature within the authorization period. Then, the other users can utilize the sender’s
ID to verify the signature. By using a one-time private key, distributed aggregate privacy-preserving aut‐
hentication (DAPPA) resolves the escrow problem, which is not rooted by the trusted authority. However, it
can make the system more complex since the vehicles need to request the shares from an adjacent RSU.
Furthermore, the utilization of the one-time private key and ID-based signature can cause the delay and
significantly reduces the communication efficiency in the VANET system [44].
Figure 6
Graphical representation of distributed aggregate privacy-preserving authentication (DAPPA).
5.6.5. Certificateless Signature Schemes
The certificateless signature is used to overcome the high cost of certificates based in the PKI technique to
resolve the escrow issue in IBS. In 2003, the certificateless public key mechanism is presented for the first
time [139]. In the certificateless cryptography, the key generation center (KCG) plays an important part,
which works as a third party and is responsible for providing the user with a private partial key DIDi,
which is evaluated from the identity of user IDi.
The secret value the user can generate include the actual private key and the partial private key delivered
by a key generation center (KGC). In contrast to the ID-based cryptography scheme, the KGC may not
have access with this type of private key. Consequently, a user can use secret values and different parame‐
ters to produce his public key identity known as PKIDi. The certificateless signature (CLS) method is cate‐
gorized into seven different algorithms, such as setup, partial private key extract, set secret value, set priva‐
te key, set public key, sign, and verify [139]. All these algorithms are discussed below.
Setup: Setup utilizes a security parameter k to produce the master key msk and master public key mpk.
Furthermore, it can also produce parameters param, which can be distributed among all nodes [44].
Partial Private Key Extract: It can produce a partial private key DID by having different parameters such
as master key, master public key, system parameters, and an identity ID [44].
Set Secret value: The secret value xID is generated by using the master public key and other system
parameters param [44].
Set Private Key: This algorithm utilizes param, partial private key DID, and secret value xID as input
parameters. The secret value xID is used to transform DID into full private key PA. The algorithm returns
PA [139].
Set Public Key: It generates the public key PKID by using different parameters such as the master key,
the system function, an identity, and its secret value [44].
Sign: It generates a certificateless signature by using a system parameter, a master public key, and more
[44].
Verify: It can verify the signature by using several parameters such as the system parameter, master
public key, ID, the ID public key, and more [44].
The security models are further classified into two types such as super type I adversary AI and super type II
adversary AI I [140]. AI solves the real-world adversary who can obtain IDs and some valid signatures,
while AI I solve the malicious KGC who contain the master secret key and can initiate the attack such as
the eavesdropping attack on signatures and create signing queries. In recent years, there are few research
studies that have been proposed regarding certificateless signature referred to as a certificateless short sig‐
nature (CLSS) [141,142]. These schemes proved to be the secure method against AI and AI I in the random
oracle model [44]. At the end of 2014, several researchers have proposed the CLS scheme without utilizing
any pairing to increase the efficiency, but the signature length is very large, which cannot constrain unlimi‐
ted bandwidth and storage devices in VANETs [143,144]. In 2015, a scheme for V2I communication based
on a certificateless signature is introduced. In this technique, conditional privacy preservation is obtained
by mapping the traffic message transmitted by the vehicle into false identity. In case of dispute, the respon‐
sible authority can recover the real identity from the pseudo identities [145]. Furthermore, this method pro‐
duces efficient computational overhead in comparison with other competent techniques. At the beginning
of 2018, Cui et al. [146] introduced a method for a certificateless aggregate signature based on an elliptic
curve cryptosystem (ECC), which can support conditional privacy preservation. It provides secure commu‐
nication between V2I in VANET. Furthermore, it can satisfy privacy requirements and also achieves lower
message overhead, which are advantages over other methods.
5.6.6. Group Signature Schemes
The vehicle privacy is preserved in the group signature based schemes, which can allow registered mem‐
bers of the group to sign up for the messages anonymously as a representative of the group [19]. The head
of the group has the right to find out which sign is coming from the original sender. The group signature
usually requires a large amount of time to verify the signature, which makes it limited to time-related ap‐
plications in VANETs.
In 2010, Zhang et al. [147] proposed an efficient method that utilized each RSU to maintain and managed
on-the-fly group within its range of communication, and the vehicles, which enter the group and can se‐
cretly send V2V messages. These can be further verified by users of the same group, if any bogus message
produced by the vehicle can be traced by the trusted authority. In 2011, Park et al. [148] presented an RSU-
based decentralized key management (RDKM), which is used only for multicast services in vehicle com‐
munication (VC) systems. This scheme reduced the large amount of rekeying overhead by contributing
some portion of the key management functions to the RSUs and also by updating the key encryption keys
(KEKs) within the RSUs.
