SMS Manual - 2010-01-31
SMS Manual - 2010-01-31
SMS Manual - 2010-01-31
GCAA Copy
Aerogulf Services Company (L.L.C.)
INTEGRATED SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
This document is the property of Aerogulf Services. No part of this publication may be
reproduced, stored in a retrieval system in any form, or transmitted by any means,
without the prior written permission of the Accountable Manager.
Copy No Holder
This Safety Management System Manual is only valid if the pages are at the same
revision level as shown in Section 0, List of Revisions.
Revisions to this manual will be carried out by the Safety / Quality Assurance
Manager as required and highlighted by a black vertical line to the left of the revised
area. The revision numbers will follow consecutively unless the page has been
reissued where it will then be ‘0’. The list of revisions will be updated with the latest
revision and signed revision status of the individual pages within the Manual.
The revision along with source material as required, a transmittal page detailing the
nature of the revision and a GCAA Control page will be sent with an accompanying
letter for their approval.
Upon approval by the GCAA a transmittal note will be issued with the revised pages
and the transmittal page detailing the nature of the revision, this will be sent to all
manual holders as listed on the distribution list. On satisfactorily incorporating the
revision in to the manual they hold they will be required to sign and return the
transmittal note to Aerogulf Tech records.
The Safety Management System Manual should be read in conjunction with the
following regulatory and company manuals:
• UAE GCAA CAR’s
• The Aerogulf Operations Manual.
• The Aerogulf Maintenance Management Exposition / Maintenance
Organisation Exposition
• The Aerogulf Quality Manual
• The Aerogulf Health, Safety and Environment Manual
The following material has been used as a reference source in compiling Aerogulf
Services Integrated Safety Management System manual:
• GCAA CAR Part X
• Shell SMS
• International Helicopter Safety Team (IHST)
Refer to Aerogulf Services MME / MOE section 0.2(1) and Operations Manual
Section A1(1.1.1.2).
Aerogulf Services being the holder of an AOC and AMO approval as issued by the UAE
GCAA has implemented as a ‘Service Provider’ an ‘Integrated Safety Management
System’ (ISMS) for both Operations and Maintenance to comply with the requirements of
GCAA CAR Part IV Operations Regulations, CAR Part V Airworthiness Regulations and
CAR Part X (section 7(f)) Safety Management System.
This manual is intended to serve as a guide for Safety related processes and activities
within Aerogulf Services and is specifically oriented and focused on the impact of safety
considerations as they apply to air operations and maintenance. It also acknowledges the
importance of the development of safety practices in all areas of the company. The
manual includes reference and guidance to areas that may not have been historically
included in the safety department, such as Emergency Response and Auditing. The
manual strongly emphasises the importance of independence and authority of the Safety
Management function in the company.
The Safety and Quality department ensures that standards, as specified in this manual
(and the Quality Manual) and the safety policy are maintained. All employees shall
maintain these standards as part of their responsibilities as defined within the MME/MOE
and Operations Manual.
There will always be hazards, both real and potential, associated with the operation of
any aircraft. To address and control them the establishment of a safety programme
ensures that by recording and monitoring any adverse trends preventative measures can
be implemented.
The Safety / Quality Assurance Manager and the Flight Safety Officer, are independent
and answerable directly to the Accountable Manager. They are also the co-ordinators of
the Company’s safety programme and have the responsibility to promote safety
awareness and to ensure that the prevention of accidents is the priority throughout the
company and to:
The structure of the Safety Management system is graphically displayed below. The
linkages between the Safety Case and the SMS are shown. This manual details the
means of managing safety in the organisation and how that is to be achieved.
Management, Leadership,
Commitment & Planning Description of the Operation
covered by this Case
Policy and Strategic Objectives
Description of how the SMS
pertains to this Case
Resources, Training and
Competence Assurance
Hazard Analysis & Register, and
Listing of Safety Critical activities
Hazard Management Programme
Workplace Safety
A part of the Safety Management System structure is the Safety Cases. The Safety
Cases are management’s assurance that for a specific part of the business, the major
hazards/risks have been identified and are under control or actions are in place to bring
them under control to levels that are ‘As Low As Reasonably Practicable’ (ALARP).
In the event that work was contracted out, the establishment of contractual standards and
their subsequent management as part of managing safety would be required and applied.
Each contract would require a detailed specification of the services or equipment to be
supplied and embedded in this is the standards that are required, in particular where the
service has been assessed as safety critical. In such cases the contract will be reinforced
with the development of an interface document that identifies and mutually agrees,
between the two parties, who is responsible for what and what the potential hazard is.
The Accountable Manager and Management Team of Aerogulf Services holds the
view that neither economic nor operational priorities shall overrule safety
considerations. And through the implementation of a proactive Safety Management
System shall endeavour to continuously improve the safety culture and in turn to
protect employees, customers, assets, facility and the environment from harm by:
“All employees shall strive to work safely, such as to protect their co-workers,
customers, assets, facility and the environment from harm.”
Robert Denehy
_____________________________
Accountable Manager
FUNDAMENTAL BELIEFS
Our fundamental safety beliefs are:
• Safety is a core business and personal value
• Safety is a source of our competitive advantage
• We will strengthen our business by making safety excellence an integral part of all
flight and ground activities
• We believe that all accidents and incidents are preventable
• All levels of line management are accountable for our safety performance, starting
with the Accountable manager
3.2 Accountabilities
The company organisational chart as found within the Quality Manual defines the
reporting line / accountabilities of all company personnel and shows their responsibilities
and duties within the company; in short the lines of accountabilities are from:
• The Managing Director who delegates to
• the Accountable Manager, who in turn delegates responsibility for managing the
SMS to
• the Safety / Quality Assurance Manager (S/QAM) with assistance from
• Flight Safety Officer and
• Each department manager / supervisor.
Accountable
manager
Asst Gen
Manager
Safety/Quality
Manager
Type Rating
Examiners
Pilots
Individuals may raise their queries verbally in the first instance but if satisfactory
action is not taken this should be followed by Safety / Hazard Report form or Multi-
purpose report form. The supervisor, Safety / Quality Assurance Manager or
Flight Safety Officer will then suggest a timetable for dealing/reviewing the issue
and liaise back with the originator / author. Normally, the response will address
the issue but in extreme cases the individual is free to raise the matter further with
their supervisor and if required to the Aerogulf Accountable Manager however,
individuals must give their supervisors prior notice of their intention to do this.
There will be a “Non-punitive culture" and management will not in any way alter
their working assessment of the individual raising the safety issue.
