Kahler M 1998 Rationality in IR

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Rationality in International Relations
Miles Kahler
International Organization / Volume 52 / Issue 04 / September 1998, pp 919 - 941

DOI: 10.1162/002081898550680, Published online: 04 April 2005
Link to this article: http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0020818398440499
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Miles Kahler (1998). Rationality in International Relations. International
Organization, 52, pp 919-941 doi:10.1162/002081898550680
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Rationality in International Relations
Miles Kahler
The role of reason in international relations has been contested since the eighteenth
century. The construction of a sphere of calculated state action, raison d'etat, and an
image of the balance of power suggested an Enlightenment equilibrium as compre-
hensible to human reason as a clockwork. Even at the time, however, the obsessive
and often self-defeating war-making of Louis XIV and Frederick the Great illustrated
the irrationality of collective outcomes and the failure of self-imposed limits in a
world grounded in raison d'etat.1 During the nineteenth century, advancing industrial
capitalism promised to overcome passions in the interest of human progress, and
modern political economy reinforced the belief that individual calculations of inter-
est could lead to beneficial social outcomes. International politics, however, was only
partially captured by the force of reason.
The questioning of reason deepened in the twentieth century as modern psychol-
ogy undermined the image of a unified and rational self. Democratic politics meant
that the phantom of an elitist and state-centered rationality would remain elusive.
Disastrous international outcomes—the failure of cooperation in the 1930s, the monu-
mental carnage of two world wars—produced pessimism regarding the power of
human reason to comprehend the realm of international competition and to contain
the passions of ideology and nationalism.
Reason, Rationality, and American International Relations
As the study of international relations took shape in the United States after World
War I, however, these shocks to reason in all of its guises—a model of individual
psychology, an avenue for comprehending international reality, and an instrument of
The author wishes to thank Alexander Thompson and the other participants in the University of Chicago
PIPES seminar, Arthur Stein, John McMillan, and the special editors of this issue for their comments on
earlier drafts.
1. Kissinger 1994, 66.
International Organization 52, 4, Autumn 1998, pp. 919-941

© 1998 by The 10 Foundation and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
920 International Organization
progress—were felt only faintly. A perspective that was broadly liberal and material-
ist assumed a central place. Incorrectly labeled idealist, human reason in this view
continued to offer the possibility of collective mastery over the forces that had pre-
cipitated world war.2
At the same time, international relations was denned in social scientific terms, as
subject to the same regularities as other spheres of social life. By the 1930s, pioneers
in the new field had begun to adopt the model of natural science for their research;
like the liberal materialists, Charles Merriam, Harold Lasswell, and Quincy Wright
assumed that human reason could illuminate international relations in the same way
that it had comprehended the economy and political behavior. They embedded the
study of world politics in a broader political analysis that stretched from individuals
to national governments to the interaction among those governments.
Two events shook the rationalist faith of this liberal and nascent social scientific
enterprise. The cataclysm of World War II produced progressive hopes for a world in
which rational planning and institutional design would play a larger role. Those
hopes were not entirely disappointed in the postwar management of international
economic relations, but the onset of the Cold War undermined lingering hopes that
collective reason could overcome the force of ideology. Political persecution and war
also produced an emigration of European scholars whose realist tenets were far more
pessimistic regarding the abilities of reason to comprehend and to curb the violent
tendencies of world politics. Those beliefs were in sharp conflict with the prevailing
consensus in American international relations.
The roots of realism lay in currents of European thought that had undermined the
reign of reason. Realism injected an awareness drawn from European social theory
and philosophy that the image of a unified and rational self had been overturned.
Although these strands, particularly Freudian psychoanalysis, were not foreign to
postwar American social science, the attack launched by realism against what it
regarded as naive liberalism and a misconceived positivist scientific enterprise was
deeper. At the time of its entry into American intellectual life, the relationship be-
tween realism and rationalism in politics was more confrontational than complemen-
tary.
In Scientific Man Versus Power Politics, published immediately after World War
II, Hans Morgenthau drew intellectual ammunition from the European cataclysm for
a realist attack on prevailing liberal ideology. He assailed the current intellectual
consensus as "a repudiation of politics," offering a false hope of meliorating a social
world driven by irrationality. Morgenthau declared that "our civilization assumes
that the social world is susceptible to rational control conceived after the model of
the natural sciences, while the experiences, domestic and international, of the age
contradict this assumption."3 He was not alone among realists in questioning the
dominant liberal embrace of reason. In early formulations of the security dilemma, a
core concept of realism, John Herz also pointed to an underlying irrationality in the
2. This account of interwar international relations in the United States is drawn from Kahler 1997.
3. Morgenthau 1946, 71, 2.
Rationality in International Relations 921
interdependence of human beings and the simultaneous "necessity for distrusting

and possibly destroying" those same fellow beings.4 Realists engaged in the practice
of diplomacy, such as George Kennan, were intellectual allies, skeptical of claims for
a scientific study of politics.5
Realist skepticism toward the power of reason, grounded in European intellectual
life, was soon purged in its new American home. American policymakers may have
deployed realist tenets in their contest with the Soviet Union, but domestic politics
demanded a public attachment to liberal aspirations for international improvement.
More important, international relations and realism absorbed what Dorothy Ross has
called the "individualistic and ahistorical premises of liberal exceptionalism," best
represented in neoclassical economics.6 Running counter to this forceful but tempo-
rary European insertion in American international relations were more powerful coun-
tervailing tendencies that reinforced rationalist approaches to international relations:
economic analysis exploited the assumption of utility maximization to construct a
research program that was the envy of the other social sciences; strategic interaction
began to yield to the power of game theory and its international relations offshoot,
deterrence theory.
Rationality and Contemporary International Relations
Since the domestication of realism, the controversies surrounding rationality in post-