To alleviate the overhead of revocation, the distributed management system is a promising approach. Based
on this technique in 2012, Sun et al. [149] introduced a distributed key management system (DKM) in the
VANET system. In this scheme, the domain is formed into small sub-regions, and the vehicle needed to
update it is the secret key from the regional head of the group, which manages the region. In this approach,
during the updating process, the DKM restricts the vehicle to disclose the updated value of a secret key to
the regional head of the group. However, the anonymity feature of the group signature makes it vulnerable
to attack by a malicious user through the broadcasting of fake messages. Malina et al. [150] introduced a
group signature with short-term linkability and categorized the batch verification. This method produced
efficient signing and verification as compared to other competent methods. In Reference [151], Zhang et al.
introduced a location based service (LBS) protocol, which is used to address the inherent challenges in
terms of authentication and conditional privacy for offering LBSs in VANETs. In this scheme, the provi‐
ders of RSUs and LBS are identity-based, and a vehicle only requires a member key. By using this key
vehicle, it can generate verifier-location group signatures. The LBS validates these signatures without in‐
terfering the privacy of a vehicle. If an LBS request is found to be false, then the key generation certificate
can evaluate the vehicle ID.
Islam et al. [152] introduced a password-based conditional privacy preserving authentication and group-
key generation (PW-CPPA-GKA) protocol for the VANET system. This method provides several features
such as user exiting, user entering, and changing a password. This protocol is computationally stable since
it is designed without using bilinear pairing and elliptic curve techniques.
6. Simulation Tools
When applications are designed and developed for VANETs, privacy and security should be considered se‐
riously. The main problem occurs when evaluating the performance of security and privacy due to the limi‐
ted features of the VANET system in terms of mobility, network structure, and decentralization. To get the
optimal solution, it is important to design and develop sophisticated simulation tools that can be used to
produce the VANETs results efficiently. VANET simulation tools are categorized such as the mobility si‐
mulator and network simulators. Specifically, the mobility simulator is used to generate vehicle mobility
[44]. The network simulator is mainly used for evaluation and performance of the VANETs and also indi‐
cates the issues related to the network.
6.1. Mobility Simulator
In the VANET system, the mobility model can determine the movements of the node, which are linked
with the simulator. By using this terminology, the simulator generates random topology based on each
vehicles’ condition [32]. The mobility model consists of two patterns named traffic and the motion pat‐
terns, respectively. The motion pattern is determined by the behavior and attitude of drivers, which can
create vehicle movements with pedestrians and vehicles [32]. The traffic generator produces random topo‐
logies and a map, which are used to evaluate the vehicle behavior, according to the traffic environment. Ge‐
nerally speaking, it is a major challenge to manage system modeling to integrate with the real traffic envi‐
ronment. Therefore, designing the mobility model can be done by using several other types of models de‐
pending upon the traffic conditions and situations. The mobility model can be categorized into two types
such as macroscopic and microscopic models [44].
The METACOR [153] utilizes traffic at high scale and is also used to determine the vehicle attitude. The
METACOR is very useful for providing the macro of the traffic environment.
VanetMobiSim [154] is the generator of realistic vehicle movement traces for networks simulator. It re‐
views and validates the microscopic and macroscopic mobility description and adds details to them, and
can reproduce the general vehicular traffic environment.
Simulation of urban mobility (SUMO) [155] is an open source micro-traffic simulator that can generate the
vehicle traffic and update the vehicles parameters such as speed and positions. It is a microscopic traffic si‐
mulation that can import city maps with a different file format and version. Each vehicle contains user ID,
time of departure vehicle, vehicle routes and location, etc. [155]. Additionally, SUMO is capable of hand‐
ling highly integrated simulations that can be used for large networks, and it is able to get timely feedback
from the network simulator. Specifically, SUMO is more reliable and suitable for V2X communication by
considering an individual vehicle behavior and feedback of each vehicle by updating the network simulator
for future processing.
6.2. Network Simulator
The University of California at Berkley and the VINT project jointly developed the NS-2, which is a dis‐
crete simulator developed for networking research. Recently, many network simulators such as NS-2 [156],
NS-3 [157], GlomoSim [158], and OMNeT++ [159] are used to evaluate the performance of the model
and measure the privacy and security of routing protocols in VANETs. Additionally, many programming
languages such as C++ and Java are used to construct simulators.
The NS-2 simulator is designed and written in C++ with an object tool command language (OTCL). NS-2
is mainly used for research in network communication to support simulation for routing, and the multicast
protocol through wired networks [156]. The main disadvantage of NS-2 is that the node must be program‐
med manually by the users in order to find the vehicle in their vicinity and establish communication. To
overcome this problem, NS-3 provides an optimal solution, which is used to improve the network modeling
and reliability. NS-3 can also provide an interface for Python and mechanism to integrate with the other
open source platform [157].