3.4 Visibility
To achieve its role Aerogulf Services operates and maintains its fleet of Helicopters under
one management team. The ‘team’ is a representative cross section of all departments
within Aerogulf who show by active involvement and through leading by example their
commitment to the Aerogulf safety policy and objectives of managing risk and reducing
harm to people, assets, environments and the company reputation. As a result of this
open commitment by management, the open communications upwards and downwards
and the ‘involvement of people’; employees are proactively committed to the company’s
vision.
3.4.1 Planning
3.4.2 Communication
3.4.3 Co-ordination
• participation in internal and external safety initiatives, especially with the customer
Dubai Petroleum and Dugas;
• becoming informed by reading and acting on safety reports;
• development of an open approach to external liaison with the GCAA;
• addressing of safety review and analysis at Management Safety Review Board
(SRB) meetings;
• spending time offshore and on the hangar floor;
• Development of safety information exchange initiatives with other relevant
operators through active involvement with Gulf Flight Safety Committee (GFSC)
and the International Helicopter Safety Team (IHST).
Both within aviation and throughout the world it is becoming clear that a solidly
implemented safety management system is an essential basis for good safety
performance, but that outstanding safety performance can only be achieved if the
"culture" is right.
Aerogulf employees look to their leadership for their direction, priorities and coaching.
Perceptions of the commitment of leadership towards safety rather than just their
intentions have a strong influence on their behaviours and performance. It is not
enough to write the safety policy and objectives on paper, senior management’s actions
must support their policies and objectives.
World-class safety performance w i t h i n A e r o g u l f requires more than e v e r y o n e
j u s t s i m p l y working safely because they have been ordered to; it needs everyone
in the organisation, from the top down and bottom up working safely because they want
to. In order to create and sustain the right “culture”, senior management will lead by
example, provide encouragement and continuously review the behaviour of staff and
seek ways of improving the safety culture. This is also achieved by ‘involvement of
people’; through inviting and encouraging employees to come up with new ideas for work
methods, responding to incidents and then rewarding staff for their involvement in the
process.
The consequences of inappropriate behaviour or incorrect actions must also be made
clear, but within the context of operating a “just and learning culture”.
The Safety / Quality Assurance Manager has the delegated authority of the Accountable
Manager to represent the company regarding the safety management system, and is
responsible for ensuring that it meets the conditions required for compliance with GCAA
CAR Part X regulatory requirements.
The Safety / Quality Assurance Manager has the delegated authority of the Accountable
Manager to:
a) Ensure that the processes needed for the Safety Management System are
established, implemented and maintained.
b) Report to the Accountable Manager on the performance of the Safety Management
System and on any need for improvement.
c) Ensure safety promotion throughout Aerogulf.
d) Determine whether proposed policies and practices meet the requirements, are
suitable for meeting the business needs and ensure that non-compliances are being
corrected.
e) Determine and communicate the effectiveness of the safety system
f) Report on the safety performance of the organisation quarterly to the Safety Review
Board and the GCAA.
g) Identify and manage programmes for improvement in the safety system
h) Promote the awareness of customer requirements throughout the organisation and
communicate the importance in meeting these requirements (together with
regulatory and statutory requirements).
i) Interface with the General Civil Aviation Authority.
4.1.1 Qualifications
The minimum qualifications required are:
The Safety / Quality Assurance Manager is responsible to the Accountable Manager for:
To assist the Safety / Quality Assurance Manager to maintain oversight of the Operational
aspects of the company will be the ‘Flight Safety Officer’.
Is the Director of Operations; a Pilot with currency on company type aircraft. He will be
responsible directly to the Safety / Quality Assurance Manager, but will also have direct
communication with the Accountable Manager, and shall also comply with the requirements
as defined above for the Safety / Quality Assurance Manager.
The functions of the Safety Focal Points (S/QAM and Flight Safety Officer) whose
responsibilities are defined within Section 4 will include:
a) The Co-ordination of Safety matters, and for monitoring Safety problems in
order to identify any trends.
b) Assisting the Accountable Manager in the investigation of any accidents,
incidents or near misses, with the aim of identifying and protecting against the
causes leading to the occurrence.
c) Organising the provision of First Aid resources, monitoring and arranging First
Aid training, and keeping records for the Company.
Changes in the documents will be reviewed and approved through Tech Records by
the Quality Manager who will have access to the relevant background information.
All documents are controlled through the central data base (Maintenance View) by
Technical records, responsibilities for revisions and approvals are:
This is the working ‘system’ for Aerogulf and contains files for all departments,
however access to some of these files are either ‘Read-Only’ or ‘Administration’
dependant on the computer location and user.
For all controlled manuals go to ‘QA Manuals’ and for all reports go to ‘QA System’
(See chapter 7), full administration access to both is limited to the Safety / Quality
Assurance Manager, QA department and Technical Records. All other users are
‘Read only’ in order to prevent tampering of controlled records and data. This data is
backed up every working day through the use of a tape; which in turn is stored within
a fire proof cupboard in Tech Records. Each tape is identified by the day of the
week, therefore it is overwritten once a week, this reduces the number of tapes
required but also permits the retention of records for at least a one week period, from
experience this has been found to be sufficient to redress any errors.
The activities governed by the SMS System are identified and documented. These
documented procedures / manuals are controlled by the Safety / Quality Assurance
Manager to ensure that our products meet regulatory and both internal and external
customer requirements. The SMS System is defined and supported in the following
controlled documents / manuals:
Where the term "documented procedure" is used in this manual, the procedure is
established, documented and maintained within and by the relevant department (e.g.
the overhaul procedures, safety equipment procedures, Operations manual, etc.).
The Quality department oversees all these documents to ensure that they all meet
their objectives.
The company has established and maintains this SMS manual including:
The Quality Manual documents our quality system to demonstrate Aerogulf’s ability
to consistently provide parts and services that meet both internal and external
customer and regulatory quality and safety requirements. Reference is made
throughout the ISMS to the Quality Manual in documentation Control and auditing.
The Quality Manual establishes compliance with GCAA CAR requirements and
applies to both maintenance and operation activities.
The Quality Manual should be read in conjunction with the Operations Manual,
Maintenance Organisation Exposition, HSE Manual and Integrated Safety
Management System Manual which covers specific safety issues within operations
and maintenance.
Procedures have been defined and documented within the Quality Procedures
Manual and covers areas such as document control, auditing, training, management
review, etc.
The Quality Procedure Manual should be read in conjunction with the Operations
Manual, Maintenance Organisation Exposition, HSE Manual, Quality Manual and
Integrated Safety Management System Manual which covers specific safety issues
within operations and maintenance.
