Wcms 492724

Firms’ demand for temporary labour
in developing countries: Necessity or

strategy?
Mariya Aleksynska
Janine Berg
CONDITIONS OF WORK AND EMPLOYMENT SERIES No. 77

INWORK
Conditions of Work and Employment Series No. 77
Inclusive Labour Markets, Labour Relations

and Working Conditions Branch
Firms’ demand for temporary labour in

developing countries: Necessity or strategy?
Mariya Aleksynska
Janine Berg
INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE - GENEVA

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ILO Cataloguing in Publication Data
Aleksynska, Mariya; Berg, Janine
Firms' demand for temporary labour in developing countries: necessity or strategy? / Mariya Aleksynska, Janine Berg;
International Labour Office, Inclusive Labour Markets, Labour Relations and Working Conditions Branch. - Geneva: ILO,
2016 (Conditions of work and employment series ; No. 77)
International Labour Office Inclusive Labour Markets, Labour Relations and Working Conditions Branch.
temporary employment / temporary worker / enterprise level / business strategy / regulation / private sector / working
conditions / developing countries
13.01.3
First published 2016
Cover: DTP/Design Unit, ILO
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Printed by the International Labour Office, Geneva, Switzerland
ii Conditions of Work and Employment Series No. 77

Abstract
Using data on private sector firms in developing countries, this paper investigates the
determinants of firms’ recourse to temporary labour. We find that there are two types of
firms: those that do not use temporary labour, and those that do. Among the latter, some
firms use temporary labour very intensively, suggesting that they may strategically organize
their production processes around this type of employment relationship. These firms are
different from others in their characteristics but also in their reasons for employing
temporary labour. At the same time, our main findings suggest that, for all firms in
developing countries, the key factors affecting demand for temporary labour are firm
expansion and the regulations authorising the use of temporary labour for permanent tasks.
Other employment protection legislation provisions have a limited and different effect,
depending on the type of firm.
Conditions of Work and Employment Series No. 77 iii

Acknowledgements
We would like to thank Friederike Eberlein for excellent research assistance, as well
as Sangheon Lee, Rosalia Vazquez-Alvarez, David Kucera, Christian Viegelahn,
participants to the ILO Regulating for Decent Work Conference and joint IZA-ILO
conference for their helpful comments. The usual disclaimers apply.
iv Conditions of Work and Employment Series No. 77

Contents
Page
Abstract ................................................................................................................................ iii
Acknowledgements ............................................................................................................. iv
Tables and Figures .............................................................................................................. vi
1. Introduction................................................................................................................... 1
2. Literature review and hypothesis setting.................................................................... 3
2.1 The flexibility argument ...................................................................................................... 3
2.2 Cost advantages ................................................................................................................... 4
2.3 Technological change .......................................................................................................... 5
2.4 Moderate v. intensive use of temporary labour ................................................................... 6
3. Data description ............................................................................................................ 6
4. Descriptive statistics ..................................................................................................... 8
5. Empirical setting and results ..................................................................................... 13
5.1 Specifications .................................................................................................................... 13
5.2 Micro level determinants of firms’ use of temporary labour ............................................. 15
5.3 Macro level determinants of firms’ use of temporary labour ............................................ 18
5.4 Robustness of the results ................................................................................................... 20
5.5 Modelling the firm decision-making process .................................................................... 20
6. Conclusions .................................................................................................................. 24
References ........................................................................................................................... 26
Annex .................................................................................................................................. 30
Conditions of Work and Employment Series .................................................................. 34
Conditions of Work and Employment Series No. 77 v

Tables and Figures
Page
Table 1: Incidence of temporary employment, as percentage of total employment, by region
and sector, circa 2010 ...................................................................................................... 10
Table 2: Incidence of temporary employment, by sector ................................................................ 10
Table 3: Firm-level determinants of using temporary work: flexibility, cost, and technology ....... 16
Table 4: Macro-level determinants of temporary work use ............................................................ 19
Table 5: Robustness of the results. Modelling the “two-step” firm decision process ..................... 21
Figure 1: Incidence of temporary employment, as percentage of total wage employment, in

private sector, circa 2010 .................................................................................................. 8
Figure 2: Distribution of the firm-level number of temporary employees, as percentage of
total employment, in firms employing at least 1 temporary worker ................................. 9
Figure 3: Distribution of firm employees (in logs), by type of firm with respect to temps use ....... 9
Figure 4: Distribution of temporary employees, by country’s level of development ....................... 11
Figure 5: Temporary employees and country income ...................................................................... 29
Figure 6: Distribution of temporary employees, as percent of firm’s workforce, by legal
regulations governing fixed-term work............................................................................. 12
Figure 7: Temporary employees and country EPL ........................................................................... 13
Annex
Appendix A: Sample Description ........................................................................................................ 30
Appendix B: Description of Variables ................................................................................................ 31
Appendix C: Descriptive Statistics...................................................................................................... 33
vi Conditions of Work and Employment Series No. 77

1. Introduction
Temporary employment has always existed in labour markets and serves specific
purposes. Over the past several decades, however, there has been an increase in the use of
temporary work in many parts of both the industrialized and the developing world, often for
new motives and in sectors not previously characterized by these arrangements (ILO,
2015a). The shift toward temporary labour and other atypical forms of employment has
prompted concerns about the future of work, including the status of the standard
employment relationship, and has led to calls for the need to ensure that all workers,
regardless of their contractual arrangement, enjoy decent working conditions (ILO, 2015b).
In many developing countries, although wage employment continues to be more limited,
there nonetheless appears to have been an evolution in contractual arrangements among
waged workers. Such evolution has differed across countries, possibly as a result of different
firm preferences, specific economic contexts, or legislative frameworks, potentially leading
to long-lasting practices.
The aim of this paper is to analyse firm-specific, macroeconomic, and institutional

factors that determine firm-level decisions to employ temporary labour in developing
countries. Specifically, our goal is to understand whether the use of temporary labour is
shaped by necessity or by firm strategy towards persistent use of temporary labour, and what
is the role of labour market regulations in determining these practices. As we proceed, we
also test the relevance of three hypotheses identified by previous literature for developed
countries – flexibility, cost advantages, and technological change – for firm use of
temporary labour, distinguishing between firms that potentially use temporary labour for
different purposes.
Our study is based on the World Bank Enterprise Survey, which is the largest and
most recent firm-level survey in the world. We use a sub-sample of over 72,000 private
firms covering 118 developing countries during the period from 2006 to 2014. The survey
contains detailed questions on firm’s current and past activities. To assess the role of labour
market institutions, we use a recently developed ILO EPLex indicator (ILO, 2015c), which
measures the degree of employment protection afforded to workers with permanent
contracts. We also test the relevance of fixed-term contracts regulations, employing an
indicator of whether fixed-term contracts (FTCs) are authorized for permanent tasks and an
indicator of whether FTCs have legal limits or can be used for unlimited duration.
Our main findings are three. First, the micro-level hypotheses for firm use of
temporary labour identified by previous literature as relevant for developed countries –
flexibility needs, cost saving strategies, and technological adjustments – are relevant in
developing countries, too.
Second, the data and our empirical results suggest that there exist two types of firms:
those that do not use temporary labour, and those that do. Firms that do not use any
temporary labour (at least not on a regular basis), represent the majority of formal firms in
developing countries, their share is about 60 per cent. Firms using temporary labour do so
quite intensively: on average, about one third of their workforce is temporary. This average,
however, also hinders important disparities across firms, as there are 5 per cent of firms that
account for 57 per cent of all temporary labour, and 18 per cent of using firms have 50 per
cent or more of their workforce staffed with temporary workers. Thus, it seems that some of
the using firms use temporary labour not only for what can be called “traditional” purposes,
such as replacing a temporarily absent worker, meeting short-term needs of seasonal spikes
in demand, or for screening and probation, but also strategically, organizing their production
processes around the use of temporary labour. Moreover, employing temporary labour may
Conditions of Work and Employment Series No. 77 1

be a two-step decision process at the firm level, whereby firms first make a deliberate
decision about employing temporary labour on a regular basis, and then decide on its
amount. While most of the previous literature also acknowledged the existence of a high
share of firms not recurring to temporary labour, to the best of our knowledge, no previous
paper explicitly accounted for a possibility of a two-step decision-making process. We show
that, indeed, firms using temporary labour can be further split into firms with “moderate”
and with “intensive” use. Intensive users have different reasons when compared to other
using and non-using firms. They also have different firm-level characteristics as compared
to others. Consequently, the role of some of the firm-level characteristics, established by the
existing literature, varies between these types of firms. The only firm-level factor that has a
similar impact on firm decisions to use temporary labour, independent of firm type, is a
recent expansion in the firm’s operations.
Third, we report mixed evidence on the role of regulations governing termination of

regular contracts. The strongest and most robust effect for all types of firms is found on the
indicator measuring whether fixed-term contracts (FTCs) are prohibited for permanent tasks:
such prohibitions seem to have a strong deterring effect for the use of temporary labour for
all types of firms. In addition, firms that use temporary labour intensively also account for a
legal possibility to use temporary labour in an unlimited manner, while firms that use
temporary labour moderately do not.
Our paper is close in spirit to studies examining the determinants of temporary

employment in a multi-country setting, and also addressing the role of institutions (Kahn,
2007; Polavieja, 2006; Baranowska and Gebel, 2010; Hevenstone, 2010; Gebel and
Giesecke, 2011; see also Hipp et al., 2015 for a recent literature review). However, those
studies focused either on the aggregate level of temporary employment, or on micro worker-
level incidence of temporary contracts; all of them were limited to developed countries. In
contrast, our contribution is to focus on the firm-level decisions to employ temporary labour
in developing countries. Our study is also close to Pierre and Scarpetta (2013), who use the
same survey, but cover a different sub-sample. They suggest that firms in countries with
high level of EPL use both more training and temporary labour – a result somewhat different
from ours due to different measurement of EPL, and different modelling of both EPL’s
effect and firm decision to use temporary labour. In contrast to us, these authors describe not
finding any significant effect of regulations concerning fixed-term contracts, which is
somewhat counter-intuitive, though they do not formally report these results.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section II contains a review of the
literature and the main hypotheses that have been advanced to explain firms’ use of
temporary labour. In Section III, we provide a brief description of the data, followed by
descriptive statistics in Section IV. Section V provides the main results of our analysis,
distinguishing between those factors that are more ‘internal’ to the firm and those that are
‘external’, as well as between different types of firms. The last section gives a summary of
our findings and discusses the implications for policy debates.
2 Conditions of Work and Employment Series No. 77

2. Literature review and hypothesis setting
What leads firms to use temporary labour? Why do some firms use temporary labour
more than others? There are several stands of literature — management studies, industrial
relations, sociology, and labour economics, that study the determinants of firm’s decision to
use temporary labour. The reasons most commonly put forward are flexibility, cost
advantages, and technological change. These three reasons are not necessarily independent
of one another, as organizations may use temporary workers for any one, or a combination,
of these reasons; also, the cost advantage reason is often embedded into flexibility and
technological change arguments. Yet while there is a vast literature addressing why firms
chose to employ temporary workers, the literature is almost silent on why some firms chose
to make this the focus of their organizational strategy, becoming ‘intensive users’, whereas
other firms opt to use temporary workers only out of punctual necessity, and in moderate
amounts. We return to this issue after first reviewing the flexibility, cost and technology
arguments.
2.1 The flexibility argument

