Kwang Swann 2010

Personality and Social Psychology
Review http://psr.sagepub.com/
Do People Embrace Praise Even When They Feel Unworthy? A Review of Critical Tests of
Self-Enhancement Versus Self-Verification
Tracy Kwang and William B. Swann, Jr
Pers Soc Psychol Rev 2010 14: 263 originally published online 30 April 2010
DOI: 10.1177/1088868310365876
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of Critical Tests of Self-Enhancement DOI: 10.1177/1088868310365876

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Versus Self-Verification
Tracy Kwang1 and William B. Swann, Jr.1
Abstract
Some contemporary theorists contend that the desire for self-enhancement is prepotent and more powerful than rival
motives such as self-verification. If so, then even people with negative self-views will embrace positive evaluations.The authors
tested this proposition by conducting a meta-analytic review of the relevant literature. The data provided ample evidence
of self-enhancement strivings but little evidence of its prepotency. Instead, the evidence suggested that both motives are
influential but control different response classes. In addition, other motives may sometimes come into play. For example,
when rejection risk is high, people seem to abandon self-verification strivings, apparently in an effort to gratify their desire
for communion. However, when rejection risk is low, as is the case in many secure marital relationships, people prefer self-
verifying evaluations. The authors conclude that future researchers should broaden the bandwidth of their explanatory
frameworks to include motives other than self-enhancement.
Keywords
self-identity, motivation, goals, self-presentation, attribution, individual differences, interpersonal processes, self-verification,
self-enhancement
People love to be admired and praised. Indeed, the notion themselves. One of the most prevalent of such biases is the
that people prefer positive, “self-enhancing” evaluations is tendency to attribute positive outcomes to the self and nega-
among the most prominent motivational assumptions in tive outcomes to external circumstances (e.g., Blaine &
Western Psychology (e.g., Jones, 1973; Leary, 2007). Never- Crocker, 1993; Fitch, 1970). Similarly, people routinely claim
theless, people’s allegedly voracious appetite for adulation to be better off than the average person, by, for example, pre-
may be qualified by a competing desire for “self-verifying” dicting better futures for themselves than for the average
evaluations—that is, evaluations that confirm their enduring person (Taylor & Brown, 1988) and even asserting that they
self-views (e.g., Lecky, 1945; Swann, 1983). In this article, are less susceptible to bias than are others (Pronin, Gilovich
we use meta-analytic techniques to evaluate the relative & Ross, 2004). When people receive feedback, they selec-
strength of these competing motives for self-enhancement tively attend to information that preserves their self-esteem
and self-verification. We begin with a discussion of the older (Ditto & Lopez, 1993) and report feeling better after receiv-
of the two theories, self-enhancement. ing positive as compared to negative feedback (e.g., Korman,
1968; Swann, Griffin, Predmore, & Gaines, 1987). Finally,
self-enhancement biases are not “all in the head,” in that they
Self-Enhancement Theory are believed to motivate people to strategically present them-
The seeds of self-enhancement theory were sewn more than selves in a flattering light (Baumeister, 1982).
seven decades ago when Gordon Allport (1937) asserted that In addition to inspiring dozens of empirical investiga-
there exists a vital human need to view oneself positively. In tions, the notion that people are fundamentally motivated to
this tradition, modern self-enhancement theorists assert that acquire positive evaluations has developed into one of social
people desire to increase the positivity—or reduce the
negativity—of their self-views (see Leary, 2007, for a review). 1
University of Texas at Austin
The proposal that there exists a pervasive desire for positiv-
Corresponding Author:
ity has inspired dozens of studies. At this juncture, people are William B. Swann, Jr., University of Texas at Austin, Department of
thought to engage in a host of self-serving biases that pre- Psychology, Austin, TX 78712
sumably enable them to maintain positive conceptions of Email: swann@mail.utexas.edu
264 Personality and Social Psychology Review 14(3)
psychology’s most influential theoretical assumptions (e.g., firmly held self-views. This desire for stable self-views can
Hoyle, Kernis, Leary, & Baldwin, 1999; Leary, 2007). In fact, be understood by considering how and why people develop
despite some early literature reviews indicating that self- self-views in the first place. Theorists have long assumed
enhancement strivings influenced affective but not cognitive that people form their self-views by observing how others
reactions (e.g., Shrauger, 1975), over the past few decades it treat them (e.g., Cooley, 1902; Mead, 1934). As they acquire
has arguably become one of social psychology’s most widely more and more evidence to support their self-views, people
accepted theory. Today self-enhancement themes can be become increasingly certain of these views. Once firmly
found in most of the field’s most influential theories, held, self-views enable people to make predictions about
including terror management (Greenberg, Pyszczynski, & their worlds, guide behavior, and maintain a sense of conti-
Solomon, 1986), self-evaluation maintenance (Tesser, 1988), nuity, place, and coherence. In this way, stable self-views not
positive illusions (Murray, Holmes, & Griffin, 1996; Taylor only serve the pragmatic function of guiding behavior but
& Brown, 1988), self-affirmation (Steele, 1988), and contin- also serve the epistemic function of affirming people’s sense
gencies of self-worth (e.g., Crocker & Wolfe, 2001). that things are as they should be. Indeed, firmly held self-
Although the assumption that people value and prefer pos- views develop into the centerpiece of their knowledge
itive evaluations is the core proposition underlying most systems. As such, it is not surprising that by mid-childhood
variations of self-enhancement theory, some contemporary children begin to display a preference for evaluations that
proponents of the theory have taken the argument further. confirm and stabilize their self-views (e.g., Cassidy, Ziv,
Impressed by wide-ranging evidence of self-enhancing biases Mehta, & Feeney, 2003).
in human information processing and behavior, several Self-verification theory’s most provocative prediction is
authors have asserted that the desire for self-enhancement that people should prefer self-confirming evaluations even
overrides the desire for accurate self-knowledge (Copleston, if the self-view in question is negative. For example, contrary
1957; Jahoda, 1958; Rogers, 1951; for a review, see Colvin & to self-enhancement theory, self-verification theory predicts
Griffo, 2007). The authors of one landmark article, for exam- that those who see themselves as disorganized or unintelli-
ple, defined self-enhancement as a tendency to entertain gent should prefer evidence that others also perceive them as
unrealistically positive self-evaluations that reflect a “general, such. Support for the theory has come from studies that have
enduring pattern of error” (Taylor & Brown, 1988, p. 194). examined the relationship of people’s enduring self-views to
Others have recently added that the self-enhancement motive their choice of feedback and interaction partners, attention,
is both prepotent and universal, a “cornerstone” of psycho- overt behavior, recall, and relationship quality (for a review,
logical activity (Sedikides & Gregg, 2008). see Swann, in press).
