E-TextModule33
E-TextModule33
E-TextModule33
Module Id SM 33
Development Team
Contents
1. Objective………………………………………………………………………………3
2. Introduction…………………………………………………………………………...3
3. Learning Outcome…………………………………………………………………….3
4. Factors influencing Maoist Movements……………………………………………....3
5. Necessary Conditions…………………………………………………………………4
Self-Check Exercise 1………………………………………………………………...5
6. Sufficient Conditions………………………………………………………………….6
Self-Check Exercise 2……………………………………………………………….10
7. Conclusion……………………………………………………………………….…..10
1. Objective
The objective of this module is to introduce you to the issues and challenges of Maoist movements in
India. As several factors have dictated the contours of this movement, this module will allow you to
introspect into diverse structural processes and discursive conditions that make the possibilities of any
collective action indefinite, fluid, and situationally contingent.
2. Introduction
The Maoist/Naxal movements (these words used alternately though they refer to different phases of
the movement) in India, which would complete 50 years in May 2017, have drawn the attention of
many scholars and activists by now. While it is true that such movements have been able to draw our
attention to the plights of poor tribals and dalits, it is equally true that the Maoist themselves are to be
blamed for restricting this ‘political’ struggle to certain pockets having little base among the mass.
Though the leaders of such movements claim to have maintained certain ideological and strategic
uniformity, these movements have taken several trajectories and shades over the years and its leaders
have maintained critical differences on many issues. Thus, the beginning of Naxalbari uprising in 1967
took the shape of an armed uprising of peasants against the landlords by a group of revolutionaries in
the Darjeeling district of West Bengal. But in 1980s, in the second phase of the movement (Banerjee
2006a), rethinking took place on the part of some survivors of the first phase. Participation in
parliamentary politics and trade union activity then became the possible path for them. Even though
some became ‘revisionists’ or ‘counter-revolutionists’, a mixture of the line of armed struggle with
mass mobilisation through open fronts was favoured by some. Fragmentation was a common feature
of the Maoists groups during 1970 and 80s. Again, in the third phase, in 2004, leaders of scattered and
divided fractions of Maoist could create a single revolutionary party, the CPI (Maoist). Further,
despite their critique of the parliamentary system, the CPI (Maoist) changed its stance in 2009 and
started developing tacit understanding with regional parties like Rashtriya Janata Dal, Jharkhand
Mukti Morcha and Trinumul Congress (Verma 2011: 11). Despite these differences, there are some
strong commonalities among those who identify them as Maoists or Naxals. Keeping in view the
changing shades and colours of Maoist movements, we would treat these as different phases of the
same movement and therefore use the plural word ‘movements’ to refer to them.
3. Learning Outcome
In this module, we would learn about the way Naxal/Maoist movements have grew in India, the
factors that contributed to its sustenance for the last five decades and the consequences of armed
struggle over the lives of marginalised tribals and dalits. The discussion would also allow students to
critically review the activities of the Maoists and decide whether and to what extent the movement
poses a ‘threat’ to India’s security.
4. Factors Influencing Maoist Movement
It is often argued that the major reasons of Maoist movements in India are poverty, inequality, lack of
development and want of primary services. Sundar (2011) has labelled this dominant liberal thinking
as “root cause perspective”. Ghosh (2003, 2015) has termed such factors ‘necessary conditions’ which
very often play a critical role in explaining the origin of many social movements. The necessary
conditions include several socio-economic factors like poverty, inequality, land alienation and
eviction, displacement, under-development, unemployment, etc. For instance, the Maoist movements
have flourished in the backward regions domesticated by the tribals and dalits. The necessary postulate
that results out of such argument is that Maoist will find it difficult to sustain if this ‘gap’ is bridged.
Going by such logic, the Indian state has announced a number of developmental projects.
Despite very strong arguments in favour of this approach, ‘development’ alone does not explain the
rise of Maoism in any area. Logically speaking, factors like “poverty, deprivation, oppression and
neglect” identified by Bandhopadyaya committee (GoI 2008: 3) are present in many other parts of the
country that has nothing to do with Maoism. According to Nandini Sundar (2011), Jhabua in western
Madhya Pradesh and Dantewada in Chhattisgarh share similar socio-economic conditions. Yet,
Dantewada is the heartland of the Maoist movement while Jhabua is a site for remarkable non-violent
movement (Narmada Bachao Andolan). Similarly, Naxalites are absent in western India despite the
presence of sizeable number of adivasis there. Scholars have therefore preferred to contextualise
Maoist movements by regions as areas with better records of development also witness the growth of
insurgent activities as compared to less developed districts.