The global mobile information system (GlomoSim) was developed in California, USA, which is used to si‐
mulate the wireless network. It is one of the most famous techniques of the network simulator after NS-2.
GlomoSim is capable of running on a shared-memory symmetric processor (SMP) and assist in dividing
the network into separate modules and each functioning with different processes [32]. The main purpose of
GlomoSim is to support millions of nodes performed as a single simulation. Aggregation of nodes and the
layer are the limitations of most network simulators.
The OMNeT++ is the discrete simulation library, which was developed to simulate the network communi‐
cation, multiprocessing, system configurations, and other distributed systems [159]. Specifically,
OMNET++ provides a simulation platform, which can be used to design simulation modeling, and also
provide more reliability for the larger mobility of VANET applications [44].
6.3. Comprehensive Simulation
To change traffic settings, the information that is received from the network simulator must be processed by
the mobility simulator. SUMO is used to generate high mobility traffic to simulate the vehicular network
because of its unique characteristics of network traffic. SUMO has a function that can simulate a single part
and whole cities in one simulation [160].
The traffic and network simulator environment (TraNS) is a Java-based visualizing tool consisting of
SUMO and NS-2, which is specially designed for the VANET system. A new TraNs Lite version is develo‐
ped for the mobility generator, which excluded the NS-2 network simulator [32]. The major disadvantage
of the TraNS simulator is that it cannot support a highly large-scale network and is also not cost-efficient in
terms of acquiring the protocol of VANETs [161].
An integrated wireless and traffic platform for a real-time road traffic management solution (iTETRIS)
[162] aims to enhance the large-scale simulation network of VANETs for evaluating the services for trans‐
port and traffic management. In order to get the real-time closed-loop coupling simulation platform, the
iTETRIS combined with SUMO and NS-3, which can be considered an extension of TraNS [161].
The vehicles in network simulation (Veins) is an open-source framework [163], which is used to run vehi‐
cular network simulations. Veins implement the IEEE 802.11p protocol at the physical and the MAC layers
and is responsible to manage the data transfer between OMNET++ and SUMO through TraCI [164]. The
main advantage of bi-directional coupling has two features. First, the network simulation mainly controls
the mobility of simulation for handling the traffic communication in VANETs. Second, information that in‐
cludes the position or routes could be provided by mobility simulation to the network simulation. Additio‐
nally, the veins offer a comprehensive function to achieve bi-directional coupling, which can provide better
accuracy for the development of protocols [163].
6.4. Performance of Authentication Schemes
In order to evaluate which algorithm of authentication schemes obtain better results in each category. Seve‐
ral papers have been reviewed related to the authentication schemes. In symmetric cryptography, Reference
[101] obtained a better result by using a JAVA-based simulator, in which, considering multiple nodes, each
node acts as a VANET user. Additionally, the proposed dual key management scheme significantly obtai‐
ned computationally efficient and secure data transmission. Thus, in symmetric cryptography, this scheme
obtains better results as compared to the other competent methods.
In asymmetric cryptography, Azees et al. [123] introduced the EAAP scheme to avoid malicious users to
enter in VANETs. In this approach, Cygwin 1.7.35-15 with the gcc version 4.9.2 was used to evaluate the
computational performance of EAAP. The proposed scheme achieved low computational cost by verifying
the multiple signatures and certificates in 300 ms as compared to the other competent methods in an asym‐
metric cryptography scheme.
In identity-based signatures, Zhang et al. [134] introduced a privacy-preservation scheme based on an iden‐
tity-based signature. The proposed method used NS-2 [156], VanetMobisim [154], and the cryptography li‐
brary MIRACL [165] to evaluate the performance by assuming different degree parameters, and generating
the vehicle mobility with the speed ranges from 50 to 60 km/h. This scheme was significantly used to redu‐
ce the transmission overhead, and also minimize the vehicle waiting time to initiate the batch verification
process. Therefore, this scheme is the best scheme among other competent methods.
In a certificateless signature, Cui et al. [146] introduced a certificateless signature based on ECC, which
can be able to support conditional privacy preservation. Several different parameters have been used to eva‐
luate the performance of this scheme. First, we created a bilinear pairing with a security level of 80 bits. In
the system model, two different layers of the vehicular network are considered. The first layer consisted of
a vehicle and RSU, and the communication medium between OBUs and RSUs is 5.9 GHz DSRC. The se‐
cond layer consists of TA and KGC. In this approach, each vehicle transmits a traffic related message in
300 ms, and the total time need to verify more than 650 signatures is less than 300 ms. Thus, it can verify
the large number of messages simultaneously. In the proposed method, the message overhead is signifi‐
cantly reduced along with the less computational and transmission cost as compared to the other certifica‐
teless signature schemes.
For the group signature scheme, Zhang et al. [151] introduced a location-based service (LBS) protocol. In
order to evaluate the efficiency of the proposed method, this scheme considered LBS and revocation stages.
In the simulation, the cryptography tool multiprecision integer and rational arithmetic library (MIRACL)