war American international relations have been much more narrowly defined. The
principal contenders have limited their disputation to the relative power of rational
and nonrational models as behavioral foundations for international relations. On the
one hand, rational and individualist models seem to fit the frequent delegation of
authoritative foreign policy decisions to a relatively small elite, the smaller role of
norms when compared to domestic politics, and the high costs of cognitive failure in
international interaction. On the other hand, cognitive inadequacy, the barriers to a
consistent pursuit of national interests imposed by domestic politics, and the intru-
sion of emotion-laden issues of identity suggest that rationalist models must be sub-
stantially modified or abandoned.
Other, larger controversies surrounding reason's powers and possibilities—
whether constructing a science of international relations or serving as a progressive
means for ameliorating the international realm—were set aside. Although some re-
cent challenges to rationalist explanations call into question the social scientific en-
terprise and its philosophical underpinnings, this account will exclude those who
seek to "dethrone" reason (using Jon Elster's term) and radically undermine the
research enterprise in which most international relations scholars participate. Episte-
mological issues continue to divide the social sciences, but most of those considered
4. Herzl951,16.
5. Stephanson 1989, 180-81.
6. Ross 1991,473.
here, from rational choice to social constructivist, pragmatically deploy their theories
in order to understand the substance of international relations. Whether the field has
reached agreement on the meaning of "understanding" is an issue too large to con-
sider here; my own belief is that broad canons of evidence and argument in the social
sciences are widely shared.7
On the narrower ground of whether rationality and rationalist models provide a
basis for constructing (or reconstructing) the field of international relations, an al-
leged affinity between rational choice models and traditional state-centric views of
international politics as well as a long-standing embrace of game theory has until
recently insulated international relations from an increasingly acrimonious conflict
between proponents of rational choice and their critics in other social sciences.8
Nevertheless, the current tendency to set up rational choice models as imperialistic
targets risks yet another fruitless and time-consuming "great debate" in international
relations. Previous great debates, whether maxi- (realism versus idealism) or mini-
(neorealism versus neoliberalism), have seldom advanced a coherent research pro-
gram for the field.9
Another intellectual tournament of this kind might be preempted by demonstrating
the value of a competitive exchange between those endorsing rationalist models and
their critics, rather than an all-or-nothing contest producing victory or defeat for one
side. Rationalist treatments have already been challenged to extend their scope and
refine their modeling; those who are skeptical of such accounts (from a number of
perspectives) have been pressed to reinforce the rigor of their arguments and to
define domains in which rational choice and the proposed alternatives carry the most
explanatory weight. Given the waves of "bashing" that too often occur on either
side, it would be premature to argue for convergence between rational choice and its
principal competitors. One feasible outcome, however, can already be discerned in
particular fields of research: a willingness by either side to emphasize problem-
focused research, permitting explanatory power rather than theoretical polemic to
decide the contest.
Two additional and equally important observations serve to obscure the lines in the
sand that are often drawn on either side. Rational and nonrational accounts share
methodological shortcomings. One problem, considered at greater length later, is a
too-easy aggregation from individual to collectivity. Confronting such shared meth-
odological problems could also contribute to intellectual exchange between rational
and nonrational modes of explanation.
Careful scrutiny of the criticisms leveled by either side also demonstrates that
differences between rational and nonrational often revolve around questions of defi-
nition. In accepting the narrower terms of controversy, reason and rationality are
defined here in broadly instrumental terms. Still, the variety of rationalist accounts is
a target for critics, who see in diversity a slippery unwillingness to confront empirical
7. For a different view of the importance of epistemological concerns, see Smith, Booth, and Zalewski,
1996; and Ruggie, this issue.
8. See Green and Shapiro 1994; and Friedman 1996.
9. Kahlerl997.
shortcomings. For those employing rational choice frames, on the other hand, such
variety undermines the allegations of some critics that they represent a monolithic
intellectual tribe. Criticisms revolve around the distinction between what John Fere-
john terms "thin" and "thick" rational accounts. To the former's assumption of
simple instrumental rationality, the latter adds auxiliary assumptions regarding agent
preferences and beliefs.10 Many of these auxiliary assumptions—such as those con-
cerning the possibility of other-regarding goals—lie at the core of many criticisms of
rational choice.
Another important definitional misunderstanding that exaggerates the lines of dis-
agreement is the common conflation of methodological individualism and rational
choice, a reasonable linkage given the roots of both in economics. As the comparison
of rationalist and constructivist accounts will suggest, individualist approaches need
not imply rationality, and rationalist accounts can and do incorporate social content.11
Since the "thickness" and individualism of rationalist models is often at the center
of disputes over their usefulness, Elster's definition of rational choice can serve as a
useful benchmark. As an explanation of behavior,
rational choice theory appeals to three distinct elements in the choice situation.
The first element is the feasible set, i.e., the set of all courses of action which (are
rationally believed to) satisfy various logical, physical, and economic constraints.
The second is (a set of rational beliefs about) the causal structure of the situation,
which determines what course of action will lead to what outcomes. The third is
a subjective ranking of the feasible alternatives, usually derived from a ranking
of the outcomes to which they (are expected to) lead. To act rationally, then, sim-
ply means to choose the highest-ranked element in the feasible set.12
Whether such a relatively "thin" definition remains empty or inaccurate, as some
critics allege, or provides the basis for a far-reaching explanation of foreign policy
and international outcomes has been central in controversies over the power of ratio-
nalist models in international relations.
Defining a benchmark for the nonrational side of this contemporary intellectual
contest is even more contentious than establishing the meaning of rationality. The
diverse critics of rational choice models in international relations either propose alter-
native nonrational explanations for behavior on the part of agents in international
relations or call into question the scope and accuracy of a rationalist account for the
behavior in question. Whether these alternatives modify, complement, or supplant
rationalist accounts is another question of central importance.
Rationalist models have confronted four persistent sources of criticism as the re-
search programs of international relations evolved after 1945. Realism has often
been paired with the assumption of a rational and unitary state actor, but its relation-
ship with rationalist theorizing has been uneasy, in both its classical, power-
maximizing form and its neorealist and structural variants. Psychological assaults on
10. Ferejohn 1991,282.

11. Arrow 1994, 2,4; Sen 1995, 2,14-18.
12. Elster 1986a, 4.
rational choice can be traced to Freud; contemporary criticisms share the individual-
ist premises of rational choice models but dispute its claims regarding the information-
processing powers of agents. Both rationalist and psychological models share a third
hurdle in explaining international outcomes: constructing a plausible model of action
for entities beyond the individual level, whether bureaucratic organizations, interest
groups, or states. Finally, the rationality and the individualism of beliefs is ques-
tioned by theories that stress culture, identity, and norms as independent sources of
action.
Reason and Neorealism
An elective affinity between international relations and rationalist models has often
been based on the assumptions of realism, which has claimed a dominant place in the
American study of international relations since 1945. The relationship of classical
realism to rational models of state behavior is more tenuous than latter-day realists
care to admit, however. The domestication of realism by the American study of
international relations obscured the earlier history of realism and rendered it less
subversive of rational choice models. In Politics Among Nations, Morgenthau him-
self adopted rational reconstruction from the viewpoint of actors as a means of com-
prehending foreign policy. This marriage of realist tenets and rationalist models took
place most clearly in the evolution of deterrence theory, but taming realism and
rendering it scientific has also been the program of structural realism (or neorealism).
Kenneth Waltz's neorealism represented the final domestication of realism by
American social science.13 Waltz self-consciously aimed to produce a social scien-
tific version of realism far removed from the anti-scientific model of power politics
endorsed by the younger Morgenthau. Whether Waltz's neorealism also represented
a final incorporation of realism within a rational choice paradigm is far more uncer-
tain. Although Robert O. Keohane attributed a rationality assumption to both classi-
cal realism and Waltz's structural variant, the microfoundations of both are unclear.14
Morgenthau's critical stance toward rationalism has already been described. Norma-
tive prescriptions of calculation and prudence suggested that realism understood ra-
tional behavior as far from universal in international politics.
Waltz drew analogies between his enterprise and microeconomics, but his empha-
sis on structure seems to place neorealism in a different methodological camp. Elster
notes that pure structuralist accounts deny the importance of rational choice in favor
of structural constraints. A modified version of structuralism—which may approach
Waltz's position—assumes uniformity in preferences and motivations and attributes
differences in behavior to differences in the opportunity set, which could be defined
by tighter or looser structural constraints.15 This second variant can be accommo-
13. Waltz 1979, 1986.