To be sure, some authors have dissented from the notion Yet the inherently social nature of the self-verification
that self-enhancement strivings are completely unbridled process points to the existence of at least one critically
(e.g., Baumeister, 1989), including even some of the original important boundary condition of the effect. That is, if people
advocates of the notion that they are pervasive (e.g., Taylor & are to receive a steady supply of self-verifying feedback,
Gollwitzer, 1995). Yet for the most part researchers interested they must maintain the “vehicles” for the delivery of such
in self-enhancement have sought to collect additional support feedback—their ongoing relationships. Simply put, no rela-
for the motive with little attention to countervailing motiva- tionship, no self-verification. This means that when people
tional forces. This focus, in combination with recent claims want the relationship to survive, feedback may be eschewed
for the prepotency of the self-enhancement motive, implies not only when it threatens the desire for self-verification,
that there exists a fundamental imbalance in human priorities but also when it threatens the future of the relationship.
rather than a delicately balanced system of motivational Hence, overly positive evaluators will be avoided because
checks and balances (Sedikides & Gregg, 2008). In particu- they might eventually be disappointed and leave; overly
lar, it would appear that the desire for positivity is so powerful negative evaluators will be avoided because their negativity
that it overrides competing accuracy-related motives such as calls the very existence of the relationship into question.
self-verification (Swann, 1983) and self-assessment (Trope, Wariness of negative evaluators may be magnified insofar
1983). To test this provocative claim, we conducted a meta- as the relationship is provisional or uncommitted, for termi-
analysis of research designed to compare the relative strength nating such relationships is far easier than ending
of self-enhancement strivings with one of its historic com- relationships that involve significant long-term commit-
petitors, self-verification.1 To set the stage for this analysis, ment. The general principle, then, is that people will seek
we briefly characterize this competing motive. self-verification only insofar as doing so does not put them
at risk of being abandoned, for abandonment would frus-
trate their communion motive (e.g., Baumeister & Leary,
The Desire for Self-Verification 1995; Heine, Proulx, & Vohs, 2006; Wiggins & Broughton,
Self-verification theory (e.g., Swann, 1983) assumes that 1985) and sever their supply of self-verification (see
people have a powerful desire to confirm and stabilize their also Hardin & Higgins’s, 1996, discussion of people’s
Kwang and Swann 265
unwillingness to embrace epistemic truth if it undermines for people with negative self-views, however. Self-enhancement
the relationship aspect of shared realities). theory predicts that people with negative self-views will
This reasoning suggests that as long as self-verifying nega- prefer positive over negative evaluations. Statistically, self-
tive feedback does not portend rejection and relationship enhancement will be reflected by a main effect of the
termination, people with negative self-views will prefer nega- evaluation factor in an analysis of variance (ANOVA) or
tive evaluations. Similarly, people with positive self-views regression. The effect size of the main effect will be reported
will display a corresponding preference for positive evalua- regardless of whether there was an interaction effect. In con-
tions. In contrast, self-enhancement theory predicts that all trast, self-verification theory assumes that the match between
people will prefer positive evaluations, regardless of the posi- the evaluation and the self-view is crucial (Swann, Chang-
tivity of their self-views. At this juncture, these competing Schneider, & McClarty, 2007). For this reason, people with
predictions have been tested in a large number of studies (for positive self-views should prefer positive over negative eval-
an early review, see Shrauger, 1975). Despite this, some of the uations and people with negative self-views should prefer
most prominent reviewers of the literature (e.g., Baumeister, negative over positive evaluations. Statistically, this will be
1998; Leary, 2007) have referenced a single article by reflected in an interaction between self-view and evaluation
Sedikides (1993) as offering definitive evidence for the pre- in an ANOVA or regression.2
potency of the self-enhancement motive. To burden a single The most straightforward form of support for self-
article with the resolution of such a complex controversy is verification theory would be for people with positive
hazardous in itself, but the choice of this particular article is self-views to prefer positive evaluations and people with
especially problematic. Witness that the author himself negative self-views to prefer negative evaluations. Neverthe-
acknowledged that five of his six studies are irrelevant to self- less, because self-verification theory holds that it is the match
verification theory because he failed to measure chronic between the self-view and evaluation that is crucial, a given
self-views and “an adequate testing of [the self-verification] evaluation could be non-matching even though it has the
perspective would require that subjects’ preexisting (both same valence as the self-view. Support for this possibility
positive and negative) self-conceptions be at stake during the comes from a study in which people with positive self-views
self-evaluation process” (p. 329). In the only study that did were less intimate with their spouses not only when the
include a measure of self-views, the self-enhancement effect spouses’ appraisals were negative but also when their apprais-
(r = .50) was no larger than the self-verification effect (r = als were extremely positive (Swann, De La Ronde, & Hixon,
.46), rendering the study absolutely inconclusive with respect 1994). For this reason, from the perspective of self-verifica-
to the prepotency of self-enhancement. tion theory, the crucial issue is whether there is an interaction
Of course, even if the Sedikides (1993) article did inform between self-views and evaluations, such that the preference
the debate between advocates of self-enhancement and self- for positivity (or aversion to negativity) is stronger among
verification theory, there is a larger point here: In light of the people with positive as compared to negative self-views.
existence of numerous relevant studies, the most appropriate
means of testing the relative merits of self-enhancement Search Procedure and Inclusion Criteria. We searched the
versus self-verification approaches is to review all available references sections of published review articles on self-
studies that meet the design criteria specified by the two the- enhancement and self-verification (e.g., Blaine & Crocker,
ories. In the next section, we report such a meta-analysis. 1993; Shrauger, 1975; Swann, 1990) for critical tests of the
Evidence that self-enhancement strivings are significantly two self-motives. In addition, we searched for relevant arti-
stronger than self-verification strivings will buttress recent cles using Academic Search Premier, Medline, PsycINFO,
claims that self-enhancement is the prepotent social psycho- PsycARTICLES, and Sociological Collection using key-
logical motive (e.g., Sedikides & Gregg, 2008). Evidence words such as self-verification, self-enhancement, self-esteem,
that self-verification strivings are equal to, or stronger than, feedback, attribution, cognitions, reactions, behavior, emo-
self-enhancement strivings will point to the existence of a tion, and affect. Finally, we e-mailed appropriate listservs and