[165] and MNT curve implement on embedded degree, which is built in C language, are used. In each LBS
event, the RSU processes only one pair to decrypt the message, which required 2.17 ms. This approach can
protect the identity and privacy of the vehicle by providing the service to the vehicle anonymously. Thus, it
can outperform other competent methods.
7. VANET Applications
VANETs provide a communication to nearby vehicles by V2V and vehicles to other communication devi‐
ces such as V2I, V2R, and more. In particular, V2V and V2I communications offer the development of va‐
rious applications and provide a wide-range of safety and comfort information to the drivers and passen‐
gers. Vehicles are equipped with GPS receivers, network devices, and electronic sensors to process and co‐
llect traffic-related information and then transfer the information to the other vehicles and infrastructures.
These exchange information between V2V and V2I enhance the traffic and road safeties, by improving dri‐
ving experiences and passenger safety [62].
VANET applications are classified into two categories: (1) comfort applications, and (2) safety ap‐
plications, as shown in Figure 7.
Figure 7
VANET applications.
7.1. Comfort Applications
The comfort applications are referred to as non-safety applications, which aim to enhance driver and pas‐
senger comfort. These provide the drivers and passengers with updated climate information, Internet access
within the network range, communication exchange between vehicles, detail the location of hotels, and
nearby restaurants and patrol stations [62].
7.2. Safety Applications
The safety applications of VANETs are used to enhance the protection of all users of the road networks. In
these applications, vehicle-to-vehicle and/or vehicle-to-infrastructure communications can be used to im‐
prove the traffic and road safeties, lane changing warning, emergency video streaming, and by avoiding co‐
llisions and accidents [62].
Safety applications have requirements to collect traffic information from a vehicle sensor and then process
and broadcast this information in the form of the message to the other vehicles and infrastructures. In ITS,
vehicles are equipped with wireless communication technology in order to communicate and exchange in‐
formation with other vehicles and infrastructures, i.e., V2V and V2I. From Figure 7, we observe that the
safety applications utilizing V2V and/or V2I communications can be categorized as below [166].
7.2.1. Public Safety
When an incident has occurred, public safety applications provide support to the drivers, and help emer‐
gency response teams by reducing their travel times and providing emergency services to them. In particu‐
lar, the average emergency vehicle response time is approximately six to seven minutes. Public safety ap‐
plications utilize the frequency of 1 Hz for both V2V and V2I communications with a communication ran‐
ge that varies from 300 to 1000 m [167]. This application can be further categorized as shown below.
Emergency Vehicle Warning: The emergency vehicle warning system is used to guide the driver and
provide a clear road to the emergency vehicles such as ambulances, fire brigade vehicles, etc. in order to
reach their destinations without being stuck in the traffic. This application is implemented by
broadcasting the safety or alert messages relying on V2V communication to clear the road for an
emergency vehicle. The broadcast message has an information of emergency vehicle speed, direction,
route, etc. [32].
SOS Services: This system is applicable in life threatening and fatal accident conditions by transmitting
SOS messages. The SOS signal is activated either automatically or manually. This service is applicable
for both V2V and V2I communications.
Emergency Vehicle Signal Preemption: Traffic infrastructure at each intersection is used to support
emergency vehicles by broadcasting messages to all traffic lights en route to the destination by using
V2I communication. In case of an emergency, the vehicle arrives at a signal and all the lights are green
to pass the emergency vehicle, which reduces the response time for the emergency vehicle, which then
subsequently reduces the chances of an accident [32].
Post-Crash Warning: A post-crash warning is one of the main systems of public safety applications,
which is used to prevent the occurrence of possible accidents. Due to an accident, a disabled vehicle
sends warning messages to the other vehicles traveling on the same route by using V2V and V2I
communications to share the incident location, direction, and route information [32].
7.2.2. Sign Extension
The aim of this application is to notify the careless drivers for signs, which are assembled on the roadside
in order to prevent drivers from an accident. Applications of sign extension works on 1 Hz on I2V commu‐
nication and use the safety messages with a communication range, which varies from 100 to 500 m [32].
The sign extension application can be further classified as follows.
Señalización en el vehículo: en esta aplicación, RSU se fija en la ubicación específica, es decir, el área
del hospital, la zona escolar y el área universitaria para transmitir mensajes de seguridad a los vehículos
que se acercan a esos lugares.
Advertencia de velocidad de giro: en esta aplicación, RSU se fija en la carretera antes de girar para
transmitir los mensajes de seguridad a los vehículos que se acercan para girar. La velocidad de los
vehículos debe discutirse con los giros para pasar con seguridad por los giros.
Advertencia de puente bajo: esta aplicación se utiliza para alertar al conductor sobre la altura del puente
mediante la transmisión de mensajes de advertencia al vehículo a través de la infraestructura vial, que se
ensambla en las cercanías del puente. Además, se equipa una OBU en el vehículo, que puede
determinar si hay o no un espacio para pasar por el puente.
Alerta ámbar en el vehículo: esta aplicación se basa en la comunicación I2V y envía mensajes