Firms in competitive labour markets face fluctuations in demand for their goods and
services, either because of seasonality, changes in the business cycle, competition from
other firms for market share, or external shocks. As labour is a variable cost in production
(or at least a quasi-fixed cost (Oi, 1962)), firms have an incentive to ensure numerical
flexibility in their labour force, so that they do not employ more staff than necessary when
demand falls. Temporary labour is thus a convenient source of numerical flexibility.
On the other hand, firms also need to ensure that they have sufficient, knowledgeable
staff to carry out the core operations of the firm and ensure firm longevity. Thus firms often
seek the right balance between stability and flexibility in their workforce. Economists have
long recognized that firms operate with this consideration in mind. In their seminal study of
internal labour markets, Doeringer and Piore (1971) explained how within a firm there are
essentially two labour markets, a primary, or internal, market consisting of jobs that are
well-paid, stable and with advancement opportunities and a secondary, or external, market,
which is lower-paid, lower-skilled and with fewer opportunities for training and
advancement. The authors explained how many firms in diverse industries organized their
workforce as internal labour markets, but also relied on a secondary group of workers whose
skills were general and where the recruitment, screening and training costs were markedly
lower.
Building on the insights of Doeringer and Piore (1971) and the efficiency-wage model
of Bulow and Summers (1986) and Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), Saint-Paul (1996) shows
mathematically how dualism along the permanent-temporary workers divide can arise
endogenously within a firm as a response to demand fluctuations. Because searching and
recruiting workers with necessary skills and monitoring their work is costly, firms pay
efficiency wages (wages above market clearing) to both motivate and retain workers. Since
adjusting such labour to demand fluctuations is also costly, firms will have an incentive to
split their workforce into a higher-paid, primary or core workforce and a secondary, or
peripheral, workforce, for whom the adjustment costs are substantially lower. These
adjustment costs may be related to the direct firing costs, but stem primarily because
secondary employees are paid less than the efficiency wages that primary employees
receive. Saint-Paul (1996) shows that such dualism arises naturally and can be optimal for a
firm, even in absence of labour market institutions and regulations, such as employment
protection legislation. In countries where firms have limited possibility of choosing which
workers can be granted employment security because of the existing employment protection

legislation, the dualism within a firm can also arise when legal provisions explicitly allow
for the use of temporary labour, and especially if legal provisions stipulate different level of
protection for permanent and for temporary workers, thereby providing an additional
incentive to use temporary labour.
Empirical evidence both in economics and in management literature, though on

industrialized countries, shows that temporary workers can indeed be used to help firms
attain numerical flexibility (Bentolila and Dolado, 1994), allowing them to survive under
adverse macroeconomic conditions (Holmlund and Storrie, 2002; Benito and Hernando,
2008), or respond to demand fluctuations, as well as to protect ‘core’ workers from any
potential downsizing due to demand fluctuations (Ko, 2003). Abraham and Taylor (1996)
also show that temporary employment indeed represents a buffer stock to adjust to
fluctuations in demand, but warn that while the demand for such work increases in less
stable economic environments, it may also be mitigated by the firms’ ability to reschedule
the delivery of some of its products and services to off-peak periods. In particular, in firms
providing out-of-site services and facing unstable demand, less labour is contracted-out,
because employers do attach a certain value to maintaining stable relationships with their
regular employees who may perform other in-house tasks during slow periods (see also Ton,
2014). Moreover, Hunt (2000) also warns that fixed-term contracts may offer firms a less-
than desired flexibility due to restrictions that typically apply to the renewals of these
contracts. Caggese and Cugnat (2008) suggest that the flexibility provided by temporary
workers is particularly useful for firms facing financing constraints.
Some further nuances regarding the use of temporary workers as “buffers” is provided
by the literature examining the role of unions and collective bargaining in firm’s decision to
hire temporary workers. On the one hand, unions may contribute to growing recourse of
temporary employment if it helps isolate permanent workers from the negative effects of
demand volatility and technological shocks (Saint-Paul, 1996; Bentolila and Dolado, 1994;
Abraham and Taylor, 1996). Thus, a few empirical studies have found that temporary
contracts are more wide-spread in countries with higher union densities or higher collective
bargaining coverage (Kahn, 2007; Baranowska and Gebel, 2010; Hevenstone, 2010). On the
other hand, unions may also oppose the recourse to temporary labour, either out of social
cohesion considerations (Visser, 2002), or because they may perceive temporary workers as
threats to their bargaining power (Heery, 2004), especially when firms strategically use
externalized workers to diminish unions’ power (Hatton, 2014).
2.2 Cost advantages

The management literature confirms the theoretical predictions from economics with
respect to the role of labour costs in determining temporary labour hiring decisions. First,
organizations devoting significant resources to hiring workers with highly job-specific
profile, and also firms providing firm-specific training, would indeed be less likely to fill the
vacancies requiring such training by temporary workers, because they would value the
possibility to recoup the investment (Davis-Blake and Uzzi, 1993). However, if temporary
contracts can be used for screening (Portugal and Varejao, 2009), such hiring costs can be
reduced by more substantial recourse to temporary work (Faccini, 2014), provided that
temporary workers are subsequently converted into permanent ones. As the pool of potential
suitable job applicants is greater during recessions, firms have higher incentives to use
temporary contracts for screening purposes when unemployment is high (Holmlund and
Storrie, 2002). As such, the overall effect of the hiring costs on the use of temporary work
depends on the type and purpose of temporary contracts.
Second, organizations may value the lower direct labour costs that firms incur while
using temporary labour, because in a vast majority of cases, temporary workers are indeed

paid lower wages as compared to permanent workers (for a review of empirical evidence,
see ILO, 2015a). More specifically, the lower wages can be the result not only of different
screening of temporary workers job intensity, as compared to permanent workers, but also
because of probationary nature of some temporary contracts; shorter tenure of temporary
workers; exclusion of temporary workers from corporate benefits, such as annual bonuses;
or simply unequal treatment of non-standard workers (Lee and Yoo, 2008). Temporary
workers are also less likely to be subject to social security contribution payments as
compared to permanent workers, or be entitled to paid leave. Given this, the higher the
wages and fringe benefits in an organization, the more incentives firms have to use
temporary workers to offset such costs (Davis-Blake and Uzzi, 1993; Kalleberg et al., 2003;
Houseman, 2001), although such relationship may be nonlinear with limits to the cost
advantage of using temporary workers (Nielen and Schiersch, 2014).
Third, the use of temporary employment, especially in the European context of the
past three decades, has often been explained by the significantly lower firing costs
associated with terminating temporary contracts, as compared to permanent contracts. While
workers on fixed-term contracts are typically well protected during the period covered by
the contract (in some instances, termination of such contracts before their end date may
entail payment of all wages due until the contractual end date), at the end of the contract,
generally no reasons need to be provided by the employer to justify the end of the
employment relationship, beyond the end date of a fixed-term contract being reached. In
contrast, terminating employment relationship with permanent workers, at the initiative of
the employer, usually entails certain costs, including severance payments, costs associated
with notification procedures, and other compensatory payments if terminations are unfair.
Starting in the 1970s, numerous European countries partly deregulated labour markets with
the aim of increasing labour market flexibility, by allowing for a wider use of temporary
contracts, by expanding their scope to jobs that were not temporary in nature, and by
increasing the allowed duration and number of renewals. At the same time, employment
protection for permanent workers remained relatively intact. As a result, the wedge in the
costs associated with terminating a temporary and a permanent worker grew, leading many
researchers to attribute the growth of temporary employment in some European countries to
these partial reforms (Bentolila and Dolado, 1994; Blanchard and Landier, 2002; Boeri and
Garibaldi, 2007; Faccini, 2014; OECD, 2014). Similar reforms on the use of temporary
labour occurred in some developing countries, particularly Peru (Vega-Ruíz, 2005).
Nonetheless, the low separation costs for temporary workers has to be weighed against costs
associated with the frequent search for new workers (Holmlund and Storrie, 2002).
2.3 Technological change

Whereas the economics literature has focused on the use of temporary labour as a
response to demand fluctuations, the management literature has emphasized the production
model of the firm, particularly the extent to which production is standardized. The
simplification of tasks brought about by technology means that tasks can be performed by
less skilled workers, who need less training and thus can be brought in at short notice
(Nollen and Axel, 1996). As a result, turnover is less costly for firms, thus there is less of an
incentive to cultivate long-term employment relationships. Uzzi and Barsness (1998)
suggest that firms using computerized technologies are also the ones that recur more often to
fixed-term workers. On the other hand, sophisticated technologies may increase firm-
specific knowledge and lessen recourse to temporary and outsourced labour, both to save on
training costs and to preserve their know-how (Mayer and Nickerson, 2005). In addition,
even with standardized production models, there may be advantages to having a stable
workforce, in which the worker is encouraged to communicate problems and suggest
innovations (Ton, 2014; Kleinknecht et al., 2014; Kleinknecht, 2015). Similarly, complex
jobs, either from an interpersonal or a technological viewpoint, are less likely to be

performed by temporary workers, and firms’ “knowledge workers” are most likely to be
permanent employees (Davis-Blake and Uzzi, 1993).
2.4 Moderate v. intensive use of temporary labour

The economics and management literature explain how firms employ ‘primary’ or
‘core’ workers and ‘secondary’ workers who either serve as a buffer to respond to
fluctuations in demand or who are performing more routine tasks and thus cost less.
However, these theories, as well as the other explanations given above, do not explicitly
address the degree to which firms use secondary workers. Seminal management articles
have addressed the importance of having companies focus on ‘core competencies’ (Prahalad
and Hamel, 1990), but without providing an indication of what the core activities of a firm
are, or suggesting the limits to not directly employing ‘core’ workers for these functions.
Yet there appear to be sizeable differences in the intensity of use of non-standard
arrangements across companies, with a small percentage of firms making extensive use of
them. For example, Capelli and Keller (2013) find in their study of U.S. businesses that
among the top 5 per cent of firms using non-standard arrangements, 66 per cent of the
workforce is part-time and 39 per cent is temporary workers (of which 10 per cent are hired
through a temporary employment agency). Houseman (2001), also studying the U.S., finds
that among firms using part-time and on-call workers, 8 per cent of firms had more than 75
per cent of their workers in part-time arrangements and 17 per cent of firms had more than
75 per cent of their workers in on-call arrangements. A study of in-house subcontracting in
Korea (whereby workers are hired through a subcontractor but work on the premises of the
lead firm) of 1,764 firms with more than 300 employees, found that 55 per cent used in-
house subcontracting and that in 8 per cent of the firms, more than 50 per cent of the
workforce were in an in-house subcontracting arrangement. While in-house subcontracting
was most common in the steel and automobile industries where it originated, it had spread
throughout manufacturing and services and was also common among public industries (Eun,
2012). Also with respect to subcontracting, Weil documents the myriad of industries that
have ‘fissured’ key functions of their businesses, such as major hotel chains that have
outsourced cleaning and front desk services to third-party management companies (Weil,
2014). More research, however, is needed to better understand why some firms rely on the
intensive use of temporary and other non-standard work arrangements, while others do not,
and the consequence of such use for both firms and workers alike.
3. Data description
Our analysis is based on the World Bank Enterprises Survey, a representative firm-
level survey of private companies in developing countries. The data were collected between
2006 and 2014, with most countries being surveyed twice, and a few countries, such as
Bulgaria and Chile, surveyed three times. Apart from a small overlap, a different set of
enterprises was surveyed in each wave, leading us to choose a pooled setting for the data
analysis.
The survey data are collected from face-to-face interviews with top managers and
business owners of formal (registered) companies with 5 or more employees , operating in
manufacturing and services sectors. The survey covers a broad range of questions on firm-
level characteristics, business environment topics, and characteristics of the firms’
workforce, including the number of temporary and permanent workers in an enterprise. The
latter questions allow computing both the use and the prevalence of temporary workers (as a
share of all employees) in an enterprise.