As against the arguments of ‘root cause perspective’, Maoism did not die a natural death in areas that
witnessed ‘development’. One of the reasons for the sustenance of Maoism is that it serves as a form
of ‘political protest’ (Judge 2015: 248) putting up stiff ‘political challenge’ to the ruling elites like
landlords, capitalists including the state apparatus at local level. Maoists also represent a political
movement based on a distinct ideology. As a political formation or group(s), the Maoists have much
similarity with many other political parties particularly of Left variety. Thus, they maintain a hierarchy
of structure with top leadership dictating terms, collect fund to maintain their operations, change
ideology and strategy to spread across regions, stress on local/regional issues and develop tacit
understanding with regional/local political parties and groups in opposition to the ruling elite. We need
to take contingence of these political processes in evaluating the strength of Maoists in a particular
area.
Another reason for their sustenance is the costs of the very model of ‘capitalist development’ that the
state follows. It has been argued that the neo-liberal policy pursued by the Indian state since 1991 had
led to displacement and deprivation of the tribals in large numbers. The state has therefore not altered
the ‘basic structure of exploitation’ (Sundar 2011) even though it spends crores of money to ‘develop’
Naxalite affected areas. Hoelscher et al. (2012) have shown that mining projects undertaken in recent
years have “pushed” local people to support anti-capitalist and anti-foreign stance of the Maoist in
order to save their land. To these authors, increased violence is a result of “pull factors” as mining
industry and Maoist movements are correlated.
One, therefore, needs to go beyond the conventional models to explain the phenomenon and look for
alternative reasons. Ghosh (2003) has called them ‘sufficient conditions’. These conditions include an
acute sense of discrimination among the youth in particular, emergence of a strong elite leadership,
political interest and manipulation, state policies and actions, easy accessibility to external support and
geographical location. Let us now discus these conditions in some detail.
5. Necessary Conditions
The significance of necessary conditions like poverty, unemployment, backwardness, deprivation, land
question, displacement, exploitation, marginalisation have found prominence in any analysis of social
movement in a country like India. The rise of Naxalite/Maoist movements also depicts the same story.
Thus, The Naxalbari movement came into being as a result of prevailing social and economic issues.
The West Bengal State Secretariat of the CPI (M) while conducting an enquiry into the uprising,
recognised that “behind the peasant unrest in Naxalbari lies a deep social malady - malafide transfers,
evictions and other anti-people actions of tea gardeners and jotedars” (Quoted in Dixit 2010). All the
regions in which the Naxal movement took place are ones with alarming levels of poverty. Alienation
of tribal land was a major issue that crippled their economic welfare. This was evident in good
measure in the Srikakulam Naxal movement. Andhra Pradesh accounted for the highest incidence of
tribal land alienation in the country with non-tribals owning more than half the land in the scheduled
areas (Banaji 2010: 136). In the Kondeamodalu in East Godavari, the Maoist took up the demands of
indebtedness of the tribals, their exploitation by money lenders and farm wages (Sinha 1989). One of
the major services that the Maoist cadres have provided is to offer protection for villagers from
confiscation of assets by moneylenders (Kapur et al 2012).
The Expert Group set up by the Planning Commission of Government of India (2008) to look into the
issues of ‘development’ of Naxal/Maoist affected areas also observed that the affected districts suffer
from lack of proper governance and appropriate implementation of poverty amelioration programmes.
And since economic globalisation, the dispossession and oppression of tribals and dalits in India have
provided the Maoists a major platform to launch movement.
We may use the example of Lalgarh in West Midnapur, West Bengal to explain the issue. This place
became famous for Maoist activities in recent past. It is an undulated forest area within Junglemahal
occupied mainly by the tribal communities belonging to the Santal, Bhumij and Sabar, along with the
Mahatos who are recognized as an OBC Community in West Bengal. The people here generally have
little or no landholding, except a very few who enjoy political authority. The area virtually has no
irrigation facility. The marginal economy is centred round collection of minor forest produces like sal
leaves (for making leaf-plates), forest tubers, babui grass (for making rope) and kendu leaves (for
making bidi). The sale of these products is done through the middlemen at a much lower price than
that in the market. Most of the young men and women are unemployed and engaged as occasional
labourers with very low wage rate. People here are forced to go to namaal (low-land distant areas with
rich agricultural prospects) as seasonal agricultural wage labourers at a cheap wage rate. Junglemahal
being an underdeveloped area is marked by absolute poverty and dearth of proper healthcare and
educational facilities. The poor people are, therefore, deprived of their basic requirements for
generations (Midya et. al. 2012).