(respuesta de emergencia de transmisión de América) a los vehículos. Este mensaje solo se transmite
cuando las autoridades encargadas de hacer cumplir la ley confirman que el vehículo está involucrado
en un presunto delito y circulan alertas ámbar al vehículo en esa área, excluyendo un vehículo
sospechoso.
Advertencia de estacionamiento bajo: esta aplicación notifica al conductor la altura mínima de
estacionamiento del automóvil en la que el vehículo está tratando de ingresar. Este sistema se basa en la
transmisión de mensajes de advertencia al vehículo desde una RSU, que se coloca cerca del
estacionamiento, y luego OBU puede analizar si ingresar o no en el área de estacionamiento.
7.2.3. Información de otros vehículos
Estas aplicaciones dependen de las comunicaciones V2V y V2I con la frecuencia de operación de 2 a 50
Hz junto con el mensaje que requiere un rango de comunicación de 50 a 400 m. Esta aplicación se utiliza
para mejorar el flujo de tráfico, garantizar la seguridad de los pasajeros al identificar con precisión las con‐
diciones del tráfico y ayudar a los conductores a tomar una ruta alternativa con anticipación. Esta aplica‐
ción se clasifica además, de la siguiente manera.
Advertencia de colisión frontal cooperativa: esta aplicación guía a los vehículos para que tomen la ruta
alternativa para evitar viajar al lugar del accidente. Esta aplicación utiliza la comunicación V2V con
una técnica de salto múltiple para enviar mensajes de advertencia al conductor sobre la situación del
incidente. Los mensajes de advertencia incluyen posición, dirección, ruta, velocidad, etc. para que cada
vehículo en la carretera pueda analizar la gravedad de un incidente y luego reenviarlo a otros vehículos.
Advertencia de estado de la carretera: esta aplicación se basa en la comunicación V2V. En esta
aplicación, los vehículos obtienen información suficiente sobre las condiciones de la carretera a partir
de los sensores electrónicos equipados en el vehículo. Tras obtener la información, la TA procesa esta
información para identificar las condiciones de la vía y enviar los mensajes de alerta al conductor y al
resto de vehículos en la vía.
Pre-Crash Sensing: Esta aplicación tiene como objetivo predecir la situación en la que está a punto de
ocurrir un accidente. La información se puede recopilar de los sensores del vehículo y se puede requerir
información adicional de otros vehículos a través de la comunicación V2V para predecir una situación.
Esta aplicación es más útil para el tráfico pesado y tiene como objetivo mejorar la seguridad de los
pasajeros y conductores.
Notificación de características de la carretera V2V: esta aplicación se utiliza para recopilar información
para la infraestructura vial mediante el uso de la comunicación V2V y luego transmitir esta información
a los otros vehículos en la carretera. Mediante el envío de mensajes, esta aplicación ayuda y notifica a
los conductores sobre las condiciones de la carretera, como baches, escombros, etc. con anticipación, y
luego el vehículo alertado envía esta notificación a otros vehículos en la carretera. Esta aplicación es
más aplicable en el tráfico rural donde las superficies de las carreteras no son lisas.
Luz de freno electrónico de emergencia: en caso de smog o clima neblinoso, esta aplicación advierte a
los vehículos que circulan por la carretera de una frenada brusca repentina mediante el uso de
comunicación V2V que transmite mensajes de seguridad a los otros vehículos y les notifica por
adelantado de una frenada brusca.
7.2.4. Diagnóstico del vehículo
Esta aplicación envía un recordatorio a los conductores en forma de mensajes por defectos de seguridad del
vehículo. Una vez que el vehículo recibió esta notificación, comienza el proceso de mantenimiento. Esta
aplicación utiliza comunicación I2V con los mensajes de seguridad que requieren un rango de comunica‐
ción de 400 m. Esta aplicación se clasifica más adelante.
Aviso de retiro de seguridad: en esta aplicación, se envía un mensaje a los conductores para recordarles
una emisión de retiro de seguridad.
Notificación de Reparación Justo a Tiempo: En esta aplicación existe una falla en los vehículos.
Primero, la OBU transmite un mensaje a la RSU mediante comunicación V2I. Luego, el vehículo
recibirá un mensaje de instrucción de TA para manejar estos problemas mediante comunicación I2V.
Esta aplicación es útil para aliviar los incidentes de tráfico y la congestión en un entorno de tráfico
urbano.
7.2.5. Intersection Collision Avoidance
This system relies on V2I communication in which RSU collect and process traffic-related information
from the vehicle approaching close to the intersection and then forward this information to the TA. Then,
TA determines, if the probability of occurrence of an incident at intersection is high, then TA sends a war‐
ning message to the vehicles in the intersection area to take precautionary measures about the possibility of
an accident. This system significantly reduced the traffic incident by analyzing and obtaining an accurate
estimation of the possibility of an incident occurring. In particular, this application provides a sophisticated
tool in the ITS for reducing traffic incident and congestion.
This application uses I2V communication with the frequency of 10 Hz and the safety messages with a
communication range of 200 to 300 m. This application is further classified below.
Warning for Violating the Stop Sign: In this application, a warning message is sent to the vehicles to
warn the driver about the distance between the vehicle and the stop sign and also the speed necessary to
avoid hard breaking. This application reduces the violation of stop signs, which can prevent the vehicle
from a fatal accident or hazardous conditions.
Violating Traffic Signal Warning: This application is used to send warning messages to the vehicles and
warn them about a hazardous condition, i.e., fatal accident, severe incident, road bottlenecks, etc. that
may happen if the vehicle did not stop in front of the sign [167].