The exact wording of the relevant question is “How many full-time temporary
employees did this establishment employ in fiscal year X?”, where temporary workers refer
to “temporary or seasonal employees, defined as all paid short-term (i.e. for less than a fiscal
year) employees with no guarantee of renewal of employment contract” (World Bank,
2011). This definition is somewhat different from the one employed in the literature: it is
relatively broad as it captures all possible types of temporary workers, including seasonal
and casual; at the same time it is narrow, because it excludes temporary workers employed
for more than one year or having promise of renewal of their temporary contract. It,
however, satisfies the key feature of temporary work from the firms’ viewpoint: the fact that
no guarantee of renewal of employment contract is provided.
Using this question, combined with the question on the number of permanent full-
time employees employed in an establishment, we construct a variable temp_share_all, as a
ratio of temporary workers to the sum of temporary and permanent workers. This variable is
used as principal dependent variable in further analysis. As explained below, we also test
alternative dependent variables.
After restricting the sample to firms containing information on the number of

temporary employees and other key firm characteristics, as well as after retaining only
meaningful observations (dropping firms with negative share of temporary employees, or
this share greater than one; firms with negative age or unknown ownership type), the sample
is reduced to 71,943 observations in 118 countries. This sample is used for constructing all
descriptive statistics. Appendix A lists the set of countries and the exact years of data
collection, and Appendix B contains full descriptive statistics of all independent variables
used in the analysis. Once only the observations with non-missing data on all other firm
characteristics are retained, the sample for empirical estimation is reduced to 43,158
observations .
In addition, we complement the World Bank Enterprises Survey with macro data from
various sources. Data on GDP growth and GDP per capita are from the World Bank
statistical portal; unemployment is from ILO STAT. To assess the role of regulations on
termination of permanent contracts we use a recently developed ILO EPLex indicator
measuring the overall degree of protection afforded by legislation to workers on permanent
contracts (ILO, 2015c). Lastly, we also complement these data with two dichotomous
variables from the World Bank’s Doing Business indicators describing the regulation of
fixed-term contracts (FTCs): the first takes value one if FTCs are authorised for permanent
tasks, and zero otherwise; the second takes value one if FTC regulations specify any limits
to the FTC duration, and zero otherwise.

4. Descriptive statistics
Figure 1 shows the distribution of temporary employees, as percent of all employees
in developing countries, in the manufacturing and services private sector. It shows that the
average share of firms’ temporary workforce spans from under 5 per cent in Latvia, Jordan,
and Sierra Leone, to over 25 per cent in Vietnam, Peru, and Mongolia, being broadly
consistent with the data from national sources (for the most recent figures, see ILO, 2015a).
The mean share of temporary workers is 11 per cent, with roughly one-third of the surveyed
countries with temporary employment around this mean.
Figure 1. Incidence of temporary employment, as percentage of total wage employment, in

private sector, circa 2010
Source: Own computations based on the World Bank Enterprise Survey, 2015.
Notes: Data for 135 countries, for the latest available year, ranging from 2005 for Morocco and Egypt to 2014
for Afghanistan and Myanmar. For the majority of countries (67), data refer to 2009 or 2010.
Interestingly, however, only about 40 per cent of all firms throughout the world
employ temporary workers, meaning that about 60 per cent of firms do not use temporary
labour at all. The minority of firms that use temporary labour use it quite intensively: on
average, about one third of their workforce is temporary (Figure 2). A closer look reveals
however a strong heterogeneity across the using firms: 5 per cent of firms account for using
57 per cent of all temporary labour. From Figure 2, it is also apparent that there is a certain
spike at 50 per cent of temporary labour, suggesting a possible categorization within the
using firms. Firms with fewer than 50 per cent of temporary workers in their workforce
account for 82 per cent of all using firms, and the mean share of temporary workers among
them is a rather moderate 19 per cent. Firms with 50 per cent or more of temporary workers
in their workforce account for 18 per cent of all using firms, and the mean share of
temporary workers among them is 63 per cent. This suggests that there are some firms that
may self-select into being high users of temporary labour, with their production process and
human resource strategy organized around the use of temporary workers. Also, plausibly,
firms make their decision about hiring temporary labour in two steps: they first decide
whether to use or not temporary labour, and only then they decide how much.

Figure 2. Distribution of the firm-level number of temporary employees, as percentage
of total employment, in firms employing at least 1 temporary worker
5
4
3
Density
2
1
0
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
temporary employees as % of all employees, employed by a firm in fiscal year
Notes: Data for 118 countries (baseline regression sample), all survey years (2006-2014).
Thus, we also checked the differences in means of characteristics of firms that do not
use temporary labour, and the firms that do, distinguishing also between moderate and
intensive users (Appendix C). The differences in most firm characteristics appear to be
statistically significant based on t-tests for differences of sample means. While it is difficult
to find a common pattern in these descriptive results, moderate users of temporary labour
are more similar to non-using firms in terms of labour efficiency. They are also the ones that
provide the most training to permanent staff. Figure 3 shows the distribution of firm size
across three types of firms, and suggests that both types of using firms are bigger in size as
compared to non-using firms, with intensive users having a potential to be more sizeable
than all others. Thus, it seems that there are worthy differences between these firms.
Figure 3. Distribution of firm employees (in logs), by type of firm with respect to temps use
.4
.3
.2
.1
0
0 2 4 6 8 10
x
Non-using Traditional
Intensive
Notes: Data for 118 countries (baseline regression sample), all survey years (2006-2014).

Table 1 further provides an overview of the incidence of temporary employment
across regions and sectors. It shows that in the Middle East and North Africa, as well as in
South Asia, temporary employment, on average, is more wide-spread in manufacturing than
in services (even though, of course, not all temporary employment in manufacturing sector
is necessary employed in manufacturing production activities; it may include support and
auxiliary personnel). The opposite is true in Africa, East Asia and Pacific, Europe and
Central Asia, and in Latin America. With the exception of Middle East and North Africa,
construction and transportation seem to be the sub-sectors that uniformly employ the largest
share of temporary workers across the world. Temporary workers represent over 35 per cent
of all workers in this sector in East Asia and Pacific, over 30 per cent in Latin America and
Caribbean, over 25 per cent in Africa, and nearly 20 per cent on South Asia. Within
manufacturing, it is the leather industry that employs the largest share of temporary workers
(average number of temporary employees per firm is 32 per cent); in services, it is
construction and transportation (average number of temporary employees per firm is 39 per
cent) (Table 2). Intensive users of temporary workers are found mainly in services, hotels
and restaurants, but also in the wood, food, and leather industry. Interestingly, the presence
of intensive users in those sectors most associated with temporary employment—such as
construction and transport—is more limited, suggesting that the motivations of the
‘intensive’ users extends beyond seasonality or other demands of the production process.
Table 1. Incidence of temporary employment, as percentage of total employment, by

region and sector, circa 2010
Manufacturing Services
Region
Africa 9.69 11.51
East Asia and Pacific 7.90 8.37
Europe and Central Asia 5.92 7.69
Latin America and Caribbean 7.01 11.93
Middle East and North Africa 13.21 12.21
South Asia 13.08 11.16
Notes: Data for 118 countries, all survey years (2006-2014).
Table 2. Incidence of temporary employment, by sector

Share of firms Mean share of Share of using firms in
M/S Sector using any temporary which temp. lab. is
temporary labour workers per firm >=50% of the workforce
M Textiles 0.36 0.24 0.14
M Leather 0.39 0.32 0.19
M Garments 0.39 0.27 0.15
M Food 0.47 0.28 0.19
M Metals and machinery 0.40 0.25 0.14
M Electronics 0.36 0.25 0.16
M Chemicals and pharmaceuticals 0.42 0.22 0.11
M Wood and furniture 0.38 0.31 0.22
M Non-metallic and plastic 0.28 0.18
materials 0.43
M Auto and auto components 0.36 0.20 0.07
M Other manufacturing 0.40 0.25 0.12
S Retail and wholesale trade 0.33 0.26 0.15
S Hotels and restaurants 0.43 0.29 0.20
S Construction, Transportation 0.55 0.39 0.15
S Other services 0.37 0.26 0.34
Note: Data for 118 countries, all survey years (2006-2014). M = manufacturing; S = services

Figures 4-7 also examine the relationship between the share of temporary wage
employment and key country characteristics of interest to our analysis: the level of
economic development, labour market regulations governing the use of FTCs and the
termination of regular contracts. From Figures 4-5, firms in lower- and lower-middle income
countries have considerably higher shares of temporary employees than in upper-middle and
high-income countries, their number clearly decreasing with country’s development. This
finding reflects the more widespread use of casual employment in developing countries. In
Figure 6, temporary wage employment distribution is shown by two types of countries:
those that authorise the use of temporary labour for permanent tasks, and those that do not.
While the two distributions appear similar, there is evidence that countries where FTCs are
legally authorised for permanent tasks have a higher number of firms using temporary
workers, particularly at the higher-end of the temporary employment distribution. The
regulations of regular contracts appear unrelated to the firms’ use of temporary labour
(Figure 7).
Figure 4. Distribution of temporary employees, by country’s level of development

4
3
2
1
0
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
x
Lower- and lower-middle income countries Upper-middle and higher-income countries
Notes: Data for 118 countries, all survey years (2006-2014). World Bank typology of countries by income

Figure 5. Temporary employees and country income
Correlation: -0.137
.3
Timor Leste2009
Tanzania2013
Liberia2009
Togo2009 Uganda2013
Mongolia2009
Chad2009 Kenya2013
Congo2009
Mongolia2013
Afghanistan2008
Benin2009 Bolivia2006 Peru2006
.2
Vietnam2009
Philippines2009
Rwanda2011
Lesotho2009 DRC2010 Kenya2007 Ukraine2013
Bhutan2009 Kyrgyz Tanzania2006 Peru2010
Republic2013
Honduras2006 Iraq2011
Kosovo2013 Panama2006 Colombia2010
Micronesia2009 BurkinaFaso2009
Mauritania2006
Mali2010 Bolivia2010
Paraguay2006
Vanuatu2009 Niger2009 Colombia2006
Guyana2010 Nicaragua2006
Gabon2009
Centralafricanrepublic2011
Kosovo2009 Elsalvador2010
ElSalvador2006
Samoa2009Gambia2006 Rwanda2006
Kyrgyz Republic2009
Tajikistan2013
Mali2007 Yemen2010
SriLanka2011
Uganda2006
Nepal2013 Venezuela2010
Ecuador2006
CapeVerde2009
Djibouti2013 Paraguay2010
TrinidadandTobago2010
Nicaragua2010
Georgia2008 Venezuela2006
Montenegro2009
Botswana2006
Armenia2009 Bangladesh2007
Ethiopia2011
Guatemala2006
Malawi2009 Côte
Madagascar2009
Tajikistan2008 d'Ivoire2009 Chile2006 Pakistan2007
Poland2009
StKittsandNevis2010
Grenada2010 Zambia2013
LaoPDR2012
Costarica2010
Nepal2009
Angola2006
Guatemala2010
.1
Bahamas2010 Honduras2010
Cameroon2009
DRC2006
Georgia2013 Chile2010
Montenegro2013
Namibia2006 DRC2013 Nigeria2007
Fiji2009 Moldova2009
Barbados2010 Albania2007
Senegal2007Ghana2007 SouthAfrica2007
StVincentandGrenadines2010
Swaziland2006 Botswana2010
Mauritius2009
Guinea2006 Indonesia2009
Burundi2006 Mozambique2007Uruguay2006 Azerbaijan2009
Zambia2007
Bosnia andCroatia2007
Herzegovina2009
DominicanRepublic2010
Croatia2013
Serbia2009
Mexico2010
GuineaBissau2006
Eritrea2009 Fyr Macedonia2009
Uruguay2010
Estonia2009 Angola2010
CzechBangladesh2013
Republic2009 China2012
Tonga2009 Latvia2009 Russia2012
Brazil2009
Albania2013 Lithuania2013 Kazakhstan2013 Russia2009
Jamaica2010 Lithuania2009 Azerbaijan2013
Serbia2013
Suriname2010 Latvia2013 Belarus2008 Ukraine2008
Kazakhstan2009
Romania2009
Belarus2013 Mexico2006
Belize2010 Bosnia and Herzegovina2013
Armenia2013
Fyr Macedonia2013 Turkey2008
Antiguaandbarbuda2010 Panama2010 Bulgaria2013
Hungary2009
Moldova2013
LaoPDR2009 Bulgaria2007 Romania2013
StLucia2010
Dominica2010 Bulgaria2009
Sierra Leone2009
0
20 22 24 26 28 30
GDP PPP, in logs
Source: Own computations based on the World Bank Enterprise Survey, 2015; and World Bank ICP, 2015.
Notes: Data for 166 country-year pairs (117 countries).
Figure 6. Distribution of temporary employees, as percent of firm’s workforce, by