more balanced and variegated motive system. contacted prominent researchers to request relevant articles
that we might have been missed.
The first author read the abstracts of all of the articles. If
Critical Tests of Self-Enhancement the abstract was at all promising, she read the article itself to
Versus Self-Verification determine if the authors provided the information required to
Both self-enhancement and self-verification theories make compute effect sizes for self-enhancement and self-verification.
similar predictions for people with positive self-views. That This led to the deletion of two types of studies (specific
is, both theories predict that people with positive self-views citations are provided below). Some articles were deleted
will embrace positive evaluations because, for such indi- because the authors discussed self-verification but failed to
viduals, positive evaluations are both self-enhancing and measure participants’ self-views—a requirement for com-
self-verifying. The two theories make competing predictions puting self-verification effects. Other studies were deleted
because the authors did not provide sufficient information to defined as a tendency for participants to devote more atten-
calculate effect sizes for self-enhancement and self-verification tion to positive evaluations and perceive them to be more
in their result sections and our efforts to obtain this informa- accurate, diagnostic, and so on than negative evaluations.
tion were fruitless. Self-enhancement was also defined as the tendency to attri-
All of the studies that provided the information required to bute positive events or outcomes to personal, stable, and
compute effect sizes were listed in our tables and included in global qualities, whereas negative events or outcomes are
an initial meta-analysis. Results were standardized to Pear- attributed to situational, unstable, and specific qualities. In
son’s r effect size and corrected for sampling error, according contrast, self-verification was defined by the tendency for
to the meta-analysis methods of Hunter and Schmidt (1990) participants with positive self-views to devote more attention
and Hunter, Schmidt, and Jackson (1982) and as outlined by and impute more accuracy to positive feedback and evalua-
Lyons (2003) as well as Rosenthal and Rosnow (2008). tors whereas people with negative self-views displayed the
After conducting the initial meta-analysis, we excluded opposite pattern. Self-verification was also defined by the
some studies from the final meta-analysis because character- tendency for those with positive self-views to attribute posi-
istics of the design or methodology compromised their tive events as internal, stable, and global and negative events
capacity to provide a fair test of the two theories. For exam- as external, instable, and specific, whereas those with nega-
ple, some researchers included only participants with negative tive self-views displayed the opposite pattern.
self-views, rendering the design incomparable to those in Twenty-six studies were not included in the tables because
which researchers recruited participants with both positive there were insufficient data to calculate r (e.g., Bell & Arthur,
and negative self-views. Other researchers manipulated feed- 2008; Crary, 1966; Sedikides & Green, 2004). This left forty-
back that was disjunctive with the self-view, a feature that five studies in Table 1. Seven studies did not meet our further
made it impossible to say whether the feedback was verifying inclusion criteria. Anseel and Lievens (2006) measured utility
or non-verifying. For instance, some researchers assessed the of feedback for improving the self rather than the accuracy or
relationship between global self-esteem and a specific self- diagnosticity of the feedback with respect to the actual self.
view (e.g., athletic ability). In such instances, the global and Similarly, McFarlin and Blascovich (1981) violated the spec-
specific self-views are mismatched, thus violating the speci- ificity matching principle in that the measure of self-view
ficity matching principle. Without a clear match between the was social skill and the outcome measure was performance
self-view and feedback, self-verification theory does not on a spatial task. Also, Bellavia and Murray (2003) manipu-
make clear predictions (see Swann et al.’s, 2007, discussion lated the mood state of the participants rather than giving
of the specificity matching principle). Still other researchers them valenced feedback. Wood, Heimpel, Newby-Clark, and
manipulated or measured variables that were not comparable Ross (2005) was eliminated because participants were not
to those examined in studies included in the meta-analysis. given negative feedback. In two studies (Moreland & Sweeney,
For example, one investigator manipulated mood state rather 1984; Shrauger & Osberg, 1980), the authors partialed out the
than giving participants positive versus negative feedback; effects of performance expectations from self-views. Because
others measured the extent to which participants believed self-views presumably exert their influence by shaping
feedback would foster self-improvement or predict future expectations, covarying out expectations may neutralize the
success. Finally, two additional studies were excluded from effects of self-views, a possibility that was supported by the
the final meta-analysis because of statistical irregularities. fact that expectations significantly influenced responses.
Specifically, the researchers partialed out the effects of par- Finally, we eliminated Study 2 of Rudich and Vallacher
ticipants’ performance expectations while assessing the (1999) because the authors confounded negative feedback
effects of their self-views, a procedure that almost surely with rejection, which disqualifies it as a test of self-verification
diminishes the contribution of self-views to the outcome. because rejection cuts off one’s supply of self-verification.
To ensure that we were comparing apples to apples, we When the foregoing studies were eliminated, thirty-eight
organized our meta-analyses into sections based on the studies remained.3 We further categorized the studies by spe-
dependent measures used by the researchers. To determine cific dependent variables: accuracy (i.e., how accurate or
straightaway if we replicated the results of the most expan- valid is the feedback), attention (i.e., how much time is spent
sive previous review of this literature (Shrauger, 1975), we scrutinizing the feedback), attribution (i.e., are successes or
began with cognitive and affective responses to feedback. failures because of internal or external causes), over-claiming
We followed with three new categories of dependent vari- bias (i.e., claiming more positive evaluations than objective
ables, namely, behavioral reactions, feedback seeking, and measures suggest), predictive ability (i.e., does the feedback
relationship quality. inform future results), and recall accuracy (i.e., remembering
the results as being more positive or negative than they were).
Cognitive Processes. These processes refer to the extent to Self-enhancement and cognitive processes. As shown in
which people perceive the feedback they receive to be accu- Table 1, the average effect size for the self-enhancement
rate, diagnostic, attributable to themselves, and delivered by a effect in the entire sample was r = .19. Broken down by spe-
competent evaluator. Operationally, self-enhancement was cific dependent variables, the average effect size for accuracy
Kwang and Swann 267
Table 1. Accumulated Effect Sizes, Corrected for Sampling Error for Cognitive Processes
Enhancement Verification
Study N Dependent variable effect size effect size
Anseel and Lievens 2006a† 389 Accuracy .16 -.08