Intersection Collision Warning: This application gathers the information of the road intersection
through the electronics sensors and then analyzes this information. The system will send a warning
message to the vehicles in case of probability of an incident occurring is high. In this application, the
data collected by the sensors include speed, position, acceleration, traffic flow information, etc.
Pedestrian Crossing Information: This application is used to notify the driver if there is a pedestrian
crossing the road. In this application, the information is collected for the pedestrians through sensors
installed in the sidewalk, which can significantly reduce accidents by sending alert messages to the
vehicles instantaneously in case a potential collision between pedestrians and vehicles is identified.
8. Open Research Challenges
It has been observed from the literature reviewed that many challenges still exist in the VANET security
and requires research and investigation in order to design sophisticated algorithms, which can tackle all se‐
curity challenges. The open research challenges are discussed below.
8.1. Challenge on Security
Since the communication takes place in an open access environment, which make VANETs more vulnera‐
ble to attacks that cause multiple threats to the security services. In particular, a Sybil attack is one of the
most dangerous attacks in VANETs. This attack is the most influential attack that is addressed by the re‐
searchers. Maintaining the balance between privacy and non-repudiation is still required in order to detect
Sybil attacks. In the past, many studies have been done on Sybil attacks. On the other hand, many other at‐
tacks such as jamming attacks and malware attacks in VANETs motivate further research. Many security
challenges still exist, which need superior algorithms in order to solve these challenges. A robust authenti‐
cation technique along with the message exchange approach is used to protect V2I and V2V communica‐
tions from inside and outside attackers. The main problem occurs when the utilization of CA and TA and
the schemes that rely on the private keys for V2X, i.e., V2V and V2I communications, can protect the vehi‐
cular network. However, it can increase the computational and transmission overheads and introduce the
scalability challenges.
Kang et al. [168] presented an access control technique for message broadcasting in VANETs, which aim
to protect the message privacy. However, this scheme did not consider communication overhead and the
delay occurred in the verification process. Wasef and Shen [115] introduced an EMAP technique for VA‐
NETs. This scheme alleviated the large computational process of CRL by an effective revocation process.
This scheme significantly reduced the authentication delay. However, this scheme did not consider the
communication overhead and cost occurred during the authentication process. In Reference [123], Azees et
al. introduced an EAAP scheme to avoid a malicious vehicle from entering in VANETs. However, in this
scheme, the signature verification can produce a delay in the verification process. Jiang et al. [169] introdu‐
ced an efficient anonymous batch verification technique. This scheme somehow improves the efficiency of
VANETs by utilizing the hash message authentication code (HMAC). However, it increases the packet
loss.
More specifically, VANET security remains a challenging issue, in which the authentication scheme plays
an important role for tackling all kinds of threats and attacks. In this context, we still need an efficient aut‐
hentication scheme, i.e., message authentication to protect the V2V and V2I communications.
8.2. Challenge on Routing
Routing protocols play an important role in VANETs. Since the high mobility vehicles in VANETs influen‐
ce the changing network topology. Such an influence challenges the routing protocol in VANETs. In the
past, several research works conducted the research on routing protocols and identified some limitations
such as large computational processing, routing un-scalability, routing services, and cost [170,171]. This
problem motivates the research community to introduce robust scalable routing protocols that can alleviate
the above-mentioned issues. In Reference [172], Li et al. proposed a new routing protocol for VANETs to
adaptively select the intersections, in which the data packet delivery and the routes that are selected must
satisfy the quality of service (QoS) constraints. Khan et al. [173] presented a novel traffic aware segment
based routing (TASR) protocol by considering the vehicle density and delivery ratio in order to transmit
packets and obtain a better routing protocol for urban mobility. Ding et al. [174] presented a traffic light
aware routing protocols named as a street centric protocol to obtain the enhanced delivery ratio and mini‐
mize end-to-end delay for an urban traffic environment in VANETs.
In particular, the reliability of successfully broadcasting the traffic information among vehicles can enhan‐
ce driving experiences, allow drivers to analyze the current traffic conditions, and take safety measures,
which can significantly improve the traffic and road safeties. Such safety systems are one of the main cha‐
llenging issues that exist in VANETs.
8.3. Challenge on a Reliable Link
The next challenging issue in VANETs is the lack of reliable links between V2V and V2I to collect traffic-
related data. In the past, several research studies have been done to detect malicious users, but suffers with
the lack of a reliable link between entities due to high mobility on the road. Therefore, the high mobility re‐
mains a challenging issue in VANETs.
Reliable links between entities improves the detection of malicious users. Developing an intrusion detec‐
tion mechanism could enhance the detection rate by incorporating different wireless technologies. Howe‐
ver, at this stage, intrusion detection has not been well studied and implemented in this domain.