legal regulations governing fixed-term work
3
2
1
0
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
x
FTCs prohibited for permanent tasks FTCs authorized for permanent tasks
Source: Own computations based on the World Bank Enterprise Survey, 2015; and WB DB 2015 information.
Notes: Data for 118 countries, all survey years (2006-2014).

Figure 7. Temporary employees and country EPL
Correlation: 0.029
.3
Tanzania2013
Uganda2013
Mongolia2009
Afghanistan2008
Mongolia2013
.2
Rwanda2011 Vietnam2009
Philippines2009
Afghanistan2014
DRC2010 Lesotho2009
Tanzania2006
Peru2010
Panama2006
BurkinaFaso2009
Niger2009
Gabon2009
Elsalvador2010 Centralafricanrepublic2011
Yemen2010
SriLanka2011
Venezuela2010
Georgia2008 Bangladesh2007
Armenia2009Ethiopia2011
Madagascar2009
Côte d'Ivoire2009
Zambia2013 Malawi2009Angola2006
.1
Cameroon2009
Georgia2013 Honduras2010
DRC2006
Chile2010
Nigeria2007 DRC2013Moldova2009 Montenegro2013
Senegal2007
SouthAfrica2007
Mexico2010 Azerbaijan2009 Indonesia2009
Argentina2010
China2012
Bangladesh2013 Angola2010
Fyr Macedonia2009 Czech Republic2009
Russia2012
Mexico2006 Serbia2013
Romania2009
Hungary2009 Fyr Macedonia2013
Bulgaria2013Panama2010
Antiguaandbarbuda2010
Moldova2013
Romania2013
StLucia2010
0
.2 .4 .6 .8
Level of employment protection, regular contracts
Source: Own computations based on the World Bank Enterprise Survey, 2015; and ILO EPLex (ILO, 2015d)
information
Notes: Data for 63 country-year pairs (45 countries).
5. Empirical setting and results
5.1 Specifications
Drawing on the overview of the literature, we start by examining the role of various
factors in firm’s decision regarding the amount of temporary labour to employ. The reasons
that prompt firm’s use of temporary labour are divided into those reasons that are ‘internal’
to the firm (micro-level) and those that are ‘external’ (macro-level). Within internal reasons,
we distinguish between those that are related to flexibility, cost, and technology. For
external factors, we test the relevance of the macroeconomic conditions and labour market
institutions.
Our empirical set-up follows closely Davis-Blake and Uzzi (1993), Devicienti et al.
(2014), and Portugal et al. (2009). The baseline specification allowing to analyse the firm-
level internal determinants of using temporary workforce is as follows:
Temp_share_all ijkt = αijk + β1i Xi + β2iYi + jj + kk + tt+ εijkt (1)
where Temp_share_all ij is the share of temporary labour in firm i operating in sector j

country k and year t; Xi is the set of individual baseline firm characteristics; Yi is the set of
additional individual firm characteristics that allow testing the relevance of flexibility, cost,

and technology factors on the micro level. In all specifications, we control for sector,
country, and year, by including the corresponding jj, kk , tt dummies1; εijkt is the error term.
Among the individual baseline firm characteristics Xi, we include the total number of
employees in a firm and its square, to capture both the actual firm size and its possible
nonlinear effects; firm age as a difference between the year of the survey and the date of
firms’ creation; two dichotomous variables for firm ownership: whether the firm is mainly
owned by domestic private or foreign private individuals, the benchmark category being
whether the firm is owned by domestic government; as well as average productivity, defined
as logarithm of the ratio of the last years’ establishment’s total annual sales converted in the
US dollars divided by all employees, as a measure (or rough proxy) of efficiency2.
To analyze the relevance of macro factors, we also estimate specifications such as (2),
where Kkt is the country-year specific macroeconomic variable.
Temp_share_all ijkt = αijk + β1i Xi + β2iYi + β3kt Kkt + jj + tt+ εijkt (2)
Since not all countries are observed more than once in the data, to avoid
multicollinearity issues, in such regressions, we omit country fixed effects, but cluster errors
on the country level. We first estimate (1) and (2) by OLS, to obtain results comparable to
those in the literature.
Lastly, we also consider the possibility that firms make their decisions regarding
hiring temporary labour in two steps, first deciding whether to employ it or not, and only
afterwards deciding on the amount. In these specifications, we use Cragg (1971) hurdle
model, in which different factors affect each stage. Our hurdle model is characterized by the
relationship:
Temp_share_all ijkt =sih ijkt * (3)
where si is the selection variable equal to one if firms employ any temporary labour,
and zero otherwise:
1 𝑖𝑓 𝑍𝑖 𝛾 + 𝜀𝑖 > 0
𝑠𝑖 = { (4)
0 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
In this equation, Zi is a vector of explanatory variables of the selection stage, 𝛾 is a

vector of coefficients, and 𝜀𝑖 is a standard normal error term.
In its turn, hijkt * is the continuous latent dependent variable observed only if si = 1.
The linear outcome model is:
1
Alternatively, one could also include survey dummies. We prefer separating country and time fixed effects, to
the extent that several countries were surveyed several times, and there is enough variation in both countries and
years.
2
To explore the rich data at hand, we also tested potential importance of some other variables, such as a
dichotomous variable for female ownership, a dichotomous variable measuring whether a firm has been
formally registered when it began operations, and a variable measuring the skill production mix (computed as a
ratio of permanent full-time employees that are skilled production workers, compared to all full-time permanent
workers). We have not found any statistically significant effects on these variables (not reported, but available
on request), and hence did not retain them for further specifications. We did find a statistically significant effect
on the variable measuring the proportion of nonproduction employees to all permanent full-time employees
(equally not reported); however, this variable is only available for manufacturing, thus considerably reducing
the sample size. We have not retained it in further specifications either.

∗
ℎ𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡 = 𝛼 𝑖𝑗𝑘 + 𝛽1𝑖 𝑋𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑖 𝑌𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑘𝑡 K kt + 𝑗𝑗 + 𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡 (5)
where Xi, Yi and Kkt are the micro and macro explanatory variables as in equations
(1) and (2).
5.2 Micro level determinants of firms’ use of temporary labour

In this section, we explore the very rich questionnaire and construct variables most
used in the literature to capture the external flexibility needs and the needs to adjust to the
volatile environment; costs of labour; and technological factors on the micro level. These
variables constitute the Yi vector in specification (1). Table 3 reports estimation results using
simple OLS regression, where, in columns 1-3, these variables are grouped by type of
hypothesis that they pertain to; and in column 4 they are included jointly. We also control
for Xi firm characteristics; average productivity is the only variable among them that
exhibits the most robust and consistent effect across all specifications, suggesting that firms
with higher average productivity recur less to temporary labour.
Flexibility hypothesis
To measure the need for external flexibility, in Table 3, column 1 we include

information on the principal market served, the extent of informal competition, demand
volatility, an indicator of firm expansion, and whether a firm is credit-constrained3.
More specifically, the information on the principal market served is constructed from
the survey question regarding the main market (either local, national or international) in
which the establishment sold its major product over the past year. From these responses, we
construct two dichotomous variables, the first equal to one if the principal market served is
national, and the second equal to one if the principal market is international, with local
market being a benchmark category.
The extent of informal competition is measured by a dichotomous variable equal to

one if a firm reports suffering from competition against unregistered firms.
If firms use more temporary labour as a buffer to adjust to fluctuations in demand, a

demand volatility measure is another relevant variable. We construct such measure
following Devicienti et al. (2014) as the standard deviation of the difference between current
annual sales and the annual sales three years ago calculated at the 2-digit ISIC product
classification of the firm’s main product. Higher values of this variable indicate higher
volatility of demand for the firm’s main product; the computation of this measure at the
product level, rather than at firm level, also helps mitigate endogeneity concerns related to
this variable.
Firms may need more flexibility when they expand their operations. As a measure of
expansion, we include the ratio of current number of permanent employees to the number of
permanent employees three years ago (expansion over a short to medium term). Higher
values of this variable capture a mid-term and long-term growth of the core labour force and
firm’s expansion.
3
There is literature addressing how unionization can affect, both positively and negatively, firms’ recourse to
temporary labour. We used information on the share of unionized workers in an enterprise to explore this issue.
The variable has an insignificant effect, but it is also available for only a fifth of the sample (the question is
asked in only 27 countries, and only in 2006; with substantial number of missing values). Thus, we do not retain
this variable for further analysis.

Table 3. Firm-level determinants of using temporary work: flexibility, cost, and technology
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
Flexibility Cost Technology All
Total N employees 1.15e-06 6.28e-06* 9.21e-06* -6.52e-06
(2.23e-06) (2.77e-06) (3.65e-06) (4.38e-06)
Total N employees squared -1.01e-10* -3.20e-10* -4.35e-10** 2.66e-10
(1.08e-10) (1.44e-10) (1.66e-10) (1.94e-10)
Firm age 0.006** -0.001* 1.91e-05 0.005**
(4.89e-05) (5.74e-05) (8.47e-05) (0.001)
Own : domestic private -0.008* -0.016** -0.018* -0.002
(0.004) (0.005) (0.008) (0.011)
Own : foreign private 0.006 -0.009 -0.004 0.005
(0.004) (0.006) (0.009) (0.011)
Ln (Efficiency) -0.010** -0.017** -0.017** -0.008**
(0.005) (0.008) (0.001) (0.001)
National market 0.007** -0.005
(0.002) (0.003)
International market 0.014** 0.002
(0.003) (0.006)
Informal competition 0.009** 0.012**
(0.002) (0.003)
Demand volatility 0.002** 0.003**
(0.0001) (0.0006)
Employment current to 0.089** 0.094**
that three years ago (0.002) (0.004)
Access to finance 0.002** 0.002
is an obstacle (0.001) (0.001)
Ln (Total labor cost) 0.002** 0.003**
(0.006) (0.009)
Training offered 0.012** 0.007**
(0.002) (0.002)
Regulations is an obstacle 0.005** 0.003*
(0.001) (0.001)
Education is an obstacle 0.003** -0.001
(0.0001) (0.001)
Telecoms are a problem 0.006**
(0.001)
Certification -0.010** -0.003
(0.003) (0.003)
Borrowed technology 0.007*
(0.003)
Constant 0.085** 0.322** 0.295** 0.013
(0.020) (0.023) (0.038) (0.018)
Observations 43,158 43,158 21,600 43,158

R-squared 0.358 0.117 0.122 0.321
Note: Dependent variable in columns 1-4 is the share of temporary employees in a firm. Estimation method: OLS. All
regressions include sector, country, and year effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ** - significant at 1 per cent,
* - significant at 5 per cent.