Bosson and Swann 1999 (Study 1)b 74 Accuracy .30 .33
Campbell, Lackenbauer, and Muise 2006c 103 Accuracy .00 .28
De La Ronde and Swann, 1998c 61 Accuracy .43 .35
Giesler, Josephs, and Swann, 1996cd 73 Accuracy .23 .76
Moreland and Sweeney, 1984e† 166 Accuracy .31 -.06
Quinlivan and Leary 2005 81 Accuracy .26 .30
Robinson and Smith-Lovin 1992 (Study 1)c 75 Accuracy .26 .41
Rudich and Vallacher 1999 (Study 1) 47 Accuracy .32 .22
Rudich and Vallacher 1999 (Study 2)† 50 Accuracy .34 .42
Shrauger and Kelly 1988 (Study 1)bcf 31 Accuracy .14 .43
Shrauger and Kelly 1988 (Study 2)bc 39 Accuracy .56 .37
Shrauger and Lund 1975c 48 Accuracy .40 .33
Shrauger and Rosenberg 1970 36 Accuracy .29 .48
Stake 1982 (Study 1) 236 Accuracy .44 .11
Swann, Griffin, Predmore, and Gaines 1987c 98 Accuracy .30 .28
Swann and Read 1981a (Study 3) 74 Accuracy .00 .84
Woo and Mix 1997c 72 Accuracy .59 .10
Wood, Heimpel, Newby-Clark, and Ross 2005 (Study 2)cg† 79 Accuracy .11 .20
Swann and Read 1981b (Study 1) 64 Attention .00 .28
Bellavia and Murray 2003† 81 Attribution .35 .35
Brown, Cai, Oakes, and Deng 2009 (Study 1)d 91 Attribution .32 .12
Burke 1978 90 Attribution .17 .29
Campbell, Chew, and Scratchley 1991 (Study 1) 67 Attribution .36 .26
Chandler, Lee, and Pengilly 1997 254 Attribution .29 .45
Feather 1969 167 Attribution .00 .00
Feather and Simon 1971h 85 Attribution .19 .28
Feather and Simon 1973h 265 Attribution .10 .11
Fielstein et al. 1985 201 Attribution .00 .30
Fitch 1970 135 Attribution .25 .22
Gilmor and Minton 1974h 80 Attribution .22 .75
Girodo, Dotzenroth, and Stein 1981 78 Attribution .01 .35
Jussim,Yen, and Aiello 1995 172 Attribution .07 .31
McMahan 1973h 336 Attribution .24 .19
Piers 1977 297 Attribution .00 .30
Raps, Peterson, Reinhard, Abramson, and Seligman 1982 106 Attribution .17 .24
Rizley 1978 (Study 1) 38 Attribution .27 .23
Rizley 1978 (Study 2) 38 Attribution .20 .26
Shrauger and Osberg 1980† 60 Attribution .27 .00
Stroebe, Eagly, and Stroebe 1977 56 Attribution .00 .42
Tennen, Herzberger, and Nelson 1987 (Study 1) 55 Attribution .17 .48
Tennen et al. 1987 (Study 2) 23 Attribution .34 .70
Kwan, John, Kenny, Bond, and Robins 2004 128 Over-claiming bias -.11 .50
McFarlin and Blascovich 1981† 64 Predictive ability .00 .41
Story 1998 (Study 1) 22 Recall .45 .50
Total 4,863 Sample-weighted mean r .19 .25
Total of studies that do not partial out expectation 3,974 Sample-weighted mean r .18 .30
a
The necessary standardized data were not published in the article, but Anseel kindly provided them.
b
F statistics were calculated from cell means and standard deviations according to the formulas outlined in Cohen (2002).
c
The dependent variable in the actual study was labeled differently in the original article. However, on closer examination, the question items did not differ
from items measuring accuracy.
d
Analyzed American sample only.
e
We averaged the effect sizes for accuracy and attribution. The accuracy effect size for self-enhancement is r = .22 and for self-verification is r = –.09. The
attribution effect size for self-enhancement is r = .39 and for self-verification is r = –.03. We separated these effect sizes when we analyzed the specific
dependent variables.
f
We did not include effect sizes for recall because almost all participants correctly recognized all the feedback they received.
g
The necessary data were not published in the article, but Wood kindly provided them.
h
Measured confidence as self-view.
†
Study does not fit inclusion criteria.
was r = .27, attention was r = .00, attribution was r = .15, Wenzlaff, Krull, & Pelham, 1992), leaving 28 studies listed in
over-claiming bias was r = –.11, predictive ability was r = Table 2. Of the studies included in the tables, Study 4 of
.00, and recall accuracy was r = .45. Sprecher and Hatfield (1982) was not excluded from the final
When we eliminated the studies that did not fit the inclu- meta-analysis because the inclusion of four feedback condi-
sion criteria, the average effect size for the self-enhancement tions (totally favorable, ambiguous favorable, rejecting, and
effect was r = .18. Broken down by specific dependent vari- totally negative) rendered it incomparable to the other studies
ables, the average effect size for accuracy was r = .31, in our sample. We also eliminated Studies 1 and 2 of Wood et
attention was r = .00, attribution was r = .14, over-claiming al. (2005) because participants received positive but not nega-
bias was r = –.11, and recall was r = .45. tive feedback. This left the 25 studies in the final sample pool.
Self-verification and cognitive processes. The average effect We further categorized the studies by specific dependent vari-
size for the self-verification effect in our preliminary sample ables: affect (i.e., both positive and negative emotional
was r = .25. Broken down by specific dependent variables, the reactions), attraction (i.e., how attracted are you to the evalu-
average effect size for accuracy was r = .20, attention was r = ator), negative affect only, positive affect only, satisfaction
.28, attribution was r = .27, over-claiming bias was r = .50, (i.e., how satisfied are you with the feedback), and task liking
predictive ability was r = .41, and recall accuracy was r = .50. (i.e., how enjoyable did you find the task).
When we eliminated the studies that did not fit the inclu- Self-enhancement and affective responses. The average
sion criteria, the average effect size for the self-verification effect size for the self-enhancement effect in our preliminary
effect was r = .30. Broken down by specific dependent vari- sample was r = .26. Broken down by specific dependent
ables, the average effect size for accuracy was r = .33, variables, the average effect size for general affect was r =
attention was r = .28, attribution was r = .27, over-claiming .31, attraction was r = .26, negative affect only was r = .12,
bias was r = .50, and recall was r = .50. positive affect only was r = .39, satisfaction was r = .62, and
In sum, there were significant enhancement and verifica- task liking was r = .16.
tion effects on cognitive processes. To determine the relative When we eliminated the studies that did not fit further
strength of the self-enhancement versus self-verification inclusion criteria, the average effect size for the self-
effects, we found the mean difference between the effect enhancement effect was r = .29. The average effect size for
sizes (M = –.067, SD = .27) based on a random effects model attraction rose to r = .34. The average effect sizes for all
and calculated the confidence interval for the weighted mean other dependent variables stayed the same.
differences. Overall, self-verification effects were greater Self-verification and affective responses. Inspection of Table 2
than self-enhancement effects, t(4884) = –17.42, p < .001, reveals that the average effect size for the self-verification
CI.95 = –.0735, –.0587, rs = .30 versus .18, respectively. effect in our preliminary sample was r = .13. Broken down by
When broken down by specific dependent variables, self- specific dependent variables, the average effect size for
enhancement effects were greater than self-verification general affect was r = .05, attraction was r = .28, negative
effects for accuracy, t(1831) = 8.945, p < .001, CI.95 = .0498, affect only was r = .10, positive affect only was r = –.03,
.0778, whereas self-verification effects were greater than satisfaction was r = .03, and task liking was r = .09.
self-enhancement effects for attribution, t(1774) = –33.89, When we eliminated the studies that did not fit further
p < .001, CI.95 = –.1206, –.1074. There were not enough inclusion criteria, the average effect size for the self-verification
studies to test mean differences for the other dependent vari- effect was r = .13. The average effect size for attraction rose
ables. Therefore, consistent with Shrauger (1975), overall, to r = .35 and negative affect dropped only to r = .09. The
the self-verification effects were stronger than the self- average effect sizes for all other dependent variables stayed
enhancement effects for studies of cognitive processes. the same.
In sum, although there were some self-verification effects
Affective Responses. These responses refer to emotional and for measures of affect, the self-enhancement effects seemed
affective responses to feedback, such as hostility, anxiety, dys- considerably stronger. To determine the relative strength of
phoria, liking, and positive and negative mood. Operationally, the self-enhancement versus self-verification effects, we
self-enhancement was defined as the tendency for participants found the mean difference between the effect sizes for
to display or report more positive affect in response to positive enhancement and verification effects (M = .152, SD = .25)
as compared to negative feedback. Self-verification was based on a random effects model and calculated the confi-
defined as the tendency for people with positive self-views to dence interval for the weighted mean differences. Overall,
experience more positive or less negative affect when their self-enhancement effects were greater than self-verification
partners view them positively and people with negative self- effects, t(4111) = 39.12, p < .001, CI.95 = .1443, .1595, rs =
views to experience more positive or less negative affect when .29 versus .13, respectively. When broken down by specific
their partners view them negatively. dependent variables, self-enhancement effects were greater
Not included in the tables were 4 studies because of insuf- than self-verification effects for general affect, t(931) = 30.98,
ficient data to calculate r (e.g., Stets & Asencio, 2008; Swann, p < .001, CI.95 = .2481, .2817; negative affect, t(1557) = 19.59,
Kwang and Swann 269
Table 2. Accumulated Effect Sizes, Corrected for Sampling Error for Affective Reactions
Dependent Enhancement Verification