14. Keohane 1986b, 165.
15. Elster 1984, 113-14.
dated within a rational choice framework, but whether structural realism relies on
choice under structural constraints or two other adaptive mechanisms—selection along
Darwinian lines and socialization—is uncertain. Waltz's own position seems to vary
on this question. In Theory of International Politics, Waltz argues that structure af-
fects behavior through socialization and competition.16 In his treatment of both clas-
sical and structural realism, Keohane argues that the rationality assumption is one of
three key assumptions that define the "hard core" of a realist research program; he
includes Waltz within the rationalist camp as well.17 In his response to Keohane,
Waltz argues that selection carries most of the explanatory weight in structural real-
ism, awarding it a position of "central importance"; he stipulates that political lead-
ers cannot make "the nicely calculated decisions that the word 'rationality' sug-
gests."18 The realm of reason within neorealism remains ambiguous. Under tight
structural constraints of international competition and selection, the rationality of
agents seems superfluous. Waltz fails to demonstrate that structures have such consis-
tent and predictable effects, however.
Psychology and Rationality: Individual Reason

and Its Limitations
The inability of neorealism to demonstrate consistent behavioral or systemic out-

comes from the structural constraints that it emphasizes—distribution of power or
capabilities—may render the issue of its decision-making assumptions moot. To the
degree that structural constraints are awarded less explanatory weight, however, other
issues of rationality loom larger. The congruence between a rationalist model and the
psychological and information-processing limitations of individual decision makers
has preoccupied scholars. Given the apparent irrationality and destructiveness that
pervades the international politics of this century—wars that appear to have served
no state's interests, military technology whose use would destroy its user—the hy-
pothesis that these outcomes resulted from the obstruction of human reasoning has
often seemed powerful.
Psychoanalysis, another European import that was grounded in the irrational sub-
structure of the human psyche, has been employed to examine decision-making be-
havior that appeared to violate the canons of rationality. In a classic study at the
origins of psychobiography, Alexander and Juliette George plumbed the puzzling
and recurrent leadership style of Woodrow Wilson, a style that gave evidence of a
man "beset by great inner conflict which somehow led to self-defeat."19 George and
George confronted one criticism of psychological approaches—the weight attached
to personality variables in explaining significant outcomes. In building their narra-
tive to culminate in Wilson's central role in the unnecessary defeat of the Treaty of
16. Waltz 1979, 74.

17. Keohane 1986b, 164-65, 173.
18. Waltz 1986,330-31.
19. George and George 1964, xix.
Versailles, George and George demonstrate that Wilson's behavior was critical to an
important historical outcome. In demonstrating that his behavior in a complicated
strategic setting was the result of nonrational influences of which he was unaware,
however, two significant assertions must be confirmed: a counterfactual proposition
that a more "reasonable" course would have resulted in a different outcome and the
more difficult contention that his behavior was nonrational, if not when measured by
short-term political ends, then by longer-term goals that he had set. These are diffi-
cult tests for those who argue that nonrational influences on behavior are strong.
Responding to such claims, Sidney Verba framed a telling response in defense of
rational decision-making models.20 Verba pointed to two important shortcomings in
many psychological accounts that were critical of rationalist models. He noted unre-
solved issues of data: whether findings from experimental and clinical settings could
be transferred to the far different environment of foreign policy and domestic poli-
tics. He also pointed to the problem of aggregation for any individualist model of
choice: both rational and psychological models slipped too easily from individual
attributions to those of organizations and bureaucracies.
Verba also clarified the methodological tests that should be applied to nonrational
psychological explanations. He advanced a cost-benefit criterion for the inclusion of
psychological variables: add psychological complexity only when it yielded greater
explanatory power. Even more important, psychological explanations needed to move
from important generalizations that were too broad in scope to contingent statements
that would clarify when "nonlogical" influences on decision making would be sig-
nificant. Finally, Verba pointed out that many psychological explanations or critiques
incorporated, implicitly or explicitly, a rational benchmark. This benchmark was
essential, whatever its limitations in particular cases, in order to permit "systematic
consideration of deviations from rationality."21 Each of the issues raised by Verba
more than three decades ago remains significant in evaluating the psychological re-
search agenda.
Cognitive psychology rapidly overtook psychoanalytic theory as the principal chal-
lenger to rational models of behavior. The proliferation of studies of foreign policy
influenced by cognitive psychology also blurred the alternative research program.
Philip Tetlock and Charles McGuire, Jr. discerned two key assumptions in this di-
verse literature: international politics imposes heavy information-processing de-
mands on policymakers; in the face of those demands, policymakers—"limited ca-
pacity information processors"—employ "simplifying strategies" to comprehend
their environment.22 Those strategies may violate definitions of rational behavior and
call into question the use of rational choice as a norm for individual decision making.
One widespread bias discovered by psychologists in foreign policy decisions is the
reliance on cognitive structures (given a variety of labels—cognitive maps, opera-
tional codes, or schemas) deeply influenced by past experience and often resistant to
20. Verba 1961.

21. Ibid., 116.
22. Tetlock and McGuire, 1986, 149-50.
more recent data that might modify or overturn those structures. Yuen Foong Khong,
for example, has carefully charted the persistent use of historical analogies as sche-
mas for organizing incoming data, comparing a psychological interpretation of this
widespread behavior to alternative explanations.23
The discovery of "theory-driven" behavior, the term that Tetlock and McGuire
use to describe this mimicking by policymakers of scientific practice, poses difficult
judgments for those evaluating its positive and normative effects on policy out-
comes. Since reliance on preexisting beliefs is both widespread and necessary for the
processing of new information, this research program must assess when such reli-
ance becomes irrational and distorts policy outcomes. As Tetlock and McGuire,
Khong, and others who argue for damaging cognitive rigidity are forced to admit,
"reliance on prior beliefs and expectations is not irrational per se (one would expect
it from a 'good Bayesian'); it becomes irrational only when perseverance and denial
dominate openness and flexibility."24 Assessing that point in other than a tautological
way (by referring to a positive or negative outcome as evidence) is very difficult. In
effect, the rationality of reliance on existing schemas or cognitive maps for interpret-
ing the world is dependent on the desirability of updating beliefs more or less fre-
quently in the face of discrepant information. No uniform answer to that dilemma is
given in the psychological literature. Khong suggests a procedural strategy—forcing
existing analogies to a rigorous and public "scientific" test of their validity. That
kind of serious testing also imposes costs, however, and once again a sensitive com-
parison of the benefits (in terms of decision-making quality) would also be required.
In cases where particular schemas seem to produce outcomes whose costs are uni-
formly high, avoiding the use of certain kinds of schemas or analogies might be a
more efficient rule of thumb.
Other psychological alternatives to rationalist models of explanation emphasize
the process by which decisions are made, particularly the use of information-
processing shortcuts and heuristics; these alternatives are often portrayed as challeng-
ing rational choice models more directly. Prospect theory has evoked the most inter-
est among students of foreign policymaking. Based on robust experimental evidence,
prospect theory points to deviations from expected utility theory, the conventional
means of explaining choice under conditions of risk. In barest outline, individuals
systematically and frequently evaluate outcomes with respect to a reference point
rather than using net losses or gains; individuals are risk-averse with respect to gains
from that reference point and risk-acceptant with regard to losses; and preference
ordering varies according to the framing of prospects (a clear violation of the crite-
rion of invariance in rational choice).25 Despite the difficulties in measuring these
effects outside an experimental or laboratory setting, researchers using cases drawn
from international politics have already begun to examine the explanatory power of
prospect theory weighed against predictions based on expected utility.26 To the de-
23. Khong 1992.