Finally, the extent to which access to finance is an obstacle to the operations of an
establishment is constructed from a question on whether firms perceive access to finance as
being “no obstacle, a minor obstacle, a moderate obstacle, or a very severe obstacle to the
current operations of the establishment”, with higher values reflecting higher degree of
obstacles. This is done consistently with Cagese and Cunnat (2008), who argue that the
payment of wages and firing costs makes hiring and firing sensitive to the financing frictions
that firms face and who classify firms as those facing financial constraints if they "answered
positively to one or more questions regarding problems in obtaining additional credit".
All of these variables are found to have a statistically significant impact on the use of
temporary labour both in the individual and (with some exceptions) joint specification
(column 4 of Table 3), confirming the relevance of the flexibility hypothesis for firms in
developing countries. As will be shown later, however, the only robust variables are,
however, the ones measuring firm expansion and to a certain extent informal competition
and demand volatility. While some of the firm’s growth can happen because of the
conversion of temporary into permanent contracts and investing in personnel, our results
show that the firm expansion is accommodated by the use of temporary labour. Conversely,
companies that had downsized might have done so at the expense of changing
organizational structure, job definitions, but also terminating or not-renewing temporary
labour.
Cost hypothesis
While many of the flexibility-related variables also embed cost factors, the literature
offers more direct ways of testing for the relevance of the cost hypothesis. We follow it by
including, in Table 3 column 2, the total labour costs, as well as controls for whether firms
offer training to permanent staff. Our estimation results show that the higher is the total
labour bill (expressed in logarithmic term, and converted into USD), the higher is the
incidence of temporary labour. The training dummy also shows a positive and significant
result. The literature suggests that training effects may be different depending of the nature
of temporary jobs and depending on the nature of training. The positive coefficient on
training offered to permanent workers is in line with the hypothesis suggesting that firms
organize their workforce along the core-periphery model, whereby the core workforce
receives training and is used with a long-term perspective, while the periphery workforce,
which is also usually less skilled and lower paid, rotates regularly.
In addition, we test whether the firm-reported perceptions of labour regulations as

being an obstacle (though this question does not specify which labour regulations are
referred to), and whether the firm-reported perceptions of difficulty of finding a suitably
educated workforce, are associated with hiring temporary labour. Research shows that firm
perceptions of regulations correlate well with the de jure level of actual labour regulations in
a country (Pierre and Scarpetta, 2006). Both variables have a significant positive effect in
the “cost” regression in Table 3 column 2, but only the firm-reported perceptions of labour
regulations have a persistently robust effect in a larger specification (Table 3 column 4). In
what follows, we discuss the robustness of other results to the inclusion on these variables.
Technology factors
To check the relevance of technology, we use three variables: the degree to which
telecommunications were perceived as an obstacle to the current operations of the
establishment; whether the establishment has an internationally recognized certification; and
whether the establishment uses any technology licensed from a foreign-owned company
(Table 3, column 3). The telecommunications variable most likely reflects volatility in
production and thus the need to have a ‘buffer’ of labour, rather than the effect of
technology on the standardization of production and the use of different types of labour. The

other two technology variables respond more directly to the literature. While in the
“technology” specification of Table 3 column 3 these variables have expected signs, their
inclusion also reduces substantially the sample size. In a larger specification of Table 3
column 4, we retain only the “certification” variable to preserve the sample size; however,
its effect is no longer significant.
5.3 Macro level determinants of firms’ use of temporary labour

Firms do not operate in isolation, and hence macroeconomic conditions as well as
laws regulating the workplace are important influences on the degree of flexibility and cost-
adjustments required by firms. Moreover, the level of economic development of a country
may also affect the level of temporary wage employment if, for example, countries
transitioning from self-employment to wage employment recur more heavily to temporary
labour. Following the literature, we test the relevance of the level of country’s economic
development, its macroeconomic situation, as well as the relevance of labour market
regulations governing the termination of regular contracts and the use of fixed-term
contracts.
In Table 4, column 1, we build up on Table 3 column 4 by including three

dichotomous variables reflecting country’ level of economic development. As compared to
low-income countries (the omitted group), firms in upper-middle and high-income countries
feature a lower level of temporary labour, consistent with descriptive evidence in Figures 4-
5. As the use of temporary labour is pro-cyclical (OECD, 2012, 2014; ILO, 2015a; Serrano
et al., 2014 – for developing countries), we also control for GDP growth and its three-year
lag, as well as for the level of unemployment (Holmlund and Storrie, 2002). These
variables, however, are not found to be statistically significant in developing countries,
potentially because, unlike in the developed countries, in developing countries the pool of
suitable job applicants is not restrained by the number of unemployed, but is also
represented by a larger number of self-employed willing to switch to wage employment,
thus rendering the number of unemployed less relevant .
In the remainder of Table 4, we test the relevance of the labour market regulations
governing the termination of regular contracts and the use of fixed-term contracts. To
measure the level of protection afforded by employment protection legislation for regular
contracts, we include the newly developed EPLex indicator (ILO, 2015c), which accounts
for all aspects of employment protection legislation, such as the extent of protection
afforded by valid and prohibited grounds for dismissal, trial periods, notification procedures
and length of notice period, severance and redundancy payments, and redress provisions.
While this indicator is available for 100 countries around the world and spanning 2009-
2014; its overlap with the World Bank Enterprises Survey country sample is not perfect and
restricts our sample to 45 countries. As some of the authors using these indicators note, it is
also important to look at the role of each individual EPL sub-component, rather than at the
EPL aggregates (Verkerke and Freyens, 2016 forthcoming). Thus, we use both aggregated
EPLex indicator, to compare our results with those found in the literature, and the
disaggregated components, to have a better understanding which EPL pillar is more
relevant. To measure the regulations governing the use of fixed-term contracts, we use the
World Bank’s Doing Business Indicators database, and specifically two dichotomous
variables: one on whether FTCs are prohibited for permanent tasks; and the other on
whether legislation does not limit the use of FTCs .
In Table 4 column 2, an aggregate EPLex indicator is included in addition to the

controls for macroeconomic conditions; its effect appears to be statistically insignificant, in
line with the descriptive evidence of Figure 7. In column 3, two measures of FTC
regulations are additionally included. While the EPLex variable remains insignificant, the

dichotomous variable measuring whether FTCs are prohibited for permanent tasks shows a
negative and significant sign: the prohibition to use FTCs for non-temporary tasks clearly
reduces firms’ recourse to temporary labour.
Table 4. Macro-level determinants of temporary work use

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Macro Macro, EPL Macro, Macro, FTC, No macro, no
EPL, FTC EPL perceptions, no
disaggregated training, FTC, EPL
disaggregated
Low-middle 0.002 0.008 0.001 0.009 -0.007
income (0.012) (0.016) (0.017) (0.015) (0.013)
Upper-middle -0.036** -0.033* -0.031* -0.037 -0.065**
income (0.013) (0.016) (0.016) (0.019) (0.014)
High-income -0.038** -0.031* -0.036* -0.059* -0.093**
(0.013) (0.017) (0.018) (0.025) (0.019)
GDPgrowth -3.64e-05 -0.0004 -0.0002 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
GDPgrowth -0.0005 0.0002 -0.001 0.001
_3y_lag (0.001) (0.0007) (0.001) (0.001)
Unemployed 0.001 -3.27e-05 -0.001 -0.003*
0.002 0.008 0.001 0.009
EPLex 0.022 0.080
(0.052) (0.045)
FTC prohib perm -0.028** -0.046** -0.042**
(0.011) (0.009) (0.009)
FTC dur unlim 0.004 -0.001 -0.001
(0.010) (0.014) (0.014)
A1_1 : Valid 0.043* 0.047**
Reasons for Dismissal (0.016) (0.016)
A1_2: Prohibited 0.061* 0.020
Grounds for Dismissal (0.023) (0.017)
A2 : Trial period -0.021 -0.027*
(0.016) (0.013)
A3 : Notification -0.055 0.033
Requirements (0.044) (0.039)
A4 : Severance/ -0.085** -0.083**
Redundancy (0.027) (0.023)
A5 : Redress for 0.041* 0.021
dismissals (0.018) (0.021)
Constant 0.003 -0.041 -0.039 -0.025 -0.025
(0.021) (0.043) (0.047) (0.052) (0.051)
Observations 41,824 21,204 21,204 21,204 21,614
R-squared 0.331 0.337 0.341 0.348 0.346
Note: Dependent variable in columns 1-5 is the share of temporary employees in a firm. Estimation method: OLS. All
regressions include firm-level controls as in Table 3, column (4), sector and year effects. Robust standard errors clustered on
country, in parentheses. ** - significant at 1 per cent, * - significant at 5 per cent.

In Table 4 column 3, we include the ILO EPLex indicator disaggregated by its
components, to assess which provisions play the most significant role in firms’ decision-
making. From this column, it is the degree of protection afforded by valid and prohibited
grounds for dismissals, and degree of protection afforded to worker in case he or she wishes
to contest the dismissal, that seem to be the factors positively affecting firm use of
temporary labour. These factors are also the ones that, from an economic viewpoint, embed
the highest degree of uncertainty about the outcomes of the dismissal process (ILO, 2015c).
In contrast, higher levels of severance and redundancy pay have a negative association with
temporary labour. Once again, the most robust effect is on the FTC regulations.
5.4 Robustness of the results

In the last column of Table 4, we test robustness of these findings to a specification
omitting insignificant macroeconomic controls, the firm-reported perceptions of the extent
to which labour regulations are an obstacle since those may be correlated with the EPLex (as
shown in Pierre and Scarpetta, 2006), and the availability of training for permanent staff,
since that may be co-determined with temporary labour when level of employment
protection is too high (as shown in Pierre and Scarpetta, 2013). Regulations prohibiting FTC
use for permanent tasks remain significant throughout, while results on EPL components are
less stable.
We further checked robustness of these findings not only to the model specification,
but also to alternative dependent variables and to the estimation methods, in Table 5.
Column 1 is a replication of Table 3 column 4 for comparative purposes. Column 2 of Table
5 is also a replication of Table 3 column 4, but on a sample restricted to the one with
available institutional data. This ensures that we compare changes in coefficients that are
due to changes in the model, not to the sample. Column 3 of Table 5 adds further
disaggregated EPL variables and regulations of fixed-term contracts. In column 4, the
dependent variable is a binary variable equal to one if firms use any temporary labour, and
zero otherwise; the estimation method is probit. Because a substantial percentage of firms do
not employ temporary labour at all, our dependent variable, expressed either as a share or as
a number of temporary workers, features a sizeable number of zeroes. Thus, in column 5, we
also fit the Poisson count model which may be seen as more appropriate than OLS. All in
all, our results are consistent across the different specifications.
5.5 Modelling the firm decision-making process