The purpose of the Health Safety and Environment (HSE) manual is to set out the
specific HSE procedures, responsibilities and processes that are relevant to Aerogulf
Services.
The intention is to reflect those practices and policies which have been highlighted,
listing the legal and company rules pertaining to safety.
.
The intention is that the HSE manual will be a live document and updated as and
when new procedures appear. Normally however, there should be relatively few
changes from year to year but when that is the case the Accountable Manager will
reaffirm the company's commitment to the policies contained by annually updating
and signing the Health, Safety and Environment Policy at the front of this manual.
It should be noted that the HSE manual should be read in conjunction with the
Operations Manual, Maintenance Organisation Exposition, Quality Manual and
Integrated Safety Management System Manual which covers specific safety issues
within operations and maintenance.
The Operations Manual, which is carried in each aircraft & in the Operations Room,
is written in accordance with all relevant parts of the UAE CAR’s. For all flight crew
the instructions, requirements, procedures and directions, detailed in this Manual in
regard to flight operations are mandatory and aircraft are to be operated
accordingly…. Aerogulf operating policy is that safety is of prime importance.
Where in the organisation there are specific risks that need to be drawn to the
attention of the staff and line management, but is considered inappropriate for
inclusion in the Operations or MME / MOE Manual, and then a local Standard
Operating Procedure (SOP) or Engineering Procedure Manual (EPM) will be raised.
These will remain as controlled documents and will form part of the standard
procedures and practices that employees would be expected to follow. Refer to
An assessment first takes place comparing the existing arrangements or controls to the
hazards identified. If the necessary controls do not exist then remedial action is taken and
all necessary procedures are incorporated into the Safety Management system.
• equipment/material failures;
• operational or planning failures;
• weather and other external natural events;
• sabotage and breaches of security;
• human factors.
Operations and maintenance employees are involved in the identification of hazards and
effects as this encourages their active involvement and commitment to the safety
programme.
• People,
• Environment,
• Assets and
• Reputation.
The risks are then compared against criteria such as the Safety strategic objectives,
S a f e t y policy a n d s a f e t y V a l u e s o f Aerogulf’s operation and maintenance,
therefore the focus is on the prevention of aircraft accidents (safety), all elements of
risk must be considered to include risks associated with deviation from limits.
All those hazards and effects identified as significant in relation to the screening criteria
are recorded in one of the following ‘Hazard and effects’ documents:
The hierarchy of control in selecting and implementing risk reduction measures should
focus attention, in order of priority, on eliminating the hazard if possible (determine if the
task/operation is necessary), changing the technology (modifications), changing the work
procedure or method and personal protection devices or equipment.
A - Assets
The hazard release scenario or the incident under consideration will often not be identical
to the previous incidents that are being used to predict likelihood. Also, detailed
information on previous incidents outside Aerogulf, or even outside the Gulf region, may
not be readily available. Therefore, a combination of available information and judgement
from experience has to be applied to make a best estimate of the likelihood level A to E.
Step 4: Estimate the risk rating
For each potential consequence determine the risk rating for each of the applicable PEAR
categories in terms of the product of the consequence severity and the likelihood. The risk
ratings (up to 4 for each potential consequence) can be plotted on the matrix to provide a
visual representation of the risk profile of the hazard release scenario under consideration.
The recommended convention for expressing risk ratings is in the form “People 2B
Low” or “Reputation 4C Medium”.
Risk ratings derived in this way reflect the controls that have typically been applied at
Aerogulf over the period for which previous incidents were used to estimate likelihood.
There is normally insufficient data on these previous incidents to allow the likelihood
estimates, and therefore the RAM ratings, to be re-estimated for the situation with
additional controls in place. The effect of additional controls on the level of risk can be
assessed by asking questions such as: “have we done enough to move the risk out of
the Red area?” The residual risk after applying additional controls should be judged
against tolerability criteria such as legal limits, company policies and standards,
contractual requirements and the ALARP process.
6.3.2. RAM - Documented Demonstration of Reduction of Risks to ALARP and the
Safety Case
Aerogulf requires a documented demonstration that Safety risks in the red and yellow
areas of the RAM have been reduced to ALARP. When the RAM is used for this
purpose the three areas are typically described as follows:
Blue Low Apply controls that are specified in the SMS
Yellow Medium Demonstrate control through the SMS and hazard control
sheets
Red High Demonstrate control through a Safety Case
6.3.3. RAM - Workplace Hazard Control (Appendix 5 and Appendix 6)
The RAM is applied in the planning of non-routine operations, maintenance, and ground
handling activities to assess the risks of the proposed work and to decide how much time
and resource should be spent on analysing the hazards.
After identifying the hazards of the proposed work the associated risks are assessed on
the RAM. The resultant planning and control actions are typically as follows:
Blue Apply the location controls, such as Safety Meetings, work orders, supervision,
Flying Staff Instructions, Read and Sign and work team discussions.
Yellow Conduct a Job Safety Analysis (form AGS/QA/042) Appendix 5. To be done
by the supervisor to identify any controls needed in addition to the location controls.
The resulting controls and instructions are communicated to the work team before the
work starts.
Red Conduct a detailed Risk Assessment (form AGS/QA/044) Appendix 6. To be
REV: 0 DATE: 27-05-09 PAGE: 6-7
Aerogulf Services Company (L.L.C.)
INTEGRATED SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM MANUAL
done either by the supervisor controlling the work, supported by engineers and/or safety
department and endorsed by management. The resulting controls and instructions are
communicated to the work team before the work starts.
Any relevant health hazards, which have been identified and assessed through the
Health Risk Assessment process, should be included in the JHA and resultant controls.
The need and extent of hazard analysis will be determined not only by the RAM
assessment but also by how non-routine and complex the work is and by whether
procedures or an existing job hazard analysis are available for the proposed work.
6.4.1. The HEMP Process Depicted in Diagram and the Application of the RAM
The bowtie is a linear approach to HEMP and involves a detailed analysis of a
hazardous event and associated threats and controls. Once all of the hazards and effects
have been identified and documented and the level of risk is evaluated, further analysis is
conducted by the Safety / Quality Assurance Manager to identify all possible threats and
controls for each hazard. The purpose of the bowtie tool is to facilitate the selection of
controls and recovery preparedness measures and provides the methodology to develop
Aerogulf’s Safety Case.
It begins with the identification of the hazardous event, which is the first release of the
hazard. Working to the left of the “hazardous event”, a hazard is identified and then the
threats are identified which could result in the release of the hazard. Controls, escalating
factors and secondary controls are then identified which would prevent the release of the
hazard and thus the result: a hazardous event.
On the right side of the “bowtie” is the sequence of measures once the “hazardous event”
has actually occurred. This combination of measures will mitigate the consequences of
the hazardous event. Recovery measures are identified to enable a degree of recovery
once the hazardous event has occurred. Escalation factors are identified which may
“escalate” the situation thus making recovery difficult or unlikely. Controls are then
identified which would prevent the escalation of the hazardous event. If the controls fail
and escalation does occur, the consequences of the hazardous event are identified
and mitigation measures are then identified and implemented.
Aerogulf’s Hazards and Effects Register is a quality record which demonstrates that
hazards and effects have been identified, are understood, and are being properly
controlled.
The Hazards and Effects Register forms part of the Safety Case and is therefore a live
document and is continuously reviewed as standards change, new operations begin, new
technology is introduced or incidents occur. Not all of the hazards and effects identified will
be included in the Safety Case. Only those with major accident potential are required to be
included in the Safety Case. In other words, a health or physical safety hazard that can be
managed through normal operating procedures does not need to be included in the Safety
Case.
Using the Hazards and Effects Register, the Safety Case demonstrates that:
• all hazards, effects and threats have been identified;
• the likelihood and consequences of a hazardous event have been assessed;
• controls to manage potential causes (threat barriers) are in place;
• Recovery preparedness measures to mitigate potential consequences have been
taken.
The structure and content of Aerogulf’s Hazard Register has been developed to cover
offshore operations, main base of operation and away from base seismic operations, and
documents all major and other safety significant hazards/threats that could be encountered
in normal operations as well as any potential operations outside the normal scope of
activity.
3. Hazardous event.
Describe the situation or event that represents the release of the hazard from defined
control limits. If this situation or event can be prevented through active controls
no scenario can develop which could lead to a consequence or effect as defined by
Case objectives.
4. Locations and acceptance criteria
List the locations where the hazard (or effect) is present. For each location the
acceptance criteria is defined, in other words, what is deemed suitable and
sufficient control of threats and what are suitable and sufficient recovery
preparedness measures
5. Threats and threat controls
The identification of all possible causes of release of the hazard or deviation from
control limits, resulting in the hazardous event. For each threat there is a description
of the necessary control or barrier that would prevent the release of the threat.
9. Reference documents.
All the documents, procedures, standards, and assessments used or referred to in
developing the information entered for the hazard or effect are recorded. Controls,
recovery preparedness measures and escalation controls are also cross-referenced
to these documents.
6.7 HEMP, THE RULE OF THREE, & THE APPLICATION TO AVIATION ACCIDENT
PREVENTION
The application of the HEMP provides Aerogulf with a systematic approach to risk
management in order to prevent accidents. Through a systematic approach, hazard
identification looks at the entire organisation as well as those factors, which are external to
t h e o r g a n i s a t i o n . Operational and Maintenance procedures and practices,
communication, personnel recruiting and training, organisational pressures, allocation of
resources, work environment factors, regulatory oversight and the provision of warning
systems, all combine to form the scope of Aerogulf’s accident prevention. By utilising a
systematic approach such as HEMP, it is possible to ensure that the scope of accident
prevention encompasses all organisational elements and therefore any hazard that may
affect the safe operation of aircraft.
Applying HEMP and Risk Management principles may also improve operational decision
making thus preventing an unsafe situation from escalating.
6.7.1 The Rule of Three
It is generally accepted that, for an accident to occur, there are usually several
contributory factors leading up to the actual event. In its theory on the “Rule of Three”,
Leiden University concluded: that if one or two limits are reached, the ability of an
individual to manage the situation was generally possible. If the operation approached a
third limit, this would dramatically increase the possibility of the loss of control of the
situation and an incident/accident was likely. For example, such a situation can occur
during pre-flight checks if unserviceability were to occur preventing departure, and
requiring the crew to revert to a standby aircraft. The proposed flight is now running
late, additional paperwork has to be completed, flight plans resubmitted and perhaps
personnel and baggage have to be transferred. In the event that this were to occur
nearing the end of the crews permissible duty day, and was further complicated by
deteriorating weather, then the three factors combined may well be more than the crew
can reasonably be expected to cope with without putting the flight at undue risk in the
event that any further complications were to arise. It is therefore essential that, as the
limits are approached, there is an assessment made as to their combined potential to
cause an incident or accident and a decision to fly or not duly made i.e. a risk
assessment is carried out.
Example:
A helicopter is operating in weather just bad enough that other aircraft are grounded but it
is within company limits. The flight plan is changed to accommodate operational
requirements, going to an additional four platforms. The crew is very close to their flight
time duty limits. They decide to do one last stop before they start the half-hour return flight
to base.
Should the crew press on and take the additional changeover shift home or should they
advise that another crew needs to take over and return to base?
REV: 0 DATE: 27-05-09 PAGE: 6-13
Aerogulf Services Company (L.L.C.)
INTEGRATED SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM MANUAL
ALARP is not just a demonstration that risks of the preferred or selected option are
acceptable and/or comparable to other similar developments. Demonstrating ALARP
requires consideration of fundamentally different options to provide assurance that
A e r o g u l f gets best value for money over the lifetime of an operation. There is no
scientific formula to calculate ALARP. Demonstrating ALARP requires consideration of
all the hard and soft issues related to a range of options and a judgmental decision at the
right level in the organisation with the full knowledge of all the options, and associated
risks and costs. It is not only a decision for today, it is also for the future, when goalposts
move and being ALARP today may avoid costly retrofit. Should A e r o g u l f be
subjected to scrutiny following an accident, for example, it should then be possible to
demonstrate that the right decisions have been made.
The predefined limits are found in legislation, contractual and Aerogulf standards.
Targets or acceptance criteria are normally more stringent than those of legislation. In the
process of continuous improvement over time A e r o g u l f ’ s targets are improved.
These improvements are made balancing the cost of improvement against the benefits
achieved (ALARP).
6.9 SAFETY-CRITICAL OPERATIONS PROCEDURE
Some of the control and recovery sections in the Hazards Register refer to specific
operating procedures. These procedures will, in almost all cases, already exist in some
form (e.g. Operations Manual) but are specifically highlighted within the Safety Case with
a location reference.
Operations monitoring is through the use of the line checks and Internal Audits of pilot /
Ops personnel’s practice’ versus published procedure. This is carried out by the Director
of Operations with the assistance of the Chief Pilot, Director of Training, flight Safety
Officer, TRE’s and the QA department.
It is accepted that all levels of management must fully support the continued development
of a just culture within the organisation, and that this will stem from sound leadership and
from motivation of staff.
These performance measurements will need to be amended, if only because they do not
truly reflect a just culture philosophy. If withholding a report is apparently rewarded, then it
is highly probable that withholding will occur, and if near miss events are not reported, an
opportunity to learn from those events and to put other controls into place will be lost.
As part of Aerogulf’s safety improvement plan key performance indicators are used
throughout the safety and Quality reporting system. KPI’s are used to measure recurrency
of findings, follow-up action and its affectivity. The results are presented at safety
meetings, safety review board meeting and management reviews. But importantly it will
provide a ‘close-out’ loop back from management back to the report author in order to
instil confidence and the sense of active involvement in the company safety culture.
All employees can and are encouraged to report safety or hazard concerns. The Aerogulf
reporting procedure uses various forms which are further defined within the Quality
Manual, Operations Manual and MME/MOE:
• Safety/Hazard report form
• Confidentiality Safety report form
• Occurrence/Incident/Accident Report which is used for all Mandatory Reports.
• Multi-Purpose Report Form (MPRF)
• Mandatory Occurrence / Defect Report
• Verbally.
• Flight Load Sheet
Any event or situation with the potential to result in significant degradation of safety and
can cause damage and/or injury should be reported. In addition the following list details
examples of occurrences which would justify a report being raised. If there is any doubt
contact the Safety / QA Manager. A report shall be filed within 72 hours of the occurrence
if possible:
Recommendations and actions taken are recorded with a close out loop back to the
originator. By ensuring a confidential, non–punitive system with feedback of action taken
to the originator, confidence in the system will be maintained which encourages hazard
reporting.
The reporting system is confidential between the person (originator) reporting the hazard
and the Safety / Quality Assurance Manager and/or Flight Safety Officer. Any safety
information distributed as a result of a report will be de-identified.
Safety / Hazard reports will be submitted in the first instance to the Safety / Quality
Assurance Manager or the Fight Safety Officer. They shall:
• Be responsible for investigation of the report and for maintaining their
confidentiality.
• While maintaining confidentiality, the Safety department must be able to follow-up
on a report to clarify the details and the nature of the problem
• Acknowledge receipt of the report and assign it a tracking number.
• Complete the reverse of the report with action taken, by whom and final resolution.
• The report will be raised at Management meetings for deliberation and action, If
necessary.
• After investigation, make widely available for the benefit of all staff (Pilots and/or
Engineering meetings), the de-identified safety report and recommendations.
• Update the database and close out.
• Return completed form in confidence to the originator, if applicable.
Reports are recorded electronically and also held as hard copies. This method ensures
that departments are made aware of incidents as they occur by the issue of a hard copy,
and the status of any investigation together with required follow-up action by both hard
and soft copy to prevent recurrence can be monitored.
In respect of Aerogulf Services operations, any events or occurrences during the period
that an aircraft is under the control of a pilot shall also be filed using an ‘Occurrence /
Incident Report’ form and administered by both Operations and Quality Assurance
Department. All occurrence reports that have technical or maintenance related event shall
be investigated in liaison with the Safety / Quality Assurance Manager and Maintenance
Section.
Any issues regarding safety can be reported using either the Multi-Purpose Report Form,
the Confidential Safety Report Form or verbally to any management personnel, the
Quality Manager or the Safety manager.
In the case of GCAA mandated reports, recommendation for the closure of a report must
be agreed with the regulatory authority. The authority and the reporter must be informed
of action taken once the incident is closed.
Data for trend analysis is gathered from Safety Reports submitted which is entered in to
the database. Dependent on the nature of the occurrence / hazard the safety / QA
manager will assign ownership with action target dates. Information such as trends, risk
assessment, hazard analysis, investigations and follow-up’s are then more effectively
implemented. After final management review the report will be displayed on the safety
notice board. Any further action will be determined at the management meeting refer to
section 7.
Some reports can be closed on receipt e.g. late or delayed departures. If follow-up is
required, action will have been assigned to the appropriate department(s). The Safety /
Quality Assurance Manager will review responses and, if satisfactory, recommend closure
of the incident at the next Safety Review Board meeting. If responses are unsatisfactory
and do not address the problem, the incident must remain open for continuing review and
action as required.
7.6 Auditing
Ref: Quality Manual
Quality Procedure Manual, Procedure P 822, Internal Quality audits
Scope – To ensure compliance with procedures audit scope must cover as a minimum
those procedures as defined within:
Department Frequency
Quality Assurance 12 mths
Line 12 mths
Overhaul / NDT workshop 12 mths
Avionics workshop 12 mths
Material control – stores 12 mths
Third Party 12 mths
Safety equipment 12 mths
Technical Records 12 mths
Machine shop 12 mths
Operations Department 12 mths
Contract Review 12 mths
Vendors 12 mths
Air BP T-181 records 12 mths
Flight Safety & security 12 mths
Away from base A/R
Table 8-1
Internal auditor qualifications as a minimum are that they must have attended an
approved Internal Audit course and a Safety Management System course and have an
aviation background as either an engineer or pilot. They must also be familiar with the
area being audited, and must be independent of the audited activities. They are
responsible for preparing and conducting the audit in accordance with the Quality
Procedure Manual.
Selection of auditors and preparation for the audit are explained in procedure P 822,
Internal Quality Audits. Auditors may be the Safety / Quality Assurance Manager, Flight
Safety Officer or Assistant quality Assurance Manager, dependent on the area under
audit. As a guide engineering will usually be audited by the Safety / Quality Assurance
Manager and/or Assistant Quality Assurance Manager and Operations by the Safety /
Quality Assurance Manager and/or Flight Safety Officer.
When nonconforming conditions / safety hazards are identified, the person responsible for
the affected area or activity is requested to propose a remedial action in the action
column on the ‘Internal Audit Report’. The report is then returned to the Quality
Department within seven days from receipt.
Implementation and effectiveness of the remedial action are verified by a follow-up audit.
However, if remedial action is not carried out as stated in the action column of the report
or the remedial action has not really addressed the non-conformance; then a ‘Major Non-
conformance’ is raised using the ‘Multi-Purpose report’ requiring immediate action.
When the auditing cycle is completed all the Internal Audit Reports are completed and
analyzed. They are submitted to the Director of Operations, Engineering Manager and the
Accountable Manager and if required are presented at the next management evaluation
review meeting.
The completed reports including all third party audit reports are retained and filed by the
Safety / Quality Assurance Manager who will carry out follow-up investigations to ensure
close-out and that final reports have been submitted to customers if required.
Aerogulf as owner / operators do not pool audit reports with other organisations other
than with the GCAA and contracted customers (e.g. Dubai Petroleum, Dugas, Shell, etc).
All communications with the auditor is through the Accountable manager who also
delegates a senior manager within Aerogulf to compile a feedback report, this is
submitted as soon as possible after the audit to assure the auditor that the report is being
actioned including remedial actions for any non-conformance.
b. Director of Operations
c. Chief Pilot
d. Engineering Manager
g. Security Manager
The evidence from numerous aviation accidents and incidents has shown that the lack of
management control and human factors are detrimental to the safe operation of aircraft.
The management of safety is not just the responsibility of management however; it is
management that has to introduce the necessary procedures to ensure a positive cultural
environment and safe practices. The best performers internationally use formal Safety
Management Systems to produce significant and permanent improvements in safety. It is
also important to develop a ‘just culture’ that encourages openness and trust between
Management and the work force. For example, all employees should feel able to report
incidents and events without the fear of unwarranted retribution. Reporting situations,
events and practices that compromise safety should become a priority for all employees.
Aerogulf promotes ‘Non-Punitive reporting’ through the use of internal Safety / Hazard
Reports, Multi-Purpose Report Forms, verbally, etc. A ‘Just Culture Disciplinary’ policy will
result in action only being taken if it is found to be as a result of gross negligence or wilful
deliberate destruction of company property, safety of assets and personnel. The following
diagram shows the Aerogulf Just Culture model.
Refer to Appendix 2 for the Aerogulf ‘Gap Analysis’ check list. This has been modelled on
the ‘National Safety Council’ check list as used by the International Helicopter Safety
Committee.
To ensure that the Safety Management System functions to the standards as defined
within this ISMS Manual, the Gap Analysis check list is included within the Safety Audit
Plan; to be carried out every two years or whenever there is a Management of Change.
1. The first column is to establish a base line for the ISMS through eighteen Primary
Considerations with ‘yes / no’ questions and current Aerogulf status.
2. The second column can now be used to ‘Plan’ and set goals to implement where
required the necessary actions to fill gaps within the safety system. This can then
be presented to the safety committee at the safety review board meetings (section
7.8.3).
The circumstances may be such that personnel will require counselling and support in
particular the next of kin. This will have a major influence on the operation and
therefore the decision will be dependant on the general feeling and morale.
Technical reasons may also have an affect on the recommencement, with aircraft
grounded until the authorities give their approval.
When the decision is taken the Accountable manager and / or his designate shall
arrange department meetings in order to clarify the situation, take questions and to
give a restart date. Operations will then recommence with all personnel carrying out
their respective duties.
Senior management as detailed at section 8.2 shall monitor the company at all levels
to ensure that personnel are performing their duties safely and without distraction.
That all concerns are noted and follow-up actions where required are assigned and
carried out. All reports to the Accountable manager.
An accident as defined within GCAA Airworthiness Notice will result in the GCAA
conducting an investigation either independently or with the assistance of an external
authority e.g. NTSB, AAIB, etc.
Likewise the customer may also implement an investigation as per their contract using
an external auditing organisation with the final report presented to Aerogulf and the
customer for corrective action.
The Accountable Manager together with advice from the Management team will
decide if an investigation is warranted for incidents / occurrences that do not directly
affect a customer or fall under a classification requiring GCAA intervention. The
designated investigator in this case will usually be the Safety / Quality Assurance
Manager and / or Flight Safety Officer possibly along with other members of the
management team who will respond directly back to the Accountable Manager /
Management Team.
The company safety policy is non-punitive and supports a just and learning approach
that doesn’t seek to apportion blame as its primary thrust. It is recognised that human
error can occur, in such cases blame and subsequent punishment will not be delivered
as the resolution to the problem, but this will not absolve all those involved, directly or
indirectly, from accepting the responsibility for their part. However, where appropriate,
in cases of gross negligence or deliberate violation, appropriate disciplinary action will
be taken.
To ensure the risks are reduced and the incidents are fully investigated, the
Accountable Manager shall detail a suitable nominee to:
d) Take steps to make the area Safe. If practical, avoid disturbing the
scene of the accident until an investigation is carried out (this is a legal
obligation in event of a fatality).
e) If safe, enter the area and endeavour to determine the cause of the
accident.
iii) If the injury was as a result of contact with an agent and requires hospital
treatment give copy of Material Safety Data Sheet for presentation to
Doctor.
Prior to the removal of any items permission must be obtained from the GCAA, the
Police and the owners of the site. The following gives an oversight into the removal
procedure and hazards likely to be encountered, for further details the following
reference material must be read.
A company employee must be on site to assist in the recovery process, they must
have access to all relevant manufacturers’ manuals. They are responsible for liaising
with the authority and the company. They are not permitted to disclose any information
without prior approval from Aerogulf management.
Personal Protective Equipment (Gloves, masks, eye protection and full length apron)
must be worn in the event of contact with human remains. Hazards such as hepatitis
and Aids / HIV are a very serious risk.
Photographic evidence of any human remains are to be taken prior to removal, then
sealed into plastic bags which in turn must be marked with the exact location that they
were found and collected in to a body bag. Removal will be determined by the Police.
Additional cleaning material such as bleach and disinfectant sprays are to be used
when vacating the site and all protective clothing is to be bagged and marked as bio
hazard for incineration. If at any time personal contamination is suspected medical
advice is to be obtained immediately.
Fuselage: Dependant on the size (in excess of 25 Kgs), heat damage and condition of
the fuselage assistance may be required in the form of a crane.
At all time PPE must be worn to avoid ingestion of dust and ash (mask and eye
protection) and the possibility of cuts / crushing (gloves, hard hat and safety shoes).
Removed parts must be labelled with location of the part from where it was found.
The procedure for reporting an accident or incident is the same as that used for first
aid injuries, using the Work Related ‘Personal’ Accident Report’. In the case of
fatalities, serious injuries or high value damage accidents the reporting will be within
24 hours. Copies of the completed Form should be distributed to:
Such accidents will be reported to the Accountable manager. The driver should
contact Aerogulf by phone on 2200331, on or by the next working day following the
accident. The driver if possible, is also to submit to the company the copy of the
accident form as issued by the Police, whether this is the RED or the GREEN form. In
either case the driver will be expected to write a report for submission to the
Accountable manager describing the nature of the accident, etc.
Any accident including those causing injury incurred by Aerogulf staff whilst in their
own car should also be reported via the Focal Points, the personnel manager or to
Operations. This is also especially important if the car is on the Group insurance
scheme and will assist in the early settlement with the Insurance Company.
Generally any First Aid trained staff will attend any staff member who is sick, or injured
whilst at work. However, if required medical assistance can be sought from the Dubai
Police Air Wing medics.
First Aid Kit’s are located in Stores, Overhaul workshop and Avionics workshop. Minor
personal injuries are to be recorded in the book contained within the First Aid kit; this
in turn will be checked monthly by the QA department.
It is incumbent on all staff to report in by phone if they are sick and unable to work.
This must be carried out through their immediate supervisors or through the Personnel
Manager. In addition any injuries incurred while on company business shall be
recorded, irrespective of whether they are working outside normal working hours or
working away from the Aerogulf facility.
The intent of reporting near misses or other hazardous situations, is to give due focus
to the management, and allow them the opportunity to manage the hazard or reduce
the risk. The process of improvement needs the support of all staff; therefore it is up
to each employee to feed back any such problem of which he becomes aware. To
assist in this complete either a Safety report or a Multi-purpose Report and submit to
the Focal Points who will record the information and instigate an investigation. If
confirmed, action will be set in motion to deal with the problem(s). The Focal Point will
ensure that these are reported to the Accountable Manager and that the individual is
given feedback on the planned action and expected resolution.
9.1 Procedures
The management of change is critical to all of Aerogulf, either when:
• a new type of aircraft is scheduled to enter service;
• a new area of operation is about to start,
• a change to procedures that may affect the safety of personnel, etc.
Each part of the MoC procedure can be defined as a business process and each process
has a process owner, unless otherwise specified this will be the department manager /
supervisor for the part of the business in which the process is primarily performed. When
change is required to the procedures, practices or standards applied for the completion of
any process that has been identified as being as safety critical to the company operations
then that change must be managed into place by the appropriate manager / supervisor.
This requires active management to ensure the staff understand and have appropriate
knowledge of the change and its implications to the operation. Change management
requirements are formally recognised through their inclusion in Safety Meeting agenda,
focussed safety meetings or training requirements.
1. SCREEN 2. REVIEW
Proposed Def ine Proposed Ev aluate Proposed
Change Change Change
4. IMPLEMENT
3. APPROVE Build the Change,
Authorize Change and Document,
Communicate and
Train.
5. CLOSE Start Up
Change is Ready to
Start Up.
Change
• Initiator - Any person who identifies the need for a change and begins the MOC
process.
• Operations Leadership - The supervisors or managers who are responsible for
the operation of the location.
• Department Manager(s) - Individual(s) responsible for the location where the
change is being considered, e.g. Accountable manager, Director of Operations,
Engineering Manager, Chief Pilot and LAE’s.
• Reviewers Those knowledgeable in the particular field or area of expertise that are
requested to comment on a particular change.
• Approver The Accountable Manager (or his designate)
• Owner(s) The person(s) accountable for the operation, maintenance, surveillance
or modification of the equipment, system or process.
• Implementation Resources Those called on to implement the change by
contributing to the completion of the work in their area of expertise and/or providing
assigned documentation, training and communication.
9.4.1 Overview
In this Step, a proposed change is initiated and then screened to determine if it
1) is desirable and justified,
2) meets the definition of a change that requires an MOC, and
3) has sufficient detail for the reviewers to reasonably understand the purpose, scope
and context.
Note: The MOC Process shall not be used merely to float ideas for comments beyond the
Asset.
Temporary changes shall not be closed out unless the system is returned to its pre-change
condition or a permanent MOC has been submitted and approved.
9.5.1 Overview
In this Step, the change is evaluated, and any issues involving the proposed change are
identified and documented. Examples of issues to be raised are HSE consequences and
risks, design deficiencies, documentation needs, communications and training
requirements.
9.6.1 Overview
In this Step, a determination is made as to whether the MOC is Approved or Cancelled or if
further review is required.
Decision Action
Approve Approving the MOC signifies that:
Reviews have been completed by skilled personnel from
required groups,
The scope and impact of the change are understood;
Identified hazards have been suitably addressed;
Required Implementation work processes are adequately
identified and can begin (e.g. detailed design, physical
work, etc.).
9.7.1 Overview
In this Step, detailed documentation, communication, training, and actual work are
conducted to bring about the change.
From the standpoint of the MOC form, two sets of requirements shall be tracked:
Documentation Requirements;
1. The implementation step is sufficiently complete to allow a safe startup and safe
operation of the change;
2. If a PSSR is required, it shall be done prior to startup;
The decision about whether to start up prior to completion of implementation is made by the
Owner.
Action
1 Monitor the implementation process to determine when
implementation is sufficiently complete, and all hazards are
sufficiently mitigated to allow startup of the change prior to the
completion of all tasks.
2 Ensure that a Pre-Startup Safety Review (PSSR) is
conducted, if required, to evaluate the change, and address
any findings from the PSSR.
Action
1 Cancel the change and notify the Implementation Resources
of the cancellation. Consider whether any completed
implementation tasks may need to be changed back to pre-
change status.
2 Archive the MOC form.
9.8.1 Overview
In this Step, the change is closed because implementation is complete.
Action
1 Verify that all documentation, communication and training
requirements in Step 4: Implementation of the form are completed
and documented in the form.
2 Verify that the work or activity necessary for the change to take
place is complete.
3 Verify that the Pre-Startup Safety Review (PSSR) has been
performed, if required.
4 Signify closure on the MOC form.
5 Archive the MOC form.
The Safety / Quality Assurance Manager and Safety Officer within Aerogulf shall both
come from an aviation background with experience on the maintenance and operation of
the aircraft to which they must maintain quality and safety oversight.
In addition they will be conversant with the regulations, have attended formal recognised
audit training and prior to assuming their position will have attended a Safety Management
System course as a minimum.
Training includes initial and recurrent training to cover quality and safety as per Aerogulf,
Regulatory and Manufacturer requirements; this can be carried out in-house.
The scope of the training carried out is dependant on the individuals’ involvement in the
Safety Management System and is carried out as part of Operations crew CRM training
and for engineering department personnel at specific training establishments, at
manufacturer’s facility, biennially and in-house.
The effectiveness of the training is evaluated based on the Course Feedback from the
employee who received the training and/or on the performance of the employee prior and
after the training. Records of these evaluations are documented and maintained.
Management to identify gaps in the training schedule, frequency of training and recurrent
training, periodically reviews training records as part of the Management Review process
and quarterly manpower meetings.
Other measures include the availability of clear and precise instructions, procedures,
flowcharts, etc. for activities that do not require specific training, e.g. Engineering
Procedures Manual, Operations Manual, etc.
Appropriate records of the employee's education, training, skills and experience are kept
in the employee's personal file.
The awareness of employees regarding the importance of their activities and their
contribution in achieving quality or safety objectives is established through induction
training at the beginning of their employment or when they assume new responsibilities,
which covers initial human factors, quality, safety, security and regulatory issues.
The Safety / Quality Assurance Manager will provide awareness training for all employees
either as part of the recurrent training programme and in particular at the regular monthly
meetings of pilots and engineering employees.
As detailed within section 7, the minutes of these meetings are displayed for all
employees to enable active feedback and involvement. Additionally through Read and
sign / Initial safety information can be communicated directly to those that need to know
giving reasons why actions have been taken, changes to procedures and generic safety
and quality information.
Ultimately any changes will be adopted permanently within the relevant manuals.
The Safety Notice boards in Operations and Engineering are also used to communicate
safety and quality issues. Safety letters and bulletins as issued by the various authorities
worldwide are also displayed giving details of related issues, and in particular helicopter
offshore operations.
Appendix
1 Safety Plan
2 GAP Analysis
3 Emergency Response Plan
4 Management of Change
5 Job Safety Analysis
6 Risk Assessment
Safety Program Activities 2009
January February March April May June July August September October November December Remarks
1 GCAA Ops audit
2 Shell Audit Eng meeting Eng meeting
3 Shell Audit Dugas Eng meeting Eng meeting Shell audit report compliance by 03/08/09 & 03/02/10
4 Eng Meeting Eng meeting
5 DP Audit Eng meeting
6 DP Audit
7 DP Audit Eng meeting
8 Dugas o/s Dugas o/s Dugas o/s
9 Dugas o/s
10
11 Dugas o/s Dugas o/s
12 Dugas o/s Dugas o/s
13 Dugas o/s Dugas o/s
14 Dugas o/s
15
16 Pilot Meeting
17
18 Dugas Meeting
19
20
21 Pilot Meeting Pilot Meeting
22 Pilot Meeting DP / SRB
23 DP / SRB DP/SRB
24 DP DP
25 Dugas Meeting DP
26 DP DP Dugas Meeting DP
27 DP
28 Dugas Meeting DP
29 DP/SRB
30 GCAA Report
31 GCAA Report GCAA Report GCAA Report
Step 1 SCREEN Initiators to complete as many fields as possible in this section, then submit the form to
Management. Fields to be verified and remaining fields to be completed by nominated
manager and / or Engineering Manager / Director of Operations.
Initiator: Origination Date: MOC #:
Operations Leadership:
Area: Facility: Location:
Type of Change:
Duration of Change:
Permanent
Temporary From: To
Start Date End Date
Equipment, System or Department
select one from the categories below
Helicopters Effected Tech records
Maintenance 145 Waste Handling
Stores Administration
Sheetmetal wokshop Operations
Machineshop
Avionics
Safety Equipment
Overhaul workshop
NDT workshop Other (specify)
Paint shop
Helicopter ramp
Hangar
Description of Change:
Attach supporting documents
Reason for Change:
Attach supporting documents
Proposed Start-up Date:
Roles:
To be Assigned by Management
Owner: Department Manager: Approver:
The person accountable for the Individual responsible dependant on Accountable Manager
operation, maintenance, surveillance or where the change is being considered.
modification of the equipment, system or
process.
Step 2 REVIEW
The fields below to be completed by nominated manager The fields below to be completed by the Reviewers
Select all that Reviewer Reviewer Comments Review Complete
Review Type apply Assigned (Attach supporting documents)
Due Date Initials Date
Flight Safety/ HSE Impact
Director of Operations
Chief Pilot
Director of Training
Engineering Manager
Quality / Safety Control
Security Manager
Chief Pilot
Ground Ops Manager
Accounts
Other 1 (specify):
Other 2 (specify):
Other 3 (specify):
This section to be completed by the Accountable Manager.
Step 3 APPROVE
Cancel MOC Yes / No Review Not Adequate Approved
Return the form to the Engineering Forward form to the Implementation Resources.
Archive the MOC Form. Manager / Director of Operations to
resolve.
Comments:
Signature: Date:
Step 4 IMPLEMENT
The fields below to be completed by nominated manager The fields below to be completed by the
implementation resources.
Select all that Resource Assigned Completed
apply
Item Due Date Name Initials Date
Documentation Requirements
General Arrangement/Plot Plan
Process & Instrumentation Diagram
Hazards Analysis Documentation
Material Safety Data Sheet (MSDS)
Regulatory Submittals (GCAA)
Design Codes & Standards Utilized
Specifications Utilized
Equipment Data
Procedures – Operating
Procedures – Maintenance
Fire Fighting & Safety Equipment
Plan
Safe Work Plan
Pre-startup Safety Review
Training Material
CAR OPS (Sub-part K & L)?
Other (specify):
Other {specify):
Other (specify):
Communications and Training Requirements
Communication and Training –
Operations/Pilots
Communication and Training -
Maintenance
Communication and Training - HSE
Other (specify):
Attendees:
• Does everyone know that any changes to the work plan have to be communicated to • working with equipment or connections under
pressure – Ground Test rig?
everyone involved in the work?
• working dangerous goods and substances
• Does everyone know that any new people joining the work party must be given a full and hazardous to health?
thorough handover? • working in areas with poor lighting or high
noise levels
• Is the immediate area free of any conflicting work? • personnel who are new to the company or each
other
• rotating equipment
If the answer to any one these question is NO, then the safety of people is at risk
If so, the work may be hazardous and care should be taken to ensure that work is done
safely.
Remember everyone is responsible for:
Using the correct tools for the job
being aware of the hazards around them and remaining vigilant to changes
using the correct PPE for the job
Making themselves aware of and working to the requirements of HSE / ISMS system,
The Supervisor should confirm the understanding of the group by asking open questions on Maintenance Manual, Procedures, Risk Assessment knowledge what action to take in an
the above point emergency
INITIAL ASSESSMENT:
DOES THE EXISTING ARRANGEMENTS OR CONTROLS TO THE HAZARD EXIST? YES □
NO □
Detail the controls in place:
RISK ASSESSMENT
RAM RAM
Hazards/Risks Additional control Residual Risk
(A to E)
Increasing Likelihood
Consequences (PEAR)
Severity (0 to 5)
* Including existing physical preventative measures (e.g. interlocks, guards, mechanical controls etc.)