It is under such circumstance, the outside Maoists leaders initially chose some areas of Junglemahal to
build up their organizational bases in late 1990s. Their presence was felt during 1996-97 when they
were trying to achieve higher price for babui rope and kendu leaves in Banspahari area. In several
other places where the Maoists operate in the country, the immediate issues of the tribals or dalits are
seriously addressed through armed resistance. These ‘modus operandi’ often allowed them to break
new grounds, spread influence and could establish them as ‘protector of rights of the tribals’ (Verma
2011: 13). To the marginalised tribals and dalits then, Maoism is “an ideology of hope for those at the
lower rung of rural society” (Chakrabarty and Kujur 2010: 202). It in such a context that Arundhati
Roy (2010) has argued for understanding a “spectrum of resistance”, on which Maoist armed struggle
deserves respect.
observed that the affected districts suffer from lack of proper governance and appropriate
implementation of poverty amelioration programmes. And since economic globalisation, the
dispossession and oppression of tribals and dalits in India have provided the Maoists a major
platform to launch movement. Hence, the committee recommended proper implementation of
protective legislation, asked the stakeholders to be careful with land acquisition as well as
rehabilitation and resettlement policies, look after the issues of livelihood security and governance,
and recommended introduction of new programmes and policies in Maoists affected areas.
6. Sufficient Conditions
We have seen earlier that ‘necessary conditions’ alone cannot explain the totally of the way the
Naxal/Maoist movements have spread and sustained over the last 48 years. Such straightforward
argument does not take care of the “human agency” factor that plays a crucial role in deciding the
trajectory of any social movement. Too much of stress on the economic factors also distract out
attention from the salient social, cultural, political and geographical factors. Let us now discuss these
factors in the context of Maoist movements in India.
In the subsequent phases of Maoist movements also the leadership, by and large, is found to be
from among the highly educated middle class intellectuals who were often from urban India (Shah
and Pettigrew 2009, Banaji 2010). Though it is often claimed that cadre of the CPI (Maoist) comes
from sections of India’s poorest population, it is equally true that men and women from subaltern
backgrounds are yet to assume top leadership posts in the party. Interestingly, Maoists also believe
that “the adivasis cannot represent themselves; they must be represented” (Nigam 2010). Looking
into the methodology of the Maoists, it appears that ‘someone else’ and not they were the
liberators. It is a project defined as such by those who claim to represent their interests.
Shah (2006) has found that the initial spread of movement of the Maoist Communist Centre in
Jharkhand was not among the poorest tribal populations, but rather within an educated, often upper
caste, rural elite, who were intimately connected with the developmental state. The Maoist could
trap the educated youth, who were no longer satisfied with tilling their land, by entering into the
‘markets of protection’ offered by locally powerful people. Similar such parallels, noted by
scholars from different parts of the world, prove that social movements take shape only after
certain stages of development, and more importantly after certain level of literacy, awareness, and
growth of middle class (Oommen 2010, Shah and Pettigrew 2009, Ghosh 2003).
The shifting strategy of mobilization of the Maoists has also given rise to confusions. There are
several instances of Maoists shifting their emphasis from mobilising landless dalits to uniting the
middle peasants by addressing the latter’s demand for government subsidies and remission of rents
and more importantly protecting them from the classes below them. This led the dalits to suspect
the Maoist’s motive.
The armed strategy of the Maoists is not without criticism. There are plenty of instances where the
Maoists have liquidated common tribals, dalits, human rights workers, NREGA activists and
members of rival groups. More importantly, the strategy of ‘annihilation of class enemies’ has
ultimately led to killing of poor tribals in most cases (Nigam 2010; Simeon 2010). In this context, it
is also alleged that notwithstanding revolutionary proclamations, the Maoist party in practice is an
undemocratic—perhaps even anti-people—force whose sole aim is to seize state power by hook or
crook to bring the masses under the control of the leadership of the party (Mukherji 2010). As
against such a negative assessment, Sundar’s (2011) field exposures in the undivided Bastar district
of Madhya Pradesh tells us about the positive contributions of the Maoists in reorganizing the
stratified society that helped them to expand their support base. But, as people’s allegiances change
over time, in response either to repression or to new opportunities, they may consciously choose to
be neutral or portray as “sandwiched” between the Maoist and the state (Sundar 2013: 366).
Santosh Rana, one of the original participants in the Naxalite movement, has accused the Maoists
of destroying the people’s unity at Lalgarh in West Bengal by killing Sudhir Mandi in November
2008. Sudhir was a leader of Majhi Marwa. His only offence was that he refused to act according
to orders of the Maoist squads (cited in Mukherji 2012a). Interestingly, when the Maoist extended
support to this movement to resist and defeat the police and other forces, the people did not mind it
as they themselves were not in a position to resist the ‘powers’ of police, forest officials, CPI (M)
leaders, big landholders, ration shop owners, contractors, agents of babui rope and kendu leaves
and the like. But gradually they understood that the Maoists are using them for their own political
benefit (Guha 2012). A movement against dictates of police and political force has therefore lost its
relevance under the dictates of an ultra-violent force.