Our last and main analytical exercise concerns conceptually re-modelling firm-level
decision to hire temporary labour. From the descriptive statistics, we noted that only about
40 per cent of all firms throughout the world employ temporary workers, meaning that about
60 per cent of firms do not use temporary labour at all, at least not on a regular basis. This
leads us to suppose that firms make two-step decisions, by first choosing whether to use any
temporary labour at all, and only then choosing its amount. To model such two-step
decisions empirically, we employ a hurdle model, which allows disentangling the factors
that affect the first and the second stage of the decision (Table 5, column 6). Among the
variables affecting the first-stage decision we include the regulations of fixed-term contracts,
as well as the maximum duration of trial periods for regular contracts, with the idea that in
countries with shorter trial periods, fixed-term contracts can be used more intensively to
serve a probationary role. All other variables are assumed to affect the second-stage firm
decision on the quantity of temporary labour used. We also experimented with additionally
including relatively stable, exogenous, firm-level characteristics, such as firm age, firm

ownership, market served, or certification to the first stage. The overall results when
including these firm-level characteristics were similar.4
Table 5. Robustness of the results. Modelling the “two-step” firm decision process
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Share, OLS, Share, Hurdle Hurdle Hurdle
Share, T3 EPL OLS Dummy; Share; Model : Model : Model :
OLS, T3 sample EPL Probit Poisson full «moderate» «intensive
users » users
-2.69e-
Total N employees -6.52e-06 -1.12e-05* -1.22e-05* -2.60e-05 -0.001 05** -1.81e-05** -9.91e-06
(4.38e- (7.37e-
06) (4.69e-06) (4.66e-06) (3.70e-05) 05) (9.17e-06) (6.58e-06) (1.78e-05)
Total N employees
squared 2.66e-10 4.77e-10* 5.07e-10* 1.23e-09 5.26e-09 1.13e-09* 8.77e-10** 1.82e-09
(1.94e- (3.54e-
10) (2.17e-10) (2.18e-10) (1.68e-09) 09) (4.41e-10) (2.96e-10) (3.83e-09)
Firm age 0.004** 0.0003** 0.0003** 0.005** 0.001 -0.0003* -0.0006** 0.0005*
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0009) (0.002) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Own : domestic
private -0.002 -0.007 -0.009 -0.304 -0.133 0.0325 0.033** 0.004
(0.011) (0.012) (0.013) (0.205) (0.141) (0.016) (0.012) (0.014)
Own : foreign
private 0.005 0.002 -0.001 -0.147 -0.049 0.031 0.024 0.014
(0.011) (0.013) (0.017) (0.190) (0.159) (0.019) (0.014) (0.017)
Ln (Efficiency) -0.008** -0.008** -0.008** -0.094** -0.086** -0.002 0.003* -0.005**
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.015) (0.017) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
National market -0.0004 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.006 -0.011* -0.004
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.032) (0.056) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006)
International
market 0.002 0.001 0.001 -0.059 -0.013 0.021* -0.004 0.004
(0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.056) (0.092) (0.011) (0.008) (0.009)
Informal
competition 0.012** 0.009** 0.008* 0.117** 0.096* 0.006 0.009* -0.007
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.029) (0.048) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
Demand volatility 0.002** 0.002* 0.002* 0.012 0.015 0.003* 0.002 0.004*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.008) (0.014) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002)
Employment
current 0.094** 0.095** 0.094** 0.492** 0.354** 0.106** 0.051** 0.038**
to that three years
ago (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.046) (0.010) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Access to finance 0.0002 0.001 0.003* 0.003 0.022 0.006* 0.004** -0.0001
is an obstacle (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.012) (0.018) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Ln (Total labor
cost) 0.003** 0.004* 0.005** 0.117** 0.046** -0.017** -0.018** 0.004*
(0.0001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.012) (0.017) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Training offered 0.007** 0.016** 0.012** 0.230** 0.180** -0.013* -0.015** 0.018**
(0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.033) (0.051) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005)
Regulations is an 0.003* 0.006** 0.007** 0.068** 0.056* 0.007* 0.005* 0.001
obstacle (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.016) (0.023) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Education is an -0.0007 -0.0003 -0.0002 0.028* 0.019 -0.008** -0.003 -0.003
obstacle (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.013) (0.021) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003)
Certification -0.003 0.003 0.006 -0.048 0.088 0.041** 0.023** 0.031**
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.046) (0.059) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007)
4
As such, we do not report the results, but they are available upon request.

A1_1: Valid
grounds 0.051** 0.386** 0.379** -0.017 -0.014 0.015
for dismissals (0.017) (0.139) (0.143) (0.016) (0.012) (0.014)
A1_2 : Prohibited 0.023 0.379** 0.277* 0.009 0.016 -0.010
grounds for
dismissals (0.016) (0.141) (0.117) (0.014) (0.010) (0.013)
A2 : Trial period -0.027 -0.058 -0.255* -0.031 -0.083* 0.270**
(0.014) (0.117) (0.118) (0.028) (0.223) (0.047)
A3 : Notification 0.033 0.381 0.482 0.067 0.058* -0.030
Requirements (0.038) (0.338) (0.310) (0.034) (0.026) (0.034)
A4 : Severance/ -0.079** -0.612** -0.486** 0.027 0.034* 0.018
Redundancy (0.024) (0.197) (0.181) (0.018) (0.014) (0.018)
A5 : Redress for 0.027 0.208 0.310* 0.031* 0.030* -0.009
dismissals (0.021) (0.178) (0.133) (0.015) (0.011) (0.014)
FTC dur unlim -0.001 0.022 -0.043 0.008 -0.011 0.194**
(0.0137) (0.119) (0.081) (0.020) (0.021) (0.034)
FTC prohib perm -0.042** -0.376** -0.388** -0.108** -0.091** -0.123**
(0.009) (0.085) (0.073) (0.018) (0.019) (0.031)
Constant 0.013 -0.012 -0.005 -1.315** -2.598** 0.126** 0.182*** 0.302**
(0.018) (0.036) (0.048) (0.483) (0.367) (0.035) (0.041) (0.057)
Observations 43,158 21,377 21,377 21,377 21,377 21,377 20,485 21,377

R-squared /Pseudo
R-squared 0.321 0.326 0.336 0.221 0.267 0.294 0.278 0.292
Note: Dependent variables: col. 1, 2, 3, 5 - share of temporary employees in a firm; col. 4 - dummy variable measuring whether a
firm employees any temporary labour; col. 6, 7, 8 – two stage estimation; dummy variable measuring whether a firm employees any
temporary labour in the first stage; share of temporary employees in a using firm in the second stage. Estimation methods: col. 1, 2,
3 – OLS; col. 4 – probit; col. 5 – PMLE: col. 6, 7, 8 – Cragg hurdle model (coefficients in italics and bold are from the first stage
regression; all others are from the second stage). All regressions include country-income, sector, and year effects. Robust standard
errors, clustered on country level, in parentheses. ** - significant at 1 per cent, * - significant at 5 per cent.
Taken together, results in Table 5 column 6 show that many variables considered up
to now do not stand robustness check to this alternative specification, either losing
significance or reversing signs. In order to better understand these results, we exploit
another key observation from the descriptive statistics suggesting that there may also be
different types of firms that use temporary labour: some firms use temporary workforce in
“moderate” amounts, while others use it very intensively. In some sense, the former firms
may be more similar to firms that do not use any temporary labour at all then to intensive
users. For example, moderate users may be those non-using firms that occasionally happen
to use some temporary labour for what can be called “traditional” reasons, such as replacing
a temporarily absent worker, meeting short fluctuations in seasonal demand, or for
probation, with the aim of converting them into permanent employees. In contrast, intensive
users would be those that strategically organize their production process around the
possibility of using temporary labour. Thus, the true difference may not between the using
and non-using firms, but firms that use temporary labour very intensively and all others.
To explore this possibility, we divide the firms that use temporary labour into two
groups, based on descriptive statistics. The first group is composed of moderate, or
traditional, users: these are the firms that have fewer than 50 per cent of temporary labour in
their workforce. They represent 87 per cent of the sample of the using firms. The second
group is composed of intensive, or strategic, users: these are the firms in which 50 per cent

or more of their workforce is temporary labour5. We then run two additional hurdle models.
In Table 5 column 7, the selection model is fit for non-using firms versus moderate users (in
other words, intensive users are dropped from the estimation). In Table 5 column 8, we treat
moderate users as if they were the same as non-using ones; hence the selection stage of the
hurdle model is between an intensive user and all others.
The results of these two estimations are striking. They help explain why the
aggregated hurdle model gave unexpected and very mixed results, and also reinforce the
idea that the two types of using firms are very different. They also help understand why
existing literature on firm use of temporary labour, which did not distinguish between these
different firms, sometimes produced opposing results on the role of some firm-level
characteristics. Approximately half of the variables in the model differentiating between
non-using and moderately-using firms have signs as suggested by previous literature and by
our own previous estimations; but the same is also true in the model differentiating between
intensive users and all other firms. Specifically, contrasting column 7 and 8 of Table 5, we
find that intensive users are older and less efficient, they are also more labour-intensive
firms that use temporary labour to face demand volatility and to save on labour costs. In
contrast, moderate users are younger, more efficient, and less labour-intensive; they choose
to employ temporary labour to cope with informal competition and credit constrains, as well
as under the condition that the costs of labour are low. A case in point is the switching sign
on the training for permanent staff variable. For intensive users, it appears with a positive
and significant sign. Existing literature suggests that finding a positive sign is in line with
the hypothesis that firms organize their workforce along the core-periphery model, whereby
the core workforce receives training and is used with a long-term perspective, while the
periphery workforce, which is also usually less skilled and less paid, rotates regularly and
can be terminated at any time, for example, when just-in-time production needs are met. For
moderate users, the sign on the training for permanent staff is negative, and this finding is
also legitimate in the literature. It signifies that most of the firms’ workforce is core and
benefits from equal access to training, while temporary labour is used for probationary
reasons, with the aim of converting them to permanent jobs. Finding this opposite sign on
training reinforces the idea that “intensive” and “moderate” users differ in their approach as
to what role that temporary labour is supposed to serve.
Interestingly, the only firm-level variable that has the same sign for both types of
firms is employment current to that three years ago, suggesting that expanding firms use
temporary labour more intensively. In a separate set of regressions (not reported, but
available on request), we also interacted this variable with sector dummies in order to
capture the extent to which decisions to employ temporary labour may be driven by
specificities of the production process. For moderate users, expansion in any sector leads to
higher use of temporary labour, indicating once again that the moderate using firms are
adding workers in response to increasing demand. For intensive users, however, only an
expansion in six of the fifteen sectors (leather, food, metals and machinery, chemicals and
pharmaceuticals, non-metal sector, and construction) leads to greater use of temporary
labour. This suggests again that the reasons for employing large amounts of temporary
labour among ‘intensive’ users goes beyond pressures of increased demand. Moreover, it
does not seem that the structure of the production process associated with these sectors is
driving firms’ decision to primarily employ temporary workers, as these sectors entail a
wide variety of production methods.
5
We also tried alternative thresholds. The results presented in this section still hold true if we set the threshold
of 40 per cent; they start being different from those presented here if a lower threshold is chosen. We prefer to
keep the 50 per cent threshold, as it is justified by descriptive statistics (Figure 2). It is of course possible that
some firms with fewer than 50 per cent of temporary labour also use temporary labour strategically and as part
of their human resources model.

