A Plan For No Spam
A Plan For No Spam
INTRODUCTION
Unwanted and irrelevant mass mailings, commonly known as spam are becoming a serious nuisance that if left unchecked may soon be regarded as a Denial of Service Attack against the email infrastructure of the Internet itself. The term spam is derived from a Monty python sketch set in a cafeteria in which the principal protagonists have difficulty making them heard about a group of Vikings singing. "SPAM" in honor of the meat product manufactured by Hormel.
TOWARDS SOLUTIONS
There are many types of spam and it is likely therefore that any realistic program to eliminate spam will have to address the problem in multiple ways. In particular we should not reject a mechanism out of hand simply because it fails to deal with a particular type of spam sender .For example it is highly unlikely that spam senders engaged in organized crime will respect Opt-Out lists or Legislative approaches. We should not however, we conclude from the fact that a mechanism fails in certain circumstances that it fails completely in all circumstances. The only mechanisms that rule out of hand are those based on vigilante actions that attempt to gain compliance by coercion.
BEST PRACTICES
The traditional response of the internet to problem uses administrators of deployed protocols is to specify some form of 'Best Practices'. Spam is an attack on the Internet community. The short survey and prosecutions by the FTC and others show that the spam senders are in many cases outright criminals, how then can best practices help? One area in which best practices can provide concrete benefit is in ensuring that the vast majority of Internet users who are acting in good faith do not inadvertently make the problem worse by poorly chosen or poorly coordinated mitigation strategies. Many of the problems being caused by irresponsible blacklists could be addressed through common agreement on best practices for blacklists setting out criteria for issues such as notice to the listed parties, appeals processes and the acceptability of 'collateral damage'. Best practices can also provide backing for legislative approaches. An appropriate statement by an authoritative body can help a court to decide that a particular form of behavior is unacceptable, even if such statements do not have the endorsement of a legislative body they can quickly acquire the force of law when the worst malefactors are being dealt with.
Pull Vs Push
One of the major problems caused by spam is positive identification as spam of legitimate emails. This is a particular problem with commercial mailing lists and newsletter messages requested by the recipient which frequently carry advertising and make use of content that is likely to be flagged by content inspection filters as spam. While some have argued that the commercial nature of these emails means that this type of false positive is unimportant it seems odd to consider the loss of messages specifically requested by the user to be less important than the loss of unsolicited personal emails. The core problem with these messages is that although the sender and the recipient know that the user has consented to receive the messages, there is no way for that consent to be communicated to the mail infrastructure that transports the message. One possible solution to this problem would be to add some form of authentication mechanism that communicated the recipient's consent to the mail infrastructure .This is unlikely to prove practical in deployment however since any benefits would require changes to all parts of the email infrastructure-clients, originating servers and receiving server. Another option would be to distribute this form of content using the pull model of the Web [HTTP] and NNTP [NNTP] rather than the push model of the email. In the pull model, no content is sent until the client specifically requests it. Consent is thus implicit in the pull request since the client will not request content unless directed by the user. For the pull model to become practical a number of difficulties must be overcome. The most important of these being obtaining a commitment from the major software client to supporting the protocol to the commonly used email clients. A mechanism is also required that tells the client where the updates will be available from, the expected frequency of those updates, the format etc. The Really Simple Syndication (RSS)
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Protocol [RSS] appears to have these properties, although it is currently being applied in a different way.
Accountability
One of the major difficulties faced with distinguishing legitimate bulk senders from illegitimate ones is the difficulty of determining whether the claims made that the bulk sender observes a particular set of best practices is true or not. This problem also faces the bulk senders themselves. At present there is no way that a outsourced provider of bulk mail services can tell if the email addresses on a list a customer wants used for a mailing have intact Opted-In as is claimed. Technical mechanisms are required that enable this form of accountability to be achieved.
CONTENT INSPECTION
Aspirin will not cure a cold but it will relieve the symptoms and make the cold more tolerable. Content inspection has a similar effect on spam. The symptoms of spam are relieved to a considerable degree, but the patient is still under attack from the infection.
Content inspection is a form of spam filtering that uses the content of the messages as the basis for the decision to filter. One of the principal difficulties with content inspection mechanism is the ease of evasion by the spam senders. If the spam sender knows the criteria applied by the Content inspection technique, then they can construct their messages so that they are not caught. There are many forms of Content inspection, each of which has advantages and disadvantages.
considerably easier. In many cases the character set in which the email is sent may be used as a proxy for language, although this technique can result in false positives as a Japanese user may send all his messages in a Japanese character set, using the ASCII subset for messages in English. Another problem with language inspection is that a large software vendors would face a considerable problem from foreign users of their product if they introduced language sensitive filters in their products.