Ironically, ‘cleansing operations’ by the state in the name of ‘Greyhounds’ (Andhra Pradesh),
‘Operation Green Hunt’ (Dandakaranya), or Salwa Judum (Chhattisgarh) have rather allowed the
Maoists intellectuals and activists to gain fresh support and followers (Shah and Pettigrew 2009,
Harriss 2010, Sundar 2011, 2013 Chandra 2013). This is because, when the state attacks and the
economic lives of adivasi and dalits are further disrupted, enrolment for the militia increases
sharply. In other words, “more the repression by the state, the bigger the ‘people’s army’ of
starving children” (Mukherji 2010b: 20). Hence, it might be argued that incidences of ‘white
terrors’8 by the state serve as ploy for the Maoists to prepare the ground for the ‘red terror’.
There are also contrary instances to prove that violence resulted only when the Maoists failed to
utilise the alternative line of action like mass mobilisation or when they became confident about
challenging the state. For instance, the Maoists in Bihar depended on mass mobilization of dalits in
the 1980s and the Mazdoor Kishan Sangram Samiti (MKSS), a Maoist mass front, carried out the
task. But, in the 1990s, with shrinking space for such mobilization, the Maoists became
increasingly reliant on armed actions (Shah and Pettigrew 2009). Consequently, the Government of
India has banned the Maoists as ‘terrorists’ only in May 2009. From such a point of view, the
production of ‘red terror’ appears to be a specific strategy that the Maoists use in a particular
context (Lecomte-Tilouine 2004).
“because of the coincidence of territorial demand of guerrilla tactics” (Ismail and Shah 2015: 116).
It is also a coincidence that marginalised population live in these hilly terrains where there is no
semblance of any government. But the continuous forest terrain of the states like Jharkhand,
Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Orissa, Andhra Pradesh, Telengana, and West
Bengal have allowed the Maoist/Naxals a free space to conduct arms training, hide themselves and
carry out guerrilla warfare. In certain parts of Bihar and Uttar Pradesh, they have also taken
advantage of Nepal border to organise their guerrilla activities. The remote areas of Sonbhadra,
Chandauli and Mirzapur districts of Uttar Pradesh - are all considered the hotbed of Maoist activity.
The Maoists have been able to make use of such geographical location to run a parallel
administration (South Asia Terrorism Portal 2013). Harriss (2010: 26), therefore, argues that ‘the
essential reason for the strength of the Maoists in the hilly, forested tracts of eastern and central
India is that this terrain, in India and elsewhere in the world, mostly favours guerrilla insurgency’.
It is equally a major challenge for the police force during combing operations. Instead of spreading
the armed struggle all over India, the Maoist leadership concentrated on the forests and
mountainous areas “as these are the strategic areas where base areas can be set up" (Banerjee
2006).
Self-Check Exercise 2
Educated tribal youth are the first to perceive exploitation, discrimination, under-development and
aspire for a better system and thereby forming the core of any protest activity. Alternately, the
Maoist enabled them to participate in a new type of modernity. The young cadres started asserting
their rights over the traditional authority of the village elders. The early youth activists of the Naxal
movement were influenced by romantic ideals of revolution. The sense of disillusionment and the
fiery idealism of youth directed them to Naxalist ideology.
7. Conclusion
This discussion so far may allow us to conclude that the growth and sustenance of Maoism have been
influenced by various structural processes and discursive conditions. Since 1967, the Naxal/Maoist
movements have surfaced again and again despite retreating to subterranean levels. This because of
the combined forces of developmental (necessary) and sociological (sufficient) issues. The number of
districts affected by Naxalism was 50 in 1990, but today it is 270. It is true that the poor tribals or
dalits do not always support the Maoists for ideological/political reasons. The agenda of the tribal and
the Maoists are not the same and hence the victory of the one would not mean the emancipation of the
other. But, in a country like India, anti-state movements have their potential to crop up under different
conditions even though at a particular context its strength and intensity may become less. A situation
of conflict that generates between the ‘powerless’ and the ‘powerful’, cannot be resolved without
looking into the structural and discursive issues. Hence, the state should realise the limits of its
counter-insurgency operation by treating such issues merely as a ‘law and order problem’. Given the
complexity of the situation, we also need to debate whether anti-state movements are really a ‘threat’
to our democracy or not. Often, ‘anti-state’ stand of a violent group is only a strategy to draw the
attention of the ‘deaf and dumb’ state. Since the possibilities of collective action in any movement are
‘indefinite’, and often they develop in sequence over a period of time, it is up to the state and other
stakeholders to presume such ‘situationally contingent’ initiatives in advance and take corrective
action.