8.4. Challenge on Group Signature
In VANETs, the group signature is a robust authentication technique, which is used to provide secured
communication in a vehicular network. However, the key distribution group of a high-speed moving vehi‐
cle still remains a challenging issue. In Reference [150], Malina et al. introduced a group signature with
short-term linkability and categorized the batch verification. This scheme produced an efficient signing
mechanism and provided a secure mechanism to register and revoke users. However, this mechanism requi‐
red a longer time to solve the batch verification when a large number of malicious messages was presented
in the batch. In Reference [175], Sampigethaya et al. introduced a scheme they call AMOEBA to provide
location privacy by using a group of vehicles. This scheme enables all members of the group to send a
message anonymously to the group manager. This method protects user privacy by ignoring the group ma‐
nager. However, AMOEBA has a main concern in which the information such as location, id, etc. can be
disclosed by the group leader. Zhang et al. [151] introduced an LBS protocol, in which the proposed met‐
hod is able to provide different security services to the vehicle user and service provider for each transac‐
tion. This method ensures vehicle privacy by providing service to the vehicle anonymously. However, in
case of heavy vehicle density, each LBS event may introduce large computational overhead.
From the above schemes, we analyze that the researcher from the wireless communication technology
background should focus on the VANET security services and scalability of key distribution schemes in
group-based signature authentication.
9. Conclusions
The VANET is a vital and promising research area in ITS due to high mobility and dynamic network topo‐
logy. It aims to ensure the safety of human lives on the street by broadcasting safety messages among the
vehicles and provide comfort services to the passengers. Since the safety messages are broadcasted in an
open access environment, VANETs are vulnerable to attacks. Therefore, sophisticated and robust security
algorithms must be designed to tackle the dangerous security and privacy attacks.
This survey provides a comprehensive review and covers most of the issues of VANETs. First, we have dis‐
cussed the basic model and function of the VANET. Then, the security services as well as threats and at‐
tacks on these services are explained, followed by the recent state-of-the-art schemes on each security ser‐
vice. Second, we have comprehensively covered the authentication schemes in detail, which are able to
protect the vehicular network from malicious nodes and fake messages. Third, we have discussed the va‐
rious simulation tools and the performance of the authentication schemes in terms of simulation tools,
which was followed by the VANET applications. Lastly, we identified some open research challenges and
future research directions in VANETs. In short, this survey is well developed to cover most aspects in secu‐
rity issues and privacy-preserving methods, while filling the gaps of existing surveys and incorporating the
latest trends in VANETs.
As the importance and popularity of V2X, C-V2X and LTE-V communications in the ITS increases, the
traffic information such as vehicle ID, location, and the weather conditions can be shared between all vehi‐
cles. The drivers and passengers not only look for the reliable and trustworthiness of the large amount of
exchange information required for privacy protection, but also look for the robust authentication algorithms
that are able to protect VANETs from different kinds of threats and attacks. More specifically, there is a
great need for designing VANET algorithms in order to tackle all these challenges. Such algorithms can
provide trustworthy communication on V2V and V2I, and also protect vehicle ID and location privacy. The
future research directions for the VANET system should focus on security and privacy issues such as pri‐
vacy preservation, trust management, location privacy, and so on. Such research directions require more
time to study and conduct research in order to design and develop robust algorithms, which can tackle dif‐
ferent kinds of security threats and challenges. In addition to these directions, the security systems must be
enhanced by efficient authentication schemes for providing a secure communication. Additionally, an effi‐
cient intrusion detection system could be incorporated in vehicular networks to detect the malicious nodes
and handle all types of security attacks.
Acknowledgments
We would like to thank Amelia Regan from the University of California, Irvine.
Author Contributions
The first author M.S.S. collected, gathered, and performed detailed analysis and reviewed the related litera‐
ture on the VANET system, performed the comparison study, and identified open research challenges.
M.S.S.: Conceptualization, M.S.S.: Methodology, M.S.S.: Resources, M.S.S.: Investigation, M.S.S.: Data
curation, M.S.S.: Writing—original draft preparation, M.S.S.: Writing—review and editing, M.S.S. and
W.W.: Visualization, M.S.S.: Supervision, J.L.: Project administration, J.L.: Funding acquisition.
Funding
This work was supported in part by National key research and development program under Grant 2018YF‐
B1600503, in part by the Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant U1564201, Grant 1664258,
and Grant 61773184, in part by Six talent peaks in Jiangsu Province under Grant DZXX-048, in part by the
College Graduate Research Innovation Program of Jiangsu University under Grant 18KJA580002, and in
part by the Project Funded by the Priority Academic Program Development of Jiangsu Higher Education
Institutions (PAPD).
Conflicts of Interest
The authors declare no conflict of interest.
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5/5/23, 20:51 Una encuesta de servicios de seguridad, ataques y aplicaciones para redes vehiculares ad hoc (VANET) - PMC