On the macro policy side, the single most robust and consistent variable affecting
firm-level decisions is whether fixed-term contracts are prohibited for permanent tasks: both
types of firms use less temporary labour if such prohibitions legally exist. For intensive
users, regulations allowing for an unlimited use of temporary labour and regulations
allowing for longer probationary periods are also important, once again suggesting that such
firms may strategically and intentionally benefit from such regulations to maintain their high
levels of temporary labour. At the same time, other regulations on terminating permanent
contracts do not seem to play a role for intensive users. In contrast, for moderate users,
regulations of terminating permanent contracts afforded by such specific aspects of
regulation as severance pay, or contesting dismissals, appear to lead to higher use of
temporary labour, suggesting as well that these firms hire temporary workers with a later
transition to permanent employment in mind. These firms, however, disregard regulations
allowing for an unlimited use of temporary labour when choosing whether to employ any
temporary labour or not – most probably because indeed they have no intention to take
advantage of these regulations and use temporary labour indefinitely. Interestingly also,
longer probationary periods do not spark more use of temporary labour by moderate users; if
anything, they are associated with lower use of temporary labour, possibly because it is
quickly converted into permanent one when genuinely used for probation purposes.
Our results on EPL are different from those of Pierre and Scarpetta (2013), who report
that the level of EPL has a positive effect on the firm’s use of temporary labour, while
regulations of fixed-term contracts do not play a role. The differences between their results
and ours are mainly due to a different sample size, different modelling of the firm decision
to use temporary labour, different set of controls, different estimation techniques (notably
distinguishing between different types of using firms), and a different measure of EPL (they
rely on the World Bank’s Employing Workers measures that include procedural
requirements, notice period, and severance payments, we use numerous additional EPL
components). While we also find some evidence that some of the EPL components, though
not the aggregate EPL, may foster the use of temporary labour by some firms, we find a
more expected, consistent, and strong effect of regulations of fixed-term contracts on the
firm use of temporary labour.
6. Conclusions
This study has sought to increase understanding of the use of temporary labour by
firms in developing countries. Using firm-level data from the World Bank Enterprise
Survey, we attempted to identify the reasons that motivate firms to rely on temporary labour.
The vast country coverage also allowed us to examine the role of labour market institutions
and of the macroeconomic environment in affecting firms’ demand for temporary labour,
providing a new evidence for non-OECD, non-European countries, and also providing new
evidence to developments during a period of global economic crisis. As such, the study
contributes to a better understanding of both firm-level and country-level determinants of
temporary labour use in developing countries.
The paper showed that the use of temporary labour differs widely across firms, with
the majority of firms (60 per cent) not using temporary labour at all. Within the 40 per cent
of firms that do use temporary labour, temporary labour accounts for 28 per cent of the
labour force on average, but there is wide variability in use.
Our analysis indicates that firms’ motivation for using temporary labour is similar to
that found in studies on industrialized countries. Flexibility and cost considerations are the
key motivators; in particular, it is the expanding firms that are in the highest demand for
temporary labour. At the same time, the novel result of this paper is to distinguish between

three types of firms: those that do not use temporary labour, those that use it for what we
called “traditional” purposes, and those that use it “intensively”. We show that intensive or
“strategic” users are quite distinct from all other firms, including on how they respond to
labour regulations. Legislation limiting the use of temporary contracts to specific activities
of firms has a statistically negative influence on the use of temporary labour among all types
of firms. In contrast, legislation limiting the duration of fixed-term contracts affects only
those firms that are intensive users; it does not seem to influence firms using moderate
amounts of temporary workers. Some aspects of employment protection legislation
governing termination of regular contracts seem also to be relevant for the amount of labour
hired by moderate users, but not for intensive users.
There has been a growing concern in recent policy debates about an increase in non-
standard forms of employment and the decline of the standard employment relationship.
Although temporary contracts are just one form of atypical contract, little is known about
their use in developing countries. This study was an attempt at exploring trends in the use of
temporary labour across developing countries in order to better understand firms’ principal
motivations. From a policy perspective, our findings are telling as they improve
policymakers understanding of business constraints, but also give evidence of the scope of
legislation to tailor business practices. They are also important in light of proposals for
reforms of regulations of both permanent and temporary contracts, because they indicate
that some reforms would have a different impact depending on the type of the firm. For
example, according to our results, changes in the regulations of permanent contracts would
probably do little to curb the use of temporary labour by those firms that already built this
practice into their production processes. In contrast, there may be merits to some more
specific policies targeted at firms using temporary labour intensively, especially if there is
evidence of abuse of such practice.

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Annex
Appendix A. Sample Description

Percent of Percent of Percent of
Destination Destination
Year N Obs Temporary Year N Obs Temporary Destination country Year N Obs Temporary
country country
Employees Employees Employees
Afghanistan 2008 434 21.3918 El Salvador 2010 277 14.16529 Namibia 2006 317 9.688589
Afghanistan 2014 91 19.28149 Eritrea 2009 106 6.89072 Nepal 2009 360 10.39414
Albania 2007 189 9.384569 Estonia 2009 239 6.64964 Nepal 2013 470 13.06999
Albania 2013 314 5.75747 Ethiopia 2011 499 11.60685 Nicaragua 2006 439 14.70149
Angola 2006 399 10.68037 Fiji 2009 78 9.366153 Nicaragua 2010 280 12.07867
Angola 2010 247 6.892796 Gabon 2009 130 14.47734 Niger 2009 113 14.97948
Antigua&Barbuda 2010 129 3.622026 Gambia 2006 165 13.55719 Nigeria 2007 1888 9.470597
Argentina 2006 980 9.538945 Georgia 2008 254 11.94288 Pakistan 2007 879 11.19986
Argentina 2010 925 7.523945 Georgia 2013 277 10.08041 Panama 2006 449 16.47372
Armenia 2009 274 11.63175 Ghana 2007 491 8.955808 Panama 2010 174 3.806549
Armenia 2013 238 4.12913 Grenada 2010 137 10.33253 Paraguay 2006 470 15.38784
Azerbaijan 2009 321 7.914034 Guatemala 2006 484 11.48099 Paraguay 2010 303 12.35198
Azerbaijan 2013 247 5.424102 Guatemala 2010 424 10.42807 Peru 2006 602 20.77694
Bahamas, The 2010 113 10.34101 Guinea 2006 220 7.610419 Peru 2010 892 17.44318
Bangladesh 2007 1497 11.7283 Guyana 2010 135 14.31241 Philippines 2009 1082 19.69354
Bangladesh 2013 1372 6.516064 Honduras 2006 386 16.78844 Poland 2009 276 10.96497
Barbados 2010 106 8.830107 Honduras 2010 248 10.27072 Romania 2009 334 4.873075
Belarus 2008 210 4.714482 Hungary 2009 271 3.430295 Romania 2013 463 2.833184
Belarus 2013 277 4.581499 Indonesia 2009 1208 8.12531 Russia 2009 708 5.542517
Belize 2010 144 4.107819 Iraq 2011 746 16.61607 Russia 2012 2928 6.153202
Benin 2009 140 20.4159 Jamaica 2010 291 5.12601 Rwanda 2006 212 13.63512
Bhutan 2009 247 17.251 Kazakhstan 2009 423 4.859324 Rwanda 2011 183 19.7706
Bolivia 2006 517 20.5292 Kazakhstan 2013 414 5.705701 Samoa 2009 65 13.08744
Bolivia 2010 200 15.36946 Kenya 2007 651 18.41259 Senegal 2007 502 9.003974
Bosnia and Herz. 2009 268 7.364587 Kenya 2013 565 22.28328 Serbia 2009 348 7.204587
Bosnia and Herz. 2013 290 4.238508 Kosovo 2009 225 13.83496 Serbia 2013 326 5.279713
Botswana 2006 317 11.69092 Kosovo 2013 172 15.71932 Sierra Leone 2009 72 0.8796296
Botswana 2010 221 8.365674 Kyrgyz Republic 2009 179 13.8971 South Africa 2007 930 8.800745
Brazil 2009 1640 6.065185 Kyrgyz Republic 2013 204 17.29786 Sri Lanka 2011 518 13.42112
Bulgaria 2007 965 2.841465 Lao PDR 2009 356 2.766383 St. Kitts and Nevis 2010 122 10.80674
Bulgaria 2009 222 1.409893 Lao PDR 2012 241 10.46691 St. Lucia 2010 138 1.833798
Bulgaria 2013 263 3.6525 Latvia 2009 233 6.465533 St VincentGrenadines 2010 135 8.021189
Burkina Faso 2009 348 15.78973 Latvia 2013 260 4.58356 Suriname 2010 148 4.930005
Burundi 2006 269 7.413216 Lesotho 2009 126 18.27225 Swaziland 2006 289 8.275153
Cabo Verde 2009 136 12.0012 Liberia 2009 146 24.83996 Tajikistan 2008 269 10.92475
Cameroon 2009 338 10.30204 Lithuania 2009 237 5.411226 Tajikistan 2013 242 13.70742
CAR 2011 135 14.49879 Lithuania 2013 214 5.57341 Tanzania 2006 406 17.49463
Chad 2009 139 22.1019 M acedonia 2009 302 6.723407 Tanzania 2013 261 26.53369
Chile 2006 894 11.22114 M acedonia 2013 337 3.828199 Timor-Leste 2009 112 27.23614
Chile 2010 917 9.977137 M adagascar 2009 339 11.48611 Timor-Leste 2013 403 10.02667
China 2012 2575 7.714693 M alawi 2009 127 10.75824 Togo 2009 138 23.87403
Colombia 2006 946 14.82269 M ali 2007 490 13.50929 Tonga 2009 145 5.985089
Colombia 2010 882 16.31705 M ali 2010 217 15.34622 Trinidad and Tobago 2010 315 11.94436
Congo, DR 2006 338 10.16731 M auritania 2006 225 15.64842 Turkey 2008 819 4.203303
Congo, DR 2010 231 18.33741 M auritius 2009 354 8.554749 Uganda 2006 541 12.98259
Congo, DR 2013 461 9.466037 M exico 2006 1236 4.95173 Uganda 2013 360 23.90944
Congo, Rep. 2009 108 21.4466 M exico 2010 1341 7.902197 Ukraine 2008 572 4.857404
Costa Rica 2010 424 10.46577 M icronesia 2009 55 16.02705 Ukraine 2013 167 18.36828
Cote d'Ivoire 2009 494 10.98156 M oldova 2009 342 9.45156 Uruguay 2006 492 7.821853
Croatia 2007 571 7.492337 M oldova 2013 297 2.940748 Uruguay 2010 458 6.625985
Croatia 2013 311 7.194686 M ongolia 2009 356 22.10404 Vanuatu 2009 94 15.44932
Czech Republic 2009 176 6.676604 M ongolia 2013 314 21.28933 Venezuela, RB 2006 438 12.21569
Djibouti 2013 204 12.14256 M ontenegro 2009 76 11.89336 Venezuela, RB 2010 180 12.72716
Dominica 2010 141 1.2824 M ontenegro 2013 99 9.873299 Vietnam 2009 981 20.12735
Dominican Rep. 2010 306 7.271244 M ozambique 2007 469 7.911129 Yemen, Rep. 2010 317 13.53957
Ecuador 2006 565 12.57322 M yanmar 2014 539 4.089261 Zambia 2007 475 7.613627
El Salvador 2006 655 13.73477 Zambia 2013 602 10.74533
Note: Counted are the observations of the sample restricted for the baseline econometric analysis. Total sample is
71,943 observations. This is the sample we use for all descriptive statistics in this paper. In some specifications, the sample
size is reduced to 43,158 observations with non-missing data on all firm-level variables of interest; and to 21,377
observations with non-missing data on all firm-level and country-level variables of interest.