Study N variable effect size effect size
Gibbons and McCoy 1991a 111 Affect .28 .00

Jussim,Yen, and Aiello 1995 172 Affect .33 .05
Moreland and Sweeney 1984b 166 Affect .63 -.06
Quinlivan and Leary 2005 81 Affect .28 .00
Shrauger and Lund 1975 48 Affect .00 .00
Stets 2005 282 Affect .14 .17
Woo and Mix 1997 72 Affect .54 .00
Katz and Beach 2000 (Study 1) 143 Attraction .44 .39
Katz and Beach 2000 (Study 2) 198 Attraction .60 .87
Morling and Epstein 1997 (Study 1) 245 Attraction .34 .36
Sprecher and Hatfield 1982 (Study 1) 37 Attraction .56 .02
Sprecher and Hatfield 1982 (Study 4)† 332 Attraction .02 .04
Robinson and Smith-Lovin 1992 (Study 1) 75 Negative affect only .35 .00
Burke and Harrod 2005 286 Negative affect only .02 .06
Cast and Burke 2002 401 Negative affect only .05 .07
Ralph and Mineka 1998 160 Negative affect only .03 .19
Shrauger and Sorman 1977c 53 Negative affect only .54 .37
Swann, Griffin, Predmore and Gaines 1987 98 Negative affect only .38 .00
Wood, Heimpel, Newby-Clark, and Ross 2005 (Study 1)d† 67 Negative affect only .20 .18
Wood et al. 2005 (Study 2)d† 79 Negative affect only .06 .11
Campbell, Lackenbauer, and Muise 2006 103 Positive affect only .23 -.10
Stake 1982 (Study 1) 236 Positive affect only .46 .00
Anseel and Lievens 2006 389 Satisfaction .58 .07
Korman 1968 (Study 1) 71 Task liking .30 .16
Total 4,590 Sample weighted mean r .26 .13
Total of studies that fit inclusion criteria 4,112 Sample weighted mean r .29 .13
a
We averaged the effect sizes for Studies 1 and 2 because the data came from the same participant sample.
b
We averaged the effect sizes for affect and satisfaction. The affect effect size for self-enhancement is r = .57 and for self-verification is r = –.06. The
satisfaction effect size for self-enhancement is r = .69 and for self-verification is r = –.06. We separated these effect sizes when we analyzed the specific
dependent variables.
c
The dependent variables measured by Shrauger and Sorman are anxiety and satisfaction. We did not average the effect sizes across these two variables
because they are very different constructs. Instead, we chose to report effect sizes for anxiety only because it is the more common variable measured
in other studies and labeled it as “negative affect only.” The satisfaction effect size for self-enhancement is r = .75 and for self-verification is r = .00. We
separated these effect sizes when we analyzed the specific dependent variables.
†
CI.95 = .0967, .1182, and task liking, t(373) = 27.62, CI.95 = positive feedback but to shun negative feedback; participants
.0625, .0720. Self-verification effects were greater than with negative self-views display the opposite pattern.
self-enhancement effects for attraction, t(1336) = –4.43, CI.95 We eliminated four studies because of insufficient data for
= –.0244, –.0094. Therefore, consistent with Shrauger (1975), calculating r (e.g., Swann & Ely, 1984; Swann, Milton, &
overall, the effect sizes for self-enhancement tended to exceed Polzer, 2000; Swann & Read, 1981b; Swann, Stein-Seroussi,
those for self-verification for studies of affective responses. & McNulty, 1992), leaving six studies, listed in Table 3. Tes-
sler and Schwartz (1972) manipulated locus of control instead
Interpersonal Behaviors. This category refers to behaviors or of positive or negative feedback, so we eliminated this study
speech designed to bring interaction partners to see oneself in from our final analysis. Finally, four studies (Baumeister &
a self-enhancing or self-verifying manner. Operationally, self- Tice, 1985; McFarlin, Baumeister, & Blascovich, 1984; Stud-
enhancement strivings would be evidenced by a tendency for ies 1 and 2 of Shrauger & Sorman, 1977) measured persistence
participants to embrace positive feedback but eschew nega- as the outcome variable. Persistence is an ambiguous outcome
tive feedback. Self-verification effects would be reflected in a as it can be explained by an increase in intrinsic motivation
tendency for participants’ positive self-views to embrace (i.e., enjoying feedback and reveling in it) or it can be
Table 3. Accumulated Effect Sizes, Corrected for Sampling Error for Interpersonal Behaviors

Baumeister and Tice 1985 (Study 1)† 61 Persistence .00 .41

McFarlin, Baumeister, and Blascovich 1984 (Study 1)† 93 Persistence .00 .00
Shrauger and Sorman 1977 (Study 1)† 53 Persistence .00 .36
Shrauger and Sorman 1977 (Study 2)a† 84 Persistence .42 .10
Tessler and Schwartz 1972† 48 Help seeking .39 .00
Swann and Hill 1982 24 Feedback resistance .00 .47
Total 363 Sample weighted mean r .15 .18
Total of studies that fit inclusion criteria 24 Sample weighted mean r .00 .47
a
We averaged the effect sizes for global and specific self-views. The global self-view effect size for self-enhancement was r = .41, and for self-verification was
r = .20. The specific self-view effect size for self-enhancement was r = .42 and for self-verification was r = .00.
evidence of motivation to disprove the feedback. Because it either instance, significant self-verification effects reflected
is unclear what task persistence signifies, we dropped all the a tendency for participants with positive self-views to be
studies that measure task persistence from the final analysis. more inclined to prefer positive feedback (evaluators) than
This left only one study in the final sample pool. The study people with negative self-views.
measured feedback resistance (i.e., amount to which the par- Omitted from Table 4 are 10 studies (e.g., Neiss,
ticipant verbally questioned or refuted feedback). Sedikides, Shahinfar, & Kupersmidt, 2006; Sedikides, 1993,
Self-enhancement and interpersonal behaviors. As displayed Experiments 1-3, 5-6) because the researchers did not mea-
in Table 3, the average effect size for the self-enhancement sure self-views, leaving 22 studies. Studies 1 and 2 of Chen,
effect for our preliminary sample was r = .15. Broken down Chen, and Shaw (2004) were then excluded because they
by specific behaviors, the average effect size for persistence measured only negative self-views (i.e., socially unskilled).
was r = .12, help-seeking was r = .39, and feedback resis- Study 2 of Rudich and Vallacher (1999) was deleted because
tance was r = .00. they confounded negative evaluation with rejection. This left
Table 3 also indicates that only one study was included in 19 studies in the final sample pool. We further categorized
the final analysis. The effect size for the self-enhancement the studies by specific dependent variables: evaluator choice
effect was r = .00. (i.e., which evaluator do you want to have future interactions
Self-verification and interpersonal behaviors. In our prelimi- with), evaluator preference (i.e., how much do you wish to
nary sample, the average effect size for the self-verification interact with the evaluator), feedback choice (i.e., which
effect was r = .18. Broken down by specific behaviors, the feedback do you wish to see), and feedback preference (i.e.,
average effect size for persistence was r = .18, help-seeking how much do you prefer to read each feedback).
was r = .00, and feedback resistance was r = .47. Self-enhancement and feedback seeking. Table 4 reveals that
Table 3 also indicates that only one study was included in the average effect size for the self-enhancement effect in our
the final analysis. The effect size for the self-verification preliminary sample was r = .19. Broken down by specific
effect was r = .47. dependent variables, the average effect size for evaluator
In sum, inspection of Table 3 reveals that the only study choice was r = .17, evaluator preference was r = .00, feedback
that was included in the final analysis supported self- choice was r = .11, and feedback preference was r = .41.
verification (r = .47). Nevertheless, a single study does not When we eliminated studies that did not meet the inclu-
provide a sound basis for drawing conclusions regarding the sion criteria, the average effect size for the self-enhancement
interpersonal behavior category. effect was r = .22, as can be seen in Table 4. Broken down by
specific dependent variables, the average effect size for eval-
Feedback Seeking. Feedback seeking refers to a tendency to uator choice was at r = .13, feedback choice was r = .18, and
choose evaluations, or evaluators, who are inclined to offer feedback preference stayed at r = .41.
particular types of feedback. The conceptual predictor Self-verification and feedback seeking. The average effect
variables were self-enhancement and self-verification. Oper- size for the self-verification effect in our preliminary sample
ationally, self-enhancement was defined as a main effect for was r = .25. Broken down by specific dependent variables,
feedback valence. Self-verification was defined as either the the average effect size for evaluator choice was r = .10, eval-
interaction between feedback valence and self-views or the uator preference was r = .38, feedback choice was r = .32,
(statistically equivalent) main effect of the congruence of and feedback preference was r = .27.
the feedback (with congruence referring to the degree of When we eliminated studies that did not fit the inclusion
match between the feedback valence and self-views). In criteria, the average effect size for the self-verification effect
Kwang and Swann 271
Table 4. Accumulated Effect Sizes, Corrected for Sampling Error for Feedback Seeking

