DP STATION KEEPING BULLETIN

IMCA DP Station Keeping Bulletin 01/19 February 2019

The following case studies and observations have been compiled from information received by IMCA during 2019. To
ensure anonymity all vessel, client and operational data has been removed from the narrative.
Vessel managers, DP operators and DP technical crew should consider if these case studies are relevant to their own vessel
DP operation so that they can be used to assess and assist the safe operation of the vessel.
Any queries regarding this bulletin should be directed to Andy Goldsmith (andy.goldsmith@imca-int.com), IMCA Technical
Adviser – Marine. Members and non-members alike are welcome to contact Andy if they have experienced DP events which
can be securely analysed and then shared anonymously with the DP industry.

Event 1: Loss of Tunnel Thruster – DP Undesired Event

DP Class 3, on DP in 4 DGNSS, 1 tautwire & Wind 6kts 261°,

4 generators online
200m water depth 5 thrusters online, 1 HPR online, 3 Gyros, 3 MRUs and current 0.5kts 031°,
2 on standby,
engaged in saturation 1 on standby 1 tautwire & 1 HPR on 3 wind sensors online wave height 0.6m,
bus tie open
diving operations standby visibility good

1506 Tunnel thruster 1510 Tunnel thruster

No. 1 tripped No. 1 restarted

Divers informed to
Verifying thruster
return to bell clump
performance
weight

1525 Thruster
1509 Both divers on
confirmed fully
clump weight
operational

1509 Engine room

informed the bridge
about the root cause

Comments from the report:

During diving operations in open water, tunnel thruster No. 1 tripped offline. Investigation showed that the cause
was due to tripping of the thruster hydraulic pump because of voltage instability. The voltage instability was caused
by a spike load on an unrelated circuit breaker on the same switchboard which tripped. Because of the voltage
drop on starboard 690V switchboard during the event some of the equipment breakers opened on under voltage:
 Tunnel Thruster No. 1 due to power drop to hydraulic pump and signal command “External Shutdown” from
controller to frequency converter drive.
 Starboard ER fans.

The vessel maintained position throughout the event.

Considerations of the IMCA Marine DP Committee from the above event:
 This event highlights how unrelated equipment failure can have an effect on DP system equipment and
therefore the vessels redundancy concept and needs to be considered during failure analysis.
 It is assumed that redundancy was not compromised by the tripping of the tunnel thruster and therefore it was
not necessary to initiate a DP amber alert.
 It is not good practice to have 4 DGNSS selected to the DP controller, this could result in rejecting other selected
systems if the DGNSS were to drift due to a common satellite problem.
 The root cause should have been identified and isolated from the 690v switchboard before the thruster was re-
enabled.
Event 2: Specialised Pipe Laying DP Mode – DP Undesired Event

DP Class 2, on DP in Wind 12kts 085°,

4 generators online,
1400m water depth 8 thrusters online, 3 Gyros, 3 MRUs & current 1.8kts 156°,
2 on standby, 4 DGNSS online
engaged in pipelaying nil on standby 3 wind sensors online wave height 0.5m,
bus tie open
operations visibility good

Vessel in auto track

mode conducting final
Operator pressed stop
moves in preparation
on track
for cutting and welding
pipe

Thrusters remained on
A series of 10m moves high load, low speed
were made in ‘Move was selected and stop
up mode’ on track request
confirmed

During one of these Mode changed to auto

moves the thrusters position and vessel
ramped up stabilised

Position setpoint
changed 140m and
heading setpoint
changed dramatically

Comments from the report:

When the vessel was confirmed stopped and on the setpoint, the operator checked the auto track setting to find
the cause of the track change. Upon checking, it was verified that the 'waypoint for radius turn' had changed to
'operator' a pre-set value of 200m; the vessel standard setting is 'waypoint table'. The operator reselected
‘waypoint table' and the previous barge track was displayed.
During investigation, the vessel crew were able to recreate the failure. Since the incident occurred the log files have
been forwarded to the DP system manufacturer for review. The conclusion is that the issue is specific to move-up
mode.
Initiating event
The position setpoint changed dramatically to about 140m, heading setpoint also changed to 14 degrees and
thrusters started ramping up. This was due to a dramatic change of barge track
Main cause
The barge track changed from a waypoint table selected radius of 1828m to 'Operator' selected of 200m.
Considerations of the IMCA Marine DP Committee from the above event:
It appears the DP system manufacturer responded well to this event.
The selection of “operator specified turn radius” (radio button selection) should be inhibited and “greyed out” when
vessel is in a turn while move-up sub mode is active. This inhibit function was not activated when the dialog box
was opened again after the “auto – turn – move up” function had been activated. Four conditions have to be aligned
for this to happen. The “move-up” mode was introduced in 2002 and this is the first time this was reported to the
original equipment manufacturer. So, the MTBF is 15-years but of course the consequence could be damage to the
pipe. A software modification has been made, installed and tested on this specific vessel. The global customer
support team have a process in place to go through all software releases which have this function and update the
vessels that are affected during next service visit.
Event 3: Planned Investigation Resulted in DP Incident