Appendix B. Description of Variables
Variable Description
Temp_share_all Ratio of the total number of temporary workers to the sum of temporary and permanent workers in a firm
Dummy temp Dichotomous variable equal to one if a firm employs any temporary labour, zero otherwise
Temporary all Total number of temporary workers in an enterprise
Total N employees Total number of temporary and permanent workers in a firm
Total N employees squared Total number of temporary and permanent workers in a firm, squared
Firm age Difference between the year of the survey and the date of firms’ creation
Own : domestic private Dichotomous variable equal to one if a firm is mainly owned by domestic private individuals
Dichotomous variable equal to one if a firm is mainly owned by foreign private individuals, the benchmark category being whether the firm is
Own : foreign private owned by domestic government
Ln (Efficiency) Logarithm of the ratio of the last years’ establishment’s total annual sales converted in the US dollars and divided by all employees
National market Dichotomous variables equal to one if the principal market in which the establishment sold its major product over the past year is national
Dichotomous variable equal to one if the principal market in which the establishment sold its major product over the past year is international;
International market local market serving as a benchmark category
Informal competition Dichotomous variable equal to one if the establishment competes against unregistered or informal firms
Log of standard deviation of the difference between current annual sales and the annual sales three years ago calculated at the 2-digit ISIC
Demand volatility product classification of the firm’s main product. Higher values of this variable indicate higher volatility of demand for the firm’s main product
Employment current to that
three years ago Ratio of current number of permanent employees to the number of permanent employees three years ago
Is access to finance, which includes availability and cost, interest rates, fees and collateral requirements: 0-No Obstacle, 1 - a Minor Obstacle, 2
Access to finance is an
- a Moderate Obstacle, 3 - a Major Obstacle, or 4 - a Very Severe Obstacle to the current operations of this establishment?
obstacle
Ln (Total labor cost) Logarithm of the total annual cost of labor, coverted into US dollars, in this establishment in the last fiscal year
Dichotomous variable equal to one if over the last fiscal year the establishment had formal training programs for its permanent, full-time
Training offered employees
Are labor regulations: 0- No Obstacle, 1 - a Minor Obstacle, 2 - a Moderate Obstacle, 3 - a Major Obstacle, or a 4 - Very Severe Obstacle to
Regulations is an obstacle the current operations of this establishment?
Is an inadequately educated workforce: 0 - No Obstacle, 1 - a Minor Obstacle, 2 - a Moderate Obstacle, 3 - a Major Obstacle, or 4 - a Very
Education is an obstacle Severe Obstacle to the current operations of this establishment?
Is telecommunications: 0 - No Obstacle, 1 - a Minor Obstacle, 2 - a Moderate Obstacle, 3- a Major Obstacle, 4 - a Very Severe Obstacle to the
Telecoms are a problem current operations of this establishment?
Certification Dichotomous variable equal to two if the establishment has an internationally-recognized quality certification; to one otherwise
Borrowed technology Dichotomous variable equal to one if the establishment uses technology licensed from a foreign-owned company, excluding office software
Manufacturing Dichotomous variable equal to one if a firm operates in manufacturing sector; zero if in services
Source: World Bank Enterprise Survey, 2015. Online Database. Available at: www.enterprisesurveys.org . Accessed: January 2015.
Low-middle income ; Dichotomous variables equal to one if a country belongs to one of these groups, based on the World Bank classification; low-income countries
Upper-middle income; is the omitted benchmark category
High-income
GDPgrowth Contemporaneous GDP growth
GDPgrowth_3y_lag GDP growth with a 3-year lag
FTC prohib perm Dichotomous variable equal to one if fixed-term contracts use is legally prohibited for permanent tasks
FTC dur unlim Dichotomous variable equal to one if fixed-term contracts use has legally set maximum duration
Source: World Bank, 2015. World Bank International Comparison Program Database. Available at: http://go.worldbank.org/PQ5ZPPYSY0. Accessed: May 2015.
Unemployed Unemployment rate, total labour force
Source: ILO STAT, 2015. ILO Statistical Online Portal. Available at: www.ilo.org/ilostat Accessed: May 2015 .
Employment protection legislation summary indicator measuring the degree of protection afforded to workers when permanent contracts are
EPLex terminated at the initiative of the employer
A1_1 : Valid reasons for Component measuring the degree of protection embedded in the valid reasons for dismissals (ranging from 0, when there is no obligation to
dismissal have a reason for dismissal, to 1, when there is an obligation to have a reason for dismissal, and valid grounds are only worker’s conduct)
Component measuring the degree of protection embedded in prohibited grounds for dismissals (ranging from 0 national labour legislation
contains a list of prohibited grounds for dismissal / discrimination cases that only partly meets the ILO fundamental principles and rights at
work to 1 when national labour legislation contains a list of prohibited grounds for dismissal / discrimination cases that fully meets the ILO
A1_2: prohibited grounds fundamental principles and rights at work; and exceeds the principles established by specific international labour standards governing
for dismissal employment termination
EPLex sub-component measuring maximum probationary period, including all possible renewals, normalized to reflect 0 - no limitation; 1 -
A2 : Trial period less than 1 month
Average of two EPLex sub-components; first measuring procedural notification requirements for individual dismissals (ranging from 0 – when
employer need only orally notify a worker of a decision to terminate his employment; to 1 – when employer cannot proceed to dismissal
A3 : Notification without authorisation from a third party); and second measuring notice period at seven different tenures (normalized so that 0 = minimum,
requirements including zero; 1 = maximum).
Average of two EPLex sub-components; first measuring severance pay at 7 tenures, second measuring redundancy pay at seven tenures; each
A4 : Severance/ Redundancy normalized so that 0 = sample minimum; 1 = sample maximum.
EPLex sub-component reflecting the degree of protection embedded in the options legally offered to workers contesting their dismissal because
of the lack of valid grounds; ranging from 0, when no remedy is available as of right, to 1 when reinstatement is available in case of unfair
A5 : Redress for dismissals dismissal and is the primary remedy for unfair dismissal; legal text explicitly mentions award of back pay and/or other additional payments
Sources: ILO, 2015d. EPLex Online Database. Available at: http://www.ilo.org/dyn/eplex/termmain.home . Accessed: May 2015.
ILO, 2015c. Employment Protection Legislation Summary Indicators in the Area of Terminating Regular Contracts (Individual Dismissals). ILO: Geneva.
Appendix C. Descriptive Statistics
Moderate users Intensive users (50% or

Firms not using any
(temporary labour<50% more of workforce is
temporary labour
of workforce) temporary)
Variable Obs Mean Obs Mean Obs Mean
Temp_share_all 44,541 0.00 22,604 0.20 4,798 0.64
Temporary all 44,541 0.00 22,603 21.98 4,794 83.41
Total N employees 44,541 78.43 22,528 128.51 4,789 113.67
Firm age 44,541 16.14 22,604 19.23 4,798 15.59
Own : domestic private 44,541 0.90 22,604 0.86 4,798 0.89
Own : foreign private 44,541 0.07 22,604 0.11 4,798 0.07
Ln (Efficiency) 44,541 9.85 22,604 9.75 4,798 8.90
National market 44,541 0.24 22,604 0.25 4,798 0.22
International market 44,541 0.06 22,604 0.06 4,798 0.07
Informal competition 44,541 0.41 22,604 0.44 4,798 0.44
Demand volatility 44,533 22.50 22,598 22.64 4,797 22.55
Employment current to that three
years ago 40,028 1.25 19,148 6.10 4,111 7.68
Access to finance is an obstacle 42,340 1.56 21,884 1.63 4,583 1.73
Ln (Total labor cost) 41,762 10.94 21,356 11.56 4,436 10.66
Training offered 32,978 0.36 16,748 0.51 3,450 0.40
Regulations is an obstacle 44,002 0.91 22,461 1.13 4,737 1.01
Education is an obstacle 43,954 1.34 22,399 1.60 4,728 1.44
Borrowed technology 27,451 0.13 14,137 0.17 2,819 0.13
Certification 43,469 1.82 21,896 1.75 4,656 1.82
GDPgrowth 44,541 3.12 22,604 3.17 4,798 3.28
GDPgrowth_3y_lag 44,541 4.51 22,604 4.30 4,798 4.22
Unemployed 43,407 8.75 21,935 8.97 4,714 8.15
AREA1 21,714 0.50 10,304 0.52 2,354 0.49
AREA2 21,714 0.64 10,304 0.65 2,354 0.69
AREA3 21,714 0.28 10,304 0.29 2,354 0.30
AREA4 21,714 0.21 10,304 0.21 2,354 0.19
AREA5 21,714 0.61 10,304 0.59 2,354 0.62
EPLex 21,714 0.43 10,304 0.43 2,354 0.43
FTC prohib perm 44,497 0.53 22,544 0.50 4,796 0.48
FTC dur unlim 44,541 0.54 22,604 0.56 4,798 0.60
Manufacturing 44,541 1.45 22,604 1.40 4,798 1.47

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Firms’ demand for temporary labour

in developing countries: Necessity or

CONDITIONS OF WORK AND EMPLOYMENT SERIES No. 77

Inclusive Labour Markets, Labour Relations

Firms’ demand for temporary labour in

INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE - GENEVA

ILO Cataloguing in Publication Data

Aleksynska, Mariya; Berg, Janine

First published 2016

Cover: DTP/Design Unit, ILO

Printed by the International Labour Office, Geneva, Switzerland

ii Conditions of Work and Employment Series No. 77

Conditions of Work and Employment Series No. 77 iii

iv Conditions of Work and Employment Series No. 77

Abstract ................................................................................................................................ iii

Tables and Figures .............................................................................................................. vi

2. Literature review and hypothesis setting.................................................................... 3

2.1 The flexibility argument ...................................................................................................... 3

2.2 Cost advantages ................................................................................................................... 4

2.3 Technological change .......................................................................................................... 5

2.4 Moderate v. intensive use of temporary labour ................................................................... 6

3. Data description ............................................................................................................ 6

4. Descriptive statistics ..................................................................................................... 8

5. Empirical setting and results ..................................................................................... 13

5.1 Specifications .................................................................................................................... 13

5.2 Micro level determinants of firms’ use of temporary labour ............................................. 15

5.3 Macro level determinants of firms’ use of temporary labour ............................................ 18

5.4 Robustness of the results ................................................................................................... 20

5.5 Modelling the firm decision-making process .................................................................... 20

Conditions of Work and Employment Series .................................................................. 34

Conditions of Work and Employment Series No. 77 v

Figure 1: Incidence of temporary employment, as percentage of total wage employment, in

vi Conditions of Work and Employment Series No. 77

The aim of this paper is to analyse firm-specific, macroeconomic, and institutional

Conditions of Work and Employment Series No. 77 1

Third, we report mixed evidence on the role of regulations governing termination of

Our paper is close in spirit to studies examining the determinants of temporary

2 Conditions of Work and Employment Series No. 77

2.1 The flexibility argument

Conditions of Work and Employment Series No. 77 3

Empirical evidence both in economics and in management literature, though on

2.2 Cost advantages

4 Conditions of Work and Employment Series No. 77

2.3 Technological change

Conditions of Work and Employment Series No. 77 5

2.4 Moderate v. intensive use of temporary labour

6 Conditions of Work and Employment Series No. 77

After restricting the sample to firms containing information on the number of

Conditions of Work and Employment Series No. 77 7

Figure 1. Incidence of temporary employment, as percentage of total wage employment, in

8 Conditions of Work and Employment Series No. 77

Conditions of Work and Employment Series No. 77 9

Table 1. Incidence of temporary employment, as percentage of total employment, by

Table 2. Incidence of temporary employment, by sector

10 Conditions of Work and Employment Series No. 77

Figure 4. Distribution of temporary employees, by country’s level of development

Conditions of Work and Employment Series No. 77 11

Figure 6. Distribution of temporary employees, as percent of firm’s workforce, by

12 Conditions of Work and Employment Series No. 77