Robinson and Smith-Lovin 1992 (Study 2) 78 Evaluator choice .38 .50

Rudich, Sedikides, and Gregg 2007 (Study 1) 148 Evaluator choice .00 .00
Rudich and Vallacher 1999 (Study 1) 47 Evaluator choice .06 .36
Rudich and Vallacher 1999 (Study 2)† 50 Evaluator choice .60 –.62
Swann and Pelham 2002 227 Evaluator choice .14 .13
Swann, Stein-Seroussi, and Giesler 1992 (Study 1) 81 Evaluator choice .14 .13
Chen, Chen, and Shaw 2004 (Study 1)† 107 Evaluator preference .00 .35
Chen et al. 2004 (Study 2)† 211 Evaluator preference .00 .40
Bosson and Swann 1999 (Study 1) 74 Feedback choice .05 .33
Giesler, Josephs, and Swann 1996a 73 Feedback choice –.21 .36
Sedikides 1993 (Study 4) 120 Feedback choice .50 .46
Swann and Read, 1981a (Study 1)b 79 Feedback choice .00 .24
Swann and Read, 1981a (Study 2) 120 Feedback choice .00 .20
Swann, Wenzlaff, and Tafarodi 1992 (Study 1) 25 Feedback choice .17 .36
Joiner 1995 100 Feedback preference .48 .29
Kraus and Chen 2009c 104 Feedback preference .32 .23
Petit and Joiner 2001 101 Feedback preference .45 .31
Silvera and Neilands 2004 89 Feedback preference .36 .22
Silvera and Seger 2004 76 Feedback preference .90 .18
Swann, Hixon, Stein-Seroussi, and Gilbert 1990 (Study 3) 51 Feedback preference .00 .30
Swann, Pelham, and Krull 1989 (Study 1) 21 Feedback preference .00 .45
Swann, Pelham, and Krull 1989 (Study 2)d 10 Feedback preference .00 .45
a
Because the feedback choice response between low self-esteem group and depressed group did not achieve statistical significance (z = 1.5, p < .07), we
collapsed the two groups.
b
We reported the average effect size for both emotionality and assertiveness. The effect sizes for emotionality were r = .00 for enhancement and r = .23
for verification. The effect sizes for assertiveness were r = .00 for enhancement and r = .26 for verification.
c
We averaged the effects sizes across both the significant other and the acquaintance groups. Insufficient data were available for the low-certainty condi-
tion group so only the results for the high-certainty condition were reported.
d
The necessary data were not provided in the published study but were provided by Swann.
†
stayed at r = .25. Broken down by specific dependent vari- Therefore, the tendency for self-verification to override
ables, the average effect size for evaluator choice was r = self-enhancement overall was driven by the relative
.17, feedback choice stayed at r = .32, and feedback prefer- strength of self-verification on indices of actual choice; self-
ence stayed at r = .27. enhancement strivings were stronger when preference
In sum, there were significant enhancement and verifica- ratings were examined.
tion effects on feedback seeking. To determine the relative The results of our analysis of feedback seeking have impli-
strength of the self-enhancement versus self-verification cations for the following section on relationship quality. In
effects, we found the mean difference between the effect particular, although Rudich and Vallacher’s (1999) second
sizes (M = –.028, SD = .25) based on a random effects model study was eliminated from the final meta-analysis because
and calculated the confidence interval for the weighted they confounded negative evaluations with rejection, their
means differences. Overall, self-verification effects were findings are nevertheless revealing and important. As shown
greater than self-enhancement effects, t(1623) = –4.46, p < in Table 4, when participants perceived that the negative eval-
.001, CI.95 = –.0401, –.0156, rs = .25 versus .22, respectively. uator was apt to reject them, their self-verification strivings
When broken down by specific dependent variables, self- were completely overridden by their desire for self-enhance-
verification effects were greater than self-enhancement ment. This evidence that people with negative self-views are
effects for evaluator choice, t(580) = –9.42, p < .001, unusually wary of rejection is also supported by evidence that
CI.95 = –.0424, –.0278, and feedback choice, t(490) = –25.20, low self-esteem persons are hesitant to enter novel social situ-
CI.95 = –.2311, –.1976, whereas self-enhancement effects ations unless acceptance is virtually guaranteed (Anthony,
were greater than self-verification effects for feedback Holmes, & Wood, 2007, Study 4; Anthony, Wood, & Holmes,
preference, t(551) = 11.76, p < .001, CI.95 = .1214, .1701. 2007). Moreover, when their feelings are hurt, people with
low self-esteem respond to hurt feelings with avoidance (e.g., evidence that people with negative self-views are adverse
Murray, 2005) and limit their risk of rejection by romantic to rejection (e.g., Anthony et al., 2007; Anthony et al.,
partners by emotionally distancing themselves from their 2007; Murray, 2005; Murray et al., 2002; Rudich & Val-
partner (Murray, Rose, Bellavia, Holmes, & Kusche, 2002). lacher, 1999), we divided the studies into two categories,
Together, the foregoing findings suggest that when we one high and one low in rejection risk. Studies of dating
examine the impact of enhancement and verification on rela- relationships were placed in the high-rejection-risk cate-
tionship quality, it will be important to distinguish the extent gory because such relationships are essentially extended
to which the threat of rejection is low versus high. Most qualifying exams in which commitment is generally lack-
important, the tendency for people with negative self-views ing. For this reason, negative evaluations often serve as an
to seek self-verification should manifest itself when the risk ominous sign that rejection may be imminent. Although
of rejection is low but not when the risk of rejection is high. rejection risk is generally much lower in marital relation-
This insight guided our approach to the meta-analysis of ships (Swann et al., 1994), the stability of such relationships
studies of relationship quality. can be threatened if one person decides that the partner is
unsuitable. In particular, if spouses verify negative quali-
Relationship Quality. Relationship quality refers to feelings ties that are high in relationship relevance (e.g., affectionate,
about the relationship such as intimacy, satisfaction, and thoughtful, warm), they convey that their partner is unsatis-
thoughts about, or actual rates of, separation and divorce. factory and thus rejectable (“You are unaffectionate,
Operationally, self-enhancement was defined as a tendency thoughtless, cold, etc.”). We accordingly placed marital
for relationship quality to be higher insofar as the partner studies that focused on qualities that were high in relation-
evaluation was positive. Self-verification effects reflected a ship relevance (i.e., the interpersonal qualities scale
tendency for participants to report superior relationship qual- developed by Murray et al., 1996) in a separate, “high-
ity when the partner saw participants as they saw themselves. rejection-risk” category; all other marital studies were
Specifically, self-verification occurred insofar as people with placed in the low-rejection-risk category.
positive self-views reported better relationship quality when Finally, studies that measured global traits such as global
their partner viewed them positively, and people with nega- worth and competency were placed in the high-rejection-risk
tive self-views reported better relationship quality when category. If one does not believe one’s partner is positive on
their partner viewed them negatively. a global level (i.e., unworthy), the evaluation is overly nega-
Four studies were not included in the tables because of tive and calls into question why the partner even wants to be
insufficient data to calculate r (i.e., Burke & Stets, 1999; in relationship with the target. In contrast, evaluations about
Carnelley, Ruscher, & Shaw, 1999; Ritts & Stein, 1995; specific traits (i.e., intelligence or athletic ability) have less
Schafer, Wickrama, & Keith, 1996). Of the studies that were impact on the rejectability of the partner. For example, low
included in the tables and initial meta-analysis, three studies ratings on intelligence could be offset by high ratings on
were eliminated from the final meta-analysis because they did attractiveness (see also Neff & Karney, 2002).
not fit into our inclusion criteria. Katz, Beach, and Anderson As can be seen in Tables 5 and 6, the foregoing procedure
(1996) measured perceived verification rather than actual left 10 studies in the high-rejection-risk category and 5 stud-
verification; this introduces the possibility that their ies in the low-rejection-risk category in the final sample
responses were influenced by projection biases or theories pool.4 We further categorized the studies by specific depen-
regarding socially appropriate responding. Katz, Arias, and dent variables: commitment (i.e., how committed are you to
Beach (2000) appear to have violated the specificity match- your partner), intimacy (i.e., how intimate is your relation-
ing principle (e.g., Swann et al., 2007), which is important ship), satisfaction (i.e., how satisfied are you with your
because one would not expect self-verification effects if relationship), and separation or divorce (i.e., did the couple
there was a mismatch between the self-view and evaluative stay together or separate or divorce).
feedback. Specifically, Katz and colleagues matched partici- Finally, note that two studies by Neff and Karney (2005)
pants’ global self-esteem with partners’ psychological and measured both global and specific self-views. In keeping
physical abuse, a problem because having low self-esteem with the reasoning outlined above, findings derived from
does not mean that one expects or desires to be physically measures of global self-views belong in the high-rejection-
abused. Finally, Cast and Burke (2002) measured verifying risk category and are displayed in Table 5; findings derived
role identities, which is how much spouses agreed on mean- from specific self-views belong in the low-rejection-risk cat-
ings and expectations on spousal roles rather than actual egory and are displayed in Table 6.
self-views. Because this operationalization of self-views was Self-enhancement and relationship quality in high-rejection-
not consistent with how self-views were measured in the risk studies. As shown in Table 5, the average effect size for
other studies, we dropped this study from the final analysis. the self-enhancement effect in our preliminary sample was
All of the remaining studies were included in the final r = .32. Broken down by specific relationship quality, the
meta-analysis. In line with the foregoing discussion of average effect size for dating commitment was r = .55, dating
Kwang and Swann 273
Table 5. Accumulated Effect Sizes, Corrected for Sampling Error for Relationship Quality in High-Rejection-Risk Studies

