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OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 23/6/2018, SPi
Socially Extended
Epistemology
J. Adam Carter, Andy Clark, Jesper Kallestrup,
S. Orestis Palermos, and Duncan Pritchard
1
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 23/6/2018, SPi
3
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OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 23/6/2018, SPi
Contents
Introduction 1
J. Adam Carter, Andy Clark, Jesper Kallestrup, S. Orestis Palermos,
and Duncan Pritchard
vi
Index 307
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 23/6/2018, SPi
List of Contributors
Introduction
J. Adam Carter, Andy Clark, Jesper Kallestrup,
S. Orestis Palermos, and Duncan Pritchard
Between 2013 and 2016, Edinburgh’s Eidyn research centre hosted the AHRC-funded
Extended Knowledge (AH/J011908/1) project (http://www.extended-knowledge.ppls.
ed.ac.uk/). The papers presented in this volume are the direct or indirect products of
workshops, conferences, and impact events held at the University of Edinburgh under
that umbrella. The project’s main team consisted of the present editors, but the project
itself comprised an international, interdisciplinary network spanning epistemology,
philosophy of mind, cognitive science, cognitive and social psychology, computer
science, Web science, and cybernetics. The goal was to provide, for the first time, a
systematic exploration of the various ways of “externalizing” knowledge.
Our focus was on two paradigmatic ways in which knowledge can be thought to be
“extended.” The first was to approach knowledge as a form of extended cognition.
The second was to conceive of knowledge as a form of distributed cognition. In both
cases, the result is a form of extended knowledge, where what is unique to the latter is
that the extension in question is distinctively social.
Extended and distributed approaches to cognition, fall under the general philo-
sophical trend of active externalism (Clark and Chalmers 1998; Clark 2007; Menary
2007; Rowlands 1999, 2004; Hutchins 1996). Active externalism holds that, under the
appropriate conditions, cognitive processes such as perception and memory as well
as mental states such as beliefs, desires and emotions can be constitutively realized by
elements that lie beyond the organismic shell. Typical examples include laptops,
smartphones, tablets, Filofaxes, lifelog applications, sensory substitution systems, or
even Transactive Memory Systems (where groups of two or more individuals col-
laboratively store, encode, and retrieve information (Wegner 1986; Wegner et al.
1985; Wegner et al. 1991; Sutton 2008; Sutton et al. 2010)). It should be noted that
active externalism is a hotly debated topic within philosophy of mind and cognitive
science. Nevertheless, it has successfully withstood criticism, generating significant
insights both within and outside academic philosophy. Currently, it is being increas-
ingly adopted by several related disciplines such as cognitive psychology, anthropol-
ogy, and computer science.
The idea of extended knowledge invites numerous philosophical questions. What
types of devices can count as proper extensions of agents’ epistemic abilities? How
can the extended knowledge approach to epistemology guide the design of such
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 23/6/2018, SPi
beliefs of their individual members (List and Pettit 2002, 2004, 2006, 2011; List 2005,
2008, 2011; Goldman 2014).
Socially Extended Epistemology attempts to further our understanding of socially
extended knowledge while also exploring its potential practical and societal impact by
inviting perspectives not just from philosophy but from cognitive science, computer
science, Web science, and cybernetics too. Contributions to the volume mostly fall
within two broad categories: (i) foundational issues within socially extended epistem-
ology (including elaborations on, defences, and criticisms of core aspects of socially
extended epistemology), and (ii) applications and new directions, where themes in
socially extended epistemology are connected to these other areas of research. The
volume is accordingly divided into two parts corresponding to these broad categories.
In the first part’s opening chapter, “How Far can Extended Knowledge be
Extended?: The Asymmetry between Research Teams and Artifacts,” Brad Wray
explores a potential problem that distributed cognition may pose for virtue epistem-
ology. By focusing on knowledge produced by scientific research teams, Wray targets
Pritchard’s (2010, 2017) groundbreaking virtue reliabilist account of extended know-
ledge. According to Pritchard, in order for an agent to know a proposition p, (i) her
cognitive success of believing the truth with regards to p must be attributable to her
cognitive abilities and (ii) she must take responsibility for p. Wray argues, however,
that theoretical considerations as well as certain cases within contemporary scientific
practice jointly demonstrate that collaboratively produced beliefs cannot satisfy both
of the above conditions on knowledge.
In “Outsourcing Concepts: Deference, the Extended Mind, and Expanding our
Epistemic Capacity,” Cathal O’Madagain employs the extended mind hypothesis in
order to explain how and why the meaning of some concepts is fixed by the minds of
others. O’Madagain argues that if we rethink this form of “semantic deference” in
terms of the extended mind hypothesis, we can answer both of the above questions: the
minds of others can be understood to play a role in storing the semantic knowledge
underpinning our concepts without undermining their functionality, and this “out-
sourcing” of semantic knowledge greatly expands our overall knowledge-bearing
capacity, both at the level of the individual and the community.
In “Representations and Robustly Collective Attitudes,” Jeroen de Ridder defends
the existence of robustly collective cognitive states against an argument that calls into
question the existence of collective representations, that is, representations held by
groups rather than individuals. De Ridder examines the argument that beliefs require
the existence of representations, so without collective representations there can be no
collective beliefs. In response, de Ridder argues that it is controversial whether belief
requires representation. But even if it does, he further notes, the above argument can
be resisted. This is because the extended and distributed cognition hypotheses can
provide a promising account of collective representations.
In their contribution, “Mind Outside Brain: A Radically Non-Dualist Foundation for
Distributed Cognition,” Francis Heylighen and Shima Beigi deny that cognition is
always centered around organismic agents. Usually, active externalists hold that cogni-
tion can extend beyond individual brains to the artefacts agents interact with, or that,
under the appropriate conditions, it can be distributed between several interacting
individuals at the same time. While such theories deny that cognition is restricted to
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 23/6/2018, SPi
because emotions are often taken to track evaluative properties. An impactful way for
exploring these kinds of risk-related emotions is through works of art about risky
technologies, which are useful in making abstract problems more concrete, letting us
broaden narrow personal perspectives, exploring new scenarios, going beyond
boundaries, and challenging our imagination. In this sense, Roeser argues, emotions
as well as works of art can contribute to socially extended knowledge concerning
ethical aspects of risk.
In “Thinking Together about Genocide: Socially Shared Cognition in Context,”
Holly Arrow and Alexander Garinther explore one of the primary examples of
distributed cognition within the literature, namely the phenomenon of collective
memory. The mutual influences between members of dyads, small groups, as well as
larger collectives many times allows people to “think together.” This is a social
phenomenon that allows group members to share attention and intentions, collect-
ively construct and validate meaning, and collaboratively develop and adjust distrib-
uted networks of learning, memory, and forgetting. Arrow and Garinther review the
psychological literature on socially shared and situated cognition and explore its
applications to the shared and unshared memories of survivors and killers in post-
genocide Rwanda.
In “Collective Amnesia and Epistemic Injustice,” Alessandra Tanesini also focuses
on collective memory by bringing together studies from epistemology, philosophy of
mind, and social psychology. Tanesini’s aim is to put forward an account of shared
memories as both a form of environmentally scaffolded cognition (e.g., on the basis
of memorials) and as socially scaffolded cognition (e.g., on the basis of social
interactions). Further, she argues that the same environmental and social scaffolds
that can enhance collective memories can also be manipulated to enhance collective
amnesia. Promoting collective amnesia in this way is a form of cognitive achievement
that can cause a form of epistemic injustice. Specifically, collective amnesia regarding
shared memories undermines the ability of some individual members who were
relying on these memories to assess their own reliability or self-trust (i.e., their
cognitive and affective stance toward their own cognitive capacities).
In their contribution, “The ‘Ontological Complicity’ of Habitus and Field: Bourdieu
as an Externalist,” Nikolaus Fogle and Georg Theiner approach the work of the
French sociologist, Pierre Bourdieu, from the point of view of embodied, extended,
and distributed cognition. They argue that the concepts that form Bourdieu’s central
dyad, habitus and field, are remarkably consonant with externalist views. Habitus is a
form of knowledge that is not only embodied but fundamentally environment-
dependent, and field is a distributed network of cognitively active positions that
serves not only as a repository of social knowledge, but also as an external template
for individual schemes of perception and action. The aim of Fogle and Theiner’s
comparative analysis is not to merely show that Bourdieu’s concepts are compatible
with cognitive and epistemological externalism, however. They further demonstrate
that the resources of Bourdieu’s theoretical framework can prove particularly useful
for developing externalist accounts of culture and society—two areas that are signifi-
cantly underexplored within mainstream debates in analytic philosophy.
In “Mandevillian Intelligence: From Individual Vice to Collective Virtue,” Paul
Smart explores collective knowledge from the point of view of “Mandevillian
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 23/6/2018, SPi
Intelligence.” It is commonly supposed that the best way to increase the epistemic
properties of a collective is to increase the epistemic properties of its members. Smart
introduces the concept of Mandevillian intelligence in order to call this intuition into
question. Mandevillian intelligence refers to a specific form of collective intelligence in
which individual-level cognitive and epistemic vices, such as limitations in attentional
capacity, cognitive shortcomings (e.g., forgetting) and cognitive biases (e.g., confirm-
ation bias), are seen to be causally relevant to the expression of intelligent behaviour at
the collective level.
Finally, in “Solving the Frame Problem Socially,” Harry Halpin approaches the
practical applications of socially extended knowledge by focusing on a classical
problem from artificial intelligence known as the ‘Frame Problem’: How can any
knowledge representation system model a changing world in order to make decisions
on the basis of what is contextually relevant while ignoring all else? On the Internet,
this version of the frame problem is currently being solved socially by relying on the
collective behavior of other agents to select what parts of the world are relevant. This
social solution to the technical problem of knowledge representation depends on
virtuous cycles of searching for content on the Web using search engines, collabora-
tive tagging systems, and social media. In this way, Halpin shows, knowledge is co-
created socially with other agents by virtue of an Internet-enabled technological
scaffolding. On this basis it is possible to argue that the locus of cognitive ability is
not a lone individual, but a supra-individual subject.
We believe that our project, enhanced by the outstanding contributions of our
international network, has helped position the topics of technologically and socially
extended knowledge at the leading edge of contemporary philosophical enquiry. The
topics themselves are of great conceptual interest, and wider interdisciplinary per-
spectives suggest many connections with social concerns and policy-making. All this
invites us to take both our socio-epistemic networks and our best present and future
technologies very seriously indeed, as they will increasingly help constitute who and
what we are.
References
Barnier, A. J., Sutton, J., Harris, C. B., and Wilson, R. A. (2008). “A conceptual and empirical
framework for the social distribution of cognition: The case of memory.” Cognitive Systems
Research, 9(1–2), 33–51. doi:10.1016/j.cogsys.2007.07.002.
Carter, J. A. (2015). “Group Knowledge and Epistemic Defeat.” Ergo, 2(28), 711–35.
Carter, J. A., and Czarnecki, B. (2016). “Extended Knowledge-How.” Erkenntnis, 81(2),
259–73.
Carter, J. A., Kallestrup, J., Palermos, S. O., and Pritchard, D. (2014). “Varieties of External-
ism.” Philosophical Issues. A Supplement to Nous, 24(1), 63–109.
Carter, J. A., Kallestrup, J., Palermos, S. O., and Pritchard, D. (2014). “Extended Knowledge.”
Philosophical Issues, 42(1), 1–482.
Carter, J. A., Clark, A., Kallestrup, J., Palermos, S. O., and Pritchard, D. H. (2016). Special issue
of American Philosophical Quarterly, “Varieties of Externalism: Epistemic, Content,
Vehicle.” American Philosophical Quarterly, 53(2).
Carter, J. A., and Palermos, S. O. (2014). “Active Externalism and Epistemic Internalism.”
Erkenntnis, 80(4), 753–72. doi:10.1007/s10670-014-9670-5.
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The Project Gutenberg eBook of Voyages to
the Moon and the Sun
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States and most other parts of the world at no cost and with
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eBook.
Language: English
By CYRANO DE BERGERAC
Translated by
RICHARD ALDINGTON
LONDON
GEORGE ROUTLEDGE & SONS LTD.
NEW YORK: E. P. DUTTON & CO.
Broadway Translations
"Age cannot wither her, nor custom stale
Her infinite variety."
À Frédéric Lachèvre
Appendices
Extracts from Godwin, D'Urfey, and Swift
Bibliography
Genealogy
Coat of Arms
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
Portrait of Cyrano
Signature of Cyrano
Title-page to Lovell's Translation
Cyrano's First Attempt
Frontispiece to Lovell's Translation
Cyrano's Flight to the Sun
The Parliament of Birds
Gonzales' Voyage to the Moon
Cyrano's Coat of Arms
CYRANO DE BERGERAC
I
THE LEGEND OF CYRANO
The legend of Cyrano de Bergerac began, one might say, during his
life; but it was strongly founded by his friend Henry Le Bret who
edited The Voyage to the Moon with an introduction, in 1657, two
years after Cyrano's death. The 'Préface' of Le Bret is one of the
chief sources of information about Cyrano. It is no discredit to Le
Bret that he drew as favourable a portrait of his friend as he could,
but we cannot accept literally everything he says and we are forced
to read between the lines of his panegyric. Le Bret is largely
responsible for the moral legend of Cyrano. He says:
"In fine, Reader, he always passed for a man of singular rare wit; to
which he added such good fortune on the side of the senses that he
always controlled them as he willed; in so much that he rarely drank
wine because (said he) excess of drink brutalizes, and as much care
is needed with it as with arsenic (with this he was wont to compare
it) for everything is to be feared from this poison, whatever care is
used; even if nothing were to be dreaded but what the vulgar call
qui pro quo, which makes it always dangerous. He was no less
moderate in his eating, from which he banished ragoûts as much as
he could in the belief that the simplest and least complicated living is
the best; which he supported by the example of modern men, who
live so short a time compared with those of the earliest ages, who
appear to have lived so long because of the simplicity of their food.
"He added to these two qualities so great a restraint towards the fair
sex that it may be said he never departed from the respect owed it
by ours; and with all this he had so great an aversion from self-
interest that he could never imagine what it was to possess private
property, his own belonging less to him than to such of his
acquaintance as needed it. And so Heaven, which is not unmindful,
willed that among the large number of friends he had during his life
some should love him until death and a few even beyond death."[1]
It will be seen later that many of these virtues were probably
necessities arising from an unheroic cause; but this moral character
given by Le Bret was very useful to the 19th-century builders of the
Cyrano legend.
Other 17th-century writers give a very different impression of Cyrano
de Bergerac: where Le Bret saw a noble, almost austere genius, they
went to the opposite extreme and saw a madman. An anecdote in
the Historiettes of Tallemant des Réaux gives us another Cyrano:
"A madman named Cyrano wrote a play called The Death of
Agrippina where Sejanus says horrible things against the Gods. The
play was pure balderdash (un vray galimathias).[2] Sercy, who
published it, told Boisrobert that he sold out the edition in a
twinkling. 'You surprise me', said Boisrobert. 'Ah, Monsieur', replied
the bookseller, 'it has such splendid impieties'."[3]
The implication that the success of the play was due to its
"impieties" is repeated in an anecdote of the Menagiana quoted by
Lacroix, to the following effect: When the pious people heard there
were impieties in The Death of Agrippina, they went prepared to hiss
it; they passed over in silence all the tirades against the Gods which
had caused the rumour, but when Sejanus said:
"Frappons, voilà l'hostie",[4]
they interrupted the actor with whistling, booing and shouts of:
"Ah! the rascal! Ah! The atheist! Hear how he speaks of the holy
sacrament!"
I cannot find this anecdote in my own copy of the Menagiana, but
since my edition is 1693 and Lacroix quotes that of 1715, I presume
his is an addition. In my edition I find another anecdote of Cyrano
which I give here both for its rarity and because it shows 17th-
century contempt for Cyrano at its most virulent:
"What wretched works are those of Cyrano de Bergerac! He studied
at the Collège de Beauvais in the time of Principal Grangier. They say
he was still in his 'rhetoric' when he wrote The Pedant Outwitted
against his head-master. There are a few passable things in this play
but all the rest is very flat. When he wrote his Voyage to the Moon I
think he had one quarter of the moon in his head. The first public
sign he gave of his madness was to go to mass in the morning in
trunk hose and a night cap without his doublet. He had not one sou
when he fell ill of the disease from which he died and if M. de
Sainte-Marthe had not charitably supplied all his necessities he
would have died in the poor-house."[5]
More 17th-century anecdotes of Cyrano will be found in the Life;
those cited will at least show the early tendency to attach anecdotes
to him and the curious conflict of contemporary opinion. During the
second half of the 17th century Cyrano remained popular and his
works were frequently reprinted. The 18th century saw a great
decline in reputation and in editions; Voltaire repeated the
accusation: "A madman!" No edition of Cyrano's works appeared in
Paris between 1699 and 1855: the last of them before the revival of
the 19th century was the Amsterdam edition of 1761. For a century
there was no edition of Cyrano. He dropped out of sight almost
entirely; but in the 19th century he was destined to be revived as an
increasingly legendary figure, culminating in the heroic apotheosis of
Rostand's Cyrano de Bergerac.
Strangely enough the revival began in England in 1820 with an
article in the Retrospective Review.[6] This article shows some
acquaintance with Cyrano's originals as well as with the translation
reviewed. The anonymous writer says:
"Cyrano de Bergerac is a marvellously strange writer—his character,
too, was out of the common way. His chief passion appears to have
been duelling; and, from the numerous affairs of honour in which he
was concerned in a very short life and the bravery he displayed on
those occasions, he acquired the cognomen of 'The Intrepid'. His
friend Le Bret says he was engaged in no less than one hundred
duels for his friends, and not one on his own account. Others
however say, that, happening to have a nose somewhat awry,
whoever was so unfortunate or so rash as to laugh at it, was sure to
be called upon to answer its intrepid owner in the field. But however
this may be, it is indisputable that Cyrano was a distinguished
monomachist and a most eccentric writer."[7]
Seventeen years later that amiable man of letters, Charles Nodier,
resuscitated Cyrano in his Bonaventure Desperiers et Cyrano de
Bergerac. Before this Nodier had incidentally defended Cyrano in his
Bibliographie des Fous:
"As to this book (The Voyage to the Moon), which he wrote when he
was already mad (according to Voltaire), would you not be
astonished if you were told that it contained more profound
perceptions, more ingenious foresight, more anticipations in that
science whose confused elements Descartes scarcely sorted out,
than the large volume written by Voltaire under the supervision of
the Marquis du Châtelet? Cyrano used his genius like a hot-head, but
there is nothing in it which resembles a madman."[8]
Nodier is responsible for that portion of the Cyrano legend which
makes him an innovator, plagiarized from, and persecuted to an
early grave.
"It seems that a man who opened up so many paths to talent and
who went so far in all the paths he opened, ought to have left a
name in any literature....
"There was once a wooden horse which bore in its flanks all the
conquerors of Ilion, yet had no part in the triumph. This begins like
a fairy-tale ... and yet it is true.
"Poor wooden horse! Poor Cyrano!"[9]
But, if Charles Nodier carried on the legend, he did little more than
open the way for Theophile Gautier, whose famous Grotesque is
filled with every conceivable error of fact and yet is obviously one of
Rostand's chief sources. Les Grotesques appeared in 1844 and
contained ten pseudo-biographical sketches of "romantic"
personalities in French literature chiefly of the 17th century. The
book itself is an interesting by-product of the romantic movement,
but here we are only concerned with the sixth sketch, Cyrano de
Bergerac. This opens with a fantastic divagation upon noses,
perhaps the most exaggerated development of the legendary
Cyranesque appendage. If the reader will examine Cyrano's
portraits, without prejudice and with particular attention to the nose,
he will scarcely be prepared for this outburst:
"This incredible nose is settled in a three-quarter face [portrait], the
smaller side of which it covers entirely; it forms in the middle a
mountain which in my opinion must be the highest mountain in the
world after the Himalayas; then it descends rapidly towards the
mouth, which it largely obumbrates, like a tapir's snout or the
rostrum of a bird of prey; at the extremity it is divided by a line very
similar to, though more pronounced than, the furrow which cuts the
cherry lip of Anne of Austria, the white queen with the long ivory
hands. This makes two distinct noses in one face, which is more
than custom allows, ... the portraits of Saint Vincent de Paul and the
deacon Paris will show you the best characterized types of this sort
of structure; but Cyrano's nose is less doughy, less puffy in contour;
it has more bones and cartilage, more flats and high-lights, it is
more heroic."
Cyrano de Bergerac.
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