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conceal their identity. This causes increase in costs of spam senders & reducing overall profit of the spam sender enterprise.
Authentication
Authentication techniques are broadly divided into two types, Network based and Crypto graphically based.
Network based
If a mail server knows the set of all possible IP addresses from which an email with a particular sender address is known the IP addresses may be used to provide a light weight means of authenticating the email sender. This mechanism is not completely reliable since an IP address is a valid source for a particular sender address. Some mail servers use the reverse DNS, which maps IP addresses to domain names for this purpose. This approach only works if the email is sent via a mail relay that is configured with reverse DNS entries for the domain of the sender address.
An SMTP message carries information that describes the path it has taken from one mail server to another.
A mail service may use the In-Reply-To and References headers to identify messages that are replies to messages that originated at that service. Construction of the original message identifiers using a secret key and Message Authentication
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code allows this to be archived without the need to maintain a list of all message identifiers issued by the service. Callback loop, Challenge/Response: When an email is received a message requesting confirmation is sent to the purported sender address. If the confirmation message is received the sender address is considered to be authentic. The callback loop mechanism is unusual in that is an active authentication mechanism that is applied at the request of the receiver rather than being applied passively to every message by the sender.
Cryptographic SSL
An extension to the SMTP protocol allows the use of the Secure Socket Layer via the START TLS operations allows authentication of both the sending and receiving email servers using X.509 digital certificates. Although SSL allows the email relay to use any IP address without the need for configuration of a reverse DNS address the sender must send their outgoing mail.
Cryptographic S/MIME
S/MIME provides end to end authentication of the sender address and message body. The sender need not send their message through any specific email relay.
Authentication Policy
For passive authentication mechanism to be useful as a means of detecting forged sender address it is necessary to know whether a purported sender has a policy of using authentication. Otherwise the recipient is unable to distinguish a message from a user does not use the authentication mechanism from a forged
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message purporting to come from a user who always uses an authentication mechanism. The Internet architecture does not include a mechanism designed for the purpose of communicating security policies. Fortunately the DNS architecture provides the necessary functionality and may be readily adapted to the purpose without putting an undue load on the DNS. The Security Policy Advisory Mechanism provides a set of DNS extensions that address this need. The principal disadvantage of using the DNS as a means of communicating security policies is that the DNS itself is insecure. Fortunately the security weakness of the DNS do not lend themselves to exploitation on the scale necessary to make exploitation of these weakness a viable means of defeating an authentication based anti-spam measure.
Revocable Credentials
Cryptographic authentication schemes such as S/MIME or SSL use X.509 digital certificates as credentials.
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Spam Litigation
Spam has spawned two types of litigation, cases caused by ISPs & individuals who object to the use of their resources to send spam and cases caused by spam senders to prevent ISPs from cutting off their resources when they violate terms of use.
Anti-spam Legislation
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In May 2002 the European Union issued a directive that directs member nations to introduce Legislation that prohibits sending of unsolicited marketing messages unless the recipients 'Opt-in'. A number of anti-spam measures have been proposed in the US congress that seeks to regulate spam by requiring spam senders to respect 'Opt-Out' requests and prohibiting the use of forged sender addresses. Most proposals are based on existing legislation concerning junk faxes and telemarketing calls that have already been tested with constitutional challenges. The chief objection to the 'Opt-Out' measures is that a recipient of a spam has no way to know the origin of a spam. It is therefore impossible for a spam recipient to know if the Opt-Out requests are being respected or not. While email spam senders have negligible support in Congress, the Direct Mail Association (DMA) that represents centers of junk mail and telemarketers has demonstrated a considerable degree of influence opposing opt-in requirements to protect privacy. The spam senders compete with the DMA members and so the DMA is opposed to spam but will oppose any measure requiring opt-in which might set a precedent that may later be applied to its members. One possible resolution of this problem would be to require spam senders to respect a one way encrypted opt-out list of the type described earlier. Such a list would meet the need for verification without threatening the interest of DMA and its members.
Pro-Spam Legislation
Not all the anti-spam legislation being proposed is intended to solve the problem of spam. Some of the 'anti-spam' proposals being raised in private are really 'pro-spam' legislation intended to solve problems for senders of spam. A common tactic used in the US to derail popular legislation is to introduce legislation at the federal level that proposes 'harmonization' of stateless that does
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so by pre-empting the existing state laws with weaker or sometimes completely ineffectual federal laws.
Another potential tactic is to attempt to force ISPs to accept all mail that does not meet some definition of spam. If that definition is sufficiently loosely worded, ISPs might become legally obliged to accept any email content, however objectionable provided only that it was sent from a member of a particular association. It is therefore important that any spam legislation be carefully evaluated on its merits and not merely its title.
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DEPLOYMENT
Content inspection based on approaches can be readily deployed but tends to loose their effectiveness as widespread adoption encourages spam senders to employ counter measures. Legislative approaches can increase the cost of spam senders by forcing them to employ costly counter measures such as moving offshore but are unlikely to eliminate spam together. Authentication based approaches provide a robust means of identifying messages that are not spam but are of limited utility unless widely adapted. This analysis suggests that content inspection, legislation and authentication are complementary approaches. Content inspection provides short-term mitigation of the effects of spam. Authentication provides a robust long-term solution. Legislation provides a means of slowing the rate of growth of spam so that the content inspection based approaches maintain their effectiveness long enough for the long-term authentication based solutions to be effective.
Previous sections have identified the need for mechanisms are that allow:Unsolicited call back request to be identified and suppressed.
Mail servers to communicate the results of server based authentication and filtering procedures to mail clients.
Mail clients to cause mail servers to apply filtering at the server Mail clients to disable server based filtering
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Authentication mechanisms
A means of advertising authentication policy through the DNS A lightweight authentication mechanism that can be deployed with minimal overhead Definition of a standard call back mechanism that allows a mail client to automatically detect call back loop requests that were initiated by the client and those that result from a message sent with a forged header
Mechanisms identifying messages sent through a mailing list and the means by which the subscription can be cancelled.
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Mechanism that allows a mail server to determine that an email user solicited a message from a particular mailing list or other bulk sender
Authenticated subscription management mechanism Mechanism for communicating the authenticated mailing list subscription mechanisms to email clients.
Mechanisms for identifying automatically generated messages that should not be replied to under any circumstances.
Means of determining that an email client confirms to a consistent means of implementing the above
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AUTHENTICATION PROCESSOR
The mail server performs the authentication procedures that are available to it, including verification of I P address, use of authenticated SSL and S/MIME authentication on the message itself.
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AUTHORIZATION PROCESSOR
The authorization processor checks to see if the sender of the message is on the local white list of approved senders. If so the message is accepted, otherwise the message is passed to the content inspection module.
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CONCLUSION
There are many techniques that address a part of the spam problem. No currently known technique provides a complete solution and it is unlikely that address a part of the problem. No currently known technique provides a complete solution and it is unlikely that any technique will be found in the future that provides a complete and costless solution. Even so, there are many techniques that in combination can provide an effective strategy for addressing the spam problem. Do not send lists, protected using one-way encryption provide an objective definition of a spam message. Legislative initiatives provide a means of increasing the costs of the spam senders and reducing the profitability of their enterprise. Content inspection provides a means of identifying undesirable messages that can be deployed with immediate advantage to the user. Authentication provides a means of identifying desirable messages that allows the problem of false positives associated with content inspection to be reduced and with widespread deployment offers the possibility of a comprehensive solution. Authentication policy provides a means of knowing that a message that does not meet the Authentication policy specified by the domain name owner has been forged and should be discarded as spam. Callback loop authentication is acceptable as a last resort when a message has been identified as likely spam. it use as a first line of defense is not acceptable. Protocol improvements provide support for the content inspection and authentication mechanisms and should be pursued aggressively. Spam is a security problem. It is the lack of authentication and authorization in the email system that allows sit to be abused for any purpose spam is a community problem and it is the internet community as a whole that must find, implement and deploy solutions.
REFERENCES
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R. Fielding, J. Gettys, Mogul.H, Frystyk, L. Manister, P.Leach and T.Berners-Lee, Hypertext Transfer Protocol-HTTP 1.1.RFC 2616 http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2616.txt
Dave Winer, RSS 2.0 http://backend.userland.com/rss2 Postel. J,"Simple Mail Transfer Protocol",STD 10,RFC 821,ISI http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc821.txt
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION IDEAL SPAM CONTROL SYSTEM PROPERTIES TOWARDS SOLUTIONS BEST PRACTICES CONTENT INSPECTION AUTHENTICATION AND AUTHORIZATION LEGISLATION AND LITIGATION DEPLOYMENT COMPREHENSIVE EMAIL MANAGEMENT CONCLUSIONS REFERENCES 21
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ABSTRACT
The problem of unwanted and irrelevant mass mailings, commonly known as spam is starting to seriously degrade the usefulness of email. In this paper we provide a survey of the principal approaches currently being applied to spam control and propose a strategy by which these mechanisms may be combined to provide a comprehensive solution to the spam menace.
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
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