Sensores (Basilea). 2019 agosto; 19(16): 3589. PMCID: PMC6720296

3. Basic Overview of VANETs

VANET model diagram.

3.1. VANET Architecture

3.2. Communication Methods

3.3. VANET Standards

Channel diagram of dedicated short range communication (DSRC).

Wireless access in vehicular environments (WAVE) architecture.

3.4. VANET Characteristics

4. VANETs Security and Attacks

4.1. VANET Security Services

VANET security services.

4.2. Security Threats and Attacks in VANETs

4.2.1. Attack on Availability

4.2.2. Attack on Confidentiality

Eavesdropping Attack: Eavesdropping is very common in wireless communication technology, such as

performance of the vehicle in the VANET system [78].

4.2.3. Attack on Authentication

4.2.4. Attack on Data Integrity

4.2.5. Attack on Non-Repudiation

5. Research Work on Security Services and Privacy-Preserving Authentication

Authentication scheme classification in vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs).

5.1. Research Work on Availability

5.2. Research Work on Confidentiality

5.3. Research Work on Data Integrity

5.4. Research Work on Non-Repudiation

5.5. Requirements of Autheticaion

Computational and Communication Overhead: The number of cryptographic operations performed by a

5.6. Privacy-Preserving Authentication

5.6.1. Symmetric Cryptography Scheme

Hash Function-Based Authentication Schemes

TESLA-Based Authentication Schemes

5.6.2. Asymmetric Cryptography Scheme

Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Schemes

Elliptic Curve Digital Signature (ECDSA) Based Authentication Schemes

5.6.3. Identity-Based Cryptography Schemes

5.6.4. Identity-Based Signature Schemes

Graphical representation of distributed aggregate privacy-preserving authentication (DAPPA).

5.6.5. Certificateless Signature Schemes

5.6.6. Group Signature Schemes

6.1. Mobility Simulator

6.2. Network Simulator

6.3. Comprehensive Simulation

6.4. Performance of Authentication Schemes

7.1. Comfort Applications

7.2. Safety Applications

7.2.1. Public Safety

7.2.2. Sign Extension

7.2.3. Información de otros vehículos

7.2.4. Diagnóstico del vehículo

7.2.5. Intersection Collision Avoidance

8. Open Research Challenges

8.1. Challenge on Security

8.2. Challenge on Routing

8.3. Challenge on a Reliable Link

8.4. Challenge on Group Signature

The authors declare no conflict of interest.

55. Cellular-Vehicle-to-Everything-C-V2X. [(accessed on 27 November 2018)]; Available online: