Introduction of Mapping The Margins
Introduction of Mapping The Margins
Introduction of Mapping The Margins
of Color
Author(s): Kimberle Crenshaw
Source: Stanford Law Review , Jul., 1991, Vol. 43, No. 6 (Jul., 1991), pp. 1241-1299
Published by: Stanford Law Review
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Kimberle Crenshaw*
INTRODUCTION
Over the last two decades, women have organized against the almost
routine violence that shapes their lives.1 Drawing from the strength of
shared experience, women have recognized that the political demands of mil-
lions speak more powerfully than the pleas of a few isolated voices. This
politicization in turn has transformed the way we understand violence
against women. For example, battering and rape, once seen as private (fam-
ily matters) and aberrational (errant sexual aggression), are now largely rec-
ognized as part of a broad-scale system of domination that affects women as
a class.2 This process of recognizing as social and systemic what was for-
I am indebted to a great many people who have pushed this project along. For their kind assist-
ance in facilitating my field research for this article, I wish to thank Maria Blanco, Margaret Cam-
brick, Joan Creer, Estelle Cheung, Nilda Rimonte and Fred Smith. I benefitted from the comments
of Taunya Banks, Mark Barenberg, Darcy Calkins, Adrienne Davis, Gina Dent, Brent Edwards,
Paul Gewirtz, Lani Guinier, Neil Gotanda, Joel Handler, Duncan Kennedy, Henry Monaghan, Eliz-
abeth Schneider and Kendall Thomas. A very special thanks goes to Gary Peller and Richard Yar-
borough. Jayne Lee, Paula Puryear, Yancy Garrido, Eugenia Gifford and Leti Volpp provided
valuable research assistance. I gratefully acknowledge the support of the Academic Senate of
UCLA, Center for Afro-American Studies at UCLA, the Reed Foundation and Columbia Law
School. Earlier versions of this article were presented to the Critical Race Theory Workshop and the
Yale Legal Theory Workshop.
This article is dedicated to the memory of Denise Carty-Bennia and Mary Joe Frug.
1. Feminist academics and activists have played a central role in forwarding an ideological and
institutional challenge to the practices that condone and perpetuate violence against women. See
generally SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE (1975);
LORENNE M.G. CLARK & DEBRA J. LEWIS, RAPE: THE PRICE OF COERCIVE SEXUALITY (1977);
R. EMERSON DOBASH & RUSSELL DOBASH, VIOLENCE AGAINST WIVES: A CASE AGAINST THE
PATRIARCHY (1979); NANCY GAGER & CATHLEEN SCHURR, SEXUAL ASSAULT: CONFRONTING
RAPE IN AMERICA (1976); DIANA E.H. RUSSELL, THE POLITICS OF RAPE: THE VICTIM'S PER-
SPECTIVE (1974); ELIZABETH ANNE STANKO, INTIMATE INTRUSIONS: WOMEN'S EXPERIENCE OF
MALE VIOLENCE (1985); LENORE E. WALKER, TERRIFYING LOVE: WHY BATTERED WOMEN
KILL AND HOW SOCIETY RESPONDS (1989); LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN SYN-
DROME (1984); LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN (1979).
2. See, e.g., SUSAN SCHECHTER, WOMEN AND MALE VIOLENCE: THE VISIONS AND STRUG-
GLES OF THE BATTERED WOMEN'S MOVEMENT (1982) (arguing that battering is a means of main-
taining women's subordinate position); S. BROWNMILLER, supra note 1 (arguing that rape is a
1241
patriarchal practice that subordinates women to men); Elizabeth Schneider, The Violence
23 CONN. L. REV. 973, 974 (1991) (discussing how "concepts of privacy permit, en
reinforce violence against women"); Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087 (1986) (ana
law as one illustration of sexism in criminal law); see also CATHARINE A. MACKINNON
HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION 143-213 (19
that sexual harassment should be redefined as sexual discrimination actionable und
rather than viewed as misplaced sexuality in the workplace).
3. This article arises out of and is inspired by two emerging scholarly discourses.
critical race theory. For a cross-section of what is now a substantial body of literature, see
J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS (1991); Robin D. Barnes, Race Con
The Thematic Content of Racial Distinctiveness in Critical Race Scholarship, 103 HA
1864 (1990); John 0. Calmore, Critical Race Theory, Archie Shepp, and Fire Music.
Authentic Intellectual Life in a Multicultural World, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2129 (1992);
Cook, Beyond Critical Legal Studies: The Reconstructive Theology of Dr. Martin Luthe
HARV. L. REV. 985 (1990); Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform and Retrenchm
formation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331 (19
Delgado, When a Story is Just a Story: Does Voice Really Matter?, 76 VA. L. R
Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution is Colorblind," 44 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1
suda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MI
(1989); Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning
Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987); Gerald Torres, Critical Race Theory: Th
Universalist Ideal and the Hope of Plural Justice-Some Observations and Question
Phenomenon, 75 MINN. L. REV. 993 (1991). For a useful overview of critical
Calmore, supra, at 2160-2168.
A second, less formally linked body of legal scholarship investigates the conn
race and gender. See, e.g., Regina Austin, Sapphire Bound!, 1989 WIS. L. REV
supra; Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 ST
(1990); Marlee Kline, Race, Racism and Feminist Legal Theory, 12 HARV. W
(1989); Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women
and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1419 (1991); Cathy Scarborough,
Black Women's Employment Experiences, 98 YALE L.J. 1457 (1989) (student a
Smith, Separate Identities: Black Women, Work and Title VII, 14 HARV. WOMEN
Judy Scales-Trent, Black Women and the Constitution: Finding Our Place, Asserti
HARV. C.R-C.L. L. REV. 9 (1989); Judith A. Winston, Mirror, Mirror on the Wall:
1981, and the Intersection of Race and Gendet 'n the Civil Rights Act of 1990, 79
(1991). This work in turn has been informed oy a broader literature examining t
race and gender in other contexts. See, e.g., PATRICIA HILL COLLINS, BLACK FEM
KNOWLEDGE, CONSCIOUSNESS, AND THE POLITICS OF EMPOWERMENT (1990)
WOMEN, RACE AND CLASS (1981); BELL HOOKS, AIN'T I A WOMAN? BLACK WO
NISM (1981); ELIZABETH V. SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL WOMAN: PROBLEMS OF EXC
NIST THOUGHT (1988); Frances Beale, Double Jeopardy: To Be Black and Femal
WOMAN 90 (Toni Cade ed. 1970); Kink-Kok Cheung, The Woman Warrior vers
Pacific: Must a Chinese American Critic Choose between Feminism and Heroism?,
FEMINISM 234 (Marianne Hirsch & Evelyn Fox Keller eds. 1990); Deborah H. King,
ardy, Multiple Consciousness: The Context of a Black Feminist Ideology, 14 SIGN
K. Lewis, A Response to Inequality: Black Women, Racism and Sexism, 3 S
Deborah E. McDowell, New Directions for Black Feminist Criticism, in THE NEW
CISM: ESSAYS ON WOMEN, LITERATURE AND THEORY 186 (Elaine Showalter e
Smith, Black Feminist Theory and the Representation of the "Other" in CHAN
WORDS: ESSAYS ON CRITICISM, THEORY AND WRITING BY BLACK WOMEN 38 (C
1989).
4. Although the objective of this article is to describe the intersectional location of women of
color and their marginalization within dominant resistance discourses, I do not mean to imply that
the disempowerment of women of color is singularly or even primarily caused by feminist and an-
tiracist theorists or activists. Indeed, I hope to dispell any such simplistic interpretations by captur-
ing, at least in part, the way that prevailing structures of domination shape various discourses of
resistance. As I have noted elsewhere, "People can only demand change in ways that reflect the
logic of the institutions they are challenging. Demands for change that do not reflect . . . dominant
ideology . . . will probably be ineffective." Crenshaw, supra note 3, at 1367. Although there are
significant political and conceptual obstacles to moving against structures of domination with an
intersectional sensibility, my point is that the effort to do so should be a central theoretical and
political objective of both antiracism and feminism.
5. Although this article deals with violent assault perpetrated by men against women, women
are also subject to violent assault by women. Violence among lesbians is a hidden but significant
problem. One expert reported that in a study of 90 lesbian couples, roughly 46% of lesbians have
been physically abused by their partners. Jane Garcia, The Cost of Escaping Domestic Violence: Fear
of Treatment in a Largely Homophobic Society May Keep Lesbian Abuse Victims from Calling for
Help, L.A. Times, May 6, 1991, at 2; see also NAMING THE VIOLENCE: SPEAKING OUT ABOUT
LESIBIAN BATTERING (Kerry Lobel ed. 1986); Ruthann Robson, Lavender Bruises. Intralesbian Vio-
lence, Law and Lesbian Legal Theory, 20 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 567 (1990). There are clear
parallels between violence against women in the lesbian community and violence against women in
communities of color. Lesbian violence is often shrouded in secrecy for similar reason
suppressed the exposure of heterosexual violence in communities of color-fear of embar
members of the community, which is already stereotyped as deviant, and fear of being
from the community. Despite these similarities, there are nonetheless distinctions bet
abuse of women and female abuse of women that in the context of patriarchy,
homophobia, warrants more focused analysis than is possible here.
6. I use "Black" and "African American" interchangeably throughout this article. I
"Black" because "Blacks, like Asians, Latinos, and other 'minorities,' constitute a specif
group and, as such, require denotation as a proper noun." Crenshaw, supra note 3,
(citing Catharine MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: An Agendafo
SIGNS 515, 516 (1982)). By the same token, I do not capitalize "white," which is not a p
since whites do not constitute a specific cultural group. For the same reason I do n
"women of color."
7. Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex, 1989 U. CH
LEGAL F. 139.
8. I explicitly adopt a Black feminist stance in this survey of violence against women of
I do this cognizant of several tensions that such a position entails. The most significant one
from the criticism that while feminism purports to speakfor women of color through its invoc
of the term "woman," the feminist perspective excludes women of color because it is based up
experiences and interests of a certain subset of women. On the other hand, when white fem
attempt to include other women, they often add our experiences into an otherwise unaltered
work. It is important to name the perspective from which one constructs her analysis; and f
that is as a Black feminist. Moreover, it is important to acknowledge that the materials
incorporate in my analysis are drawn heavily from research on Black women. On the other h
see my own work as part of a broader collective effort among feminists of color to expand fem
to include analyses of race and other factors such as class, sexuality, and age. I have atte
therefore to offer my sense of the tentative connections between my analysis of the interse
experiences of Black women and the intersectional experiences of other women of color. I stre
this analysis is not intended to include falsely nor to exclude unnecessarily other women of
9. I consider intersectionality a provisional concept linking contemporary politics w
postmodern theory. In mapping the intersections of race and gender, the concept does engage
nant assumptions that race and gender are essentially separate categories. By tracing the cate
to their intersections, I hope to suggest a methodology that will ultimately disrupt the tendenci
see race and gender as exclusive or separable. While the primary intersections that I explore h
I. STRUCTURAL INTERSECTIONALITY
between race and gender, the concept can and should be expanded by factoring in issues such
class, sexual orientation, age, and color.
10. Professor Mari Matsuda calls this inquiry "asking the other question." Mari J. Mat
Beside My Sister, Facing the Enemy: Legal Theory Out of Coalition, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1183 (1
For example, we should look at an issue or condition traditionally regarded as a gender issue
ask, "Where's the racism in this?"
11. During my research in Los Angeles, California, I visited Jenessee Battered Women's S
ter, the only shelter in the Western states primarily serving Black women, and Everywoman's
ter, which primarily serves Asian women. I also visited Estelle Chueng at the Asian Pacifi
Foundation, and I spoke with a representative of La Casa, a shelter in the predominantly L
community of East L.A.
12. One researcher has noted, in reference to a survey taken of battered women's shelters,
"many Caucasian women were probably excluded from the sample, since they are more likely
have available resources that enable them to avoid going to a shelter. Many shelters admit
women with few or no resources or alternatives." MILDRED DALEY PAGELOW, WOMAN-B