Katz and Beach 2000 (Study 2) 198 Dating commitment .55 .88
Campbell, Lackenbauer, and Muise 2006 103 Dating intimacy .33 .20
Katz, Arias, and Beach 2000a† 82 Dating intimacy .37 .11
Swann, De La Ronde, and Hixon 1994 179 Dating intimacy .19 .00
Murray, Holmes, and Griffin 1996 196 Dating satisfaction .25 –.19
Murray, Holmes, and Griffin 2000 121 Dating satisfaction .49 –.01
Murray et al. 1996 178 Marital satisfaction .34 .02
Murray et al. 2000 105 Marital satisfaction .60 –.01
Sacco and Phares 2001b 198 Marital satisfaction .30 –.15
Neff and Karney 2005 (Study 1)c 82 Divorce .08 .03
Neff and Karney 2005 (Study 2)c 169 Divorce .03 –.06
a
We averaged the effect sizes for both intimacy and stability outcomes across Time 1 and Time 2.
b
We averaged the effect sizes for global self-views of depression and self-esteem because of similar patterns in results.
c
Effect sizes for global self-views only.
†
Table 6. Accumulated Effect Sizes, Corrected for Sampling Error for Relationship Quality in Low-Rejection-Risk Studies

De La Ronde and Swann 1998 160 Marital intimacy .08 .24

Swann, De La Ronde, and Hixon 1994 165 Marital intimacy .00 .30
Katz, Beach, and Anderson 1996† 265 Marital satisfaction .65 .17
Cast and Burke 2002a† 460 Separation or divorce .05 .12
Burke and Harrod 2005a 286 Separation or divorce .05 .12
Neff and Karney 2005 (Study 1)b 82 Divorce .07 .14
Neff and Karney 2005 (Study 2)b 169 Divorce .04 .17
Total of studies that fit inclusion criteria 862 Sample weighted mean r .05 .19
a
The necessary c2 statistic was not reported in the article but was kindly provided to us by Burke.
b
Effect sizes for specific self-views only.
†
intimacy was r = .27, dating satisfaction was r = .34, marital dating intimacy dropped to r = .07. All other effect sizes
satisfaction was r = 38, and divorce was r = .05. stayed the same.
When we eliminated studies that did not fit the inclusion To determine the relative strength of the self-enhancement
criteria, the average effect size for the self-enhancement versus self-verification effects in the high-rejection-risk stud-
effect was r = .31. The effect size for dating intimacy dropped ies, we found the mean difference between the effect sizes
to r = .24. All other effect sizes stayed the same. (M = .234, SD = .27) based on a random effects model and calcu-
Self-verification and relationship quality in high-rejection-risk lated the confidence interval for the weighted means
studies. The average effect size for the self-verification effect differences. Overall, self-enhancement effects were greater
for our preliminary sample was r = .08. Broken down by than self-enhancement effects, t(1528) = 33.69, p < .001,
specific relationship quality, the average effect size for dating CI.95 = .2206, .2479, rs = .31 versus .08, respectively. When
commitment was r = .88, dating intimacy was r = .08, dating broken down by specific dependent variables, self-enhance-
satisfaction was r = –.12, marital satisfaction was r = –.06, ment effects were greater than self-verification effects for
and divorce was r = –.03. dating intimacy, t(281) = 97.53, p < .001, CI.95 = .1647, .1715;
When we eliminated studies that did not fit the inclusion dating satisfaction, t(316) = 282.31, p < .001, CI.95 = .4597,
criteria, the average effect size for the self-verification effect .4661; marital satisfaction, t(480) = 88.60, p < .001,
stayed at r = .08, as can be seen in Table 5. The effect size for CI.95 = .4271, .4465; and divorce, t(250) = 64.84, p < .001,
CI.95 = .0746, .0793. In short, when rejection risk was high, strivings trumped self-verification. On the balance, the evi-
self-enhancement strivings prevailed over self-verification dence suggests that both motives are potent but that they
strivings. express themselves differently depending on the response
Self-enhancement and relationship quality in low-rejection-risk class under scrutiny as well as the relevance of other moti-
studies. As shown in Table 6, the average effect size for the vational forces. The communion motive seemed particularly
self-enhancement effect in our preliminary sample was r = important, as it seems likely that people abandoned their self-
.15. Broken down by specific relationship quality, the average verification strivings when rejection risk was high in an effort
effect size for marital intimacy was r = .04, marital satisfac- to gratify their desire for communion.5
tion was r = .65, and separation or divorce was r = .05. If one looks beyond a simple tally of wins and losses,
When we eliminated studies that did not fit the inclusion it appears that somewhat different processes may have
criteria, the average effect size for the self-enhancement mediated responses to different dependent measures. In
effect was r = .05. Broken down by specific relationship part, this may reflect the fact that studies associated with
quality, the effect size for marital intimacy was r = .04, and some response classes were conducted in the laboratory
separation or divorce was r = .05. whereas studies associated with other response classes were
Self-verification and relationship quality in low-rejection-risk conducted in naturally occurring settings. Research on feed-
studies. As shown in Table 6, the average effect size for the back seeking versus relationship quality is a case in point.
self-verification effect for our preliminary sample was r = Recall that in studies of feedback seeking, the size of the
.17. Broken down by specific relationship quality, the average self-verification effects equaled or exceeded self-enhance-
effect size for marital intimacy was r = .27, marital satisfac- ment effects, but in studies of relationship quality,
tion was r = .17, and separation or divorce was r = .13. self-verification effects prevailed in studies in which rejec-
When we eliminated studies that did not fit the inclusion tion risk was low but self-enhancement prevailed in studies
criteria, the average effect size for the self-verification effect in which rejection risk was high. It may be that, in both
was r = .19. Broken down by specific relationship quality, types of studies, rejection avoidance was a crucial mediat-
the average effect size for marital intimacy stayed at r = .27, ing mechanism but that it manifested itself differently
and separation or divorce was r = .14. because of unique properties of the laboratory versus field
To determine the relative strength of the self-enhancement settings. In the laboratory settings in which most studies of
versus self-verification effects in the low-rejection-risk stud- feedback seeking were conducted, the interaction partner
ies, we found the mean difference between the effect sizes was often a stranger in whom the participant had very little
(M = –.143, SD = .08) based on a random effects model and investment. The overriding goal of participants in such
calculated the confidence interval for the weighted means dif- experiments was likely to complete the study with a mini-
ferences. Overall, self-verification effects were greater than mum of effort or duress. Participants were therefore
self-enhancement effects t(861) = –49.69, p < .001, CI.95 = unconcerned with being rejected unless the experimenter
–.1481, –.1369, rs = .19 versus .05, respectively. When specifically alerted them to this possibility, as did Rudich
broken down by specific dependent variables, self-verification and Vallacher (1999, Study 2). Seeking verifying, negative
effects were greater than self-enhancement effects for marital feedback in the typical feedback seeking study, then, is
intimacy, t(324) = –59.43, p < .001, CI.95 = –.2387, –.2234, something of a mixed bag: Although it is valued because it
and separation or divorce, t(536) = –73.85, p < .001, CI.95 = seems accurate, it is unpleasant to receive (Swann et al.,
–.0912, –.0865. In summary, just as the effect sizes for self- 1987; Wood et al., 2005). It is thus not surprising that
enhancement tended to be higher in the high-rejection-risk there was evidence for both self-verification and self-
studies, the effect sizes for self-verification tended to be enhancement strivings on the measures of feedback seeking,
higher in the low-rejection-risk studies. although the overall pattern favored self-verification.
In contrast, in ongoing relationships, evaluations from the
partner can serve as a bellwether of the relationship. In dating