24. Tetlock and McGuire 1986, 160.
25. See Quattrone and Tversky 1988; Levy 1992; Levy 1997; and Pauly and Stein 1993.
26. See Pauly and Stein 1993; Famham 1992; and McDermott 1992.
gree that convincing tests can be made using the data available, results appear mixed:
expected utility theory is hardly without value in explaining many of the outcomes.
The rich psychological literature in international relations has produced many case
studies demonstrating widespread cognitive and information processing distortions
that deviate from the predictions of rational choice and expected utility theories.
Psychological approaches often supplement rational choice explanations, however,
rather than providing an alternative to them. In other cases, such as prospect theory,
expected utility theorists are hard at work incorporating anomalous findings into
broader and more inclusive theories of decision making.27 Theory-building strategies
among psychological critics of rationalist models confront the same issue of "thin-
ness" as those using rational choice. Critics of rational choice voice dissatisfaction
with the emptiness of those models in the absence of a theory of preferences. Psycho-
logical process models, such as prospect theory, remain equally empty without a
theory of reference points or framing.
Psychological studies of foreign policymaking have produced important evidence
that qualifies rational choice models, but they do not represent a single psychological
alternative to rational choice. Mirroring the claims of rational choice theorists, psy-
chological critics have argued wide scope for their findings. They have generally
avoided a presentation of contingent theories or hypotheses that would stipulate the
conditions under which psychological distortions of rational decision making are
most likely. Even the most prolific and perceptive scholars who have mined histori-
cal and contemporary data find it difficult to claim more than the presence of system-
atic and widespread biases toward misperception across a wide range of cases.28 The
judgment of Tetlock and McGuire of a decade ago still stands: psychological ap-
proaches must work, not toward a single "cognitive portrait," but rather toward
producing a "contingency theory of information processing," specifying more clearly
the conditions under which particular cognitive strategies, rational and nonrational,
are pursued.29
Unfortunately, the obstacles to that course are formidable. Critics of the psycho-
logical perspective on choice have long alleged that the transfer of experimental
laboratory data, no matter how robust, to real-world choice situations is a flawed
strategy: even the most ingenious experiments cannot capture the subjective percep-
tions of risk that are present in markets or international bargaining.30 Even if one
allows the validity of testing for such effects in historical or contemporary settings,
the collection and evaluation of data that is aimed at reconstructing very refined,
subjective estimates of risk and utility is difficult to accomplish. Alternative and
equally convincing explanations based on different utility calculations (for example,
those including domestic political goals) can often be constructed.
Given these difficulties, Verba's cost-benefit criterion of research efficiency must
be taken seriously. Weighing the potential explanatory contribution of psychological
27. Machina 1987.

28. Jervis 1988.
29. Tetlock and McGuire 1986, 169-70.
30. For only one example, see Riker 1995.
approaches against more austere rationalist models becomes crucial in designing

research strategy. As Arthur Stein has argued, even the direction of psychological
effects on international outcomes is uncertain: plentiful and unbiased information
may not lead to greater cooperation or to other desired outcomes.31 Recent discus-
sions of prospect theory have produced widely divergent conclusions regarding the
overall effect of its decision heuristics on international politics. Timothy McKeown
argues that prospect theory predicts "bland foreign policies"; Robert Jervis and Jack
S. Levy perceive a status quo bias that might be upset by risk-acceptant propensities
in the domain of losses.32 A great deal hinges on the reference point deployed in a
particular choice situation, and prospect theory provides no theory of reference points.
If even the sign of these psychological effects is uncertain, then nonrational models
of this kind may add little power to existing explanations.
Using an expected utility framework, Woosang Kim and Bruce Bueno de Mes-
quita have attempted to measure the importance of misperception—defined as differ-
ences in perception regarding the probability of crisis escalation.33 This line of re-
search sidesteps the methodological difficulty in demonstrating mwperception, a
counterfactual that Kim and Bueno de Mesquita claim is unobservable in nearly all
historical cases. Such a concentration on shared or dissimilar beliefs and the exis-
tence of common knowledge provides one rationalist response to the criticisms of
psychologists. A second strategy in the face of evidence that rationalist models do not
capture decision making in an array of cases is to relax the assumptions of the ratio-
nalist model. Evolutionary game theory and models incorporating bounded rational-
ity have pursued this approach.
Both psychological and rational choice approaches share an individualist orienta-
tion. Both have tended to evade the crucial question of aggregation: whether assump-
tions regarding individual decision-making processes, rational or nonrational,
can be transformed into plausible assumptions about the behavior of collectivities.
That shared theoretical problem has been a stimulus to incorporating rational and
nonrational models of organization and institutions into theories of national
behavior.
Reason and Collectivities: The Issue of Aggregation
Deterrence theory represents one of the most sophisticated and highly elaborated
uses of rational actor modeling in international relations. It has also been an intellec-
tual testing ground for both rational actor (subjective expected utility) models and
those deploying psychological models. Much of the debate has centered on method-
ological issues, particularly the use of deductive models rather than case studies.
Participants on either side, however, have admitted that the contenders share an in-
31. Stein 1990, chap. 3.

32. See McKeown 1993, 217; Jervis 1992b, 190-91; and Levy 1992, 286.
33. Kim and Bueno de Mesquita 1995.
ability to offer convincing models that aggregate individual choices and behavior.
Jervis has pointed out that units composed of many individuals appear more irratio-
nal than individual decision makers for several reasons: governments or coalitions
that pursue contradictory goals, organizational or institutional incapacity in strategy
choice, alternation of different groups (with different preference orderings) in power,
and the possibility of cycling.34 George Downs, who has urged a positive symbiosis
between rationalist and psychological approaches to decision making in order to
produce a "strong" model of deterrence, also remarks on a less positive attribute on
the part of both rational deterrence theorists and psychological modelers to transfer
their assumptions about individual choice to states and organizations.35
Elster notes that treating the polity "as a unitary actor, with coherent and stable
values, well-grounded beliefs, and a capacity to carry out its decisions" is most
widespread in international relations and in the theory of economic planning.36 Given
its unhappy consequences in economic planning, it is surprising that this assumption,
which he labels potentially "treacherous and misleading," has been so easily ac-
cepted as an adequate microfoundation for much of international relations. Realist
assumptions of state rationality depended on an implicit selection argument, as de-
scribed in the case of Waltz: states that were unable to behave in at least a crudely
rational manner would be selected out through intense international competition.
Although a model of international selection may give some purchase on the differen-
tial survival of units, the link between rational action and survival has not been made.
In fact, much of the psychological literature suggests precisely the opposite: that
distortions in decision making and deviations from a rational model occur frequently
in international politics, with mixed survival consequences for the units in question.
Building on early decision-making models, Graham Allison's Essence of Decision
was one of the first efforts to challenge unitary and rational actor assumptions on the
basis of political process.37 Allison described a rational actor model of governmental
decision making (model I) and then proposed two alternatives that heavily qualified
the model. In choosing the Cuban Missile Crisis, the most threatening case of super-
power crisis bargaining during the Cold War, Allison deliberately selected a case in
which the international environment should have reinforced pressures toward unitary
and rational decision making. Instead, Allison found substantial deviations from such
a model, which he explained through two alternatives, an organizational process
model (model II) and a bureaucratic politics model (model III).
Critics of Allison's approach focused initially on the descriptive accuracy of his
account of the foreign policy process. More recently, however, his specification of
the models and particularly his tilt against his candidate for a rational choice model
have become a target. Jonathan Bendor and Thomas H. Hammond argue that Allison
creates a rational actor model without a dimension of strategic behavior. Omitting a
test of the insights of game theory is odd in a study of crisis bargaining. They contend
34. Jervis 1989b, 204-205.