DP Class 3, on DP in Wind 46kts 251°,

3 generators online
2051m water depth 6 thrusters online, 2 DGNSS & 3 Gyros, 3 MRUs & current 3.9kts 217°,
3 on standby,
engaged in drilling nil on standby 2 HPR online 4 wind sensors online wave height 6m,
bus tie open
operations visibility good

There was a requirement to Power restored to the At 35m from initial

investigate a faulty AVR which starboard switchboard, position control of
was causing an overvoltage on standby generator thrusters restored,
the switchboard online joystick control

A planned controlled
All thrusters
shutdown of the Total excursion
operational DP status
starboard switchboard approximately 100m
returned to green
was initiated

Technical team
DP status changed continue reinstating
Vessel on location
from advisory to breakers resulting from
on DP
yellow initial switchboard
blackout

Test confirmed vessel Thruster network lost,

could hold position thrusters remain
with power via the running but no
port & centre communication to DP
switchboard only system

Drilling operations
Vessel drifting
ceased

Comments from the report:

An AVR problem in diesel generator No. 1 engine caused an over voltage in the system. Due to increased voltage,
the standby machine could not be brought online, and the switchboard required a controlled blackout. After this,
many alarms from Network B were observed due to the supply being interrupted. An hour later, there was a total
loss of network communication affecting many field stations together with loss of DP communication to all
thrusters, which caused the vessel to drift off. The probable cause was accidentally resetting network A, when
trouble shooting of network B was taking place.
Further investigation of the overvoltage issue found a 3-phase breaker was faulty to engine No.1; the breaker was
replaced by an onboard spare. The DP system manufacturer concluded that the vessel was operational as designed,
indicating a possible human mistake by rebooting network A.

Considerations of the IMCA Marine DP Committee from the above event:

The vessel instigated a DP yellow alert whilst a fault was investigated. Considering the weather conditions and
nature of investigation the vessel should have either abandoned operations or been fully prepared to do so.

Given the circumstances, it is evident the vessel returned to normal operations too quickly and whilst reinstatement
of the system was still in progress. The root cause of the incident was not given in the report, but it is evident that
work involving the resetting of the network caused the loss of DP communication with the thrusters and subsequent
position excursion. While total network failure and subsequent drift off represents a DP incident, the initial failure
of the AVR only represents an undesired event.
Event 4: Loss of One Redundant Group – DP Undesired Event

DP Class 3, on DP in 3 generators online, Wind 10kts 220°,

1593m water depth 5 thrusters online, nil 3 on standby, bus tie 2 DGNSS & 3 Gyros, 3 MRUs and current 1.3kts 215°,
engaged in drilling on standby open – 3 redundant 2 HPR online 4 wind sensors online wave height 1.5m,
operations groups visibility good

11:03:57 – High
winding temperature 11:04:23 – ME No. 1
alarm No. 2 centre centre start requested
generator

11:04:22 – High 11:04:39 – ME No. 1

winding temperature centre main breaker
alarm No. 2 centre closed as part of
generator blackout recovery

11:04:23 – Main engine 11:05:24 – Thruster

(ME) No. 2 centre no. 3 & 6 running and
shutdown ready for DP

Thruster No. 3 & 6

stopped

Comments from the report:

A partial blackout of the centre high voltage (HV) switchboard at 11.04am caused by No. 2 generator. This caused
the loss of the 440V distribution board and thrusters No. 3 & 6. The centre generator No. 1 started and connected
onto the switchboard, there was no loss of power to the drill floor as this is fed from both port and starboard HV
switchboards. The power management system worked as expected, investigation found a poor connection to the
temperature sensor of No. 2 generator causing the temperature fluctuation.

There was no loss of position.

Considerations of the IMCA Marine DP Committee from the above event:

 With the loss of one redundant group DP amber alert should have been activated.
 The system reacted well to the loss of the centre switchboard however it was felt worthwhile to highlight the
configuration in this case. The vessel was operating with one generator on each of the three switchboards.
Therefore, it was accepted that if one generator failed then one redundant group would be lost.
 It is important that DP personnel are fully aware of the situation and recognise that there could be a degree of
risk as the switchboard is brought back on line.