General Discussion relationships and other designs in which rejection risk is high,
The results of our meta-analysis confirm earlier evidence that negative evaluations represent a clear signal that all is not
self-enhancement strivings influence affective responses but well. Such evaluations are therefore unwelcome, even if they
self-verification strivings shape cognitive reactions (e.g., contain a kernel of truth. In contrast, things are different in
Shrauger, 1975; Swann et al., 1987). In addition, our findings marital relationships and other designs in which rejection risk
extend earlier reviews by showing that self-verification is low because of high levels of commitment. Here, negative
strivings were significantly stronger predictors of feedback evaluations are not necessarily worrisome, as long as they do
seeking and—as long as rejection risk was low—relationship not focus on qualities that are crucial to the survival of the
quality. In studies of relationship quality in which rejection relationship, such as being loving or caring. By the same
risk was high (i.e., when a negative appraisal might signal token, overly positive evaluations can be troubling, as they
disinterest in maintaining the relationships), self-enhancement signal that the partner may expect more than the target of the
Kwang and Swann 275
evaluations feels capable of delivering. In addition to low also explain these responses. At a general level, we suspect
levels of rejection risk, in marital relationships, negative eval- that people feel good about positive evaluations because,
uations can be welcome as they signal mutual understanding for most people most of the time, positive evaluations are
of limitations and confirm an expectation that spouses should associated with positive outcomes. As such, it is not so much
know one another. Consistent with this reasoning, Campbell, that people with negative self-views are smitten with the
Lackenbauer, and Muise (2006) found that as relationship positive evaluations per se, it is that they associate such eval-
length increased, couples came to desire self-verifying feed- uations with increased feelings of agency (e.g., getting a
back over self-enhancing feedback, even when self-views good job, pay raise, or respect) or communion (e.g., social
were negative. Of course, additional moderators may be at acceptance, a friend or relationship partner). As such, peo-
play (e.g., Neff & Karney, 2002), and we urge future research- ple’s affective responses to feedback could be driven by
ers to continue the search for such variables. people’s need for agency (competence and autonomy; Ryff,
1989) or communion (belongingness and interpersonal con-
nectedness; Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Heine et al., 2006;
Conclusion Wiggins & Broughton, 1985). More work is needed to test
At the very least, the findings from the meta-analysis reported this hypothesis.
here refute the contention that the desire for self-enhancement But if self-enhancement theory is not the master motive,
routinely overrides the desire for self-verification (Sedikides then what is? Clearly, it is not self-verification, as our find-
& Gregg, 2008). More interestingly, the robustness of self- ings suggested that self-verification strivings were poor
verification strivings in our results throws into question the predictors of affective reactions and relationship quality when
proper interpretation of dozens of studies that are widely rejection risk was high. Could communion be the master
assumed to represent evidence for self-enhancement theory: motive? Here again, we think not. For example, although the
studies that were not included in our meta-analyses because desire for communion almost surely places some constraints
the investigators failed to include measures of self-views. on the manner in which people pursue their self-verification
The failure of researchers to measure self-views in such strivings, we suspect that the opposite is sometimes the case.
putative studies of self-enhancement introduces a glaring Consider, for example, evidence that people divorce partners
interpretative ambiguity. That is, because most people in who see them too positively or too negatively (e.g., Burke &
most societies have positive self-views (Diener & Diener, Harrod, 2005; Cast & Burke, 2002; Neff & Karney, 2005).
1995), in unselected samples roughly 70% will possess Insofar as such evidence reflects a tendency for self-verification
positive self-views. This means that evidence of “self- strivings to override people’s desire for communion, it would
enhancement” in such samples may reflect self-verification appear that the self-verification motive does not always sub-
strivings of the majority of people who happen to have posi- serve a superordinate communion motive.
tive self-views (see also Kwan, John, Kenny, Bond, & The upshot is this: Human social behavior is far too com-
Robins, 2004; Kwan, John, Robins, & Kuang, 2008). Stated plex and nuanced to be readily explained by any single
differently, the dozens of “self-enhancement” studies in motive or even a hierarchy in which a single motive is the
which researchers failed to incorporate measures of self- “master” of the others. As such, it would behoove workers to
views may not support the theory after all. Among many suspend their competitive quest to establish that their chosen
others, this includes studies that some (Heine & Hamamura, motive is “biggest.” In the place of this quest, we suggest
2007; Heine, Kitayama, & Hamamura, 2007; Mezulis, that researchers acknowledge the existence of multiple
Abramson, Hyde, & Hanklin, 2004; Sedikides, Gaertner, & motives and strive to develop a deeper understanding of the
Vevea, 2005) have taken as support for the cross-cultural gen- delicate interplay between them.
erality of the self-enhancement motive.
Of course, advocates of self-enhancement theory could Acknowledgments
respond to our evidence that neither self-verification nor We thank Michael Buhrmester, Matthew Brooks, Christine Chang-
self-enhancement strivings dominated the responses of Schneider, Serena Chen, Steven J. Heine, Sade Jones, Robin R.
participants by singling out the one arena in which self- Vallacher, and Morgan Ward for their feedback on earlier versions of
enhancement strivings were clearly strongest: affective this article.
responses. Furthermore, they might add, people’s feelings
are the most telling indicator of what they really want. We Declaration of Conflicting Interests
question this argument on two grounds. First of all, we see The authors declared no potential conflicts of interests with respect
no compelling reason to believe that affective responses are to the authorship and/or publication of this article.
any more diagnostic of what people want than any of the
other responses we examined. Second, although the affective Financial Disclosure/Funding
responses certainly did conform to the predictions of self- The authors received no financial support for the research and/or
enhancement theory, we believe that other motives could authorship of this article.
Notes for social decision-making. Journal of Experimental Social

Psychology, 43, 425-432.
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.33, r = –.34, and r = .24, respectively; the enhancement effect participant personality, and affective response to the feedback
sizes were r = .11, r = .00, and r = .68, respectively. As such, session. Journal of Organizational Behavior, 29, 681-703.
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Personality and Social Psychology

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Do People Embrace Praise Even 14(3) 263­–280

of Critical Tests of Self-Enhancement DOI: 10.1177/1088868310365876

Tracy Kwang1 and William B. Swann, Jr.1

Anseel and Lievens 2006a† 389 Accuracy .16 -.08

Dependent Enhancement Verification

Gibbons and McCoy 1991a 111 Affect .28 .00

Dependent Enhancement Verification

Baumeister and Tice 1985 (Study 1)† 61 Persistence .00 .41

Dependent Enhancement Verification

Robinson and Smith-Lovin 1992 (Study 2) 78 Evaluator choice .38 .50

Dependent Enhancement Verification

Dependent Enhancement Verification

De La Ronde and Swann 1998 160 Marital intimacy .08 .24

Notes for social decision-making. Journal of Experimental Social

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Do People Embrace Praise Even 14(3) 263–280