35. Downs 1989, 236.
36. Elster 1989b, 177.
37. Allison 1971.
that Allison sets a benchmark for individual rationality that makes easier his promo-
tion of boundedly rational or nonrational models.38
Allison's second and third models, whatever their shortcomings, trace two paths
by which political and social units and organizations could be portrayed as rational.
The first avenue is increasing circumscription of rationality as aggregation increases.
Model II assumed that large organizations constrained individual rationality and be-
haved according to highly simplified decision rules. John Steinbruner's cybernetic
theory of decision, published soon after Allison's work appeared, elaborated a simi-
lar model of simplified organizational behavior that relied on simple and nonrational
decision-making processes.39 In both cases, rationality was held to become more
bounded and imperfect as one moved from individual choice to organizational rou-
tine. Despite the widely held view that organizations are less rational and "dumber"
than the individuals who compose them, Bendor and Hammond argue that large
organizations may, on the contrary, enhance the decision-making capacities of indi-
viduals rather than constrain them. Allison's view of institutional rationality is founded
on an optimistic view of individual rationality embodied in model I.40
If limitations on rationality are one route toward aggregation (the whole is less
rational than its parts), Allison's model of bureaucratic bargaining points toward
another. Policy outcome may be seen as the equilibrium of two-level or linked games.
In other words, bargaining among rational agents within an institutional setting adds
a degree of specification and rigor missing in Allison's bureaucratic politics model,
as well as captures the dimension of external bargaining. Helen Milner's contribution
to this issue of 10 describes at greater length the positive benefits of relaxing the
assumption that states are units. She provides a particularly telling critique of the
realist assumption that states are unitary actors. Less attention will be given here to
the modeling of internal political processes. Aggregation conceived as bargaining
among rational domestic actors in what Milner terms polyarchic settings has its own
risks and limits, however. Allison's early bureaucratic politics model appears to as-
sume that little hierarchy exists in foreign policy organizations.41 Two-level game
models sometimes evade this issue by positing a "chief of government" or other
authoritative decision maker who bargains with other political actors, typically legis-
lators (or the legislature). Whether that chief executive must also bargain with bureau-
cratic subordinates or cabinet colleagues (other than coalition partners in a parliamen-
tary regime) can be unclear in simpler game-theoretic models of two-level games.
Modeling the influence and points of intervention of interest groups raises similar
issues. Although on many international economic issues, a likely route for influenc-
ing foreign policy will be the legislature, many interest groups forge strong bonds
with bureaucracies in order to influence policy implementation. How such influence
filters into the preferences of the chief executive or head of government should also
be incorporated in the modeling of foreign policymaking. Principal-agent models
38. Bendor and Hammond 1992, 313, 319.

39. Steinbruner 1974.
40. Bendor and Hammond 1992, 312.
41. Ibid., 316-17.
and delegation regimes provide one avenue of institutional analysis that can incorpo-
rate diverse domestic actors within hierarchical settings.42
Another potential weakness of rational institutionalist analysis is its treatment of
the institutional rules of the game. Robert Bates's recent study of the International
Coffee Organization is an excellent exemplar of building from rational social and
economic actors toward institutions at the domestic and the international level.43 His
treatment of political institutions is squarely within the frame of positive political
economy, "the study of rational decisions in a context of political and economic
institutions," or, as Bates puts it, institutions "defining political games in which
interests compete for influence over public policy."44
Building foreign policy actions from individual rational actors constrained by in-
stitutions leaves open the question of whether institutions are exogenous or endog-
enous, however. Positive political economy ultimately regards institutional change
as explicable through the same rational choice means as equilibrium outcomes within
a given institutional setting. However, most studies, like that of Bates, accept domes-
tic institutions as fixed and play out the domestic political games (interacting with
international strategic bargaining) within that context. In assessing the stability of
national preferences in a more elaborated institutionalist analysis of foreign policy,
as described by Milner, stability of domestic political institutions and the games that
they define is crucial. Unfortunately, determining when political actors will opt for
institutional change rather than change within institutions is rarely specified clearly.
If one can assume relatively fixed preferences on the part of key individuals (or
representatives of interests) and fixed institutional rules of the game, treating national
preferences and behavior within a rationalist framework is far more convincing than
under circumstances in which institutional rules change frequently and unpredict-
ably.
Despite their weaknesses, Allison's alternative models stood at the beginning of
two broad avenues for creating unified, if not unitary, rational actors from organiza-
tional and national collectivities. One route produces actors embedded in and con-
strained by organizational context. Whether that context bounds or amplifies their
rational decision making remains open to argument. The second route carefully speci-
fies domestic bargaining games that are then linked to international bargaining behav-
ior and strategic interaction. Those games may vary according to domestic institu-
tions, information environment, and type of international interaction.45 This second
avenue produces outcomes that may serve as proxies for a unified national interest.
Both routes force close attention to the simple, conventional assumptions within
international relations that have produced unitary and rational actors from the com-
plexities of domestic political and bureaucratic competition.
42. For an introduction to agency problems and their solutions in a political context, see Kiewiet and
McCubbins 1991, chap. 2.
43. Bates 1997a.
44. See Ibid., 164; and Alt and Shepsle 1990, 2.
45. For a representative and rigorous array of models linking international and domestic politics, see
Pahre and Papayoanou 1997.
Culture, Norms, and Identity: Supplements and Alternatives

to Rational Models
The insertion of norms and identity into the analysis of international relations has
been taken by some as a direct assault on rationalist models of national policy and
international interaction. That insertion has taken many different forms, however,
and not all are incompatible with rational choice models. In part, the view that ratio-
nalist models are incompatible with the inclusion of norms or culture is the result of
an unfortunate conflation of methodology and substance. Most cultural and norma-
tive treatments employ "thick description" or interpretive approaches to their sub-
jects, in contrast to the deductive and parsimonious bent of rationalist models. The
alternatives are critical of the methodological individualism that is coupled with
rationality in these models of politics. Whether rationality and collective identity can
be combined within a modified rational choice framework is one of the central ques-
tions posed by the recent turn toward identity and norms. To the degree that one can
assemble common positions among a diverse group of theorists and researchers, four
different criticisms have been leveled at rationalist models. These critical positions
can be arrayed from those that complement modified rationalist models to those that
suggest a much larger theoretical divide between rational and nonrational.
The treatment of preferences as exogenous and individualistic has been questioned
by economists, social psychologists, and, within international relations, proponents
of strategic culture as a determinant of behavior. For some, the absence of a theory of
beliefs and preferences is simply a failure of explanation within rational choice mod-
els; if explanation occurs "when the mind is at rest," standard rational choice models
often leave restless minds in their wake. Herbert Simon has argued that without
strong auxiliary assumptions (such as those in public choice theory) rational choice
models are nearly empty of explanatory or predictive content.46 Others have ques-
tioned individualist assumptions regarding beliefs, preferences, and the information
environment that seem to underlie many rationalist models. Kenneth Arrow has re-
cently argued that both the rules of the game (in economic or strategic interaction)
and much knowledge is irreducibly social.47 Arrow's assertion can be tied to the
assumption of common knowledge that underlies equilibrium analysis in game
theory.48 Norman Schofield situates this question at the heart of social (and by exten-
sion international) cooperation: "The theoretical problem underlying cooperation
can be stated thus: what is the minimal amount that one agent must know in a given
milieu about the beliefs and wants of other agents, to be able to form coherent no-
tions about their behavior, and for this knowledge to be communicable to the oth-
ers."49 Schofield's language and the problem of common knowledge that he raises
provide a link to those who propose including social and cultural content in rational
models.
46. Simon 1995, 50.

47. Arrow 1994,5-6.
48. For a summary, see Morrow 1994a, 307-308.
49. Schofield 1985.
934 IntemationaJ Organization
Within international relations strategic culture is sometimes portrayed as an alter-

native to rational choice explanations. In fact, strategic culture is better seen as a
modification or extension of those models, providing a source of organizational and
national preferences. For example, Alastair Iain Johnston offers "a limited, ranked
set of grand strategic preferences that is consistent across the objects of analysis . . .
and persistent across time" as the "essential empirical referent of strategic culture."
Strategic culture is proposed as a more powerful explanation for this ranking than
variables such as "technology, threat, or organization."50 Elizabeth Kier also presents
a "culturalist" approach to the choice of military doctrine as a means of endogeniz-
ing preferences, in contrast to structural or functional explanations.51 Jeffrey W. Legro,
in another deployment of organizational culture (as an alternative to realist and insti-
tutionalist explanations), also uses the culture of military organizations as a means
for explaining state preferences.52 In each of these cases, cultural explanations are a
means of enriching models of state choice, not an instrument for overturning them.
Even these efforts to explain the collective or social content of beliefs and prefer-
ences may with extension suggest a deeper conflict with rationalism. One point of
disagreement concerns the nature of culture itself. To the degree that organizational
and strategic culture is defined carefully, it is not seen as the result of individual
interaction: through processes of socialization, organizational cultures are embedded
in individuals and those individuals accept such cultures in a relatively unreflective
way. Contrast this image with the rational and individualist model of corporate cul-
ture proposed by David M. Kreps. Although Kreps allows that corporate culture may
be "rigid and immutable," he offers a definition of culture that is functional and
evolutionary: a principle or set of principles that permit "relatively efficient transac-
tions to take place and on which a viable reputation can be based."53 Although both
views of organizational culture employ the word culture, the means by which culture
is created and transmitted is very different.
A second point of divergence links culturalist explanations to psychological cri-
tiques described earlier. If culture implies "culturally dictated schemas which guide
individuals to see, do, and want what is required of them,"54 one may arrive at a view
of choice so constrained by culture that little choice remains: to return to Elster's
original definition, the feasible set is sharply constrained by culture, collective be-
liefs largely guide interpretation of the choice situation, and in the most culturally
driven account, choice can hardly be said to occur. If this interpretation is placed on
strategic or organizational culture, we approach a nonrational, norm-driven behavior
that is described later.
This first group of critics wishes to elaborate and "socialize" beliefs and prefer-
ences within reigning rationalist accounts. A second group is more concerned with
50. Johnston 1995b, 48.

51. Kier 1995, 67.
52. Legro 1995, 27-28.
53. Kreps 1990a, 127, 125.
54. Rosenberg 1995, 132.
anachronistic or inaccurate auxiliary assumptions that have characterized too many

rational choice models of political behavior. If the first critics are concerned with the
emptiness of rational choice models, the second set remarks that such models have
been filled with particular assumptions about individual and state preferences, specifi-
cally the assumption of a self-interested homo economicus. Using Ferejohn's distinc-
tions, the criticisms here are directed at "thick rationality" of the wrong kind (in the
view of the critics) rather than the thin rationality that was the focus of the first
criticisms.
The inclusion of other-regarding or altruistic motivations in rationalist models has
been the source of considerable controversy, much of it without direct relevance to
international relations. On one side, it is argued that by emptying rational choice of
self-interest narrowly defined, the concept of rationality becomes so thin as to be-
come a tautology.55 The opposed view is in favor of "broad," not thin rationality,
criticizing the narrow self-interest view of rationality as an unnecessary auxiliary
assumption imposed by too many economists. Elster, for example, distinguishes be-
tween economic man "defined through continuous preferences and narrow self-
interest," and rational man, "who may have non-Archimedean preferences and be
moved by concern for others."56
Although less concerned with altruism, debates within international relations re-
volve around similar issues: does "broadening" rational models to incorporate differ-
ent beliefs about the world and nonmaterial conceptions of interest render the model
so "thin" as to undermine its explanatory usefulness? The introduction of ideational
variables into explanations of foreign policy, widespread over the past decade, does
not seem to have weakened the explanatory power of essentially rationalist models.57
Ferejohn makes a convincing argument that even interpretivist accounts based on
thick description of distant historical episodes, accounts that challenge some of the
assumptions embedded in public choice and positive political economy models of
political behavior, can be fruitfully incorporated into broader rational and purposive
models of behavior. By drawing on both interpretivist and rationalist approaches the
indeterminacies of each can be partially alleviated.58 This apparently happy comple-
mentarity may reach its limits, however, when the beliefs and preferences of another
culture or another time challenge rationalism itself. Some argue that the worldviews
of other cultures, such as Islamic fundamentalism, cannot be melded with an ap-
proach derived from the European Enlightenment.59 The reply to such arguments
raises two questions: is this worldview, typically derived from the writings of intel-
lectuals and clerics, shared widely by the population and reflected in its behavior? To
the degree that action cannot be explained by a very thin rational model, how do
these actors accomplish their political and religious ends (that is, are there costs or
selective pressures imposed on nonrational operating codes)?
55. Monroe 1995, 5.

56. Elster 1984, 146. On less self-centered views of rationality, see also Sen 1994, 389.
57. See the contributions to Goldstein and Keohane 1993b.
58. Ferejohn 1991, 285.
59. Euben 1995, 157-78.
Rather than emphasizing the social and cultural content of beliefs and preferences,
a third set of critics concentrates on the determinants of identity, which is held to be
socially constructed and prior to any definition of preferences or behavior. Once
again, the elevation of identity undermines methodological individualism rather than
rationalist models per se, but some interpretations of identity call into question ratio-
nal choice assumptions as well. Social constructivism, which incorporates a diverse
body of scholarship, emphasizes socially constructed identity and its implications as
a core constituent of its research program.60 Sociological approaches to international
relations also argue against a starting point of individual, rational agents. Instead,
agents themselves, whether individuals or states, are shaped profoundly by a dense
institutional environment. The environment can not only alter choices, it can also
constitute the properties of actors and even their existence.61 The sociological perspec-
tive accepts institutions as pervasive; although institutions "are certainly the product
of human activity, they are not necessarily the products of conscious design." They
represent "collective outcomes that are not the simple sum of individual interests."62
The social constructivist or sociological view of a highly institutionalized environ-
ment shaping or even determining the identity of its constituent actors need not be
incompatible with rationalist models. One could argue that choices are simply highly
constrained by social and cultural determinants (as earlier criticisms alleged) and that
socially constituted identities are an ontological issue prior to be\\aviota\ modeling
along rational choice lines.63 As John Ruggie puts it, "a core constructivist research
concern is what happens before the neo-utilitarian model purportedly kicks in. "M In
Outlining the effects Of identity on national security policy, for example, Ronald L.
Jepperson, Peter J. Katzenstein, and Alexander Wendt point to two ways in which
identity is prior to interests: states may develop interests linked to particular identi-
ties, or domestic identity politics may be reflected in foreign policy interests. In both
cases, identity is prior to interests and may define those interests, but the pursuit of
those interests could be incorporated in a rationalist model.65
Once again, however, extending or reinterpreting this concern with identity may
produce conflict rather than complementarity with a rationalist approach. Identity
may itself affect interests and behavior in a direct and unmediated way that is difficult
to reconcile with rational choice models. Kristen Renwick Monroe's sphere of ethi-
cal action, for example, proceeds directly from identity: "Certain kinds of political
action emanate primarily from one's perception of self in relation to others; this
perception effectively delineates and sets the domain of choice options perceived as
available to an actor, both in an empirical and moral sense." Or more radically:
60. See Adler 1997; and Ruggie, this issue.

61. Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein 1996,41.
62. DiMaggio and Powell 1991, 8-9.
63. Spruyt's excellent account of the emergence of the sovereign territorial state combines an analysis
of the success of one identity with a rational choice explanation for the emergence of the initial competi-
tors. Spruyt 1994.
64. Ruggie, this issue.
65. Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein 1996, 60-61.
"ethical action does not result from conscious calculus."66 Identity may also under-
mine a rationalist calculus if it can be attached to different forms of rationality. Shawn
Rosenberg contends that individuals may exhibit different structures of reasoning
and different rationalities; at the level of collectivities, cultural arguments (described
earlier in the case of non-Western cultures) could ascribe the same variation.67 Doubts
remain, however: would selection produce some form of roughly similar rationality
among individuals or collectivities; can the evidence of such radical variation in
reasoning (drawn from experimental evidence) be transposed to social and political
settings?
A final alternative to rational choice explanations of behavior, described by Elster
as the only alternative that cannot be absorbed by even an expanded rationalist frame,
is behavior driven by social norms.68 Behavior driven by social norms defined in this
way undermines both individualist and rationalist premises of rational choice mod-
els. The norms in question are social in two respects: they are shared by a population,
and that population sustains them by enforcing them (through expressed approval
and disapproval). Unlike rational action, which is determined by the instrumental
pursuit of future outcomes, norm-driven behavior is not outcome-oriented. One easy
guide to behavior governed by social norms (as compared to behavior driven by
rational or optimizing behavior) is the response (when challenged) that a certain
action "just isn't done." Norm-driven behavior is nonrational in a second sense, in
its tie to the emotions: "Social norms have a grip on the mind that is due to the strong
emotions their violations can trigger."69
Elster's conception of norm-driven behavior is contested from both the rationalist
and the social constractivist positions. Those deploying rational choice models seek
to incorporate this sphere of human behavior within a rationalist perspective as well.
Russell Hardin, for example, challenges Elster's definition of norms as not outcome-
oriented. For Hardin, following norms may combine elements of both rational self-
interest and nonconsequentialist motivation. The. fluid boundaries between norm-
driven and rational choice can only be assessed empirically.70 Social constructivists,
on the other hand, would contest the methodological individualism of Elster's defini-
tion and seek to expand the scope of norm-driven behavior as against behavior ex-
plained through individual choice.71 Two separable characteristics of norms are at
issue then: to what degree norms can be regarded as based in individual beliefs and
behavior and to what degree norms are sustained by rational self-interest (denned
minimally as concern with the consequences of the behavior induced by norms).
More than in economic transactions (where there are strong norms regarding what
money can buy), international relations has been portrayed as a setting of weak or
nonexistent norms. Norm-driven behavior in the conventional or realist view is rare
66. Monroe 1995, 12-13.

67. Rosenberg 1995, 124-25.
68. The description here is drawn from Elster 1989c, chap. 3; and Elster 1989b, 32-35.
69. Elster 1989c, 100.
70. Hardin 1995, 108, 140.
71. On the individualism of Elster's conception of norms, see Elster 1989c, 105.
or absent. Social constructivists have expanded attention to outcomes that appear to

be explained by the evolution of social norms in international relations—norms that
are often closely tied to identity. Nevertheless, most case studies of the influence of
norms in international relations, as responses to realist skepticism, have not been
designed to establish norm-driven behavior as a nonrational alternative to rationalist,
outcome-driven behavior described by Elster.72 Although social constructivists would
reject an individualist account for the origins of norms, as Martha Finnemore and
Kathryn Sikkink make clear in this issue, they would not in every case reject a role
for individual or state self-interest in sustaining norms. On further investigation,
norms with a wholly nonrational basis may be discovered in international relations:
the attachment to national sovereignty may be one example. In international rela-
tions, however, the ability to assign an instrumental explanation for the power of
many norms and the absence of an apparent affective or emotional linkage that sus-
tains compliance through social disapproval in domestic contexts may reduce the
scope of wholly nonrational, norm-driven behavior.
Just as deterrence theory has served as the principal site of contest between ratio-
nal choice and psychological approaches, identity- and norm-centered explanations
on the one hand and rational choice models on the other have challenged each other
on the field of ethnic or national identity since the end of the Cold War. In predicting
the prevalence of ethnic conflict in particular, rational choice and cultural or eclectic
models have competed for explanatory success. The competition is made more inter-
esting by a mingling of normative and positive analysis. As Bernard Yack has argued,
the familiar distinctions between civic and ethnic nationalism (good/bad, rational/
nonrational, peaceful/conflictual) combine unexamined assumptions about the sources
of unfolding ethnic conflict as well as assumptions about desirable outcomes.73
Models of ethnic outbidding based on rational politicians have been widely em-
ployed; the instrumental view of ethnicity at the individual and the elite level is a
powerful one. At the same time, those models appear incomplete or fail to "work" in
the absence of a cultural (if not primordial) substrate that closely resembles Elster's
norm-driven behavior: suffused with affect and often unconcerned with outcomes.
All of the social and interpretive qualifications of rational choice models mentioned
earlier are applicable here, as are the cautions regarding the easy leap from individual
to group motivations and action.74 Prevailing theoretical eclecticism in the study of
ethnicity and ethnic conflict, combined with a rich and growing set of historical and
contemporary cases, suggests that this arena will provide not only some clear tests of
the limitations and strengths of rationalist models and their competitors but also a site
for bridge building between the theoretical and methodological camps. Whether those
bridges are illusory or real is the subject of the concluding section.
72. See the cases in Katzenstein 1996c.

73. Yack 1996, 7.
74. On this point, see Fearon and Laitin 1996, 731.
Reason and the Domain of International Politics

International relations has always been a realm of reason only in part, claimed by
both passions and interests. Perhaps the long coexistence of those who have tried to
capture its elements of calculation and prudence and those impressed by the irratio-
nality of international outcomes and processes has spared the field from some of the
battles that are underway between rational choice and its critics elsewhere in the
social sciences. In the inconclusive great debates of international relations, those
employing rational choice models could be found on either side, particularly in the
most recent neorealist and neoliberal controversies. The image of rational and uni-
tary state actors has been pervasive in the field; strategic interaction is a given. As a
result, rational choice and game-theoretic approaches have been easier to accept.
A certain familiarity with models drawn from microeconomics has not meant an
absence of critical scrutiny for those approaches, however. Critics from a number of
psychological perspectives—depth psychology, cognitive psychology, prospect
theory—have pointed out important deviations from austere models of subjective
expected utility. Psychological approaches have confronted rational actor models on
a level playing field: both accepted individualist premises. The long-standing ex-
changes between rational choice and its psychological critics demonstrate that argu-
ments about scope must be framed precisely to move the field forward. The hege-
monic aspirations of rationalist modelers have often confronted equally broad claims
regarding the prevalence of psychological distortions in decision processes. Many of
those at the center of psychological research programs, such as Robert Jervis, Philip
Tetlock, and Janice Stein, have argued for context-dependent or contingent theories
that would specify when rational choice or alternative psychological models of deci-
sion should be applied. Unfortunately, such a theory has not emerged on either side.
Although the experimental results in support of prospect theory—the latest theoreti-
cal alternative championed by the psychologists—are robust, the translation of those
findings into decision situations comparable to those in international politics remains
problematic. Psychological critiques have elicited a significant response by rational
choice modelers and game theorists, however. Expected utility models rely on a
rationality that is increasingly constrained, reducing the heroic assumptions that pro-
vided such an easy target for the psychologists. The incorporation of bounded ration-
ality into these models and the development of evolutionary game theory have per-
mitted more realistic definitions of rational behavior and opened new research avenues.
In addition to the need for contingent statements of scope, rational choice and its
individualist critics also share methodological shortcomings that could be explored
together. Both rational choice and its micro-level critics have moved blithely from
the individual to the organizational and governmental levels of analysis, accompa-
nied by their rational and nonrational assumptions. The issue of appropriate aggrega-
tion or modification in order to preserve assumptions drawn from the individual level
has seldom been broached explicitly. Under the influence of neorealism and moves to
"bring the state back in," international relations, far more than the other social sci-
ences, was willing to attribute a circumscribed rationality to states and other interna-
tional actors. Typically, the issue is dealt with through simple pragmatism: unitary
actors are a useful assumption until proven unrealistic. Only recently has institu-
tional analysis provided a rigorous means for identifying the constraints on domestic
political actors and modeling both the international and domestic bargaining in which
they engage.
A diverse set of critics who emphasize culture and norms exemplify a third strat-
egy that is necessary for fruitful theoretical exchange: clarifying points of comple-
mentarity and conflict through careful definition. Many of these critics have ques-
tioned the individualist assumptions of most rational choice models; their arguments
have implications that are less clear for rational choice assumptions. By forcing
implicit auxiliary assumptions to the surface, rational choice models have been broad-
ened. By pressing for a theory of preference and belief formation and arguing for
attention to the identity formation of actors, alternatives based on culture and norms
opened questions that many rationalist models had mistakenly believed to be an-
swered. As a result, new research agendas—driven by rationality, culture, and iden-
tity—have illuminated ethnic and identity politics and their influence on interna-
tional relations, the character of units—as defined by themselves and by others—
across time, and "knowledge politics," the construction of social knowledge within
and across national boundaries.
Arguing for inevitable convergence or accommodation between rational choice
and its critics would be as naive as proclaiming peace in our time. Nevertheless, the
conditions described provide a basis for intellectual exchange that promises to ad-
vance research agendas on either side rather than promoting fruitless and grandiose
claims and counterclaims. Careful stipulations of scope, acknowledgment of joint
methodological shortcomings, and precise definition of perceived differences can be
supplemented empirically by problem-centered research. If research agendas are
largely theory-driven, selection biases will tend to favor research questions more
tractable for rational choice or its critics. By accepting the "neutral" empirical ground
of historical or contemporary issues whose importance is widely acknowledged, a
level playing field for theoretical competition may be established. Deterrence served
this purpose and illuminated the differences between rational deterrence theory and
its critics. Nationalism and ethnicity provide a similar competitive research frontier
for social constructivist and rational choice models.
Full-blown alternatives to rational choice may arise from each of these critical
alternatives. An evolutionary or selective model, endorsed by Waltz, would render
micro-level rationality otiose. Prospect theory or another model of psychological
processes may yet offer the breadth of application that rational choice has enjoyed as
a model of individual decision. Social constructivism could produce a unified, norm-
driven model of international relations that will contend with the state-centric and
rationalist predilections of both neorealists and liberal institutionalists.
What is more likely is further evolution of rationalist models in directions that
accommodate at least some of these criticisms. Heroic and unrealistic assumptions
regarding information and information processing will continue to be relaxed in fa-
vor of constrained or bounded rationality. Models of linked domestic and interna-

tional bargaining will eliminate the need for another set of unrealistic assumptions
concerning unitary and rational states. Finally, rational models will be "collectiv-
ized," as persistent cultural beliefs are incorporated into game-theoretic and institu-
tionalist models.75 In light of past experience, valuable complementarities between
rational choice and its critics will be more rapidly exploited by rationalist models.
Assumptions of rationality and criticisms of those assumptions have defined re-
search agendas in international relations; in the past they also defined a normative
stance in international relations. Rational choice provided a means to explore the
most efficient means to pursue national ends, to attain collectively desirable interna-
tional outcomes, and to avoid disastrous ones. Military strategy, at least since Clause-
witz, has been designed to impose reason on conflicts that threatened to spin out of
control, to transform fights into games. Deterrence theory, with its applications to
nuclear policy and arms control, was perhaps the most striking demonstration of
reason in the service of particular national and international goals, but one that dem-
onstrated in the eyes of some the irrationality of reason's offspring. Psychological
dissents from rational choice were directed toward what was seen as the hubris of
early deterrence theory, but the goal remained an undistorted set of rational beliefs
and decision-making processes. The delicate balance of terror was rendered less
delicate and less dangerous, but what many saw as the fundamental irrationality of
mutual assured destruction remained.
The narrowing of reason's import to a criterion of decision-making efficiency may
have eliminated its status as a normative standard. The effects of misperception and
other nonrational distortions on international outcomes are ambiguous; theory-
driven behavior can have both positive and negative consequences. Rational institu-
tional design (from the point of view of individual agents) may produce governmen-
tal deadlock and foreign policy passivity at the national level. And nonrational
influences, such as norms and national identity, may create both a community ca-
pable of forging a coherent and legitimate foreign policy and one that oppresses its
own minorities and wages war against those outside the community's pale. Reason's
role at the core of explanatory models continues to grow. Its status as a benchmark
for judgment remains as uncertain as it was when Morgenthau attacked "scientific
man."
75. For an important example of such a strategy, see Greif 1995.

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Rationality in International Relations

International Organization / Volume 52 / Issue 04 / September 1998, pp 919 - 941

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Reason, Rationality, and American International Relations

International Organization 52, 4, Autumn 1998, pp. 919-941

interdependence of human beings and the simultaneous "necessity for distrusting

Rationality and Contemporary International Relations

Since the domestication of realism, the controversies surrounding rationality in post-

10. Ferejohn 1991,282.

Reason and Neorealism

13. Waltz 1979, 1986.

Psychology and Rationality: Individual Reason

The inability of neorealism to demonstrate consistent behavioral or systemic out-

16. Waltz 1979, 74.

20. Verba 1961.

23. Khong 1992.

27. Machina 1987.

approaches against more austere rationalist models becomes crucial in designing

Reason and Collectivities: The Issue of Aggregation

31. Stein 1990, chap. 3.

34. Jervis 1989b, 204-205.

38. Bendor and Hammond 1992, 313, 319.

Culture, Norms, and Identity: Supplements and Alternatives

46. Simon 1995, 50.

Within international relations strategic culture is sometimes portrayed as an alter-

50. Johnston 1995b, 48.

anachronistic or inaccurate auxiliary assumptions that have characterized too many

55. Monroe 1995, 5.

60. See Adler 1997; and Ruggie, this issue.

66. Monroe 1995, 12-13.

or absent. Social constructivists have expanded attention to outcomes that appear to

72. See the cases in Katzenstein 1996c.

Reason and the Domain of International Politics

vor of constrained or bounded rationality. Models of linked domestic and interna-

75. For an important example of such a strategy, see Greif 1995.

———. 1993. Nationalism: An Instrumental Social Construction. Millennium: Journal of International

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OECD. Various years. Trade Statistics. Paris: OECD.

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